Holding

Section 12A is mandatory, but its consequence of rejecting a plaint applies only prospectively from 20‑08‑2022; suits filed earlier may be kept in abeyance and directed to mediation.

Summary

The Union of India filed a money suit of over Rs 8.73 crore in a Commercial Court in August 2019 without first complying with the pre‑institution mediation requirement of Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The defendant, Dhanbad Fuels Pvt. Ltd., raised a preliminary objection and sought rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, arguing that Section 12A is mandatory. The Commercial Court declined to reject the plaint and directed post‑institution mediation; the Calcutta High Court affirmed this by keeping the suit in abeyance and ordering the parties to mediate. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the mandatory nature of Section 12A, the prospective effect of its non‑compliance as clarified in Patil Automation (2022), and the doctrine of lex non cogit ad impossibilia given the lack of mediation infrastructure at the time of filing. The Court held that suits instituted before 20‑08‑2022 may be kept in abeyance and referred to time‑bound mediation, while suits filed after that date must be rejected for non‑compliance. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s order to keep the suit in abeyance and proceed with mediation.

Issues considered

Whether non‑compliance with Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 mandates rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC.
Whether the consequence of non‑compliance with Section 12A applies prospectively as per Patil Automation (2022).
Whether a suit filed before the prospective date can be kept in abeyance and referred to mediation instead of being dismissed.
How the expression ‘urgent interim relief’ in Section 12A should be construed.

Legislation cited

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. Section 30(4)
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order VII Rule 11, s. Order VII Rule 13, s. Section 80(2)
Commercial Courts Act, 2015s. 12A
Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts (Amendment) Act, 2018
Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987
Limitation Act, 1963
Pre‑Institution Mediation and Settlement Rules, 2018

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose whether, due to non-compliance with s.12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, a suit should be dismissed u/Ord. VII r.11 CPC, or whether it should be kept in abeyance, directing the parties to first explore the possibility of settlement by instituting mediation; Court erred in passing the impugned order, keeping the suit in abeyance and sending the parties to mediation as per the PIMS Rules and the 2020 SOP. Headnotes† Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – s.12A – Pre-institution mediation and settlement – Pre-institution mediation, if

Subjects

Rejection of plaintPre‑institution mediationPost‑institution mediationMoney suitRecovery process in a money suitProspective applicabilityLex non cogit ad impossibiliaUrgent interim reliefHarmonious constructionPersisting vacuum created by lack of appointment of necessary authoritiesExpeditious resolution of commercial disputesSuit kept in abeyanceExplore possibility of settlement by instituting mediationSending the parties to mediationPre‑institution mediation and settlementPre‑institution mediation, if mandatoryProspective effect to declaration in Patil Automation’s caseRemedy of pre‑institution mediationTime‑bound mediation

Judgment

[2025] 6 S.C.R. 431 : 2025 INSC 696

M/s Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited
v.
Union of India & Anr.
(Civil Appeal No. 6846 of 2025)
15 May 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose whether, due to non-compliance with s.12A of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015, a suit should be dismissed u/Ord.
VII r.11 CPC, or whether it should be kept in abeyance, directing
the parties to first explore the possibility of settlement by instituting
mediation; and whether the High Court erred in passing the
impugned order, keeping the suit in abeyance and sending the
parties to mediation as per the PIMS Rules and the 2020 SOP.

Headnotes†
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – s.12A – Pre-institution mediation
and settlement – Pre-institution mediation, if mandatory –
Prospective effect to declaration in Patil Automation’s case –
Money suit by respondent Union of India in commercial court
for recovery of certain sum from appellant – No urgent interim
relief prayed for – Preliminary objection by appellant as
regards maintainability of the suit without availing the remedy
of pre-institution mediation u/s.12A – Interim application by
appellant u/Ord.VII r.11 seeking rejection of plaint – Commercial
court declining to reject the plaint, directed post-institution
mediation – In revision application, the High Court directed
the suit be kept in abeyance and parties to attend mediation –
Correctness:
Held: Approach adopted by High Court in keeping the suit in
abeyance and referring the parties to mediation, strikes a perfect
balance between the mandatory nature of s.12A as well as the
prospective applicability of the consequence of non-compliance
with s.12A as held in Patil Automation’s case – Decision of this
Court in Patil Automation’s case lays down the correct position of
law as regards s.12A by holding it to be mandatory in nature, which

* Author
432 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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relates back to the date of the Amending Act; and that any suit which
is instituted under the 2015 Act without complying with s.12A is
liable to be rejected u/Ord.VII r.11, however, this declaration applies
prospectively to suits instituted on or after the date of the decision
in Patil Automation’s case, i.e., 20.08.2022 – Suits instituted without
complying with s.12A of the 2015 Act prior to 20.08.2022 cannot
be rejected u/Ord.VII r.11 on the ground of non-compliance with
s.12A unless they fall within the exceptions stipulated in Patil
Automation’s case – In suits instituted without complying with
s.12A prior to 20.08.2022 which are pending adjudication before
the trial court, the court shall keep the suit in abeyance and refer
the parties to time-bound mediation in accordance with s.12A if
an objection is raised by the defendant by filing an application
u/Ord.VII r.11, or where any of the parties expresses an intent
to resolve the dispute by mediation – Respondent does not fall
under any of the exceptions and it cannot be said that bar of s.12A
would continue to apply to the money suit filed by respondents
despite there being a prospective declaration in Patil Automation’s
case – Money suit was filed by the respondents much prior to the
decision in Patil Automation’s case and it is squarely protected
by the prospective ruling – Harmoniously construing observations
in Patil Automation’s case, it is clear that while s.12A is held to
be mandatory from the date of inception of the provision itself,
the consequence of rejection for non-compliance is only made
applicable prospectively – Trial court and High Court did not commit
any error in refusing to reject the plaint – Mediation proceedings
to be completed within the time frame stipulated by s.12A and
the PIMS Rules – Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement
Rules, 2018 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord.VII r.11.
[Paras 46, 47, 58, 59, 62, 64]

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – s.12A – Expression “urgent
interim relief” – Construction of:
Held: Suit which contemplates an urgent interim relief may be filed
under the 2015 Act without first resorting to mediation – Unlike
s.80(2) CPC, leave of the court not required to be obtained before
filing a suit without complying with s.12A – Test for “urgent interim
relief” is if on an examination of the nature and the subject-matter of
the suit and the cause of action, the prayer of urgent interim relief
by the plaintiff could be said to be contemplable when the matter
is seen from the standpoint of the plaintiff – Courts must also be
wary of the fact that the urgent interim relief must not be merely
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 433

M/s Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited v. Union of India & Anr.

an unfounded excuse by the plaintiff to bypass the mandatory
requirement of s.12A. [Para 62]

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – s.12A – Equitable maxim lex
non cogit ad impossibilia – Meaning:
Held: Law does not compel an impossible performance – After the
establishment of Commercial Court at relevant place, the statutory
framework and corresponding rules were progressively implemented
until December 2020 – Thus, during this intervening period, referring
the matter to pre-suit mediation u/s.12A was impossible due to a
persisting vacuum created by lack of appointment of necessary
authorities and delineation of the procedural framework – Awaiting
the establishment of the requisite infrastructure would unduly
impede the recovery process in a money suit involving public
funds, thereby defeating the very purpose and legislative intent
of the 2015 Act, which aims to ensure the expeditious resolution
of commercial disputes – Declaration of the mandatory nature
of s.12A was given prospective effect in Patil Automation’s case
keeping in mind the fact that s. 12A, being in its stages of infancy,
had given rise to conflicting views by different High Courts and
consequently an overall lack of clarity on the nature of the provision.
[Paras 49, 51, 52, 53]

Case Law Cited
Patil Automation Private Limited and Others v. Rakheja Engineers
Private Limited [2022] 11 SCR 808 : (2022) 10 SCC 1 – relied on.
I.C. Golaknath and others v. State of Panjab and Others [1967]
SCR 762 : AIR 1967 SC 1643; Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey
[1988] 1 SCR 118 : (1987) 4 SCC 398; Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra
Murthy v. Syed Jalal [2017] 5 SCR 294 : (2017) 13 SCC 174; Popat
and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn. [2005]
Supp. 2 SCR 1030 : (2005) 7 SCC 510; Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D.
Keerthi (2024) 5 SCC 815; U.P. SRTC v. Imtiaz Hussain [2005]
Supp. 5 SCR 725 : (2006) 1 SCC 380 – referred to.
Spectrum Plus Ltd., In re: (2005) 3 WLR 58 – referred to.

