M/S. SOORAJMULL NAGARMULLversusSTATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

                         [2015] 9 S.C.R. 220


A                M/S.SOORAJMULL NAGARMULL
                                   v.
                      STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.·
             (Civil Appeal Nos. 10394-10396 OF 2011)
B
                          AUGUST 17, 2015
                    [VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND
                 ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.]

c          LandAcquisitionAct, 1894-s. 17, 4, 6, 5A, 11A-Land
     acquisition - Lapse of - Land acquisition proceedings
    initiated in 1981 lapsed due to delay in publishing the award
    - Initiation of fresh acquisition proceedings by the State -
    Appellant-land owners sought release of their land - High
D    Court held that since 1981 acquisition proceedings had not
    been withdrawn by the State and the appellant did not
     challenge the same, possession of the land as well as the
     title thereof vested with the State despite the delay in
    publication of the award- On appeal, held: Old notifications
E   are superseded and obliterated by subsequent ones, as the
    subsequent acquisition proceeding manifest and indicate the
    intention of the State to abandon the preceding one - On
    facts, 1981 acquisition had lapsed- There is no reason or
    basis to allow the State to revive the lapsed acquisition -
F   Further, the actions of the State have denied the appellant
    just and fair compensation as envisag(!d and postulated in
    the Act, for its land from which it was dispossessed well over
    three decades ago - 1981 acquisition is set aside for non-
G   compliance with the provisions of s.11A- Ratio of Satendra
    Prasad Jain is confined to the proposition that the State is
    precluded from setting aside the acquisition for its own failure
    to carry out compliance with s. 11 A and once possession has
    been taken by the State u/s. 17, it is no tonger open to the
H   State to relinquish or return ihe land to the legal entity who
                                 220
  M/S.SOORAJMULL NAGARMULL v. STATE OF BIHAR                221


had been dispossessed from it - Thus, the acquisition A
proceedings with regard to the said land have lapsed- State
to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings or take any other
action available to it in accordance with law - Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013- s.24.              B

  Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh vs. Shri Avinash
  Sharma (1970) 2 SCC 149:1971 (1) SCR 413;
  Satendra Prasad Jain vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1993)
  4 SCC 369:1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 336; Laxmi Devi vs.          C
  State of Bihar 2015 (7) SCALE 555; Land Acquisition
  Officer-cum-RDO vs. A. Ramachandra Reddy(2011) 2
  SCC 447:2011 (1) SCR 324; Bhimandas Ambwani vs
  Delhi Power Company Limited (2013) 14 SCC 195 -
  referred to.                                               D

                    Case Law Reference
1971 (1) SCR 413           referred to.        Para 3
1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 336 referred to.           Para3         E
2015 (7) SCALE 555         referred to.        Para4
2011 (1) SCR 324           referred to.        Para 7
(2013) 14 sec 195          referred to.        Para 7
                                                             F
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
10394.-10396 of 2011

     From the Judgment and Order dated 01.10.2010 of the
Division Bench of the High Court of Patna in C.W.J.C. No. G
1608 of 2004 along with C.W. J.C. No. 15767 of 2004 and
C.W.J.C. No.13769of2004

     C.A. Sundaram, C. Mukund,Ashok K. Jain, Pankaj Jain,
Zafar lnayat, Rohini Musa, Abhishek Gupta, Yamini Sharma,    H
Bijoy Kumar Jain for the Appellant.
222          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A           Sanjeev Sen, Prerna Singh, Shubhra Rai, Rashmi
      Srivastava, Gopal Singh, Shabyashachi Patra, Sanjeev Kumar
      (for Khaitan & Co.) forthe Respondents.

