M/S. JAINHIND ROADWAYSversusMAHARASHTRA RAJYA MATHADI TRANSPORT AND GENERAL KAMGAR UNION AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2005 INSC 463
- Decided
- 30 September 2005
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
In the absence of any specific allegation or material showing that a settlement is unfair, the Industrial Tribunal is bound to pass the award in accordance with the settlement, and the High Court's rejection of the settlement was erroneous.
Summary
The dispute concerned a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 involving transport employers and workmen who had entered into settlements during the pendency of the industrial tribunal proceedings. The tribunal rejected the settlements, deeming them unfair and fixing what it called "fair wages" instead of the minimum wages stipulated in the settlements. The workmen did not raise any specific objection to the fairness of the settlements, and the unions that opposed the settlements lacked locus standi. The High Court and the tribunal dismissed the writ petitions and upheld the award despite the absence of material showing coercion, fraud or undue influence. The Supreme Court held that, in the absence of a specific allegation or evidence challenging the fairness of a settlement, the tribunal must pass the award in accordance with the settlement, and the earlier courts erred in rejecting it. Consequently, the appeals were disposed of without any order as to costs.
Issues considered
- The tribunal may reject a settlement without any material questioning its fairness.
- Whether the absence of a specific allegation of unfairness obliges the tribunal to pass an award based on the settlement.
- The locus standi of unions to challenge a settlement entered into by workmen.
- Whether the tribunal should treat cases lacking a settlement separately from those with settlements.
Legislation cited
- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 10(1), s. 12(2), s. 13(3), s. 18(1), s. 18(3)(d)
Subjects
Judgment
A MIS. JAINHIND ROADWAYS
v.
MAHARASHTRA RANA MATHADI TRANSPORT AND GENERAL
KAMGAR UNION AND ORS.
SEPTEMBER 30, 2005
B
[ARIJITPASAYAT ANDC.K. THAKKER,JJ.]
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-Jndustrial Dispute-Settlement between
C employer and employee-Plea to pass award in view of settlement-Fairness
of settlement not questioned-Plea not accepted by the Courts below-On
appeal, held: Award to be passed in view of settlement as no issue was raised
regarding fairness of the settlement.
An award passed by Industrial Tribunal was challenged before High
D Court. The reference was remanded by High Court to the Tribunal holding
that the Tribunal instead offtxing fair wages had fixed minimum wages. During
pendency of the disputes before the Tribunal, workmen entered into
settlements with the employers and request was made to dispose of the
reference accordingly. The plea was opposed by the Union leaders. Tribunal
did not accept the plea of settlement holding the same not being fair and'"fixed
E wages which according to it were fair. Writ Petition challenging the same
was dismissed by Single Judge of High Court holding that the settlement was
not fair. Appeal thereagainst was dismissed by Division Bench of High Court.
Hence the present appeals.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
F
HELD: 1. There was no issue raised regarding fairness of the
settlement. The Tribunal as well as the High Court came to conclusion without
any material that settlements were not fair. There has to be a specific reference
in this issue which was not there before the Tribunal and in any event no
material was placed or any positive stand taken by any workman. [827-GI
G
National Engineering Industries ltd. v. State of Rajasthan-and Ors.,
[20001 1 SCC 371 and State of Uttaranchal v. Jagpal Singh Tyagi irr Civil
Appeal No. 6505 of 2004 decided on 31st August, 2005, relied on.
The Sirsilk ltd. and.Ors. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr.,
II 820
JAINHINDROADWAYSr.MAHARASHTRARAJYAMATHADITRANSPORT(PASAYAT,J.] 821
(19641 2 SCR 448 and The Stafe of Bihar v. D.N. Ganguly and Ors., (1959) A
SCR 1191, referred to.
2. Tribunal dealt with two cases by treating them at par with other cases
though there was no settlement in those cases. The Tribunal shall deal with
these two cases separately. [828-DI
B
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4377 of2005.
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.4.2003 of the Bombay High
Court in A. No. 652 of2002 in W.P. No. 676of1999.
With C.A. Nos. 4378, 4379, 4380, 4381, 4382, 4383, 4384, 4385, 4386, 4393, C
4394, 4395, 4396, 4397, 4401and4402 of2005.
Vinod Bobde, L.Nageshwar Rao, Nikhil M. Sakhardande, Anand Mishra,
A.V. Palli and Ms. Rekha Palli for the Appellant.
Dr. R.S. Kulkarni, Jamshed Bey, Parmanand Gaur and Ms. Ruby Singh D
Ahuja for the Respondents.
