Supreme Court of India

M.S. GREWAL AND ANR.versusDEEP CHAND SOOD AND ORS.

Citation: 2001 INSC 395
Decided: 24 August 2001
Disposal: Disposed off
Bench: AJAY PRAKASH MISRA

Holding

The school is vicariously liable for the teachers' negligence during the picnic and the Rs.5 lakh compensation award is upheld.

Summary

Fourteen schoolchildren drowned during a picnic on the banks of the Beas River after teachers deputed to escort them allowed the children to stray into deep water. The teachers were convicted under Section 304A IPC and the High Court ordered the school to pay Rs.5 lakh compensation to each bereaved parent. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the school could be held vicariously liable for the teachers' negligence despite the incident occurring off‑campus, and whether the quantum of compensation was excessive. The Court held that the teachers were acting within the course of their employment, making the school liable as a joint tortfeasor, and that the award was not arbitrary given the school's affluent status. It also affirmed the maintainability of the writ petition and upheld the compensation award with interest, dismissing the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether a school is vicariously liable for the negligence of its teachers during a picnic held outside school premises.
Whether the compensation of Rs.5 lakh per deceased child awarded by the High Court is excessive or arbitrary.
Whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable in a claim for compensation.
Method of assessing compensation: applicability of the multiplier method versus other approaches.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304A
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939s. 110-B, s. 1-A, s. 2, s. 2nd Schedule

Subjects

vicarious liabilitynegligenceschool liabilitycompensation assessmentmultiplier methodArticle 226Section 304A IPCMotor Vehicles Act

Judgment

A M.S. GREWAL AND ANR.
V.

DEEP CHAND SOOD AND ORS.

AUGUST 24, 2001

B [A.P. MISRA AND UMESH C. BANERJEE, JJ.]

Negligence-School-Picnic organised by-Negligence of teachers-
Vicarious liability of school-Picnic on bank of river-Students allowed to
C stray. down stream and enter unchartered water-Drowning-Death offourteen
students-Writ by parents of deceased children-School held vicariously
liable-Compensation to parents of deceased children-Determination of
compensation-Principles for.

Negligence-Meaning of-Difference between negligence and
D inadvertence.

Teacher-Students under charge-Duty of care towards students.

In a picnic organised by a school on the bank of a river death of 14
students occurred due to drowning because of utter and callous neglect of
teachers on duty. In the writ petition filed by the parents of the deceased
E children the High Court found that the students fell a victim of utter neglect .
of two teachers who were deputed to escort the students for taking their due
and proper care. The children were allowed to play in the danger zone of
water without any caution or warning being sounded. They were allowed to
stray down stream and enter into unchartered waters. Consequently they
p drowned as the depth of water exceeded their average height. Both these
teachers were found guilty and convicted under section 304-A IPC. The High
Court also directed that the Chairman and Management of the School to pay
a compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs to the parents of each of the fourteen students
who died in the incident.

G In appeal to this Court it was contended for the school that (i) the school
cannot be held vicariously liable for negligence of teachers because the event
occurred outside the school premises; (ii) the award of staggering figure of
rupees five lakhs to the parents of each of the deceased student was arbitrary
and in utter disregard of the known principles of law; (iii) while fixing
compensation courts cannot proceed on emotions and sentiments only and
H 156
M.S. GREWAL v. D.C. SOOD 157
that determination of compensation must also have a co-relation with ability A
or capability to pay.

Disposing the appeal, the Court

HELD : I. Negligence is an independent tort and has its own strict
elements specially in the matter of children. The liability is absolute vis-a-vis B
the children. While the parent owes his child, a duty of care in relation to the
child's physical security, a teacher in a school is expected to show such care
towards a child under his charge as would be exercised by a reasonably careful
parent. Duty of care varies from situation to situation-whereas it would be
the duty of the teacher to supervise the children in the playground but the C
supervision, as the children leave the school, may not be required in the san1e
degree as is in the play-field. While it is true that if the students are taken to
another school building for participation in certain games, it is sufficient
exercise of diligence to know that the premises are otherwise safe and secure
but undoubtedly if the students are taken out to playground near a river for
fun and swim, the degree of care required stands at a much higher degree D
and no deviation therefrom can be had on any count whatsoever. Mere
satisfaction that the river. is otherwise safe for swim by reason of popular
sayings will not be a sufficient compliance. As a matter of fact the degree of
care required to be taken specially against the minor children stands at a much
higher level than adults; children need much sticter care. [167-F, D-E[
E
Ricketts v. Erith Borough Council and Anr., (1943) 2 All ER 629 and Prince
and Anr. v. Gregory and Anr., (1959) 1 WLR 177, referred to.

2. To escort the children was the duty assigned to the two teachers and
till such time this period of escorting stands over, one cannot but ascribe it to
be in the course of employment. The two teachers were assigned to escort the F
students : the reason obviously being-the children should otherwise be safe
and secure and it is the act of utter negligence of the two teachers which has
resulted in this unfortunate tragedy and thus it is no gainsaid that the teachers
were on their own fralic and the school had done all that was possible to be
done in the matter-safety of the children obviously was of prime concern so G
far as the school authorities are concerned and till such time the children
return to school, safe and secure after the picnic, the course of employment
continued and thus resultantly, the liability of the school. [170-F-G]

3. Even a simple rule of discipline and safety would have prompted the
teachers not only not to go to the river where they went but also nowhere H
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A near the river ought to have been the guiding factor. Children are children-
fun and frolic stand ingrained in them. However, teachers deputed for
escorting them ought to have been reasonably careful since they were
entrusted with the safety of students. This entrustment ought to have infused
a sense of duty which should have prompted them to act not in the manner
B as they have so acted. Liability of the school in the contextual facts cannot be
shifted for any reason whatsoever by reason of the factum of teachers being
within the course of employment of the school at the time of the tragedy.
(171-C-D(

Kooragang Investments Pvt. Ltd v. Richardson & Wrench Ltd, (1982) A.C.
C 462 and Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, (1867) L.R. 2 Ex. 259, referred
to.

Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort 15th Ed., referred to.

