M SAMBASIVA RAOversusTHE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

                [2025] 7 S.C.R. 1183 : 2025 INSC 868

                          M Sambasiva Rao
                                   v.
                     The State of Andhra Pradesh
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 391 of 2017)
                                17 July 2025
           [Pankaj Mithal and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether the High Court erred in convicting the appellant-accused
       no.1 u/s.120B, IPC and ss.7, 13(2) r/w s.13(1)(d), Prevention of
       Corruption Act, 1988 by reversing the finding of acquittal of the
       Trial Court.

                                 Headnotes†
       Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – ss.7, 11, 12, 13(2)
       r/w13(1)(d) – Penal Code, 1860 – s.120B – Demand-and-
       trap proceedings – Evidentiary standard to prove – PW1-
       complainant submitted the insurance claim and requested
       the appellant-accused no.1 (Administrative Officer in the
       Insurance Company) for early disposal of the claim – As per
       the prosecution, the appellant demanded bribe for himself
       and accused no.2-Regional Manager for settlement of the
       claim – Complaint made – Trap set up – Cash, whisky bottle
       and the shirt of accused no.3 (appellant’s brother) were
       seized – To prove criminal conspiracy between the appellant
       and accused no.2, the prosecution relied on the call made
       between them – Trial Court acquitted the accused persons –
       High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellant
       and accused no.3 (accused no.2 passed away during the
       pendency of the appeal in the High Court) – Interference
       with:
       Held: 1.1 Prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt the
       demand of and acceptance of the bribe in the trap laid by PW12
       (Inspector, CBI) – Present is a case of a fabrication, attempted
       frame-up and botched-up trap with serious lapses committed by
       the investigative agency – There are glaring contradictions in the


* Author
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    prosecution evidence which cumulatively shake the foundations
    of the prosecution case. [Paras 31, 38]
    1.2 High Court itself relied on inferences and conjectures
    alone – Even if the factum of phone call, as alleged, having
    been made stands accepted, the contents of the conversation
    are not available at all – Also, the protection of Art.20(3) of
    the Constitution would apply and the appellant could not be
    compelled to disclose the nature and content of the conversation,
    assuming it happened – Further, mere fact that accused no.3
    is the appellant’s brother would not lead to a presumption in
    law that the money taken by him was meant for the appellant
    and that too, pursuant to demand being made by the appellant.
    [Para 28, 37]
    1.3 Moreover, on facts, the allegation of demand of bribe, as
    projected by the prosecution, is shrouded in a cloud of dubiety –
    Mere fact that accused no.3 is the appellant’s brother would not
    lead to a presumption in law that the money taken by him was
    meant for the appellant and that too, pursuant to demand being
    made by the appellant – Further, except for PW1, no other witness/
    person was privy to the demand made to the complainant by the
    appellant – This does not satisfy the requirement that in trap cases
    where after a complaint is received, independent witnesses of
    the trap team are also required to confirm the demand made by
    the accused personally, which has not been done in the present
    case – Thus, the procedure of the trap case itself from the very
    inceptual stage suffers from serious legal lacuna, which cannot
    be now overcome – For, the purpose of this requirement is that
    before the trap is set into motion, there should be corroboration of
    the allegation made by the complainant of actual and real demand
    being made by the accused-public servant as a quid pro quo for
    extending a favour to the complainant – On to the next stage of
    actual laying of trap, there also the appellant was nowhere in the
    picture – The prosecution’s effort of still trying to bring him under
    the ambit and scope of the corruption net clearly has not succeeded
    in the circumstances. [Paras 29, 31, 37]
    1.4 Furthermore, in a case where the accused persons were
    acquitted by the Trial Court, there is a double presumption of
    innocence which accrues in their favour – Hence, it was all the more
    important for the High Court to have provided cogent reasoning
    for disturbing the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
    [Paras 34, 35]
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                              1185

            M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh


     1.5 Appellant entitled to benefit of doubt – Impugned Judgment set
     aside and that of the Trial Court is restored – Appellant acquitted.
     [Paras 38, 39]

                              Case Law Cited
     Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2022) 5 SCR 104 : (2023)
     4 SCC 731 – followed.
     Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala [2022) 5 SCR 721 : (2022) 8 SCC
     440; Suresh Thipmppa Shetty v. State of Maharashtra [2023] 11
     SCR 1135 : 2023 SCC OnLine 1038 – relied on.
     D Velayutham v. State [2015] 6 SCR 361 : (2015) 12 SCC
     348 – referred to.

                                 List of Acts
     Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Penal Code, 1860; Constitution
     of India.

                              List of Keywords
     Procedure of the trap case; Demand-and-trap proceedings;
     Settlement of claim; Request for Early disposal of claim; Demand
     and acceptance of the bribe; Bribe; Demand of bribe; Bribe not
     paid; Accident policy; Accidental death of insured; Teapoy; Tainted
     currency; Cash seized; Whisky bottle; White shirt; Claim file pending;
     Liaison; Regional Office; Administrative Officer; Insurance Company;
     Regional Manager; Criminal conspiracy; Circumstance of conspiracy;
     Demand and acceptance of the tainted currency; Trap team; Call
     for fixation of the bribe; Phenolphthalein; Sodium carbonate solution
     test; Solution turned pink; Moss-coloured shirt; Yellowish/brownish
     tinge; Tainted cash; Quantum of the bribe; Vigilance inquiry; Post-
     trap proceedings; Quid pro quo; Two views possible; Fabrication and
     attempted frame-up; Acquittal; Double presumption of innocence;
     Phone call; Protection of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.