List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Commercial Courts Act, 2015;
Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement Rules, 2018; Limitation Act,
434 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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1963; Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial
Appellate Division of High Courts (Amendment) Act, 2018;
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

List of Keywords
Rejection of plaint; Pre-institution mediation; Post-institution
mediation; Money suit; Recovery process in a money suit; Prospective
applicability; Lex non cogit ad impossibilia; Urgent interim relief;
Harmonious construction; Persisting vacuum created by lack of
appointment of necessary authorities; Expeditious resolution of
commercial disputes; Suit kept in abeyance; Explore possibility of
settlement by instituting mediation; Sending the parties to mediation;
Pre-institution mediation and settlement; Pre-institution mediation,
if mandatory; Prospective effect to declaration in Patil Automation’s
case; Remedy of pre-institution mediation; Time-bound mediation.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6846 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.02.2021 of the High Court
at Calcutta in CO No. 1678 of 2020

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Vikas Singh, Pradip K.tarafder, Sr. Adv., Ms. Deepeika Kalia,
Ms. V. Singh, Sudeep Chandra, Shambudha Dutta, Mrs. Anjani
Aiyagari.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, A.S.G.,
Ms. Harshita Choubey, Sudarshan Lamba, Aaditya Dixit, Ms. Mili
Baxi, Bhuvan Kapoor.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.B. Pardiwala, J.

For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts:
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 435

M/s Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited v. Union of India & Anr.

INDEX*

A. FACTUAL MATRIX .............................................................. 2

B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT ......... 9

C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE UNION OF INDIA ... 13

D. ANALYSIS ............................................................................ 19

i. Legislative intent behind the enactment of Section 12A
of the 2015 Act ............................................................. 20

ii. Section 12A of the 2015 Act is mandatory in nature .... 26

iii. How the expression “urgent interim relief” is to be
construed ....................................................................... 35

iv. The effect of according prospectivity to the declaration
in Patil Automation (supra) on cases like the one at
hand ............................................................................... 39

v. The equitable maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia ......... 41

E. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 49

1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High
Court at Calcutta on its appellate side dated 22.02.2021 in C.O.
No. 1678 of 2020 by which the High Court disposed of the revision
application filed by the appellant herein by directing that the suit
instituted by the respondent herein, i.e., Union of India, on 09.08.2019,
shall be kept in abeyance for seven months from the date of the
order or until the receipt of the report of the mediator, whichever is
earlier. In other words, the High Court proceeded to pass an order
keeping in mind Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015
(for short, “the 2015 Act”), as amended in 2018.

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
436 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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A. FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarised as under:
a. The respondent Union of India instituted Money Suit No. 28 of
2019 on 09.08.2019 in the Commercial Court, Alipore against the
appellant herein for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 8,73,36,976/-
(Rupees Eight Crore, Seventy-Three Lakh, Thirty-Six Thousand,
Nine Hundred and Seventy-Six only) towards differential freight
and penalty. Indisputably, no urgent interim relief was prayed
for in the said suit.
b. No sooner the suit referred to above came to be instituted
than the appellant herein, as defendant, raised a preliminary
objection in its written statement dated 20.12.2019 as regards
the maintainability of the suit without availing the remedy of
pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the 2015 Act
read with Pre-Institution Mediation and Settlement Rules, 2018
(in short, “the PIMS Rules”) which came into force with effect
from 03.07.2018.
c. On 30.09.2020, the appellant herein preferred Interim Application
No. 190 of 2020 under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure
Code, 1908 (for shot, the “CPC”) read with Section 12A of the
2015 Act seeking rejection of the plaint, inter alia, on the ground
that the Money Suit No. 28 of 2019 suffered from institutional
defects and was violative of the mandatory provisions of pre-
institution mediation.
d. The Order VII Rule 11(d) application, referred to above, came
to be rejected by the Commercial Court vide order dated
21.12.2020. While rejecting the I.A. No. 190 of 2020 the
Commercial Court observed thus:
“13. Since the case has been filed on 09.08.2019 and
the present application has been filed at a belated
stage, I find there is no requirement to reject the suit
even for noncompliance of the mandatory provision
of Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015,
otherwise, instead of aid in justice, the justice will
be more delayed.
14. Once the plaint has been accepted by this Court,
it would be presumed that the Court has no reason
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 437

M/s Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited v. Union of India & Anr.

whatsoever to reject the plaint and obviously, the
Defendant can raise this issue even at the time of
filing W/S but admittedly, the Defendant no. 1 filed
W/S even without taking the plea as now he has taken
and in that case, it would be presumed that they are
not also interested in the mediation proceedings.
15. This Court has been established on 05.07.2019
and within a month or more, the instant suit has been
filed and at this stage, there is no proper infrastructure
for conducting pre-litigation mediation and standard
operating procedure has also not been framed by
the Hon’ble High Court at Calcutta.
16. In the above circumstances, the plea as taken by
the Defendant no. 1/Petitioner is liable to be rejected
as filed at a belated stage.
17. It appears from the instant application that the
Defendant no. 1 is interested to proceed with the
mediation proceedings and accordingly, let the dispute
be referred to mediation and in such case also, the
interest of the Defendant no.1/Petitioner will not be
prejudiced.
18. Let the dispute be referred for mediation and
Mr. Jayanta Mukherjee, Ld. Member of the Bar is
appointed as the Mediator.
19. Both sides are directed to attend the mediation
proceedings on 04.01.2021 at 2 p.m., and thereafter,
the Ld. Mediator will fix further dates of proceedings
and for doing so, the Ld. Mediator can obtain
proposals for settlement from both sides.
20. The Ld. Mediator is further directed to complete
his proceedings within 11.01.2021 and to submit the
report alongwith the proposal if any, as submitted
by both parties in a separate sealed envelope for
consideration of this Court while awarding cost under
Section 35A of the CPC.
21. Accordingly, the instant I.A. is disposed of as
being rejected on contest.”
438 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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e. Thus, the Commercial Court while declining to reject the plaint
directed post-institution mediation by asking the parties to name
and appoint an advocate as a mediator.
f. The appellant herein, being dissatisfied with the order passed
by the Commercial Court rejecting the application filed under
Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, challenged the same before
the High Court by filing a civil revision application.
g. The High Court disposed of the revision application, inter alia,
holding as under:
“15. In this case, the defendant filed the application
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil
Procedure for rejection of the plaint as being barred by
law, the plaintiff having failed to initiate the process of
mediation under Section 12A of the said Act. However,
assuming that the plaint is rejected on this ground,
Order VII rule 13 would allow the plaintiff to file another
suit on the self same cause of action. Thus, in my
opinion, rejecting the plaint at this stage, would not
be in consonance with the objectives of the said Act
and Rules. The plaintiffs may face a non-starter or
a non-settlement and would have to come back and
file a suit once again. This will cause unnecessary
delay and shall not be cost effective even for the
defendant. Thus, considering the ultimate object
of the provision of law, this Court is of the opinion
that the suit which is at its early stage, be kept in
abeyance and the plaintiff be directed to comply with
the provisions of Section 12A. This order is further
passed keeping in mind the time and the situation
when the plaint was filed, that is, within a month after
the commercial division at Alipore had been made
operative. It is also true that until December, 2020, the
SOP and the meditation rules to be followed by the
Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 in West Bengal,
for conducting commercial mediations had not been
notified. The panel of trained mediators for commercial
suit was also prepared and published thereafter. Thus
the plaintiffs had sufficient reasons not to go for an
effective mediation as envisaged under the said Rules
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 439

M/s Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited v. Union of India & Anr.