4. Negligence in common parlance mean and imply failure to exercise
D due care, expected of a reasonable prudent person. It is a breach of duty and
negligence in law ranging from inadvertence to shameful disregard of safety
of others. In most instances it is caused by headlessness or inadvertence, by
which the negligent party is unaware of the results which may follow from
his act. Though sometimes, the word 'inadvertence' stands and used as a
synonym to negligence, but in effect negligence represents a state of the mind
E which however is much serious in nature than mere inadvertence. There is
thus existing a differentiation between the two expressions-whereas
inadvertence is a milder form of negligence, negligence by itself mean and
imply a state of mind where there is no regard for duty or the supposed care
and attention which one ought to bestow. (166-E-F)

F Black's Law Dictionary and Clerk & Lindse// on Torts 18th F:d., referred to.

5. The award of compensation at Rs. 5 lakhs cannot be attributed to
be the resultant effect of either emotion or sentiments or the High Court's
anguish over the incident. The High Court obviously considered the overall
G situation as regards social placements of the students. The school presently is
one of the affluent schools in the country and fee structure and other
incidentals are so high that it would be a well nigh impossibility to think of
admission in the school at even the upper middle class level. Thus in the factual
situation award of compensation at Rs. 5 lakhs cannot by any stretch be
termed to be excessive. The school as of date stands out to be one of the most
H affluent schools in the country; as such ability to pay cannot be termed to be
M.S. GREWAL v.D.C. SOOD 159
an issue in the matter and on the wake thereto court is not inclined to deal A
with the same in any further detail. 1178-A-B, El

6. In assessing damages, all relevant materials should and ought always
be placed before the court so as to enable the court to come to a conclusion
in the matter of affectation of pecuniary benefit by reason of the unfortunate
death. Though mathematical nicety is not required but a rough and ready B
estimate can be had from the records claiming damages since award of
damages cannot be had without any material evidence; whereas one party is
to be compensated, the other party is to compensate and as such there must
always be some material available therefor. It is not a fanciful item of
compensation but it is on legitimate expectation of loss of pecuniary benefits. C
1165-E-Fl

7. While judicial precedents undoubtedly have some relevance as
regards the principles of law, but the quantum of assessment stands dependent
on the fact-situation of the matter before the court, than judicial precedents.
As regards the quantum no decision as such can be taken to be of binding D
precedent as such, since each case has to be dealt with on its own peculiar
• facts and thus compensation is also to be assessed on the basis thereof though
however the same can act as a guide; placement in the society, financial status
differ from person to person and as such assessment would also differ. The
whole issue is to be judged on the basis of the fact-situation of the matter
concerned though however, not on mathematical nicety. 1166-A-B) E
C.K. Subramania Iyer and Ors. v. T Kunhikuttan Nair and Six Ors., 119691
3 SCC 64; Lata Wadhwa and Ors. v. State ofBiharand Ors. Civil Writ Petition
No. 232of1991 decided by Supreme Court on 16.8.2001; General Manager
Kera/a State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma Thomas and p
Ors., 11994] 2 SCC 176 and Gobald Motor Service Ltd v. R.MK. Veluswami
AIR (1962) SC l, referred to.

Franklin v. The South East Railway Company, 157 English Reports, 3 H
& Np. 448; Taft Vale Railway Comany v. Jenkins (1913) AC l; Grand Trunk
Railway Company of Canada v. Jennigs, (13 Appeal Cases 800); Hedge v. G
Har/andk. Wolff Limited, (1965) l All ER 1986 and Davies v. Powell Duffryn
Associated Collieries Ltd, (1942) AC 617, referred to.

8. The law courts exist for the society and they have an obligation to
meet the social aspirations of citizens since law courts must also respond to
the needs of the people. Currently judicial attitude has taken a shift from the H
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A old draconian concept and the traditional juriprudential system-affectation
of the people has been taken note of rather seriously and the judicial concern
thus stands on a footing to provide expeditious relief to an individual when
needed rather than taking recourse to the old conservative doctrine of civil
courts' obligation to award damages. Law court will lose its efficacy ifit cannot
B possibly respond to the need of the society-Technicalities there might be
many but the justice oriented approach ought not to be thwarted on the basis
of such technicality since technicality cannot and ought not to outweigh the
course of justice. [172-F-G]

Nilabati Behera (Smt.) alias Lalita Behera (through the Supreme Court Legal
C Aid Committee), v. State of Orissa and Ors., [1993] 2 SCC 746; Ruda/ Sah v.
State of Biharand Anr., [1993[ 4SCC141 and D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal,
[1997[ 1 sec 416, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 9738 of
1996.
D
From the Judgment and Order dated 4.3.96 of the Himachal Pradesh
High Court in C.W.P. No. I 049 of 1995. -
I

Vijay Bahuguna, S. Bagga and Seeraj Bagga for Ms. S. Bagga for the
Appellants.
E P.P. Malhotra, Anish Kumar Gupta and Shrish Kumar Misra for the
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BANERJEE, J. A very sad tale concerning fourteen young kids resulting
F in untimely and unfortunate death of all of them stands out to be the subject
matter of the Appeal under consideration: Sad tale by reason of the fact that
a sheer fun of young ones turned out to be fatal as a consequence of utter and
callous neglect of teachers on duty.

Adverting to the factual aspects, it appears that on 28.5.1995, 59 boys
G and 18 girls (totaling 77) students, all in 4th, 5th and 6th classes of Dalhousie
Public School, Badhani, Pathankot were brought for a picnic at
Tandapatanindora on the bank of river Beas. The Head Master of the School
deputed one Shri Surinder Pal Singh and another Shri K. Shanmugham being
teachers in the School for escorting and taking due and proper care of the
H students. Incidentally, the site chosen for the picnic was the same on which
M.S. GREWAL v.D.C. SOOD [BANERJEE, J.) 161
the earlier picnic of the School was held on 7th May, 1995. A
On the contextual facts, it appears that the School concerned has in its
activities, a usual picnic for all the students in batches. Some of the students
had already been into the picnic and these 77 were chosen for the batch
which was scheduled for 28th May, 1995. It has been the version of the
School authorities that in a true educational institution, extra curricular B
activities play a dominant role in imparting proper education to the students
and outings/picnics thus have been a regular feature in the school: whereas
in the event of there being a plan for overnight stay, the School management
without parental consent would not permit the concerned student for
participation therein though however, the same is not a requirement in a day C
time outing or picnic.

The factual score further reveals that the management of the School
organised the picnic on 7th May, 1995 for the students as noticed above and
selected the same site on the bank of river Beas which flows from North to
South direction having a width of approximately 200 ft. On the fateful day, D
however (28th May, 1995) the students were accompanied by five teachers,
two mess boys, one supplier and the driver of the bus along with two European
ladies (GAP students) in the picnic party. The records depict that in the post
lunch period, fourteen students alongwith two teachers Shanmugam and S.P.
Singh went down the river for a considerable distance with about 14 students E
and the teachers however discovered a sudden · dibber' of about 6 -8 ft. deep
by reason wherefor the teachers themselves along with the students fell into
a great danger - whereas teachers could save themselves up - the students fell
a victim of utter neglect of the teachers - The children were allowed to play
in the danger zone of the water without any caution or any warning being
sounded, the resultant effect of which drowning of these unfortunate fourteen F
children - a rather unfortunate sad end and finale to the so-called extra
curricular activities of the School.

On the further factual score, it appears that the Government of Himachal
Pradesh, ordered a judicial inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act
1952 by the District and Sessions Judge, Kangra and the State of Punjab also G
ordered an inquiry by the sub-divisional Magistrate, Pathankot but nothing
was forthcoming by reason wherefor the private respondents on 14th July,
1995, being the parents of the unfortunate children moved a writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court against the Petitioner
Nos. I and 2 and respondent Nos.14-16 seeking a relief by way of an inquiry H
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A by C.B.I to find out the causes for the tragedy and fixation of responsibility
therefor and punishment to the guilty ones together however, with a prayer
for adequate compensation from the School authorities and on 2nd August,
1995, the High Court ordered an Inquiry to be conducted by the Central
Bureau of Investigation and the latter upon examination of various witnesses
B recording the unfortunate incident of drowning of children concluded in
paragraph 41 of the report as below:

"41. The concluded investigations have established that the death of ..
14 students by drowning was caused by the rash and negligent acts
of firstly allowing the students to stray down stream by about 1100
C ft. and enter into unchartered waters and secondly, due to direct
instigation by Shri Surinder Pal Singh whereby the students in their
efforts to catch him and thereafter to race to the bushes on the western
river bank down stream, entered into the water of' Dibber' and were
drowned as the depth of the water exceeded their average height. The
investigation has thus prima facie established the commission of
D offence u/s 304A of the Indian Penal Code by S/Shri S.P. Singh,
Director Physical Education, Dalhousie Public School and Shri K.
Shanmugam, teacher, Dalhousie Public School, Badhani."

The Writ Petition, however, came up for final disposal before the High
E Court on 4th March, 1996 wherein the writ petition was allowed and it was
ordered that the Chairman and the Management of the School shall pay a
compensation of Rs.5 lakh to each of the parents of fourteen students who
died in the incident and a sum of Rs. 30,000 to each of the parents of students
who suffered due to drowning incident within two months with interest at the
rate of 12% per annum from 28th May, 1995 by depositing the same in the
F registry of the High Court and hence the Special Leave Petition before this
Court and the subsequent grant of leave with an order to deposit a sum of
Rs. 7 lakhs towards discharge of the liability of the petitioner, if ultimately
upheld by the Court to be disbursed in accordance with the orders of the
court. Incidentally, the order requiring the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs.7
G lakhs stands complied with.

It is on this factual backdrop Mr. Bahuguna, learned Senior Advocate
in support of the Appeal in no uncertain terms stated before the Court that
the event that has happened, should not have happened. Strong reliance was
placed on the report of the C.B.I. wherein there has been total exoneration
H of any liability so far as the management of the School are concerned though
M.S. GREWAL v.D.C. SOOD [BANERJEE, J.] 163
responsibility has been fixed on to School teachers personally. Mr. Bahuguna A
with his usual eloquence expressed his deepest sorrow for the incident and
on the very first day of the hearing submitted that irrespective of any instruction
in the matter, a sum of Rs. 2 lakhs can be termed to be a reasonable figure
and his clients should be prepared to pay the same - a good gesture
undoubtedly, but since the same does not receive concurrence from Mr. B
Malhotra, the learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the Respondents herein,
we refrain ourselves from expressing any opinion thereon. Be that as it may,
Mr. Bahuguna contended the quantum had been fixed by the High Court at
a strangely staggering figure Rs. 5 lakhs without however any basis whatsoever
- Acknowledging, however, the fact that no amount of compensation can
possibly redress the grievances of the parents in the contextual facts, it has C
been contended that the law courts also cannot possibly proceed on emotions
and sentiments only: the order pertaining to payment of compensation must
have its foundation on some finding of fact in the absence of which the order
becomes totally untenable. A number of decisions have been cited to depict
that the quantum must be realistically realistic having its proper basis rather
than assessment thereof on sentiment and anguish. Mr. Bahuguna submitted D
that the anguish of the Judges of the High Court obviously is understandable
but that does not however mean and imply, award of compensation to a
staggering amount of Rs.5 lakhs per student by reason wherefor the School
stands foisted with the liability of more than one crore. Mr. Bahuguna
contended that assessment of compensation must also have a co-relation with E
the ability or capability to pay. Ability to pay, it was contended, is a necessary
criteria in regard to the fixation of quantum of compensation in the event of
there being an unfortunate event and it is on this score that paragraph 41 of
the Report has been taken recourse to - The teachers have been ascribed to
be negligent and not a whisper about the conduct of the school and as such
conferment of liability on to the school in any event is totally an injudicious F
discretion of the High Court. True, and as noticed hereinbefore the conclusion
of CBI, fixed the entire responsibility upon the two teachers and criminal
proceedings stand initiated by reason therefor and the accused persons as a
matter of fact also stand convicted under Section 304-A I.P.C. =but what is
the affect of such a finding: Needless to record that the CBI's investigation G
was not in regard to the assessment of the quantum of tort feasor's or joint
tort-feasors' liability and as such the report by itself would not be of any
assistance to the school authorities in the matter of fixation of monetary
liability by reason therefor.

Incidentally, this Court in C.K. Subramania Iyer and Ors. v. T H
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001) SUPP. 2-S.C.R.

