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Supreme Court of India

M/S HARSH AUTOMOBILES PRIVATE LIMITEDversusINDORE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

Citation
2023 INSC 893
Decided
9 October 2023
Disposal
Disposed off

Holding

A sign board that merely identifies a business and displays product information without soliciting customers does not amount to "advertisement" within the meaning of Section 132, and therefore cannot be taxed as advertisement.

Summary

Harsh Automobiles Private Limited and a related company, dealers of motor vehicles, displayed name boards on their premises showing their trade name and the types of vehicles sold. The Indore Municipal Corporation issued notices demanding payment of advertisement tax under Section 132 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, treating the boards as advertisements. The appellants contended that the boards merely identified their business and did not solicit customers, and therefore could not be taxed as advertisements; the High Court had upheld the demand relying on the Bharti Airtel decision. The Supreme Court examined the statutory definition of "advertisement" and relevant case law, concluding that mere informational signboards without a commercial solicitation do not fall within the meaning of advertisement for tax purposes. Consequently, the Court directed the municipal corporation to reconsider the objections filed by the appellants within eight weeks and stayed enforcement of the tax demand. The appeals were disposed of.

Issues considered

  • Whether display of name boards or sign boards by a business constitutes "advertisement" under Section 132 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956.
  • Whether the Municipal Corporation can levy advertisement tax on such sign boards.
  • Whether premises situated outside the municipal limits fall within the jurisdiction of the corporation for levying advertisement tax.
  • Whether the statutory provisions empower taxation of informational sign boards.

Legislation cited

Subjects

advertisement taxsign boardmunicipal corporationMadhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Actdefinition of advertisementconstitutional rightsSection 132jurisdictionbusiness identification

Judgment

                  [2023] 15 S.C.R. 28 : 2023 INSC 893



                            CASE DETAILS
         M/S HARSH AUTOMOBILES PRIVATE LIMITED
                                     v.
               INDORE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
                     (Civil Appeal No. 5362 of 2023)
                           OCTOBER 09, 2023
       [S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.]

                             HEADNOTES
     Issue for consideration: Whether the display boards or sign
boards or name boards as displayed by the appellants would partake the
character of “advertisement” so as to attract s.132 of the Madhya Pradesh
Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 and thereby the demand (for payment of
advertisement tax) is to be sustained.
     Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 – s.132
– Appellants displayed their name board of respective business
establishment which also depicted the nature of the respective vehicles
which were sold and it would be inseparable part of the appellants’
business establishment – The demand notices were raised against the
appellants for payment towards advertisement tax – Same were affirmed
by the High Court – Propriety:
      Held: By mere mentioning the name of the product in which the
business establishment is being run would not partake the character of
the advertisement until and unless by such display customers are solicited
– In the absence of the display of the name board or sign board either by
a business establishment or any other establishment, it would drive the
potential customer to such a situation where it would be neigh impossible
to identify the business establishment from which the potential customer
proposes to buy – However, if the sign boards so displayed would in any
manner promote a particular product or goods or services or in other words
it would attract customers to purchase a particular brand of product or goods
or services and such display provides information about the product/ services
and solicit the customers, it may amount to advertisement while the latter
                                     28
   M/S HARSH AUTOMOBILES PRIVATE LIMITED v. INDORE                       29
               MUNICIPAL CORPORATION


would only be an information to the public – The statutory provisions does
not empower the Municipal Corporation or its agency to demand tax for
display of information through name boards or display boards – It would
emerge from the statutory provisions that the legislative intent was never
to impose tax liability on sign boards but only on advertisement – Prima
facie, the sign boards are display boards displayed by the appellants’
companies in the instant appeals would indicate that they have displayed
on their respective premises the general information to the public about the
products being dealt with by them and it would not reflect any soliciting
of customers or induce the general public to buy the products dealt by the
appellants and displayed on the board – In the instant case, on the demand
being raised both the appellants had objected to the same and even before
it came to be considered they approached the High Court – Therefore, the
first respondent directed to examine the objections filed by the appellants
afresh. [Paras 18, 19]
       LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
      Bharti Airtel Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh WP No. 2296 of 2012
decided on 12.01.2015; ICICI Bank Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 62 : (2005) 6 SCC 404; Municipal Corporation
of Greater Bombay Vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. [2002] 2 SCR
860 : (2002) 4 SCC 219 – referred to.
       OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
              ORDER AND APPEARANCES
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5362 of 2023.
    From the Judgment and Order dated 24.10.2017 of the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh at Indore in WP No.1842 of 2016.
     With
     Civil Appeal No.5363 of 2023.
     Appearances:
      Ms. Manjula Baxla, Kapil Arora for M/s Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas,
Niraj Sharma, Raghav Gupta, Ms. Mahima Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Mishra Saurabh, Ambar Pare, Advs. for the Respondent.
30           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 15 S.C.R.



       JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
                              JUDGMENT
     ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
     1. The Order dated 24.10.2017 passed in WP No.1842 of 2016 and
WP No.2106 of 2012 by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh whereunder
the demand notices raised against the appellants for payment towards
advertisement tax came to be affirmed by relying upon the judgment of
Bharti Airtel Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh rendered in WP No. 2296 of
2012 decided on 12.01.2015 has been called in question.
    RE:Facts in C.A.5362 of 2023 arising out of final order and
judgment dated 24.10.2017 passed in WP No.1842 of 2016
      2. Appellant is the occupier of the premises at 14 Rukmini Plaza, AB
Road, Indore and is a dealer of Hyundai Passenger Cars and is carrying on
said business at the said premises apart from other places. Appellant has
displayed a name board with its trade name and business in the premises
where business is being run. Second respondent issued a notice on 04.07.2015
demanding an amount of Rs.2,03,850/- for recovery of advertisement tax
namely for the displaying sign board at its premises under Section 189-A
of the Municipal Act, 1965. An objection was raised to the same by the
appellant contending inter alia that putting up of sign board and displaying
the name of the appellant’s business would not fall within the definition of
“advertisement”, rather it was displaying its own name and business through
the sign board as it would be necessary for the general public to know the
name and nature of business and the product it was dealing with. Being
aggrieved by this notice writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India came to be filed and the Hon’ble High Court by impugned order
relying upon the judgment of Bharti Airtel (supra) dismissed the petition.
Hence this appeal.
    RE: Facts in CA 5363 of 2023 arising out of the final order and
judgment dated 24.10.2017 passed in WP No.2106 of 2012.
     Appellant is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956
and in order to let the general public know the name and business of the
company and the nature of its business and its products, appellant company
   M/S HARSH AUTOMOBILES PRIVATE LIMITED v. INDORE                         31
      MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]


has put up a name board displaying its trade name within the business
premises displaying the products and services in which the appellant is
dealing and as such the notice dated 04.01.2012 came to be issued by the
second respondent demanding advertisement tax of Rs.1,31,137/- and yet
another notice dated 04.01.2012 of Rs.51,000/- in respect of another premises
where similar board had been put up by the appellant. These notices were
duly replied to by the appellant by objecting to the same and contending inter
alia that it was not displaying any advertisement rather it was displaying its
own trade name and business sign board and sought for withdrawal of the
notice. It was also contended that notice issued was without jurisdiction as
one of its premises situated at Lasudia Mori, AB Road, Tehsil and District
Indore was situated outside the municipal limits and therefore no tax was
leviable. Hence, sought for notices being withdrawn.
      3. Subsequently, second respondent issued another notice on 08.02.2012
revising its earlier demand of sum of Rs.1,82,137.50 to Rs.46,050. This
notice came to be challenged by filing a Writ Petition under article 226
of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in
Writ Petition No.2106 of 2012.The High Court by impugned order dated
24.10.2017 relying upon the judgment of Bharti Airtel (supra) dismissed
the petition. Hence this appeal.
      4. We have heard the arguments of learned advocates appearing for
the parties namely Shri Kapil Arora and Mr. Niraj Sharma, learned counsel
appearing for the appellants and Shri Mishra Saurabh, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent.
      5. It is the contention of the learned advocates appearing for the
appellant that impugned orders have been passed by relying upon the
judgment rendered by the coordinate bench of the High Court in Bharti
Airtel (supra) which was inapplicable to the facts on hand as the issue
involved in the said case related to whether the municipal corporation can
appoint a tax collecting agent for the purpose of collection of advertisement
tax? and the question relating to display of trade name and nature of business
by a trader or a business establishment on its own premises where business
is being carried on would tantamount to an advertisement, was neither in
issue examined or decided in the said case. It is contended display of trade
name and nature of business by a trader at its premises does not amount
32           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 15 S.C.R.