                             Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     391 of 2017
     From the Judgment and Order dated 09.09.2015 of the High Court
     of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the
     State of Andhra Pradesh in CRLA No. 548 of 2006
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                        Appearances for Parties

     Advs. for the Appellant:
     Jayant Bhushan, Sr. Adv., Venkateswara Rao Anumolu, Sunny
     Kumar, Prateek Raushan, Amartya Bhushan, Yogit Mehra.
     Advs. for the Respondents:
     Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Nachiketa Joshi, Sr. Adv., Mukesh
     Kumar Maroria, Shubhendu Anand, Praneet Pranav, Shaurya Rai,
     Nring Chamwibo Zeliang, Piyush.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

     Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

     The present appeal challenges the Final Judgment and Order dated
     21.08.2015/09.09.2015 passed in Criminal Appeal No.548/2006
     (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Judgment’) by the then
     High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana
     and the State of Andhra Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High
     Court’), whereby the appellant/accused no.1 and accused no.3 (Mr.
     M Venkata Siva Naga Prasad) were convicted, by reversing the
     finding of acquittal recorded in the Final Judgment and Order dated
     07.06.2005 passed in C.C. No.17/2000 on the file of the Court of the
     learned Special Judge for CBI Cases, Visakhapatnam (hereinafter
     referred to as the ‘Trial Court’), and sentenced to undergo rigorous
     imprisonment for a period of one year, alongwith imposition of fine(s).
     Accused no.2 (Mr. N Govindarao Naidu) passed away during the
     pendency of the appeal in the High Court on 15.12.2013.

     THE FACTUAL MATRIX:
2.   The appellant/accused no.1 was posted as an Assistant Administrative
     Officer in United India Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to
     as the ‘Insurance Company’), Branch Office-II, Guntur (hereinafter
     referred to as the ‘branch’), in the year 1999. His duty was, inter
     alia, to assist the Branch Manager in processing of claims submitted
     in the branch. Accused no.2 was posted as the Regional Manager,
     Visakhapatnam Region from June-October, 1999 and it was his duty
     to process claims submitted through the branches and forward it to
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                       1187

            M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh


     higher authorities for approval. The branch supra of the Insurance
     Company fell under his jurisdiction. Accused no.3 is the appellant’s
     younger brother and is engaged in agriculture and business.
3.   Mr. L Laxman Reddy had taken a Janata Personal Accident policy
     (hereinafter referred to as the ‘policy’) from the branch on 21.11.1997
     for a sum of Rs.8,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Lakhs). After the accidental
     death of the insured on 28.03.1999, his wife and nominee for the
     policy, Mrs. Srilakshmi (PW2), submitted claim dated 05.06.1999 for
     the insured sum in the branch. This claim was submitted through Mr.
     L Srinivasa Rao, the surveyor appointed by the branch as instructed
     by the appellant. The complainant/Mr. T Kotireddy (PW1) is the
     maternal uncle of Mrs. Srilakshmi and was authorized to pursue the
     settlement of the claim.
4.   During investigation, it emerged that Mr. L Srinivasa Rao had
     submitted Investigation Report dated 13.07.1999 on the claim of
     PW2 to the Manager of the branch on 20.07.1999. Thereupon, the
     appellant made his recommendation on 16.08.1999 and sent the file
     to the Branch Manager, who made his recommendation on 20.08.1999
     and referred the file to the Senior Divisional Manager, who in turn,
     on 15.09.1999, recommended settlement of the claim and ordered
     to refer the file to the Regional Office for approval. The claim was
     sent for settlement and onward transmission to higher authority to
     the office of the accused no.2 on 18.09.1999.
5.   Meanwhile, PW1 after submitting the claim met the appellant and
     requested for early disposal of the claim. Such request, for early
     settlement of the claim, was reiterated by PW1 when he met the
     appellant once again on 15.10.1999. It is then that the appellant
     told him, as the prosecution’s story goes, to arrange an amount
     of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand) as bribe for himself and
     accused no.2 for settlement of the claim and travel with him on
     17.10.1999 to Hyderabad, where accused no.2 was available, to give
     him his share of the bribe. PW1 did not agree to pay the bribe and
     did not go to Hyderabad. Thereafter, PW1 again met the appellant
     on 20.10.1999 when the appellant told him that accused no.2 was
     still in Hyderabad and PW1 should arrange for the bribe and book
     two train tickets for their journey to Hyderabad by the Narsapur-
     Hyderabad Express on 22.10.1999. The appellant also told PW1 to
     arrange for a bottle of whisky as accused no.2 was fond of liquor.
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     PW1 was told to convey his confirmation to the deal in the morning
     of 21.10.1999.
6.   PW1 gave a complaint on 21.10.1999 to Mr. N Vishnu (PW12),
     Inspector of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter
     abbreviated to ‘CBI’), Visakhapatnam, who was camping at the
     Railway Retiring Room of the Vijayawada Railway Station, and on
     his instructions, he purchased the tickets and called the appellant
     to inform that the arrangement of money and berths in the train had
     been done. The appellant was to meet PW1 near his coach at the
     Guntur Railway Platform on 22.10.1999. Accordingly, PW12 secured
     the presence of another CBI Inspector, Mr. S B Shanker and two
     independent mediators, Mr. M Radhakrishnan and Mr. M Nagaraju
     (PW3), Excise Inspectors, and along with the complainant prepared
     the first mediators’ report dated 22.10.1999. The report noted that
     the tainted currency of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand) and
     whisky bottle was handed over to PW12. The numbers of each of the
     eighty (80) tainted notes of Rs.500 denomination and batch number
     of the whisky bottle was noted down. PW1 was instructed to signal
     by wiping his face with a handkerchief soon after the demand and
     acceptance of the tainted currency and the whisky bottle.
7.   The trap party led by PW12 boarded the Narsapur Express at
     Vijayawada Station. The train left the station at 10:40 pm. When
     the train reached Guntur, the appellant, with accused no.3, came
     near S2 coach and informed PW1 that he was unable to come to
     Hyderabad due to some personal problem and, instead, the accused
     no.3 will accompany PW1. The train reached Secunderabad early
     in the morning of 23.10.1999 and PW1 and accused no.3 checked
     into the Rama Krishna Hotel. It is alleged that accused no.3 took an
     appointment with accused no.2 on a call and thereafter, both left for
     accused no.2’s house. The trap team followed them. On reaching the
     house of accused no.2, the independent witnesses saw accused no.2
     waiting outside his house. PW1 and accused no.3 along with accused
     no.2 went inside the house. Once inside, accused no.3 introduced
     PW1 as the party and told accused no.2 that he had brought the
     bribe. Thereafter, accused no.2 sent PW1 outside the room and both
     these accused talked for some time, after which accused no.3 called
     PW1 inside. Thereafter, PW1 requested accused no.2 for settlement
     of the claim to which accused no.2 replied by stating that it would
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                      1189