A Kunhikuttan Nair and Six Ors., [1969] 3 SCC 64 while dealing with the
matter of fatal accidents laid down certain relevant guidelines for the purpose
of assessment of compensation. Paragraph 13 of the report would be relevant
on this score and the same is set out hereinbelow:

"13. The law on the point arising for decision may be summed up
B thus: Compulsory damages under Section 1-A of the Act for wrongful
death must be limited strictly to the pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries
and that under Section 2, the measure of damages is the economic
loss sustained by the estate. There can be no exact uniform rule for
measuring the value of the human life and the measure of damages
cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations but the
c amount recoverable depends pn the particular facts and circumstances
of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiaries
whichever is shorter is an important factor. Since the elements which
go to make up the value of the life of the deceased to the designated
beneficiaries are necessarily personal to each case, in the very nature
D of things, there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the
value of human life. In assessing damages, the Court must exclude all
considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy though
conjecture to some extent is inevitable. As a general rule parents are
entitled to recover the present cash val~e of the prospective service
of the deceased minor child. In addition they may receive compensation
E for loss of pecuniary benefits reasonably to be expected after the
child attains majority. In the matter of ascertainment of damages, the
Appellate Court should be slow in disturbing the findings reached by
the courts below, if they have taken all the relevant facts into
consideration." (Emphasis supplied)
p.
The observations as above, undoubtedly lays down the basic guidance
for assessment of damage but one redeeming feature ought to be noted that
compensation or damages cannot be awarded as a solatium but to assess the
same with reference to loss of pecuniary benefits. In the decision last noted
((1969) 3 SCC 64] this Court placed strong reliance on two old decisions of
G the English Courts to wit: Franklin v. The South East Railway Company (157
English Reports 3 H & N, p.448) wherein Pollock, C.B. stated :

"We do not say that it was necessary that actual benefit should have
been derived, a reasonable expectation is enough and such reasonable
expectation might well exist, though from the father, not being in
H need, the son had never done anything for him. On the other hand a
M.S. GREWAL v.D.C. SOOD [BANERJEE, J.] 165
jury certainly ought not to make a guess in the matter, but ought to A
be satisfied that there has been a loss of sensible and appreciable
pecuniary benefit, which might have been reasonably expected from
the continuance of life."

The other decision relates to the case of Taff Vale Railway Company v.
Jenkins, (1913) AC I wherein Atkinson, J. stated the law as below: B
"l think it has been well established by authority that all that is
necessary is th<1t a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit should
be entertained by the person who sues. It is quite true that the existence
of this expectation is an inference of fact - there must be a basis of
fact from which the inference can reasonably be drawn; but I wish to C
express my emphatic dissent from the proposition that it is necessary
that two of the facts without which the inference cannot be drawn
are, first, that the deceased earned money in the past, and second, that
he or she contributed to the support of the plaintiff. These are, no
doubt, pregnant pieces of evidence, but they are only pieces of D
evidence; and the necessary inference can I think be drawn from
circumstances other than and different from them."

Be it placed on record that in assessing damages, all relevant materials
should and ought always be placed before the court so as to enable the Court
to come to a ~onclusion in the matter of affectation of pecuniary benefit by E
reason of the unfortunate death. Though mathematical nicety is not required
but a rough and ready estimate can be had from the records claiming damages
since award of damages cannot. be had without any material evidence: whereas
one party is to be compensated, the othe'r party is to compensate and as such
there must always be some materials available therefor. It is not a fanciful
item of compensation but it is on legitimate expectation of loss of pecuniary F
benefits. In Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada v. Jennings, (13
Appeal Cases 800) this well accepted principle stands reiterated as below:

"Jn assessing the damages, all circumstances which may be legitimately
pleaded in d.imihution of the damages must be considered. It is not G
a mere guess work neither it is the resultant effect of a compassionate
attitude." · ·

As noticed above, a large number of decisions were placed before this
Court as regards the quantum of compensation ·varying between 50,000 to
one lakh in regard to unfortunate deaths of young.. children. We do deem it H
166 SUPREME COURT REPllRTS 121101] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A fit to record that while judicial precedents undoubtedly have some relevance
as regards the principles of law, but the quantum of assessment stands
dependent on the fact-situation of the matter before the court, than judicial
precedents. As regards the quantum no decision as such can be taken to be
of binding precedent as such, since each case has to be dealt with on its own
B peculiar facts and thus compensation is also to be assessed on the basis
thereof though however the same can act as a guide: Placement in the society,
financial status differ from person to person and as such assessment would
also differ. The whole issue is to be judged on the basis of the fact-situaticn
of the matter concerned though however, not on mathematical nicety.

C On the issue of negligence, the CBI report and subsequent decision the
Criminal Court have foisted liability on to the teachers accompanying the
students - But what is the effect of such a finding? Significantly, the school
authority though claimed to be not liable in any way, in no uncertain terms
however blamed the teachers and their utter negligence, resulting in such a
tragedy.
D
Negligence in common parlance mean and imply 'failure to exercise
due care, expected of a reasonable prudent person'. It is a breach of duty and
negligence in law ranging from inadvertence to shameful disregard of safety
of others. In most instances, it is caused by heedlessness or inadvertence, by
which the negligent party is unaware of the results which may follow from
E hi, act. Negligence 1s thus a breach of duty or lack of proper care in doing
something, in short, it is want of attention and doing of something which a
prudent and a reasonable man would not do (vide Black's Law Dictionary).
Though sometimes, the word ·inadvertence' stands and used as a synonym to
negligence, but in effect negligence represents a state of the mind which
p however is much serious in nature than mere inadvertence. There is thus
existing a differentiation between the two expressions - whereas inadvertence
is a milder form of negligence, 'negligence' by itself mean and imply a state
of mind where there is no regard for duty or the supposed care and attention
which one ought to bestow. Clerk & lindse/l on Torts (18th Ed.) sets out four
several requirements of the tort of negligence and the same read as below:
G
(I) the existence in law of a duty of care situation, i.e. one in which
the Jaw attaches liability to carelessness. There has to be
recognition by law that the careless infliction of the kind of damage
in suit on the class of person to which the claimant belongs by the
class of person to which the defendant belongs is actionable;
H
M.S. GREW AL v. D.C. SOOD [BANERJEE, J.] 167
(2) breach of the duty of care by the defendant, i.e. that it failed to A
measure up to the standard set by law;
(3) a causal connection between the defendant's careless conduct and
the damage;
(4) that the particular kind of damage to the particular claimant is not
so unforeseeable as to be too remote." B

While the parent owes his child, a duty of care in relation to the child's
physical security, a teacher in a School is expected to show such care towards
a child under his charge as would be exercised by a reasonably careful
parent. In this context, reference may be made to a decision of Tucker, J. in C
Ricketts v. Erith Borough Council and Anr., (1943) 2 All ER 629 as also the
decision of the Court of Appeal in Prince and Anr. v. Gregory and Anr.,
(1959) I WLRl77.