to “advertisement” and this fact has not been considered by the High
Court under the impugned judgment. The learned advocates would further
elaborate their submissions by contending that if putting up of a sign board
at its own premises for identification purposes or for the customers to know
the identity of the premises would amount to advertisement then sign name
boards of all business establishments, Government officers, public sector
undertakings, sign boards put up by professionals like Doctors, Advocates,
Engineers, Architects, Consultants, schools, colleges, hotels, restaurants
etc. would also fall within the ambit of advertisement and would be liable
to pay advertisement tax. Non-putting up of sign board displaying the
name of the firm would result in the public or the customer making an
extensive research and survey for buying a particular product or availing
the services which the appellants were to provide. They would also contend
that where the sign boards are put up to attract the customers and to promote
the purchase of a particular product and providing information of the said
product or service at a particular place would be an ‘advertisement’ whereas
depicting the name of the business establishment and the products being
dealt by it would only be an information to the general public and such
display of information would not amount to advertisement and as such it
would not be liable to be taxed.
      6. They would also contend that imposition of “advertisement tax” on
sign boards displaying the name and products of the business establishment
is violative of Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
      7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant in Civil Appeal
No.5363 of 2023 (Special Leave Petition No. 5761 of 2018) would
also contend the Indore Municipal Corporation (advertisement, bye-
laws) framed by virtue of the powers conferred under Indore Municipal
Corporation Act, 1956 would mandate the imposition of advertisement tax
to the premises situated within the territorial limits of Indore Municipal
Corporation and the business premises of the appellant was situated outside
the municipal limits namely the premises at Lasudia Mori, Tehsil and
District Indore was not falling within the territorial limits of Municipal
Corporation and as seen it would not be exigible for levy of advertisement
tax and such levy would be without jurisdiction. Hence, they have sought
for allowing the appeal.
   M/S HARSH AUTOMOBILES PRIVATE LIMITED v. INDORE                         33
      MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]


      8. Per contra, Shri Mishra Saurabh, learned counsel appearing for
the respondent No.1 (Indore Municipal Corporation) would contend that
appellants were displaying the name of their business establishment, name of
their principal, names of the products and services of the companies in which
they were dealing, with an intent to bring it to the notice and information
of the general public for commercial exploitation. Hence, he would
contend if the sign board which has the purpose to make publicly known
and information which is covered under the definition of “advertisement”
it would amount to display for commercial exploitation. By referring to
the judgment of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay
(2002) 4 SCC 219 and ICICI Bank Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay (2005) 6 SCC 404 he would contend that appellants have admittedly
displayed the trade name and also the products and services in which they
are dealing so as to bring it to the notice and information of general public
about their business, the product and services provided by them which
fulfills the definition of “advertisement” as held in Municipal Corporation
of Greater Bombay Vs. Bharat Petroleum (2002) 4 SCC 219. He would
further contend that display of names of the commodity would fall under
the definition of “advertisement” and therefore the name boards containing
the names of product would be liable to advertisement tax. Contending on
the touchstone of the Judgments of this Court when the facts on hand are
examined it would clearly indicate that display boards of the appellants
would reflect that they had a common object to seek the attention of the
customers and give information about the products and services which
they would be rendering and thereby advertising to the general public
about the product, its utility etc. and seeking the attention of the customers
would tantamount to advertisement. Reiterating the contentions raised in
the counter-affidavit and by relying upon the following judgments he has
sought for dismissal of the appeals.
     1.    New Delhi Municipal Committee v/s. Allied Motors Pvt. Ltd
           (1995) SUPP (4) SCC 150.
     2.    ICICI Bank & Another v/s. Municipal Corporation of Greater
           Bombay & Ors. (2005) 6 SCC 404.
     3.    Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v/s. Bharat Petroleum
           Corporation Ltd. (2002) 4 SCC 219.
34           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


