Holding

Visura ITCL is a secured creditor, not a financial creditor, and must be granted the rights under Sections 52 and 53 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, with the resolution plan required to respect its pledged‑share security.

Summary

The corporate debtor Amtek Auto Ltd pledged 66.77% of its shares in JMT Auto Ltd as security to M/s Vistra ITCL (appellant No.1) for short‑term loans extended to its group companies. Vistra filed a claim as a secured creditor, which was rejected by the resolution professional and later by the adjudicating authority. The NCLAT held that Vistra was not a financial creditor and dismissed its application under Section 60(5). On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Visura is a secured creditor under the IBC, though not a financial creditor, and must be afforded the rights of a secured creditor under Sections 52 and 53, including the option for the successful resolution applicant to retain the pledged shares and their proceeds. The Court directed that the resolution plan should respect this security interest, but it would not require the plan to be withdrawn. The appeal was disposed of, modifying the NCLAT order and granting Visura the secured‑creditor rights without any order as to costs.

Issues considered

The appellant's status under the IBC: whether it qualifies as a financial creditor or only as a secured creditor.
Whether the resolution plan approved by the Committee of Creditors can override the pledge agreement and extinguish the appellant's security interest.
Whether the appellant can be denied the rights under Sections 52 and 53 of the IBC despite holding a valid security interest.
Whether the appellant's claim is barred by delay, laches or acquiescence.

Legislation cited

Companies Act, 2013
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016s. Rule 21A
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016s. 30, s. 31, s. 52, s. 53, s. 5(7), s. 5(8), s. 60(5)

Subjects

InsolvencyBankruptcySecured creditorFinancial creditorPledgeResolution planCommittee of CreditorsSection 52 IBCSection 53 IBCDelayLachesOperational creditor

Judgment

806 [2023]
SUPREME COURT 6 S.C.R. 806
REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.

A M/S VISTRA ITCL (INDIA) LTD & ORS.
v.
MR. DINKAR VENKATASUBRAMANIAN & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No.3606 of 2020)
B MAY 04, 2023
[M. R. SHAH AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016: ss. 30, 52 and 53 –
Claim of the appellant as financial creditor of the corporate debtor
on basis of the pledged shares – Entitlement to – On facts, corporate
C
debtor approached the appellants to extend a short- term loan
facility to its group companies for the ultimate end use of the
corporate debtor – It was an understanding that the corporate
debtor would create first ranking exclusive security by way of
pledging shares held by the corporate debtor – Execution of Security
D Trustee Agreements between the appellant no. 1 and the group
companies – Thereafter, an application u/s.7 admitted against the
corporate debtor and the respondent appointed as the resolution
professional – Appellant no. 1 filed its claim as a secured creditor
of the corporate debtor and submitted Form C claiming a principal
amount, however, the same was rejected by the resolution
E
professional – Appellants then filed application u/s. 60(5) claiming
the right based on pledged shares, which was rejected by the
Adjudicating Authority as well as the NCLAT – NCLAT held that the
appellants not having advanced any money to the corporate debtor
as a financial debt would not be coming within the purview of a
F financial creditor of the corporate debtor – On appeal,
held:Appellant No. 1 has security interest in the pledged shares –
Appellant No. 1 is to be treated as a secured creditor, but would not
fall under the category of financial creditors or operational creditors
– Appellant No.1 is being denied the rights u/s. 52 as well as s. 53
in respect of the pledged shares whereas, the intent of the amended
G
s. 30(2) rw s. 31 is to protects the interests of other creditors who
are outside the purview of the CoC – Viable solution is to treat the
appellant no. 1 as secured creditor in terms of s. 52 rw s. 53 –
Option is given to the successful resolution applicant to treat the
appellant no.1 as a secured creditor, who would be entitled to retain
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806
M/S VISTRA ITCL (INDIA) LTD v. MR. DINKAR 807
VENKATASUBRAMANIAN

the security interest in the pledged shares, and in terms thereof, A
retain the security proceeds on the sale of the said pledged shares –
This option would meet the mandate of the Code and does not violate
the rights given to the secured creditor –Thus, appellant no.1 would
be treated as a secured creditor, and entitled to all rights and
obligations as applicable to a secured creditor in terms of ss. 52
B
and 53 and in accordance with the pledge agreement – Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations,
2016 – r. 21A.
Disposing of the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The submission that the Amended and Restated C
Pledge Agreement dated 5.07.2016 between the corporate debtor
and the IL&FS Trust Company Limited, the predecessor-in-
interest of the appellant no. 1 (Pledge Agreement) inter alia
provides that the Corporate Debtor is the guarantor of the entire
loan amount for which reliance was placed upon clause 2.12 of
the Pledge Agreement, is rejected, for the Pledge Agreement D
specifically restricts and limits the liability of the Corporate
Debtor the extent of the pledged shares vide clause 2.1.1. [Para
6][821-C-D]
1.2 Certain communications issued by the IDBI Bank, the
lead bank of the Joint Lenders Forum, which now constitutes E
the majority of the CoC of the corporate debtor permitting the
pledge of shares etc., have to be read and understood in the
context in which they were written. It was clear and understood
by the financial creditors of the corporate debtor that the corporate
debtor is not to bear any additional financial liability by a security F
or charge of its assets for the STL Facilities, and the loans were
being procured and taken by Brassco and WLD from the Appellant
Nos. 2 and 3. It was stipulated that the assets of the Corporate
Debtor would not be encumbered in anyway, and except for shares
given as security, and the burden to repay/ discharge the loan
was/ is upon Brassco and WLD. IDBI Bank had only permitted G
the corporate debtor to pledge the shares in question, and to
this extent, they did not have any objection. [Para 6.1][822-A-C]
1.3 Appellant No. 1 is a secured creditor to the extent of
the shares pledged to it by the Corporate Debtor. It holds the
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808 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.

