M/S TRL KROSAKI REFRACTORIES LTDversusM/S SMS ASIA PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.

268            SUPREME COURT
                         [2022]REPORTS
                                2 S.C.R. 268               [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A                M/S TRL KROSAKI REFRACTORIES LTD.
                                        v.
                 M/S SMS ASIA PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.
                       (Criminal Appeal No. 270 of 2022)
B
                             FEBRUARY 22, 2022
               [N. V. RAMANA, CJI, A. S. BOPANNA AND
                         HIMA KOHLI, JJ.]
             Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s.482 – Dishonour of
C     cheque – Respondent issued certain cheques in favour of the
      appellant company which on presentation were dishonoured by the
      bank – On respondent’s failure to comply with the demand notices,
      appellant filed the complaint before the Magistrate u/ss.138 and
      142 of N.I. Act – Respondent filed petition u/s.482 before the High
D     Court for quashing of complaint, which was allowed – On appeal,
      held: s.142(1)(a) of N.I. Act states that the complaint ought to be in
      writing and it should be filed by payee or the holder in due course
      – In the instant case, requirements were satisfied, firstly, complaint
      was filed in the name of the company i.e. the payee, through the
      General manager (Accounting) – Secondly, Managing Director of
E     the appellant had duly authorized General Manager (Accounting)
      to institute proceedings and represent the company – The Managing
      director was delegated by the Board of Directors all the powers
      necessary for the management and operation of the company –
      Hence, the complaint u/s.138 NI Act was filed on the behalf of the
F     payee company with due authorization – In respect of General
      Manager’s knowledge about the transaction or witness to the
      transaction, transactions between the parties were based on the
      agreement in which witness on behalf of appellant was none other
      than General Manager – Further, the document for reconciliation
      of account was attested by the representatives of the parties and
G     appellant was represented by the General Manager – Moreover,
      when the cheques were dishonoured, it was the General Manager
      who issued the notices on the behalf of the appellant – Hence, the
      said documents and affidavit filed in lieu of oral sworn statements
      before Magistrate indicated that the appellant was represented by
      an authorized person who has knowledge about the transaction –
H
                                       268
    M/S TRL KROSAKI REFRACTORIES LTD. v. M/S SMS ASIA                     269
                 PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.

Requirement of s.142 was satisfied – High Court was not justified         A
in entertaining the petition u/s.482 – Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 – s.142.
        Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881: s.142 – When a company
is the payee of the cheque based on which a complaint is filed under
s.138 of N.I. Act, the complainant necessarily should be the Company      B
which would be represented by an employee who is authorized – All
that is necessary is to demonstrate before the Magistrate that the
complaint filed is in the name of the “payee” and if the person who
is prosecuting the complaint is different from the payee, the
authorisation therefor and that the contents of the complaint are
within his knowledge – If at all, there is any serious dispute with       C
regard to the person prosecuting the complaint not being authorized
or if it is to be demonstrated that the person who filed the complaint
has no knowledge of the transaction and, as such that person could
not have instituted and prosecuted the complaint, it would be open
for the accused to dispute the position and establish the same during     D
the course of the trial – In such circumstances entertaining a petition
under s.482 to quash the order taking cognizance by the Magistrate
would be unjustified when the issue of proper authorisation and
knowledge can only be an issue for trial.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court                                      E
       HELD: 1. The Managing Director apart from himself being
the key managerial personnel of the appellant company, has also
been delegated the power by the Board of Directors through the
document dated 06.04.1998. Through the said document the
Managing Director has been delegated, in general, all powers              F
necessary for the management and operation of the company and
it has been specified among others, to exercise the power relating
to important issues affecting the company’s land and property.
Through the said document, the Managing Director is also
empowered to delegate where necessary and to the extent
required, any of the powers delegated to him, to his subordinate          G
officers. The above noted documents would disclose that the
complaint under Section 138 NI Act was filed on behalf of the
“payee” company with due authorisation. [Para 11][280-B-E]

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270            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A           2. The next aspect on which the High Court has interfered
      is on accepting the contention that there is no averment in the
      complaint as to whether the General Manager (Accounting) had
      any knowledge about the transaction or he was a witness to the
      transaction. On the said aspect it is noted that the transaction
      between the parties is based on the agreement dated 18.07.2014.
B
      The said document depicts, below the signature of the executives
      representing the appellant and the respondent company, a witness
      each from either side have appended their signatures. The witness
      on behalf of the appellant company is none other than Mr.