     4.    Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors. v/s. Ratiloku
           Shetty AIR 2002 Bom 94.
     5.    Shri Krishna Pictures v/s. Administrator, Indore Municipal
           Corporation, Indore 1980 JLJ 530.
      9. A plain reading of the impugned order would clearly indicate that
the Writ Petitions filed by the appellants herein before the High Court was
dismissed by relying upon the judgment of Bharti Airtel vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh rendering in W.P. No.2296 of 2012 on 12.01.2015 by arriving
at a conclusion that all the grounds raised in the writ petitions have been
answered in Bharti Airtel.
       10. A perusal of the judgment rendered in Bharati Airtel (supra) could
indicate that the issue involved or the lis revolved around in the said matter
was whether the advertisement tax levied under the impugned notices
therein through the medium of an agency is permissible? Namely, “whether
contractor can be empowered to recover the terminal tax?” It is in this
background the impugned notices therein came to be quashed. Hence, we
are of the considered view that principles enunciated in Bharti Airtel (supra)
would be inapplicable to the facts on hand the impugned order would not be
sustainable on this short ground. However, it would not stop at it, inasmuch
as the issue regarding levy of advertisement tax would still be at large. It
is in this background, we propose to examine as to what further course of
action is proposed to be taken?
      11. In the instant appeals, a demand was raised by the second
respondent on the appellants for payment of advertisement tax which was
objected to by the appellants contending inter alia that imposition of tax
on sign boards is impermissible and they were not advertising any product
or goods and had only displayed the name of the business establishment
describing or displaying the goods/ products in which they are dealing and
exhibiting or displaying its trade name along with the commodity with
which it is dealing, on its premises would not tantamount to advertisement
particularly when no details/characteristics, etc. are displayed to attract
potential buyers by calling upon such purchasers to purchase a particular
product and said notice was unsuccessfully challenged by the respective
appellants before the High Court.
   M/S HARSH AUTOMOBILES PRIVATE LIMITED v. INDORE                           35
      MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]


      12. The Indore Municipal Corporation is a municipality as defined
under Article 243-Q of the Constitution of India and by virtue of Entry
No.5 of State List-II under Schedule VII of the Constitution the State
Government has promulgated Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act,
1956 for Constitution, regulation of Municipal Corporation whereunder
as the Corporation has been empowered to carry out all civil body works
including levy and collection of various taxes which includes the tax on
“advertisements” (otherwise advertisements published in newspapers and
advertisement broadcasted by radio or television) as provided under Entry
No.55 of State List.
     13. The respondent authorities have sought to sustain the demand
by virtue of Section 132(6)(1) of the Municipal Corporation Act and said
provisions reads:
     “132. Taxes to be imposed under this Act.-
     (1) For the purpose of this Act, the Corporation shall, subject to any
     general or special order which the State Government may make in this
     behalf, impose in the whole or in any part of the Municipal Area, the
     following taxes namely: -
     (a) a tax payable by the owners of buildings or lands situated within
     the city with reference to the gross annual letting value of the buildings
     or lands, called the property tax, subject to the provisions of Sections
     135,136 and 138.
     (b) a water tax, in respect of lands and building to which a water
     supply is furnished from or which are connected by means of pipe
     with municipal water works.
     (c) a general sanitary cess, for the construction and maintenance of
     public latrines and for removal and disposal of refuse and general
     cleanliness of the city.
     (d) a general lighting tax, where the lighting of public streets and places
     is undertaken by the corporation.
     (e) a general fire tax, for the conduct and management of the fire
     service and for the protection of life and property in the case of fire.
36           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