            M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh


     be settled without delay. Then, on demand made by accused no.3,
     PW1 handed over the bribe to accused no.3, who took out 10 tainted
     notes amounting to Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) and kept
     it in his shirt pocket and handed over the rest of the bribe amount
     i.e., Rs.35,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Five Thousand) to accused no.2,
     who instead of handling it, told accused no.3 to keep the same on
     the teapoy. Accordingly, accused no.3 kept Rs.35,000/- (Rupees
     Thirty-Five Thousand) on the teapoy. Accused no.3 also took the
     whisky bottle from PW1 and placed it by the right side of the sofa
     on which accused no.2 was sitting. After this, PW1 went outside and
     gave the pre-arranged signal to the trap team, which rushed inside
     the house. The cash from the teapoy and the shirt of accused no.3
     was seized alongwith the whisky bottle. The hands of accused no.2
     were subjected to phenolphthalein and sodium carbonate solution
     test and the solution remained colourless. After this, the hands and
     shirt pocket of accused no.3 were subjected to the chemical test
     and the resultant solution turned pink. The numbers of the currency
     notes and the whisky bottle tallied with the first mediators’ report.
     The white shirt worn by accused no.3 was also seized. All of this
     was recorded in the second mediators’ report dated 23.10.1999.
8.   On the basis of the above investigation, Crime No.RC.23(A)/99-
     VSP came to be registered on 24.10.1999 under Section 120B of
     the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’)
     read with Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
     (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). Chargesheet was filed against
     the three accused on 28.06.2000 under Section 120B, IPC along
     with Sections 7, 11, 12, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Act. During
     trial, the prosecution examined PWs 1 to 13 and got marked Exhibits
     P1 to P49 and also MOs 1 to 9. The appellant and accused no.3 did
     not lead any evidence in defence. Accused no.2, on the other hand,
     got examined DWs 1 and 2 and got marked Exhibits D1 to D6. After
     appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court
     found the accused not guilty of the offences alleged and, accordingly,
     acquitted them of all the charges. Aggrieved, the State went up in
     appeal to the High Court by filing Criminal Appeal No.548/2006.
     After evaluation of the facts and evidence, the High Court vide the
     Impugned Judgment allowed the appeal and convicted the appellant
     and accused no.3 as under:
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          Position         Sections                     Sentence
         Appellant/    Section 120B, IPC     1 year’s rigorous imprisonment
        accused no.1   and Sections 7,       and fine of Rs.5,000 on three
                       13(2) read with       counts, and in default of payment
                       13(1)(d) of the Act   of fine, additional simple
                                             imprisonment for 2 months.
        Accused no.3   Section 120B, IPC     1 year’s rigorous imprisonment
                       and Sections 12,      and fine of Rs.5,000 on three
                       13(1)(d) read with    counts, and in default of payment
                       13(2) of the Act      of fine, additional simple
                       read with Section     imprisonment for 2 months.
                       109, IPC

9.   This Impugned Judgment, as noted above, is challenged before us.

     APPELLANT’S SUBMISSIONS:
10. Mr Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel, at the outset submitted
    that where two views are possible on the same evidence, and the
    Trial Court’s view favours the accused, the Appellate Court shall not
    ordinarily interfere unless the findings are perverse or unreasonable
    and based on no evidence. It was argued that, in a case of acquittal,
    there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of the accused
    and the High Court should have reversed the acquittal only on cogent
    grounds. In the present case, the High Court erred in reversing the
    well-reasoned judgment of the Trial Court, which has scrutinized all
    the evidence minutely.
11. It was pointed out that the appellant made his recommendation on the
    claim on 16.08.1999 itself and sent the file to the Branch Manager,
    who made his recommendation on 20.08.1999 and referred the
    file to the Senior Divisional Manager, who in turn, on 15.09.1999,
    recommended settlement of the claim and ordered to refer the file
    to the Regional Office for approval. Thus, it was submitted that there
    was no occasion for the appellant to collude with accused no.2 and
    demand a bribe of Rs.40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand), precisely
    for the reason that there was lack of any official favour pending with
    the appellant.
12. It was further submitted that the mother-in-law of PW2 had filed
    O.S. No.63/1999 before the II Additional District Judge and also
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            M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh


     preferred I.A. No.1163/1999 for restraining the Insurance Company
     from disbursing the policy amount to the nominee, pending the
     disposal of such suit. It was due to the order in this case that claim
     settlement was delayed and not due to the alleged demand of bribe
     by the appellant.
13. The only circumstance to establish conspiracy between the appellant
    and accused no.2 is the call made on the night of 21.10.1999.
    The High Court erred in drawing an adverse inference against the
    appellant for denying the call and not coming forth with the contents
    of the conversation. On the other hand, the Trial Court has rightly
    appreciated this circumstance in the view of the background facts and
    correctly noticed that if this was the only call, then the prosecution
    had failed to establish as to when the apparent quantum of the bribe
    was decided between the accused. The High Court also failed to take
    note of the most important fact i.e., that the appellant and accused
    no.2 were not on cordial terms as the accused no.2 had transferred
    the appellant twice to different offices after receiving complaint(s)
    against him. In such circumstance, it is inconceivable that the two
    would enter into a conspiracy, as alleged by the prosecution.
14. It was contended that the first mediators’ report noted that
    phenolphthalein was only applied on the currency and not on the
    whisky box. However, surprisingly the second mediators’ report
    conducted after the trap proceedings note that phenolphthalein
    powder was collected from the whisky box and the chemical solution
    turned pink. Learned senior counsel submitted that the High Court
    had given a bizarre explanation for the same when it reasons that
    since PW1 first handed over the tainted currency and then the whisky
    box, the powder must have transferred from the currency onto PW1’s
    hand and then onto the box.
15. During trap proceedings, the white shirt worn by the accused no.3
    was seized. However, the Trial Court notes that the shirt exhibited
    in evidence was not white but rather it was moss-coloured. Another
    bizarre explanation, in the learned senior counsel’s opinion, that the
    High Court provides, is that the white shirt seized in 1999 would
    have turned moss-coloured as the colour would have withered away
    due to dust.
16. It was argued that there were multiple inconsistencies in the
    prosecution evidence. PW3 deposed that only two people went inside
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     the house of accused no.2, whereas the second mediators’ report
     provides that three people went inside the house. Further, there is
     inconsistency in the evidence with regard to the fact as to whether
     accused no.2 was watering the plants or standing at the gate, when
     the accused no.3 along with PW1 approached him. Moreover, there
     is material contradiction in the depositions apropos construction
     work going on in the upper portion of the house of accused no.2 on
     the relevant day. PW1 was sent out by the accused present in the
     house after entering the house. Some witnesses say that he came
     out after 2-3 minutes, whereas others estimate the time period to be
     15 minutes. Furthermore, the second mediators’ report was prepared
     belatedly. It was submitted that all these material inconsistencies and
     contradictions would go on to show that the entire trap proceedings
     are false and concocted.
17. It was further argued that accused no.2 in his defence states that
    the then Superintendent of Police (hereinafter abbreviated to ‘SP’),
    Mr. A Sudhakara Rao came to his house and told him to be wise
    enough to come out of the case, to which accused no.2 did not
    agree. This, it was contended, is to be seen with the evidence of
    PW12 who had deposed to the effect that he did not inform the SP
    about laying of the trap from Hyderabad, but informed him about
    the same only after his return to Visakhapatnam. This evidence is
    falsified by the Tour Diary of the SP which shows that on 23.10.1999
    he had reached Hyderabad and in that whole week, only a solitary
    trap case was registered. This goes to demonstrate, again, that the
    entire case was fabricated to falsely implicate the accused.
18. It was contended that there are too many loose ends in the case
    of the prosecution, which has miserably failed to prove the charges
    alleged against the appellant. We were reminded across the bar
    that the two co-accused have passed away. The appellant is aged
    around 74 years and suffering from multiple ailments. In view of the
    above, learned senior counsel urged us to allow the appeal and
    acquit the appellant.

     SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT-STATE:
19. Per contra, Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General
    (hereinafter abbreviated to ‘ASG’), contended that the Trial Court had
    misdirected itself in appreciating the evidence and the High Court
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            M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh


     has considered the same in the correct perspective. The High Court,
     submitted the learned ASG, has every power to re-appreciate the
     evidence and facts and interfere when the Trial Court’s judgment
     suffered from a perverse appreciation of the facts. It was submitted
     that the Impugned Judgment is based on cogent reasoning and does
     not call for any interference by this Court.
20. It was argued that the processing/clearing of the claim at the level
    of the appellant before the date of demand is of no consequence,
    as the demand made by the appellant was not to clear the file at
    his level but to liaison with accused no.2 to get the claim settled.
    This has been rightly noted by the High Court. The demand by the
    appellant and acceptance of the bribe by the other accused has
    been proven by the testimony of PW1, which remained unshaken
    in the cross-examination. The High Court has correctly analyzed the
    probative value of the evidence, including the deposition of PW1
    and has rightly convicted the appellant. Reliance was placed on
    D Velayutham v State, (2015) 12 SCC 348 to argue that the Court
    has, previously, taken note of the byzantine methods of bribe-taking,
    and where an evader escapes a trap, constructive receipt has to be
    an alternate means of fastening criminal culpability.
21. It was contended that the injunction order passed in O.S. No.63/1999
    was only with respect to disbursal of the amount. It should be noted
    that despite the injunction, the Assistant Divisional Manager and the
    Senior Divisional Manager approved the claim and forwarded the file
    to the accused no.2 for settlement of the claim, subject to judgment
    in the case. PW5 has deposed that accused no.2 instructed him to
    keep the file pending. Further, there was no noting in the file to the
    effect that it is pending due to vigilance enquiry.
22. Learned ASG further submitted that the appellant and accused no.2
    were on cordial terms, as evident from the phone call made on
    21.10.1999. This is also clear from the fact that even after receiving
    corruption complaint against the appellant, accused no.2 transferred
    the appellant locally in Guntur. Hence, it is clear that the transfer(s)
    were done only as a formality. Another crucial fact noted by the
    High Court is the call made by accused no.3 to accused no.2 on the
    morning of 23.10.1999 to take an appointment. This call has been
    proved through oral and documentary evidence and clinches that a
    conspiracy was hatched.
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23. It was further contended that minor inconsistencies in the evidence
    of the witnesses is natural and should be ignored by this Court.
    On principally these grounds, learned ASG urged us to dismiss the
    appeal and uphold the conviction.

     ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
24. We have heard the learned senior counsel for the appellant and
    learned ASG for the State, considered their submissions and perused
    the material on record. We have bestowed anxious consideration to
    the issues involved. It is imperative to, at the outset, note that there are
    multiple contested facts apropos the demand-and-trap proceedings
    and given that there are divergent opinions expressed by the Courts
    below, it is all the more appropriate to analyze and appraise the
    evidence adduced. We may gainfully refer to the discussion by a
    5-Judge Bench in Neeraj Dutta v State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4
    SCC 731 with regard to the evidentiary standard to prove offence(s)
    under the concerned provisions of the Act:
           ‘88. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
           summarised as under:
           88.1. (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
           gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the
           prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the
           guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and
           13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
           88.2. (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused,
           the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal
           gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter
           of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct
           evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or
           documentary evidence.
           88.3. (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of
           demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also
           be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of
           direct oral and documentary evidence.
           88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the
           demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public
           servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:
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            M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh


           (i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribegiver without there
           being any demand from the public servant and the latter
           simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification,
           it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In
           such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the
           public servant.
           (ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand
           and the bribe-giver accepts the demand and tenders the
           demanded gratification which in turn is received by the
           public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case
           of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification
           emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under
           Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
           (iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe-
           giver and the demand by the public servant respectively
           have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue.
           In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal
           gratification without anything more would not make it an
           offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii),
           respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the
           Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be
           an offer which emanates from the bribe-giver which is
           accepted by the public servant which would make it an
           offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant
           when accepted by the bribe-giver and in turn there is a
           payment made which is received by the public servant,
           would be an offence of obtainment under Sections
           13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
           88.5. (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand
           and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification
           may be made by a court of law by way of an inference
           only when the foundational facts have been proved by
           relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the
           absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record,
           the court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact
           while considering whether the fact of demand has been
           proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption
           of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the
           absence of rebuttal presumption stands.
1196                                                         [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