            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
            VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 1. Th.eAppeal before us involves
       an acquisition of land under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition
       Act, 1894 (L.A. Act for brevity). The Respondent State initiated
       acquisition proceedings in 1981 by Notifications under Section
c      4 and Section 6 of the L.A. Act, both dated 25.3.1981, invoking
       the urgency provisions contained in Section 17. The operation
       of Section 5A was simultaneously made inapplicable by
       resorting to Section 17(4). Possession of the land was taken
       by the Respondent State after almost five months on 20.8.1981.
D      The land has subsequently been declared to be a 'Protected
       Forest' as envisaged in Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act,
       1927 as per Notification dated 4.9.1990. Thereafter,
       proceedings were once again initiated by the Respondent
       State vide another Section 4 Notification dated 24.5.1995. This
E      was followed by a N~tification dated 17 .8.1996 issued under
       the urgency provisions of Section 17, whereby Section 5A was
       yet again dispensed with. The Appellant landowner challenged
       these proceedings by way of a writ petition. The High Court
       found that since the same land for which acquisition
F      proceedings had initially commenced invoking the emergency
       provisions fourteen years ago was being re-acquired once
      .again for an unspecified public purpose, there was clearly non-
       application of mind by the Respondent State and the action
       was ma/a fide in law. The writ petition came to be allowed on
G      22.7.1998 and has subsequently attained finality. It is pertinent
       to note that the Respondent State, in its counter affidavit in
       that matter, stated that it was initiating fresh acquisition
       proceedings because the 1981 acquisition had lapsed due to
H      the delay in publishing the Award. On 17.11.2003, the
...     M/S.SOORAJMULL NAGARMULL v. STATE OF BIHAR                      223
                    [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

      Respondent State took steps to annul the second proceedings A
      by attempting to rely on Section 48 with the objective to
      withdraw from the acquisition. S.ubsequently, the Appellant filed
      another writ petition seeking the issuance of a direction
      commanding the Respondent State to release the land in
      question and hand over its possession to the Appellant. A writ B
      petition giving rise to CWJC No.15767 of 2004 was also filed
      by the Divisional Forest Officer challenging the action of the
      Respondent State in endeavouring to withdraw from the
      acquisition proceedings. The Forest Officer also sought a
      direction restraining the Authorities from dispossessing the      c
      Forest Department from the land. A Public Interest Litigation
      also came to be filed by one Sunil Kumar Singh, a self
      proclaimed social activist, with the intent and purpose of
      protecting and preserving the forest. While these writ petitions
                                                                        D
      were pending, pursuant to an internal communication dated
      14.11.2005 of which the Appellant had no notice, an Award
      was published on 27 .9.2006, purportedly in continuity of the
      1981 acquisition proceedings. The Respondent State has
      submitted that a cheque was sent to the Appellant albeit E
      bearing the wrong name. When the Appellant was asked to
      return the cheque so that a new one could be issued, the
      Appellant asked the Respondent State not to take any further
      action as the matter was sub-judice. The Appellant, on the other
      hand, contends that upon its refusal to accept the F
      compensation, the Respondent State ought to have complied
      with Section 31 of the L.A. Act by depositing the amount with
      the Court, which it neglected to do.

           2 All three writ petitions were heard together by the High   G
      Court. The arguments put forward by th·e Appellant were that
,,    since no Award had been passed till 2006, the acquisition had
      lapsed under Section 11A; that the 1981 proceedings had
      lapsed by virtue of the proceedings initiated in 1995-96; that
      the land was neither arable nor waste with the legal              H
•
224         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A     consequence that Section 17 was not avail.able to the
      Respondent State; and that a Notification under Section 4 and
      aDeclaration under Section 6 ~ere issued on the same day.
      However, it was not denied that the Appellant had not
      challenged 1981 acquisition proceedings or the Award
a     belatedly published pursuant thereto.

       3 In light of the fact that the 1981 acquisition proceedings
  had not been withdrawn by the Respondent State and the
  incontrovertible position thattheAppellanthad not challenged
C those proceedings, the Impugned Order held that the
  possession of the land as well as the title thereof vested in the
  Respondent State, notwithstanding the avowedly delayed
  publication of the Award. Reliance was placed upon Lt.
  Governor of Himachal Pradesh vs. Shri Avinash Sharma
D (1970) 2 SCC 149, according to which land that is statutorily
  vested in the Government cannot revert to the original owner
  by way of mere cancellation of the Notification. Support was
  also drawn from Satendra Prasad Jain vs. State of Uttar
  Pradesh (1993) 4 sec 369, which was erroneously
E understood by the High Court to have held that the provisions
  of Section 11Ado not apply to acquisitions under Section 17
  of the L.A. Act.