in the absence of proper infrastructure. The situation
would have been otherwise, had there been proper
infrastructure in place.
16. The decision of the Calcutta High Court will not
apply as the decision was on the point of leave to file
the suit without exhausting the mediation process.
This Court is not dispensing with the requirement of
Section 12A but directing the plaintiff to comply with
the provision of law by keeping the suit in abeyance.
17. Mediation in India is still in its nascent stage and
requires more awareness. Prior to the publication
of the panel of trained mediators for settlement
of commercial disputes, there was no complete
machinery which could be availed. Settlement of
commercial disputes require special technical and
commercial knowledge.
18. Mandatory training for mediation of commercial
disputes is the minimum requirement for any mediator
to be appointed in terms of the said Rules. Commercial
disputes are very often technical in nature and may
involve knowledge in commercial law and business.
If such was not the case, a separate panel of such
mediators would not have been prepared. The Act
and the Rules have been framed with an object of
improving the “ease of doing business”.
19. Section 12A of the Pre-Institution Mediation, is a
mere tool for reduction of pendency of commercial
litigation in India. However, the purpose of the said
Section 12A and the Rules cannot not be to nonsuit a
party but only to encourage the party seeking to file a
suit to first explore the possibility of settlement of the
dispute through mediation. Section 12A provides the
parties with an alternative mechanism to resolve their
disputes by negotiation in the presence of a mediator.
Such mediation has been made time bound and the
parties also have the liberty to move the commercial
court for adjudication of the dispute, if a mediation
results in a non-starter or the talks of settlement fail.
440 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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20. Thus the plaint should not be rejected at this stage
on the ground of non-compliance with Section 12A
of the said Act when the plaintiff can still be directed
to comply with the provisions of law by keeping the
suit in abeyance.
21. The instant case is a suit for recovery of money
filed by the Union of India for an amount over Rs.8
Crores. The alleged claim is for recovery of public
money. The allegation is illegal claim of concessional
rate of freight under Rate Circular No.24/2008,
30/2008 and 36/2009. The suit was filed, summons
were issued, the written statement was filed, case
management hearing was held. The defendant did
not show any inclination towards settlement of the
dispute by way of mediation. An application under
Order VII Rule 11 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure
was filed by the defendant for rejection of the plaint
against the defendant No. 2 to 4. Noncompliance
with Section 12A was not raised by the defendant
in the said application. Thereafter, once the earlier
application was rejected, a subsequent application
under Order VII Rule 11(d) for rejection of the plaint
on the ground of noncompliance with Section 12A of
the said Act was again filed. The application was filed
on September 30, 2020, that is, more than a year
since the institution of the suit. Thus, the learned court
held that the suit should not fail for non-compliance
of Section 12A of the said Act. Rejection of the plaint
would result in delay in dispensation of justice, instead
of the court acting in aid of justice. In my opinion, this
was a correct approach, keeping in mind the objects
and reasons for establishing Commercial Courts, that
is, quick and easy resolution of disputes either by
settlement or in court. Yet, the obligation under the
law must be complied with. The learned court below
rightly directed the suit to be kept in abeyance. In my
opinion, the defendants will not suffer any prejudice.
The suit has not progressed beyond filing of the written
statement. Thereafter two consecutive applications
were filed by the defendant for rejection of the plaint.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 441

M/s Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited v. Union of India & Anr.

It is also not the case of the defendant that they are
interested in settlement through mediation.
22. The decisions cited by Mr. Mitra are not applicable
in the facts of this case. The court can make an order
adjusting equities for satisfying the ends of justice as
it may deem fit while interpreting a procedural law
even if the same is couched with a negative covenant.
23. However, the learned court below erred in naming
the mediator himself, instead of directing the plaintiffs
to approach the State Legal Services Authority, West
Bengal, in terms of the 2018 Rules and the SOP
notified by the State of West Bengal in this regard.
24. The order impugned is set aside to the extent
of appointment of Mr. Jayanta Mukharjee learned
member of the bar as a mediator, and the direction
upon the parties to attend the mediation on the date
fixed by the learned court below and also further
directing the learned mediator to complete the
proceeding within January 11, 2021 and submit a
report before the learned court.
25. Hence, it is ordered that the suit be kept in
abeyance for seven months from date or until receipt
of the report of the learned mediator, whichever is
earlier. The plaintiffs are directed to approach the
District Legal Services Authority, West Bengal in
accordance with the Standard Operating Procedure
(SOP) dated December 11, 2020, mandatorily, within
two weeks from date. In case of default, the learned
court below shall be at liberty to pass such orders
in the suit for non-compliance of the order of court.
The Authority shall act in accordance with the said
Rules of 2018 and the SOP. The process is to be
completed within the period as prescribed by the Rule
3(8) of the Rules of 2018. The Mediator shall file the
report in such Form and manner as prescribed by
the Rules, before the learned court below within the
aforesaid period. The remuneration/fees etc. of the
learned Mediator will be fixed as per the SOP.
442 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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26. Upon receipt of the report from the Mediator, the
learned Commercial court will proceed according to
law. This revisional application is disposed of and
there shall be no order as to costs.”
4. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant-original
defendant has come up before us with the present appeal.

B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
5. Mr. Vikas Singh, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellant, vehemently submitted that the High Court committed an
egregious error in declining to reject the plaint having regard to the
mandatory provision of Section 12A of the 2015 Act. According to
the learned counsel, the issue is squarely covered by the decision
of this Court in Patil Automation Private Limited and Others v.
Rakheja Engineers Private Limited reported in (2022) 10 SCC 1,
wherein this Court has said in so many words that Section 12A
of the 2015 Act is mandatory and any suit instituted violating the
mandate of Section 12A must be visited with rejection of the plaint
under Order VII Rule 11.
6. The learned counsel laid much emphasis on the observations made
by this Court in Patil Automation (supra) as contained in paragraphs
103 and 114 of the judgment respectively. He would argue that in
Patil Automation (supra) this Court while holding on one hand that
it is crystal clear that the procedure provided under Section 12A of
the 2015 Act is mandatory, said on the other hand that in view of the
facts of Patil Automation (supra), where the trial had progressed
substantially, directed the parties to appear before the Secretary
District Legal Services Authority, Faridabad for mediation keeping
the suit alive and in abeyance. Taking a clue from the observations
made by this Court in paragraphs 103 and 114 of Patil Automation
(supra) respectively, the learned counsel submitted that the suit
in question is still at the initial stage and the same has been kept
in abeyance and has not progressed beyond filing of the written
statement. This, according to the learned counsel, would take the
suit in question out of the purview of the category where there has
been substantial progress in the suit. In other words, according to
the learned counsel, since there has been no progress worth the
name in the suit in question, the mandate of Section 12A will apply
with all force and the plaint ought to meet with the fate of rejection.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 443

M/s Dhanbad Fuels Private Limited v. Union of India & Anr.

7. The learned counsel submitted that this Court in Patil Automation
(supra) applied the principle of prospective overruling more particularly
for the purpose of issuing directions as contained in paragraph 113
and sub-paragraphs respectively thereof. Relying on the decision
of the Constitution Bench in I.C. Golaknath and others v. State of
Panjab and others reported in AIR 1967 SC 1643, more particularly
the observations made in paragraph 45 therein, the learned counsel
would submit that even while applying the doctrine of prospective
overruling the law laid down could be said to have been always the
same. If a subsequent decision changes the earlier one, the later
decision would not change the law but would only discover and lay
down the correct principle of law. According to the learned counsel,
if the suit is allowed to proceed further the same would amount to a
fresh litigation as it has not progressed beyond the initial stage and
has been under subsisting orders of stay since 2021.
8. In such circumstances referred to above, according to the learned
counsel there remains no material distinction between a fresh suit if
filed today and the present suit sought to be revived from the state
of inception.
9. The learned counsel laid much stress on his submission that the
suit in question would be governed by the declaration made by this
Court in Patil Automation (supra).
10. The learned counsel further submitted that while applying the
doctrine of prospective overruling, the House of Lords in the case
of Spectrum Plus Ltd., In re: reported in (2005) 3 WLR 58, has
held that prospective overruling takes several different forms. In
its simplest form prospective overruling involves a court giving a
ruling of the character sought by the bank in that case. Overruling
of this simple or “pure” type has the effect that the court’s ruling
has an exclusively prospective effect. The ruling applies only to
transactions or happenings occurring after the date of court’s decision.
All transactions entered into, or events occurring, before that date
continue to be governed by the law as it was conceived to be before
the court gave its ruling.
11. It was also argued that even otherwise since the suit has not
progressed beyond the initial stage the declaration made by this
Court in paragraph 104 of Patil Automation (supra) would apply
with all force. In paragraph 104 the Court observed, “They would
have to bring a fresh suit, no doubt after complying with Section 12A,
444 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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as permitted under Order VII Rule 13. Moreover, the declaration of
law by this Court would relate back to the date of the Amending Act
of 2018”. The same would be applicable in the present facts and
circumstances of the case.
12. In the last, the learned counsel submitted that if the suit is withdrawn
today and filed afresh after exploring the avenue of pre-institution
mediation, it would not, in any manner, give rise to the question of
limitation having been exhausted, since the plaintiff is the Central
Government, and the limitation to file the suit by Central Government
is 30 years under Article 112 of the schedule of the Limitation Act,
1963 (for short, “the Limitation Act”).
13. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed
that there being merit in his appeal the same may be allowed and
the plaint be ordered to be rejected.