          88.6. (f) In the event the complainant turns “hostile”, or
          has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial,
          demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in
          the evidence of any other witness who can again let in
          evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the
          prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence.
          The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of
          acquittal of the accused public servant.
          88.7. (g) Insofar as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on
          the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the
          court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification
          was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned
          in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised
          by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption
          in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject
          to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Sections
          13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
          88.8. (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under
          Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact
          referred to above in sub-para 88.5(e), above, as the former
          is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary
          in nature.’
25. Keeping in mind the aforesaid decision, we turn to the evidence on
    record. On the point of demand of bribe by the appellant, the Trial
    Court opined that the appellant and other officers of the Branch
    Office had already approved the claim file and referred the file to
    the Regional Office for its approval on 15.09.1999 and thus, there
    was no occasion for the appellant to demand the bribe. The High
    Court, on the other hand, has observed that the demand was made
    to liaison with the accused no.2. To drive home the act of liaison, it
    was alleged by the prosecution, and accepted by the High Court,
    that since the bribe was not paid by PW1, the claim file was kept
    pending in the Regional Office by accused no.2.
26. PW1 has spoken of the demand made by the appellant, wherein he
    is stated to have specifically demanded Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees Forty
    Thousand) i.e., 5% of the claim amount to be shared between himself
    and accused no.2, failing which, the claim will not be cleared. The
    prosecution would contend that it is apparent then, that the demand,
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                         1197

            M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh


     if so made by the appellant, was clearly to liaison and the fact that
     the claim was cleared at the Branch Office cannot be used to discard
     the theory of demand. Having said so, this sole circumstance, as we
     later discuss, cannot by itself prove the factum of demand having
     been made by the appellant.
27. In order to present proof of criminal conspiracy between the appellant
    and accused no.2, the prosecution had placed reliance on the call
    made between them on 21.10.1999 at 21:45 hours. The Trial Court
    disbelieved the criminal conspiracy on the ground that if this was the
    only circumstance of conspiracy, then it was not proved as to when
    the accused had arrived at an understanding on the quantum of the
    bribe, which had been demanded earlier on 15.10.1999. The High
    Court, on the other hand, has preferred to take a more plausible
    view insofar as it states that it is not the prosecution’s case that
    this call was the first instance for fixation of the bribe. However, the
    High Court then goes on to draw an adverse inference against the
    accused for not divulging the contents of the conversation holding
    the call to be a conspiratorial talk, which, in our view, ought not to
    have been done, as the reasoning for the same is based on shaky
    ground. The High Court’s analysis of the call reads thus:
           ‘20) Another instance which clinches the conspiracy
           between AO1 and AO2, is the telephonic call made by AO1
           on the night of 21.10.1999 from his residence telephone.
           PW9, the Chief Accounts Officer of Telecom Department,
           Guntur provided the particulars of the out going calls from
           the telephone to phone No.358621 belonging to AO1
           under Ex.P36. Ex.P37 is the covering letter for Ex.P36.
           As per Ex.P36A entry, a phone call was made from this
           telephone No.7745462 which admittedly belonging to
           AO2 on the night of 21.10.1999 at 21.39 hours. In the
           cross-examination of PW9 except denying that Ex.P36
           particulars are not correct and unauthenticated nothing
           was brought on record to disprove the authencity of call
           particulars furnished by a responsible officer like PW9.
           Therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve Ex.P36A call
           particulars which would show that on the crucial date
           i.e. one day prior to the proposed visit of AO1 and PW1
           to AO2 at Hyderabad, AO1 made a call to AO2. If AO1
           and AO2 were not in good terms, there was no occasion
1198                                                     [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                      Supreme Court Reports


        for AO1 to make a call to AO2 that too when he was on
        leave and stayed in his house at Secunderabad. When we
        believe that the aforesaid call was made by AO1 to AO2
        the logical conclusion is that AO1 owed a responsibility
        to divulge as to the reason for his calling AO2. As already
        stated supra, he was totally denying the authenticity
        of Ex.P36 and specifically Ex.P36A calls. It could have
        been a different thing had he admitted that he made a
        phone call to AO2 and gave a reason for calling. In such
        circumstances, the authenticity of his explanation would
        have been discussed and decided. On the other hand, he
        simply denied the authenticity of Ex.P36 and P36A. As
        already held, the authenticity of Ex.P36 cannot be doubted
        in view of evidence of PW9. It confirms that AO1 indeed
        made a phone call to AO2. His flat denial of making phone
        call on the pretext of inauthenticity of Ex.P36 prompts me
        to draw an adverse inference against him to the effect that
        the phone call was nothing but part of conspiratorial talk
        between AO1 and AO2. In my esteem, this phone call
        and another phone call made by A3 to AO2 about which
        I will discuss at the relevant part of the judgment, are the
        crucial pieces of evidence which fortify the prosecution
        case on one hand and blast away the defence of all the
        accused. Unfortunately the trial Court, it must be said,
        on a perverse appreciation, has discarded the aforesaid
        valuable piece of evidence. For discarding such a valuable
        piece of evidence covered by above two phone calls, the
        trial Court did not make a logical analysis basing on the
        facts, evidence and circumstances but came to slipshod
        conclusion. It is pertinent to narrate its conclusion covered
        by para-26 of the judgment which reads thus:
             “Para 26: Even with regard to the telephone
             calls allegedly made to A2 by A3, there is
             absolutely no dependable evidence as to who
             actually spoke those calls and as to what was
             that conversation. The same is the result of
             the analysis with regard to the telephone call
             allegedly made by A1 to A2 in the night of
             21.10.1999.”
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                          1199