       4 We have dealt with a substantially similar factual and
F forensic scenario in Laxmi Devi vs. State of Bihar, 2015 (7)
  SCALE 555 in which we have discussed the relevant legal
  issues at length. Having had the benefit of hearing the
  arguments in this matter prior to pronouncing that Judgment,
  we had taken into consideration the arguments raised in the
G presentAppeals in coming to a considered conclusion on the
  legal regime pertaining to the acquisition of land. We shall
  therefore decide these Appeals in accordance with our
  decision in Laxmi Devi, on the strength of that decision.

H          5 It has been mentioned in these Appeals themselves that
                                                                      •
      M/S.SOORAJMULL NAGARMULL v. STATE OF BIHAR                         225
                  [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

    on 13.11.1979, the Commissioner, Bhagalpur had recorded              A.
    that the subject land was not required by the Health Department
    and it may be given to the Forest Department instead. It is
    also the admitted position, and as already noted above, that
    on 25.3.1981, consequent upon contemporaneo~s
    Notifications under Sections 4, 6 and 17, the Appellant's            B
    property was sought to be acquired for the Office of the
    Conservator of Forests and its staff quarters. Thereafter,
    possession of the land was duly taken by the Respondent
    State, which however failed to pass an Award in respect
    thereof. Since the acquisition was initiated in 1.981, there was
                                                                         c .
    no statutory obligation to pass an award within two years, as
    Section 11 A came to be introduced by way of an amendment
    in 1984. However, upon Section 11A coming into force on
    24.9.1984, the Respondent State was under a statutory
                                                                         0
    obligation to pass an Award within two years of its
    commencement No Award was passed in 1986 (i.e. within
    two years), or in fact even till 2006, causing grave prejudice
    to, nay deracinating, the Constitutional rights of the Appellant
    landowner. It seems to us that the realization by the Respondent     E
    State that the failure to pass an Award for over a decade was
    likely to render the acquisition void, is the reason that prompted
    it to once again initiate steps to acquire the land, in terms of
    the Notification dated 13.8.1996. under Section 4 and 17(4)
    of the L.A. Act.                                                     F
          6. It is thus clear that the validity of the 2005 revival and
    the 2006Award is immaterial, as the 1981 acquisition in itself
    cannot be allowed to stand for its abject failure to comply with
    the requirements of Section 11A of the L.A. Act. The G
    Respondent State has argued that the Appellant has not
    challenged the 1981 acquisition proceeding, or indeed the
•
    2006 Award, till today. While it is true that the Appellant had
    initially prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus


-
    commanding the Respondent State to hand over possession H
226         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A     of the land, the restricted nature of that demand was because
      the Appellant's case was predicated on the premise that the
      1981 acquisition had lapsed, as is clear from a perusal of thf:!
      Appellant's Affidavit filed before this Court. We shall therefom
      not be prejudiced by the fact that the Appellant has not directly
B     challenged the 1981 proceedings, but has instead done so
      indirectly. To penalize the Appellant for a viewpoint that the
      Respondent State clearly adhered to as well, till the time of
      initiating the 2005 revival of the acquisition, would be patently
      unfair.
c
           7. Furthermore, in light of the judgments in Land
      Acquisition Officer-cum-RDO vs. A. Ramachandra Reddy
      (2011) 2 SCC 447 and BhimandasAmbwani vs Delhi Power
      Company Limited (2013) 14 SCC 195, the 1981 acquisition
D     stood superseded upon the issuance of the fresh Notifications
      in 1996. This Court has consistently held that old notifications
      are superseded and obliterated by subsequent ones, as the
      subsequent acquisition proceeding manifest and indicate the
      intention of the State to abandon the preceding one. This is
E     particularly clear in the case at hand, where the Respondent
      State, in its Counter Affidavit in previous litigation, had
      asserverated that it believed that the 1981 acquisition had
      lapsed. We find no reason or basis to allow the Respondent
F     State to revive the lapsed acquisition ..