C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE UNION OF INDIA
14. Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, the learned Additional Solicitor General,
submitted that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be
said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the
impugned order.
15. The learned ASG laid much emphasis on the fact that the suit instituted
by the Union of India for recovery of money from the appellant herein
should not fail in view of the purported non-compliance with Section
12A of the 2015 Act, more particularly, when the infrastructural
requirement for the mediation process was not completed and the
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) came to be framed only on
11.02.2020.
16. The learned ASG submitted that there need not be any debate on the
point that Section 12A of the 2015 Act is mandatory. In other words,
Section 12A stipulates compulsory pre-suit mediation. She would
submit that the issue is no longer res integra in view of the decision
of this Court in Patil Automation (supra). However, according to the
learned ASG the law laid down by this Court in Patil Automation
(supra) should be applied prospectively with effect from 20.08.2022
as made clear in the decision itself.
17. The learned ASG provided us with a table to give a bird’s eye view
of the timelines for insertion of Section 12A of the 2015 Act followed
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 445

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by creation of the necessary infrastructure for implementation of the
provisions and the filing of the money suit by Union of India.
18. According to the learned ASG, the table would reveal that after the
establishment of the first Commercial Court in Alipore, the statutory
framework and corresponding rules were progressively implemented
till December 2020. According to her, the money suit instituted in
2019 could not have been referred to pre-suit mediation under
Section 12A due to persisting infrastructural vacuum created by lack
of appointment of necessary authorities/mediators and delineation
of the procedural framework for the same. The table provided by
the learned ASG reads thus:

Insertion and subsequent
Date Money Suit
implementation of S.12A

S. 12A was introduced by
way of amendment to the
03.05.2018
2015 Act mandating pre-suit
mediation.

Central Government notified
the PIMS Rules. Rule 3
requires a party to make an
application to the Authority
for initiation of mediation
process. The Central
03.07.2018 Govt. further authorised
the State Authority and
District Authority constituted
under the Legal Services
Authorities Act, 1987 for the
purposes of pre-institution
mediation and settlement.

The Central Govt. further
authorised the authorities
constituted under the Legal
Services Authorities Act,
12.09.2018 1987 such as the National
and District Legal Services
Authorities for the purposes
of pre-institution mediation
and settlement.
446 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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Money Suit No. 28 of 2019
filed before the Commercial
Court by the respondents
09.08.2019
seeking recovery of a sum of
INR 8,73,36,976 against the
appellant.
The appellant filed its written
20.12.2019
statement in the suit.
A panel of trained mediators
for conducting pre-litigation
mediation in commercial
27.01.2020
disputes was sent to the State
Legal Services Authority,
West Bengal.
Appellant filed an application
under Order 7 Rule 11 of
the CPC seeking rejection
of the plaint after more than
30.09.2020 one year of filing of the suit,
evincing that the same was
merely an afterthought with
the purpose of negating the
suit.
The SOP was prepared by
14.10.2020 the State Legal Services
Authority.
11.12.2020 The SOP was approved

19. The learned ASG submitted that although the first commercial
court was established at Alipore on 05.07.2019, yet the institutional
infrastructure for pre-suit mediation was not in place until much later.
This is because the panel of trained mediators was prepared only on
27.01.2020 followed by approval of the SOP on 21.12.2020. As such,
when the Union of India instituted the Money Suit on 09.08.2019, the
requisite infrastructure for conducting pre-suit mediation was not yet
established thereby making compliance with Section 12A impossible.
20. The learned ASG tried to fortify her submission by relying on the
equitable maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia, i.e., law does not
compel an impossible performance. In this regard, the learned ASG
placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Raj
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 447

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Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey reported in (1987) 4 SCC 398, more
particularly, the observations made in paragraph 6 therein.
21. The learned ASG submitted that taking advantage of this administrative
vacuum, the appellant should not be allowed to defeat the money
suit under the garb of non-compliance. Section 12A, at its nascent
stage was not a feasible course. If settlement through mediation is
truly the real objective and intention of the petitioner, the same may
be fully achieved by the impugned order.
22. It was further submitted that had Union of India awaited the
establishment of the requisite infrastructure, the same would have
unduly impeded the recovery process in a money suit involving
public funds, thereby defeating the very purpose and legislative
intent of the 2015 Act, which aims to ensure expeditious resolution
of commercial disputes.
23. In the last the learned ASG submitted that if the money suit instituted
by the Union of India is dismissed on the ground of Section 12A of
the 2015 Act, the Union of India would still have the opportunity to
file another suit on the same cause of action under Order VII Rule
13 of the CPC and the process would have to start afresh. The
court fees would also have to be deposited for the fresh suit. Such
delay and protraction of the suit proceedings would be contrary to
the very objective of the 2015 Act and the same may lead the public
exchequer to suffer.
24. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned ASG prayed
that there being no merit in this appeal, the same may be dismissed.

D. ANALYSIS
25. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, two questions fall for
our consideration:
a. Whether the High Court committed any error in passing the
impugned order; and
b. Whether, due to non-compliance with Section 12A of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015, a suit should be dismissed under
Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or
whether it should be kept in abeyance, directing the parties to
first explore the possibility of settlement by instituting mediation?
448 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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i. Legislative intent behind the enactment of Section 12A of
the 2015 Act
26. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side,
we must look into few relevant provisions of law.
27. Section 12A of the 2015 Act reads as follows:
“12-A. Pre-institution mediation and settlement.—(1)
A suit, which does not contemplate any urgent interim
relief under this Act, shall not be instituted unless the
plaintiff exhausts the remedy of pre-institution mediation
in accordance with such manner and procedure as may
be prescribed by rules made by the Central Government.
(2) The Central Government may, by notification, authorise
the Authorities constituted under the Legal Services
Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), for the purposes of
pre-institution mediation.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Legal
Services Authorities Act, 1987 (39 of 1987), the Authority
authorised by the Central Government under sub-section
(2) shall complete the process of mediation within a period
of three months from the date of application made by the
plaintiff under sub-section (1):
Provided that the period of mediation may be extended
for a further period of two months with the consent of the
parties:
Provided further that, the period during which the parties
remained occupied with the pre-institution mediation, such
period shall not be computed for the purpose of limitation
under the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963).
(4) If the parties to the commercial dispute arrive at a
settlement, the same shall be reduced into writing and shall
be signed by the parties to the dispute and the mediator.
(5) The settlement arrived at under this section shall have
the same status and effect as if it is an arbitral award on
agreed terms under sub-section (4) of Section 30 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996).”
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 449

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28. At the time of enactment of the 2015 Act, the monetary limit for a suit
liable to be tried by the Commercial Court was fixed at Rs 1 crore.
29. In the course of three years, noticing certain features, the legislature
decided to amend the 2015 Act. Therefore, in the year 2018,
the 2015 Act came to be amended by the Commercial Courts,
Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High
Courts (Amendment) Act, 2018 (Act 28 of 2018) (hereinafter referred
to as “the Amending Act”).
30. It is apposite that we notice the Statement of Objects and Reasons
of the Amending Act:
“Statement of Objects and Reasons.—The Commercial
Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate
Division of High Courts Act, 2015 was enacted for the
constitution of Commercial Courts, Commercial Division
and Commercial Appellate Division in the High Courts for
adjudicating commercial disputes of specified value and
for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.
2. The global economic environment has since become
increasingly competitive and to attract business at
international level, India needs to further improve its ranking
in the World Bank “Doing Business Report” which, inter alia,
considers the dispute resolution environment in the country
as one of the parameters for doing business. Further,
the tremendous economic development has ushered in
enormous commercial activities in the country including
foreign direct investments, public private partnership,
etc. which has prompted initiating legislative measures
for speedy settlement of commercial disputes, widen the
scope of the courts to deal with commercial disputes and
facilitate ease of doing business. Needless to say that
early resolution of commercial disputes of even lesser
value creates a positive image amongst the investors
about the strong and responsive Indian legal system. It
is, therefore, proposed to amend the Commercial Courts,
Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division
of High Courts Act, 2015.
3. As Parliament was not in session and immediate action
was required to be taken to make necessary amendments
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in the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and
Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015,
to further improve India’s ranking in the “Doing Business
Report”, the President promulgated the Commercial Courts,
Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of
High Courts (Amendment) Ordinance, 2018 on 3-5-2018.
4. It is proposed to introduce the Commercial Courts,
Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division
of High Courts (Amendment) Bill, 2018 to replace the
Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial
Appellate Division of High Courts (Amendment) Ordinance,
2018, which inter alia, provides for the following namely—
(i) to reduce the specified value of commercial disputes
from the existing one crore rupees to three lakh rupees,
and to enable the parties to approach the lowest level of
subordinate courts for speedy resolution of commercial
disputes;
(ii) to enable the State Governments, with respect to the
High Courts having ordinary original civil jurisdiction, to
constitute commercial courts at District Judge level and
to specify such pecuniary value of commercial disputes
which shall not be less than three lakh rupees and not
more than the pecuniary jurisdiction of the district courts;
(iii) to enable the State Governments, except the territories
over which the High Courts have ordinary original civil
jurisdiction, to designate such number of Commercial
Appellate Courts at district judge level to exercise the
appellate jurisdiction over the commercial courts below
the district judge level;
(iv) to enable the State Governments to specify such
pecuniary value of a commercial dispute which shall not
be less than three lakh rupees or such higher value, for
the whole or part of the State; and
(v) to provide for compulsory mediation before institution of
a suit, where no urgent interim relief is contemplated and
for this purpose, to introduce the pre-institution mediation
and settlement mechanism and to enable the Central
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 451

