Supreme Court of India
MAHARANA PRATAP SINGHversusTHE STATE OF BIHAR & ORS
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 554
- Decided
- 23 April 2025
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- DIPANKAR DATTA
Holding
The Supreme Court held that due process was not followed, the dismissal was unjustified, and the disciplinary finding on charge 1 cannot stand in view of the appellant's criminal acquittal, leading to the setting aside of the Division Bench order and award of compensation.
Summary
Maharana Pratap Singh, a constable in the CID dog squad, was dismissed from service in 1996 following departmental proceedings that found him guilty of four charges, while he was later acquitted of the related criminal charges. The appellant challenged the dismissal, alleging denial of due process, vague charges, and the inability to cross‑examine a key witness, PW‑1. The Supreme Court examined whether the disciplinary inquiry complied with Rule 55 of the 1930 Civil Services Rules, whether the charges in the criminal case were substantially identical to those in the departmental case, and whether the High Court's Division Bench judgment should stand. The Court held that the departmental proceedings were fraught with procedural irregularities, the charges were vague, and the appellant was denied a fair opportunity to defend himself, especially given his criminal acquittal. Consequently, the Court set aside the Division Bench order, partially upheld the Single Judge’s findings, and awarded the appellant a lump‑sum compensation in lieu of reinstatement. The appeal was disposed of with costs awarded to the appellant.
Issues considered
- Whether due process was followed in dismissing the appellant from service and whether the dismissal was justified.
- Whether the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in the criminal proceedings are substantially identical to those in the departmental proceedings, rendering the disciplinary findings vulnerable.
- Whether the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court should be upheld.
- Whether the appellant is entitled to relief, including reinstatement or monetary compensation.
Legislation cited
- Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935s. Note 1 attached to Rule 2
- Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005
- Bihar Police Manual, 1978s. Rule 824A(e)
- Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930s. Rule 55
- Evidence Act, 1872s. 114(g)
- Indian Penal Code, 1860
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether due process was followed in dismissing the appellant from service and whether his dismissal from service is justified, on facts and in the circumstances; whether, in light of the facts, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances of the case, the charges in the identical to those in the departmental proceedings, such that an acquittal in the criminal case would render the findings in the disciplinary proceedings vulnerable. Headnotes† Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 – R.55 – Bihar and Orissa
Subjects
Departmental proceedingsDisciplinary proceedingsDismissal from serviceAcquittal in criminal proceedingsDepartmental file not submittedPrinciple of adverse inferenceDue processRight of cross-examinationIpse dixitProcedural lapsesSubstantially similar or identical chargesPrinciples of natural justicePrinciple of fairness
Judgment
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1662 : 2025 INSC 554
Maharana Pratap Singh
v.
The State of Bihar & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 5497 of 2025)
23 April 2025
[Dipankar Datta* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether due process was followed in dismissing the appellant
from service and whether his dismissal from service is justified,
on facts and in the circumstances; whether, in light of the facts,
evidence, witnesses, and circumstances of the case, the charges
in the criminal proceedings are substantially identical to those in
the departmental proceedings, such that an acquittal in the criminal
case would render the findings in the disciplinary proceedings
vulnerable.
Headnotes†
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1930 – R.55 – Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1935 – Note 1 attached to Rule 2 – Bihar
Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 2005 – Appellant was appointed as a constable in the
dog squad of CID – Disciplinary and criminal proceedings were
initiated against the appellant – In disciplinary proceedings,
inquiry officer found appellant guilty of all four charges –
Consequently, appellant was dismissed from service by memo
dated 21.06.1996 – Whereas, in the criminal proceeding, the
appellant was acquitted of the charges by the Appellate Court –
Aggrieved by dismissal from service, the appellant filed writ
petition – The Single Judge of the High Court quashed the
dismissal order dated 21.06.1996 – However, the Division
Bench of the High Court set aside the judgment of Single
Judge of the High Court and held that interference with the
order of dismissal was not warranted – Correctness:
Held: Finding of the appellant being guilty of charge no.1 cannot be
sustained following his acquittal in the criminal proceedings, which
seem to have involved substantially similar or identical charges,
* Author
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1663
Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
evidence, witnesses, and circumstances – In the instant case,
it is evident that the denial of the right to cross-examine PW-1
caused prejudice to the appellant, who should have been afforded
the opportunity for cross-examination for three reasons: first, had
PW-1 been cross-examined, particularly regarding the appellant’s
claim of personal animosity, it is plausible that such examination
could have influenced the Inquiry Officer’s findings, potentially
leading to a different conclusion; second, the Inquiry Officer
placed significant reliance on PW1’s testimony to substantiate
proof of the charges against the appellant which could have been
demolished had a chance of cross-examination been extended;
and third, PW-2, the only other witness, refused to identify the
appellant during cross-examination – Further, the Inquiry Officer
and the respondents 5, 4, and 2 have compromised their ability
to reach a fair conclusion by considering factors extraneous to the
evidence and merits of the case, viz., the fact that charge 2 was
made part of the charge-sheet although the appellant had been
punished therefor previously – Also, the Inquiry Officer and the
respondents 5, 4, and 2 have disregarded that the informant, whose
complaint initiated the disciplinary proceedings, was not made a
witness – Concerning charge no.3, the charge explicitly states that
the appellant was arrested on 08.08.1988 – Consequently, it is
implausible that the appellant could have resumed his duties on the
same date – Finally, what remains is charge no.4 – Having been
arrested, the appellant could not have reasonably been expected
to inform the fact of his arrest till such time he was granted bail –
The appellant claimed that he requested PW-1 to notify the CID
authorities of his arrest, but PW-1 failed to do so due to personal
animosity – This appears to be probable, in the absence of any
contra-material on record – The disciplinary proceedings had not
been conducted against the appellant in tune with principles of
fairness as well as natural justice which severely prejudiced his
defence – Thus, the impugned order is unsustainable and set
aside. [Paras 53, 57, 58, 61, 62, 63]
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1930 – R.55 – Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1935 – Note 1 attached to Rule 2 – Bihar
Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 2005 – Whether due process was followed in dismissing
the appellant from service and whether his dismissal from
service is justified, on facts and in the circumstances:
1664 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Held: R.55 of the Rules of 1930 stipulates that the grounds for the
proposed disciplinary action must be clearly articulated in the form
of specific charges, accompanied by a detailed statement outlining
the allegations supporting each charge – A specific objection have
been taken on behalf of the appellant that the charges were vague,
indefinite, not specific and lacking in material particulars – However,
in view of withholding of the departmental file, the presumption that
can legitimately and validly be drawn is that the respondents did
not deliberately produce the departmental file lest the illegality in
proceeding against the appellant from the inception is exposed –
The version of the appellant that the charges drawn up against
him were vague, indefinite, unspecific and lacked essential
particulars has to be accepted – Furthermore, on perusal of the
materials before this Court, preponderance of probability favours
the appellant for a finding to be returned that he was denied his
right to cross-examine PW-1 – Next, the Inquiry Officer expressed
disbelief at the version of PW-2 in course of cross-examination
when he unequivocally denied the appellant’s involvement in the
alleged offences – Inquiry Officer suggested that PW-2 might have
been unduly influenced or persuaded by the appellant, noting that
the cross-examination occurred after a substantial delay of nine
(9) months from the date of PW-2’s testimony in-chief – It is once
again essential to fall back on withholding of the departmental
file pertaining to the disciplinary proceedings, thereby preventing
an ascertainment of the cause of the delay in production by the
prosecution of PW-2 for cross-examination by the appellant – In any
event, appellant cannot be held liable for such a prolonged gap –
The Inquiry Officer was not justified in the approach he adopted
while conducting the inquiry – Findings had to be returned by him
neither on his ipse dixit nor surmises and conjectures but on the
basis of legal evidence – It is imperative to further underline that
the chargesheet against the appellant was issued based on the
written complaint of the informant – Law is again clear to the effect
that mere production of a document does not constitute proof – If
chargesheet is issued on the basis of a written complaint, the author/
complainant has to be produced – Notably, in the instant case, the
informant/complainant had not been examined – This, is one other
glaring error in the decision-making process – Upon reviewing the
materials and considering the aforementioned anomalies in the
issuance of the chargesheet and the procedural lapses, none of
which can be attributed to the appellant, and in light of the absence
of the departmental file pertaining to the disciplinary proceedings,
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1665
Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
it is concluded beyond any cavil of doubt that due process was
not followed in dismissing the appellant from service, rendering
the dismissal unjustified. [Paras 32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43 44]
Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
1930 – R.55 – Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1935 – Note 1 attached to Rule 2 – Bihar
Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 2005 – In disciplinary proceedings, inquiry officer found
appellant guilty of all charges – However, he was acquitted in
criminal proceedings – Whether, in light of the facts, evidence,
witnesses, and circumstances of the case, the charges in the
criminal proceedings are substantially identical to those in
the departmental proceedings, such that an acquittal in the
criminal case would render the findings in the disciplinary
proceedings vulnerable:
Held: While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically
entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his
dismissal from public service following disciplinary proceedings, it is
well-established that when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and
circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and the criminal
proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation
assumes a different context – In such cases, upholding the
findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and
oppressive – A plain reading of the materials available on record
only reveals that charge no.1 in the disciplinary closely resembled
the allegations in the criminal proceedings – The judgment acquitting
the appellant reveals that the prosecution “miserably failed to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt” as both the informant
and PW-2 refused to identify the appellant in court – Besides,
the appellant’s case is strengthened by the principle of adverse
inference – It can be reasonably inferred that the respondents
deliberately withheld the scanned copy of the departmental file,
which was essential to assess whether the charges, witnesses,
evidence, and circumstances in both the criminal and departmental
proceedings were substantially similar or identical, likely due to
concerns over the potential adverse consequences – Therefore,
the finding of the appellant being guilty of charge no.1 cannot be
sustained following his acquittal in the criminal proceedings, which
seem to have involved substantially similar or identical charges,
evidence, witnesses, and circumstances. [Paras 47-50, 52, 53]
1666 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.114(g) – Failure of party to produce
evidence – Presumption that withheld evidence would be
unfavourable – Discussed. [Para 27]
Constitution of India – Arts 226, 227 – High Court does not
exercise powers that are available to an appellate court –
Decision-making process falls for scrutiny – Discussed.
[Paras 55, 56]
Case Law Cited
Union of India v. H.C. Goel [1964] SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364 –
followed.
Surath Chandra Chakrabarty v. State of West Bengal [1971] 3
SCR 1 : (1970) 3 SCC 548 – relied on.
Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan [1986] 2 SCR 957 : AIR 1986
SC 995; G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat & Anr. [2006] Supp. 2 SCR
253 : AIR 2006 SC 2129; Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran [2014]
13 SCR 1312 : (2015) 2 SCC 610; T.N.C.S. Corporation Ltd. v. K.
Meerabai [2006] 1 SCR 540 : (2006) 2 SCC 255; State (Inspector
of Police) v. Surya Sankaram Karri [2006] Supp. 5 SCR 229 :
(2006) 7 SCC 172; Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. Workmen
& Ors. [1972] 1 SCR 241 : (1971) 2 SCC 617; Ram Lal v. State
of Rajasthan [2023] 15 SCR 808 : (2024) 1 SCC 175; State of
Mysore v. Shivabasappa Shivappa Makarpur [1963] SCR 943 : AIR
1963 SC 375; L.K. Tripathi v. State Bank of India [1984] 1 SCR
184 : AIR 1984 SC 273; State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda
[1964] 4 SCR 540 : AIR 1964 SC 506; Nicholas Piramal India
Limited v. Harisingh (2015) 8 SCC 272 – referred to.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930; Bihar and Orissa Subordinate
Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935; Bihar Police Manual,
1978.