A first right in pledge on 66.77% shareholding in JMT Auto
Limited. The expression ‘security interest’ as defined in Section
3(31) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 states that it
means right, title, interest or a claim to a property created in
favour, or provided for a secured creditor by a transaction which
secures payment or performance of an obligation and includes,
B
mortgage, charge, hypothecation, assignment and encumbrance,
or any other agreement or arrangement for securing payment or
performance of any obligation of any person. The person is whose
favour the security interest is created need not be the creditor
who avails the credit facility, and can be a third person. Security
C interest can be created for credit facilities/loan advanced to
another person. It is accepted and admitted that the appellant
No. 1 has security interest in the pledged shares. [Para 7][822-
D-G]
1.4 The law of pledge contemplates special rights for the
D pawnee in the goods pledged, i.e., the right to possession of the
security, and in case of default, the right to bring a suit against
the pawnor, as well as the right to sell the goods after giving
reasonable notice to the pawnor. The general rights or ownership
rights in the property remain with the pawnor, and wholly reverts
to him on discharge of the debt or performance of the promise.
E In other words, the right to property vests in the pawnee only as
far as it is necessary to secure the debt. [Para 7.2][824-F-G]
1.5 The amendment introduced by Act No. 26 of 2019
ensures that the operational creditors under the resolution plan
should be paid the amount equivalent to the amount which they
F would have been entitled to, in the event of liquidation of the
Corporate Debtor under Section 53 of the Code. In other words,
the amount payable under the resolution plan to the operational
creditors should not be less than the amount payable to them
under Section 53 of the Code, in the event of liquidation of the
G Corporate Debtor. The amended provision also provides that the
financial creditors who have not voted in favour of the resolution
plan shall be paid not less than the amount which would be paid
to them in accordance with sub- section (1) to Section 53 of the
Code, in the event of liquidation of the corporate debtor.
Explanation to clause (b) of the 30(2) of the Code, for the removal
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M/S VISTRA ITCL (INDIA) LTD v. MR. DINKAR 809
VENKATASUBRAMANIAN

of doubts, states and clarifies that the distribution in accordance A
with this clause shall be fair and equitable to such creditors. [Para
8.1][826-F-H]
1.6 It is also the mandate of Section 31 of the Code that the
adjudicating authority should be satisfied that the resolution plan,
as approved by the CoC under sub-section (4) of Section 30 meets B
with the requirement as referred to in sub-section (2) of Section
30. Only then, the adjudicating authority shall approve the
resolution plan, which shall then be binding on the Corporate
Debtor and its employees, members, creditors, guarantors and
other stakeholders involved in the resolution plan. Section
30(2)(e) also requires the resolution professional to examine each C
resolution plan received by him/her and confirm that it does not
contravene any provisions of law for the time being in force. Thus,
the amended Section 30(2) read with Section 31 of the Code,
enunciates the manner in which the interests of the creditors
who are not included in the CoC i.e., the operational creditors D
and the financial creditors who have not voted in favour of the
resolution plan, must be protected in the resolution plan by the
resolution professional and the adjudicating authority. [Para 8.2-
8.3][827-A-D]
1.7 It is in this context that the appellant No. 1 submits E
that the resolution plan in question does not meet the
requirements of the Code, as it extinguishes and vaporises the
pledge created in favour of the appellant no. 1 and thereby,
appellant no. 1, a secured creditor, viz, the pledged shares, is left
remediless and worse off than the dissenting financial creditors,
or even the operational creditors. [Para 8.4][827-D-E] F

1.8 The difficulty which arises in the instant case is that, in
terms of the decision of this Court in Anuj Jain’s case and Phoenix
ARC’s case, appellant no. 1 is to be treated as a secured creditor,
but would not fall under the category of financial creditors or
operational creditors. Therefore, they would be denied the benefit G
of the amendments to Section 30(2) of the Code made vide Act
No. 26 of 2019, or for that matter Act No. 26 of 2018.
Consequently, a very odd and a peculiar situation is created where
a secured creditor is denied the benefit of the secured interest
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810 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.

A i.e., the right to exercise the sale of the secured interest, yet not
be treated as either a financial creditor or an operational creditor.
In terms of Section 52 of the Code, a secured creditor in
liquidation proceedings has the right to relinquish its security
interest to the liquidation estate and receive proceeds from the
sale of assets by the liquidator in the manner specified under
B
Section 53 of the Code. The second option given to the secured
creditor is to realise the security interest in the manner specified
in said Section. Rule 21 A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board
of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 deals with the
presumption of security interest. If the secured creditor
C relinquishes the security interest, it is then entitled to priority in
payment under clause (b) to sub-section (1) to Section 53 of the
Code. The debts owed to the secured creditor in such event,
rank pari passu with the workmen’s dues for the period 24 months
preceding the liquidation commencement date. As per Section
52(9) of the Code, where the proceeds on realisation of secured
D
assets are not adequate to repay the debts due to the secured
creditors who have exercised the option to realise the security
interest, the unpaid dues of such secured creditors are to be
paid by the liquidator in terms of clause (e) of sub-section (1) of
Section 53 of the Code. [Para 8.5][828-A-E]
E 1.9 The answer to the situation wherein the appellant no.1,
a secured creditor, is being denied the rights under Section 52
as well as Section 53 of the Code in respect of the pledged shares,
whereas, the intent of the amended Section 30(2) read with Section
31 of the Code is too contrary, as it recognises and protects the
F interests of other creditors who are outside the purview of the
CoC, is two-fold. First is to treat the secured creditor as a financial
creditor of the Corporate Debtor to the extent of the estimated
value of the pledged share on the date of commencement of the
CIRP. This would make it a member of the CoC and give it voting
rights, equivalent to the estimated value of the pledged shares.
G However, this may require re-consideration of the dictum and
ratio of Anuj Jain’s case and Phoenix ARC’s case, which would
entail reference to a larger bench. In the context of the instant
case, the said solution may not be viable as the resolution plan
has already been approved by the CoC without appellant no. 1
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M/S VISTRA ITCL (INDIA) LTD v. MR. DINKAR 811
VENKATASUBRAMANIAN

being a member of the CoC. Therefore, the second option would A
be opted. The second option is to treat the appellant no. 1 as a
secured creditor in terms of Section 52 read with Section 53 of
the Code. In other words, the option is given to the successful
resolution applicant-DVI to treat the appellant no.1 as a secured
creditor, who would be entitled to retain the security interest in
B
the pledged shares, and in terms thereof, would be entitled to
retain the security proceeds on the sale of the said pledged shares
under Section 52 of the Code read with Rule 21 A of the Liquidation
Process Regulations. The second recourse available, would be
almost equivalent in monetary terms for the appellant no. 1, who
is treated it as a secured creditor and is held entitled to all rights C
and obligations as applicable to a secured creditor under Section
52 and 53 of the Code. This would be a fair and just solution to
the legal conundrum and issue highlighted. [Para 9][828-F-H;
829-A-C]
1.10 It is clarified that the directions given would not be a D
ground for the successful resolution applicant-DVI to withdraw
the resolution plan which has already been approved by the
NCLAT and this Court. The reason is simple. Any resolution
plan must meet with the requirements/provisions of the Code
and any provisions of law for the time being in force. What is
directed and the option given by, ensures that the resolution plan E
meets the mandate of the Code and does not violate the rights
given to the secured creditor, who cannot be treated as worse
off/inferior in its claim and rights, viz, an operational creditor or a
dissenting financial creditor. [Para 9.1][828-D-E]
1.11 The submission raised by the respondent No. 1, F
resolution professional for the Corporate Debtor and the
respondent no. 2-CoC of the Corporate Debtor that the plea of
the appellant no.1 to be treated as a financial creditor of the
Corporate Debtor should be dismissed on the grounds of delay,
laches and acquiescence is accepted. The submission is that the G
appellant no. 1 had not objected to the resolution plan submitted
by the erstwhile resolution applicant-LHG and, as a sequitur, its
non-classification as a financial creditor in the CoC of the
Corporate Debtor. Though this argument had appealed and had
weighed with the NCLAT, is untenable since the resolution plan
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812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.

