M/S. FAIR AIR ENGINEERS PVT. LTD. AND ANR.versusN.K. MODI

A            M/S. FAIR AIR ENGINEERS PVT. LTD. AND ANR.
                                          v.
                                     N.K. MODI

                                 AUGUST 20, 1996

B               [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

           Consumer Protection Act, 1986: Sections 3, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18,
    22, 23, 24, 25 and 27.

C         Arbitration Act, 1940: Sections 2(a) and 34.

           Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 : Sectio11 9.

          Consumer Protection Act-Proceedings before fornms created under the
  Act-Nature of-Applicability of Section 34 of Arbitration Act-Contract for
D installation of ce11trally air-co11ditio11ed plant i11 respondellt's house-Dis-
  pute-Complaint before Consumer Commission-Application for stay of
  proceedings-National Consumer Commission holding that Section 34 of
  Arbitration Act, 1940 was not available to stay the proceedings-Ap-
  peal-Held proceedings before the District Fornm, State Commission and the
   National Commission are legal proceedings-The District Fornm, National
E Commission and the State Conimission are judicial autho1ities falling under
   Section 34. of the Arbitration Act-But by invocation of Section 34, the party
   to the proceedings does not get an automatic right to have the proceedings
  pending before the judicial authorities staye~Section 34 giv~s discretion to
   the autho1ities to stay the proceedi11gs on their satisfying that there was 1io
F ·sufficient reason why the matter should not be refe"ed in accordance with the
   agreeme/11 between the parties for arbitration when the party seeking stay of
   the proceedings was and .still remains ready and willing to do all things
   necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration--17wugh the District Fornm
   State Commission and National Commission are judicial authorities, for the
G purpose of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act yet it would be appropriate that
   these fornms are at liberty to proceed with the matters in accordance with
   the provisions of the Act rather than relegating the parties to an arbitration    ...
   proceedings--171e reason is that the Act intends to relieve the consumers of
   the cumbersome arbitration proceedings or civil action unless the fornms on
   their own and on the peculiar facts and circumstances of a particular case,
H come to the conclusion that the appropriate fornm for adjudication of the
                                         820
                     FAIRAIR ENGRS. PVT. LTD. v. N.K. MODI                     821

    disputes would be otherwise those given in the Act-Considered from this            A
    perspective this dispute need not be refe"ed to arbitration under clause (12)
    of the agreement and the matter could be decided on merits by the State
    Commission itself

          1he Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. 1he Employees of the Bharat Bank,
    (1950] 1 SCR 459; Associated Cement Companie.< Ltd. v. P.N. Shamza &               B
    Anr., [1965] 2 SCR 366 ; Sarojini Ramaswami v. Union of India, (1992] 4
    SCC 506; Canara Bank v. Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors.,
    JT (1995) 3 SC 42 and Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta,
    (1994] 1 sec 243, referred to.
                                                                                       c
           Arbitration agreement-Contract for carrying out installation of a
    centrally air-conditioned plant in respondent's residential house---Breach of
    contract-Dispute about non existence of arbitration agreement-Clause 12 of
    quotation-When the quotation was offered with the conditions enumerated
    thereunder, the respondent merely made a counter-offer giving technical
    details of a part of the offer as cou111er-offer and when it was accepted by the   D
    appellant, the parties agreed for that offer and the counter offe,...../n other
    words, they became an integral part of the co/llract of the parties-1hereby,
    clause ( 12) of the agreeme/11 became an integral part of the conlract-17ius,
    there 1vas an arbitration agreen1ent between the parties.
                                                                                       E
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11459 of
    1996.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 13.11.92 of the National Con-
-   sumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in F.A. No 62 of 1991.
                                                                                       F
            R.S. Suri for the Appellants.

            Ranjit Kumar, Ms. Binu Tamta and Yatish Mohan for the Respon-
    dent.

            The following Order of the Court was delivered :                           G
            Leave granted.

            We have heard learned counsel on both sides.

            This appeal by special leave arises from the order dated November          H
    822                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 13, 1992 of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New
    Delhi (the "Commission", for short) passed in First Appeal No. 62/1991.