            M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh


           With regard to phone call made by A3 to AO2 and the
           perversity of finding of trial Court I will discuss later.
           a) Sofaras first phone call made by AO1 to AO2 is
           concerned, from the above observation of the trial Court
           what we can understand is it disbelieved the said phone call
           on the ground that there is no dependable evidence about
           phone call and it is not known who actually spoke and what
           was the nature of conversation. This observation is quite
           inappreciable. Dependability of evidence is concerned, a
           responsible officer of calibre of PW9 avouched authenticity
           of Ex.P36 and P36A call data particulars. The trial Court
           did not give any plausible reason for not accepting his
           evidence. So, the dependability of Ex.P36 and P36A is
           not a question at all. Then, the question of who spoke is
           concerned, there can be no doubt because the call was
           emanated from the residential telephone of AO1 and not
           from a public booth or from some other telephone. The
           recipient of the call being the higher officer of AO1 none
           else than AO1 must have talked to AO2. It is true that
           the Court has no benefit of conversion between AO1 and
           AO2. However, as already observed supra, from the flat
           denial of every thing by AO1 the adverse inference can
           be drawn that they must have talked about the proposed
           visit of AO1 and PW1 to the residence of AO2. It must
           be noted that the trial Court gave illogical reasoning to
           hold that the conversion between AO1 and AO2 even
           if believed must not be in connection with the claim of
           PW2 and bribe etc. The trial Court observed that if the
           said phone call is accepted as the proof for the alleged
           criminal conspiracy between AO1 and AO2 to come to
           a common understanding regarding quantum of bribe of
           Rs.40,000/- how come that on that day morning itself PW1
           could already mention the said amount as demanded by
           AO1 in Ex.P4— complainant and held that there was no
           conspiracy at all. It must be noted that it is not the case
           of the prosecution that through this phone call only, AO1
           and AO2 for the first time conspired and fixed the bribe
           amount. They might have discussed about their conspiracy
           and fixed the bribe amount through another phone call by
1200                                                         [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


           a different phone number. What the prosecution intended
           to establish is that the phone call in Ex.P36A is a part of
           their conspiracy but not the first one for fixation of bribe
           amount. Hence, the above circumstances clearly establish
           the conspiracy between AO1 and AO2.’ (sic)
                                                   (emphasis supplied)

28. From the above extract, rather portions thereof, it is quite clear that
    the High Court itself has relied on inferences and conjectures alone.
    Even if the factum of phone call, as alleged, having been made stands
    accepted, it is clear that the contents of the conversation are not
    available at all. That aside, surely the protection of Article 20(3) of the
    Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’)
    would apply and the appellant could not be compelled to disclose
    the nature and content of the conversation, assuming it happened.
    In this background, much has also been said about the nature of
    the relationship between the appellant and the accused no.2. The
    prosecution has strived to prove that they shared a cordial relationship
    while the defence has argued that there was antagonism between
    them in view of the orders passed by accused no.2 transferring the
    appellant twice. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that one Mr. K
    Venkata Reddy, stating to be a close friend of Mr. L Laxman Reddy
    (PW2’s deceased-husband) had written a letter dated 04.08.1999 to
    accused no.2 informing him that the appellant is demanding a bribe
    to settle PW2’s claim and requested for settlement of the claim as
    also suitable action against the appellant. This letter was forwarded
    by accused no.2 to Mr. K N Rasool (Vigilance Officer) for investigation
    which is apparent from letter dated 11.08.1999 sent by Mr. Rasool
    to the Head Office, Vigilance Department informing them about the
    complaint(s) received against the appellant. Thereafter, accused no.2
    passed an Office Order dated 12.08.1999 transferring the appellant
    to the Divisional Office, Guntur. Subsequently, through another
    Office Order dated 07.10.1999, accused no.2, again, transferred the
    appellant to the Branch Office, Guntur. The High Court has termed
    the transfer orders as a fleabite in view of the transfers being made
    locally. No doubt, it is true that accused no.2 could have imposed
    harsher punishment/posting to the appellant and even assuming, for
    the sake of argument, that the two shared a cordial relationship, we
    are unable to persuade ourselves to the ultimate conclusion drawn by
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                       1201

            M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh


     the High Court in this regard especially in view of the fact that it was
     accused no.2 himself who had forwarded the complaint against the
     appellant to the Vigilance Officer. Being so, it would militate against
     normal human conduct besides being extremely unwise and illogical,
     for accused no.2 to enter into a conspiracy with the very appellant,
     against whom he had complained to the Vigilance Officer, just a month
     later, being acutely aware of the scrutiny placed on the appellant by
     Mr. Rasool/the Vigilance Department and the ongoing investigation.
29. The prosecution further alleged that since the bribe was not paid
    by PW1, the claim file was kept pending in the Regional Office by
    accused no.2. The Trial Court attributed the delay in clearing of the
    file by the Regional Office to the injunction order dated 18.08.1999
    passed in O.S. No.63/1999 filed by PW2’s mother-in-law. However,
    as rightly taken note of by the High Court, the injunction was only
    with regards to disbursing the policy amount and not on settling the
    claim filed by PW2. This is why, despite the injunction order, multiple
    officers in the Branch Office approved the claim and sent it to higher
    authorities for approval. The delay, therefore, cannot be attributed
    to the injunction order. The High Court has placed reliance on the
    testimony of PW5/Assistant General Manager, Regional Office, to
    hold that accused no.2 indeed kept the file pending as per the pre-
    arrangement between the accused persons. It has come in, by way
    of PW5’s deposition, that if a complaint is received in respect of
    any file and the same is referred to the Vigilance Department, then
    the file will not be processed till instructions are received therefrom.
    On 04.10.1999, accused no.2 told PW5 to keep the file pending at
    his level but did not disclose any reason for the same. By this time,
    accused no.2 had already forwarded complaint dated 04.08.1999 to
    the Vigilance Officer and was aware of the pending vigilance inquiry
    in respect of the claim, therefore, it was incumbent on him to keep
    the file pending. However, he had to make an endorsement of this
    fact on the file which he failed to do. This conduct on his part raises
    some suspicion, however, we have some hesitation in accepting the
    theory of demand for the reason already noted supra, viz. that accused
    no.2 was well-aware of the vigilance inquiry against the appellant. In
    this scenario, it is not reasonably conceivable to believe that he would
    be audacious enough to hatch a conspiracy with the appellant. More
    importantly, after the file was dealt with by the appellant, he stood
    transferred to the Divisional Office on 12.08.1999 and then back to
    the Branch Office on 07.10.1999. By such time, the file in question
1202                                                         [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     had moved to the Regional Office, Vishakhapatnam where accused
     no.2 was posted. PW1-Complainant could not have been unaware of
     the fact that a close friend of the deceased had already written a letter
     on 04.08.1999 to accused no.2 complaining that the appellant was
     demanding a bribe to settle the claim and had also sought suitable
     action against him, which had resulted in the appellant’s transfer from
     the Branch Office to the Divisional Office, with the file being referred
     to the Vigilance Department. Therefore, it does not stand to reason
     as to why he would approach the same officer and agree to offer him
     bribe and further, that the appellant would agree to act as a liaison
     between PW1 and accused no.2 in respect of the same claim. Hence,
     as the facts reveal themselves to us, the allegation of demand of bribe,
     as projected by the prosecution, is shrouded in a cloud of dubiety.
     Nevertheless, arguendo, taking the allegation of the demand of bribe
     to be proved, even if we proceed to analyze the evidence put forth in
     support of the subsequent trap and post-trap proceedings, it would
     not be possible for this Court to sustain the Impugned Judgment.
30. We may take note that the Trial Court has pointed out several
    contradictions and inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence
    which, inter alia, relate to: i) placement of the whisky bottle in the
    house of accused no.2; ii) number of people that went inside the
    house of accused no.2; iii) accused no.2 watering the plants when
    accused no.3 and PW1 reached his house; iv) presence of labourers
    and ongoing construction work in the upper portion of the house of
    accused no.2, and; v) time-gap after which PW1 first came out of
    the house of accused no.2. We do not wish to dwell upon these
    aspects elaborately as in light of our eventual conclusion, we feel
    they are minor which are natural in the usual course of progression
    of a trial and more importantly as ultimately, for reasons below, we
    are unable to concur with the view taken by the High Court holding
    the demand and acceptance of the bribe as proved.
31. We say so, in view of three glaring contradictions in the prosecution
    evidence which cumulatively shake the foundations of the prosecution
    case and render its death knell. Firstly, the foremost aspect is the
    presence and participation of the SP/Mr. A Sudhakara Rao in the
    trap proceedings. This is all the more relevant in view of the specific
    defence raised by accused no.2 that the SP during the trap gave a
    sly hint that there is no case against him given that he is wise enough
    to come out of the case, which is also spoken of by DW2 (accused
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                      1203