     (f) a local body tax on the entry of such goods as may be declared
     by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette into
     the municipal area for consumption, use or sale therein at a rate not
     exceeding four percent of the value of goods.
     (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (f) of sub-section
     (1) if in the opinion of the State Government it is expedient to do so,
     it may delegate the power to the Corporation to declare the goods on
     which local body tax shall be levied and the rates thereof.
     (3) The mode of assessment and collection of the local body tax shall
     be such as may be prescribed.
     (4) The water tax under the clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be
     charged-
          (a) on buildings and lands which are exempted from property
          tax, at a rate as shall be determined by the Corporation.(omitted)
          (b) on buildings and lands which are not exempted from
          property tax, at a rate as determined in clause (a) plus such
          percentage of the property tax, as shall be determined by the
          Corporation.
          Provided that the water tax under clause (b) of sub-section (1)
          shall not be levied on building and land owned by freedom
          fighters during their life time, if they are exempted from Income
          Tax and the water connection is for domestic purpose and which
          does not exceed half inch connection.
     (5) The taxes under clause (c), (d), and (e) of sub-section (1) shall
     be levied at a consolidated rate as under:- (a) on buildings and lands
     which are exempted from property tax at a rate as determined by
     the corporation (omitted) (b) on buildings and lands which are not
     exempted from property tax at a rate prescribed under clause (a) plus
     such percentage of the property tax, as may be determined by the
     Corporation, subject to the conditions that such percentage shall not
     exceed ten percent of the amount of property tax.
     (6) In addition to the taxes specified in sub-section (1), the Corporation
     may, for the purpose of this Act, subject to any general or special order
   M/S HARSH AUTOMOBILES PRIVATE LIMITED v. INDORE                          37
      MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]


     which the State Government may make in this behalf, impose any of
     the following taxes, namely:
     (a) a latrine or conservancy tax payable by the occupier or owner upon
     private latrines, privies or cesspools or open premised or compounds
     cleansed by Corporation agency;
     (b) a drainage tax, where a system of drainage has been introduced;
     (c) a tax on persons exercising any profession or art or carrying on
     any trade or calling within the city;
     (d) omitted
     (e) omitted.
     (f) fees on the registration of cattle sold within the city;
     (g) market dues on persons exposing goods for sale in any market or
     in any place belonging to or under the control of the Government or
     of the Corporation;
     (h) a betterment tax on properties whose value may have improved
     as a result of town planning scheme under taken by the Corporation;
     (i) a tax on pilgrims resorting periodically to a shrine within the limits
     of the Corporation;
     (j) a tax on persons occupying houses, buildings or lands within the
     limits of the Corporation according to their circumstances and property
                                       ××××
     (1) a tax on advertisement other than advertisements published in
     newspapers.”
     14. A perusal of the above provision would indicate that a tax on
“advertisement” other than the advertisement published in newspapers,
can be imposed. Sub-section (1) of Section 133 of the Act provides that
Corporation may, by a special meeting bring forward a resolution to
propose imposition of any tax under Section 132 defining classes of persons
or description of property proposed to be taxed, amount or rate of tax to
be imposed and system of assessment to be adopted. By virtue of power
vested under Section 427 of the Act, respondent Corporation has made the
38           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 15 S.C.R.


Municipal Corporation (advertisement) bye-laws, 1976 which came to be
approved by the State Government under Section 430 of the Act and it was
duly published in the official gazette on 18.08.1978 as required under Section
429 and 431 of the Act of 1956. The respondent-Corporation is tracing its
source of power to levy and collect advertisement tax under clause 4, 5 and
6 of the bye-laws of 1976.
      15. In the teeth of aforesaid statutory provisions, it requires to be
examined as to whether the display boards or sign boards or name boards as
displayed by the appellants would partake the character of “advertisement”
so as to attract Section 132 of the Act and thereby the demand is to be
sustained? If the answer is in the affirmative, necessarily the demand deserves
to be sustained. On the contrary, if the answer is in the negative it would
not detain us for long to quash the same. The incidental question which
may also arise would be whether all modes of display would tantamount to
advertisement? or such display would only be information to the potential
customer so as to make aware about the type of product, goods or services
dealt with by the business establishment that is available in the premises of
such business establishment? To answer this, it would be apt and appropriate
to note the meaning of the expression “advertisement” assigned under
various dictionaries. They read as under:
     (a) “BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 8TH EDITION
     Advertising: 1. The action of drawing the public’s attention to
     something to promote its sale. 2. The business of producing and
     circulating advertisements
     (b) LAW AND COMMERCIAL DICTIONARY
     Advertisement: Notice given in a manner designed to attract public
     attention. Edwards v. Lubbock Country, Tex Civ. App., 33 S.W.2d 482.
     Information communicated to the public, or to an individual concerned,
     as by handbills, newspaper, television, bill-boards, radio. First Nat.
     Corporation v. Perrine, 99 Mont 454: 43 P.2d 1073
     (c) THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA VOLUME-I
     Advertising, the techniques used to bring products, services, opinions,
     or causes to public notice for the purpose of persuading the public to
   M/S HARSH AUTOMOBILES PRIVATE LIMITED v. INDORE                         39
      MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]