Sushi! Karanjkar, Anil Padiyar and Venkateswara Rao Anumolu for
Intervenor.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by E
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. All these appeals have a common matrix in a
judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissing
the appeals filed by the present appellants which were filed against judgments
of learned Sirigle Judge.
F
Factual background needs. to be noted in brief:
Around 1980 the All-India Transport Employees Association (in short
'association') raised dispute relating to certain general demands including
pay-scales, dearness allowance etc. In relation to employees employed with
various transporters having establishment all over India. The dispute was G
referred by the appropriate Government on 12th August, 1981 under Section
IO(l)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short 'the Act') for adjudication.
Initially the reference was in respect of 259 employers. Subsequently, by a
corrigendum issued on 25.2.1982 116 more employers were included in the
reference. A common award was made by the Industrial Tribunal on 12th H
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A November, 1986. Award was challenged by some of transporters and the
union representing some of the workmen by filing writ petitions. By common
judgment dated I Ith November, 1992 the writ petitions were disposed of by
the High Court remanding the reference to the Industrial Tribunal. The High
Court found that the Tribunal instead of fixing fair wages had fixed minimum
wages as the wages payable to the concerned workmen. When the matter was
B taken by the Tribunal afresh, all the 28 transporters and the workmen appeared
before the Industrial Tribunal. Two unions which are respondent nos. I and
2 herein appeared before the Tribunal taking the stand that they were
representing the workmen. While the matter was pending before the Indus~ial
Tribunal it was brought to the notice of the Tribunal that the concerned
C workmen had entered into settlements with the employer-transporters and
request was made to dispose of the reference accordingly. This plea was
resisted by the respondent nos. I and 2-unions. The Tribunal did not accept
the settlement by holding as follows;
"The settlement if arrived with coercive under influence, by fraud
D or by corrupt practices and adopting malajide and by inducement
then it spould be examined ...... In these settlement the basic wages are
fixed at the rate of minimum wages as notified in 20th July 1994 giving
increments. In these settlements there is no dearness allowance agreed
between the workers and employer respectively. Even the demand of
transfer subject to consultation with union has not been agreed. In
E other words during the pendency and at the final stage of the
proceeding these settlements have arrived and given goodbye to all
the demands ... If these settlements are accepted then in other words
the minimum wages are allowed to be paid. As the lordship in W.P.
has observed that the Tribunal has to fix fair wages, and not the
F minimum wages. The Government machinery has to fix the minimum
wages and not the Tribunals or court of law, to fix the minimum
wages."
The Tribunal fixed the wages which according to it were the fair wages.
The award was assailed by filing writ petitions in the High Court under Article
G 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short 'the Constitution').
Before the learned Single Judge in certain cases the affidavits of the
workers concerned were filed stating that the dispute with the employer was
settled and they were agreeable to che wages settled under the settlement.
The learned Single Judge, however, was of the view that the Tribunal's
H judgment did not warrant interference as the Tribunal was bound to answer
JAINHINDROADWA YS 1•. MAHARASHTRARAJYA MATHAD! TRANSPORT[PASAYAT,J.] 823
the reference in tenns of the order of the High Court. Appeals were preferred A
before the Division Bench. By the impugned common judgment they were
dismissed.
In support of the appeals, learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that the approach of the Tribunal and the High Court is clearly erroneous. The
concerned workmen never questioned fairness or tenns of the settlement. The B
respondent nos. I and 2-union who had no locus standi to raise any dispute
made some suggestions in that regard. As a matter of fact, there was no
material placed before the Tribunal to show that the settlements were tainted.
It is a settled position in law that where question is raised about the fairness
of a settlement a separate industrial dispute is contemplated. In the absence C
of any material or reference the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the
settlements were not legal. The vulnerability of the Tribunal's award and the
judgments of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench is apparent
from the fact that in respect of one transporter-employer the settlement
providing for identical scales of a wages was accepted. No reason has been
indicated by the Tribunal as to why a departure was made in the case of the D
appellants. With regard to the locus standi of respondent nos. 1 and 2 it is
pointed out that in the writ petitions before the High Court a clear plea was
taken that they had no locus standi to represent the workmen. Specific
reference was made to the following averments:
"10. The petitioners state that none of their employees are members E
of either the Respondent No. I or the Respondent No. 2 nor were
Respondents No. 1 and 2 in existence in 1981.
11. The Petitioners state that the All India Transport Employees
Association has ceased to exist and in the aforesaid reference, the
Respondent No. 1 and 2 Union caused their appearance claiming to F
represent the employees of all the Transport Operators."
It is pointed out in the counter-affidavit filed before the High Court the
stand of the present respondent nos. 1 and 2 can be culled out from the
following statement:
G
"With reference to paragraph 1 to 11, I say that no comments are
called out."