      Subhasis Kumar Das who was at that point in time, designated as
C     General Manager (Commercial). Further, the document for
      reconciliation of account spanning the period from 01.04.2011 to
      30.09.2014, as carried out on 28.10.2014, depicts that the same
      was attested by the representatives of both the companies. The
      appellant company is represented by the General Manager
      (Accounting). That apart, when the cheques were dishonoured,
D
      it was the General Manager (Accounting) who had issued the
      notices on behalf of the appellant company, to the respondent
      company. The said documents would indicate that the person who
      had knowledge of the transaction and was witness to it, has been
      authorized and has instituted the complaint on behalf of the
E     company. [Para 12][280-E-H; 281-A]
             3. A meaningful reading of the affidavit filed before SDJM
      would indicate that the company having authorized the General
      Manager (Accounting) and the General Manager (Accounting)
      having personal knowledge had in fact been clearly averred. What
F     can be treated as an explicit averment, cannot be put in a
      straitjacket but will have to be gathered from the circumstance
      and the manner in which it has been averred and conveyed, based
      on the facts of each case. The manner in which a complaint is
      drafted may vary from case to case and would also depend on the
      skills of the person drafting the same which by itself, cannot defeat
G     a substantive right. However, what is necessary to be taken note
      of is as to whether the contents as available in the pleading would
      convey the meaning to the effect that the person who has filed
      the complaint, is stated to be authorized and claims to have
      knowledge of the same. In addition, the supporting documents
H
    M/S TRL KROSAKI REFRACTORIES LTD. v. M/S SMS ASIA                  271
                 PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.

which were available on the record by themselves demonstrate           A
the fact that an authorized person, being a witness to the
transaction and having knowledge of the case had instituted the
complaint on behalf of the “payee” company and therefore, the
requirement of Section 142 of N.I. Act was satisfied. [Para 14][282-
A-D]
                                                                       B
       4. When a company is the payee of the cheque based on
which a complaint is filed under Section 138 of N.I. Act, the
complainant necessarily should be the Company which would be
represented by an employee who is authorized. Prima facie, in
such a situation the indication in the complaint and the sworn
statement (either orally or by affidavit) to the effect that the       C
complainant (Company) is represented by an authorized person
who has knowledge, would be sufficient. The employment of the
terms “specific assertion as to the knowledge of the power of
attorney holder” and such assertion about knowledge should be
“said explicitly” as stated in A.C. Narayanan cannot be                D
understood to mean that the assertion should be in any particular
manner, much less only in the manner understood by the accused
in the case. All that is necessary is to demonstrate before the
Magistrate that the complaint filed is in the name of the “payee”
and if the person who is prosecuting the complaint is different
from the payee, the authorisation therefor and that the contents       E
of the complaint are within his knowledge. When, the complainant/
payee is a company, an authorized employee can represent the
company. Such averment and prima facie material is sufficient for
the Magistrate to take cognizance and issue process. If at all,
there is any serious dispute with regard to the person prosecuting     F
the complaint not being authorized or if it is to be demonstrated
that the person who filed the complaint has no knowledge of the
transaction and, as such that person could not have instituted
and prosecuted the complaint, it would be open for the accused
to dispute the position and establish the same during the course
of the trial. In such circumstances entertaining a petition under      G
Section 482 to quash the order taking cognizance by the
Magistrate would be unjustified when the issue of proper
authorisation and knowledge can only be an issue for trial. [Para
17][286-A-B]
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272            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A           A.C. Narayanan v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2014)
            11 SCC 790 : [2013] 11 SCR 80; National Small
            Industries Corporation Ltd. v. State (NCT of Delhi) and
            Ors. (2009) 1 SCC 407 : [2008] 16 SCR 83; Samrat
            Shipping Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Dolly George (2002) 9 SCC
            455; Vinita S. Rao v. Essen Corporate Services (P) Ltd.
B
            (2015) 1 SCC 527 – relied on.
            M/s. M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchi Chemicals and Pharma
            (P) Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC 234 : [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 265;
            Vishwa Mitter v. O.P. Poddar (1983) 4 SCC 701 : [1984]
            1 SCR 176; Janaki Vashdeo Bhojwani & Anr. v.
C           Indusind Bank Ltd. & Ors. (2005) 2 SCC 217 : [2004]
            6 Suppl. SCR 681– referred to.
                              Case Law Reference
      [2013] 11 SCR 80                 relied on                 Para 4
D     [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 265          referred to               Para 9
      [1984] 1 SCR 176                 referred to               Para 9
      [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 681          referred to               Para 9
      (2015) 1 SCC 527                 relied on                 Para 14
E     [2008] 16 SCR 83                 relied on                 Para 16
            CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
      270 of 2022.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 14.12.2017 of the High Court
      of Orissa at Cuttack in CRLMC No.1210 of 2017.
F
           Ashok K. Parija, Sr. Adv., Gaurav Khanna, Arnav Behera, Ms.
      Sadhvi Swarup, Advs. for the Appellant.
            Arunav Patnaik, Santosh Kumar - I, Advs. for the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G           A. S. BOPANNA, J.
            1. Leave granted.
            2. The appellant is assailing the judgment dated 14.12.2017 passed
      by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in CRLMC No.1210 of 2017.