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Government to authorise the authorities constituted under
the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 for this purpose.
5. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.”
31. It is, accordingly, by the Amending Act that Section 12A came to be
inserted. We should also look into the PIMS Rules that came to be
published in the Gazette and thereby came into force on 03.7.2018.
Rule 3 reads as follows:
“3. Initiation of mediation process.—(1) A party to
a commercial dispute may make an application to the
Authority as per Form 1 specified in Schedule I, either
online or by post or by hand, for initiation of mediation
process under the Act along with a fee of one thousand
rupees payable to the Authority either by way of demand
draft or through online;
(2) The Authority shall, having regard to the territorial and
pecuniary jurisdiction and the nature of commercial dispute,
issue a notice, as per Form 2 specified in Schedule I
through a registered or speed post and electronic means
including e-mail and the like to the opposite party to appear
and give consent to participate in the mediation process
on such date not beyond a period of ten days from the
date of issue of the said notice.
(3) Where no response is received from the opposite party
either by post or by e-mail, the Authority shall issue a final
notice to it in the manner as specified in sub-rule (2).
(4) Where the notice issued under sub-rule (3) remains
unacknowledged or where the opposite party refuses to
participate in the mediation process, the Authority shall
treat the mediation process to be a non-starter and make
a report as per Form 3 specified in the Schedule I and
endorse the same to the applicant and the opposite party.
(5) Where the opposite party, after receiving the notice
under sub-rule (2) or (3) seeks further time for his
appearance, the Authority may, if it thinks fit, fix an alternate
date not later than ten days from the date of receipt of
such request from the opposite party.
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(6) Where the opposite party fails to appear on the date
fixed under sub-rule (5), the Authority shall treat the
mediation process to be a non-starter and make a report
in this behalf as per Form 3 specified in Schedule I and
endorse the same to the applicant and the opposite party.
(7) Where both the parties to the commercial dispute
appear before the Authority and give consent to participate
in the mediation process, the Authority shall assign the
commercial dispute to a mediator and fix a date for their
appearance before the said mediator.
(8) The Authority shall ensure that the mediation process
is completed within a period of three months from the
date of receipt of application for pre-institution mediation
unless the period is extended for further two months with
the consent of the applicant and the opposite party.”
32. A perusal of Section 12A indicates that the period during which the
parties remain occupied with the pre-institution mediation shall not
be computed for the purpose of limitation under the Limitation Act.
Further, if the parties to the commercial dispute arrive at a settlement,
the same shall be reduced into writing and shall be signed by the
parties to the dispute and the mediator. The settlement arrived shall
have the same status and effect as if it is an arbitral award on agreed
terms under Section 30(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
This is another remarkable feature of the mediation regime ushered
in by the Amending Act which, by deeming the mediated settlement
at par with an arbitral award, provides strong legal backing to the
mediation process and ensures that the enforceability of the same
is met with fewer hurdles, thereby increasing the attractiveness of
mediation as an alternative to litigation.
33. The aim and object of Section 12A is to ensure that before a
commercial dispute is filed before the court, the alternative means
of dissolution are adopted so that only genuine cases come before
the courts. The said procedure has been introduced to decongest
the regular courts.

ii. Section 12A of the 2015 Act is mandatory in nature
34. We shall now look into the decision of this Court in Patil Automation
(supra). In Patil Automation (supra), this Court declared Section
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 453

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12A of the 2015 Act to be mandatory in nature. It further held that
pre-litigation mediation is necessary, unless the suit contemplates an
urgent interim relief. The decision obviated the prevailing confusion
as regards the mandatory nature of Section 12A of the 2015 Act
as well as the legal consequences of non-compliance, which was
necessary in light of the divergent views adopted by a number of
High Courts. A few relevant observations from the said decision are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“The regime under Order VII Rule 11CPC
92. Order VII Rule 11 declares that the plaint can be
rejected on 6 grounds. They include failure to disclose
the cause of action, and where the suit appears from the
statement in the plaint to be barred. We are concerned
in these cases with the latter. Order VII Rule 12 provides
that when a plaint is rejected, an order to that effect with
reasons must be recorded. Order VII Rule 13 provides that
rejection of the plaint mentioned in Order VII Rule 11 does
not by itself preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh
plaint in respect of the same cause of action. Order VII
deals with various aspects about what is to be pleaded in
a plaint, the documents that should accompany and other
details. Order IV Rule 1 provides that a suit is instituted by
presentation of the plaint to the court or such officer as the
court appoints. By virtue of Order IV Rule 1(3), a plaint is
to be deemed as duly instituted only when it complies with
the requirements under Order VI and Order VII. Order V
Rule 1 declares that when a suit has been duly instituted,
a summon may be issued to the defendant to answer the
claim on a date specified therein. There are other details in
the order with which we are not to be detained. We have
referred to these rules to prepare the stage for considering
the question as to whether the power under Order VII Rule
11 is to be exercised only on an application by the defendant
and the stage at which it can be exercised.
93. In Patasibai v. Ratanlal reported in (1990) 2 SCC
42, one of the specific contentions was that there was no
specific objection for rejecting of the plaint taken earlier.
In the facts of the case, the Court observed as under :
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“13. On the admitted facts appearing from the record
itself, the learned counsel for the respondent, was
unable to show that all or any of these averments
in the plaint disclose a cause of action giving rise
to a triable issue. In fact, Shri Salve was unable to
dispute the inevitable consequence that the plaint
was liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC
on these averments. All that Shri Salve contended
was that the court did not in fact reject the plaint
under Order 7 Rule 11CPC and summons having
been issued, the trial must proceed. In our opinion,
it makes no difference that the trial court failed to
perform its duty and proceeded to issue summons
without carefully reading the plaint and the High Court
also overlooked this fatal defect. Since the plaint
suffers from this fatal defect, the mere issuance of
summons by the trial court does not require that the
trial should proceed even when no triable issue is
shown to arise. Permitting the continuance of such a
suit is tantamount to licensing frivolous and vexatious
litigation. This cannot be done.”
94. On a consideration of the scheme of Orders IV, V and
VII of the CPC, we arrive at the following conclusions:
94.1. A suit is commenced by presentation of a plaint.
The date of the presentation in terms of Section 3(2) of
the Limitation Act, 1963 is the date of presentation for the
purpose of the said Act. By virtue of Order 4 Rule 1(3),
institution of the plaint, however, is complete only when
the plaint is in conformity with the requirement of Order
6 and Order 7.
94.2. When the court decides the question as to issue
of summons under Order V Rule 1, what the court must
consider is whether a suit has been duly instituted.
94.3. Order VII Rule 11 does not provide that the court
is to discharge its duty of rejecting the plaint only on an
application. Order VII Rule 11 is, in fact, silent about any
such requirement. Since summon is to be issued in a
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 455

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duly instituted suit, in a case where the plaint is barred
under Order VII Rule 11(d), the stage begins at that time
when the court can reject the plaint under Order VII Rule
11. No doubt it would take a clear case where the court
is satisfied. The Court has to hear the plaintiff before it
invokes its power besides giving reasons under Order
VII Rule 12. In a clear case, where on allegations in
the suit, it is found that the suit is barred by any law, as
would be the case, where the plaintiff in a suit under the
Act does not plead circumstances to take his case out
of the requirement of Section 12A, the plaint should be
rejected without issuing summons. Undoubtedly, on issuing
summons it will be always open to the defendant to make
an application as well under Order VII Rule 11. In other
words, the power under Order VII Rule 11 is available to
the court to be exercised suo motu. (See in this regard,
the judgment of this Court in Madiraju Venkata Ramana
Raju v. Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy, (2018)
14 SCC 1)”
(Emphasis supplied)

35. The Court summed up its reasoning from paragraph 99 onwards
as follows:
“99.1. The Act did not originally contain Section 12-A. It
is by amendment in the year 2018 that Section 12-A was
inserted. The Statement of Objects and Reasons are explicit
that Section 12-A was contemplated as compulsory. The
object of the Act and the Amending Act of 2018, unerringly
point to at least partly foisting compulsory mediation on
a plaintiff who does not contemplate urgent interim relief.
The provision has been contemplated only with reference
to plaintiffs who do not contemplate urgent interim relief.
The legislature has taken care to expressly exclude the
period undergone during mediation for reckoning limitation
under the Limitation Act, 1963. The object is clear.
99.2. It is an undeniable reality that courts in India
are reeling under an extraordinary docket explosion.
Mediation, as an alternative dispute mechanism, has
456 [2025] 6 S.C.R.

