M. VENKATESH AND ORS.versusCOMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

                       (2015] 11S.C.R.454


A                      M. VENKATESH AND ORS.
                                    v.
           COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT
                      AUTHORITY
B                    (Civil Appeal No. 7944 of 2015)
                         SEPTEMBER 24, 2015
                 [T.S. THAKUR, R.K. AGRAWAL AND
                       R. BANUMATHI, JJ.)
c
        Property laws: Vacant land - Claim for settled
  possession - Entitlement for- Held: Not entitled - Question
  of establishing settled possession does not arise in relation
  to the properties that already stood cleared of any structures
D by demolition of whatever stood on the same.

          Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Safe of property post issue
    of preliminary notification is void and non-est giving to the
    vendee the limited right to claim compensation and no more.
E
        Adverse possession: Proof of - Held: Is proved only
    when possession is peaceful, open, continuous and hostile.

           Disposing of the appeals, the Court

F       HELD: 1. Once the High Court recorded a finding
  that the property was vacant as on the date of the filing
  of the suitthere was no question of the plaintiffs claiming
  settled possession of the said property assuming the
  view taken in John B. James case was otherwise legally
G sound since the so called settled possession of the
  appellants in RFA No.911 of 2002 stood vacated from the
  suit schedule property, no prayer for injunction as set
  out in the petition filed by the appellants in those appeals
  could help them for an injunction issues only to protect          ~


H                                                                   ,_
                                   454
    M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV.                  455
                    AUTHORITY

what is in lawful possession of the plaintiffs. Injunction A
could not be claimed when plaintiffs stand dispossessed
from the suit property prior to the filing of the suit. The
question of establishing settled possession did not,
therefore, arise in relation to the properties that already
stood cleared of any structures by demolition of B
whatever stood on the same. The High Court was, in that
view, justified in setting aside the decree passed by the
Trial Court and dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiffs.
[Para 12) [464-B-F]
                                                             c
     John B. James and Ors. v. Bangalore
     Development Authority (2001) 1 KarLJ 364 -
     approved.

      2. The respondents claim to have purchased the         o
suit property in terms of a sale deed dated 22nd August,
1990, i.e. long after the issue of the preliminary
notification published in July 1984. The sale in such
cases is void and non-est in the eyes of law giving to the
Vendee the limited right to claim compensation and no        E
more. [Para 13) [464-G-H; 465-A]

     U.P. Jal Nigam v. Katra Properties Pvt. Ltd. AIR
     1996 SC 1170: 1996 (1) SCR 683; Ajay Kishan
     Singhal v. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 2677: 1996        F
     (4) Suppl. SCR 319; Mahavir and Anr. v. Rural
     Institute, Amravati and Anr. (1995) 5 SCC
     335:1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 421; Gian Chand v.
     Gopala and Ors. (1995) 5·scc 528; Meera Sahni
     v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and Ors. (2008) 9       G
     SCC 177: 2008 (10) SCR 1012; Tika Ram v. State
     of U.P. (2009) 10 SCC 689; Tamil Nadu Housing
     Board v. A. Viswam (dead) by Lrs. AIR 1996 SC
     3377: 1996 (2) SCR 402; Larsen & Toubro Ltd.
                                                             H
456        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A         v. State of Gujarat and Ors. AIR 1998 SC 1608:
          1998 (2) SCR 339 - relied on.

         3. The High Court has remained oblivious of the
   principle of adverse possession. All that the High Court
 8 has found in favour of the plaintiffs is that their
   possession is established. That, however, does not
   conclude the controversy. The question is not just
   whether the plaintiffs were in possession, but whether
   they had by being in adverse possession for the
 C statutory period of 12 years perfected their title. That
   question has neither been adverted to nor answered in
   the judgment impugned in this appeal. Such being the
   case the High Court erred in dismissing the appeal filed
   by the appellant-BOA. The fact that the plaintiffs had not
 D and could not possibly establish their adverse
   possession over the suit property should have resulted
   in dismissal of the suit for an unauthorised occupant had
   no right to claim relief that would perpetuate his illegal
   and unauthorised occupation of property that stood
 E vested in the BOA. (Para 19] (469-G-H; 470-A-C]

          Kamataka Board of Wakfv. Govt. of India (2004)
          10 SCC 779: 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 255; Saroop
          Singh v. Banta (2005) 8 SCC 330: 2005 (4) Suppl.
 F        SCR 253; Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar (1996)
          1 sec 639: 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 638;
          Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Ba/want (1995) 2
          SCC 543: 1995 (1) SCR 88- relied on.