In response, learned counsel for the respondent nos. I and 2 submitted
that under industrial Jaw the role of the union is clearly recognized. They
symbolize collective bargaining for the welfare of its members. It is submitted H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A that well recognized principle in law is that if a settlements is factually found
to have been arrived at with coercion, undue influence or fraud or by corrupt
practice or adopting malafides or by inducement then the Tribunal can by
examining the factual position ignore the settlements. It is further submitted
that the factual position clearly shows that the possibility of an adverse
B decision may have operated as a positive force for the so-called settlement.
The effect of settlement has been considered by this Court in several
cases. In The Sirsilk Ltd. and Ors. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and
Anr., (1964) 2 SCR 448 it was observed at page 453 as follows:
"The contention on behalf of the appellant in the alternative is this.
c It is said that the main purpose of the Act is to maintain peace
between the parties in an industrial concern. Where therefore parties
to an industrial dispute have reached a settlement which is binding
. under s. 18(1 ), the dispute between them really comes to an end. In
such a case it is urged that the settlement arrived at between the
D parties should be respected and industrial peace should not be allowed
to be disturbed by the publication of the award which might be
different from the settlement. There is no doubt that a settlement of
the dispute between the parties themselves is to be preferred, where
it can be arrived at, to industrial adjudication, as the settlement is
likely to lead to more lasting peace than an award, as it is arrived at
E by the free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill
between them. Even though this may be so, we have still to reconcile
the mandatory character of the provision contained ins. 17(1) for the
publication of the award to the equally mandatory character of the ,
binding nature of the settlement arrived at between the parties as
provided in s. 18(1 ). Ordinarily there should be no difficulty about the
F
matter, for if a settlement has been arrived at between the parties .while
the dispute is pending before the tribunal, the parties would file the
settlement before the tribunal and the tribunal would make the award
in accordance with the settlement."
G Similarly in The State of Bihar v. D.N Ganguly and Ors., (1959] SCR
1191 it was observed as follows:
"It is, however, urged that if a dispute referred to the industrial
tribunal under section 10(1) is settled between the parties, the only
remedy for giving effect to such a compromise would be to cancel the
H reference and to take the proceedings out of the jurisdiction of the
JAINHINDROADWAYSv.MAHARASHTRARAJYAMATIIAD!TRANSPORT[PASAYAT,J.l 825
industrial tribunal. This argument is based on the assumption that the A
.industrial tribunal would have to ignore the settlement by the parties
of their dispute pending before it and would have to make an award
on the merits inspite of the said settlement. We are not satisfied that
this argument is well-founded. It is true that the Act does not contain
any provisions specifically authorising the industrial tribunal to record
a compromise and pass an award in its terms corresponding to the B
provisions of order XXIIII, r. 3, of the Code of civil procedure. But it
would be very unreasonable to assume that the industrial tribunal
would insist upon dealing with the dispute on the merits even after
it is informed that the dispute has been amicably settled between the
parties. We have already indicated that amicable settlements of C
industrial disputes which generally lead to industrial peace and harmony
are the primary objects of this Act. Settlements reached before the
conciliation officers or boards are specifically dealt with by sections
12(2) and 13(3) and the same are made binding under section 18. There
can, therefore, be no doubt that if an industrial dispute before a
tribunal is amicably settled, the tribunal would immediately agree to D
make an award in terms of the settlement between the parties. It was
stated before us at the bar that innumerable awards had been made
by industrial tribunals in terms of the settlements between the parties.
In this connection we may incidentally refer to the provisions of
section 7(2)(b )of the Industrial Disputes (Appellant Tribunal) Act, E
1950 (XL VIII of 1950), which expressly refer to an award or decision
of an industrial tribunal made with the consent of the parties. It is true
that this Act is no longer in force; but when it was in force, in
providing for appeals to the Appellate Tribunal set up under the said
Act, the legislature had recognized the .making of awards by the
industrial tribunals with the consent of the parties. Therefore, we F
cannot accept the argument that cancellation of reference would be
necessary in order to give effect to the amicable settlement of the
dispute by the parties pending proceedings before the industrial
tribunal."