     respond in a certain way toward what is advertised. Most advertising
     involves promoting a good that is for sale, but similar methods are
     used to encourage people to drive safely, to support various charities,
     or to vote for political candidates, among many other examples.
     (d) COLLINS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
     Advertisement any public notice, as a printed display in a newspaper,
     short film on television, announcement on radio, etc., designed to sell
     goods, publicize an event, etc.
     Advertising 1) the action or practice of drawing public attention to
     goods, services, events etc., as by the distribution of printed notices,
     broadcasting, etc. 2) the business that specializes in creating such
     publicity, 3) advertisements collectively; publicity.
     (e) THE CHAMBERS DICTIONARY
     Advertisement - the act of advertising; a public notice with the
     purpose of informing and/or changing public attitudes and behavior;
     a short performance recorded for radio, T.V. etc. to advertise goods
     or services; news.
     16. This Court in the case of ICICI Bank and Another Vs. Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay (2005) 6 SCC 404 has held that
advertisement should have some commercial exposition or the soliciting
customers to the product or service prominently shown in the advertisement.
Primarily, it should have a commercial purpose and should be indicative
of business activity of the displayer with a view to attract the attention of
people to its business it has been further held:
     “15. An advertisement is a matter that draws attention of the public or
     segment of public to a product, service, person, organisation or line
     of conduct in a manner calculated to promote or oppose directly or
     indirectly that product, service, person, organisation or line of conduct
     intended to promote sale or use of product or range of products. An
     advertisement is an information that the producer provides about its
     products or services. An advertisement tries to get consumers to buy
     a product or a service. An advertisement is generally of goods and
     services and is an information intended for the potential customers
40           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 15 S.C.R.


     and not a mere display of the name of the company unless the same
     happens to be a trade mark or trade name.”
      17. The aforesaid finding was recorded in the background of Section
328A of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. It has been further held therein
to the following effect:
     “18. The context in which the word advertisement has been used in
     Section 328-A of the Corporation Act and in the commercial and
     ordinary parlance it must have direct or indirect connection with the
     business, trade or commerce carried out by the advertiser. It must
     have some commercial exposition. The advertisement would be for
     the purpose of directing or soliciting customers to the product or
     service prominently shown in the advertisement. If ordinary parlance
     meaning is not given to the word advertisement in Section 328-A it
     will create anomalous position, inasmuch as a simple name board put
     on the house to indicate who is residing in the premises, would also
     be an advertisement; a name board or signboard of a trader visible
     to the public or identifying the place of business would also be an
     advertisement. In our considered opinion advertisement within the
     meaning of Section 328-A of the Corporation Act must primarily have
     a commercial purpose and should be indicative of business activity
     of the displayer with a view to attract the attention of people to its
     business.
     19. In the present case the appellant has put up an illuminated ATM
     board at various sites and as per the appellant it has been put only to
     tell the existing customers and others about the location of the ATM
     centres, which in itself is in the interest of public at large and not to
     attract new customers for opening the bank account. Normally, the
     ATM centres enable the customers to carry out the banking activities
     or transactions at any time, day or night and even on gazetted holidays.
     They are in the nature of public service as they enable the customers
     to do away with the need to keep large sums of cash in their house;
     they are able to have access to the money in their account even on
     holidays and emergency. The ATM centres have a signboard over
     them that are illuminated and tell about the fact that there lies the
     ATM centre of the Bank in that premises. The fact that there is an
   M/S HARSH AUTOMOBILES PRIVATE LIMITED v. INDORE                       41
      MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]