 G                         Case Law Reference
      (2001) 1 KarLJ 364            approved        Para 7
      1996 (1) SCR 683              relied on.      Para 13
 H 1996 (4) Suppl. SCR 319          relied on.      Para 14
        M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV.                   457
                        AUTHORITY

    1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 421          relied on.      Para 14      A
    (1995) 5 sec 528                 relied on.      Para 14
    2008 (10) SCR 1012               relied on.      Para 14
    (2009) 1o sec 689                relied on.      Para 14
                                                                  B
    1996 (2) SCR 402                 relied on.      Para 14
    1998 (2) SCR 339                 relied on.      Para 14
    2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 255          relied on.      Para 15
    2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 253          relied on.      Para 16      c
    1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 638          relied on.      Para 17
    1995 (1) SCR 88                  relied on.      Para 18
         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
                                                                  D
    7944 of2015

         From the Judgment and Order dated 30.05.2012 of the
    High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in RFA No. 912 of 2002

•                                 With                            E

         C.A. Nos. 7945-47, 7948 of 2015

         Rama Jois, Subramayam Jois, G.V. Chandrasekhar, N.
    K. Verma, Anjana Chandrashekar, S. K. Kulkarni, M. Gireesh
                                                                  F
    Kumar, Ankur S. Kulkarni for the appearing parties.

         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted.
                                                                G
         2. These appeals arise out of a common judgment and
    order dated 30 1h May, 2012 passed by a Single Bench of the
    High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore whereby the High Court
    has allowed RFA Nos.912, 914, 915 and 916 of 2002, set
    aside the judgments and orders of the courts below and H
458        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A  dismissed the suits relevant to those appeals. The High Court
   has, at the same time, affirmed the decree passed in OS
   No.6925 of2001 and dismissed RFANo.911 of2002 filed by
   the appellant against the same. The factual backdrop in which
   the suits and the appeals mentioned above came to be filed
 B may be summarised as under:

          3. M. Venkatesh-appellant in SLP (C) No.38601 of 2012
   claimed ownership over the suit schedule property by
   inheritance from his grandfather Munishamappa who is said
 C to have purchased the same under a registered sale-deed
   dated 7th July, 1954. In connected SLP (C) No.12016 of 2013
   Prabhaudas Patel also claimed to be the owner of suit schedule
   property relevant to his suit on the basis of purchase of the
   said property from its previous owner. The aforementioned two
 D parcels of land together with a larger extent in the vicinity were
   acquired by the Bangalore Development Authority ('BOA' For
   short) for the formation of Hosur Road, Sarjapur Layout in terms
   of a preliminary notification dated 17th July, 1984 and a final
   notification dated 28th November, 1986 published on 25th
 E December, 1986, after notices to the Khatedars and the
   persons interested, some of whom had filed their claims before
   the competent authority. Determination of amount of
   compensation payable. to the landowners having been
 F approved by the competent authority on 21st August, 1986,
   the BOA claimed that possession of the land was taken over
   from the landowners and handed over to the engineering
   section of the authority by drawing a possession mahazar on
   6th November, 1987. A Notification under Section 16(2) of the
 G Act was also published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 4th
   July, 1991 which, according to the BOA, signified thatthe land
   in question stood vested with the BOA free from all
   encumbrances whatsoever. The further case of BOA is that
   long after the land had vested in the BOA, sites were carved
 H out and sold to different persons by the erstwhile owners, the
    M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV.                        459
            AUTHORITY[T.S. THAKUR, J.]

unauthorised act of the plaintiffs, however, got vacated and        A
the possession was taken over..