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been identified as a workable solution in commercial
matters. In other words, the cases under the Act lend
themselves to be resolved through mediation. Nobody
has an absolute right to file a civil suit. A civil suit can be
barred absolutely or the bar may operate unless certain
conditions are fulfilled. Cases in point, which amply
illustrate this principle, are Section 80 CPC and Section
69 of the Partnership Act.
99.3. The language used in Section 12-A, which includes
the word “shall”, certainly, goes a long way to assist the
Court to hold that the provision is mandatory. The entire
procedure for carrying out the mediation, has been spelt
out in the Rules. The parties are free to engage counsel
during mediation. The expenses, as far as the fee payable
to the mediator, is concerned, is limited to a one-time
fee, which appears to be reasonable, particularly, having
regard to the fact that it is to be shared equally. A trained
mediator can work wonders.
99.4. Mediation must be perceived as a new mechanism
of access to justice. We have already highlighted its
benefits. Any reluctance on the part of the Court to give
Section 12-A, a mandatory interpretation, would result in
defeating the object and intention of Parliament. The fact
that the mediation can become a non-starter, cannot be
a reason to hold the provision not mandatory. Apparently,
the value judgment of the lawgiver is to give the provision,
a modicum of voluntariness for the defendant, whereas,
the plaintiff, who approaches the court, must, necessarily,
resort to it. Section 12-A elevates the settlement under
the Act and the Rules to an award within the meaning of
Section 30(4) of the Arbitration Act, giving it meaningful
enforceability. The period spent in mediation is excluded
for the purpose of limitation. The Act confers power to
order costs based on conduct of the parties.”
(Emphasis supplied)

36. Touching upon the aspect of what the expression “does not
contemplate urgent interim relief” appearing in Section 12A of the
2015 Act entails, the judgment observed that unlike Section 80(2)
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of the CPC which allows the filing of a suit after seeking leave of
the court, Section 12A contains no such stipulation. The Court also
observed that whether the absence of such stipulation under Section
12A could be misused by litigants to bypass the mandate of pre-
litigation mediation was an aspect which may be looked into by the
legislature. The relevant observations read as follows:
“100. In the cases before us, the suits do not contemplate
urgent interim relief. As to what should happen in suits
which do contemplate urgent interim relief or rather the
meaning of the word “contemplate” or urgent interim relief,
we need not dwell upon it. The other aspect raised about
the word “contemplate” is that there can be attempts
to bypass the statutory mediation under Section 12-A
by contending that the plaintiff is contemplating urgent
interim relief, which in reality, it is found to be without
any basis. Section 80(2) CPC permits the suit to be filed
where urgent interim relief is sought by seeking the leave
of the court. The proviso to Section 80(2) contemplates
that the court shall, if, after hearing the parties, is satisfied
that no urgent or immediate relief need be granted in
the suit, return the plaint for presentation to the court
after compliance. Our attention is drawn to the fact that
Section 12-A does not contemplate such a procedure.
This is a matter which may engage attention of the
lawmaker. Again, we reiterate that these are not issues
which arise for our consideration. In the fact of the cases
admittedly there is no urgent interim relief contemplated
in the plaints in question.”
(Emphasis supplied)

37. The Court ultimately disposed of the matters in the following manner:
“113.1. We declare that Section 12-A of the Act is
mandatory and hold that any suit instituted violating the
mandate of Section 12-A must be visited with rejection
of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11. This power can be
exercised even suo motu by the court as explained earlier
in the judgment. We, however, make this declaration
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effective from 20-8-2022 so that stakeholders concerned
become sufficiently informed.
113.2. Still further, we however direct that in case plaints
have been already rejected and no steps have been
taken within the period of limitation, the matter cannot be
reopened on the basis of this declaration. Still further, if
the order of rejection of the plaint has been acted upon
by filing a fresh suit, the declaration of prospective effect
will not avail the plaintiff.
113.3. Finally, if the plaint is filed violating Section 12-A
after the jurisdictional High Court has declared Section 12-A
mandatory also, the plaintiff will not be entitled to the relief.”
(Emphasis supplied)

38. As discussed aforesaid, the observations in paragraph 100 of Patil
Automation (supra) refer to Section 80(2) of the CPC, which permits
a suit, praying urgent interim relief, to be filed by seeking the leave of
the court. The proviso to Section 80(2) of the CPC states that, if, after
hearing the parties, the court is satisfied that no urgent or immediate
relief is required to be granted in the suit, the court may return the
plaint for presentation to it after compliance with requirements of
Section 80(1) of the CPC.
39. The position of law is well settled that a plaint may be rejected under
Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC if any of the conditions specified therein
are fulfilled. The decision in Patil Automation (supra) recognised this
principle and stipulated that beginning 20.08.2022, any suit instituted
under the 2015 Act without complying with Section 12A must meet
with the fate of rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11. It is also
pertinent to observe that under Order VII Rule 11, no time period
within which the plaint may be rejected has been stipulated. The
power to reject a plaint, thus, can be exercised at any stage of the
suit. This Court in Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed
Jalal reported in (2017) 13 SCC 174 observed that the power to
reject a plain is exercisable by the court at any stage of the suit.
The relevant observations read as under:
“7. The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if
conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled.
It is needless to observe that the power under Order 7
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Rule 11 CPC can be exercised by the Court at any stage
of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked
into for deciding the application are the averments of
the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of
the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious
and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right
to sue, the court should exercise power under Order 7
Rule 11 CPC. Since the power conferred on the Court
to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the
conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to
the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be
strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to
be read as a whole to find out whether the averments
disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred
by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as
to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
The averments in the written statement as well as the
contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while
considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of
the plaint. Even when the allegations made in the plaint
are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value,
if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not
disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of
plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7
Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting of the
plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the
court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus
litigation will end at the earlier stage.”
(Emphasis supplied)

40. Similarly, in Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India
Staff Assn., reported in (2005) 7 SCC 510, this Court observed that
the scheme of Order VII Rule 11 is silent about the stage at which
the power to reject a plaint may be invoked by the court. However,
the use of the word “shall” denotes that the courts are under an
obligation to reject a plaint if the conditions specified therein are
satisfied. Thus, it could be said that under the scheme of Order VII
Rule 11, it is not the stage at which the objection is raised which is
relevant, but it is the merit of the objection raised which has been
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conferred primacy. The relevant observations from the said decision
read as under:
“23. Rule 11 of Order 7 lays down an independent
remedy made available to the defendant to challenge the
maintainability of the suit itself, irrespective of his right
to contest the same on merits. The law ostensibly does
not contemplate at any stage when the objections can
be raised, and also does not say in express terms about
the filing of a written statement. Instead, the word “shall”
is used clearly implying thereby that it casts a duty on
the court to perform its obligations in rejecting the plaint
when the same is hit by any of the infirmities provided in
the four clauses of Rule 11, even without intervention of
the defendant. In any event, rejection of the plaint under
Rule 11 does not preclude the plaintiffs from presenting
a fresh plaint in terms of Rule 13.”
(Emphasis supplied)

41. At this juncture, we would like to point out that the Trial Court in the
instant case, while refusing to allow the application of the appellant
under Order VII Rule 11, observed that the application, having been
filed at a belated stage of more than an year after the filing of the
written statement, was liable to be rejected. However, the decision
in Patil Automation (supra) does not leave any scope for a similar
approach to be adopted by courts anymore in cases where Section
12A has not been duly complied with. The Court in the said decision
has also observed that even if a plea of rejection of plaint is not
taken by the defendant, the courts must suo motu take note of the
non-compliance with Section 12A and reject the plaint, and the stage
of the suit proceedings is not a valid consideration to be looked into
while rejecting a plaint. However, as we shall discuss in more detail in
the subsequent paragraphs, the decision in Patil Automation (supra)
makes the consequence of rejection of plaint for non-compliance
prospectively applicable for suits instituted post 20.08.2022.