A submitted by erstwhile resolution applicant LHG did not in any
way affect the rights or interests of the appellant No. 1 as a
secured creditor in respect of the pledged shares. appellant no.
1 has elaborately explained that LHG etc. were in negotiations
with them so as to redeem the pledge and acquire the shares.
[Para 10][829-F-H;]
B
1.12 The impugned judgment of the NCLAT affirming the
view taken by the NCLT is partly modified in terms of the
directions holding that appellant no.1 would be treated as a secured
creditor, who would be entitled to all rights and obligations as
applicable to a secured creditor in terms of Sections 52 and 53 of
C the Code, and in accordance with the pledge agreement dated
05.07.2016. [Para 11][830-B-C]
Anuj Jain Interim Resolution Professional for Jaypee
Infratech Limited vs. Axis Bank Limited etc. etc. (2020)
8 SCC 401 : [2020] 8 SCR 291; Phoenix ARC Private
D Limited vs. Ketulbhai Ramubhai Patel (2021) 2 SCC
799; PTC India Financial Services Limited v.
Venkateswarlu Kari and Another (2022) 9 SCC 704 –
referred to.
Case Law Reference
E
[2020] 8 SCR 291 referred to Para 3.5
(2021) 2 SCC 799 referred to Para 3.5
(2022) 9 SCC 704 referred to Para 7.1
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.3606
F
of 2020.
From the Judgment and Order dated 24.08.2020 of the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins.) No.703 of
2020.
G Rakesh Dwivedi, Shyam Divan, Sr. Advs., Ms. Anindita Roy
Chowdhury, Ms. Vatsala Rai, Ms. Anannya Ghosh, Brian Henry Moses,
Advs. for the Appellants.
Tushar Mehta, SG, Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Sr. Adv., Ms. Misha,
Anoop Rawat, Siddhant Kant, Ms. Charu Bansal, Ms. Prabh Simran
H Kaur, S. S. Shroff, Sanjay Bhatt, Ms. Niharika Sharma, Ramchandran
M/S VISTRA ITCL (INDIA) LTD v. MR. DINKAR 813
VENKATASUBRAMANIAN

Madan, Dhruv Sharma, Ms. Akansha Srivastava, Rabin Majumder, Advs. A
for the Respondents.
K. V. Viswanathan, Vikram Nankani, Sr. Advs., Ashish Prasad,
Dinesh Pednekar, Chanakya Keswani, Arpan Behl, Mahfooz Ahsan
Nazki, Advs. for the Applicant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by B

M. R. SHAH, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 24.08.2020 passed by the National Company Law
Appellate Tribunal (NCLT) passed in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) C
No.703 of 2020 by which the NCLAT has dismissed the said appeal and
has confirmed the order passed by the NCLAT passed in IA No.62/2020
in CP (IB) 42/Chd./Hry.2017 preferred by the appellant herein, the original
applicant has preferred the present appeal.
2. The facts leading to the present appeal in a nutshell are as D
under:
2.1 That one Amtek Auto Limited (hereinafter referred to as
Corporate Debtor) approached appellant nos. 2 and 3 to extend a short-
term loan facility of INR 500 crores to its group companies i.e. Brassco
Engineers Ltd. and WLD Investments Pvt. Ltd. for the ultimate end use
E
of the Corporate Debtor. According to the appellants it was an
understanding that the Corporate Debtor will create a first ranking
exclusive security by way of pledge over 16,82,06,100 equity shares of
face value of Rs.2/- each of JMT Auto Ltd. held by the Corporate Debtor
(Pledged Shares). A Security Trustee Agreement was executed between
the appellant no.1 and WLD for an amount of Rs.150,00,00,000/- on F
28.12.2015. The Corporate Debtor’s board of directors passed Board
Resolutions whereby the board of directors resolved to create security
over the shares of JMT Auto Ltd.
2.2 IDBI Bank issued NOC stating that they had no objection to
the proceeds of sale of assets to the extent of a maximum of INR G
450,00,00,000 being used to first settle all the dues under the Security
Trustee Agreement STFs issued by AAL. The Security Trustee
Agreement was executed between the appellant no.1 and Brassco for
an amount of Rs.150,00,00,000/-. That thereafter pursuant to the
resolution passed on 23.12.2015, the Corporate Debtor’s board of
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814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.

A directors passed Board Resolutions whereby the board of directors paid
security towards shares. That thereafter one another Security Trustee
Agreement was executed between the appellant no.1 and Brassco for
an amount of Rs.200,00,00,000/-. That thereafter the Corporate Debtor,
WLD, BRASSCO and Vistra executed an amended and re-instated
pledge agreement on 05.07.2016 and the Corporate Debtor pledged
B
66.77% of its shareholding in JMT Auto Limited to secure the term loan
facilities availed by WLD and Brassco from KKR and L&T. That
thereafter an application under Section 7 of the Insolvency & Bankruptcy
Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IBC/Code’) was admitted against
the Corporate Debtor/AAL on 24.07.2017. The respondent herein - Mr.
C Dinkar T. Venkatasubramanian was appointed as the interim resolution
professional which came to be later confirmed as the resolution
professional.
2.3 That on 02.11.2017 the appellant no.1 filed its claim as a secured
creditor of the Corporate Debtor and submitted Form C claiming a principal
D amount of INR 500 crores. However, the claim by the appellants –
secured creditors was rejected by the Resolution Professional in 2017,
which order was not challenged by the appellants. Resolution Professional
received two resolution plans from only 2 resolution applicants being
Liberty House Group Pvt. Ltd. (LHG) and Deccan Value Investors
(DVI). DVI withdrew its Resolution Plan so the revised plan by M/s
E LHG was considered by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) which
approved the plan on 02.04.2018 with majority voting shares of 94.20%.
The Resolution plan submitted by the LHG was approved by the
Adjudicating Authority vide order dated 25.07.2018. However, thereafter
as the LHG did not fulfil its commitment the Adjudicating Authority passed
F an order directing reconsideration of the CoC for consideration of DVI’s
plan. Thereafter further proceedings were initiated before the NCLAT
by the CoC etc. (which are not relevant for the issue involved in the
present appeal).
2.4 That thereafter the appellants filed another application under
G Section 60(5) of the IBC being I.A. No.62/2020 claiming the right on the
basis of the pledged shares. This Court passed an order dated 08.06.2020
directing the Adjudicating Authority to decide the resolution plan and all
pending applications and pass appropriate orders within 15 days. The
Resolution Professional filed I.A. No.225 of 2020 before the Adjudicating
Authority on 12.06.2020 seeking approval of the resolution plan. The
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M/S VISTRA ITCL (INDIA) LTD v. MR. DINKAR 815
VENKATASUBRAMANIAN [M. R. SHAH, J.]

Adjudicating Authority dismissed the application filed by the appellants A
being I.A. No.62 of 2020. The order passed by the Adjudicating Authority
dated 09.07.2020 passed in I.A. No.62 of 2020 was the subject matter of
appeal before the NCLAT. By the impugned judgment and order the
NCLAT has dismissed the said appeal by observing that the appellant
no.1’s claim in purported capacity of ‘Secured Financial Creditor’ has
B
been rejected way back in the year 2017 and the decision in this regard
has not been called in question and therefore it is not open for the appellants
to raise the same issue in 2020 by filing I.A. No.62 of 2020. The NCLAT
has also observed that the appellants have not lent any money to the
Corporate Debtor and the Corporate Debtor did not owe any financial
debt to the appellants except the pledge of shares was to be executed. C
Therefore, the NCLT observed that the appellants not having advanced
any money to the Corporate Debtor as a financial debt would not be
coming within the purview of financial creditor of the Corporate Debtor.
Making above observations, the NCLAT has dismissed the appeal.
2.5 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment D
and order passed by the NCLAT dismissing the appeal and confirming
the appeal passed by the Revenue dismissing I.A.No.62 of 2020, the
original applicants – M/s Vistra and others have preferred the present
appeal.
3. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate has appeared E
on behalf of the appellant in C.A. No.3606 of 2020 and Shri Shyam
Divan, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the appellant
in C.A. No.6372-73 of 2021. Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General
has appeared on behalf of the respondent no.1 – CoC.
3.1 Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants F
have vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the
case the NCLT/NCLAT have materially erred in observing that the claim
made by the appellant no.1 as a secured financial creditor was belated.
It is submitted on behalf of the appellants that both the NCLT as well as
NCLAT have not properly appreciated the fact that it was a continuing
cause of action. So, it was a case of continuing cause of action. It is G
submitted under the IBC that there is no limitation prescribed for objecting
to the categorization of the creditors in a wrongful category.
3.2 It is submitted that the ratio of the limitation is connected with
the principle of cause of action.
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816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.

A 3.3 It is submitted that it is a case of continuous cause of action as
resolution professional, CoC, Resolution Applicant and the Adjudicating
Authority are all required to consider the correct categorization of the
claimants.
3.4 It is submitted that in the present case, the corporate insolvency
B resolution process (“CIRP”) commenced on 24.07.2017 and the present
resolution plan (which as per the Adjudicating Authority’s order dated
09.07.2020) was submitted for voting by the CoC from 07.02.2020 to
11.02.2020; which was only approved by the Adjudicating Authority on
09.07.2020 i.e., almost 3 years since the start of the CIRP. The Appellants
had already challenged the non-inclusion of the Appellants as a financial
C secured creditor in the CoC on 11.02.2020, which was 5 months before
the resolution plan was approved by the Adjudicating Authority. Therefore,
the question of delay on the part of the Appellants does not arise and
neither can delay be agitated by the Respondents since the CIRP process
under the supervision of the Resolution Professional and CoC itself carried
D on for 3 years, which 3 years is well beyond the timeline of 330 days as
set out under the IBC. Therefore, the CoC and Resolution Professional
cannot justify their delay on one hand and then seek to erode the rights of
the Appellants by relying on delay.
3.5 On merits learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants
E have vehemently submitted that the decisions of this Court in the case of
Anuj Jain Interim Resolution Professional for Jaypee Infratech
Limited vs. Axis Bank Limited etc. etc.1 and Phoenix ARC Private
Limited vs. Ketulbhai Ramubhai Patel,2 are distinguishable and shall
not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand.

F 3.6 It is submitted that there is creditor-debtor relationship between
the appellants and the Amtek Auto Limited. It is submitted that WLD
and Brassco took loans from the appellant nos.2 and 3 through appellant
no.1 for the end use and ultimate benefit of the Corporate Debtor. In
order to establish a direct debtor-creditor relationship, reliance is placed
on the Board Resolution of Amtek Auto dated 13.06.2016; no objection
G certificate requested by Amtek Auto on 23.12.2015; no objection certificate
requested by Amtek Auto on 26.03.2016 from IDBI; No objection
certificate issued by IDBI Bank to Vistra ITCL etc. It is submitted that
from the aforesaid it is clear that Amtek obtained monies from Appellant
1
(2020) 8 SCC 401.
2
H (2021) 2 SCC 799.
M/S VISTRA ITCL (INDIA) LTD v. MR. DINKAR 817
VENKATASUBRAMANIAN [M. R. SHAH, J.]

Nos.2 & 3 when it was in financial distress, which fact the banks were A
aware of since the reason for obtaining these loans was to ‘standardize’
Amtek’s loan account with the banks.
3.7 It is vehemently submitted that the pledge of shares constituted
as financial debt under the IBC is defined as Security Interest under
Section 3(31) of the IBC. B
4. Shri Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf
of respondent no.2 has vehemently submitted that the appellant had filed
its claim with the Resolution Professional on 02.11.2017 which was
rejected and the same was duly reflected in the list of creditors published
on the website of the Corporate Debtor. It is submitted that the said C
rejection has never been challenged by the appellant. It is submitted that
even in various communications exchanged, the appellant no.1 raised no
challenge to non-acceptance of its claim but rather put forth an absurd
request to the Resolution Professional to ensure that the pledged shares
are not to be dealt with in any manner without the prior written consent
of the appellant no.1. It is submitted that therefore the appellant on D
11.02.2020 had filed an application before the NCLT that too not in
challenge to its claim rejection but for seeking admission into the CoC. It
is submitted that since the said application was filed belatedly the same is
rightly rejected by the NCLT and is rightly confirmed by the NCLAT.
4.1 Shri Mehta, learned Solicitor General has further submitted E
that the issue involved in the present appeal is squarely covered by this
Court in the case of Anuj Jain (supra) and Phoenix ARC Private
Limited (supra). It is submitted that the appellants could not qualify to
be financial creditors of the Corporate Debtor. It is submitted that there
is only a third-party security given in form of pledged shares with respect F
to the amounts advanced by the appellants to affiliates of the Corporate
Debtor. Thus, the appellants cannot be considered as financial creditor
of the Corporate Debtor.
5. The issue and legal question are partly covered by two decisions
of this Court namely, Anuj Jain (supra) and Phoenix ARC Private G
Limited (supra). We will first examine the decisions in these two cases
and then advert to the contention of the Appellant No. 1 – M/s Vistra
ITCL that these decisions are distinguishable from the facts of the instant
case.

H
818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.

A 5.1 In Anuj Jain (supra), the issue was whether the lenders of
Jaypee Associates Limited (JAL), the holding company of Jaypee
Infratech Limited (JIL), the Corporate Debtor, hold the status of ‘financial
creditors’ of JIL within the meaning of Section 5(7) of the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code, 20163 read with expression ‘financial debt’ as
defined in Section 5(8) of the Code. This issue had arisen as JIL had
B
mortgaged certain land with the creditors of JAL.4 Highlighting and
expounding the unique status of the financial creditors in the context of
Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process5 under the Code, and that the
legislature has assigned them a specific role to ensure that the Corporate
Debtor is, if possible, revived, rejuvenated, and resuscitated, it was held
C that the financial creditors are the only stakeholders who would be
obviously concerned and concomitant to the resurgence and restructuring
of the Corporate Debtor. A secured creditor may only have an interest in
realising the value of its security and, therefore, will not have stake or
interest in Corporate Debtor’s revival or equitable liquidation, while a
financial creditor, apart from looking for safeguards of its own interests,
D
will also be simultaneously interested in the revival and growth of the
Corporate Debtor. Therefore, a person only having a security interest in
the assets of the Corporate Debtor, even if falling in the description of
‘secured creditor’ by virtue of collateral security extended by the
Corporate Debtor, would nevertheless stand outside the sect of the
E ‘financial creditors’, and consequently outside the CoC as well. The
aforesaid decision is also based upon the meaning assigned to the term
‘financial debt’ under Section 5(8) of the Code, which, in the context of
the present decision, need not be elaborated.
5.2 In Phoenix ARC (supra), the Corporate Debtor, namely
F Doshion Veolia Water Solutions Private Limited (Doshion Veolia), had
pledged 40,160 shares of Gondwana Engineers Limited as a security to
L&T Infrastructure Finance Company Limited (L&T). A deed of
undertaking was also executed by Doshion Veolia in favour of L&T.
However, the main and principal transaction was between L&T, which
had advanced financial facility, to and with Doshion Limited of Rs.40
G crores, pursuant to which specific agreements were executed. For clarity,
3
For short, Code.
4
The mortgage by JIL in favour of creditors of JAL were, in fact, set aside in terms of
Section 43 of the Code, albeit this Court had opined on the legal issue on the assumption
even if the mortgage was valid.
5
For short, CIRP.
H
M/S VISTRA ITCL (INDIA) LTD v. MR. DINKAR 819
VENKATASUBRAMANIAN [M. R. SHAH, J.]

we may state that L&T had subsequently assigned the debt to Phoenix A
ARC (P) Ltd., who were the appellants before this Court.
5.3 A three judges’ bench of this Court in Phoenix ARC (supra)
observed that the pledge agreement was in respect of 40,160 shares of
Doshion Veolia, which were pledged to L&T as security, thereby
restricting the liability of Doshion Veolia, albeit, this cannot constitute B
‘financial debt’ as defined in Section 5(8) of the Code and, therefore, the
appellant would not be a financial creditor of the corporate debtor.
5.4 Phoenix ARC (supra) also refers to Chapter VIII of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872 which deals with the definition of ‘indemnity’ and
‘guarantee’ under Sections 124 and 126 therein. It was observed: C
“25. As is clear from the definition a “contract of guarantee” is a
contract to perform the promise, or discharge the liability, of a
third person in case of his default. The present is not a case where
the corporate debtor has entered into a contract to perform the
promise, or discharge the liability of borrower in case of his default. D
The pledge agreement is limited to pledge 40,160 shares as security.
The corporate debtor has never promised to discharge the liability
of the borrower. The facility agreement under which the borrower
was bound by the terms and conditions and containing his obligation
to repay the loan security for performance are all contained in the
facility agreement. A contract of guarantee contains a guarantee E
“to perform the promise or discharge the liability of third person in
case of his default”. Thus, key words in Section 126 are contract
“to perform the promise”, or “discharge the liability”, of a third
person. Both the expressions “perform the promise” or “discharge
the liability” relate to “a third person”. F
Reference is made to the expression ‘pledge’ as defined in Section
172 of the Contract Act and it has been held:
“26. …..The pledge agreement dated 10-1-2012 does not contain
any contract that the corporate debtor has contracted to perform
the promise, or discharge the liability of the third person……. G
30. The words “guarantee” and “indemnity” as occurring in Section
5(8)(i) has not been defined in the Code. Section 3 clause (37) of
the Code provides that words and expressions used but not defined
in the Code but defined in the Contract Act, 1872 shall have the
meanings respectively assigned to them.” H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.

A 5.5 The decision in Phoenix ARC (supra) has also relied upon
and reproduced paragraphs 46-50.2 of the decision in Anuj Jain (supra)
(referred to as Jaypee Infratech Interim Resolution Professional v.
Axis Bank in the aforesaid judgment), and thereupon observes:
“36. This Court held that a person having only security interest
B over the assets of corporate debtor, even if falling within the
description of “secured creditor” by virtue of collateral security
extended by the corporate debtor, would not be covered by the
financial creditors as per definitions contained in clauses (7) and
(8) of Section 5. What has been held by this Court as noted above
is fully attracted in the present case where corporate debtor has
C only extended a security by pledging 40,160 shares of GEL. The
appellant at best will be secured debtor qua above security but
shall not be a financial creditor within the meaning of Section 5
clauses (7) and (8).
37. Mr Vishwanathan tried to distinguish the judgment of this Court
D in Jaypee Infratech Ltd. [Jaypee Infratech Ltd. Interim Resolution
Professional v. Axis Bank Ltd., (2020) 8 SCC 401] by contending
that the above judgment has been rendered in the specific facts
scenario which does not apply to the present case at all. Shri
Vishwanathan submits that in Jaypee Infratech Ltd. [Jaypee
E Infratech Ltd. Interim Resolution Professional v. Axis Bank Ltd.,
(2020) 8 SCC 401] corporate debtor had created mortgage for the
loan obtained by the parent Company and no benefit of such loan
has been received by the corporate debtor whereas in the present
case corporate debtor has been the direct and real beneficiary of
the loan advanced by assignor to the parent Company of the
F corporate debtor.”
5.6 We have specifically quoted paragraph 37 in the decision of
Phoenix ARC (supra) as the counsel for the appellant therein, had also
argued before us to distinguish the decisions of Anuj Jain (supra) and
Phoenix ARC (supra) from the instant case, on the ground that the
G Short Term Loan Facilities (STL Facilities) advanced by the Appellant
No. 1 - Vistra in the present case to the group companies of the Corporate
Debtor – Amtek Auto Limited (Amtek) i.e., Brassco Engineering Limited
(Brassco) and WLD Investments Private Limited (WLD) vide Facility
Agreement dated 30.06.2016 (Facility Agreement), was in fact for the
H end-use and benefit of the Corporate Debtor – Amtek. The said reasoning
M/S VISTRA ITCL (INDIA) LTD v. MR. DINKAR 821
VENKATASUBRAMANIAN [M. R. SHAH, J.]

does not appeal to us for the reason that the liability to repay the STL A
Facilities advanced to Brassco and WLD is that of the said companies,
and that not of the Corporate Debtor - Amtek, even if the latter was, as
per the terms of the Facility Agreement, the ultimate beneficiary of the
amount disbursed through the STL Facilities. The aforesaid decisions
cannot be distinguished on the ground that the loans were not for the end
B
use and benefit of JIL or Doshion Veolia. The Corporate Debtor – Amtek
was not liable to repay the loans advanced by the predecessor-in-interest
of the appellant -Vistra, in respect of which there were detailed and
separate agreements executed by the lenders with Brassco and WLD.
6. It was submitted before us that the Amended and Restated
Pledge Agreement dated 5.07.2016 between the corporate debtor – C
Amtek and the IL&FS Trust Company Limited, the predecessor-in-interest
of the Appellant No. 1 - Vistra (Pledge Agreement) inter alia provides
that the Corporate Debtor - Amtek is the guarantor of the entire loan
amount, for which reliance was placed upon clause 2.1.2 of the Pledge
Agreement. This contention is liable to be rejected, for the Pledge D
Agreement specifically restricts and limits the liability of the Corporate
Debtor to the extent of the pledged shares vide clause 2.1.1, which reads
as under:
“2.1.1.- Pursuant to the Financing Documents and in consideration
of the Identified Lenders having entered into and/or agreed to E
enter into the Financing Documents in respect of each of the
Facilities, the Pledgor covenants and agrees with the Identified
Lenders that it shall comply with the provisions of the Financing
Documents in relation to each of the Facilities and shall repay, pay
and/or discharge the Outstanding Amounts in relation to the
Identified Debt in accordance with the terms set out herein and F
therein. Provided that the Pledgor shall not be required to
pay to any Finance Party any amount in excess of the
aggregate amount realized by the Trustee pursuant to an
enforcement of the Security Interest over the Pledged
Shares in accordance with the terms of this Pledge G
Agreement.”
(Emphasis supplied)
6.1 Similarly, reliance has also been placed by the Corporate Debtor
– Amtek on certain communications issued by the IDBI Bank, the lead
H
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.

A bank of the Joint Lenders Forum, which now constitutes the majority of
the CoC of the corporate debtor – Amtek, permitting the pledge of shares
etc. We observe that these communications have to be read and
understood in the context in which they were written. It was clear and
understood by the financial creditors of the corporate debtor – Amtek
that the corporate debtor – Amtek is not to bear any additional financial
B
liability by a security or charge of its assets for the STL Facilities, and the
loans were being procured and taken by Brassco and WLD from the
Appellant Nos. 2 and 3, namely, KKR India Financial Services Limited
and L&T Finance Limited. It was stipulated that the assets of the
Corporate Debtor – Amtek would not be encumbered in anyway, and
C except for shares given as security, and the burden to repay/discharge
the loan was/is upon Brassco and WLD. IDBI Bank had only permitted
the corporate debtor – Amtek to pledge the shares in question, and to this
extent, they did not have any objection.
However, there is another aspect of the matter.
D 7. Appellant No. 1 - Vistra is a secured creditor to the extent of
the shares pledged to it by the Corporate Debtor - Amtek. It holds the
first right in pledge on 66.77% shareholding in JMT Auto Limited. The
expression ‘security interest’ as defined in Section 3(31) of the Code
states that it means right, title, interest or a claim to a property created in
E favour, or provided for a secured creditor by a transaction which secures
payment or performance of an obligation and includes, mortgage, charge,
hypothecation, assignment and encumbrance, or any other agreement or
arrangement for securing payment or performance of any obligation of
any person. The person is whose favour the security interest is created
need not be the creditor who avails the credit facility, and can be a third
F person. Security interest can be created for credit facilities/loan advanced
to another person. It is accepted and admitted that the Appellant No. 1 –
Vistra has security interest in the pledged shares. In order to examine
the nature of the said interest, we must first understand what constitutes
‘pledge’ in law.
G 7.1 The concept of ‘pledge’ has been elucidated by this Bench in
PTC India Financial Services Limited v. Venkateswarlu Kari and
Another,6 with reference to the provisions of contract of bailment and
specific provisions concerning the pledge, a subset of bailments, in the
following manner:
6
H (2022) 9 SCC 704.
M/S VISTRA ITCL (INDIA) LTD v. MR. DINKAR 823
VENKATASUBRAMANIAN [M. R. SHAH, J.]

“18. As per Section 151, a bailee is bound to take as much care A
of the goods bailed to him as a man of ordinary prudence would,
under similar circumstances, take of his goods of the same bulk,
quality and value as the goods bailed. Section 152 states that a
bailee, in the absence of a special contract, will not be liable for
any loss, destruction, or deterioration of the bailed goods if he acts
B
in conformity with Section 151. As per Section 153, a contract for
bailment is voidable at the option of the bailor if the bailee does
any act with regard to the goods bailed, inconsistent with the
conditions of the bailment. Section 154 lays down that the bailee
shall be liable for damage arising from unauthorised use of the
bailed goods. The bailee, with the consent of the bailor, can mix C
the goods bailed with his own goods, in which event, the bailor and
the bailee will have interest in proportion to their respective shares
in the mixture. [ Section 155, Contract Act.] However, if the bailee,
without the bailor’s consent, mixes the bailed goods with his own,
and the goods can be separated or divided, the property in the
D
goods remain with the parties respectively. [ Section 156, Contract
Act.] Further, the bailee is bound to bear the expense of separation
or division of the goods, as well as any damage arising from the
mixture. Section 157 provides that when the goods are so mixed
without the bailor’s consent and cannot be separated, the bailor is
liable to be compensated, and the bailee is liable for the loss. E
19. Under Section 160, the bailee has to return or deliver, as per
the bailor’s directions, the goods, without demand, as soon as the
time for which they were bailed has expired or the purpose for
which they were bailed has been accomplished. Section 161 states
that if there is a default by the bailee and the goods are not returned, F
delivered, or tendered at the proper time, the bailee is responsible
to the bailor for any loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods
from that time. As per Section 163, in the absence of any contract
to the contrary, the bailee is bound to deliver to the bailor, or in
accordance with his directions, any increase or profit that may
accrue from the goods bailed. G

20. Section 172 of the Contract Act is reproduced as under:
“172. ”Pledge”, “pawnor” and “pawnee” defined.—The bailment
of goods as security for payment of a debt or the performance of
H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.

A the promise, is called a “pledge”. The bailor is in this case called
the “pawnor”. The bailee is called the “pawnee”.”
As per Section 172, creating a valid pledge requires delivery of
the possession of goods by the pawnor to the pawnee by way of
security upon the promise of repayment of a debt or the performance
B of a promise, thereby, creating an estate that vests with the pawnee.
22. As per Section 176, when a pawnor makes a default in payment
of debt or performance of a promise, the pawnee may bring a suit
against the pawnor upon such debt or promise and retain the goods
pledged as collateral security, or he may sell the goods pledged
C upon giving the pawnor reasonable notice of the sale. If the pledged
goods are sold, and the proceeds of such sale are less than the
amount due in respect of the debt or promise, the pawnor is still
liable to pay the balance amount to the pawnee. If the proceeds of
such sale exceed the amount due, the pawnee will be liable to pay
the surplus to the pawnor.
D
23. Section 177 gives statutory right to the pawnor, who is at default
in payment of the debt or performance of the promise, to redeem
the pledged goods at any time before “actual sale” by the pawnee.
However, in such cases, the pawnor must pay in addition the
expenses that have arisen from his default. Section 179 states that
E the limited interest that a pawnor has in the goods can be validly
pledged.”
7.2 The law of pledge contemplates special rights for the pawnee
in the goods pledged, i.e., the right to possession of the security, and in
case of default, the right to bring a suit against the pawnor, as well as the
F right to sell the goods after giving reasonable notice to the pawnor. The
general rights or ownership rights in the property remain with the pawnor,
and wholly reverts to him on discharge of the debt or performance of the
promise. In other words, the right to property vests in the pawnee only as
far as it is necessary to secure the debt. We need not refer to other
G portions of the said judgment which relate to right of redemption till ‘actual
sale’, etc.
8. In light of the aforesaid exposition, the second issue which arises
for consideration is whether the resolution plan can dilute, negate, or
override the pledge agreement because a resolution plan to this effect
has been approved by the CoC. Revisiting this issue is important, as
H
M/S VISTRA ITCL (INDIA) LTD v. MR. DINKAR 825
VENKATASUBRAMANIAN [M. R. SHAH, J.]

Anuj Jain (supra) had interpreted the provisions as they existed prior to A
substitutions of several provisions of the Code by Act No. 26 of 2018
with retrospective effect from 6.06.2018 and Act No. 26 of 2019 with
effect from 16.08.2019. In particular, we would like to make reference
to the amended Section 30(2) of the Code, which post the substitution by
Act No. 26 of 2019, reads as under:
B
“30. Submission of Resolution plan. — (2) The resolution
professional shall examine each resolution plan received by him to
confirm that each resolution plan—
(a) provides for the payment of insolvency resolution process costs
in a manner specified by the Board in priority to the payment of C
other debts of the corporate debtor;
(b) provides for the payment of debts of operational creditors in
such manner as may be specified by the Board which shall not be
less than—
(i) the amount to be paid to such creditors in the event of a liquidation D
of the corporate debtor under Section 53; or
(ii) the amount that would have been paid to such creditors, if the
amount to be distributed under the resolution plan had been
distributed in accordance with the order of priority in sub-section
(1) of Section 53, E
whichever is higher, and provides for the payment of debts of
financial creditors, who do not vote in favour of the resolution
plan, in such manner as may be specified by the Board, which
shall not be less than the amount to be paid to such creditors in
accordance with sub-section (1) of Section 53 in the event of a F
liquidation of the corporate debtor.
Explanation 1.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified
that a distribution in accordance with the provisions of this clause
shall be fair and equitable to such creditors.
Explanation 2.—For the purposes of this clause, it is hereby G
declared that on and from the date of commencement of the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019, the
provisions of this clause shall also apply to the corporate insolvency
resolution process of a corporate debtor—
H
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.

A (i) where a resolution plan has not been approved or rejected by
the Adjudicating Authority;
(ii) where an appeal has been preferred under Section 61 or Section
62 or such an appeal is not time barred under any provision of law
for the time being in force; or
B (iii) where a legal proceeding has been initiated in any court against
the decision of the Adjudicating Authority in respect of a resolution
plan;
(c) provides for the management of the affairs of the corporate
debtor after approval of the resolution plan;
C
(d) the implementation and supervision of the resolution plan;
(e) does not contravene any of the provisions of the law for the
time being in force;
(f) conforms to such other requirements as may be specified by
D the Board.
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (e), if any approval of
shareholders is required under the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of
2013) or any other law for the time being in force for the
implementation of actions under the resolution plan, such approval
E shall be deemed to have been given and it shall not be a contravention
of that Act or law.”
8.1 The amendment introduced by Act No. 26 of 2019 ensures
that the operational creditors under the resolution plan should be paid the
amount equivalent to the amount which they would have been entitled to,
F in the event of liquidation of the Corporate Debtor under Section 53 of
the Code. In other words, the amount payable under the resolution plan
to the operational creditors should not be less than the amount payable to
them under Section 53 of the Code, in the event of liquidation of the
Corporate Debtor. The amended provision also provides that the financial
creditors who have not voted in favour of the resolution plan shall be paid
G not less than the amount which would be paid to them in accordance
with sub-section (1) to Section 53 of the Code, in the event of liquidation
of the corporate debtor. Explanation (1) to clause (b) of the 30(2) of the
Code, for the removal of doubts, states and clarifies that the distribution
in accordance with this clause shall be fair and equitable to such creditors.
H
M/S VISTRA ITCL (INDIA) LTD v. MR. DINKAR 827
VENKATASUBRAMANIAN [M. R. SHAH, J.]

8.2 It is also the mandate of Section 31 of the Code7 that the A
adjudicating authority should be satisfied that the resolution plan, as
approved by the CoC under sub-section (4) of Section 30 meets with the
requirement as referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 30. Only then,
the adjudicating authority shall approve the resolution plan, which shall
then be binding on the Corporate Debtor and its employees, members,
B
creditors, guarantors and other stakeholders involved in the resolution
plan.
8.3 Section 30(2)(e) also requires the resolution professional to
examine each resolution plan received by him/her and confirm that it
does not contravene any provisions of law for the time being in force.
Thus, the amended Section 30(2) read with Section 31 of the Code, C
enunciates the manner in which the interests of the creditors who are not
included in the CoC i.e., the operational creditors and the financial creditors
who have not voted in favour of the resolution plan, must be protected in
the resolution plan by the resolution professional and the adjudicating
authority. D
8.4 It is in this context that the Appellant No. 1 - Vistra submits
that the resolution plan in question does not meet the requirements of the
Code, as it extinguishes and vaporises the pledge created in favour of the
Appellant No. 1 – Vistra, and thereby, Appellant No. 1 – Vistra, a secured
creditor, viz, the pledged shares, is left remediless and worse off than the E
dissenting financial creditors, or even the operational creditors.
8.5 The difficulty which arises in the present case is that, in terms
of the decision of this Court in Anuj Jain (supra) and Phoenix ARC
(supra), Appellant No. 1 - Vistra is to be treated as a secured creditor,
but would not fall under the category of financial creditors or operational F
creditors. Therefore, they would be denied the benefit of the amendments
7
31. Approval of resolution plan.— (1) If the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that the
resolution plan as approved by the committee of creditors under sub-section (4) of
Section 30 meets the requirements as referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 30, it shall
by order approve the resolution plan which shall be binding on the corporate debtor and
its employees, members, creditors, including the Central Government, any State
Government or any local authority to whom a debt in respect of the payment of dues
G
arising under any law for the time being in force, such as authorities to whom statutory
dues are owed, guarantors and other stakeholders involved in the resolution plan:
Provided that the Adjudicating Authority shall, before passing an order for approval of
resolution plan under this sub-section, satisfy that the resolution plan has provisions for
its effective implementation.
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828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.

A to Section 30(2) of the Code made vide Act No. 26 of 2019, or for that
matter Act No. 26 of 2018. Consequently, a very odd and a peculiar
situation is created where a secured creditor is denied the benefit of the
secured interest i.e., the right to exercise the sale of the secured interest,
yet not be treated as either a financial creditor or an operational creditor.
In terms of Section 52 of the Code, a secured creditor in liquidation
B proceedings has the right to relinquish its security interest to the liquidation
estate and receive proceeds from the sale of assets by the liquidator in
the manner specified under Section 53 of the Code. The second option
given to the secured creditor is to realise the security interest in the
manner specified in aforesaid Section. Rule 21-A of the Insolvency and
C Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 20168 deals
with the presumption of security interest, which we need not elaborate
for the present decision. If the secured creditor relinquishes the security
interest, it is then entitled to priority in payment under clause (b) to sub-
section (1) to Section 53 of the Code. The debts owed to the secured
creditor in such event, rank pari passu with the workmen’s dues for the
D period 24 months preceding the liquidation commencement date. As per
Section 52(9) of the Code, where the proceeds on realisation of secured
assets are not adequate to repay the debts due to the secured creditors
who have exercised the option to realise the security interest, the unpaid
dues of such secured creditors are to be paid by the liquidator in terms of
clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 53 of the Code.
E
9. Thus, we are presented with a difficult situation, wherein,
Appellant No.1 – Vistra, a secured creditor, is being denied the rights
under Section 52 as well as Section 53 of the Code in respect of the
pledged shares, whereas, the intent of the amended Section 30(2) read
with Section 31 of the Code is too contrary, as it recognises and protects
F the interests of other creditors who are outside the purview of the CoC.
To our mind, the answer to this tricky problem is two-fold. First is to treat
the secured creditor as a financial creditor of the Corporate Debtor to
the extent of the estimated value of the pledged share on the date of
commencement of the CIRP. This would make it a member of the CoC
and give it voting rights, equivalent to the estimated value of the pledged
G shares. However, this may require re-consideration of the dictum and
ratio of Anuj Jain (supra) and Phoenix ARC (supra), which would
entail reference to a larger bench. In the context of the present case, the
said solution may not be viable as the resolution plan has already been
approved by the CoC without Appellant No. 1 - Vistra being a member
H 8
For short, Liquidation Process Regulations.
M/S VISTRA ITCL (INDIA) LTD v. MR. DINKAR 829
VENKATASUBRAMANIAN [M. R. SHAH, J.]

of the CoC. Therefore, we would opt for the second option. The second A
option is to treat the Appellant No. 1 – Vistra as a secured creditor in
terms of Section 52 read with Section 53 of the Code. In other words,
we give the option to the successful resolution applicant – DVI (Deccan
Value Investors) to treat the Appellant No.1 – Vistra as a secured creditor,
who will be entitled to retain the security interest in the pledged shares,
B
and in terms thereof, would be entitled to retain the security proceeds on
the sale of the said pledged shares under Section 52 of the Code read
with Rule 21-A of the Liquidation Process Regulations. The second
recourse available, would be almost equivalent in monetary terms for the
Appellant No. 1 - Vistra, who is treated it as a secured creditor and is
held entitled to all rights and obligations as applicable to a secured creditor C
under Section 52 and 53 of the Code. This to our mind would be a fair
and just solution to the legal conundrum and issue highlighted before us.
9.1 We wish to clarify that the directions given by us would not be
a ground for the successful resolution applicant – DVI to withdraw the
resolution plan which has already been approved by the NCLAT and by D
us. The reason is simple. Any resolution plan must meet with the
requirements/provisions of the Code and any provisions of law for the
time being in force. What we have directed and the option given by us
ensures that the resolution plan meets the mandate of the Code and does
not violate the rights given to the secured creditor, who cannot be treated
as worse off/inferior in its claim and rights, viz, an operational creditor or E
a dissenting financial creditor.
10. In the end, we must meet the argument raised by the Respondent
No. 1 – Dinkar Venkatasubramanian, resolution professional for the
Corporate Debtor – Amtek and the Respondent No. 2 – the CoC of the
Corporate Debtor – Amtek, that the present plea of the Appellant No.1 – F
Vistra to be treated as a financial creditor of the Corporate Debtor -
Amtek should be dismissed on the grounds of delay, laches and
acquiescence. The submission is that the Appellant No. 1 - Vistra had
not objected to the resolution plan submitted by the erstwhile resolution
applicant - LHG and, as a sequitur, its non-classification as a financial G
creditor in the CoC of the Corporate Debtor - Amtek. Though this
argument had appealed and had weighed with the NCLAT, in our opinion
is untenable since the resolution plan submitted by erstwhile resolution
applicant - LHG did not in any way affect the rights or interests of the
Appellant No. 1 – Vistra as a secured creditor in respect of the pledged
H
830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 6 S.C.R.

A shares. Appellant No. 1 – Vistra has elaborately explained that LHG etc.
were in negotiations with them so as to redeem the pledge and acquire
the shares.
11. In view of our aforesaid findings, the impugned judgment of
the NCLAT affirming the view taken by the NCLT is partly modified in
B terms of our directions holding that appellant no.1 – M/s. Vistra ITCL
(India) Limited would be treated as a secured creditor, who would be
entitled to all rights and obligations as applicable to a secured creditor in
terms of Sections 52 and 53 of the Code, and in accordance with the
pledge agreement dated 05.07.2016.
C Present appeal is disposed of in the above terms without any order
as to costs.

Nidhi Jain Appeal disposed of.
(Assisted by : Shubhanshu Das, LCRA)

D

E

F

G

H