      4. The case of the plaintiffs M. Venkatesh and
Prabhaudas Patel on the other hand was that they were always
in established possession of the suit schedule property owned B
and that apprehending their dispossession from the same they
had approached the High Court along with several others to
restrain the BDA from interfering with their peaceful occupation
of the suit property. Those petitions were disposed of by the
High Court reserving liberty to the writ-petitioners to approach C
the civil court for appropriate relief in a proper civil action. It
was only after the disposal of the said petitions that OS
Nos.3075 of2000, 6925 of2001, 5742 of2001, 7945 of2000
and 5791 of 2001 came to be filed by the aggrieved parties in
which the plaintiffs claimed to be the owners and occupants of D
the suit property and prayed for an order restraining the BOA
from interfering with their peaceful occupation. Plaintiffs also
claimed that they had the title over the suit schedule property
by prescription.
                                                                     E
       5. The suits aforementioned were contested by the
defendant-BOA in which they, inter alia, claimed that the suit
property stood duly acquired and its ownership vested in the
BDA was free from all encumbrances whatsoever and that the
plaintiffs had no right, title or interest in the same nor were they F
entitled to any declaration of title or injunction. According to
the Trial Court the pleadings qf the parties gave rise to the
following issues which were clubbed together for a common
disposal:
                                                                    G
     (1) Whether the Plaintiffs prove that, they have acquired
     and perfected their alleged title to the suit schedule
     properties by virtue of the alleged law on adverse
     possession, as claimed?
                                                                    H
460         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A          (2) Whether the Plaintiffs prove their alleged lawful
           possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule
           properties, as on the date of the suit?

           (3) Whether the Plaintiffs further prove the alleged illegal
 B         interferences and obstructions by the defendant?

           (4) Whether the defendant proves that, the suit schedule
           properties is duly acquired by the defendant, in
           accordance with law and as such, the same have stood
c          vested with the defendant, free from all the
           encumbrances?

           (5) Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to the suit relief of
           declaration and injunction, against the defendant?

 D         (6) What Order or Decree?

            6. The Trial Court answered issue nos. 1 to 3 and 5 in
      the affirmative while issue no.4 was answered in the negative.
      The suits were on those findings decreed.
 E
         7. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the
  Trial Court, BDAfiled RFANos.911, 912, 914, 915 and 916 of
  2002 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. A
  Single Judge of the High Court, as noticed earlier, has allowed
F RFANos.912, 914, 915 and 916 of2002 but dismissed RAF
  No.911 of 2002. The High Court took the view that respondents
  in RFA No.911 of 2002 w~o happened to be respondents in
  SLP No.12016 of2013 were running a saw-mill which was in
  operation long prior to the filing of the suit and which continues
G to be in existence even on the date of the suit and the judgment
  of the High Court. The High Court held that the legal position
  stated by the Division Bench of that Court in John B. James
      and Ors. v. Bangalore Development Authority (2001) 1
      KarLJ 364 was clearly applicable to the said appeal entitling
H
    M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV.                           461
            AUTHORITY[T.S. THAKUR, J.]

the owner in occupation to protection against attempted               A
eviction by the BOA The High Court, on that basis, dismissed
RFA No.911 of 2012 filed by BOA upholding the judgment and
decree passed by the Trial Court and restrai.ning the BOA from
interfering with possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule
property. As regards the remaining appeals, the High Court            B
held that the plaintiffs in those appeals were claiming settled
possession of vacant pieces of land which even according to
the pronouncement in John B. James case (supra) did not
entitle them to any relief as no one could claim to be in
established possession of a vacant piece of land. The High            C
Court found that there was no dispute that all the structures on
the suit properties relevant to those suits had been demolished
and that the land was a vacant piece of land all along and at all
material times including the date of the judgment. The High
                                                                      0
Court accordingly non-suited all the plaintiffs except plaintiff in
RFANo.911of2002. In SLP (C) No.12016 of 2013 the BOA
has assailed the judgment of the High Court in so far as the
same has dismissed RAF No.911of2002 filed by it. SLP (C)
No.38601of2012 and SLP (C) Nos.12013-15 of2013 have                   E
been on the other hand filed by the appellants to assail the
orders passed by the High Court in so far as the same have
dismissed RAF Nos.912, 914, 915 and 916 of2002.