Duty of care varies from situation to situation - whereas it would be the
duty of the teacher to supervise the children in the playground but the D
supervision, as the children leave the school, may not be required in the same
degree as is in the play-field. While it is true that if the students are taken to
another school building for participation in ·certain games, it is sufficient
exercise of diligence to know that the premises are otherwise safe and secure
but undoubtedly if :he students are taken out to playground near a river for
fun and swim, the degree of care required stands at a much higher degree and E
no deviation therefrom can be had on any count whatsoever. Mere satisfaction
that the river is otherwise safe for swim by reason of popular sayings will not
be a sufficient compliance. As a matter of fact the degree of care required to
be taken specially against the minor children stands at a much higher level
than adults: Children need much stricter care.
F
Incidentally, negligence is an independent tort and has its own strict
elements specially in the matter of children - the liability is thus absolute vis-
a-vis the children. The school authorities in the contextual facts attributed
negligence to the two teachers who stand convicted under Section 304A of
the Indian Penal Code as noticed above and Mr. Bahuguna appearing in G
support of the appeal during the course of hearing, however, also in no
uncertain terms attributed utter negligence on the part of the teachers and
thus conceded on the issue of negligence. Concession, if any, as noticed
above, though undoubtedly a good gesture on the part of the school authority,
but can the school absolve its responsibility and corresponding culpability in
regard to the incident: Would they be termed to be a joint tort feasors or H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A would it be a defence that the school has taken all due care having regard to
its duty and it is irrespective thereof by reason of utter neglect and callous
conduct on the part of the two of the teachers escorting them that has caused
the injury - Mr. Bahuguna contended that the school cannot be made liable
under any stretch of imagination by reason of the happening of an event
B which is not within the school premises and has, in fact, happened by reason
of the neglect of two of the teachers. It is on this score that Mr. Malhotra
rather emphatically contended that the liability cannot simply be obliterated
by reason of plea of utter neglect on the part of the two of the teachers:
School concerned can be said to be liable even as a joint tort-feasor and in
any event, Mr.' Malhotra contended that applicability of the doctrine of
C vicarious liability cannot be doubted or be brushed aside, in any way
whatsoever and since the issue of vicarious liability has been more emphatic
and pronounced than the issue of joint tort-feasor, we deem it expedient to
deal with the second of twin issues first as noticed above.

Be it noted that the doctrine of 'vicarious liability' has had a fair amount
D of judicial attention in the English Courts. By the end of 18th century, the
idea began to grow up that some special importance ought to be attached to
the relationship of master and servant and in 1849 it was officially held that
existence of that relationship was essential. Thereafter, though primary liability
on the part of anyone could be established on proof of direct participation in
E the tort, such direct participation was not even theoretically required to make
a master liable for his servant's torts. The liability is derived from the
relationship and is truly vicarious, At the same time, the phrase 'implied
authority' which had been the cornerstone of the master's primary liability
gives way gradually to the modern "course of employment", (vide Winfield
& Jolowicz on Tort 15th Ed.).
F
In recent years, the tendency has been however, towards more liberal
protection of third party and so in establishing a particular 'course of
employment' the court should not dissect the employees basic task into
component parts but should ask in a general sense: What was the job at
which he was engaged for his employer? And it is on this perspective Lord
G Wilberforce in Kooragang Investments Pty. Ltd v, Richardson & Wrench
Ltd (1982) A.C. 462) stated:

"Negligence is a method of performing an act: instead of it being
done carefully, it is done negligently. So liability for negligent acts
in the course of employment is clear. Cases of fraud present at first
H
M.S. GREWAL v.D.C. SOOD [BANERJEE, J.] 169
sight more difficulty: for if fraudulent acts are not directly forbidden, A
most relationships would carry an implied prohibition against them.
If committed for the benefit of the employer and while doing his
business, principle and logic demand that the employer should be
held liable, and for some time the law rested at this point. The classic
judgment of Willes J. in Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, ( 1867) B
L.R. 2 Ex.259, 266 stated the principle thus:

"Jn all these cases it may be said ... that the master has not authorised
the act. It is true, he has not authorised the particular act but he has
put the agent in his place to do that class of acts and he must be
answerable for the manner in which the agent has conducted himself C
in doing the business which it was the act of his master to place him
in."

That was a case where the wrong was conimitted for the master's (viz.,
the bank's) benefit, and Willes J. stated this as an ingredient of liability at
p.265: D
".... the master is answerable for every such wrong of the servant or
agent as is committed in the course of the service and for the master's
benefit, though no express command or privily of the master be
proved."

But a sharp distinction has been made as regards the group of cases
E
which is concerned with the use of motor vehicles. These are the cases Lord
Wilberforce observed:

"(i) where a servant has, without authority, permitted another person
to drive the master's vehicle; (ii) where a servant has, without authority, F
invited another person on to the vehicle, who suffers injury; (iii)
where a servant has embarked on an unauthorised detour, or, as lawyers
like to call it, a "frolic of his own." These cases have given rise to
a number of fine distinctions, the courts in some cases struggling to
find liability, in others to avoid it, which it is not profitable here to
examine. It remains true to say that, whatever exceptions or G
qualifications may be introduced, the underlying principle remains
that a servant, even while performing acts of the class which he was
authorised, or employed, to do, may so clearly depart from the scope
of his employment that his master will not be liable for his wrongful
acts."
H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A The English law, therefore, takes a softer attitude in cases where motor
vehicles are involved in the matter of foisting of liability so far as the employer
is concerned - the reason obviously being if the concerned employee acts in
a manner contrary to the course of employment and on a "frolic of his own''
- why should the employer be made responsible: It seems logical - but
B obviously there are cases and cases on the basis wherefor the liability of the
employer ought to be fixed. The Privy Council in Kooragang Ltd. attributed
"frolic of his own" to be the exonerating factor but this frolic has also to be
considered from facts to facts in the matter of foisting of liability on to the
employer. In any event, we need not devote much of our time to the excepted
cases, since we have in this country several legislations covering the "excepted
C categories''. The recognition of broader approach however, stands undisputed
and has also our concurrence herewith.

