M/S. SHERALI KHAN MOHAMED MANEKIAversusTHE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS

                    [2015] 3 S.C.R. 829


      M/S. SHERALI KHAN MOHAMED MANEKIA                       A

                             v.
    THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRAAND OTHERS

          Civil Appeal Nos. 2475-2476 of 2015                 B

                  FEBRUARY 27, 2015

       [ M.Y. EQBAL AND KURIAN JOSEPH, JJ.]

     Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. 40 - Court receiver C
- Continuance of - After disposal of the appeal -
Permissibility - Held: Ordinarily the function of Receiver
comes to an end with the final decision of the case -
However, even after the final decision the Court has
discretion to take further assistance of the Receiver - Jn the D
instant case, since the decree-holder had kept the decree
in execution for recovery of possession, the executing court
could have taken assistance of the Receiver only for
affecting delivery of possession and not more than that.       E

    Dismissing the appeals, the Court

      HELD: When a Receiver is appointed pending suit
or appeal, the prime objective is to preserve the
property by taking possession or otherwise and to keep F
an account of rent and profits that may be realized by
the Receiver and to submit it before the court till the
lis is finally decided. Ordinarily the function of receivers
comes to an end with the final decision of the case.
However, even after the final decision, the Court has the G
discretion to take further assistance of the Receiver as
and when the need arises. In the instant case, the
appellants have already put the decree in execution for
                           829                                H
830        SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2015] 3 S.C.R.


A recovery of possession. Therefore, the Executing Court
  while executing the decree may take assistance of the
  Receiver or by appointing new Receiver or
  Commissioner for effecting delivery of possession in
  accordance with law and not more than that. In the facts
B and circumstances of the case, there is no error in the
  impugned order passed by the High Court. [para 14-15]
  [836-G-H; 837-A-D]
         Halsbury Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 32; Law of
      Receiver, 4th Edn. by James L. High - referred to.
c
         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.
      2475-2476 of 2015.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 14.01.2013 of the
  High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Court Receiver's
D Report No. 25 of 2007 and Additional Report No. 383 of
  2012 in Appeal from Order No. 221 of 1980 in C. A. No.
  11569 of 1980.
       Shyam Divan, Ayaz Bilawala, Manish Parikh, Mahesh
E Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala, E. C. Agrawala, Pratush Panjwani
  for the Appellant.
          Aniruddha P. Mayee, Charuddatta Mahindrakar, A.
      Selvin Raja, Vinay Navare, Satyajeet Kumar, Keshav, Abha
      R. Sharma, Asha Gopalan Nair, Sushil Karanjkar, Ratan G.
F     Wasekar, K. N. Rai for the Respondents.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
          M.Y. EQBAL, J. 1. Leave granted.
G      2. In the instant appeals by special leave the appellant
  assailed the order dated 14th January, 2013 passed by the
  learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Court
  Receiver's Report No.25 of 2007 and Additional Report No.
  383 of 2012, whereby the High Court while disposing of the
  Report of the Court Receiver held that after the disposal of
H First Appeal No. 767 of 1998 and dismissal of the special
 SHERALI KHAN MOHAMED MANEKIA v. THE STATE 831
       OF MAHARASHTRA [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]

leave petition, the Receiver deemed to have been A
discharged.

     3. It appears that the suit property was declared as
evacuee property and the same was purchased by the
appellant in an auction sale as far back as on 15.6.1964. B
In the year 1980, the appellant filed a suit being Civil Suit
No. 37 of 1980 before the District Judge, Thane Court
seeking specific performance of the sale of the property and
possession and interim relief of injunction restraining the
defendants therein from carrying on further construction on C
the suit property. The appellant further made a prayer for
appointment of Receiver.

     4. The trial court rejected the prayer for appointment
of Receiver by order dated 3.5.1980 and against that, D
appellant moved the High Court in First Appeal, which was
finally heard and order dated 22. 7 .1980 was passed
appointing the Court Receiver. The High Court while making
appointment of the Receiver directed to take possession of
the suit property. All the persons who were in actual E
possession of any part of the suit property were continued
to remain in possession. The Receiver was directed to
collect rent and compensation as the case may be from all
the persons in actual possession after verifying from them
their present right to remain in possession. The High Court F
further directed that the Receiver should take suitable
direction from the court if he was presented with any
particular difficulty.

     5. Indisputably, the suit was finally disposed of on G
4.2.1998. While disposing the suit, the trial court gave liberty
to the plaintiff-appellant to move the High Court for
directions for taking possession of the suit property from
the Court Receiver so appointed by the High Court.
                                                                 H
832       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2015] 3 S.C.R.


A       6. As against the judgment and decree of the trial court,
  First Appeal was filed being F.A. No.767of1988, which was
  finally heard and dismissed by the High Court vide judgment
  dated 22.12.2004. The special leave petition filed against
  the judgment of the High Court was also dismissed on
B 19.2.2007.
      7. It further reveals from the record that the Court
  Receiver so appointed submitted Report No.25/2007 before
  the High Court seeking directions with regard to the
C encroachment on the suit property and handing over
  possession to the appellant. The Court Receiver also
  submitted Additional Report No.383 of 2012. The High Court
  after taking into consideration these Court Receiver's
  reports, passed the impugned order holding that the receiver
D shall be deemed to have been discharged after the
  dismissal of the first appeal by the High Court, followed by
  dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by the Supreme
  Court.
       8. Assailing the impugned order, Mr. Shyam Divan,
E learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant,
  submitted that even after the disposal of the appeal,
  affirming the judgment and decree of the trial court, the
  Court Receiver continues in his office till he is discharged
  and fulfills all the incidental obligations that are cast upon
F him by virtue of his appointment and till he renders account
  to the Commissioner of Accounts.
       9. The short question, therefore, that falls for
  consideration is as to whether after the disposal of the
G appeal, the Court Receiver stands discharged or whether
  he continues in his office till an order of discharge is passed
  by the Court?
        10. The High Court in the impugned order observed:
        "The directions cannot be issued only on assumption
H
                       •


 SHERALI KHAN MOHAMED MANEKIA v. THE STATE 833
       OF MAHARASHTRA [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]

that this Court was monitoring the matter for all these years   A
irrespective of disposal of the Appeal from Order. That may
be the understanding of parties, but before me nothing has
been placed which would enable me to hold that from 1983
till this report was filed in the year 2007, this Court had
issued any directions or had passed any orders indicative       B
of control over the Court Receiver. In fact the Court
Receiver's reports and paragraphs of which have been
reproduced by me hereinabove, would indicate that it is only
the correspondence and meetings of parties with the Court
Receiver or his representative that have been referred to.      C
The Court Receiver seems to b e now for the first time
informing the Court of such meetings and contents of letters.
He has not sought any direction for all these decades and
because the parties were engaging and involving him in          D
correspondence, does not mean that the Court has in any
way continued him. If it is the understanding of parties that
the Court Receiver continues, then, that cannot be proved
only by his correspondence. The Court Receiver, High Court
of Bombay, on account of his own limitation and lack of         E
understanding may be under an impression that he
continues as a Receiver of the immovable property despite
disposal of the Appeal from Order, main suit, First Appeal
and thereafter, the proceedings before the Honourable
Supreme Court. If that is the understanding which he has        F
given to parties or parties have given to him and he
entertains correspondence and holds meetings, by itself and
without anything more cannot assist the Plaintiffs/Decree
Holders. The Court cannot issue any directions .on such
reports and filed belatedly. In fact the Plaintiffs/Decree      G
Holders understood that they have to proceed to execute
and enforce the Decree for possession in their favour by
adopting appropriate proceedings. Even then they have
continued the correspondence and persuaded the Court
Receiver to file reports before this Court, does not mean       H
834        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015) 3 S.C.R.


A     that the Court is obliged to take cognizance of the same.
          To my mind these are thoroughly misconceived
          proceedings and the remedy of the Plaintiffs/Decree
          Holders lies elsewhere. They cannot insist on the Court
          passing orders only because of continued
B
          correspondence and meetings with the Court Receiver.
          The Court has not authorized him nor has he sought
          permission of the Court authorising him in any manner
          to continue in possession of the suit property. If parties
c         and equally the Court Receiver do not deem it fit to
          approach this Court for all these years and seek its
          intervention or interference, then, all the more they
          cannot in the exercise that is now carried out, insist on
          directions to be given to the Court Receiver. Equally,
D         the Court Receiver cannot pray for any direction. If the
          Court Receiver continues to be in possession and
          wants to handover possession to the parties claiming
          under the Decree, then he is at liberty to move the
          Executing Court. If the plaintiffs/Decree Holders desire
E         any directions being given to the Court Receiver, then
          it is for them to seek appropriate reliefs and directions
          in the pending execution proceedings. It is open to the
          Court Receiver or parties to do so. This Court after the
          disposal of the Appeal from Order has nothing before
 F        it which could be said to be pending. The First Appeal
          is disposed of long time back. The Reports are filed in
          proceedings which are no longer pending, but are
          disposed of finally. Neither the parties nor the Court
          Receiver sought any further directions from the Court."
G
           11. In paragraph 49 of the order the High Court noted
      the following:-