       8. We have heard Mr. Rama Jois, learned senior counsel, F
appearing for the appellants and Mr. S. K. Kulkarni, counsel
appearing for the BOA We may first deal with the question
whether the plaintiffs in the suits relevantto RFANos.912, 914,
915 and 916 of 2002 could claim to be the owners of the suit
property on the basis of inheritance or sale instruments in their G
favour and yet plead adverse possession over the very same
property. The case set up by the plaintiffs in their suits was that
they were the lawful owners of the suit schedule property and
that they had been duly recognised as Khatedars by the village
panchayat concerned. It was further alleged that property tax H
462         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A     was also being assessed and levied by the competent authority
      from time to time and is being paid by them. It was alleged
      that the suit properties were being used for carrying on business
      in different names.and style. The local authorities had also
      issued no objection certificates for grant of electricity supply
 B    connections in their favour and that they were paying electricity
      charges as and when demanded. The appellants claim to have
      set up their business which was their source of livelihood.
      Whatever may be the rights vested in the BOA pursuant to the
      notifications and the award, the BOA was not entitled to disturb
C     the peaceful occupation of the landowners according to the
      averments in the plaint. The plaintiffs, on that basis claimed
      the relief of permanent injunction restraining the BOA and its
      officials from disturbing their possession over the suit schedule
      properties. The plaintiffs, it is noteworthy, claimed ignorance
0
      about the acquisition proceedings and alleged that they had
      not received any compensation and that they had continued to
      be in occupation as owners to the knowledge of the BOA and
      its officials.
E           9. In the written statement filed by the BOA it was
      asserted that the suit schedule properties stood acquired and
      vested in BOA as early as in the year 1986-87 and that the
      question of anyone developing or using any part of the same
F     did not arise. The documents relied upon by the plaintiffs were,
      according to the BOA, of no value or relevance ..

            10. The High Court has, as noticed earlier, on an appraisal
      of the material on record, held that the suit schedule properties
      relevant to RFA No.911 of 2002 was a vacant piece of land
G     from which structures stood demolished and removed before
      the institution of the suits. The High Court in this regard
      observed:

            "But, insofar as the other respondents are concerned,
H           whether the appellant was justified in law or not in
    M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV.                    463
            AUTHORITY [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

     carrying out the demolition, there is no dispute that all A
     structures in the respective suit properties have been
     razed to the ground and it was vacant land during the
     pendency of the suit and as on the date of the judgment.
     Therefore, the trial c.ourt was clearly in error in holding
     that the plaintiffs continued in settled possession of what B
     was vacant land. The law, as laid down in John B.
     James's case, supra clearly disentitled persons
     claiming to be in settled possession of vacant land.
     Therefore, the remedy of damages which was certainly
     available to the plaintiffs was unfortunately not claimed C
     and though the plaintiffs are said to have sought to
     reserve their right to claim such damages, it is not shown
     that the court below has expressly granted any such
     relief"
                                                                D
      11. There is, in our opinion, no infirmity in the above
reasoning. The decision in John B. James case (supra) upon
which heavy reliance was placed by the plaintiffs before the ·
courts below itself did not permit anyone to claim that he is in
settled possession of vacant land. The following passage from E
the said decision in this regard is apposite:

     "If anyone, who has trespassed into BOA land or in
     unauthorised possession of BOA land, has put up a
     structure and completes and accomplishes the act of F
     possession and continues in such settled possession
     asserting possession and ownership in himself, openly,
     peacefully and uninterruptedly to the knowledge of BOA
     for more than 12 years, then it is possible for him to
     contend that he has perfected his title to such property G
     by adverse possession and consequently, the title of
     BOA stood extinguished. It is needless to say that such
     adverse possession for 12 years should be subsequent
     to the date of vesting of land in BOA. The person H
464        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A         claiming such title by adverse possession cannot call
          in aid any possession on his part or his predecessor
          for any period prior to date of vesting of land in BOA, to
          establish adverse possession, or possession during the
          tendency of any litigation regarding the property, cannot
 B        be considered as possession adverse to BDA."

         12.0nce the High Court recorded a finding that the
  property was vacant as on the date of the filing of the suitthere
  was no question of the plaintiffs claiming settled possession
C of the said property assuming the view taken in John B. James
  case (supra) was otherwise legally sound since the so called
  settled possession of the appellants in RFA No.911 of 2002
  stood vacated from the suit schedule property, no prayer for
  injunction as set out in the petition filed by the appellants in
D those appeals could help them for an injunction issues only to
  protect what is in lawful possession of the plaintiffs. Injunction
  could not be claimed when plaintiffs stand dispossessed from
  the suit property prior to the filing of the suit. The question of
  establishing settled possession did not, therefore, arise in
E relation to the properties that already stood cleared of any
  structures by demolition of whatever stood on the same. The
  High Court was, in that view, justified in setting aside the decree
  passed by the Trial Co1,1rt and dismissing the suit filed by the
F plaintiffs.