            M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh


     no.2’s wife). It is his stand, that on his refusal, he has been falsely
     implicated in the case. Interestingly, PW12 has stated that he did
     not inform the SP about the laying of the trap from Hyderabad, but
     only after his return to Visakhapatnam, he informed the SP. Neither
     the prosecution witnesses nor any documentary evidence prepared
     during the trap proceedings record/indicate the presence of the SP
     and/or his participation in the trap proceedings. But on the other
     hand, the tour diary of the SP duly signed by him, shows that on
     23.10.1999, the day of the trap, he reached Hyderabad from Chennai
     and participated in a trap. It further shows that during the week
     commencing from 18.10.1999 to 24.10.1999, there was only one trap
     case registered i.e., RC 23(A)/99 which relates to the present case.
     This unimpeachable document, therefore, conclusively falsifies the
     PW12’s evidence and raises serious doubts on the veracity of the trap
     proceedings. It speaks volumes that no prosecution witness, including
     PW12, indicated the presence of the SP. The justification provided by
     the prosecution that the SP came to Hyderabad to attend a meeting
     at the regional headquarters with the Deputy Inspector-General of
     Police is negated by the tour diary which speaks of no such meetings
     and provides in unambiguous terms that the SP ‘reached Hyderabad
     and participated in trap and started Hyderabad to Vishakhapatnam’.
32. Secondly, prosecution witnesses have deposed to the effect that
    accused no.3 was wearing a white shirt with stripes. It is further
    their case that the shirt pocket was dipped in the chemical solution
    which turned pink and thereafter the white shirt was seized. Bizarrely
    enough, the shirt produced before the Trial Court was a green/
    moss-coloured shirt with stripes. The Trial Court after having seen
    the material object, i.e., the ‘white’ shirt has reached the conclusion
    that by no stretch of imagination can the shirt produced qualify to be
    a ‘white’ shirt. The High Court has taken a view that since the ‘white’
    shirt was seized in 1999, due to the efflux of time, its white colour
    would have withered away due to dust. We are quite dumb-founded
    by the explanation offered by the High Court, to fill in a glaring gap
    in the prosecution case, which is beyond comprehension. The High
    Court should not have made such an incredulous and irrational
    leap, only to find some semblance of logic. It is to be kept in mind
    that during trial, material objects are exhibited and the Trial Court
    has the visual benefit of perceiving the material object’s physical
    characteristics. The Trial Court, thus, has the advantage of direct
1204                                                         [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


     examination, which may not be available to the appellate courts,
     who, more often than not, only have the benefit of testimonies
     or photographs. In such scenario, it was incumbent on the High
     Court to have either summoned the material object for examination
     by itself, in exercise of powers under Section 91 of the Code of
     Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’) or to
     have accepted the view of the Trial Court which discerned that the
     shirt exhibited was a moss-coloured shirt and not white-coloured.
     There is also a sea of difference between a moss-coloured shirt and
     the yellowish/brownish tinge that is accumulated due to disuse and
     withering of the colour of a white shirt due to passage of time. While
     these may appear trivial to the layman at first blush, the Courts of
     law dealing with life and liberty cannot ever be too careful. The High
     Court ought not to have proceeded with such lack of care in simply
     accepting the explanation proffered by the prosecution.
33. Lastly, we find from the second mediators’ report and the evidence
    of the prosecution witnesses, that a cotton swab was used to collect
    the phenolphthalein powder from the surface of the cardboard box of
    the whisky bottle and the same on being subjected to chemical test
    yielded positive result. Curiously, the first mediators’ report which was
    prepared before the trap does not mention that any phenolphthalein
    powder was applied to the cardboard box or the whisky bottle. In such
    circumstances, it is doubtful how the phenolphthalein powder was
    recovered from the surface of the cardboard box in the first place.
    The High Court has reasoned that since PW1 first handed over the
    tainted cash to accused no.3 and thereafter handled the whisky box,
    the phenolphthalein powder must have transferred from his hands
    to the whisky box. We are afraid that such reasoning is based on
    conjectural assumptions alone, while hastening to add that we should
    not be understood as saying that transfer of phenolphthalein powder
    from the tainted cash to the hands of PW1 and thereafter from his
    hands to cardboard box is not possible at all. It may have been
    possible but to presume such fact in a criminal trial, having severe
    eventual penal consequences, is something that we express our
    clear reservation on. In fact, this is also indicative of the lack of care
    with which the High Court proceeded. The High Court misdirected
    itself in engaging deeply with the minor inconsistencies, while not
    providing sufficient reasoning for accepting the most glaring and
    obvious contradictions in the prosecution’s case.
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                             1205