        The admitted facts are that the appellant had entered into a contract
  with the respondent to carry out installation of a centrally air-conditioned
  plant in the residential house of the respondent in New Delhi. Since he has
B committed breach of the contract, seeking to recover a sum of Rs. 3,75,000
  as compensation for alleged deficiency in service ·on the part of the
  appellant in carrying out the work of installation of the centrally air-con-
  ditioned plant, the respondent laid the complaint before the State Com-
  mission which in its order dated October 30, 1990 had stayed the
c proceedings and relegated the parties to arbitration for seeking the
  remedy. The appellant carried the matter in appeal. By the impugned order
  the Commission has held that the proceedings before the forums created
  under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (Act 68 of 1986) (for short the
  "Act") is not a legal proceedings nor is the Commission a judicial authority;
D therefore, Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is not available to stay
  the proceedings. Thus this appeal by special leave.

        ' Shri R.S. Suri, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the
    scheme of the Act, in particular Sections 3, 10, 16 and 20 provides for
    constitution of District Forum, State Commission and National Commis-
E sion which conduct proceedings as per the procedure prescribed in Section
  13; finality is attached to the order of the forums under Section 24. The
  orders are enforceable at law by operation of Section 25 and the penalties
  for contravention get sanctions under Section 27. The hierarchy of appeals
  provided under Section .19 et al does indicate that the proceedings before
F the authorities under the Act are legal proceedings and the authorities are
  judicial authorities within the meaning of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act,
  1940. The Commission, therefore, was in error in its conclusion that
  proceedings before the authorities are not legal proceedings nor is the
  Tribunal a judicial authority. Ms. Binu Tamta, learned counsel appearing
  for the respondent contended that there is no consensus ad idem between
G the parties on the point of reference to an arbitration; pursuant to a
  quotation given by the appellant, the respondent agreed only on the
  conditions enumerated and communicated by the respondent to which the
                                                                                    -
  appellant had agreed thereunder. No arbitration clause emerged by con-
  sensus ad idem. Therefore, there is no arbitration agreement for reference
H of the dispute for arbitration. It is also contended that the respondent, after
               FAIR AIR ENGRS. PVT. LTD. v. N.K. MODI                    823

issuance of the notice by the State Commission, had appeared and taken A
five adjournments to file the counter; thereby, it had acquiesced to the
jurisdiction of the State Commission. Thereby, the appellant, having par-
ticipated in the proceedings before the State Commission, is not entitled
to avail of the remedy of stay of further proceedings under Section 34,
pending reference to an arbitration. It is also contended that the Tribunals
                                                                              B
constituted under the Act are Special Tribunals. Though they are invested
with the powers of the civil Court in a limited way they are not conferred
with trappings of the Court. Therefore, it is neither legal proceedings nor
is the Tribunal a judicial authority under Section 34. Thereby, the remedy
of Section 34 is not available to the appellant. It is further contended that
the Act being a special statute having given exclusive jurisdiction to the c
forums created under the Act to provide inexpensive and expeditious
remedy. Relegating the parties to the arbitration defeats the purpose of the
remedy through summary trial which is provided under the Act. Therefore,
the Court would be slow to relegate the parties to the process of arbitration
under the Arbitration Act.                                                    D
      Having regard to the respective contentions, the first question that
arises for consideration is : whether there is an arbitration agreement
between the parties? It is true that respondent had raised before the
Commission the dispute in the grounds of appeal about the non-existences
of the arbitration agreement and want of co!lse!lsus ad idem in that behalf;    E
but from a reading of the order of the National Commission it would
appear that the question was not argued. The State Commission expressly
has gone into the question and held that by operation of clause (12) of the
quotation there is an arbitration agreement brought into vogue between the
parties. It envisages reference to arbitration and thereby there was col!Sen-   F
sus ad idem. It is seen that when the quotation was offered with the
conditions enumerated thereunder, the respondent merely made a counter-
offer giving technical details of a part of the offer as counter-offer and
when it was accepted by the appellant, the parties agreed for that offer and
the counter-offer. In other words, they became an integral part of the
contract of the parties. Thereby, clause (12) of the agreement became as        G
integral part of the contract. Thus, there is an arbitration agreement
between the parties.

      The question then is : whether the appellant has disabled itself by
acquiescence to the jurisdiction of the State Commission in seeking ad- H
    824                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A journment to file the counter. It is true that in the counter-affidavit filed
    in this Court the respondent has stated that the appellant had taken five
    adjournments to file the counter. On the fifth occasion the counter came
    lo be filed with the petition for stay of the proceedings. But, unfortunately,
    this question was not argued before the National Commission and, there-
    fore, we cannot go into the question whether the appellant acquiesced to
B
    the jurisdiction of the State Commission before proceedings further in the
    matter.

         The crucial question is : whether the proceedings of the forums
  created under the Act are legal proceedings and the authorities have the
c trappings of judicial authorities of a court within the meaning of Section
  34 of the Arbitration Act? Before going into the decisions of this Court it
  is ·necessary to read the provisions of the Act so that we can have a clear
  picture of the conspectus of its operation. Section 3 envisages that "the
  provisions of the Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the
D provisions of any other law for the time being in force". Section 10 speaks
  of constitution and composition of District Forums so as to consist of
  persons specified in clauses (a) and (b). They shall include a person who
  is, or who has been, or is qualified to be a District Judge, as its President,
  apart from other members envisaged in clause (b) in suL-section (1)
  thereof. Similarly, Section 16 of the Act speaks about composition of the
E State Commission. It provides that each State Commission shall consist of
  a person who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court, appointed by the
  State Government, who shall be the President of the Commission, apart
  from other members envisaged under clause (b) of sub-section (i) thereof.
  Section 20 of the Act, similarly, envisages the composition of the Notional ·
F Commission and a person who is, or has been, a Judge of the Supreme
   Court, to be appointed by the Central Government, shall be its President,
   apart from other members envisaged in clause (b) of sub-section (1)
   thereof. Thus the presiding officers of the forums are judicial officers and
   in the case of Commissions they are sitting or retired Judges of the High
   Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. A remedy of complaint
G has been provided to the aggrieved consumer defined under Section 2(d)             ....
   of the Act. The expression "complaint" has been defined under Section 2(c)
   and "complainant" has been defined under Section 2(b) of the Act. Section
   12 prescribes the manner in which the complaint shall be made. Section
   24-A provides for the period of limitation within which the complaint shall
H be laid, namely, within 2 years from the date on which the cause of action
                    FAIRAIRENGRS. PVT. LTD. v. N.K.MODJ                      825

    has arisen.                                                                     A
          Section 13 provides for the procedure after receipt of complaint and
    for disposal thereof. The details thereof are not material except sub-sec-
•   tions (4), (5) and (6) thereof which have cutting edge as material in this
    behalf. Sub-section (4) postulates that for the purposes of that section, the
    District Forum shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court        B
    under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, while trying a suit in respect of
    the enumerated matters, namely, (i) summoning and enforcing the atten-
    dance of any defendant or witness and examining the witness on oath, (ii)
    discovery and production of any document or other material object
    producible as evidence, (iii) the reception of evidence on affidavits, (iv) the c
    requisitioning of the report of the concerned analysis or test from the
    appropriate laboratory or from any other relevant source, (v) issuing of any .
    commission for the examination of any witness, a~d (vi) any other matter
    which may be prescribed. Under the Rules framed under the Act District
    Forums have got power to prescribe the procedure of collecting and D
    discovering evidence. Under sub-section (5), every proceeding before the
    District Forum shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the
    meaning of Section 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code and shall be
    deemed to be a Civil Court for the purpose of Section 195 and Chapter
    XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Sub-section (6) provides E
    that where the complainant is a consumer referred to in sub-clause (iv) of
    Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 2, the provisions of Rule 8 of Order
    1 of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall apply
    subject to the modification that every reference therein to a suit or decree
    shall be construed as a reference to a complaint or the order of the District
    Forum thereon. The finding of the District Forum is envisaged under F
    Section 14 of the Act. If any person feels aggrieved by the order of the
    District Forum there is a right of appeal provided under Section 15 to the
    state Commission. The State Commission, in addition to the remedy of
    appeal against the order of District Forum, has original jurisdiction to
    entertain complaints if the matter is covered under its specified pecuniary G
    jurisdiction. Under Section 18 of the Act, the procedure for the disposal
    of complaints provided in Section 12, 13, and 14 of the Act and the rules
    made thereunder, is made available for the disposal of the complaint or
    the appeals by the State Commission. Similarly, the National Commission
    under Section 21, has been given, in addition to original jurisdiction power H
    826                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A to entertain an appeal against the order of the State Commission or to call
    for the records and pass appropriate orders, in circumstances enumerated
    under clause (b) thereof, in any consumer dispute pending before or
    decided by any State Commission. By operation of Section 22, the power
    of a ciVil court as specified in sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) of Section 13 of
B   the Act are vested in the National Commission for disposal of any com-
    plaint or proceedings before it; the procedure to the followed by it shall
    be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government. Under Section
    23 of the Act, remedy of appeal to this Court is made available to any
    person aggrieved by an order of the National Commission. Section 24
    attaches finality to every order of the District Forum, State Commission or
C   of the National Commission if no appeal is preferred within specified time.
    However, that it subject to any judicial review under Article 226 or 32 of
    the Constitution. Section 25 gives teeth to the orders passed by the District
    Forum, State Commission and National Commission; every order can be
    enforced in the same manner as if it were a decree or an order made by a
D    court in a civil suit pending therein; it shall be lawful for the District Forum,
    State Commission or National Commission to send its orders, in case of it
    inability to execute it, for execution to the appropriate executing court. It
    is obligatory for the executing court to execute the order treating it to be
     a decree or order of a court sent to it for execution. For specific enforce-
E    ment of the Act, Section 27 gives sanction of the State for imposing
    penalties against the traders or persons against whom a complaint is made
     if fails to comply with the order passed by the aforesaid District Forums,
     National Commission or State Commission, as the case may be.

           Thus, it would be seen that the District Forums, State Commission
                                                                                         ..
F    and National Commission have all the trappings of a civil court and judicial
     authority. The proceedings before them are legal proceedings. Similar
     controversy was considered by this Court in The Bharat Bank Ltd. Delhi v.
     The employees of the Bharat Bank, (1950) 1 SCR 459 and in Associated
     Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Shanna & Anr., (1965] 2 SCR 366. In
G    Sarojini Ramaswami v. Union of India, (1992] 4 SCC 506, one of us, K.
     Ramaswamy, J. had dealt with this aspect of the matter and held thus :


              "It is, therefore, settled law that all the trappings of the court need
              not necessarily be present in a particular case to bring the authority
H             as a Tribunal but the essential postulate must be that it must be
                     FAIR AIR ENGRS. PVT. LTD.>. N.K. MODI                      827

             the creature of the statute and the State should delegate its             A
             inherent power of judicial review to the Tribunal; all or some of
             the trappings of a court may or not be present in a given case.
             The Tribunal should adjudicate the dispute between the parties
             before, it after giving reasonable opportunity to the parties, con-
             sistent with the principles of fair play and natural justice. It is not   B
             necessary that porprio vigore it is enforceable. The mere fact that
             it is subject to further orders does not take away the effect of the
             decision or findings recorded thereunder."


..         This Court in recent decision in Canara Bank v. Nuclear Power
     Co1poration of India Ltd. & Ors., J.T. (1995) 3 SC 42 considered the
                                                                                       c
     controversy and held that the word "court" must be read in the context in
     which it is used in the statute. It is permissible, given the context, to read
     it as comprehending the courts of civil judicature and courts or some
     tribunals exercising curial, or judicial powers. In the context in which the      D
     word "court" is used in Section 9A of the Special Courts Act, it is intended
     to encompass all curial or judicial bodies which have the jurisdiction to
     decide matters or c]aims, inter alia, arising out of transactions in securities
     entered into between the stated dates in which a person notified was
     involved. Therein, the Company Law Board has been held to be a court
     exercising the functions of the court; therefore, it is possessed of the          E
     trappings of a Court. Thus, we have no hesitation to hold that the proceed-
     ings before the District Forum, State Commission and the National Com-
     mission are legal proceedings. The District Forum, National Commission
     and the State Commission are judicial authorities falling under Section 34
     of the Arbitration Act.                                                           F

           The question then is : whether the case shall be stayed by operation
     of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act? Section 34 envisages that where any
     party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming under him
     commences any legal proceedings against any other party to the agreement G
     or any person claiming under him in respect of any matter agreed to be
     referred. any party to such legal proceedings, before filing a written state-
     ment at any time or before taking any other step in the proceedings, shall
     apply to the judicial authority before which the proceedings are pending
     to stay the proceedings; and such authority, if satisfied that there is no H
    828                  SUPREMECOliRTREPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4S.C.R.

A   sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with
    the arbitration agreement and that the applicant was, at the time when the
    proceedings were commenced, and still remains ready and willing to do all
    things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration, may make an
    order staying the proceedings.                                                  1
B          It would thus be clear that, by invocation of Section 34, the party to
    the proceedings does not get an automatic right to have the proceedings
    pending before the judicial authorities stayed. The said section gives dis-
    cretion to the authoriti.es to stay the proceedings on their satisfying that
    there was no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in
c   accordance with the agreement between the parties for arbitration when
    the party seeking stay of the proceedings was and still remains ready and
    willing to do all things necessary .to the proper conduct of the arbitration.
    In other words, on judicial satisfaction as to the contract between the
    parties and subject matter of the dispute as to the nature of the dispute,
D   the judicial authority has been invested with a discretion to stay the
    proceedings or proceed with the matter pending before it. Similar power
    is available under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Third
    Ordinance, 1996. The Act was enacted to provide for protection of the
    interests of consumers and for that purpose the Act has made provision
E   for the establishment of Consumer. Councils and other authorities, viz.,
    District Forums, State Commissions and National Commission for the
    settle~ent of consumers' disputes and for matters connected therewith.


          This Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K Gupta, [1994]
    1 SCC 243 elaborately considered the scheme and object of the Act. It was
F   held that object was to secure social purpose to promote the facilities in a
    comprehending manner for settlement of issue involved in the consumer
    complaints and to assess the damage. In construing the object of the Act,
    the interests of the consumers which the Act seeks to protect are given
  predominance. The Act has departed from the settled legal forums
G provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. The importance of the Act
  is to promote the welfare of the society by enabling the consumers to
  participate directly in the market economy. It attempts lo remove the
  helplessness of a consumer which he faces against powerful business,
  described as a 'network of rackets' or a society in which 'producers have
H semred power' to rob the rest or as the might of public bodies which are
                    FAIRAIRENGRS. PVT.LTD. v. N.K.MODI                          829

    degenerating into storehouses of inaction where papers de not move from. A
    one desk to another as a matter of duty and responsibility but for ex-
    traneous consideration leaving the common man helpless, bewildered and
    shocked. The malady is becoming so rampant, widespread and deep that
    the society, instead of bothering, complaining ""_; fig'iting against it, is
    accepting it as a part of life. The Act, therefore, intends to secure inexpen- B
    sive and expeditious consumer service.

           Accordingly, it must be held that the provisions of the Act are to be
    construed widely to give effect to the object and purpose of the Act. It is
    seen that Section 3 envisages that the provisions of the Act are in addition
    to and are not in derogation of any other law in force. It is true, as rightly     C
    contended by Shri Suri, that the words "in derogation of the Provisions of
    any other law for the time being in force" would be given proper meaning
    and effect and if the complaint is not stayed and the parties are not
    relegated to the arbitration, the Act purports to operate in derogation of
    the provisions of the Arbitration Act, P1ima facie, the contention appears         D
    to be plausible but on construction and conspectus of the provisiqns of the

.   Act we think that the contention is not well-founded. The Parliament is
    aware of the provisions of the Arbitration Act and the Contract Act and
    the consequential remedy available under Section 9 of the Code of Civil
    Procedure, i.e., to avail of right of civil action in a competent court of civil   E
    jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Act provides the additional remedy.

           It would, therefore, be clear that the Legislature intended to provide
    a remedy in addition to the consentient arbitration which could be en-
    forced under the Arbitration Act or the civil action in a suit under the
    provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereby, as seen, Section 34 of
                                                                                  F
    the Act does not confer and automatic right nor create an automatic
    embargo on the exercise of the power by the judicial authority under the
    Act. It is a matter of discretion. Considered from this perspective, we hold
    that though the District Forum, State Commission and National Commis-
    sion are judicial authorities, for the purpose of Section 34 of the Arbitra- G
    tion Act, in view of the object of the Act and by operation of Section 3
    thereof, we are of the considered view that it would be appropriate that
    these forums created under the Act are at liberty to proceed with the
    matters in accordance with the provisions of the Act rath~j.than relegating
    the parties to an arbitration proceedings pursuant to a contract entered H
    830                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A into between the parties. The reason is that Act intends to relieve the
    consumers of the cumbersome arbitration proceedings or civil action unless
    the forums on their own and on their own and on the peculiar facts and
    circumstances of the particular case, come to the conclusion that the
    appropriate forum for adjudication of the disputes would be otherwise
B   those given in the Act.

         Considered from this perspective, we hold that this dispute need not
    be referred to arbitration under clause (12) of the agreement and the
    matter could be decided on merits by the State Commission itself.

C         The appeal is, therefore, allowed to the above extent but, in the
    circumstances, without costs. The order of the State Commission stands set
    aside and the matter is remitted to the State Commission for decision on
    merits according to law.

    T.N.A.                                                    Appeal allowed.