List of Keywords
Departmental proceedings; Disciplinary proceedings; Dismissal
from service; Acquittal in criminal proceedings; Departmental file
not submitted; Principle of adverse inference; Due process; Right
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1667
Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
of cross-examination; Ipse dixit; Procedural lapses; Substantially
similar or identical charges; Principles of natural justice; Principle
of fairness.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5497 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.11.2016 of the High Court
of Judicature at Patna in LPA No. 516 of 2014
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Sunil Kumar, Sr. Adv., Rajiv Jain, Ms. Rohini Prasad.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Samir Ali Khan, Pranjal Sharma, Kashif Irshad Khan, Abhimanyu
Jhamba.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Dipankar Datta, J.
1. Leave granted.
The Appeal
2. This civil appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 16th
November 20161 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature
at Patna2 allowing the respondents’ intra-court appeal3 arising from
a writ petition4 presented before the High Court by Maharana Pratap
Singh5. The judgment and order of the Single Judge dated 16th July,
2013 was set aside and resultantly, the writ petition of the appellant
stood dismissed. The Single Judge had quashed the order dismissing
1 impugned order
2 High Court
3 L.P.A. No. 516 of 2015
4 C.W.J.C. No. 471 of 2004
5 appellant
1668 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the appellant from service and directed that he be reinstated in
service with all consequential benefits from the date of the dismissal.
Facts
3. The appellant was appointed as a Constable in the Dog Squad of the
Crime Investigation Department6 in 1973. He proceeded on earned
leave for two days, with the intention of resuming his duties on 8th
August, 1988. Incidentally, on 7th August 1988, a First Information
Report7 was registered on the complaint of one Prem Kumar Singh8
against unknown persons, giving rise to Kotwali P.S. Case No. 882
of 1988 for offences under Sections 392, 387, 420, 342, 419 read
with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 18609. The FIR included
a request for the formation of a raiding party to apprehend those
who had extorted money from the informant by blackmailing him.
A raiding party was formed, which proceeded to raid the Rajasthan
Hotel in Patna on 8th August, 1988. The accused was expected to
arrive there to collect ₹40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand) from the
informant. Meanwhile, the appellant was on his way to the office
to resume his duties after completing his earned leave when the
informant handed over the briefcase to the appellant. Subsequently,
the appellant was arrested and was brought to Kotwali Police Station.
On the same date, i.e., 08th August, 1988, the appellant was placed
under suspension by his superior authority.
4. On 14th June, 1989, disciplinary proceedings10 were initiated against
the appellant by drawing up a memorandum of charges. The
memorandum, duly served on the appellant, levelled 4 (four) charges
as detailed under:
i. Based on the written complaint of the informant, a case was
registered under Sections 392, 387, 420, 342, 419, and 34
of the IPC. In connection with this case, the appellant was
arrested while receiving ₹40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand) from
the informant, in furtherance of an alleged act of cheating by
impersonation and extortion under duress, at gunpoint.
6 CID
7 FIR
8 informant
9 IPC
10 Proceeding No. 9 of 1989
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1669
Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
ii. On 30th June 1976, a case was registered against the appellant
for cheating the Manager of Elphinstone Cinema Hall by falsely
representing himself as a Sub-Inspector of the CID. The
appellant was found guilty of the offence and subsequently
punished.
iii. After availing earned leave, the appellant failed to resume his
duty on 08th August, 1988 without any information although
subsequently, he was arrested by personnel of Kotwali Police
Station on the same day.
iv. The appellant failed to inform the CID Headquarters about his
arrest on 8th August, 1988.
5. In response to the memorandum, the appellant submitted a prayer
dated 15th March, 1990 requesting that the departmental proceedings
be conducted only after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.
The appellant expressed concern that if the departmental proceedings
were held first and should the appellant cross-examine the witnesses
during the departmental inquiry, his defence is bound to be disclosed;
and this would gravely prejudice him in the criminal proceedings.
Notwithstanding the appellant’s prayer, an inquiry ensued culminating
in the Inquiry Officer submitting his report on 3rd May, 199511, finding
the appellant guilty of the charges levelled against him.
6. Later, the appellant was served with a second show cause notice by
the Superintendent of Police, CID12 on 23rd June, 1995 calling upon
him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service.
Copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer was furnished. The appellant
replied to the second show cause notice on 11th March, 1996 seeking
to point out the illegalities committed by the Inquiry Officer in course
of the inquiry thereby vitiating the same. Nevertheless, the respondent
no. 5 accepted the Inquiry Report and, by order dated 14th June, 1996
contained in Memo No. 1833 dated 21st June, 1996, dismissed the
appellant from service, with the additional direction that the appellant
would not be entitled to any payment for the period of suspension,
except for the amounts already disbursed to him.
11 Inquiry Report
12 respondent no. 5
1670 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
7. Meanwhile, the appellant along with the co-accused was tried and
convicted by the trial court on 26th April, 1994. The appellant was
found guilty of offences under Sections 384 and 411 of the IPC and
was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one
year. However, he was acquitted of the charges under Sections 392
and 419 of the IPC.
8. The judgment of conviction and order on sentence having been carried
in an appeal13 by the appellant, the Additional Sessions Judge-XI,
Patna14, on 16th February, 1996, set aside the judgment and order
under challenge. The appellant was acquitted of the charges, with
the appellate court holding that the prosecution had failed to prove
its case.
9. The appellant, aggrieved by the dismissal order dated 21st June, 1996
passed by the respondent no. 5, filed an appeal before the Deputy
Inspector General of Police15. However, by an order dated 14th July,
1997, the respondent no. 4 dismissed the appeal and upheld the
dismissal order passed by the respondent no. 5 dated 21st June,
1996, based on the report and the findings of the Inquiry Officer.
10. Subsequently, the appellant filed a revision before the Director
General-cum-Inspector General of Police, C.I.D.16 on 24th September,
1997, seeking to challenge the appellate order. However, as the
revision remained undecided, the appellant filed a writ petition 17
before the High Court. The said writ petition was disposed of on 13th
May, 2002 with a direction to the respondent no. 2 to decide the
appellant’s revision within two months from the date of the order.
In compliance with the said direction, the respondent no. 5 on 06th
August, 2003 dismissed the revision, with the result that the dismissal
order stood reaffirmed.
Proceedings Before The Single Judge
11. Thoroughly dissatisfied with the outcome of the revision, the appellant
laid a challenge to the revisional order (in which the appellate order
13 Criminal Appeal No. 108 of 1994
14 sessions judge
15 respondent no. 4
16 respondent no. 2
17 C.W.J.C. No. 5946 of 2002
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1671
Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
and the original order of dismissal had merged) in the writ petition
out of which this civil appeal arises. The appellant inter alia raised
the following objections: (i) the Officer-in-Charge18 was neither
examined in the appellant’s presence nor permitted to be cross-
examined, rendering the disciplinary proceedings vitiated; (ii) both
the departmental and criminal proceedings having stemmed from
the same facts based on the informant’s written complaint and
identical charges being involved, after the appellant’s exoneration
in the criminal proceedings, rendered the disciplinary proceedings
untenable and should have been dropped; (iii) the order of dismissal
violated principles of natural justice; (iv) the respondent no. 4 upheld
the order of dismissal without affording the appellant an opportunity
to be heard; and (v) the respondent no.2 having a duty to set right
the wrong, failed to discharge such duty. Issuance of a writ of
certiorari was sought by the appellant to quash the impugned orders.
Additionally, the appellant sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus
directing the respondents to grant him all consequential benefits as
if he had never been dismissed from service.
12. The Single Judge observed, upon an examination of the allegations
made by the informant — who had also submitted a written statement
against the appellant in the department — that the narrative
presented by the informant lacked credibility due to several apparent
inconsistencies. Notably, the question that seemed to trouble the
Single Judge was why a person would enter a hotel room solely for
the purpose of having tea, and why an acquaintance would escort
both the informant and Devnath Pathak19 to the hotel room while
leaving a young girl in the attached toilet. The Single Judge opined
that the Inquiry Officer’s reliance on the testimony of PW-1, who
was not allowed to be cross-examined, raised concerns of undue
influence. PW-1 had a matrimonial connection with the family of
Virendra Singh, who allegedly had a strained relationship with the
appellant’s family, suggesting a personal motive to act against the
appellant. However, the Inquiry Officer failed to examine or address
the appellant’s contention regarding this potential conflict of interest.
The Single Judge further observed that the respondents’ claim,
asserting the absence of a written request from the appellant to the
18 PW-1
19 PW-2
1672 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Inquiry Officer for permission to cross-examine PW-1, was neither
legally valid nor proper. The appellant was not required to submit
such a request; rather, it was the duty of the Inquiry Officer to ensure
that the appellant was given the opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. As a result, testimony of PW-1 could not be relied upon in
the absence of such an opportunity being provided to the appellant.
13. The decision in Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan20 was relied on
by the Single Judge to hold that the charges were vague, indefinite
and lacking in material particulars.
14. The Single Judge further noted that the charges in the criminal
proceedings against the appellant and the evidence presented by
the prosecution to substantiate the same were largely identical to
those in the departmental proceedings. Placing reliance on the
decision in G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat & Anr.21, the Single Judge
concluded that charge no. 1 could not have been held to be proved
by the disciplinary authority since the respondents 5, 4, and 2 failed
to provide reasoning distinct from that of the relevant sessions judge
who had acquitted the appellant of the charges. The Single Judge
further observed that it was not open to the respondents to reopen
charge no. 2 in subsequent departmental proceedings, as the matter
had already been concluded in 1976 and the appellant visited with
punishment. Regarding charges 3 and 4, the Single Judge found
them self-explanatory, noting that the appellant’s arrest on 8th August,
1988 and subsequent detention in the police lock-up prevented him
from resuming his duties and notifying the CID, Headquarters, about
his arrest.
15. In light of the aforementioned findings and conclusions, the Single
Judge found the charges against the appellant to be frivolous and
unfounded, with the Inquiry Officer failing to adhere to due process.
Consequently, by judgment and order dated 16th July 2013, the Single
Judge quashed the dismissal order dated 21st June 1996 (upheld
by the respondents 4 and 2 on 14th July 1997 and 6th August 2003,
respectively), and directed the respondents to grant the appellant
all consequential benefits from the date of dismissal.
20 AIR 1986 SC 995
21 AIR 2006 SC 2129
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1673
Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
Proceedings Before The Division Bench
16. The respondents, aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Single
Judge, appealed to the Division Bench of the High Court.
17. The Division Bench, relying on a series of precedents and quoting
therefrom extensively, observed that exercise of jurisdiction by the
Single Judge evinced exercise of appellate jurisdiction over the
decision of the departmental authorities, whereas judicial review
of departmental orders should focus solely on the decision-making
process and not on the merits or demerits of the findings. The Division
Bench, relying on Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran22, held that the
Single Judge’s re-appreciation of evidence, which led to the conclusion
of the appellant’s innocence, was unsustainable due to the lack of
a justifiable basis for such an approach. It also emphasized that the
strict rules of evidence do not apply to departmental proceedings,
as declared in T.N.C.S. Corporation Ltd. v. K. Meerabai23. The
Division Bench further distinguished the decision in Sawai Singh
(supra) relied on by the Single Judge, based on differing factual
circumstances. It concluded that the charges against the appellant
were specific, and the procedural requirements during the inquiry
had been properly followed, with sufficient opportunities provided
to the appellant.
18. The Division Bench also referred to several decisions of this Court
regarding legal principles, including the admissibility of hearsay
evidence in departmental proceedings, rules of natural justice, the
right to cross-examine, opportunities to lead evidence, and the scope
of natural justice in disciplinary proceedings. Also, upon reviewing the
proceedings file maintained by the department24, the Division Bench
found the respondents’ claims to be substantiated. It was concluded
that there was no procedural error or breach of natural justice during
the inquiry. Consequently, the Single Judge’s interference with the
order of dismissal was not warranted.
19. Resting on such conclusions, the Division Bench set aside the
judgment and order of the Single Judge and dismissed the writ petition.