Significantly, however, Mr. Malhotra with all the emphasis at his
command and rather strongly commented upon the submissions of Mr.
Bahuguna on the issue of award of compensation by reason of specific
D legislations in the country - in particular reference to Motor Vehicles Act and
on a conjoint reading of the 2nd Schedule thereto, Mr. Malhotra contended
that the quantum would be far in excess of the amount awarded by the High
Court - submissions seem to be rather attractive: Motor Vehicles Act and the
2nd Schedule thereto cannot but be treated to be a guide in the matter of ''
E award of compensation and there cannot possibly be any doubt in regard
thereto. We shall however be dealing with the issue slightly later in this
judgment.

Turning attention however on to the issue of vicarious liability, one
redeeming feature ought to be noticed at this juncture that to escort the
F children was the duty assigned to the two teachers and till such time thus the
period of escorting stands over, one cannot but ascribe it to be in the course
of employment - the two teachers were assigned to escort the students : the
reason obviously being - the children should otherwise be safe and secure
and it is the act of utter negligence of the two teachers which has resulted in ...
this unfortunate tragedy and thus it is no gain-said that the teachers were on
G their own frolic and the school had done all that was possible to be done in
the matter - safety of the children obviously were of prime concern so far as
the school authorities are concerned and till such time the children return to
school, safe and secure after the picnic, the course of employment, in our
view continues and thus resultantly, the liability of the school. A profitable
H re-capitulation of facts depict that the criminal court has already found both
M.S. GREWAL v.D.C. SOOD [BANERJEE, J.] 171
the teachers guilty of utter negligence and convicted them under Section 304 A
A IPC (which provides that whoever causes the death of any person by doing
any rash or negligence act not amounting to culpable homicide shall be
punished with .... ) We are not inclined to record anything contra, save what
stands recorded by the District Court in the criminal proceeding but we are
constrained to record our anguish over the conduct of the teachers escorting B
the students - even a simple rule of discipline and safety would have prompted
the teachers not only to go to the river where they went but no where near
the river ought to have been the guiding factor - children are children: fun
and frolic stand ingrained in them and it is School/Teachers deputed for
escorting ought to be reasonably careful since entrusted with the safety - this
entrustment ought to have infused a sense of duty which shou\d have prompted C
them to act not in the manner as they have so acted.

In view of the above, we are unable to record our concurrence with the
submissions of Mr. Bahuguna that the doctrine of' vicarious liability' cannot
in any event be made applicable in the facts of the matter under consideration.
Liability of the school, in our view, in the contextual facts cannot be shifted D
for any reason whatsoever by reason of the factum of teachers being within
the course of employment of the school at the time of the tragedy.

Next is the issue 'maintainability of the writ petition' before the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The appellant though initially
very strongly contended that while the negligence aspect has been dealt with E
under penal law already, the claim for compensation cannot but be left to be
adjudicated by the Civil law and thus the Civil court's jurisdiction ought to
have been invoked rather than by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution. This plea of non-maintainability of the writ petition though
advanced at the initial stage of the submissions but subsequently the same F
was not pressed and as such we need not detain ourselves on that score,
excepting however recording that the law courts exist for the society and they
have an obligation to meet the social aspirations of citizens since law courts
must also respond to the needs of the people. In this context reference may
be made to two decisions of this court: The first in line is the decision in
Nilabati Behera (Smt) alias Lalita Behera (Through the Supreme Court Legal G
Aid Committee) v. State of Orissa and Ors., [1993] 2 SCC 746 wherein this
Court relying upon the decision in Ruda! Sah v. State of Bihar and Anr.,
[1983] 4 sec 141 decried the illegality and impropriety in awarding
compensation in a proceeding in which court's power under Articles 32 and
226 of the Constitution stand invoked and thus observed that it was a clear H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A case for award of compensation to the petitioner for custodial death of her
son. It is undoubtedly true however that in the present context, there is no
infringement of State's obligation unless of course the State can also be
termed to be a joint tort-feasor, but since the case of the parties stand restricted
and without imparting any liability on the State, we do not deem it expedient
B to deal with the issue any further except noting the two decisions of this
Court as above and without expression of any opinion in regard thereto.

The decision of this Court in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, [1997]
SCC 416 comes next. This decision has opened up a new vesta in the
jurisprudence of the country. The old doctrine of only relegating aggrieved
C to the remedies available in civit law limits stands extended since Anand, J.
(as His Lordship then was) in no uncertain terms observed:

"The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the
citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected
to respond to their aspirations. A court of law cannot close its
D consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere punishment of
the offender cannot give much solace to the family of the victim -
civil action for damages is a long drawn and a cumbersome judicial
process. Monetary compensation for redressal by the court finding
the infringement of the indefeasible right to life of the citizen is,
therefore, useful and at time perhaps the only effective remedy to
E apply balm to the wounds of the family members of the deceased
victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the family."

Currently judicial attitude has taken a shift from the old draconian
concept and the traditional jurisprudential system - affectation of the people
has been taken note of rather seriously and the judicial concern thus stands
F on a footing to provide expeditious relief to an individual when needed rather
than taking recourse to the old conservative doctrine of civil courts obligation
to award damages. As a matter of fact the decision in D.K Basu has not only
dealt with the issue in a manner apposite to the social need of the country but
the learned Judge with his usual felicity of expression firmly established the
G current trend of 'justice oriented approach'. Law courts will lose its efficacy
if it cannot possibly respond to the need of the society - technicalities there
might be many but the justice oriented approach ought not to be thwarted on
the basis of such technicality since technicality cannot and ought not to
outweigh the course of justice.

H The only other issue, thus left outstanding in the matter under
M.S. GREW AL v. D.C. SOOD [BANERJEE, J.] 173
consideration pertains to the quantum of compensation. It is at this juncture A
that we record our appreciation for the gesture of Mr. Bahuguna who at the
very commencement of the hearing submitted that while the figure of Rs. 5
lacs compensation per child seem to be strangely absurd but he recommended
a figure of Rs. 2 lacs per child as monetary compensation for the events that
had taken place; compensation there cannot be any, far less monetary B
compensation, for the unfortunate death of one's own child - it cannot be
termed to be a solatium. Unfortunately the situation in the facts of the matter
does not warrant us to accept the same as a result of which we wish to deal
with the matter in slightly more greater detail.