      Through the said judgment, the High Court while disposing of the petition
H
    M/S TRL KROSAKI REFRACTORIES LTD. v. M/S SMS ASIA                         273
         PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

has quashed the order dated 05.11.2015 passed by the learned SDJM,            A
Jharsuguda by which cognizance was taken and summons was issued in
I.C.C. Case No.422 of 2015. The appellant who is the complainant in
I.C.C. Case No.422 of 2015 is therefore before this Court, claiming to
be aggrieved by the said judgment.
       3. The brief facts are that the respondent herein had issued seven     B
cheques dated 13.03.2015, in all amounting to Rs.1,10,00,000/- (Rupees
one crore ten lakhs) in favour of the appellant company. On presentation,
the said cheques were dishonoured by the Bank and returned with the
endorsement, ‘account closed’. The appellant in that view issued notices
dated 14.04.2015 through registered post, acknowledgement due. Though
the notices were received on 16.04.2015 as per the postal                     C
acknowledgement, the respondent failed to comply with the demand or
respond to the same. In that view, the appellant filed the complaint before
the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, (‘SDJM’ for short)
Panposh, Uditnagar Rourkela under Section 138 and 142 of Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘N.I. Act’). The said complaint was          D
registered based on the affidavit filed on behalf of the complainant, in
lieu of oral sworn statement. The learned SDJM on being satisfied that
there is sufficient material and the complaint under Section 138 of N.I.
Act against the accused is in accordance with law, took cognizance of
the complaint and directed summons to the respondent-accused, vide
order dated 05.11.2015.                                                       E

       4. The respondent herein however filed a petition in CRLMC
No.1210 of 2017 under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code
(for short ‘Cr.P.C.) before the High Court claiming to be aggrieved by
the order dated 05.11.2015. The respondent, in the said petition had
contended that the complaint filed was by an incompetent person without       F
the requisite averments in the complaint, despite which the learned SDJM
had taken cognizance and issued summons. In that regard, it was
contended that Mr. Subhasis Kumar Das, General Manager (Accounting)
who had filed the complaint representing the complainant company,
neither had knowledge about the alleged transaction, nor had he witnessed     G
the same. In that light, the respondent had contended that the order
taking cognizance and the summons issued to them, is liable to be quashed.
The High Court, accepting the said contention and placing reliance on
the judgment of this Court in A.C. Narayanan vs. State of Maharashtra
& Anr. (2014) 11 SCC 790 has held that there is no mention in the
                                                                              H
274             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A     complaint or affidavit as to when and in what manner the company had
      authorized its General Manager (Accounting) to represent the company
      to file the complaint. It is further held that there is no averment in the
      complaint as to whether the General Manager (Accounting) had
      knowledge about the transaction or he was a witness to the transaction.
      It was also held, neither any resolution of the Board of Directors of the
B
      complainant company nor any authorisation of the company in favour of
      the person representing it in the complaint was filed for perusal of the
      Magistrate. Only an authorisation letter issued by the Managing Director
      of the complainant company in favour of the General Manager
      (Accounting) was produced and the said authorisation does not indicate
C     whether the Board of Directors had authorised the Managing Director
      to sub-delegate his powers to the General Manager (Accounting) to file
      the complaint on behalf of the company.
             5. Mr. Ashok K. Parija, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
      of the appellant while assailing the judgment passed by the High Court,
D     would contend that the High Court has utterly misconstrued the principle
      enunciated in A.C. Narayanan (supra) to non-suit the appellant. It is
      contended that in the said decision, while considering the nature of the
      complaint filed based on the power of attorney executed by one individual
      in favour of another individual to conduct the case, the requirement therein
      has been stated. Even in that context the High Court has not properly
E     appreciated the facts involved in the instant case since the complaint
      was as per the observations made in A.C. Narayanan (supra). It is
      contended that the order passed by the learned SDJM dated 05.11.2015
      taking cognizance would indicate that the learned Magistrate having
      perused the complaint and the entire record, was satisfied that there is
F     sufficient material for issuance of summons. In that background, the list of
      documents and the documents are referred to. The agreement dated
      18.07.2014, entered into between the appellant and respondent would
      disclose that Mr. Subhasis Kumar Das, General Manager (Accounting)
      who had represented the company in the complaint, was a witness to the
      said agreement. He had also signed the reconciliation statement and has
G     despatched the notice to the respondent when the cheques were
      dishonoured. In that view, the company was represented by a competent
      person who had knowledge of the transaction. The verifying affidavit
      enclosed with the complaint also specified that he had knowledge and that
      the complaint was based on the relevant documents. In addition, the said
H     Mr. Subhasis Kumar Das, General Manager (Accounting) in the affidavit
    M/S TRL KROSAKI REFRACTORIES LTD. v. M/S SMS ASIA                            275
         PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

filed as his sworn statement, had explicitly stated that he is the authorized    A
representative of the complainant company and has filed the complaint
against the accused persons. Learned senior counsel would also point out
that in addition to the fact that he was a Senior Managerial Officer of the
appellant company, Mr. Subhasis Kumar Das was also authorized by the
Managing Director on 23.05.2015, to initiate the legal proceedings. The
                                                                                 B
Managing Director on the other hand, was authorized by the Chairman
based on the approval of the Board of Directors. In that view, it is contended
that the complaint was filed in accordance with law and the learned
Magistrate having applied his mind, had taken cognizance which was
quashed by the High Court without appropriately applying its mind.
       6. Mr. Santosh Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent would            C
however, seek to sustain the judgment passed by the High Court. It is
contended that the High Court having noted the judgment in A.C.
Narayanan (supra) and also the judgments of the Orissa High Court
had arrived at the conclusion that the complaint filed did not satisfy the
requirement of Section 142 of N.I. Act as the complaint was not filed by         D
a person who was authorized by the company. It is further contended
that in A.C. Narayanan (supra) this Court has held that there should be
explicit averment to the effect that the person filing the complaint is
authorized by the complainant and has knowledge of the transaction in
question so as to maintain the complaint. It is contended that since the
High Court has arrived at its conclusion by relying on a decision rendered       E
by this Court, such a decision would not call for interference in this appeal.
      7. Having noted the sequence of events and the rival contentions
put forth by the learned counsel for the parties, the solitary issue for
consideration herein is as to whether the complaint filed by the appellant
herein under Section 138 of N.I. Act is in accordance with the                   F
requirement under Section 142 of the N.I. Act. The relevant provision
reads as hereunder: -
       “142. Cognizance of offences.—[(1)] Notwithstanding anything
       contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—
              (a)    no court shall take cognizance of any offence               G
                     punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint,
                     in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be,
                     the holder in due course of the cheque;
              (b)    xxxxxxxxxx
              (c)    xxxxxxxxxx”                                                 H
276             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A            8. In that background, a perusal of the complaint (Annexure P-
      14) would disclose that the complainant named therein is M/s. TRL
      Krosaki Refractories Limited through its General Manager (Accounting)
      Subhasis Kumar Das. A perusal of the cheques (Annexures P-3 to P-9)
      which are the subject matter of the said complaint under Section 138 of
      NI Act would disclose that the “payee” named in the said cheques is M/
B
      s. TRL Krosaki Refractories Limited. If that be the position, the
      requirement as contemplated under Section 142 (1) (a) of NI Act that
      the complaint ought to be in writing and that it should be filed by the
      payee or the holder in due course, stands satisfied. The issue raised is
      that the complaint filed by Mr. Subhasis Kumar Das, General Manager
C     (Accounting) on behalf of the company is not competent for want of
      authorisation and that there is no averment with regard to his knowledge
      about the transaction. On this aspect, strong reliance is placed by the
      learned counsel for the respondents on A.C. Narayanan (supra). Further,
      the judgment passed by the High Court is also entirely based on the
      guidelines laid down in the said decision.
D
             9. To place the matter in perspective, it would be necessary for us
      to take note of the circumstances under which the consideration arose
      in A.C. Narayanan (supra). In that regard, it is noticed that this Court
      while considering the scope of Section 142 (1)(a) of N.I. Act in the case
      of M/s. M.M.T.C. Ltd. vs. Medchi Chemicals and Pharma (P} Ltd.,
E     (2002) 1 SCC 234, had taken note of an earlier decision of this Court in
      Vishwa Mitter vs. O.P. Poddar, (1983) 4 SCC 701 wherein it was held
      that anyone can set the criminal law in motion by filing a complaint of
      facts constituting an offence, before a Magistrate entitled to take
      cognizance. It was further held in Vishwa Mitter (supra) that if any
F     special statute prescribes offences and makes any special provision for
      taking cognizance of such offences under the statute, thenthe complaint
      requesting the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence must satisfy
      the eligibility criterion prescribed by such statute. In that circumstance,
      it was held that the only eligibility criteria prescribed by Section 142 of
      N.I. Act is that the complainant must be by the payee or the holder in
G     due course. However, in a subsequent decision in Janaki Vashdeo
      Bhojwani & Anr. vs. Indusind Bank Ltd. & Ors. (2005) 2 SCC 217,
      while considering the right of a power of attorney holder to act on behalf
      of the principal in a civil proceeding, the provision contained in Order III
      Rule 1 and 2 of CPC was kept in view and it was held that if the power
      of attorney holder has rendered some acts in pursuance of the power of
H
    M/S TRL KROSAKI REFRACTORIES LTD. v. M/S SMS ASIA                              277
         PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he          A
cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal and not
by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the
matter of which only the principal is entitled to be cross-examined. The
said two decisions which were rendered by Division Benches were assumed
to be in conflict with each other by another Division Bench while considering
                                                                                   B
A.C. Narayanan (supra) and therefore it desired clarification.
        10. In that view, the matter in A.C. Narayanan (supra) was
referred to a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges. The said Bench after
holding that the said two judgments of this Court are not in conflict with
each other has considered the scope and requirement of Section 142
(1)(a) of N.I. Act and formulated the questions for consideration as               C
contained in para 21 of the judgment which read as hereunder: -
        “21. In terms of the reference order, the following questions have
        to be decided by this Bench:
        21.1. Whether a power-of-attorney holder can sign and file a
        complaint petition on behalf of the complainant? /Whether the              D
        eligibility criteria prescribed by Section 142(a) of the NI Act would
        stand satisfied if the complaint petition itself is filed in the name of
        the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque?
        21.2. Whether a power-of-attorney holder can be verified on oath
        under Section 200 of the Code?                                             E
        21.3. Whether specific averments as to the knowledge of the
        power-of-attorney holder in the impugned transaction must be
        explicitly asserted in the complaint?
        21.4. If the power-of-attorney holder fails to assert explicitly his
        knowledge in the complaint then can the power-of-attorney holder
                                                                                   F
        verify the complaint on oath on such presumption of knowledge?
        21.5. Whether the proceedings contemplated under Section 200
        of the Code can be dispensed with in the light of Section 145 of
        the NI Act which was introduced by an amendment in the year
        2002?”
        The consideration made in paras 29 to 30 would be relevant to be           G
noted, which read as hereunder: -
        “29. From a conjoint reading of Sections 138, 142 and 145 of the
        NI Act as well as Section 200 of the Code, it is clear that it is
        open to the Magistrate to issue process on the basis of the
        contents of the complaint, documents in support thereof                    H
278      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A     and the affidavit submitted by the complainant in support
      of the complaint. Once the complainant files an affidavit in
      support of the complaint before issuance of the process under
      Section 200 of the Code, it is thereafter open to the Magistrate, if
      he thinks fit, to call upon the complainant to remain present and to
      examine him as to the facts contained in the affidavit submitted
B
      by the complainant in support of his complaint. However, it is a
      matter of discretion and the Magistrate is not bound to call upon
      the complainant to remain present before the court and to examine
      him upon oath for taking decision whether or not to issue process
      on the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. For the purpose
C     of issuing process under Section 200 of the Code, it is open to the
      Magistrate to rely upon the verification in the form of affidavit
      filed by the complainant in support of the complaint under Section
      138 of the NI Act. It is only if and where the Magistrate,
      after considering the complaint under Section 138 of the
      NI Act, documents produced in support thereof and the
D
      verification in the form of affidavit of the complainant, is of
      the view that examination of the complainant or his
      witness(s) is required, the Magistrate may call upon the
      complainant to remain present before the court and examine
      the complainant and/or his witness upon oath for taking a
E     decision whether or not to issue process on the complaint
      under Section 138 of the NI Act.
      30. In the light of the discussion, we are of the view that the
      power-of-attorney holder may be allowed to file, appear and
      depose for the purpose of issue of process for the offence
F     punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. An exception to the
      above is when the power-of-attorney holder of the complainant
      does not have a personal knowledge about the transactions then
      he cannot be examined. However, where the attorney holder
      of the complainant is in charge of the business of the
      complainant payee and the attorney holder alone is
G     personally aware of the transactions, there is no reason why
      the attorney holder cannot depose as a witness.
      Nevertheless, an explicit assertion as to the knowledge of
      the power-of-attorney holder about the transaction in
      question must be specified in the complaint. On this count,
H     the fourth question becomes infructuous.”
    M/S TRL KROSAKI REFRACTORIES LTD. v. M/S SMS ASIA                         279
         PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

       The answer to the question raised for consideration is contained       A
in para 33 which read as hereunder: -
       33. While holding that there is no serious conflict between the
       decisions in M.M.T.C. and Vashdeo Bhojwani, we clarify the
       position and answer the questions in the following manner:
       33.1. Filing of complaint petition under Section 138 of the            B
       NI Act through power of attorney is perfectly legal and
       competent.
       33.2. The power-of-attorney holder can depose and verify
       on oath before the court in order to prove the contents of
       the complaint. However, the power-of-attorney holder must
                                                                              C
       have witnessed the transaction as an agent of the payee/
       holder in due course or possess due knowledge regarding
       the said transactions.
       33.3. It is required by the complainant to make specific
       assertion as to the knowledge of the power-of-attorney
       holder in the said transaction explicitly in the complaint             D
       and the power-of-attorney holder who has no knowledge
       regarding the transactions cannot be examined as a witness
       in the case.
       33.4. In the light of Section 145 of the NI Act, it is open to the
       Magistrate to rely upon the verification in the form of affidavit      E
       filed by the complainant in support of the complaint under Section
       138 of the NI Act and the Magistrate is neither mandatorily obliged
       to call upon the complainant to remain present before the Court,
       nor to examine the complainant of his witness upon oath for taking
       the decision whether or not to issue process on the complaint
       under Section 138 of the NI Act.                                       F
       33.5. The functions under the general power of attorney cannot
       be delegated to another person without specific clause permitting
       the same in the power of attorney. Nevertheless, the general power
       of attorney itself can be cancelled and be given to another person.”
                                                      (Emphasis supplied)     G
       11. A cumulative perusal of the facts of the instant case would
indicate that the requirement as indicated in A.C. Narayanan, (supra)
are in fact satisfied. Firstly, as noted above, the complaint was filed in
the name of the company i.e., “the payee”, through Mr. Subhasis Kumar
Das, General Manager (Accounting). The authorisation dated 23.05.2015         H
280            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A     by the Managing Director in his favour (Annexure P-17) discloses that
      Mr. Priyabrata Panda, Managing Director of the appellant company had
      authorised Mr. Subhasis Kumar Das, General Manager (Accounting) to
      institute criminal proceedings, including proceedings under the provisions
      of the N.I. Act and civil proceedings on behalf of the company against
      M/s. SMS Asia Private Limited (respondent), to represent the company
B
      and take all necessary actions in the matter in learned SDJM’s Court.
      The specimen signature of Mr. Subhasis Kumar Das has also been
      attested by the Managing Director. The Managing Director apart from
      himself being the key managerial personnel of the appellant company,
      has also been delegated the power by the Board of Directors through
C     the document dated 06.04.1998 (Annexure P-16). Through the said
      document the Managing Director has been delegated, in general, all
      powers necessary for the management and operation of the company
      and it has been specified among others, to exercise the power relating to
      important issues affecting the company’s land and property. Through
      the said document, the Managing Director is also empowered to delegate
D
      where necessary and to the extent required, any of the powers delegated
      to him, to his subordinate officers. The above noted documents would
      disclose that the complaint under Section 138 NI Act was filed on behalf
      of the “payee” company with due authorisation.
              12. The next aspect on which the High Court has interfered is on
E     accepting the contention that there is no averment in the complaint as to
      whether the General Manager (Accounting) had any knowledge about
      the transaction or he was a witness to the transaction. On the said aspect
      it is noted that the transaction between the parties is based on the
      agreement dated 18.07.2014 (Annexure P-1). The said document depicts,
F     below the signature of the executives representing the appellant and the
      respondent company, a witness each from either side have appended
      their signatures. The witness on behalf of the appellant company is none
      other than Mr. Subhasis Kumar Das who was at that point in time,
      designated as General Manager (Commercial). Further, the document
      for reconciliation of account spanning the period from 01.04.2011 to
G     30.09.2014, as carried out on 28.10.2014, depicts that the same was
      attested by the representatives of both the companies. The appellant
      company is represented by Mr. Subhasis Kumar Das. That apart, when
      the cheques were dishonoured, it was Mr. Subhasis Kumar Das, General
      Manager (Accounting) who had issued the notices (Annexure P-11, 12-
H     13) on behalf of the appellant company, to the respondent company. The
    M/S TRL KROSAKI REFRACTORIES LTD. v. M/S SMS ASIA                         281
         PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

said documents would indicate that the person who had knowledge of            A
the transaction and was witness to it, has been authorized and has
instituted the complaint on behalf of the company.
       13. Apart from the factual aspects as stated in the complaint,
relating to the transaction, the complaint as also the affidavit supporting
the complaint contain averments regarding authorization in favour of          B
and knowledge on the part of Mr. Subhasis Kumar Das, which read as
hereunder: -
      “That, the complainant Company incorporated under the companies
      Act 1956 and having registered office At/PO/PS-Belpahar, Dist.-
      Jharsuguda, (Odisha) represent through its General Manager              C
      (Accounting), Shri Subhasis Kumar Das, aged about 47 years,
      S/O Shri Gopal Chandra Das and also authorize by the Company
      to file this complaint.”
      The verifying affidavit reads as hereunder:-
      “I, Sri. Subhasis Kumar Das, aged about 47 years, S/o. Gopal            D
      Chandra Das General Manager (Accounting) of M/s. TRL
      Krosaki Refractories Limited, At / PO /PS- Belpahar, Dist.-
      Jharsuguda (Odhisa), do hereby solemnly affirm and state as
      follows:-
             1.     That, I am the General Manager (Accounting)               E
                    of M/s. TRL Krosaki Refractories Limited, At /
                    PO / PS- Belpahar, Dist.-Jharsuguda (Odisha) and
                    competent to file this complaint petition.
             2.     That, facts stated above in this complaint
                    petition from Para : 1 to 13 are true to the best         F
                    of my knowledge, belief and basing on the
                    relevant documents.”
      In addition, the affidavit filed in lieu of the oral sworn statement
before the learned SDJM to enable cognizance to be taken contains the
averment as follows: -                                                        G
      “That I am the authorized representative of the complainant
      Company incorporated under the companies Act 1956 and having
      registered office At/PO/PS- Belpahar, Dist. Jharsuguda (Odisha)
      has filed this complaint petition against the accused person.”
                                                     (Emphasis supplied)      H
282             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A            14. A meaningful reading of the above would indicate that the
      company having authorized the General Manager (Accounting) and
      the General Manager (Accounting) having personal knowledge had in
      fact been clearly averred. What can be treated as an explicit averment,
      cannot be put in a straitjacket but will have to be gathered from the
      circumstance and the manner in which it has been averred and
B     conveyed, based on the facts of each case. The manner in which a
      complaint is drafted may vary from case to case and would also depend
      on the skills of the person drafting the same which by itself, cannot
      defeat a substantive right. However, what is necessary to be taken
      note of is as to whether the contents as available in the pleading would
C     convey the meaning to the effect that the person who has filed the
      complaint, is stated to be authorized and claims to have knowledge of
      the same. In addition, the supporting documents which were available
      on the record by themselves demonstrate the fact that an authorized
      person, being a witness to the transaction and having knowledge of the
      case had instituted the complaint on behalf of the “payee” company
D     and therefore, the requirement of Section 142 of N.I. Act was satisfied.
      In Vinita S. Rao vs. Essen Corporate Services (P) Ltd. (2015) 1
      SCC 527, to which one of us (Hon’ble CJI) was a member of the
      Bench has accepted the pleading of such a nature to indicate the power
      to prosecute the complaint and knowledge of the transaction as
E     sufficient to maintain the complaint.
             15. Despite our conclusion that the documents available on record
      would on facts satisfy the requirement relating to delegation of power and
      also knowledge of the transaction by the person representing the Company
      in the instant case, it is also necessary for us to keep in perspective that
      though the case in A.C. Narayanan (supra) has taken the center stage of
F     consideration, the facts involved therein were in the background of the
      complainant being an individual and the complaint filed was based on the
      power of attorney issued by the “payee” who was also an individual. In
      such an event, the manner in which the power was being exercised was
      to be explicitly stated so as to establish the right of the person prosecuting
G     the complaint, to represent the payee i.e., the complainant. The position
      that would emerge when the complainant is a company or a corporate
      entity will have to be viewed from a different standpoint. In this regard in
      Samrat Shipping Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Dolly George (2002) 9 SCC 455,
      while disapproving the manner in which cognizance was refused to be
      taken and the complaint had been dismissed by the learned Magistrate at
H     the threshold, this Court has held as hereunder:
    M/S TRL KROSAKI REFRACTORIES LTD. v. M/S SMS ASIA                          283
         PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

      “3. Having heard both sides we find it difficult to support the          A
      orders challenged before us. A company can file a complaint
      only through human agency. The person who presented the
      complaint on behalf of the Company claimed that he is the
      authorized representative of the company. Prima-facie, the
      trial court should have accepted it at the time when a
                                                                               B
      complaint was presented. If it is a matter of evidence when
      the accused disputed the authority of the said individual to
      present the complaint, opportunity should have been given
      to the complainant to prove the same, but that opportunity
      need be given only when the trial commences. The dismissal
      of the complaint at the threshold on the premise that the individual     C
      has not produced certified copy of the resolution appears to be
      too hasty an action. We, therefore, set aside the impugned orders
      and direct the trial court to proceed with the trial and dispose of it
      in accordance with law. Parties are directed to appear before the
      trial court on 31.1.2000.”
                                                                               D
                                                      (Emphasis supplied)
       16. Further, in National Small Industries Corporation Ltd. Vs.
State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors. (2009) 1 SCC 407, this Court though
was essentially considering the issue relating to the exemption available
against examining a public servant keeping in view the scope under
Section 200 (a) of Cr.PC, has exhaustively considered the validity of a        E
complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act and the satisfaction of the
requirement under Section 142 thereof. In the said context this Court
has held as hereunder: -
      “14. The term “complainant” is not defined under the Code. Section
      142 of the NI Act requires a complaint under Section 138 of that         F
      Act to be made by the payee (or by the holder in due course). It
      is thus evident that in a complaint relating to dishonour of a cheque
      (which has not been endorsed by the payee in favour of anyone),
      it is the payee alone who can be the complainant. The NI Act
      only provides that dishonour of a cheque would be an offence and         G
      the manner of taking cognizance of offences punishable under
      Section 138 of that Act. However, the procedure relating to
      initiation of proceedings, trial and disposal of such complaints, is
      governed by the Code. Section 200 of the Code requires that the
      Magistrate, on taking cognizance of an offence on complaint, shall
      examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present              H
284      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A     and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing
      and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses. The
      requirement of Section 142 of the NI Act that the payee
      should be the complainant, is met if the complaint is in the
      name of the payee. If the payee is a company, necessarily
      the complaint should be filed in the name of the company, if
B
      a company is the complainant. A company can be
      represented by an employee or even by a non-employee
      authorized and empowered to represent the company either
      by a resolution or by a power of attorney.
      16. Section 142 only requires that the complaint should
C
      be in the name of the payee. Where the complainant is a
      company, who will represent the company and how the
      company will be represented in such proceedings, is not
      governed by the Code but by the relevant law relating to
      companies. Section 200 of the Code mandatorily requires
D     an examination of the complainant; and where the
      complainant is an incorporeal body, evidently only an
      employee or representative can be examined on its behalf,
      As a result, the company becomes a de jure complainant
      and its employee or other representative, representing it
      in the criminal proceedings, becomes the de facto
E
      complainant. Thus in every complaint, w here the
      complainant is an incorporeal body, there is a complainant
      – de jure, and a complainant-de facto. Clause (a) of the
      proviso to Section 200 provides that where the complainant is a
      public servant, it will not be necessary to examine the complainant
F     and his witnesses. Where the complainant is an incorporeal body
      represented by one of its employees, the employee who is a
      public servant is the de facto complainant and in signing and
      presenting the complaint, he acts in the discharge of his official
      duties. Therefore, it follows that in such cases, the exemption
G     under clause (a) of the first proviso to Section 200 of the Code
      will be available.
      19. Resultantly, when in a complaint in regard to dishonour
      of a cheque issued in favor of a company or corporation, for
      the purpose of Section 142 of the NI Act, the company will
      be the complainant, and for purposes of Section 200 of the
H
    M/S TRL KROSAKI REFRACTORIES LTD. v. M/S SMS ASIA                        285
         PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

      Code, its employee who represents the company or                       A
      corporation, will be the de facto complainant. In such a
      complaint, the de jure complainant, namely, the company
      or corporation will remain the same but the de facto
      complainant (employee) representing such de jure
      complainant can change, from time to time. And if the de
                                                                             B
      facto complainant is a public servant, the benefit of exemption
      under clause (a) of the proviso to Section 200 of the Code will be
      available, even though the complaint is made in the name of a
      company or corporation.”
                                                    (emphasis supplied)
        17. In that view, the position that would emerge is that when a      C
company is the payee of the cheque based on which a complaint is
filed under Section 138 of N.I. Act, the complainant necessarily should
be the Company which would be represented by an employee who is
authorized. Prima-facie, in such a situation the indication in the
complaint and the sworn statement (either orally or by affidavit) to the     D
effect that the complainant (Company) is represented by an authorized
person who has knowledge, would be sufficient. The employment of
the terms “specific assertion as to the knowledge of the power of
attorney holder” and such assertion about knowledge should be “said
explicitly” as stated in A.C. Narayanan (supra) cannot be understood
to mean that the assertion should be in any particular manner, much          E
less only in the manner understood by the accused in the case. All that
is necessary is to demonstrate before the learned Magistrate that the
complaint filed is in the name of the “payee” and if the person who is
prosecuting the complaint is different from the payee, the authorisation
therefor and that the contents of the complaint are within his knowledge.    F
When, the complainant/payee is a company, an authorized employee
can represent the company. Such averment and prima facie material
is sufficient for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance and issue
process. If at all, there is any serious dispute with regard to the person
prosecuting the complaint not being authorized or if it is to be
                                                                             G
demonstrated that the person who filed the complaint has no knowledge
of the transaction and, as such that person could not have instituted
and prosecuted the complaint, it would be open for the accused to
dispute the position and establish the same during the course of the
trial. As noted in Samrat Shipping Co. Pvt. Ltd. (supra), dismissal of
a complaint at the threshold by the Magistrate on the question of            H
286                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 2 S.C.R.


A     authorisation, would not be justified. Similarly, we are of the view that
      in such circumstances entertaining a petition under Section 482 to quash
      the order taking cognizance by the Magistrate would be unjustified
      when the issue of proper authorisation and knowledge can only be an
      issue for trial.
B            18. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High
      Court was not justified in entertaining the petition filed under Section
      482 of Cr.PC and quashing the order dated 05.11.2015, taking cognizance
      of the complaint filed by the appellant.
             Accordingly, we pass the following order;
C
             (i)      The judgment dated 14.12.2017 passed in CRL. MC. No.
                      1210 of 2017 by the High Court of Orissa, Cuttack is set
                      aside.
             (ii)     The complaint in I.C.C Case No. 422 of 2015 is restored to
D                     the file of SDJM, Jharsuguda with a direction to list the
                      case on 15.03.2022 as the first date for appearance of the
                      parties.
             (iii)    The respondent who has appeared herein and is represented
                      by a counsel shall appear on the said date before the learned
E                     Magistrate in continuation of the proceedings wherein
                      summons had already been issued, without expecting fresh
                      summons to be issued.
             (iv)     Keeping in view the fact that the complaint is of the year
                      2015, the same shall be proceeded with further expeditiously
F                     and be concluded in a period not later than six months from
                      the first date indicated above.
             (iv)     The appeal is accordingly allowed with cost quantified at
                      Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) payable by the
                      respondent to the appellant.
G
             19. All pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.


      Devika Gujral                                                  Appeal allowed.


H