        8. We therefore conclude that the actions of the
  Respondent State have denied the Appellant just and fair
  compensation as envisaged and postulated in the L.A. Act,
  for its land from which it was dispossessed well over three
G decades ago. The 1981 acquisition is accordingly set aside
  for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 11 A of the
  L.A. Act. We must hasten to reiterate the submission made by
  the learned Solicitor General to the effect that Section 11 A, or
H the necessity to pass an Award, is not necessary in view of the

                                                                          -
,,
       M/S.SOORAJMULL NAGARMULL v. STATE OF BIHAR                        227
                   [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

     exposition of the law in Satendra Prasad Jain. We may A
     adumbrate, since it already been discussed by us in detail in
     Laxmi Devi, thatthe ratio of the Thr~ejudge bench in Satendra
     Prasad Jain is confined to the proposition that the errant
     Respondent State is precluded from endeavouring to have the
     acquisition set aside for its own failure to carry out compliance B
     with Section 11 A, and that once possession has been taken
     by the State under Section 17 of the L.A. Act, it is no longer
     open to the State to relinquish or return the land to the legal
     entity who had been dispossessed from it. Accordingly, we
     refrain from passing any orders or directions interfering with c
     the possession of the Respondent State over the subject land.

          9. In this situation the current acquisition law needs to be
     analysed. We have already concluded that the 1981 acquisition
     had lapsed because of the failure of the Respondent State to        D
     pass an Award and secondly because it had launched upon a
     fresh acquisition in 1996. Section 24 of The Right to Fair
     Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
     Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereafter 2013 Act)
     deserves to be placed here -                                        E

       "24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of
       1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain
       cases. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
       Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated        F
       under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ( 1 of 1894}, -

          (a) Where no award under section 11 of the said Land .
          Acquisition Act has bE;len made, then, all provisions of
          this Act relating to the determination of compensation         G
          shall apply; or

 "        (b} Where an award under said section 11 has been
          made, then such proceedings shall continue under the
          provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the
                                                                         H
          said Act has not been replealed".
228        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015) 9 S.C.R.      -·

A      (2)Notwithstanding anything· contained in sub~section (1),
       in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under
       the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an
       award under the said section 11 has been made five
       years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but
B      the physical possession of the land has not been taken
       or the compensation has not been paid the said
       proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the
       appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate
       the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in
c      accordance with the provisions of th is Act:

       Provided that where an award has been made and
       compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings
       has not been deposited in the account of the
D      beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the
       notification for acquisition under section 4 of the Land
       Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in
       accordance with the provisions of this Act.

E       10. At first perusal, there seems to be an unexplained
  inconsistency between Section 24(1)(a), which allows an
  acquisition to stand despite a failure to pass an award while
  only requiring the compensation to be determined under the
  2013Act, and Section 24(2), which deems the acquisition to
F have lapsed for a failure to pay compensation or take physical
  possession of the land where an award has been passed over
  five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act. It
  appears that the State is in a better position in situations where
  it has been remiss in taking any action, towards publication of
G an award than in situations where it has taken partial steps
  towards the completion of the acquisition proceedings.
  However, it is possible that the reason behind this differentiation
  is that Section 24(2) gives the State the option to initiate fresh
H proceedings, as opposed to placing an obligation upon it to
  M/S.SOORAJMULL NAGARMULL v. STATE OF BIHAR                         229 .
              [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.]

do so. To give the State the discretion to set aside an A
acquisition for its own error in not passing an award would be
in the face of the decision in Satendra Prasad Jain. The
Parliament has therefore sought to give the erstwhile landowner
the benefit of enhanced compensation under the 2013 Act,
while restraining the State from taking advantage of its own B
wrong. Section 24(2), on the other hand, seeks to allow the
land to be returned to the landowner party in situations where
there is genuinely no need for it, thus benefiting both the
dispossessed landowner and the State. There still remains an
incongruity, but which presently we are not burdened to unravel. C
Which provision in the 2013 Act governs a situation where the
State has not progressed beyond making a Declaration under
Section 6; where possession of the land has not assumed by
the State; where neither part n0r whole of the compensation
                                                                    0
has been paid or tendered! However, since in this Appeal we
do not have to traverse this legal labyrinth, we shall refrain from
indulging in a more detailed discussion of it.

      11. In conclusion we declare that acquisition proceedings
with regard to the subject lands have lapsed. The Respondent         E
State is directed to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings or
take any other action available to it in accordance with law
within six weeks from today. The Appeals are allowed in these
terms.
                                                                     F
Nidhi Jain                                        Appeals allowed.