22 (2015) 2 SCC 610
23 (2006) 2 SCC 255
24 departmental file
1674 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Contentions
20. Learned senior counsel for the appellant, while assailing the impugned
judgment, submitted that the following points merit consideration by
this Court:
A. First, in light of the decision in G. M. Tank (supra), the Division
Bench erred in failing to recognize that both the criminal and
disciplinary proceedings were based on the same allegations,
the same facts, the same evidence and the same witnesses. The
appellant was acquitted by the sessions judge on merits, and
as such he could not have been found guilty in the disciplinary
proceedings.
B. Secondly, the appellant was acquitted by the sessions judge
based on a merits-based evaluation and not on technical
grounds. This is further substantiated by the informant’s failure
to identify the appellant in the criminal proceedings, who had not
been made a witness in the inquiry. Additionally, PW-2 denied
the appellant’s involvement in both the inquiry and the criminal
case, refusing to identify him.
C. Thirdly, the findings in the Inquiry Report holding the appellant
guilty and which were upheld by the respondents 5, 4, and
2, lack credibility. Consequently, these findings are not only
perverse but also influenced by extraneous factors and mala
fide intentions.
D. Fourthly, PW-1 harboured a personal vendetta against the
appellant, a fact brought to the attention of the respondents.
However, this issue was neither examined nor considered by
them, although the same did deserve thorough examination
and proper consideration being fact finding authorities.
E. Fifthly, regarding charge no. 2, the appellant had already faced
disciplinary proceedings and been penalized; hence, proceeding
against him again for the same misconduct was barred on the
ground of double jeopardy. Furthermore, a review of the Inquiry
Report reveals a complete lack of evidence substantiating the
said charge.
F. Sixthly, charges 3 and 4 are derived from charge no. 1 and are
driven by extraneous motives. Following his arrest on 8th August
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1675
Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
1988, the appellant’s repeated requests to the Officer-in-Charge to
inform the CID authorities were deliberately ignored. The Inquiry
Report itself acknowledges the lack of evidence for charge no. 4.
Moreover, the appellant could only have been suspended on 8th
August 1988 if the authorities had not been informed of his arrest.
G. Seventhly, the procedure followed in the inquiry was neither
fair nor proper, as an interested witness (PW-1) was examined
in the appellant’s absence, despite this being brought to the
attention of the Inquiry Officer and the respondents. Moreover,
the appellant was denied the opportunity to cross-examine the
said witness.
H. Eighthly, the charges framed against the appellant were utterly
vague and lacking in material particulars; hence, reliance was
correctly placed by the Single Judge on the decision in Sawai
Singh (supra).
I. Finally, the Inquiry Officer and the respondents erred in law by
recording findings against the appellant without any admissible
evidence, leading to a manifest miscarriage of justice. Therefore,
the dismissal from service and denial of consequential benefits
are clearly erroneous and perverse.
21. Per contra, Mr. Khan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents,
contented that the impugned judgment of the Division Bench suffers
from no error or infirmity either of law or on facts, far less manifest
error or infirmity, and hence does not call for any interference. He
sought upholding of the impugned judgment asserting that there
were no procedural irregularities or violations of natural justice in
the process of inquiry.
22. The arguments of the appellant were sought to be strongly rebutted
by advancing the further following points:
A. First, PW-1 was examined in the appellant’s presence, and
despite being given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness,
the appellant knowingly chose not to do so. The Inquiry Officer’s
inference that PW-2, who refused to identify the appellant during
cross-examination, was likely to have been influenced by the
appellant because of the lapse of time since he was examined-
in-chief and cross-examined, and such inference being accurate
did not call for any interference.
1676 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
B. Secondly, the charges in the disciplinary proceedings are distinct
from those in the criminal case. Charges 1 and 2 were sufficiently
substantiated, while charges 3 and 4 were not contested by the
appellant. Additionally, charge no. 2 does not constitute double
jeopardy, as it pertains to the appellant’s prior conduct rather
than a separate offence.
C. Thirdly, the standards for establishing evidence of guilt in
disciplinary proceedings differ from those applied in criminal
proceedings and that decisions are legion declaring the law
that mere acquittal in criminal proceedings does not result
in automatic reversal of the departmental decision of taking
disciplinary action for proved misconduct.
D. Fourthly, the Division Bench was absolutely right in observing
that the Single Judge had exceeded its writ jurisdiction as if
it were sitting in appeal on the administrative decisions of the
respondents.
E. Fifthly, the appellant being the member of a disciplined force
was found to have conducted himself in a manner unbecoming
of a police officer and, therefore, the Division Bench was right
in interfering with the injudicious exercise of discretion by the
Single Judge.
23. Mr. Khan, therefore, urged that the impugned order of the Division
Bench deserves affirmation and dismissal of the appeal ought to
be ordered.
Analysis and Reasons
24. We have heard learned senior counsel/counsel for the parties at
length and examined the materials on record.
25. The issues for determination that emerge for decision are:
(i) Whether due process was followed in dismissing the appellant
from service and whether his dismissal from service is justified,
on facts and in the circumstances, that have unfolded before us?
(ii) Whether, in light of the facts, evidence, witnesses, and
circumstances of the case, the charges in the criminal
proceedings are substantially identical to those in the
departmental proceedings, such that an acquittal in the criminal
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1677
Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
case would render the findings in the disciplinary proceedings
vulnerable?
(iii) Whether the impugned judgment, which allowed the appeal of
the respondents and dismissed the writ petition of the appellant,
deserves to be upheld?
(iv) Whether the appellant is entitled to any relief, should the
aforesaid questions be answered in his favour?
26. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that considering the nature of
arguments advanced which required ascertaining facts by looking
into the records of inquiry, which are not on record, we had required
the respondent-State of Bihar vide order dated 17th December, 2024
to submit scanned copy of the complete departmental file by 10th
January, 2025.
27. Under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, if a party
fails to produce evidence that is within its control, it is presumed
that the withheld evidence would be unfavourable to it. Though
reference to any authority is not required, we may profitably refer
to the decision in State (Inspector of Police) v. Surya Sankaram
Karri25 in this behalf.