          "Therefore, the record of that case was perused by the ·
H         learned judge in its entirety and he found that the order
 SHERALI KHAN MOHAMED MANEKIA v. THE STATE . 835
       OF MAHARASHTRA [M.Y. EQBAL, J.]

    was passed dischargi.ng the Court receiver on A
    26.11.1992 and at the same time continuing him for
    certain period to enable parties to file the Appeal from
    the said order. The Appeals were filed, but same were
    dismissed by a Division Bench and the Special Leave
    Petition which was filed before the Supreme Court also B
    came to be dismissed on 27.07.1993. The issue was
    whether the Court Receiver became functus officio right
    from the date when the order was passed on
    26.11.1992 discharging the Court receiver or whether
    the Court Receiver continued to be in charge of the C
    property on account of pendency of his reports before
    the Court and for the other reasons pointed out by the
    counsel for the Plaintiffs and Defendant No.2 therein."

     12. Normally, when a Receiver is appointed on an D
interlocutory application without any limit of time, it is
necessary to provide for the continuance of his appointment
in the final judgment. In Halsbury Laws of England, 3r<1 Edn.,
Vol. 32 (Lord Simond) at page 386 says :-
                                                                 E
     "When a receiver is appointed for a limited time, as in
     the case of interim orders, his office determines on the
     expiration of that time without any further order of the
     court, and if the appointment is 'until judgment or further
     order' it is brought to an end by the judgment in the F
     action. The judgment may provide for the continuance
     of the receiver, but this is regarded as a new
     appointment. If a further order of the court, though silent
     as~ to the receivership, is inconsistent with a
     continuance of the receiver, it may operate as a G
     discharge."

    When a receiver has been appointed on an
    interlocutory application without any limit of time, it is
    not necessary to provide for the continuance of his H
836        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015) 3 S.C.R.


A         appointment in the final judgment The silence of the
          judgment does not operate as a discharge of the
          receiver or determination of his powers. So also the
          appointment of a receiver by the judgment in an
          administration action need not be continued by the
B         order, no further consideration."

           13. In Law of Receiver, 4th Edn. by James L. High, the
      following observation appears at page 985:-

C         "the functions of a receiver usually terminate with the
          termination of the litigation in which he was appointed.
          And when the bill upon which the appointment was
          made is afterwards dismissed upon demurrer, the
          duties of the receiver cease as between the parties to
o         the action ..... And although as between the parties to
          the litigation his functions have terminated with the
          determination of the suit, he is still amenable to the
          court as its officer until he has complied with its
          directions as to the disposal the funds which he has
E         received during the course of his receivership .... But an
          order of discharge does not necessarily follow, in all
          cases, because of the determination of the suit, and
          the court may, upon sufficient cause shown, either
          discharge or continue the receiver, according to the
F         exigencies of the case."

       14. In our view, when a Receiver is appointed pending
  suit or appeal, the prime objective is to preserve the
  property by taking possession or otherwise and to keep an
G account of rent and profits that may be realizedoy the
  Receiver and to submit it before the court till the lis is finally
  decided. Ordinarily the function of receivers who are
  appointed comes to an end with the final decision of the
  case. However, even after the final decision, the Court has
H the discretion to take further assistance of the Receiver as
 SHERALI KHAN MOHAMED MANEKIA v. THE STATE 837
       OF MAHARASHTRA [M.Y EQBAL, J.]

and when the need arises. In the instant case, admittedly, A
the appellants have already put the decree in execution for
recovery of possession. We are, therefore, of the opinion
that the Executing Court while executing the decree may
take assistance of the Receiver or by appointing new
Receiver or Commissioner for effecting delivery of B
possession in accordance with law and not more than that.

     15. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we do
not find any erro~ in the impugned order passed by the High
Court. The Civil Appeals are, therefore, of no merit and are C
dismissed.

Kalpana K. Tripathy                      Appeals dismissed.