Mr. Bahuguna for the appellant with however strong vehemence C
contended that the High Court has totally misread and misapplied the principles
of law in the matter of awarding compensation and in any event the quantum
thereto has been fixed at an absurdly higher figure. The anguish of the High
Court, Mr. Bahuguna contended, is understandable by reason of the factual
import in the matter but that does not however mean and imply that a court
of law would be guided by emotions and allow the sentiments to play a D
pivotal role in the matter of assessment of damages. It has been the contention
of Mr. Bahuguna that there is not an iota of evidence as to the pecuniary loss
for pecuniary benefit and as such the assessment of quantum has been totally
arbitrary and in utter disregard of the known principles of law.

As noticed herein before six several judgments have been cited wherein E
the quantum of compensation varies between Rs. 30,000 to Rs. 1,50,000 but
in every decision there was a factual basis for such an assessment and there
is no denial of the same. But the adaptability of the multiply method and its
acceptability without any exception cannot just be given a go by. This Court
in a long catena of cases and without mixing word did apply the multiply F
method to decide the question of compensation in the cases arising out of
Motor Vehicles Act. It is in this context the view of British Law .Commission
may be noticed and which indicates " the multiplier has been, remains and
should continue to remain, the ordinary, the best and the only method of
assessing the value ofa number of future annual sums". The actuarial method
of calculation strictly speaking may not have lost its relevance but its G
applicability cannot but be said to be extremely restricted - said the British
Commission. Lord Denning's observations in Hodges v. Harland & Wolff
Limited, (1965) l ALL ER 1986 also seem to be rather apposite. Lord Denning
observed that multiplier method cannot but be termed to be of universal
application and as such it would meet the concept of justice in the event the H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A same method is applied for determining the quantum of compensation.
Incidentally in a very recent decision of this Court (Civil Writ Petition No.
232 of 1991 in the matter of Lata Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and
Ors., [of which one of us (U.C. Banerjee, J.) was a party] wherein a three-
Judge Bench of this Court has had the occasion to consider an award of a
former Chief Justice pertaining to the assessment of compensation by reason
B of a huge accidental fire. Significantly a writ petition was filed in this Court
and this Court thought it expedient to have the claims examined by a former
Chief Justice of the country and the iatter duly and upon adaptation of
multiplier method finalised the quantum of compensation which more or less
barring some exceptions stands accepted by this Court in the decision noticed
C above. In Lata Wadhwa's decision factual score records that while l 50th
Birth Anniversary of Sir Jamshedji Tata, was being celebrated on 3rd March,
1989 within the factory premises at Jamshedpur and a large number of
employees, their families including small children had been invited, a
devastating fire suddenly engulfed the Panda! and the area surrounding and
by the time the fire was extinguished, a number of persons lay dead and
D many were suffering with burn injuries. The death toll reached 60 and the
total number of persons injured were 113. The factual score in Lata Wadhwa's
case further depicts that amongst the persons dead, there were 26 children,
25 women and 9 men and Srimati Lata Wadhwa the petitioner in the matter
lost her two children, a boy and a girl as also her parents. It is on this score
E that the learned arbitrator fixed in the absence of any material a uniform
amount of Rs. 50,000/- to which again a conventional figure of Rs. 25,000
has been added for determining the total amount of compensation payable.
While dealing with the matter this Court (Pattanaik, J. speaking for the Bench)
observed:

F "So far as the determination of compensation in death cases are
concerned, apart from the three decisions of Andhra Pradesh High
Cour;t, which had been mentioned in the order of this Court dated
15th December, 1993, this Court in the case of General Manager,
Kera/a State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma
Thomas and Ors., [1994] 2 SCC 176, exhaustively dealt with the
G question. It has been held in the aforesaid case that for assessment of
damages to compensate the dependants, it has to take into account
many imponderables, as to the life expectancy of the deceased and
the dependants, the amount that the deceased would have earned
during the remainder of his life, the amount that he would have
H contributed to the dependants during that period, the chances that the
M.S. GREWAL v.D.C. SOOD [BANERJEE, J.] 175
deceased may not have lived or the dependants may not live up to the A
estimated remaining period of their life expectancy, the chances that
the deceased might have got better employment or income or might
have Jost his employment or income altogether. The Court further
observed that the manner of arriving at the damages is to ascertain
the net income of the deceased available for the support of himself B
and his dependants, and to deduct therefrom such part of his income
as the deceased was accustomed to spend upon himself, as regards
both self-maintenance and pleasure, and to ascertain what part of his
net income the deceased was accustomed to spend for the benefit of
the dependants, and thereafter it should be capitalised by multiplying
it by a figure representing the proper number of year's purchase. It C
was also stated that much of the calculation necessarily remains in

-
the realm of hypothesis and in that region arithmetic is a good servant
but a bad master, since there are so often many imponderables. In
every case, "it is the overall picture that matters", and the Court must
try to assess as best as it can, the Joss suffered. On the acceptability
of the multiplier method, the Court observed: D
"The multiplier method is logically sound and legally well-
established method of ensuring a 'just' compensation which will make
for uniformity and certainty of the awards. A departure from this
method can only be justified in rare and extraordinary circumstances E
and very exceptional cases."

In the decision of Susamma Thomas (supra), this Court in paragraphs
7 & 8 of the report observed:

7. In a fatal accident action, the accepted measure of damages awarded
to the dependants is the pecuniary Joss suffered by them as a result F
of the death. How much has the widow and family lost by the father's
death? The answer to this lies in the oft-quoted passage from the
opinion of Lord Wright in Davies v. Powell Dujfryn Associated
Collieries Ltd., ( 1942) AC 617] which says:

The starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased G
was earning, the ascertainment of which to some extent may
depend on the regularity of his employment. Then there is
an estimate of how much was required or expended for his
own personal and living expenses. The balance will give a
datum or basic figure which will generally be turned into a H.
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A lump sum by taking a certain number of years' purchase.
That sum, however, has to be taxed down by having due
regard to uncertainties, for instance, that the widow might
have again married and thus ceased to be dependent, and
other like matters of speculation and doubt.

B 8. The measure of damage is the pecuniary loss suffered and is likely
to be suffered by each dependent. Thus "except where there is express
statutory direction to the contrary, the damages to be awarded to a
dependant of a deceased person under the Fatal Accidents Acts must ,..
take into account any pecuniary benefit accruing to that dependant in
consequence of the death of the deceased. It is the net loss on balance
c which constitutes the measure' of damages. (Per Lord Macmillan in
Davies v. Powell) Lord Wright in the same case said, "The actual
pecuniary loss of each individual enti~d to sue can only be ascertained
by balancing on the one hand the loss to him of the future pecuniary
benefit, and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever
D source comes to him by reason of the death". These words of Lord
Wright were adopted as the principle applicable also under the Indian
Act in Gobald Motor Service Ltd. v. R.. MK. Veluswami, AIR (1962)
SC I where the Supreme Court stated that the general principle is that
the actual pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the
one hand the loss to the claimants of the future pecuniary benefit and
E on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever source
comes to them by reason of the death, that is, the balance of loss and
gain to a dependant by the death, must be ascertained."

Needless to say that the multiplier method stands accepted by this
Court in the decision last noticed and on the acceptability of multiplier method
F
this Court in para 16 had the following to state:

"It is necessary to reiterate that the multiplier method is logically
sound and legally well-established. There are some cases which have
proceeded to determine the compensation on the basis of aggregating
G the entire future earnings for over the period the life expectancy was
lost, deducted a percentage therefrom towards uncertainties of future
life and award the resulting sum ·as compensation. This is clearly
unscientific. For instance, if the deceased was, say 25 years of age at
the time of death and the life expectancy is 70 years, this method
would multiply the loss of dependency for 45 years - virtually adopting
H a multiplier of 45 - and even if one-third or one-fourth is deducted
M.S. GREWAL v.D.C. SOOD [BANERJEE, J.) 177
therefrom towards the uncertainties of future life and for immediate A
lump sum payment, the effective multiplier would be between 30 and
34. This is wholly impermissible. We are, aware that some decisions
of the High Courts and of this Court as well have arrived at
compensation on some such basis. These decisions cannot be said to
have laid down a settled principle. They are merely instances of B
particular awards in individual cases. The proper method of
computation is the multiplier method. 'Any departure, except in
exceptional and extraordinary cases, would introduce inconsistel)cy
of principle, lack of uniformity and an element of unpredictability for
the assessment of compensation. Some judgments of the High Courts
have justified a departure from the multiplier method on the ground C
that Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 insofar as it
envisages the compensation to be 'just'., the statutory determination
of a 'just' compensation would unshackle the exercise from any rigid
formula. It must be borne in mind that the multiplier method is the
accepted method of ensuring a 'just' compensation which will make
for uniformity and certainty of the awards. We disapprove these D
decisions of the High Courts which have taken a contrary view. We
indicate that the multiplier method is the appropriate method, a
departure from which can only be justified in rare and extraordinary
circumstances and very exceptional cases."
E
In Lala Wadhwa's case, however, this Court came to a conclusion that
upon acceptability of the multiplier method and depending upon the facts
situation namely the involvement of TISCO in its tradition that every employee
can get one of his child employed in the company and having regard to
multiplier 15 the compensation was calculated at Rs. 3.60 lacs with an
additional sum of Rs. 50,000 as conventional figure making the total amount F
payable at Rs. 4.10 lacs for each of the claimants of the deceased children.

The decision in Lata Wadhwa, thus, is definitely a guiding factor in the
matter of award of compensation wherein children died under an unfortunate
incident as noticed morefully hereinbefore in this judgment.
G
Having considered the matter in its proper perspective and the
applicability of multiplier method and without even any further material on
record we do feel it expedient to note that though Mr. Bahuguna attributed
the quantum granted by the High Court as strangely absurd, we, however, are
not in a position to lend our concurrence therewith. It is not that the award H
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A of compensation at Rs. 5 lacs can be attributed to be the resultant effect of
either emotion or sentiments or the High Court's anguish over the incident.
The High Court obviously considered the overall situation as regards social
placements of the students. As stated hereinafter the school presently is one
of the affluent school in the country and fee structure and other incidentals
B are so high that it would be a well nigh impossibility to think of admissi9n
in the school at even the upper middle class level. Obviously the school
caters to the need of upper strata of the society and if the 2nd Schedule of
Motor Vehicles Act, can be termed to be any guide, the compensation could
have been a much larger sum. Thus in the factual situation award of
compensation at Rs. 5 lakhs cannot by any stretch be termed to be excessive.
C Another redeeming feature of Mr. Bahuguna submissions pertains to the
theory of ability to pay: Audited accounts have been produced for the year
1995 depicting a situation, though not of having stringency but the situation
truly cannot but be ascribed to be otherwise comfortable to pay as directed
by the High Court. The matter, however, prolonged in the law courts in the
usual manner and it took nearly six years for its final disposal before this
D Court - these six years however had rendered the financial stability of the
school concerned in a much more stronger situation than what it was in the
year 1995. The school as of date stands out to be one of the most affluent
schools in the country as such ability to pay cannot be termed to be an issue
in the matter and on the wake thereto we are not inclined to deal with the
E same in any further detail.
In the view we have taken as above, we could have awarded a larger
sum but judicial propriety deters us from doing so, since in the normal course
of events appellate forum ought not to interfere with the award of
compensation.
F
In the view, we have taken as noted hereinbefore, we do not feel it
inclined to deal with the other issue of the school authority being a joint-tort
feasor as submitted before this Court by the respondents. The issue thus is
left open.

G As regards the question of interest as contended by Mr. Malhotra, we
feel it inclined to grant 6% simple interest from the date of the judgment of
the High Court till payment on the reducing balance. The amount so directed
by the High Court together with interest as modified above be paid by eight
(8) quarterly instalments.

H The amount deposited in terms of earlier order of this Court inclusive
M.S. GREWAL v.D.C. SOOD [BANERJEE, J.] 179
of interest with the Registrar of this Court be made available to the parties A
pro-rata in terms of this order and the balance, however, be paid as directed
above.

This appeal thus stands disposed of without any order as to costs.

T.N.A. Appeal disposed of B

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