     ATM centre in the premises tells that the appellant Bank is providing
     automatic teller machine service there and hence the service provider
     is clearly identified. The communication in this is directed to the
     account-holders and also to prospective account-holders. The kind
     of information supplied of the location of the service provided
     may also be construed of commercial exploitation indirectly, as the
     signboards may not aim at the existing customers only but they may
     also affect the decisions of the prospective customers. They tell the
     prospective customers that the service of the ATM round the clock is
     being made available by the appellant Bank which would influence
     the prospective customers to make a decision about which service
     provider he or she has to choose. The signboard also helps the people
     to find out which bank is offering better services as compared to the
     other bank. The fact that a bank has more ATM centers than the other
     banks, in the competitive trade and business, provides the incentive
     to the people to choose that bank. The fact that one bank has an ATM
     center in the given location helps them to get more account-holders
     in that area. This also serves the commercial interest of the bank.
     Whether particular action is an advertisement or not would depend
     on whether the person wants to promote directly or indirectly his
     product or service. If by any communication, the communicator tries
     to influence the people to buy his product or service or attract towards
     his product or service then it would be a guiding factor to identify
     whether a particular communication of the communicator tantamount
     to be an advertisement.”
      18. Keeping the aforesaid principles enunciated in mind when we
turn our attention to the facts on hand in general and particularly the
photographs appended (Annexure P-7 in Civil Appeal No.5363 of 2023
@ SLP(C) 5761 of 2018 and Annexure P-6 in Civil Appeal No.5362 of
2023 @ SLP(C) 5703 of 2018),prima facie, it would indicate that as dealers
of Tata Motors and Hyundai Vehicles appellants have displayed their
name board of respective business establishment which is also depicting
the nature of the respective vehicles which are being sold and it would
be inseparable part of the appellants’ business establishment. By mere
mentioning the name of the product in which the business establishment
is being run would not partake the character of the advertisement until and
42           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 15 S.C.R.


unless by such display customers are solicited. In the absence of the display
of the name board or sign board either by a business establishment or any
other establishment including public offices and professionals or schools
or colleges etc. it would drive the potential customer to such a situation
where it would be neigh impossible to identify the business establishment
from which the potential customer proposes to buy. However, if the sign
boards so displayed would in any manner promote a particular product or
goods or services or in other words it would attract customers to purchase a
particular brand of product or goods or services and such display provides
information about the product/ services and solicit the customers, it may
amount to advertisement while the latter would only be an information to
the public. The statutory provisions noted hereinabove does not empower
the Municipal Corporation or its agency to demand tax for display of
information through name boards or display boards. It would emerge from
the statutory provisions noted hereinabove that the legislative intent was
never to impose tax liability on sign boards but only on advertisement.
Prima facie, the sign boards are display boards displayed by the appellants’
companies in the instant appeals would indicate that they have displayed
on their respective premises the general information to the public about the
products being dealt with by them and it would not reflect any soliciting
of customers or induce the general public to buy the products dealt by the
appellants and displayed on the board. Even in such circumstances, if it is
held that it amounts to advertisement, such levy would be without authority
of law and would find foul of Article 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g) and Article 265 of
the Constitution of India.
      19. In the instant case as noticed hereinabove, on the demand being
raised both the appellants objected to the same and even before the ink
on the objections so raised could dry or in other words even before it
came to be considered they approached the High Court invoking the extra
ordinary jurisdiction of the High court which was in due haste as such
the dismissal of the petition though for a different reason which we have
not subscribed our approval, yet the end result requires to be sustained
and at the same breadth we hold that impugned notices are required to
be adjudicated by the first respondent afresh in the light of objections
filed to the said notices. Hence, we direct the first respondent to examine
the objections filed by the appellants to the impugned demand notices
   M/S HARSH AUTOMOBILES PRIVATE LIMITED v. INDORE                          43
      MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]


expeditiously and at any rate with an outer limit of (8) eight weeks from
the date of receipt of this order and in the event of issue being answered
against the appellants the demand raised there under shall not be enforced
for a further period of (8) eight weeks from the date of such order or
determination. It is needless to state that appellants would be at liberty to
challenge any adverse orders passed by the Commissioner in accordance
with law. It is also made clear that interim order passed shall continue
till the period indicated hereinabove. In the peculiar circumstances of
the case costs made easy.
      20. Accordingly, the appeals stand disposed of.


Headnotes prepared by:                                      Appeals disposed of.
Ankit Gyan


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