28. We regretfully record that neither has the departmental file been
submitted for our perusal nor has the respondent-State of Bihar prayed
for any extension of time. The consequence of non-compliance of
such order is fatal, as would appear from our discussion hereafter.
29. The issues arising for decision are now taken up for consideration.
Issue No. 1
30. The specific statutory rule in terms whereof the chargesheet against
the appellant was drawn up or the inquiry conducted, cannot be
ascertained as copy of the chargesheet in its entirety is not part of
the paper book. This is precisely the reason why we called for the
departmental file concerning the disciplinary proceedings which,
unfortunately, has not been provided to us. Nonetheless, and given
the circumstance that the appellant was dismissed from service on
21st June, 1996, it is reasonable to infer that the relevant rules in
25 (2006) 7 SCC 172
1678 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
this case would likely be the Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 193526 and/or the Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 27. These were
adopted through Notification No. III/63-8051-A dated 3rd July, 1963,
and were subsequently repealed by the Bihar Government Servants
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2005.
31. Our abovesaid inference is bolstered by Rule 824A (e) of the Bihar
Police Manual, 1978, which stipulates that for experts and other ranks
officials — i.e., barring members of the Indian Police Services, Deputy
Superintendents and their equivalent ranks, ministerial officers and
members of the Bihar Sashastra Police—the Rules of 1935 would be
applicable if the official is non-gazetted and the Rules of 1930 would
be applicable if gazetted. It is noteworthy that the post of Constable
in the CID is a non-gazetted post and, hence, the Rules of 1935
provided the source of power to initiate disciplinary proceedings
against the appellant by drawing a chargesheet.
32. Note 1 attached to Rule 2 of the Rules of 1935 underlines that the
procedure stipulated in Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930 must be followed
prior to the issuance of a dismissal order against the charged official.
Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930 stipulates that the grounds for the
proposed disciplinary action must be clearly articulated in the form
of specific charges, accompanied by a detailed statement outlining
the allegations supporting each charge.
33. On perusal of whatever is available on record, it is found that
allegations had been levelled against the appellant under 4 (four)
distinct charges. A specific objection having been taken on behalf
of the appellant that the charges were vague, indefinite, not specific
and lacking in material particulars, we felt it all the more necessary
to have a look at the nature and wording of the chargesheet from the
departmental file. However, in view of withholding of the departmental
file, the presumption that can legitimately and validly be drawn and
which we do hereby draw is that the respondents did not deliberately
produce the departmental file lest the illegality in proceeding against
the appellant from the inception is exposed.
26 Rules of 1935.
27 Rules of 1930.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1679
Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
34. Based on the foregoing discussion, the version of the appellant that
the charges drawn up against him were vague, indefinite, unspecific
and lacked essential particulars has to be accepted. The decision of
this Court in Sawai Singh (supra), thus, does apply on all fours in
this case. This, in turn, reinforces the finding that the chargesheet
contravened Rule 55 of the Rules of 1930, as made applicable by
Note 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules of 1935.
35. If there is a flaw from the inception of the disciplinary proceedings,
i.e., the charge-sheet is not issued conforming to the relevant rules
and the charged officer finds it difficult to meet the charges because
it is vague, indefinite, not specific and lacking in material particulars,
the charge-sheet itself becomes susceptible to vulnerability. We
are reminded of the decision of this Court in Surath Chandra
Chakrabarty v. State of West Bengal28 where this Court ruled that:
6. Now in the present case each charge was so bare
that it was not capable of being intelligently understood
and was not sufficiently definite to furnish materials to
the appellant to defend himself. It is precisely for this
reason that Fundamental Rule 55 provides, as stated
before, that the charge should be accompanied by a
statement of allegations. The whole object of furnishing
the statement of allegations is to give all the necessary
particulars and details which would satisfy the requirement
of giving a reasonable opportunity to put up defence. …
The entire proceedings show a complete disregard of
Fundamental Rule 55 insofar as it lays down in almost
mandatory terms that the charges must be accompanied
by a statement of allegations. We have no manner of doubt
that the appellant was denied a proper and reasonable
opportunity of defending himself by reason of the charges
being altogether vague and indefinite and the statement
of allegations containing the material facts and particulars
not having been supplied to him. In this situation, for the
above reason alone, the Trial Judge was fully justified in
decreeing the suit.
(emphasis supplied)
28 (1970) 3 SCC 548
1680 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
36. Moving further, the appellant had raised an allegation that PW-1
was not allowed to be cross-examined. Rule 55 of the Rules of
1930 provides that the witnesses may be cross-examined by the
charged individual. Had the departmental file been placed on record,
it would have facilitated a more thorough analysis of this sub-issue.
Nevertheless, based on the available material, the question remains
whether it can be determined if the appellant was provided with a
sufficient opportunity to cross-examine PW-1, or if the appellant
chose not to exercise that opportunity.
37. The respondents’ counsel contended before this Court that the
appellant deliberately chose not to cross-examine PW-1 and it is
not their contention that opportunity of cross-examination could not
have been given, particularly in light of the fact that PW-2 was made
available for cross-examination by the appellant. However, the Single
Judge’s observations reveal that the respondents claimed there was
no record of any request or indication from the appellant expressing
an intent to cross-examine the said witness. This demonstrates that
the respondents have altered their position on the issue of cross-
examination of PW-1, as reflected in their submissions both before
the Single Judge and this Court.
38. Furthermore, on perusal of the materials before this Court,
preponderance of probability favours the appellant for a finding to be
returned that he was denied his right to cross-examine PW-1. The
respondents’ assertion that the appellant deliberately refrained from
cross-examining PW-1, given his request to cross-examine PW-2,
is untenable for three reasons: first, the respondents have changed
their position on this issue; second, no reasonable person would
voluntarily forgo a right of cross-examination, particularly when PW-1
was one of only two witnesses who testified from a list of seven, and
there were allegations of a personal vendetta against him; and third,
the respondents have never claimed that cross-examination was
not part of the prescribed inquiry procedure or that it was optional,
or that the appellant abandoned the enquiry or failed to appear on
the relevant date.
39. Next, the Inquiry Officer expressed disbelief at the version of PW-2
in course of cross-examination when he unequivocally denied the
appellant’s involvement in the alleged offences and failed to recall
whether the seizure list relating to ₹ 40,000/- (Rupees forty thousand)
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1681
Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
had been prepared in his presence. The Inquiry Officer suggested
that PW-2 might have been unduly influenced or persuaded by
the appellant, noting that the cross-examination occurred after a
substantial delay of nine (9) months from the date of PW-2’s testimony
in-chief, which had previously affirmed hinted at the involvement of
the appellant.
40. Before delving further into this sub-issue, it is once again essential
to fall back on withholding of the departmental file pertaining to the
disciplinary proceedings, thereby preventing an ascertainment of the
cause of the delay in production by the prosecution of PW-2 for cross-
examination by the appellant. In any event, can the appellant be held
liable for such a prolonged gap? Likely not, as it is the responsibility
of the prosecution to produce the witness. Moreover, in the absence
of the departmental file, we cannot conclusively attribute the delay
to the appellant either. Consequently, the lapse, without anything
more before us, has to be attributed to the prosecution.
41. Nonetheless, we are of the view that dismissing PW-2’s cross-
examination as incredible, solely due to the delay in its conduct,
would not be a reasonable conclusion. PW-2 had also denied the
appellant’s involvement in the criminal proceedings and, during his
cross-examination in the inquiry, he explained that he had previously
disclosed the appellant’s name based on hearsay from individuals
within the department.
42. We do not consider that the Inquiry Officer was justified in the
approach he adopted while conducting the inquiry. Findings had
to be returned by him neither on his ipse dixit nor surmises and
conjectures but on the basis of legal evidence. A Constitution Bench
of this Court, speaking through Hon’ble P.B. Gajendragadkar, J.,
in Union of India v. H.C. Goel29 pointed out that in carrying out
the purpose of rooting out corruption, mere suspicion should not
be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries.
Although technical rules which govern criminal trials in courts may
not necessarily apply to disciplinary proceedings, nevertheless, the
principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care should be taken
to see that the innocent is not punished, applies as much to regular
criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under statutory rules.
29 AIR 1964 SC 364
1682 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
This has, thus, been the well-settled position of law for decades and
bearing such law in mind, we have no hesitation to hold that the
reason for which the Inquiry Officer doubted the version of PW-2 in
his cross-examination was not available to be assigned without first
returning a finding attributing the fault for the delay to the appellant.
43. At this juncture, it is imperative to further underline that the chargesheet
against the appellant was issued based on the written complaint of
the informant. Law is again clear to the effect that mere production
of a document does not constitute proof. If chargesheet is issued on
the basis of a written complaint, the author/complainant has to be
produced. The decision of this Court in Bareilly Electricity Supply
Co. Ltd. vs. Workmen & Ors.30 is an authority for this proposition.
Notably, in the instant case, the informant/complainant had not been
examined. This, we hold is one other glaring error in the decision-
making process.
44. Upon reviewing the materials at our disposal and considering the
aforementioned anomalies in the issuance of the chargesheet and the
procedural lapses, none of which can be attributed to the appellant,
and in light of the absence of the departmental file pertaining to the
disciplinary proceedings, we are compelled to conclude beyond any
cavil of doubt that due process was not followed in dismissing the
appellant from service, rendering the dismissal unjustified.
45. While we agree with the Division Bench that the Single Judge, to a
large extent, exercised appellate jurisdiction, on its part, the Division
Bench failed to take into account the aforementioned vices that
infected the decision-making process. One could call it an inadvertent
slip or oversight; but, whatever be it, in our opinion, such slip or
oversight resulted in a failure of justice.
Issue No. 2
46. The aforesaid discussion on the first issue seals the fate of the
respondents. However, since arguments were advanced in respect
of this issue too, we propose to briefly answer the same.
47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the
accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public
30 (1971) 2 SCC 617
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1683
Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that
when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both
the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical
or substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In
such cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings
would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by
the decision in G. M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision
of recent origin in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan31.
48. To assess the degree of similarity between the charges, evidence,
witnesses, and circumstances in the disciplinary and criminal
proceedings, it is indeed crucial to review the materials placed before
the Court where such an issue arises. However, we regret, absence
of the departmental file has disabled us from looking into the same.
49. Notwithstanding the above, a plain reading of the materials available
on record only reveals that charge no.1 in the disciplinary closely
resembled the allegations in the criminal proceedings. In fact, the
disciplinary proceedings were initiated based on the written complaint
of the informant.
50. The judgment acquitting the appellant reveals that the prosecution
“miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt” as both
the informant and PW-2 refused to identify the appellant in court.
This discussion confirms that the appellant’s acquittal was based
not on mere technicalities. In Ram Lal (supra), this Court held that
terms like “benefit of doubt” or “honourably acquitted” should not be
treated as formalities. The Court’s duty is to focus on the substance
of the judgment, rather than the terminology used.
51. That apart, it is noteworthy that in course of the inquiry PW-2 had also
declined to identify the appellant during cross-examination, and the
informant was not called as a witness in the disciplinary proceedings.
This sort of creates a parallel between the circumstances in both
the criminal and disciplinary proceedings.
52. Besides, the appellant’s case is strengthened by the principle of
adverse inference. It can be reasonably inferred that the respondents
deliberately withheld the scanned copy of the departmental file, which
was essential for us to assess whether the charges, witnesses,
31 (2024) 1 SCC 175
1684 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
evidence, and circumstances in both the criminal and departmental
proceedings were substantially similar or identical, likely due to
concerns over the potential adverse consequences.
53. In light of the preceding discussion and the adverse presumption that
is available to be drawn, we hold that the finding of the appellant being
guilty of charge no.1 cannot be sustained following his acquittal in
the criminal proceedings, which seem to have involved substantially
similar or identical charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances.
Issue No. 3
54. The Division Bench and the Single Judge differed in their views
on the appellant’s dismissal following disciplinary proceedings.
Whereas the Single Judge found the inquiry report flawed due to
unlawful procedures and untenable findings, the Division Bench,
upon reviewing the “original file of the departmental proceedings,”
concluded that there was no procedural irregularity or breach of natural
justice; and, therefore, held that the Single Judge’s interference with
the inquiry officer’s findings—particularly by evaluating the merits of
those findings in its writ jurisdiction—was unwarranted.
55. Law is trite that while exercising its powers under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not exercise powers
that are available to an appellate court. It is the decision-making
process that falls for scrutiny. Be that as it may, the High Courts can
rectify errors of law or procedural irregularities, if any, that lead to a
manifest miscarriage of justice or breach of the principles of natural
justice. Law is also well-established that the standards for establishing
a guilt in disciplinary proceedings differ from those applicable to
criminal proceedings. However, it is equally true that departmental
authorities are obligated to provide a fair opportunity to the parties
involved, and what constitutes a fair opportunity must be determined
based on the facts and circumstances of each case, as has been laid
down in State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa Shivappa Makarpur32.
56. It is well-established that any action resulting in penal or adverse
consequences must be consistent with the principles of natural justice.
To sustain a complaint of natural justice violation, based on lack of
32 AIR 1963 SC 375
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1685
Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
opportunity for cross-examination, the party alleging the violation
must show that prejudice was caused, as affirmed by this Court in
L.K. Tripathi v. State Bank of India33.
57. Upon perusal of the decisions of this Court in the preceding
paragraphs, it is evident that the denial of the right to cross-examine
PW-1 caused prejudice to the appellant, who should have been
afforded the opportunity for cross-examination for three reasons:
first, had PW-1 been cross-examined, particularly regarding the
appellant’s claim of personal animosity, it is plausible that such
examination could have influenced the Inquiry Officer’s findings,
potentially leading to a different conclusion; second, the Inquiry
Officer placed significant reliance on PW1’s testimony to substantiate
proof of the charges against the appellant which could have been
demolished had a chance of cross-examination been extended; and
third, PW-2, the only other witness, refused to identify the appellant
during cross-examination.
58. Further, we observe that the Inquiry Officer and the respondents 5,
4, and 2 have compromised their ability to reach a fair conclusion
by considering factors extraneous to the evidence and merits of the
case, viz., the fact that charge 2 was made part of the charge-sheet
although the appellant had been punished therefor previously.
59. Also, the Inquiry Officer and the respondents 5, 4, and 2 have
disregarded that the informant, whose complaint initiated the
disciplinary proceedings, was not made a witness. The testimonies
of PW-1 and PW-2 reflect a failed attempt to establish the contents
of the informant’s written complaint, as the former was not cross-
examined, and the latter failed to identify the appellant during cross-
examination. Additionally, the potential bias of PW-1 as an interested
witness, was not given proper consideration or weight.
60. Regarding charge no. 2, while a previous finding in respect of
a guilt can form part of a subsequent charge-sheet to award
enhanced punishment, the law requires the disciplinary authority
to give sufficient notice to the charged employee of such intention
to take the same into consideration for deciding the question of
punishment. Useful reference could be made to the decisions in
33 AIR 1984 SC 273
1686 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda34 and Nicholas Piramal
India Limited v. Harisingh35. The argument of the appellant to the
contrary is overruled. Since, however, the disciplinary proceedings
have been found to be suffering from incurable defects, assessment
of the appellant’s conduct for deciding on the punishment does not
really survive.
61. Concerning charge no. 3, the charge explicitly states that the appellant
was arrested on 8th August, 1988. Consequently, it is implausible that
the appellant could have resumed his duties on the same date, after
his earned leave had expired, especially since the respondents have
not raised any objection regarding the date of the appellant’s arrest.
62. Finally, what remains is charge no. 4. Having been arrested, the
appellant could not have reasonably been expected to inform the fact
of his arrest till such time he was granted bail. The appellant claimed
that he requested PW-1 to notify the CID authorities of his arrest,
but PW-1 failed to do so due to personal animosity. This appears
to be probable, in the absence of any contra-material on record.
63. Accordingly, this Court concludes based on the materials available
on record that the disciplinary proceedings had not been conducted
against the appellant in tune with principles of fairness as well as
natural justice which severely prejudiced his defence. The impugned
order, thus, is unsustainable.
Issue No.4
64. Now, we need to consider the relief that ought to be granted to the
appellant.
65. The impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court dated
16th November, 2016 is set aside together with the orders dated
21st June, 1996, 14th July, 1997, and 6th August, 2003, issued by the
respondents 5, 4, and 2, respectively.
66. The order passed by the Single Judge dated 16th July, 2013 is partly
upheld. Top of FormBottom of FormThe direction for release of full
back wages is, however, set aside.
34 AIR 1964 SC 506
35 (2015) 8 SCC 272
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1687
Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors.
67. Before granting further relief, it is pertinent to note that the date of the
alleged incident giving rise to the charge-sheet is 7th August, 1988,
and the appellant was dismissed from service on 21st June, 1996.
Based on the records available, the appellant was 53 years old when
he approached the Single Judge in 2004. Therefore, he would be
approximately 74 years old in 2025 and around 45 years old in 1996,
evincing that he had nearly 14/15 (fourteen/fifteen) years of service
remaining at the time of his dismissal. The relief of reinstatement in
service cannot be granted now. We are left to consider the quantum
of monetary relief that would meet the ends of justice.
68. Having bestowed serious consideration, we are of the clear opinion
that ends of justice would be sufficiently served if we direct payment
of a lumpsum compensation of ₹ 30 lakh (Rupees thirty lakh) to the
appellant inclusive of all service and retiral benefits by the respondents
within 3 (three) months from date. Ordered accordingly.
CONCLUSION
69. The appeal, accordingly, stands disposed of.
70. The appellant shall be entitled to costs assessed at ₹ 5 lakh (Rupees
five lakh), to be paid by the respondents within the aforesaid period.
Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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