iii. How the expression “urgent interim relief” is to be construed
42. Further, it is also pertinent to note that Section 12A of the 2015
Act does not contemplate leave of the court for filing a suit which
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contemplates an urgent interim relief, as is clear from the language
and words used in the provision. The provision also does not
necessarily require an application seeking exemption if a suit is being
filed without pre-institution mediation. An application seeking waiver
on account of urgent interim relief setting out grounds and reasons
may allay a challenge and assist the court, but in the absence of
any statutory mandate or rules made by the Central Government, an
application per se is not a condition under Section 12A of the 2015
Act. Pleadings on record and oral submissions would be sufficient
in ordinary course.
43. This Court in Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi reported in (2024) 5
SCC 815 while interpreting the import of the expression “a suit which
does not contemplate any urgent interim relief” used in Section 12A
of the 2015 Act observed that the word “contemplate” connotes to
deliberate and consider. Further, the legal position that the plaint can
be rejected and not entertained reflects application of mind by the
court as regards the requirement of “urgent interim relief”. The Court
further observed that the prayer of urgent interim relief should not act
as a disguise to get over the bar contemplated under Section 12A.
However, at the same time, the Court observed that the mere non-
grant of the interim relief at the ad-interim stage, when the plaint is
taken up for admission and examination would not justify the rejection
of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, as interim relief is
at times also granted after issuance of notice. Further, even if after
the conclusion of arguments on the aspect of interim relief, the same
is denied on merits, that would not by itself justify the rejection of
the plaint under Order VII Rule 11. The relevant observations from
the said decision are reproduced hereinbelow:
“10. We are of the opinion that when a plaint is filed
under the CC Act, with a prayer for an urgent interim
relief, the commercial court should examine the nature
and the subject-matter of the suit, the cause of action,
and the prayer for interim relief. The prayer for urgent
interim relief should not be a disguise or mask to wriggle
out of and get over Section 12-A of the CC Act. The facts
and circumstances of the case have to be considered
holistically from the standpoint of the plaintiff. Non-grant
of interim relief at the ad interim stage, when the plaint is
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taken up for registration/admission and examination, will
not justify dismissal of the commercial suit under Order
7 Rule 11 of the Code; at times, interim relief is granted
after issuance of notice. Nor can the suit be dismissed
under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, because the interim
relief, post the arguments, is denied on merits and on
examination of the three principles, namely : (i) prima facie
case, (ii) irreparable harm and injury, and (iii) balance of
convenience. The fact that the court issued notice and/or
granted interim stay may indicate that the court is inclined
to entertain the plaint.
11. Having stated so, it is difficult to agree with the
proposition that the plaintiff has the absolute choice and
right to paralyse Section 12-A of the CC Act by making a
prayer for urgent interim relief. Camouflage and guise to
bypass the statutory mandate of pre-litigation mediation
should be checked when deception and falsity is apparent
or established. The proposition that the commercial courts
do have a role, albeit a limited one, should be accepted,
otherwise it would be up to the plaintiff alone to decide
whether to resort to the procedure under Section 12-A of the
CC Act. An “absolute and unfettered right” approach is not
justified if the pre-institution mediation under Section 12-A
of the CC Act is mandatory, as held by this Court in Patil
Automation [Patil Automation (P) Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers
(P) Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1 : (2023) 1 SCC (Civ) 545] .
12. The words “contemplate any urgent interim relief” in
Section 12-A(1) of the CC Act, with reference to the suit,
should be read as conferring power on the court to be
satisfied. They suggest that the suit must “contemplate”,
which means the plaint, documents and facts should show
and indicate the need for an urgent interim relief. This
is the precise and limited exercise that the commercial
courts will undertake, the contours of which have been
explained in the earlier paragraph(s). This will be sufficient
to keep in check and ensure that the legislative object/
intent behind the enactment of Section 12-A of the CC
Act is not defeated.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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44. Thus, it becomes clear from a perusal of the aforesaid decision that
the test under Section 12A is not whether the prayer for the urgent
interim relief actually comes to be allowed or not, but whether on
an examination of the nature and the subject-matter of the suit
and the cause of action, the prayer of urgent interim relief by the
plaintiff could be said to be contemplable when the matter is seen
from the standpoint of the plaintiff. Further, what is also to be kept
in mind by the courts is that the urgent interim relief must not be
merely an unfounded excuse by the plaintiff to bypass the mandatory
requirement of Section 12A of the 2015 Act.
45. In the case at hand indisputably, no urgent interim relief was prayed
for at the time of the institution of the suit by the Union.

iv. The effect of according prospectivity to the declaration
in Patil Automation (supra) on cases like the one at hand
46. In Patil Automation (supra), this Court held that the language of
Section 12A is plainly imperative in nature, and any commercial suit
instituted without adhering to this provision is liable to be rejected
under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. However, recognising that
the Amending Act containing Section 12A is a ‘toddler’, and that
the “law necessarily would have teething problems at the nascent
stage”, this Court declared the aforesaid declaration to operate
prospectively, effective from 20.08.2022, so that the stakeholders
may be sufficiently informed. In the instant case, as the money suit
was filed by the respondents much prior to the decision in Patil
Automation (supra), it is squarely protected by the prospective
ruling of this Court.
47. This Court had further held that the protective umbrella of prospective
overruling in Patil Automation (supra) would not apply to plaints
which were rejected, and no steps had been taken within the period
of limitation; or such rejection had been acted upon by filing a new
suit; or if the plaint violating Section 12A had been filed after the
jurisdictional High Court has declared the provision to be mandatory.
Indisputably, the Union of India does not fall under any of the other
aforementioned exceptions. Thus, we find it difficult to agree with
the submission canvassed by the appellant that the bar of Section
12A of the 2015 Act would continue to apply to the money suit filed
by the respondents despite there being a prospective declaration in
Patil Automation (supra).
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48. While it is correct that any declaration of the correct position of the
law goes back to the day of the inception of the law itself, as the
courts merely discover the correct position of law by applying settled
legal principles and not legislate a new legal position, it is equally
well recognised that the courts, while declaring an interpretation of
the law, may declare it to be operative only prospectively so as to
prevent chaos which may ensue as a result of the unsettling of the
transactions which may have taken place before such declaration.
Taking a clue from the decisions of this Court on the aspect of
prospective overruling, it could be said that this Court has been
endowed with the power to mould the relief to do complete justice in
a given situation, and to avoid the possibility of chaos and confusion
that may be caused in the society at large.

v. The equitable maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia
49. It is settled that law does not compel an impossible performance,
and the same position has been followed by this Court in a catena
of judgments. Espousing the aforesaid maxim in Raj Kumar Dey
(supra) this Court has held as follows:
“6. …. The other maxim is lex non cogit ad impossibilia
(Broom’s Legal Maxims — page 162) — The law does not
compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform.
The law itself and the administration of it, said Sir W. Scott,
with reference to an alleged infraction of the revenue
laws, must yield to that to which everything must bend,
to necessity; the law, in its most positive and peremptory
injunctions, is understood to disclaim, as it does in its general
aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the
administration of laws must adopt that general exception in
the consideration of all particular cases.”
50. The aforesaid maxim was recognised and reiterated by this Court in
U.P. SRTC v. Imtiaz Hussain reported in (2006) 1 SCC 380.
51. The materials on record would indicate that after the establishment
of the first Commercial Court at Alipore, the statutory framework and
corresponding rules were progressively implemented until December
2020. Therefore, during this intervening period, referring the matter
to pre-suit mediation under Section 12A was impossible due to a
persisting vacuum created by lack of appointment of necessary
authorities and delineation of the procedural framework.
[2025] 6 S.C.R. 465

