MAHARAJI EDUCATIONAL TRUSTversusSGS CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. & ORS

                        · (2015] 7 S.C.R. 92


A                MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUST
                                 v.
            SGS CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. & ORS
                  (Civil appeal No. 4494 of 2015)
B
                           MAY 15, 2015
              [H. L. DATTU, CJI., S. A. BOBDE AND
                       ARUN MISHRA, JJ.]
c           Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parish ad Adhiniyam,
    1965:

            Object of- Discussed.

          s. 15 - Boundary dispute - Default in repayment of
D loan amount taken by appellant-Trust from HUDCO resulting
  in mortgage of immovable properties including property in
  dispute-A portion of property in dispute exchanged by Trust
  from Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and exchange deed
  deposited with HUDCO- Recovery proceedings by HUDCO,
E pending on objection of builder- Objection of builder on the
  strength of agreement to sell entered with Trust - Builder
  preferred writ petition for seeking relief of issuance of
  mandamus commanding the Avas to demarcate land- High
F Court directed the Avas to demarcate 42.45 acres of the
  mortgaged land and 21 acres as unencumbered land out of
  total area of 63. 45 acres- Challenged- Held: It was not the
  function of Avas to demarcate the land on the basis of an
  agreement entered into inter se between the Trust and Builder
G - It was for the parties to agitate the questions before the
  ORT where the recovery proceedings were pending at the
  instance of HUDCO with whom the property had been
  mortgaged by the Trust- Principle of noscitur a socii will be
  applicable in construing s. 15 and the words 'to make
H investigation, examination or survey of any property' in
                                92
        MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS                     93
           CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD.

s. 15(1)(m) will take their meaning and colour from the other A
phrases employed in s.15(1) - Avas, the housinf:J ..,oard,
therefore, could not have demarcated the land by invoking
powers uls. 15 - Principle of noscitur a socii.

Writ jurisdiction : Writ petition seeking direction to declare B
any property as encumbered one - Held : It is not within the
ken of the High Court in writ jurisdiction to declare any
property as encumbered one - Such rights between private
parties cannot be made subject matter of writ jurisdiction~
                                                              c
Jurisdiction: Recovery proceedings pending in Delhi - Writ
petition at Lucknow at the instance of HUDCO - Held: Not
maintainable.

      Allowing the appeals, the Court ·
                                                              D
        HELD: 1. The objections had been preferred by
the Builder before the Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery
Tribunal, Delhi. Admittedly, 21 acres of land, out of the
total of63.45 acres which was mortgaged to HUDCO had
been exchanged by the Trust with Avas Evam Vikas              E
Parishad (Avas). Thus, the exchange was with the
property which was under mortgage with HUDCO and
the exchange deed had been deposited by the Trust with"
HUDCO. Before the Recovery Officer, New Delhi, prayer         F
has been made by the Builder to sell property No~.1 to 5
and not to sell property No.6 with respect to which he
has entered into an agreement with the Trust. Though,
there is serious dispute between the parties to the lis
whether the said land is unencumbered, finding has           G
been given by the High Court that 21 acres of land is
unencumbered. It was not open to the High Court to
enter into the arena, which of the property is
encumbered. The sale in realization of debt is the outlook
of the Recovery Officer, ORT, Delhi, where the recovery       H
94         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A proceedings are pending, including the objections
  preferred by the Builder. It was not open to the Builder
  to file a writ application for the aforesaid reliefs. The High
  Court could not have adjudicated on the property rights
  under the guise of directing Avas to demarcate the land
B and give finding that it was unencumbered land. [Paras
  10, 12 and 13] [101-F-H; 102-A; 103-C-E, F]

             2. It was for the parties to agitate the questions
     before the ORT where the recovery proceedings are
C    pending at the instance of HUDCO with whom the
     property had been mortgaged by the Trust. Prima facie,
     on the strength of the agreement to sell, particularly
     when possession had not been handed over to the
     Builder, it was not open to him to file a writ application
D    for demarcation of the property as unencumbered
     property or otherwise. What was sought to be achieved
     by filing a writ petition, was to get rid of the proceedings
     pending before the Recovery Officer, ORT at Delhi, and
     to save land at serial No.6 from being sold which
E    includes 21 acres of land, and an attempt was made to
     get the 21 acres of land declared as unencumbered orie.
     As a matter offact, such disputed questions with respect
     to the properties inter se between the Builder and the
F    Trust as to demarcation, writ petition could not be said
     to be appropriate remedy, particularly when the order
     passed by the Recovery Officer, ORT, was not in question
     and the order passed by the ORT, Delhi, could not have
     been questioned before the Lucknow Bench of High
G    Court of Allahabad. [Paras 14 and 15) [104-B-F]

          3. No part of the cause of action to the Builder
  has arisen at Lucknow where the Head Office of Avas is
  situated. Avas was not at all answerable to the Builder.
H As way-back in the year 2007, much before agreement
  to sell was entered into, it had exchanged its 21 acres of
        MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS                      95
           CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD.

land with the Trust. Moreover, no application was ever        A
filed by the Builder to Avas for seeking demarcation of
the land. Thus, in case of dispute inter se between the
Builder and the Trust based upon subsequent
agreement to sale entered into in 2010, there was no right
available to the Builder to askAvas to demarcate the land     B
which it had already given to the Trust. After the 21 acres
of land had been given to the Trust, Avas had nothing to
do with that land. This, it was a wholly misconceived
venture on the part of the Builder to ask Avas to
demarcate the land given to the Trust, particularly when      C
the Avas was not having any housing scheme with
respect to the land which had been given to the Trust.
Thus, filing of the writ petition at' Lucknow Bench was
totally uncalled for and the propriety required that it       D
should not have been entertained at Lucknow Bench.
No part of the cause of action has arisen at Lucknow,
and it was not the function of Avas to demarcate the
property in case of dispute between private party or.for
the purpose of proceeding before the ORT and that the         E
property was situated in the district of Ghaziabad
wherein not under territorial jurisdiction of Bench at
Lucknow. Thus, the writ petition was not maintainable
at Lucknow Bench. [Paras 16 and 22] [105-A-F; 113-F-G]
                                   ,. "
                                                              F
  Sri Nasiruddin etc. v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal
  etc. 1975 (2) SCC 671 : 1976 (1)'SCR 505; Oil and
  Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu & Ors.
  1994 (4) SCC 711: 1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 252; Nationa/J
  Textile Corporation Ltd. & Ors. v. Haribox Swalram &        G
  Ors. 2004 (9) SCC 786: 2004 (3) SCR 738; Alchemist
  Ltd. & Anr. v. State Bank of Sikkim & Ors. 2007 (11)
  SCC 335: 2007 (4) SCR 46; Eastern Coalfields Ltd. &
  Ors. v. Kalyan Banerjee 2008 (3) SCC 456: 2008
  (3) SCR 920 - referred to.                                  H
96              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 7 S.C.R.

                             ...,, .
A        4. Section 15 deals with the functioning of the
  Board and the provisions of the Act. As per the provisions
     J l l ..

  of section 15, the power to make investigation,
  examination or survey of any property is to be exercised
  by the Board in connection with its functions enjoined
B in the Act. The principle of noscitur a socii will be
  applicable in construing Section 15 of the Act and the
  words "to make investigation, examination or survey of
  any property" in section 15(1)(m) will take their meaning
  and colour from the other phrases employed in section
C 15(1). [Paras 25 and 27] [117-F; 118-B-C]

           Rohit Pulp & Paper Mi/ls Ltd. v. Collector of Central
           Excise, Baroda 1990 (3) SCC 447: 1990 (2) SCR 797
           - relied on.
D
                          Case Law Reference

     1976 (1) SCR 505                  referred to.       Para 17

     1994 (1) Suppl. SCR 252 referred to.                 Para 18
E
     2004 (3) SCR 738                  referred to.       Para 19

     2007 (4 ) SCR 46                  referred to.       Para 20

     2008 (3) SCR 920                  referred to.       Para 21
F
     1990 (2) SCR 797        dC.       relied on.         Para 21

           CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
     4494 of2015.
G          From the Judgment and Order dated 25.09.2013 of the
     High Court of Judicature atAllahabad, Lucknow Bench in W.P.
     No. 11669 (M/B) of2011.
                            WITH
H C. A. Nos. 4495 and 4496 of 2015
         MAHARAJ I EDUCATIONAL TRUST v. SGS                      97
            CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD.

        Ranjit Kumar, S. G., Dr. A. M. Singhvi, Jayant Bhushan, A
K. V. Vishwanathan, Vikas Singh, Rajeev Dhavan, Krishnan
Venugopal, Ashutosh Khaitan, Navpreet Singh Ahluwalia,
Kanishk V. Shahi, Deepak Chawla, Adhish Sharma, Manoj
Kumar, Umesh Kumar Khaitan, Rohit Kumar, A. K. Singh, B.
Subrahmanya Prasad, Abhindra Maheshwari, Pankaj Singh, B
Ridhima Singh, Vishwajit Singh, Aarohi Bhalla, Mayank Gulati,
Devadatt Kamat, Omita Unnarkar, M. Y. Deshmukh, Sujata
Kurdukar, Rajesh lnamdar, Deepeika Kalia, Kapish Seth,
lrshadAhmad,Abhisth Kumar,Abhishek Kumar Singh, Somraj
Choudhary, T. Harish Kumar, E. C.Agrawala for the appearing C
parties.                               ' '

       The Judgment of the Court was"delivered by
                                      Jt'·
       ~RUN MISHRA, J. 1. Leave granted in all the special D
leave petitions.

        2. In the appeals the judgment and order dated
25.9.2013 passed by the High Court of Allahabad, Bench at
Lucknow, has been questioned by Maharaji Educational Trust E
(for short 'the Trust'), U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (for short
'Avas Evam Vikas Parishad') and Housing and Urban
Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'HUDCO')
whereby the High Court has directed the Avas Evam Vikas
Parishad to demarcate 42.45 acres of the mortgaged land F
and 21 acres as unencumbered land out of total area of 63.45
acres in writ petition filed by SGS Construction & Development
(P) Ltd. (for short 'Builder').

        3. The factual matrix indicate that the Trust has takeh'a G
loan from HUDCO. The outstanding figure at present is stated
to be approximately Rs.433 crores. There was default in
making the payment. The Trust had mortgaged the immovable
properties mentioned from serial Nos.1 to 5 and also the
property at serial No.6 which is in question in the present matter H
98        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A in an area of 63.45 acres of vacant land situated at village
  Akbarpur, village Behrampur and village Mirzapur, Pargana-
  Loni, Tehsil and District Ghaziabad. Out of the property
  mentioned at serial No.6 which was mortgaged with HUDCO,
  the Trust had exchanged the land in area 21 acres fromAvas
B Evam Vikas Parishad vide Exchange Deed dated 4.5.2007.
  Thereafter, the Trust had also deposited the deed of exchange
  of the said land with HUDCO on 27.7.2011.

          4. As the loan was not repaid by the Trust, HUDCO had
C started proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal at
  Delhi. The recovery proceedings are pending before the
  Recovery Officer, in which the builder has filed objections which
  are stated to be pending. The objections have been filed by
  the Builder in respect of property No.6 against the action
D initiated by HUDCO for sale of mortgaged property under
  Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
  Enforcement of Security lnterestAct, 2002 (hereinafter referred
  to as 'the SARFAESI Act').

E          5. The Builder has filed objections on the strength of an
  agreement to sell dated 26.8.2010 entered with Trust which
  was initially unregistered for purchase of 63.45 acres of land
  comprised in property No.6, which includes the 21 acres of
  land which was exchanged by the Trust with the Avas Evam
F Vikas Parish ad. The agreement was executed between the
  Builder and the Trust for consideration of Rs.154 crores. Out
  of the same, it is submitted that sum of Rs.9 crores has been
  paid by the Builder to the Trust. The agreement had been
  registered subsequently, which has been questioned by the
G Trust and writ petition is pending in High Court at Allahabad. A
  civil suit is also stated to be pending.

          6. Notwithstanding the pendency of the aforesaid
  proceedings, the Builder preferred writ petition in question
H before the High Court of Allahabad, Bench at Lucknow claiming
      MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS                           99
   CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARLIN MISHRA, J.]

following reliefs:                                               A

   "i) Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding...
   the Respondent/Opposite Party No.1 i.e. U.P. Awas Evam
   Vikas Parishad to demarcate lands measuring 42.45
   acres·out of 63.45 acres, which are mortgaged so that if      B
   at a later date the properties at SI. No.6 as mentioned in
   Annexure P/1 were to be sold by the Respondent No.3,
   there would be no ambiguity in identifying the mortgaged
   property.
                                                                 c
   ii) Issue a writ, order or direction commanding the
   Respondent No.2 to implement its order dated 61h
   September, 2011 in a time bound manner preferably with
   a period of 3 months in order to sell properties at SI.
   No.1 to 5 as mentioned in Annexure P/1 and further            o
   restrain the Respondent No.2 to proceed with the
   application filed by the Respondent No.3 dated
   20.10.2011 (Annexure P/7) till the properties at SI. No.1
   to 5 are not sold.
                                                                 E
   iii) Issue any writ, direction or orders as may be deemed
   fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."

Second prayer had been abandoned at the time of final hearing
of the writ petition.
                                                                 F
       7. On behalf of the appellants, it was submitted that it is
not the function of Avas Evam Vikas Parishad to demarcate
the land on the basis of an agreement entered into inter se
between the Trust and the Builder. Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam
Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 (in short referred to as G
Adhiniyam of 1965) has been enacted so as to further various
kinds of housing schemes and development projects. The
powers under Section 15 of the Adhiniyam of 1965 cannot be
exercised out of context of the Act. It was also submitted that H
Lucknow Bench had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
100        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A The High Court could not have treated the property exchanged
  by Avas Evam Vlkas Parishad with the Trust as unencumbered
  one. It was further submitted that on the strength of unregistered
  agreement to sell, no right, title or interest passes to the Builder.
  The registration of agreement to sale which had been obtained
B subsequently, has been stayed by the High Court in the
  pending writ application. The writ petition was a misconceived
  venture. By virtue of section 70 of the Transfer of Property Act
  (for short 'the TP Act'), HUDCO was having a right over the
  property of Trust obtained in exchange with mortgaged property.
C The Deed of Exchange has also been deposited by the Trust
  with HUDCO. No application was ever filed by the Builder
  with theAvas Evam Vikas Parishad for demarcation of land.
  There was no housing scheme framed by Avas Evam Vikas
D Parishad with respect to the land which had been given in
  exchange to the Trust. Thus, provision of section 15 of the
  Adhiniyam of 1965 is not attracted. It was also submitted on
  behalf of the appellants that the Builder is dilly dallying the
  recovery proceedings by filing frivolous litigation.
E         8. Per contra, on behalf of the Builder, it was submitted
  that the agreement to sell has been executed in favour of the
  Builder by the Trust with respect to 63.45 acres of land which
  includes 21 acres of the land given by Avas Evam Vikas
F Parishad to the Trust in exchange. Recovery proceedings
  against the Trust are pending before the Deb't Recovery
  Tribunal, New Delhi, in which objections have been preferred
  by the Builder which are pending consideration. The Builder
  having entered into an agreement, had the right to apply to
G Avas Evam Vikas Parishad to demarcate the land it had
  exchanged with the Trust. The direction for demarcation is
  beneficial to all concerned. No case for interference is made
  out. The Builder has submitted a proposal under section 56 of
  the T.P. Act to the Chairman of HUDCO. The land given by the
H Avas Evam Vikas Parishad to the Trust was unencumbered.
      MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS                                101
   CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

The 21 acres of land obtained in exchange was not mortgaged A
with HUDCO. Indubitably, Lucknow Bench had the jurisdiction
as the Head Office of Avas Evam Vikas Parishad is situated
at Lucknow. TheAvas Evam Vikas Parishad had the onus to
demarcate the land as provided under section 15(1) (e), (k)
(m) and (o). The Builder had the right to know/identify the B
property i.e. 21 acres of land which was unencumbered. The
land received by theAvas Evam Vikas Parishad from the Trust
has been utilised for a housing scheme. Thus, the impugned
order calls for no interference.
                                                                       c
        9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length,
we are of the considered opinion that it was a misadventure
on the part of the Builder to file a writ petition for the kind of
reliefs prayed for and that too could not have been entertained
by the Bench at Lucknow.                                            D

        10. It is not in dispute that property Nos.1 to 6 had been
mortgaged with HUDCO by the Trust. Property No.6 which is
in dispute comprised of 63.45 acres of land which was initially
mortgaged by the Trust with HUDCO. Proceedings for                     E
recovery of debt which seems to have presently amassed to
more than Rs. 433 crores under the SARFAESI Act, are stated
to be pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Delhi. The
property is admittedly situated in the district of Ghaziabad,
State of U. P. and Ghaziabad falls within the territorial limits of    F
the main seat of the High Court of Allahabad. Undisputedly,
objections had been preferred by the Builder before the
Recovery Officer, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Delhi. Admittedly,
21 acres of land, out of the total of 63.45 acres which was
mortgaged to HUDCO as item No.6, had been exchanged by                 G
the Trust with Avas Evam Vikas Parishad. Thus, the exchange
was with the property which was under mortgage with HUDCO
and the exchange deed had been deposited by the Trust with
HUDCO on 11. 7.2011. Before the Debt Recovery Officer, New             H
102        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015) 7 S.C.R.


A Delhi, prayer has been made by the Builder to sell property
  Nos.1 to 5 and not to sell property No.6 with respect to which
  he has entered into an agreement with the Trust.

          11. The writ petition filed for the aforesaid twin reliefs,
B was not maintainable before the writ court; firstly, it is not within
  ken of the High Court in writ jurisdiction to declare any property
  as unencumbered one. Such rights between private parties
  cannot be made subject-matter of writ jurisdiction as has been
  ordered in the impugned judgment and order that out of a total
C of 63.45 acres of land, 21 acres be demarcated as an
  unencumbered property and to maintain status quo. Following
  is the operative portion of the order passed by the Division
  Bench at Lucknow :

D      "In the premises discussed hereinabove, we are of the
       considered view that the relief as sought in prayer no.1
       can be granted by directing respondent no.1 to
       dem~rcate 42.45 acres, said to be mortgaged, and 21
       acres as unencumbered, out of the total area of 63.45
E      acres, as mentioned at serial no.6, in the list of properties
       as detailed in the foregoing paragraphs. Thus, we allow
       this petition and direct respondent no. 1 to carry out the
       aforesaid exercise of demarcation either itself or being
       an instrumentality of the State, and having statutory duties
F      as extracted and reproduced hereinabove, with the help
       of revenue authorities concerned. Moreover, in view of
       the chequered background of the litigation in respect of
       the l~nds/properties in question, and the conduct of
       respondent no.3, as noticed above, we also deem it
G      expedient in the interest of justice to direct and thus it is
       ordered that the parties shall maintain status quo qua
       the lands, namely, 21 acres out of the total area of 63.45
       acres as mentioned at serial no.6. We also direct that
       the said area of21 acres of the land at serial no. 6 shall
H
     MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS                                103
  CONSTRUCTION & DEV P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

  not be alienated and/or transferred in any manner till the          A
  exercise of demarcation is fully carried out in accordance
  with law. Additionally, it is further directed that tile area of
  42.45 acres, said to be encumbered and 21 acres, as
  unencumbered shall be clearly identified and segregated
  in the presence of the parties."                                    B

         12. Though, there is serious dispute between the parties
to the lis whether the said land is unencumbered, finding has
been given by the High Court that 21 acres of land is
unencumbered. The High Court could not have treated 21 acres C
of land as unencumbered one. out of 63.45 acres. It was not
open to the High Court to enter into the aforesaid arena, which
of the property is encumbered and to be sold in realization of
debt is the outlook of the Recovery Officer, ORT, Delhi, where
the recovery proceedings are pending, including the objections D
                     .                            .n1;.
preferred by the Builder.

         13. In our opinion, it was not open to the Builder to file a
writ application for the aforesaid reliefs. Though the second
relief had been abandoned at the time of final arguments but E
the first relief could not have been granted witho'ut going into
the said question. The High Court in writ jurisdiction has made
a declaration that the property 21 acres"of land is
unencumbered. The High Court could not have adjudicated
on the property rights under the guise of directing Avas Evam F
Vikas Parishad to demarcate the land and give findfng that it
was unencumbered land. The High Court has erred in law in
giving a finding on merits on effect of exchange and that section
70 of TP Act is not applicable. It was not the functi~n of the
High Court to decide these questions under writ jurisdiction. G
Section 70 of the TP Act is extracted hereunder :

  ."70. Accession to mortgaged property.-lf, after the date
   of a mortgage, any accession is made to the mortgaged
   property, the mortgagee, in the absence of a contract to           H
104       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A      the contrary, shall, for the purposes of the security, be
       entitled to such accession."
                    ~-

           14. We could have decided the aforesaid question
  finally. However, we refrain from doing so as, in our opinion, it
B was not open to the High Court to take up these questions
  under writ jurisdiction and to declare the properties as
  unencumbered. It was for the parties to agitate the questions
  before the ORT where the recovery proceedings are pending
  at the instance of HUDCO with whom the property had been
C mortgaged by the Trust.

           15. Prima facie, we are of the view that on the strength
  of the agreement to sell, particularly when possession had not
  been handed over to the Builder, it was not open to him to file
o a writ application for demarcation of the property as
  unencumbered property or otherwise. What was sought to be
  achieved by filing a writ petition, was to get rid of the
  proceedings pending before the Recovery Officer. ORT at
  Delhi, and tO' save land at serial No.6 from being sold which
E includes 21 acres of land, and an attempt was made to getthe
  21 acres of land declared as unencumbered one. As a matter
  of fact, sue~, ~isputed questions with respect to the properties
  inter se between the Builder and the Trust as to demarcation,
  writ petition could not be said to be appropriate remedy,
F particularly when the order passed by the Recovery Officer,
  ORT, was not in question and the order passed by the ORT,
  Delhi, could not have been questioned before the Lucknow
  Bench of High Court of Allahabad.
               '"
G         16. It was submitted on behalf of the Builder that the
  writ petition was filed before the Lucknow Bench of the High
  Court of Allahabad as the Head Office of Avas Evam Vikas
  Parishad is located at Lucknow and part of the cause of action
  has arisen at Lucknow. In view of the fact that the Avas Evam
H Vikas Parishad had exchanged the 21 acres of land with the
      ·MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS                               105
   CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

Trust and it had a statutory duty enjoined under section 15 of         A
the Adhiniyam of 1965 so as to conduct survey and demarcate
the land. In our considered opinion, no part of the cause of
action to the Builder has arisen at Lucknow where the Head
Office of Avas Evam Vikas Parishad is situateo. Avas Evam
Vikas Parishad was not at all answerable to the Builder. As            B
way-back in the year 2007, much before agreement to sell
was entered into, it had exchanged its 21 acres of land with
the Trust. Moreover, no application }'Jas ever filed by the Builder
toAvas Evam Vikas Parishad for seeking demarcation of the
land. Thus, in case of dispute inter se between the Builder            C
and the Trust based upon subsequent agreement to sale
entered into in 2010, there was no right available to the Builder
to askAvas Evam Vikas Parishad to demarcate the land which
it had already given to the Trust. After the 21 acres of land had      D
been given to the Trust, Avas Evam Vikas.:.i;>e,rishad had
nothing to do with that land. This, it was a wholly misconceived
venture on the part of the Builder to ask Avas Evam Vikas
Parishad to demarcate the land given to the Trust,  " particularly
when the Parishad was not having any housing scheme with               E
respect to the land which had been given to tbe Ju..1st.

         Thus, filing of the writ petition at Lucknow. Bench was
totally uncalled for and the propriety required that it should not
have been entertained at Lucknow Bench. Merely because F
the transfer petition filed in this court for transfer of case was
withdrawn and the direction was issued by the Chief Justice
of High Court to decide at an early date, would not confer
jurisdiction on Bench at Lucknow, all the questions had been
left open to be agitated at the time of hearing. In our opinion, G
Bench at Lucknow ought not to have entertained the petition
as it lacked the jurisdiction.

      17. With respect to the jurisdiction of the Lucknow Bench,
the Builder has relied upon the decision of this Court in Sri H
106       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A Nasiruddin etc. v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal etc.
  (1975 (2) SCC 671]. Reliance has been placed upon paras
  37 and 38 and the same are reproduced hereunder:

       "37. The conclusion as well as the reasoning of the High
B      Court is incorrect. It is unsound because the expression
       "cause of action" in an application under Article 226 would
       be as the expression is understood and if the cause of
       action arose because of the appellate order or the
       revisional order which came to be passed at Lucknow
c      then Lucknow would have jurisdiction though the original
       order was passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh.
       It may be that the original order was in favour of the person
      applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate
      order might be the cause of action. The expression
D     "cause of action" is well- known. If the cause of action
      arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified
      Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If
      the cause-Of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh
      areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would
E      have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause
      of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh
      it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to
      have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to
      go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In
F
      such cases, it is incorrect to say that the litigant chooses
      any particular Court. The choice is by reason of the
      jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of cause
      of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court.
G     Similarly, ifthe cause of action can be said to have arisen
      partly within specified areas in Oudh and partly outside
      the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice
      to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow.
      The Court will find out in each case whether the jurisdiction
H     of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of
   MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS                            107
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

action.                                                         A

38. To sum up, our conclusions are as follows. First, there
is no permanent seat of the High Court atAllahabad. The
seats atAllahabad and at Lucknow may be changed in
accordance with the provisions of the Order. Second,            B
the Chief Justice of the High Court has no power to
increase or decrease the areas in Oudh from time to
time. The areas in Oudh have been determined once by
the Chief Justice and, therefore, there is no scope for
changing the areas. Third, the Chief Justice has power          c
under the second proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order
to direct in his discretion that any case or class of cases
arising in Oudh areas shall be heard at Allahabad. Any
case or class of cases are those which are instituted at
Lucknow. The interpretation given by the High Court that        D
the word "heard" confers powers on the Chief Justice to
order that any case or class of cases arising in Oudh
areas shall be instituted or filed at Allahabad inst~ad of
Lucknow is wrong. The word "heard" means that cases
which have already been instituted or filed at Lus;,!<now       E
may in the discretion of the Chief Justice under the second
proviso to paragraph 14 of the Order be directed;tQ be
heard at Allahabad. Fourth, the expression "cause of
action" with regard to a civil matter means that it should
                                                                F
be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench
or at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action
arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the
cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas then the
Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the         G
cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas
in Oudh then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause
of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and
part of the cause of action arises outside the specified
areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case        H
108       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A      appropriately to 2ttract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow
      or at Allahabad. Fifth, a criminal case arises where the
      offence has been committed or otherwise as provided
      in the Criminal Procedure Code. That will attract the
      jurisdiction of the Court at Allahabad or Lucknow. In some
B     cases depending on the facts and the provision regarding
      jurisdiction, it may arise in either place."

          18. Learned counsel for the appellants has strongly
  relied upon the decision of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas
C Commission v: Utpal Kumar Basu & Ors. [1994 (4) SCC 711}
  as follows:

       "12. Pointing out that after the issuance of the notification
       by the State Government under Section 52( 1) of the Act,
D      the notified land became vested in the State Government
       free from all encumbrances and hence it was not
       necessary for the respondents to plead the service of
       notice under Section 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate
       direction or order under Article 226 for quashing the
E      notification acquiring the land. This Court, therefore, held
       that no part of the cause of action arose within the
      jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. This Court deeply
       regretted and deprecated the practice prevalent in the
       High Court of exercising jurisdiction and passing
F      interlocutory orders in matters where it lacked territorial
      jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the strong observations
      made by this Court in the aforesaid decision and in the
      earlier decisions referred to therein, we are distressed
      that the High Court of Calcutta persists in exercising
G     jurisdiction even in cases where no part of the cause 6f
      action arose within its territorial jurisdiction. It is indeed
      a great pity that one of the premier High Courts of the
      country should appear to have developed a tendency to
      assume jurisdiction on the sole ground that the petitioner
H
   MAHARAJ I EDUCATIONAL TRUST v. SGS                             109
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

before it resides in or carries on business from a                 A
registered office in the State of West Bengal. We feel all
the more pained that notwithstanding the observations
of this Court made time and again, some of the learned
Judges continue to betray that tendency. Only recently
while disposing of appeals arising out of SLP Nos.                 B
10065-66 of 1993, Aligarh Muslim University and Anr.
v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. and Anr.,
[1994 (4) SCC 71 OJ this Court observed:

    "We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court           c
    of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a
    case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction."

  In that case, the contract in question was executed at
 Aligarh, the constructjon work was to be carried out at           D
 Aligarh, the contracts provided that in the event of dispute
 the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction, the Arbitrator
. was appointed atAligarh and was to function atAligarh
  and yet merely because the respondent was a Calcutta
  based firm, it instituted proceedings in the Calcutta High
  Court and the High Court exercised jurisdiction where it
  had none whatsoever. It must be remembered that the
  image and prestige of a Court depends on how the
  members of that institution conduct themselves. If an
 impression gains ground that even in cases which fall             F
 outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, certain
 members of the Court would be willing to exercise
 jurisdiction on the plea that some event, however trivial
 and unconnected with the cause of action had occurred
 within the jurisdiction of the said Court, litigants would       G
 seek to abuse the process by carrying the cause before
 such members giving rise to avoidable suspicion. That
 would lower the dignity of the institution and put the entire
 system to ridicule. We are greatly pained to say so but if
                                                                   H
110       . SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A       we do not strongly deprecate the growing tendency we
        will, we are afraid, be failing in our duty to the institution
        and the system of administration of justice. We do hope
        that we will not have another occasion to deal with such
        a situation."
B
            19. Reliance has also been placed on National Textile
      Corporation Ltd. & Ors. v. Haribox Swalram & Ors. [2004 (9)
      sec 786] as follows:
c       "10. Under clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution,
        the High Court is empowered to issue writs, orders or
        directions to any Government, authority or person
        exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within
        which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the
D       exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of
        such Government or authority or the residence of such
        person is not within those territories. Cause of action as
        understood in the civil proceedings means every fact
        which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to
E       prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the
        court. To put it in a different way, it is the bundle of facts
        which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the
        plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. In Union of
        India v. Adani Exports Ltd. [2002 (1) SCC 567] in the
F       context of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, it
        has been explained that each and every fact pleaded in
        the writ petition does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion
        that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the
        court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded
G       are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that
        is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with
        the lis or dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to
        a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on
        the court concerned. Asimilar question was examined in
H
    MAHARAJ I EDUCATIONAL TRUST v. SGS                            111
 CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

  State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties [1985 (3) SCC            A
  217]. Here certain properties belonging to a company
  which had its registered office in Calcutta were sought
  to be acquired in Jaipur and a notice under Section 52 ·
  of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act was served
  upon the company at Calcutta. The question which arose           B
  for consideration was whether the service of notice at
  the head office of the company at Calcutta could give
  rise to a cause of action within the State of West Bengal
· to enable the Calcutta High Court to exercise jurisdiction
  in a matter where challenge to acquisition proceedings           c
  conducted in Jaipur was made. It was held thatthe entire
  cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land
  under Section 152 of the Rajasthan Act arose within the
  territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court and it
                                                                   D
  was not necessary for the company to plead the service
  of notice upon them at Calcutta for grant of appropriate
  writ, order or direction under Article 226 of the
  Constitution for quashing the notice issued by the
  Rajasthan Government under Section 52 of the Act. It             E
  was thus held that the Calcutta High Court had no
  jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
                           xx xx x ...,., '

 12.1. As discussed earlier, the mere fact that the writ           F
 petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply
 to the correspondence made by it was received at
 Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of action and,
 therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to
 entertain the writ petition and the view to the contrary taken    G
 by the Division Bench cannot be sustained. In view of the
 above finding, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
 However, in order to avoid any further harassment to the
 parties .and to put an end to the litigation, we would
                                                                   H
112       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A     examine the matter on merits as well."

          20. Reliance has also been placed with respect to
  jurisdiction of the High Court in the decision of this Court in
  Alchemist Ltd. & Anr. v. State Bank of Sikkim & Ors. [2007
B (11) SCC 335] as follows:

      "20. It may be stated that the expression "cause of action"
      has neither been defined in the Constitution nor in the
      Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It may, however, be
c     described as a bundl~ of essential facts necessary for
      the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed. Failure to
      prove such facts would give the defendant a right to
      judgment in his favour. Cause of action thus gives
      occasion for and forms the foundation of the suit.
D
                                 xxxxx
      22. For every action, there has to be a cause of action. If
      there is no cause of action, the plaint or petition has to
      be dismissed.
E
                                  xxxxx

      25. The learned cour;isel for the respondents referred to
      several decisions of this Court and submitted that
F     y.ihether a particular fact constitutes a cause of action or
      not must be decided on the basis of the facts and
      circumstances of each case. In our judgment, the test is
      whether a particular fact(s) is (are) of substance and can
      be said to be material, integral or essential part of the /is
G     between the parties. If it is, it forms a part of cause of
      action. If it is not, it does not form a part of cause of action.
      It is also well settled that in determining the question, the
      substance of the matter and not the form thereof has to
      be considered.
H
      MAHARAJ I EDUCATIONAL TRUST v. SGS                        113
   CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

                          xxxxx                                  A

  38. In the present case, the facts which have been
  pleaded by the appellant Company, in our judgment,
  cannot be said to be essential, integral or material facts
  so as to constitute a part of "cause of action" within the     B
  meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution. The High
  Court, in our opinion, therefore. was not wrong in
  dismissing the petition."
                                    .......
       21. Reliance was also place9 1 on the decision of this    c
Court in Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Ors. v. Ka/yan Banerjee
[2008 (3) sec 456) to the' following effect :

  "13. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of the
  Calcutta High Court that the entire cause of action arose
                                                                 D
  in Mugma area within the State of Jharkhand, we are of
  the opinion that only because the head office of the
  appellant Company was situated in the State of West
  Bengal, the same by itself will not confer any jurisdiction
  upon the Calcutta High Court, particularly when the head       E
  office had nothing to do with the order of punishment
  passed against the respondent."

        22. We have held that no part of the cause of action
has arisen at Lucknow, and itwas notthefunction ofAvas Evam F
Vikas Parishad to demarcate the property in case of dispute
between private party or for the purpose of proceeding before
the ORT and that the property was situated in the district of
Ghaziabad which is not under territorial jurisdiction of Bench
at Lucknow. Thus, the writ petition was not maintainable at G
Lucknow Bench.

       23. Apart from that, we find that there is no merit in the
submission that the Housing Board could have demarcated
the land in exercise of powers within the purview of section 15 H
114       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A of the Act of 1965. The objective of the Act of 1965 is to tackle
  the housing and development problems of urban areas. The
  objective of the Act is extracted hereunder:

       "Migration of people from rural to urban area, influx of
B      displaced persons, increasing impact of the development
       activity generated by the Five Year Plans and several
       other factors have resulted in rapid increase of population
       in towns of this State. Construction of new houses and
       the planned development of towns has, however, not kept
C      pace with this rapid increase of urban population. The
       efforts in this direction made by the State Government,
       Nagar Mahapalikas, Nagar Palikas, Improvement Trusts,
       Development Board and other Smaller Local Bodies
       have, for want of effective co-ordination and control, not
D      met with the desired success. The said local bodies with
       their limited resources and know-how and due to other
       factors have not been able to relieve the housing
       shortage and to undertake the requisite development of
       land. There are areas in this State with immense
E      potentialities of development, but they still remain as they
       were a decade or so back. It is now considered absolutely
       essential for tackling the housing and development
       problems of practically all the fast growing urban areas,
       and areas with potentialities of development, that an
F
       autonomous central body to be known as Housing and
       Development Board be created for the whole State. A
       Comprehensive Bill, called the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam
       Vikas Parishad Vidheyak has accordingly been prepared
G      to provide for the establishment, incorporation and
      ·functioning of a Housing and Development Board in this
       State. This bill is being introduced accordingly."

        24. The provision~ of section 15 of Adhiniyam of 1965
H have been relied upon. Same are extracted below:
   MAHARAJ I EDUCATIONAL TRUST v. SGS                            115
CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

"15. Functions of the Board.-(1) Subject to the                   A
provisions of this Act and the rules and regulations, the
functions of the Board shall be-

   (a)    To frame and execute housing and
   improvement schemes and other projects;                        B
  (b)       To plan and co-ordinate various housing
  activities in the State and to ensure expeditious and
  efficient implementation of housing and improvement
  schemes in the State;                                           c
                               '
  (c)     To provide technical advice for and scrutinise
  various projects under housing and improvement
  schemes sponsored or assisted by Central
  Government or the State Government;
                                                                  D
  (d)      To assume management of such immovable
  properties belonging to the State Government as may
  be transferred or entrusted to it for this purpose;

  (e)      To maintain, use, allot, lease, or otherwise           E
  transfer plots, buildings and other properties of the
  Board or of the State Government placed under the
  control and managementofjhe Board;

  (f) To organise and run workshops and stores for the            F
  manufacture and stockpiling of building materials;

  (g)     On such terms and conditions as may be
  agreed upon between the Board and the State
  Government, to declare houses constructed by it in              G
  execution of any scheme to be houses subject to the
  U.P. Industrial Housing Act, 1955 (U.P. Act XXlll of
  1955);

  (h)      To regulate building operations;
                                                                  H

                                                            •.
116      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015) 7 S.C.R.


A       (i)      To improve and clear slums;

        0) To provide roads, electricity, sanitation, water supply
        and other civic amenities and essential services in
        areas developed by it;
B
        (k)      To acquire movable and immovable
        properties for any of the purposes before mentioned;

        (I) To raise loans from the market, to obtain grants and
        loans from the State Government, the Central
c       Government, local authorities and other public
        corporations, and to give grants and loans to local
        authorities, other public corporations, housing co-
        operative societies and other persons for any of the
        purposes before mentioned;
D
        (m)      To make investigation, examination or survey
        of any property or contribute towards the cost of any
        such investigation, examination or survey made by any
        local authority or the State Government;
E
        (n)      To levy betterment fees;

        (o)      To fulfil any other obligation imposed by or
        under this Act or any other law for the time being in
F       force; and

        (p)     To do all such other acts and things as may
        be necessary for tlie discharge of the functions before
        mentioned.
G     (2) Subjectto the provisions of this Act and the rules and
      regulations, the Board may undertake, where it deems
      necessary, any of the following functions, namely-

        (a) To promote research forthe purpose of expediting
H       the construction of and reducing the cost of buildings;
      MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS                         117
   CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

      (b) To execute works in the State on behalf of public      A
      institutions, local authorities and other public
      corporations, and departments of the Central
      Government and the State Government;

      (c) To supply and sell building materials;                 B

      (d) To co-ordinate, simplify and standardise the
      production of building materials and to encourage and
      organise the prefabrication and mass production of
      structural components;                                     c
     (e) With a view to facilitating the movement of the
     population in and around any city, municipality, town
     area or notified area, to establish, maintain and
     operate any transport service, to construct widen,
                                                                 D
     strengthen or otherwise improve roads and bridges
     and to give financial help to others for such purposes;

     (f) To do all such other acts and things as may be
     necessary for the discharge of the functions before
     mentioned."                                                 E

       25. Chapter Ill of Adhiniyam of 1965 deals with the
powers and functions of the Board constituted under section
3. Section 15 deals with the functioning of the Board and the
provisions of the Act. It is crystal clear from the provisions of F
section 15 that the power to make investigation, examination
or survey of any property is to be exercised by the Board in
connection with its functions enjoined in the Act. The power is
not general in nature. Section 18 deals with types of housing
schemes. Sections 19 to 27 deal in details with the schemes G
provided in section 18(1 )(a) to (i). Other sections 28 to 49 deal
with acquisitions, framing of schemes, its execution, transfer
of property to Board, streets, square etc.

       26. It is apparent from the scheme of the Adhiniyam of H
118       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 7 S.C.R.


A 1965 that.the provisions contained in section 15(1)(m) are not
  to be read in isolation but with reference to the objectives of
  the Adhiniyam of 1965 and its functions relating to housing
  and development issues.

B         27. The principle of noscitur a socii will be applicable
  in construing Section 15 of the Act and the words-"to make
  investigation, examination or survey of any property" in section
  15(1 )(m) will take their meaning and colour from the other
  phrases employed in section 15( 1). As held by this Court in
C Roh it Pulp & Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise,
  Baroda (1990 (3) SCC 447]:

      "12. The principle of statutory interpretation by which a
      generic word receives a limited interpretation by reason
o     of its context is well established. In the context with which
      we are concerned, we can legitimately draw upon the
      "noscitur a sociis" principle. This expression simply
      means that "the meaning of a word is to be judged by the
      company it keeps." Gajendragadkar, J. explained the
E     scope of the rule in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor
      Sabha (1960 (2) SCR 866) in the following words: (SCR
      pp. 873-74)

         "This rule, according to Maxwell, means that, when
F        two or more words which are susceptible of
         analogous meaning are coupled together they are
         understood to be used in their cognate sense. They
         take as it were their colour from each other, that is,
         the more general is restricted to a sense analogous
G        to a less general. The same rule is thus interpreted
         in "Words and Phrases" (Vol. XIV, p. 207).
         "Associated words take their meaning from one
         another under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the
         philosophy of which is that the meaning of a doubtful
H        word may be ascertained by reference to the
     MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS                           119
  CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

      meaning of words associated with it; such doctrine         A
      is broader than the maxim ejusdem generis" In fact
     the latter maxim "is only an illustration or specific
     application of the broader maxim noscitur a sociis".
     The argument is that certain essential features of
     attributes are invariably associated with the words         B
     "business and trade" as understood in the popular
     and conventional sense, and it is the colour of these
     attributes which is taken by the other words used in
     the definition though their normal import may be
     much wider. We are not impressed by this                    c
     argument. It must be borne in mind that noscitur a
     sociis is merely a rule of construction and it am not
     prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider
     words have been deliberately used in ordertQ:fTlake
                                                                 D
     the scope of the defined word correspondingly
     wider. It is only where the intention of the legislature
     in associating wider words with words of narrower
     significance is doubtful, or otherwise not cle~r that
     the present rule of construction can be usefully            E
     applied. It can also be applied where the meaning
     of the words of wider import is doubtful, but, where
     the object of the legislature in using wider words is
     clear and free of ambiguity, the rule of construction
     in question cannot be pressed into service."                F
  This principle has been applied in a number of contexts
  in judicial decisions where the court is clear in its mind
  that the larger meaning of the word in question could not
  have been intended in the context in which it has been         G
  used." ·.

      28. The Trust has submitted ~n application for limited
purpose of approval of site plan of housing society to Avas
Evam Vikas Parishad which was not pressed by it. The said H
          /

      I
120       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2015] 7 S.C.R.
               ·.ii'




A application Yt.as not for the purpose of demarcation and would
  not enure to the benefit of the Builder. The objective of builder
  in writ petition was to get land demarcated as unencumbered.

         29. For the purpose of demarcation the remedy is
B available before the concerned authority under section 24 of
  the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006. Section 24 of the
  Code is extracted below:

      "24. Disputes regarding boundaries.- (1) The Sub-
c     Divisional Officer may, on his own motion or on an
      application made in this Qehalf by a person interested,
      decide, by summary inquiry, any dispute regarding
      boundaries on the basis of existing survey map or, where
      the same is not possible, in accordance with the
D     provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings
      Act, 1953, on the basis of such map.

      (2) If in the course of an inquiry into a dispute under sub-
      section J1 ), the Sub-Divisional Officer is unable to satisfy
E     himself as to which party is in possession or if it is shown
      that possession has been obtained by wrongful
      dispossession of the lawful occupant, within a period of
      three months preceding the commencement of the
      inquiry, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall-
F
      (a) in the first case, ascertain by summary inquiry who is
      the person best entitled to the property, and shall put such
      person in possession.
      (b) i.n the second case, put the person so dispossessed
G     in possession, and for that purpose use or cause to be
      used such force as may be necessary an shall then fix
      the boundary accordingly.

      (3) Every proceeding under this section shall, as far as
H     possible, be concluded by the Sub-Divisional Officer
      MAHARAJ! EDUCATIONAL TRUSTv. SGS                              121
   CONSTRUCTION & DEV. P. LTD. [ARUN MISHRA, J.]

   within six months from the date of the application.               A

   (4) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Sub-
   Divisional Officer may prefer an appeal before the
   Commissioner within 30 days of the date of such order.
   The order of the Commissioner shall be final."                    B

       The corresponding provision in the U.P. Land Revenue
Act, 1901 was section 41. The recourse to provision of the
Adhiniyam of 1965 in such cases was not available.

          30. It was also submitted on behalf of the appellants C
  that the agreement which was entered into between the Trust
  and the Builder was required to be registerediunder the
  provisions of the Registration Act as per Section 17 read with
. section 49 of the Registration Act as applicable;:in U.P. and D
  section 3 read with section 54 of the TP Act. We decline to
  entertain and examine the submissions as it would not be
  proper to do so in the present proceedings ancfas effect of
  non-registration and validity of registration made subsequently
  has been questioned in Writ Petition [CJ No:3S596/2013 E
  pending consideration before the High Court of Allahabad.
  Thus, it is for the High Court to adjudicate upon the aforesaid
  questions.

        31. In view of the afore discussion, we allow the appeals, F
set aside the judgment and order pass~d by the Lucknow
Bench of the High Court of Allahabad, and dismiss the writ
petition filed by the Builder - respondent No.1·:... with costs
quantified at Rs.5 lakhs to be paid to the Supreme Court Legal
Services Committee, within a period of six weeks from today. G

Devika Gujral                                    Appeals allowed.