Whether the settlement is tainted or unfair has to be decided if specific G
reference is made on .that aspect. In National Engineering Industries Ltd.
v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., [2000] I SCC 371 at para 24 it was observed
as follows:-
"It will be thus seen that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain H
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is no industrial
dispute and none apprehended which could be the subject-matter of
reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10
of the Act. Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial
Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ
jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial Tribunal (sic dispute)
B which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make
the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is
no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended the appropriate
Government lacks power to make any reference. A settlement of dispute
between the parties themselves is to be preferred, where it could be
c arrived at, to industrial adjudication, as the settlement is likely to lead
to more lasting peace than an award. Settlement is arrived at by the
free will of the parties and is a pointer to there being goodwill between
them. When there is a dispute that the settlement is not bona fide in
nature or that it has been arrived at on account of fraud,
misrepresentation or concealment of facts or even corruption and
D other inducements it could be the subject-matter of yet another
industrial dispute which an appropriate Government may refer for
adjudication after examining the allegations as there is an underlying
assumption that the settlement reached with the help of the Conciliation
officer must be fair and reasonable. A settlement which sought to be
E impugned has to be scanned and scrutinized. Sub-sections (I) and (3)
of section 18 divide settlements into two calegories, namely, ( 1) those
arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings, and (2) those arrived
at in the course of conciliation proceedings. A settlement which
belongs to the first category has a limited application in that it merely
binds the parties to the agreement but the settlement belonging to the
F second category has an extended application since it is binding on all
the parties to the industrial disputes, to all others who were summoned
to appear in the conciliation proceedings and to all persons employed
in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be,
to which the -dispute related on the date of the dispute and to all
others who joined the establishment thereafter. A settlement arrived
G
at in the course of conciliation proceedings with a recognized majority
union will be binding on all workmen of the establishment, even those
who belong to the minority union which had objected to the same.
The recognized union having the majority of member is expected to
protect the legitimate interest of the labour and enter into a settlement
H in the best interest of the labour. This is with the object to uphold the
JAINH!NDROADWAYSi'.MAHARASHTRARAJYAMATHAD!TRANSPORT[PASAYAT,J.l 827
sanctity of settlement reached with the active assistance of the A
Concillation Officer and to discourage an individual employee or a
minority union from scuttling the settlement. When a settlement is
arrived at during the conciliation proceedings it is binding on the
members of the Workers' Union as laid down by Section 18(3)(d) of
the Act. It would ipso facto bind all the existing workmen who are all B
parties to the industrial dispute and who may not be, members of
unions that are signatories to such settlement under Section 12(3) of
the Act. The Act is based on the principle of collective bargaining for
resolving industrial disputes and for maintaining industrial peace.
"This principle of industrial democracy is the bedrock of the Act," as
pointed out in the case of P. Virudhachalam v. Lotus Mills, [1998] l C
sec 650. In all these negotiations based on collective bargaining the
individual workman necessarily recedes to the background. Settlements
will encompass all the disputes existing at the time of the settlement
except those specifically left out."
The position was recently examined in State of Uttaranchal v. Jagpal D
Singh Tyagi Civil Appeal No. 6505 of 2004 decide on 3 lst August, 2005. It
was held as follows:
"Learned counsel for the appellant State submitted that there was
nothing on record to show that there any pressure put on the
respondent employee or that undue influence was exercised. The E
conclusion was arrived at without pleadings in this regard. For the
first time in the counter affidavit filed before the High Court, stand to
that effect was taken. Without any material to support the contention,
the High Court held that the settlement was not proper and in order
to frustrate the order passed by the High Court, the same was arrived F
at. The effect of the affidavits and the undertaking was totally ignored."
We find there was really no issue raised regarding fairness of the
settlement. The Tribunal as well as the High Court came to conclusions
without any material that settlements were not fair. As noted in National
Engineering case (supra) and State of Uttarancha/'s case (supra) there has G
· to be a specific reference in this issue which was not there before the Tribunal
and in any event no material was placed or any positive stand taken by any·
workman.
In the aforesaid background the orders of the learned Single Judge and
the Division Bench of the High Court as well as that of the Tribunal are set H
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A aside. The Tribunal shall decide the matter within six months from the date
of receipt of a copy of the judgment. If however, a competent person raises
a dispute regarding fairness of the settlement within a month from today
before the appropriate Government with a copy of our judgment the same
shall be examined within two months from the date the dispute is raised. It
shall take a decision whether a reference is called for. We make it clear that
B we have not expressed any opinion on the desirability or otherwise of making
the reference.
Needless to say while deciding the question both on the desirability of
making the reference or answering the reference the appropriate Government
C and the Tribunal, as the case may be, shall examine the locus standi of person
seeking reference and/or the acceptability of the stand.
At this juncture it is to be noted that the Tribunal dealt with the cases
which are the subject-matter of CA Nos. 4381 and 4382 of 2005, by treating
them at par with other cases though there was no settlement in those cases.
D The Tribunal shall deal with these tow cases separately.
The appeals are accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs.
K.K.T. Appeals disposed of.
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