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52. The learned ASG is right to some extent in her submission that
awaiting the establishment of the requisite infrastructure would
unduly impede the recovery process in a money suit involving public
funds, thereby defeating the very purpose and legislative intent of
the 2015 Act, which aims to ensure the expeditious resolution of
commercial disputes.
53. The declaration of the mandatory nature of Section 12A of the 2015
Act was given prospective effect in Patil Automation (supra) keeping
in mind the fact that Section 12A, being in its stages of infancy,
had given rise to conflicting views by different High Courts and
consequently an overall lack of clarity on the nature of the provision.
Thus, the Court was of the view that in the absence of prospective
effect being given to the declaration, all such suits which had been
filed without complying with the provision, owing to the lack of clarity on
the mandatory nature of the provision, would be susceptible to being
rejected and the court fees submitted at the time of their institution
being written off. The Court further expressed apprehensions as
regards the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to fresh
suits filed after the rejection of plaint for non-compliance with Section
12A and thus held that it would be in the best interest of justice that
the declaration of mandatory compliance with Section 12A be given
prospectivity to avoid the aforesaid complexities from cropping up.
54. While giving prospectivity to its finding on the mandatory nature of
Section 12A and the consequence of rejection of plaint in cases
of non-compliance, the Court also observed that the prospective
declaration would not save the situation in certain categories of cases
which we have discussed in paragraph 47 above. However, it is not
the case of the appellant that the case at hand falls within the ambit
of any of the exceptions laid down in Patil Automation (supra).
55. It is interesting to note that the decision impugned before us was
referred to by this Court in paragraph 54 of Patil Automation (supra)
while it was discussing the divergent views of different High Courts
on the nature of Section 12A of the 2015 Act. Therein, this Court
had observed thus:
“54. A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta,
in the decision reported in Dhanbad Fuels Ltd. v. Union
of India and Others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 429, took the
view that mediation in India is still at a nascent stage and
requires more awareness. There was a need for mandatory
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training of commercial disputes. It was further found that
the party cannot be denied the right to participate in the
justice dispensation system. It wasfurther noticed that
there was no obligation on the part of the defendant to
respond to the initiative of the plaintiff. Rejecting the plaint
under Order VII Rule 11(d) in view of Order VII Rule 13,
which enables a fresh Suit to be filed upon rejection under
Order VII Rule 11, would show that the power under Order
VII Rule 11 should not be invoked as it would not be in
accordance with the objectives of the Act and the Rules.”
56. After taking into consideration the view taken by the Calcutta High
Court in the impugned decision as well as the view of several other
High Courts, this Court, in Patil Automation (supra), arrived at the
findings as we have discussed in detail in the preceding paragraphs.
Thus, insofar as the interpretation of the nature of Section 12A of
the 2015 Act in the impugned decision is concerned, the same must
be seen in the context of the decision in Patil Automation (supra).
57. However, the pertinent question that falls for us is whether the
approach adopted by the Trial Court and approved by the High Court
in the present case, in keeping the suit in abeyance, and sending
the parties to mediation as per the PIMS Rules and the 2020 SOP,
was the correct approach. In other words, while the decision in Patil
Automation (supra) is clear that any suit instituted after 20.08.2022
without complying with Section 12A of the 2015 Act must be visited
with the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11, whether in
suits filed prior to the said date, the courts must keep the suit in
abeyance and refer the parties to mediation, and proceed with it
only after the report of the mediator is received.
58. The answer to the aforesaid question requires us to harmoniously
construe the two observations made by this Court in Patil Automation
(supra). The Court observed in paragraph 104 of the said decision
that the declaration of the law by the Court would relate back to
the date of the Amending Act. However, keeping in mind practical
considerations, the Court in paragraph 113.1 observed that the
consequence of rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 for not
complying with Section 12A of the 2015 Act would only be operative
prospectively with effect from 20.08.2022. Thus, what is clear from a
joint reading of both these observations is that while Section 12A is
held to be mandatory from the date of the inception of the provision
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itself, the consequence of rejection for non-compliance is only made
applicable prospectively.
59. Thus, although suits which were instituted before the date of the
decision in Patil Automation (supra) may not be rejected under
Order VII Rule 11 for not complying with Section 12A of the 2015
Act, unless they fall within the exceptional categories described in
the said decision itself, yet this would not obviate the requirement
of giving the parties a chance to attempt to resolve the disputes
through mediation as envisaged under Section 12A of the 2015 Act.
One of the ways by which this can be achieved is by keeping the
suit in abeyance and referring the parties to a time-bound mediation
and only proceeding with the suit once the report of the mediator is
received. This approach would ensure that even if not pre-institution,
the parties at the very least get an opportunity to resolve the disputes
through mediation post the institution of the suit. This in no way
means that Section 12A envisages post-institution mediation. Post-
institution mediation, while keeping the suit in abeyance, is only
envisaged for the limited category of cases which are not covered
by the prospective declaration made in Patil Automation (supra)
as the rejection of plaints under Order VII Rule 11 has been done
away with in the interest of justice in such category of cases. This
approach also received the tacit approval of this Court in Patil
Automation (supra), wherein while disapproving the reasoning
adopted in the order impugned therein, the Court refused to interfere
with the impugned order which had referred the parties to mediation
while keeping the suit in abeyance.
60. However, it is also important to clarify that in cases where a suit
instituted prior to 20.08.2022 has been decided, it would not be of any
avail to the parties to revisit the same on the ground of mandatory
compliance with Section 12A of the 2015 Act. However, wherever
such a suit is pending before the trial court and an objection is raised
by the defendant for non-compliance with Section 12A of the 2015
Act, or any intent to settle the dispute by mediation is exhibited by
the parties, then it would be permissible for the court to keep the
suit in abeyance and refer the parties to time-bound mediation in
accordance with the 2015 Act, the PIMS Rules and the 2020 SOP.
61. Before we part with the matter, we also deem it appropriate to address
one of the main contentions of the appellant that having regard to
the fact that the suit is still at the nascent stage of filing of written
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statement and no substantial progress has been made therein, this
Court must reject the plaint and direct the respondents to institute a
fresh suit after complying with the mandatory requirement of Section
12A. However, we do not find any force in the aforesaid submission.
We do not see how directing the respondents to institute a fresh
suit would be of any benefit to the appellant. We have discussed in
detail that this Court in Patil Automation (supra) made its decision
prospectively applicable keeping in mind the predicament of suits like
the one at hand wherein owing to a lack of clarity in law, Section 12A
of the 2015 could not be complied with in certain cases. Directing
the institution of a fresh suit would only result into the forfeiture of
the court fees deposited by the respondents, which would only be an
unnecessary burden on the public exchequer. The approach adopted
by the Trial Court and the High Court in keeping the suit in abeyance
and directing the parties to approach the competent authority for
mediation commends more to us as it complies with a harmonious
reading of the decision in Patil Automation (supra) and prevents
unnecessary delays and burden on the public exchequer. Further,
substantial progress in the suit was not the only reason why the Court
in Patil Automation (supra) gave prospective effect to its decision.
As we have discussed, factors like forfeiture of court fees, ambiguity
over the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, unsettling
of settled cases, etc. were a few other reasons which weighed with
the Court in arriving at its decision of according prospectivity to the
judgment. Thus, we find it difficult to accept the argument advanced
by the appellant that the plaint must be rejected for the reason that
the suit has not made substantial progress after its institution.

E. CONCLUSION
62. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise our findings as
under:
a. The decision of this Court in Patil Automation (supra) lays
down the correct position of law as regards Section 12A of the
2015 Act by holding it to be mandatory in nature.
b. As held in paragraph 104 of the decision in Patil Automation
(supra), the declaration of the mandatory nature of Section 12A
of the 2015 Act relates back to the date of the Amending Act.
c. As held in paragraph 113.1 of the decision in Patil Automation
(supra), any suit which is instituted under the 2015 Act without
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complying with Section 12A is liable to be rejected under Order
VII Rule 11. However, this declaration applies prospectively to
suits instituted on or after 20.08.2022.
d. A suit which contemplates an urgent interim relief may be
filed under the 2015 Act without first resorting to mediation as
prescribed under Section 12A of the 2015 Act.
e. Unlike Section 80(2) of the CPC, leave of the court is not
required to be obtained before filing a suit without complying
with Section 12A of the 2015 Act.
f. The test for “urgent interim relief” is if on an examination of
the nature and the subject-matter of the suit and the cause of
action, the prayer of urgent interim relief by the plaintiff could
be said to be contemplable when the matter is seen from the
standpoint of the plaintiff.
g. Courts must also be wary of the fact that the urgent interim
relief must not be merely an unfounded excuse by the plaintiff
to bypass the mandatory requirement of Section 12A of the
2015 Act.
h. Even if the urgent interim relief ultimately comes to be denied,
the suit of the plaintiff may be proceeded with without compliance
with Section 12A if the test for “urgent interim relief” is satisfied
notwithstanding the actual outcome on merits.
i. Suits instituted without complying with Section 12A of the 2015
Act prior to 20.08.2022 cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule
11 on the ground of non-compliance with Section 12A unless
they fall within the exceptions stipulated in paragraph 113.2 and
113.3 of the decision in Patil Automation (supra).
j. In suits instituted without complying with Section 12A of the
2015 Act prior to 20.08.2022 which are pending adjudication
before the trial court, the court shall keep the suit in abeyance
and refer the parties to time-bound mediation in accordance
with Section 12A of the 2015 Act if an objection is raised by
the defendant by filing an application under Order VII Rule 11,
or in cases where any of the parties expresses an intent to
resolve the dispute by mediation.
63. Thus, the answer to the question formulated by us whether a suit
filed without complying with Section 12A of the 2015 Act must be
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dismissed or be kept in abeyance with a direction to the parties to
explore mediation is as follows:
a. If the suit is instituted on or after the date of the decision in
Patil Automation (supra), i.e., 20.08.2022, without complying
with Section 12A of the 2015 Act, then it must meet with
rejection under Order VII Rule 11, either on an application by
the defendant or suo motu by the court.
b. If the suit was instituted prior to 20.08.2022 without complying
with Section 12A of the 2015 Act, and the same does not
fall within one of the exceptional categories as explained in
paragraph 47 of this judgment, then it would be open to the
court to keep the suit in abeyance and direct the parties to
explore the possibility of mediation in accordance with the 2015
Act, the PIMS Rules and the 2020 SOP.
64. Having answered the issues as aforesaid, we find it difficult to accept
the contention of the appellant that the Trial Court as well as the
High Court committed an error in refusing to reject the plaint under
Order VII Rule 11. On the contrary, the approach adopted by the High
Court in the impugned order in keeping the suit in abeyance and
referring the parties to mediation, strikes a perfect balance between
the mandatory nature of Section 12A of the 2015 Act as well as the
prospective applicability of the consequence of non-compliance with
Section 12A as held in Patil Automation (supra).
65. Needless to clarify that the mediation proceedings must be completed
within the time frame stipulated by Section 12A of the 2015 Act
and the PIMS Rules, that is, within a period of three months and
extendable by two more months, if the need so arises.
66. In the result, the present appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
67. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
68. We direct the Registry to circulate a copy of this judgment to all
High Courts.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain