Holding

Clause 15 of the contract and the CIL policy letter do not constitute an arbitration agreement, so the High Court could not exercise jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Summary

Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd., a subsidiary of Coal India Ltd., entered into a contract with IVRCL AMR Joint Venture for road works. The contract contained Clause 15 titled “Settlement of Disputes/Arbitration”, which the respondent invoked to issue a notice of arbitration and later sought appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The High Court appointed a sole arbitrator, holding that Clause 15 created an arbitration agreement. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the definition of an arbitration agreement under Sections 2(b) and 7 of the Act and applied the principles from Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander, concluding that Clause 15 was merely a company‑level dispute‑resolution mechanism and did not contain the essential attributes of an arbitration agreement. The Court also rejected a policy letter issued by Coal India Ltd. as an arbitration agreement. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and allowed the appeal, holding that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 11(6) was not valid.

Issues considered

What constitutes an arbitration agreement under Sections 2(b) and 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?
Whether Clause 15 of the Contract Agreement between the parties creates a valid arbitration agreement?
Whether the policy document issued by Coal India Ltd. on 7 April 2017 can be treated as an arbitration agreement?
Whether the High Court was justified in exercising jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act?

Legislation cited

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 11(6), s. 2(b), s. 7

Subjects

Arbitration agreementSection 11(6) jurisdictionDispute resolution clauseContract interpretationArbitration and Conciliation ActPublic sector undertakingPolicy document

Judgment

522 [2022]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 7 S.C.R. 522 [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A MAHANADI COALFIELDS LTD & ANR
v.
M/s IVRCL AMR JOINT VENTURE
(Civil Appeal No. 4914 of 2022)
B JULY 25, 2022
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
A S BOPANNA, JJ.]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss. 2(b), 7 and 11(6)
– Arbitration agreement – Attributes – Contract Agreement entered
C
between appellant (a subsidiary of CIL) and respondent on 30
January 2012 – Dispute between the parties – Invocation of
jurisdiction u/s.11(6) by respondent before the High Court for
appointment of arbitrator – Challenged, on ground that there was
no arbitration agreement between the parties within meaning of
D ss.2(b) and 7 – Held: It was wrong on the part of the High Court to
construe Clause 15 of the Contract Agreement dated 30 January
2012 as an arbitration agreement – Clause 15 of the Contract
Agreement was titled “Settlement of Disputes/Arbitration”, however,
substantive part of the provision makes it abundantly clear that
there was no arbitration agreement between the parties agreeing to
E
refer either present or future disputes to arbitration – Clause 15 of
the Contract Agreement was a dispute resolution mechanism at the
company level, rather than an arbitration agreement and did not
comport with the essential attributes of an arbitration agreement in
terms of s.7 as well as the principles laid down under Jagdish Chander
F case – Policy document / communication dated 7 April 2017 issued
by CIL also cannot be construed as an arbitration agreement
between appellants and respondent in terms of s.7 of the Act so as
to compel the appellants to appoint an arbitrator, since it merely
indicates a desire on behalf of CIL to have disputes related to work
contracts settled by arbitration and requires both the parties to
G
arrive at a further agreement to proceed to arbitration when the
dispute arises – Invocation of jurisdiction of the High Court u/
s.11(6) of the Act was accordingly not valid and there being no
arbitration agreement between the appellants and the respondent,
no reference to arbitration could have been made – Respondent,
H
522
MAHANADI COALFIELDS LTD & ANR v. M/s IVRCL AMR 523
JOINT VENTURE

however, at liberty to seek recourse to remedy available in law to A
pursue redressal of its grievances.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. Section 2(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 defines an arbitration agreement to mean an agreement
as referred to in Section 7. In terms of Section 7, an arbitration B
agreement is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration
all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise
between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether
contractual or not. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 stipulates that an
arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause C
in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement. In terms of
sub-section (3) of Section 7, the arbitration agreement has to be
in writing. [Para 8][527-G-H; 528-A]
2. In the present case, clause 15 of the Contract Agreement
is titled “Settlement of Disputes/Arbitration”. However, the D
substantive part of the provision makes it abundantly clear that
there is no arbitration agreement between the parties agreeing
to refer either present or future disputes to arbitration. Clause
15 of the Contract Agreement is a dispute resolution mechanism
at the company level, rather than an arbitration agreement.
Consequently, in case of a dispute, the respondent was supposed E
to write to the Engineer-in-charge for resolving the dispute.
Clause 15 does not comport with the essential attributes of an
arbitration agreement in terms of section 7 of the 1996 Act as
well as the principles laid down under Jagdish Chander case. A
plain reading of the clause leaves no manner of doubt about its F
import. There is no written agreement to refer either present or
future disputes to arbitration. Neither does the substantive part
of the clause refer to arbitration as the mode of settlement, nor
does it provide for a reference of disputes between the parties to
arbitration. It does not disclose any intention of either party to
make the Engineer-in-Charge, or any other person for that matter, G
an arbitrator in respect of disputes that may arise between the
parties. Further, the said clause does not make the decision of
the Engineer-in-Charge, or any other arbitrator, final or binding
on the parties. Therefore, it was wrong on the part of the High
H
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A Court to construe clause 15 of the Contract Agreement as an
arbitration agreement. [Paras 10, 13][530-E; 531-D-G]
Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander (2007) 5 SCC
719 : [2007] 5 SCR 720 – relied on
3. On 7th April, 2017, CIL issued a policy document to its
B General Managers for the settlement of disputes or differences
arising out of works and services contracts through arbitration.
The communication dated 7 April 2017 however merely indicates
a desire on behalf of CIL to have disputes related to work contracts
settled by arbitration. It requires both the parties to arrive at a
C further agreement to proceed to arbitration when the dispute
arises. Therefore, in view of the principles laid down in Jagdish
Chander case, following a line of precedent, clause 5 in the
aforesaid communication cannot be construed as an arbitration
agreement between the appellants and the respondent in terms
of section 7 of the 1996 Act so as to compel the appellants to
D appoint an arbitrator. [Paras 14 and 17][531-H; 532-A; 533-B-C]
4. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court under
Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act was not valid and there being no
arbitration agreement between the appellants and the respondent,
no reference to arbitration could have been made. The respondent
E would, however, be at liberty to seek recourse to the remedy
available in law to pursue the redressal of its grievances. [Para
19][533-E-F]
K. K. Modi v. K. N. Modi (1998) 3 SCC 573 : [1998]
1 SCR 601; Bharat Bhushan Bansal v. U.P. Small
F Industries Corpn. Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 166 : [1999]
1 SCR 181; Bihar State Mineral Development Corpn
v. Encon Builders (I) (P) Ltd. (2003) 7 SCC 418 : [2003]
2 Suppl. SCR 812; State of Orissa v. Damodar Das
(1996) 2 SCC 216 : [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 800 and IB
G Valley Transport, Vijay Laxmi (P) Ltd. v. Mahanadi
Coalfields Ltd. (2014) 10 SCC 630 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2007] 5 SCR 720 relied on Para 9

H
MAHANADI COALFIELDS LTD & ANR v. M/s IVRCL AMR 525
JOINT VENTURE

[1998] 1 SCR 601 referred to Para 9 A
[1999] 1 SCR 181 referred to Para 9
[2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 812 referred to Para 9
[1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 800 referred to Para 9
(2014) 10 SCC 630 referred to Para 12 B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4914
of 2022.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2019 of the High Court
of Orissa at Cuttack in ARBP No. 44 of 2018.
C
K. K. Venugopal, AG, Soumyajit Pani, Siddharth Jain, Advs. for
the Appellants.
S. Niranjan Reddy, Sr. Adv., Polanki Gowtham, Amitabh Sinha,
Sanjay Mishra, Ajit Yadav, Ms. Divya Roy, Advs. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by D

DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd., is a subsidiary of Coal
India Limited1. The respondent, IVRCL AMR Joint Venture, is a joint E
venture of engineering contractors engaged in the business of
infrastructure development. On 11 October 2010, the appellant floated
an e-tender for the work of strengthening and widening of a coal
transportation road at the Talcher Coalfields in the State of Orissa. The
respondent was the successful bidder and was awarded a work order F
on 14 December 2011. A ‘Contract Agreement’ was entered into
between the parties on 30 January 2012, in terms of which the work
order was to be executed between 16 January 2012 and 14 January
2015.
3. In a meeting held on 28 June 2012, the appellant advised the
G
respondent to expedite the mobilization of resources to start the work
immediately. Later, the appellant sent a series of letters to the respondent
requesting it to expedite the work as per the work schedule. In 2013 and
2014, the appellant served several notices to the respondent when the

1
“CIL’’ H
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A latter failed to adhere to the work schedule. Ultimately, the appellant
terminated the work order on 15 May 2014 allegedly on account of
delay in completing the work and the inability of the respondent to meet
the work schedule.
4. Thereafter, on 12 October 2017 the respondent raised a claim
B of Rs. 128,65,12,688 enumerating the latches and delays on the part of
the appellant. The claim was rejected by the appellant on 18 December
2017. Subsequently, the respondent issued a notice of arbitration to the
appellant by a letter dated 9 April 2018 in terms of clause 15 of the
Contract Agreement. Through the said arbitration notice, the respondent
called upon the appellant to give its consent to the appointment of Justice
C Asok Kumar Ganguly as the sole arbitrator. Having received no response
from the appellant to the arbitration notice within 15 days, the respondent
filed an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 19962 before the High Court of Orissa.
5. On 29 November 2019, a Single Judge of the High Court of
D Orissa allowed the application under Section 11 of the 1996 Act by
appointing a sole arbitrator. The relevant extracts of the High Court’s
decision read as follows:
“3. Learned counsel for both the sides do not dispute the fact that
Clause 15 of the contract agreement provides for “Settlement of
E dispute/Arbitration” in case there is any dispute or difference
between the parties.
4. Mr. R Sharma, learned counsel for the opposite party has taken
different contentions on merit. He has also brought to the notice
of this Court clause 19 of the letter dated 14.12.2011 (Annexure-
F 3), which reads as under:
“19. That matters relating to any dispute or difference arising
out of the tender, work order and subsequent contract
agreement entered into, based on this tender and work order
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of District Court, Angul
G only.”
5. However, in view of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Mayavati Trading Private Limited vs. Pradyuat
Deb Burman, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 714, the Court has to look

H 2
“1996 Act’’
MAHANADI COALFIELDS LTD & ANR v. M/s IVRCL AMR 527
JOINT VENTURE [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

into the arbitration clause. In that view of the matter, the matter is A
required to be referred to the arbitrator.”
6. Mr K K Venugopal, learned Attorney General for India, appears
on behalf of the appellants, while Mr S Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior
Counsel, appears on behalf of the respondent.
7. The submission which has been urged on behalf of the appellants B
by the learned Attorney General is that clause 15 of the Contract
Agreement dated 30 January 2012 does not constitute an arbitration
agreement. Hence, it has been urged that in the absence of an arbitration
agreement within the meaning of Sections 2(b) and 7 of the 1996 Act,
the very invocation of the jurisdiction under Section 11(6) was not valid. C
In order to appreciate the submission, it would be necessary to extract
clause 15 of the Contract Agreement. The provision reads as follows:
“15. Settlement of Disputes/Arbitration:
15.1 It is incumbent upon the contractor to avoid litigation and
disputes during the course of execution. However, if such D
disputes take place between the contractor and the
department, effort shall be made first to settle the disputes
at the company level. The contractor should make request
in writing to the Engineer-in-Charge for settlement of such
disputes/claims within 30 (thirty) days of arising of the case E
of dispute/claim failing which no disputes/claims of the
contractor shall be entertained by the company.
15.2 If differences still persist, the settlement of the dispute with
Govt. Agencies shall be dealt with as per the Guidelines
issued by the Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India in this F
regard. In case of parties other than Govt. Agencies, the
redressal of the disputes may be sought in the Court of
Law.”
8. Section 2(b) of the 1996 Act defines an arbitration agreement
to mean an agreement as referred to in Section 7. In terms of Section 7,
G
an arbitration agreement is an agreement by the parties to submit to
arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise
between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether
contractual or not. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 stipulates that an arbitration
agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in
the form of a separate agreement. In terms of sub-section (3) of Section H
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A 7, the arbitration agreement has to be in writing. Sub-section (4) of Section
7 then stipulates that:
“(4) An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in-
(a) a document signed by the parties;
B (b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of
telecommunication including communication through
electronic means which provide a record of the agreement;
or
(c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which
C the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and
not denied by the other.”
9. In Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander,3 a two-judge bench
of this Court, while relying upon the earlier decisions in K. K. Modi v.
K. N. Modi,4 Bharat Bhushan Bansal v. U.P. Small Industries
D Corpn. Ltd,5 Bihar State Mineral Development Corpn v. Encon
Builders (I) (P) Ltd., 6 and State of Orissa v. Damodar Das, 7
enumerated the principles governing what constitutes an arbitration
agreement. Justice R V Raveendran, speaking on behalf of the bench,
held that the words used in an arbitration agreement should disclose a
determination and obligation on behalf of parties to refer disputes to
E arbitration. This court held:
“8 (i) The intention of the parties to enter into an arbitration
agreement shall have to be gathered from the terms of the
agreement. If the terms of the agreement clearly indicate an
intention on the part of the parties to the agreement to refer their
F disputes to a private tribunal for adjudication and a willingness to
be bound by the decision of such tribunal on such disputes, it is
arbitration agreement. While there is no specific form of an
arbitration agreement, the words used should disclose a
determination and obligation to go to arbitration and not
merely contemplate the possibility of going for arbitration.
G
Where there is merely a possibility of the parties agreeing
3
(2007) 5 SCC 719
4
(1998) 3 SCC 573
5
(1999) 2 SCC 166
6
(2003) 7 SCC 418
7
H (1996) 2 SCC 216
MAHANADI COALFIELDS LTD & ANR v. M/s IVRCL AMR 529
JOINT VENTURE [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

to arbitration in future, as contrasted from an obligation to A
refer disputes to arbitration, there is no valid and binding
arbitration agreement.
(ii) Even if the words “arbitration” and “Arbitral Tribunal (or
arbitrator)” are not used with reference to the process of settlement
or with reference to the private tribunal which has to adjudicate B
upon the disputes, in a clause relating to settlement of disputes, it
does not detract from the clause being an arbitration agreement if
it has the attributes or elements of an arbitration agreement. They
are: (a) The agreement should be in writing. (b) The parties should
have agreed to refer any disputes (present or future) between
them to the decision of a private tribunal. (c) The private tribunal C
should be empowered to adjudicate upon the disputes in an
impartial manner, giving due opportunity to the parties to put forth
their case before it. (d) The parties should have agreed that the
decision of the private tribunal in respect of the disputes will be
binding on them. D
(iii) Where the clause provides that in the event of disputes arising
between the parties, the disputes shall be referred to arbitration, it
is an arbitration agreement. Where there is a specific and direct
expression of intent to have the disputes settled by arbitration, it is
not necessary to set out the attributes of an arbitration agreement E
to make it an arbitration agreement. But where the clause
relating to settlement of disputes, contains words which
specifically exclude any of the attributes of an arbitration
agreement or contains anything that detracts from an
arbitration agreement, it will not be arbitration agreement.
For example, where an agreement requires or permits an F
authority to decide a claim or dispute without hearing, or
requires the authority to act in the interests of only one of
the parties, or provides that the decision of the authority
will not be final and binding on the parties, or that if either
party is not satisfied with the decision of the authority, he G
may file a civil suit seeking relief, it cannot be termed as an
arbitration agreement.
(iv) But mere use of the word “arbitration” or “arbitrator”
in a clause will not make it an arbitration agreement, if it
requires or contemplates a further or fresh consent of the H
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A parties for reference to arbitration. For example, use of words
such as “parties can, if they so desire, refer their disputes to
arbitration” or “in the event of any dispute, the parties may also
agree to refer the same to arbitration” or “if any disputes arise
between the parties, they should consider settlement by arbitration”
in a clause relating to settlement of disputes, indicate that the
B
clause is not intended to be an arbitration agreement. Similarly, a
clause which states that “if the parties so decide, the disputes
shall be referred to arbitration” or “any disputes between parties,
if they so agree, shall be referred to arbitration” is not an arbitration
agreement. Such clauses merely indicate a desire or hope to
C have the disputes settled by arbitration, or a tentative
arrangement to explore arbitration as a mode of settlement
if and when a dispute arises. Such clauses require the
parties to arrive at a further agreement to go to arbitration,
as and when the disputes arise. Any agreement or clause
in an agreement requiring or contemplating a further
D
consent or consensus before a reference to arbitration, is
not an arbitration agreement, but an agreement to enter
into an arbitration agreement in future.”
(emphasis supplied)
E 10. In the present case, clause 15 of the Contract Agreement is
titled “Settlement of Disputes/Arbitration”. However, the substantive
part of the provision makes it abundantly clear that there is no arbitration
agreement between the parties agreeing to refer either present or future
disputes to arbitration.

F 11. Clause 15.1 contains a reference to the steps to be taken for
settlement of disputes between the parties. Clause 15.2 stipulates that if
differences still persist, the settlement of the disputes with government
agencies shall be dealt with in accordance with the guidelines of the
Ministry of Finance. In the case of parties other than government
agencies, the redressal of disputes has to be sought in a court of law.
G
12. A clause similar to clause 15 of the Contract Agreement in the
present case was considered by a bench of this Court in IB Valley
Transport, Vijay Laxmi (P) Ltd. v. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd
consisting of J Chelameswar and A. K. Sikri, JJ.8 In the said case, the
8
H (2014) 10 SCC 630.
MAHANADI COALFIELDS LTD & ANR v. M/s IVRCL AMR 531
JOINT VENTURE [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

clause was interpreted as an alternative remedy at the company level to A
be exhausted before taking recourse to other suitable legal remedies. It
was observed:
“10. From the aforesaid narration of facts, it becomes clear that
Clause 12 of the general terms and conditions provides for
a mechanism of dispute resolution before resorting to the B
legal remedies. This clause specifically states that it is incumbent
upon the contractor to avoid litigation and disputes during the course
of execution. If any dispute takes place between the
contractor and the department, effort shall be made first to
settle the disputes at the company level. Further, this clause
states that the contractors should make request in writing C
to the Engineer Incharge for settlement of such dispute/
claim within 30 days of arising of cause of dispute/claim.”
(emphasis supplied)
13. The above extract makes it abundantly clear that clause 15 of D
the Contract Agreement is a dispute resolution mechanism at the company
level, rather than an arbitration agreement. Consequently, in case of a
dispute, the respondent was supposed to write to the Engineer-in-charge
for resolving the dispute. Clause 15 does not comport with the essential
attributes of an arbitration agreement in terms of section 7 of the 1996
Act as well as the principles laid down under Jagdish Chander (supra). E
A plain reading of the above clause leaves no manner of doubt about its
import. There is no written agreement to refer either present or future
disputes to arbitration. Neither does the substantive part of the clause
refer to arbitration as the mode of settlement, nor does it provide for a
reference of disputes between the parties to arbitration. It does not F
disclose any intention of either party to make the Engineer-in-Charge, or
any other person for that matter, an arbitrator in respect of disputes that
may arise between the parties. Further, the said clause does not make
the decision of the Engineer-in-Charge, or any other arbitrator, final or
binding on the parties. Therefore, it was wrong on the part of the High
Court to construe clause 15 of the Contract Agreement as an arbitration G
agreement.
14. However, it has been urged on behalf of the respondent by
Mr S Niranjan Reddy that the first appellant is a subsidiary of CIL. It
has been submitted that on 7 April 2017, CIL issued a policy document
H
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 7 S.C.R.

A to its General Managers for the settlement of disputes or differences
arising out of works and services contracts through arbitration. Clause 5
of the above communication provides as follows:
“Past/existing work order/contract:
5. With regards to dispute/differences cropping up in existing
B work order/contract, employer (department) shall adopt
procedure for settlement of the same, through arbitration
process. As you are aware that neither the CIL Manuals
nor contract document at present contains any clause
regarding arbitration, therefore, dispute/differences cannot
C be referred to arbitration straight away. Hence, before
referring the matter to arbitration, consent of the other party
(contractor) is necessary for redressal of dispute/
differences through arbitration. Once, the contractor agrees
for settlement of dispute/differences arising out of contracts
through arbitration, an agreement may be signed between
D employer and contractor for referring the dispute/
differences to Sole Arbitration by a person appointed by
Competent Authority of CIL/CMD of Subsidiaries (as the
case may be). The rest of the procedure shall be as per the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 as amended by
E Amendment Act of 2015 and also as per instruction
incorporated in clause “Settlement of Disputes through
Arbitration”.”
15. Hence, it is urged that the first appellant being a subsidiary of
CIL and being a public sector undertaking may well consider as to whether
F the disputes which have arisen between the appellants and the respondent
should be referred to arbitration. In this context, the appellants and the
respondent placed reliance on an order dated 20 July 2018 of the Chief
Justice of the High Court of Orissa in Arbitration Petition No 59 of 2016.
16. We are unable to subscribe to the submission which has been
G urged on behalf of the respondent based on the policy letter dated 7
April 2017. The communication which has been issued by CIL refers to
the possibility of a consensual resolution of disputes or differences through
arbitration as neither the CIL manuals nor the contract document, at the
time, contained a clause regarding arbitration. However, it has been
submitted that once the contractor has agreed to settle a dispute through
H
MAHANADI COALFIELDS LTD & ANR v. M/s IVRCL AMR 533
JOINT VENTURE [DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

arbitration, the agreement may be signed between the employer and the A
contractor for reference to arbitration, by a person to be appointed by
the competent authority of CIL or, as the case may be, the Chairman
and Managing Director of the subsidiaries.
17. The communication dated 7 April 2017 merely indicates a
desire on behalf of CIL to have disputes related to work contracts settled B
by arbitration. It requires both the parties to arrive at a further agreement
to proceed to arbitration when the dispute arises. Therefore, in view of
the principles laid down in Jagdish Chander (supra), following a line of
precedent, clause 5 in the aforesaid communication cannot be construed
as an arbitration agreement between the appellants and the respondent
in terms of section 7 of the 1996 Act so as to compel the appellants to C
appoint an arbitrator.
18. The order of the Chief Justice of the High Court of Orissa
dated 20 July 2018 proceeds on an understanding that the learned counsel
for both the sides did not dispute the fact that clause 15 of the Contract
Agreement and clause 5 of the policy decision 7 April 2017 taken by D
CIL provide for appointment of an arbitrator in case there is any dispute
or difference between the parties. The order has, therefore, proceeded
on an understanding of counsel, which in any event cannot be regarded
as a binding statement of law on the existence of an arbitration
agreement. E
19. For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion that
the invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 11(6)
of the 1996 Act was not valid and there being no arbitration agreement
between the appellants and the respondent, no reference to arbitration
could have been made. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside F
the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 29 November
2019. The respondent would, however, be at liberty to seek recourse to
the remedy available in law to pursue the redressal of its grievances.
20. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
G
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeal allowed.
(Assisted by : Rakhi, LCRA)

H