        13. That brings us to the question whether Prabhaudas
  Patel and other respondents in SLP (C) No.12016 of 2013
  were entitled to any relief from the Court. These respondents
  claim to have purchased the suit property in terms of a sale
G deed dated 22"d August, 1990, i.e. long after the issue of the
  preliminary notification published in July 1984. The legal
  position about the validity of any such sale, post issue of a
  preliminary notification is fairly well settled by a long line of the
  decisions of this Court. The sale in $LlCh cases is void and
H
   M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV.                              465
           AUTHORITY [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

non-est in the eyes of law giving to the Vendee the limited A
right to claim compensation and no more. Reference may in
this regard be made to the decision of this Court in U.P. Jal
Nigam v. Kalra Properties Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1996 SC 1170,
where this Court said :
                                                                        B
      "3. It is settled law that after the notification under Section
     4(1) is published in the Gazette any encumbrance
     created by the owner does not bind the Government
     and the purchaser does not acquire any title to the
     property. In this case, notification under Section 4(1)            C
     was published on 24-3-1973, possession of the land
     admittedly was taken on 5-7-1973 and pumping station
     house was constructed. No doubt, declaration under
     Section 6 was published later on 8-7-1973. Admittedly
    power under Section 17(4) was exercised dispensing                  D
     with the enquiry under Section 5-A and on service of
     the notice under Section 9 possession was taken, since
     urgency was acute, viz., pumping station house was to
    ·be constructed to drain out flood water. Consequently,
     the land stood vested in the State under Section 17(2)             E
     free from all encumbrances. It is further settled law that
     once possession is taken; by operation of Section 17(2),
     the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances
     unless a notification under Section 48(1) is published             F
     in the Gazette withdrawing from the acquisition. Section
     11-A, as amended by Act 68 of 1984, therefore, does
     not apply and the acquisition does not lapse. The
     notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration
     under Section 6, therefore, remain valid. There is no              G
     other provision under the Act to have the acquired land
     divested, unless, as stated .earlier, notification under
     Section 48(1) was published and the possession is
     surrendered pursuant thereto. That apart, since Mis
     Katra Properties, respondent had purchased the land                H
466         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A           after the notification under Section 4(1) was published,
            its sale is void against the State and it acquired no right,
            title or interest in.the land. Consequently, it is settled
            law that it cannot challenge the validity of the notification
            or the regularity in taking possession of the land before
 B          publication of the declaration under Section 6 was
            published."

            14. To the same effect are the decisions of this Court in
  Ajay Kishan Singhal v. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 2617;
C Mahavir and Anr. v. Rural Institute, Amravati and Anr.
  (1995) 5 SCC 335; Gian Chand v. Gopala and Ors. (1995)
  5 SCC 528; Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi
  and Ors. (2008) 9 SCC 177 and Tika Ram v. State of U.P.
      (2009) 10 SCC 689. More importantly, as on the date of the
 D    suit, the respondents had not completed 12 years in
      possession of the suit property so as to entitle them to claim
      adverse possession against BOA, the true owner. The
      argument that possession of the land was never t~ken also
      needs notice only to be rejected for it is settled that one of the
 E    modes of taking possession is by drawing a Panchnama which
      part has been done to perfection according to the evidence
      led by the defendant- BOA. Decisions of this Court in Tamil
      Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam (dead) by Lrs. AIR
 F    1996 SC 3377and Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat
      and Ors. AIR 1998 SC 1608, sufficiently support the BOA
      that the mode of taking possession adopted by it was a
      permissible mode.

         15. Coming then to the question whether the plaintiffs-
G  respondents could claim adverse possession, we need to
   hardly mention the well known and oft quoted maxim nee vi,
   nee clam, nee precario meaning thereby that adverse
   possession is proved only when possession is peaceful, open,
 H continuous and hostile. The essentials of adverse possession
     M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV.                     467
            . AUTHORITY[T.S. THAKUR, J.]

 were succinctly summed-up by this Court in Karnataka Board A
 of Wakfv. Govt. of/ndia (2004) 10 SCC 779 in the following
 words:

         "11. In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to
  be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. B
  Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time
  won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when
  another person takes possession of the property and asserts
  a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession
  by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the C
  true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming
  adverse possession must prove that his possession is "nee
  vi, nee clam, nee precario", that is, peaceful, open and
  continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity,
  in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is D
  adverse to the true owner. It must ~tart with a wrongful
  disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible,
  exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period.
  (See S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina (AIR 1964SC1254), Parsinni
  v. Sukhi (1993) 4 SCC 375 and D.N. Venkatarayappf3 v. State E
  of Kamataka (1997) 7 SCC 567). Physical fact of exclusive
  possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in
  exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors
  that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of F
  adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a
  blended one offact and law. Therefore, a person who claims
  adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came
  into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession,
  (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other G
  party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his .
  possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading
· adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he
  is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to
  clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish H
                                      .                  .
468         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2015] 11 S.C.R.


A     his adverse possession. [Mahesh Chand Sharma (Dr.) v. Raj
      Kumari Sharma (1996) 8 SCC 128)."

            16. Reference may also be made to the decision of thi~
      Court in Saroop Singh v. Banta (2005) B SCC 330, where
 B    this Court emphasised the importance of animus possidendi
      and observed:

           "29. In terms of Article 65 the starting point of limitation
           does not commence from the date when the right of
c          ownership arises to the plaintiff but commences from
           the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse.
           (See Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak v. Somnath Muljibhai
           Nayak (2004) 3 sec 376).

           30. "Animus possidendi" is one of the ingredients of
D
           adverse possession. Unless the person possessing the
           land has the requisite animus the period for prescription
           does not commence. As in the instant case, the
           appellant categorically stales that his possession is no"t
E          adverse as that of true owner, the logical corollary is
           that he did not have the requisite animus. (See Mohd.
           Mohd. Ali v. Jagadish Kalita (2004) 1 SCC 371, SCC
           para 21.)"

F            17.Also noteworthy is the decision of this Court in Mohan
      Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar (1996) 1 SCC 639, where this Court
      held that claim of title to the property and adverse possession
      are in terms contradictory. This Court observed:

           "4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the
G          second plea. Having come into possession under the
           agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and
           plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile
           adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor
           or his successor in title or interest and that the latter
H
    M. VENKATESH v. COMMNR., BANGALORE DEV.                        469
            AUTHORITY [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

     had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the A
     entire period of 12 years, i.e., up to completing the period
     of his title by prescription nee vi, nee clam, nee precario.
     Since the appellant's claim is founded on Section 53-
     A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication
     that he came into possession of the land lawfully under B
     the agreement and continued to remain in possession
     till date of the suit. Thereby the plea ·of adverse
     possession is not available to the appellant."

      18.To the same effect is the decision of this Court in       C
Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Ba/want (1995) 2 SCC 543,
where this Court elaborated the significance of a claim to title
viz.-a-viz. the claim to adverse possession over the same
property. The Court said:
                                                               D
     "15. Where possession can be referred to a lawful title,
     it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason being
     that a person whose possession can be referred to a
     lawful title will not be permitted to show that his
     possession was hostile to another's title. One who holds E
     possession on behalf of another, does not by mere
     denial of that other's title make his possession adverse
     so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of
     /imitation. Therefore, a person who enters into
     possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another F
     of that title by pretending that he had no title at all."

      19. The Courts below have not seen the plaintiff-
respondent's claim from the above perspectives. The High
Court has, in particular, remained oblivious of the principle G
enunciated in the decisions to which we have referred herein
above. All thatthe High Court has found in favour of the plaintiffs
is that their possession is established. That, however, does
not conclude the controversy. The question is not just whether
                                                                    H
470          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 11 S.C.R.


A     the plaintiffs were in possession, but whether they had by being
      in adverse possession for the statutory period of 12 years
      perfected their title. That question has neither been adverted
      to nor answered in the judgment impugned in this appeal. Such
      being the case the High Court, in our opinion, erred in
 B    dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant-BOA. The fact that
      the plain!iffs had not and could not possibly establish their
      adverse possession over the suit property should have resulted
      in dismissal of the suit for an unauthorised occupant had no
C     right to claim relief that would perpetuate his illegal and
      unauthorised occupation of property that stood vested in the
      BOA. In the result:

            (i) Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) No.38601 of 2012
            and SLP (C) Nos. 12013-12015 of 2013 fail and are,
0           hereby, dismissed.

            (ii) Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.12016 of2013
            succeeds and is, hereby, allowed. The impugned
            judgment of the High Court is set aside insofar as the
 E          same dismisses BDA's RFA No.911 of 2002. Resultantly
            RFA No.911 of 2002 shall stand allowed and the suit filed
            by the plaintiff dismissed but in the circumstances without
            any order as to costs.

F     Devika Gujral                                  Appeals disposed of.