            M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh


34. In a case of such nature, where the accused persons have been
    acquitted by the Trial Court, there is a double presumption of
    innocence which accrues in their favour. Reference may be made to
    Jafarudheen v State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440 which observed:
           ‘25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by
           invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to
           consider whether the trial court’s view can be termed as
           a possible one, particularly when evidence on record has
           been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal
           adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the
           accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow
           in reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal.
           Therefore, the presumption in favour of the accused does
           not get weakened but only strengthened. Such a double
           presumption that enures in favour of the accused has to
           be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on the accepted
           legal parameters.’
                                                   (emphasis supplied)

35. Hence, it was all the more important for the High Court to have
    provided cogent reasoning for disturbing the finding of acquittal
    recorded by the Trial Court. Unfortunately, the Impugned Judgment
    does not sufficiently address the weakest links in the prosecution
    version, necessitating interference by this Court.
36. Even if we take the prosecution case at its highest, ignoring the
    chinks in its armour, it can, at best, be said that it is a case where two
    views are possible. When faced with this situation, the view of this
    Court has been only one – where two views are possible, the Court
    should err on the side of caution and lean in favour of the defence,
    as held in Suresh Thipmppa Shetty v State of Maharashtra, 2023
    SCC OnLine 1038 in the following terms:
           ‘18. On a deeper and fundamental level, when this Court is
           confronted with a situation where it has to ponder whether
           to lean with the Prosecution or the Defence, in the face
           of reasonable doubt as to the version put forth by the
           Prosecution, this Court will, as a matter of course and of
           choice, in line with judicial discretion, lean in favour of the
1206                                                       [2025] 7 S.C.R.

                        Supreme Court Reports


          Defence. We have borne in mind the cardinal principle
          that life and liberty are not matters to be trifled with,
          and a conviction can only be sustained in the absence
          of reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence in
          favour of the accused and insistence on the Prosecution
          to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt are not empty
          formalities. Rather, their origin is traceable to Articles 21
          and 14 of the Constitution of India. Of course, for certain
          offences, the law seeks to place a reverse onus on the
          accused to prove his/her innocence, but that does not
          impact adversely the innocent-till-proven-guilty rule for
          other criminal offences.’
                                                 (emphasis supplied)

37. In fine, even if it is accepted that the appellant and accused no.2
    had a close relationship and the so-called action of transfer of the
    appellant by accused no.2 was cosmetic in nature, this would not
    obviate the requirement of proving the factum of demand being made
    by the appellant for himself and also on behalf of accused no.2 for
    approval of the amount to be paid to the policy-claimant. Moreover, if
    the appellant was demanding Rs. 40,000/- (Rupees Forty Thousand)
    from PW1 as bribe, the division being Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five
    Thousand) for himself and Rs.35,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Five Thousand)
    for accused no.2, it does not stand to reason as to why the appellant
    would not keep his share of Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) in
    Vijayawada itself and then send the remaining Rs.35,000/- (Rupees
    Thirty-Five Thousand) to accused no.2 or even keep the entire sum
    of Rs.35,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Five Thousand) meant for accused no.2
    with himself. There may also be an indication that accused no.3 had
    taken out Rs.5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) from the Rs.40,000/-
    (Rupees Forty Thousand) given by PW1 and kept it in his pocket and
    passed on the remaining Rs.35,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Five Thousand) to
    accused no.2 meaning thereby, at best and presuming for argument’s
    sake, it was a deal between PW2, accused no.2 and accused no.3.
    The mere fact that accused no.3 is the appellant’s brother would not
    lead to a presumption in law that the money taken by him was meant
    for the appellant and that too, pursuant to demand being made by
    the appellant. It would also be important to take note of the fact that
    except for PW1-Complainant, no other witness/person was privy to
[2025] 7 S.C.R.                                                       1207

              M Sambasiva Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh


     the demand made to the complainant by the appellant. This does not
     satisfy the requirement that in trap cases where after a complaint is
     received, independent witnesses of the trap team are also required
     to confirm the demand made by the accused personally, which has
     not been done in the present case. Thus, the procedure of the trap
     case itself from the very inceptual stage suffers from serious legal
     lacuna, which cannot be now overcome. For, the purpose of this
     requirement is that before the trap is set into motion, there should be
     corroboration of the allegation made by the complainant of actual and
     real demand being made by the accused-public servant as a quid pro
     quo for extending a favour to the complainant. On to the next stage
     of actual laying of trap, there also the appellant was nowhere in the
     picture. The prosecution’s effort of still trying to bring him under the
     ambit and scope of the corruption net clearly has not succeeded in
     the circumstances.
38. Having analysed the evidence threadbare and considered the entire
    evidential gamut, we find that the prosecution has not proved beyond
    reasonable doubt the demand of and acceptance of the bribe in the
    trap laid by PW12. This is, to be charitable to the investigative agency,
    at best a case of a botched-up trap with serious lapses committed
    by the investigative agency. The role of the SP and PW12 also calls
    for a detailed look, but in view of the fact that they are not before
    us, we refrain from further comment. At its worst, this case is an
    example of fabrication and attempted frame-up. Whatever be the
    truth of the matter, the fact remains that in either scenario, benefit
    of doubt has to flow to the appellant. It would be unsafe to uphold
    the conviction of the appellant in any view of the matter. In view of
    our foregoing discussion, we set aside the Impugned Judgment and
    restore the Judgment and Order of the Trial Court.
39. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The appellant is acquitted of all
    charges relating to this case. The appellant is entitled to refund of the
    fine amount, if any deposited, in pursuance of the Impugned Judgment

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




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         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey