M/S CABLE CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD.versusADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR AND ORS.

                        [2008] 8 S.C.R 1182


A          MIS CABLE CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD.
                                 v
     ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR AND ORS.
               (Civil Appeal No. 7211 of 2005)
                           MAY 16, 2008
B
        [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P.SATHASIVAM, JJ]

         INDUSTRUAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947:
       s. 25-N(6)-lnterpretation of - HELD: A plain reading of
C the provision makes the position clear that two courses aM
  open - Power is conferred on the appropriate Government t(•
  either on its own motion on an application made, review its
  order or refer the matter to the Tribunal - Whether one or the
  other of the courses could be adopted depends on the fact of
D each case, surrounding circumstances and several other rel-       ....
  evant factors - Interpretation of Statutes .
         INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES:
        Construing a provision - Held: When the language of
E the provision is plain and unambiguous and admits of only
  one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises,
  for the Act speaks for itself.
         WORDS AND PHRASES:
F        Word 'or' occurring in s. 25-N(6) of Industrial Disputes
    Act - Connotation of .
        The appellant company made an application in terms
  of s. 25 - N (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the
  Specified Authority to retrench 280 workmen out of 509
G workmen working in one of its Unit. The application was
  partly allowed granting permission to retrench 276 work-          •
  men on the conditions mentioned in the order. The order
  was challenged by filing applications uls 25-N (6) of the
  Act for review of the decision or to refer the matter for
H                             1182
             MIS CABLE CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD. v.           1183
              ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR

      adjudication. The application was rejected. However, the A
      High Court, in writ petition, held that merely because re-
      view application was rejected, reference could not be said
      to be barred u/s 25-N (6) of the Act, and accordingly, di-
      rected the Specified Authority to refer the matter for adju-
      dication to the Industrial Tribunal.                         B
           In the instant appeal filed by the employer, it was con-
 "    tended for the appellant that once the review application
      was disposed of, there was no scope for further making
      a reference, in view of the determinative expression "or"
      and the clear language of s. 25-N (6) of the Act, which pro-    c
      vided for the alternatives and did not prescribe a refer-
      ence after the review petition had been rejected.
           Allowing the appeal, the Court
           HELD: 1.1 A plain reading of the provision of s. 25-N D
.,.   (6) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 shows that two
      options are open. Power is conferred on the appropriate
      Government to either on its own motion, or on an appli-
      cation made, review its order or refer the matter to the Tri-
      bunal. Whether one or the other of the courses could be E
      adopted depends on the fact of each case, the surround-
      ing circumstances and several other relevant factors.
      [para 8 and 15] [1187-H; 1188-A; 1189-D]
           Orissa Textile & Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Ors.
      (2002 (2) sec 578 - distinguished.                              F

            Excel Wear v. Union of India and Ors. 1978 (4) SCC 224;
      Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. And Ors. v. Meenakshi Mills
      Ltd. And Anr 1992 (3) SCC 336- referred to.
            Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. Mis Abdu/bhai G
      Faizullabhai and Ors. AIR 1976 SC 1455; Rajya General
-t·
      Kamgar Manda/ and Ors. v. Vice President, Packart Press
      Div. Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises, Baroda and Ors. 1995 II
      CLR 613- cited.
                                                                      H
    1184       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2008] 8 S.C.R.


A        1.2 The word 'or' is normally disjunctive and 'and' is
    normally conjunctive. But at times they are read as vice
    versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the Legis-
    lature as disclosed from the context. [para 12] [1188-E]
B        Fakir Mohd. (dead) by Lrs. V Sita Ram 2002 (1) SCC
    741 :- referred to.
         1.3 When the words of a statute are clear, plain or
    unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only
    one meaning, no question of construction of a statute
c   arises, for the Act speaks of itself, and the courts are
    bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of con-
    sequences. [para 17 and 19] [1189-F; 1190-A]
        State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh AIR 2005 SC 294
  and Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta 2005 (2) SCC 271; -
D relied on
           Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11CJ&F85 - referred to.
         CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7211
    of 2005
E        From the Judgment and final Order dated 5.4.2005 of the
    High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Appeal No. 693/2004 in
    W.P. No. 1947/2003
           T.R. Andhyarujina, Ranjit Kumar, J.P. Cama, Mukul Rohtagi,
F   L. Nageshwar Rao, P.K. Rele, Shyam Diwan, U.U. Lalit, Akhil
  Sibal, R.N. Karanjawala, Pragya Singh Baghel, ManuAggarwal,
  Abeer Kumar, Ruby Singh Ahuja, Manik Karanjawala, P.C. Sen,
  Pallav Kumar, Binu Tamta, R.R. Kumar, Bennet D' Costa, Sanjay
  Sinhgvi, Arshad Shaikh, Bharat Sangal, R.N. Shah, Manu
G Agarwal, Vinay Navare, Meena Doshi and Abha R. Sharma for
  the Appearing Parties.
           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                        ..
                                                                        .




        Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to
H the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
          M/S CABLE CORP. OF INDIA LTD·. v. ADDITIONAL 1185
        COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

     upholding the view of a learned Single Judge that once the re- A
     view application in terms of Section 25-N(6) of the Industrial
     Disputes Act, 194 7 (in short the 'Act') is rejected, the appropri-
     ate GovernmenUspecified authority is not precluded from mak-
     ing a reference for adjudication under the said provision.
          2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:              B

           The appellant company was established in 1957 for the
     manufacture of high voltage electric cables and wires. The cpm-
     pany has manufacturing units at Borivli and Nasik. In the present
     case we are concerned with the Company's unit at Borivli. The c
     company made an application in terms of Section 25-N(2) to
     the Specified Authority on 16.1.2003 to retrench 280 workmen
     out of 509 workmen working at its Borivli Unit. The Specified
     Authority, after giving an opportunity of being heard to the com-
     pany, workmen and other interested persons, including work- D
     ers unions and after conducting an inquiry, by a reasoned order
     dated 29.4.2003 partly allowed the application preferred by the
     company by granting permission to retrench 276 workmen out
     of 509 workmen on conditions mentioned in the order. The cor-
     rectness of that decision was put in issue by the workers unions,
     the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 herein by filing applications under E
     Section 25-N(6) of the Act for review of the decision or to refer
     the matter for adjudication. By an order dated 9.7.2003 the ap-
     plications preferred by the Unions were rejected on the ground
     that such applications could be preferred only by workmen
     whereas the same have been made by the Unions. Besides, it F
     was observed that no new point was raised in the review pro-
     ceedings which warranted fresh examination. Accordingly, both
     the applications for review/reference came to be rejected.
          The aforesaid order of the Specified Authority was chal- G
     lenged through Writ Petition No. 1947 of 2003 by the 2nd re-
+-   spondent-union, which came to be partly allowed by the learned
     Single Judge, vide order dated 2.8.2004. The learned Single
     Judge held that finding of the Specified Authority that unions
     had no locus as all the aggrieved workmen were not made par-
                                                                    H
    1186     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2008] 8 S.C.R.


A ties to the application was contrary to law laid down by this Court     -~

  in Mumbai Kamgar Sabha, Bombay v. Mis Abdulbhai
  Faizul/abhai and Ors. (AIR 1976 SC 1455). The learned Single
  Judge further held that the right of review is possible only on
  limited grounds and since no new points have been raised by
B the unions, the prayer for review was rightly rejected. The learned
  Single Judge relying upon the judgment of a Division Bench of
  Gujarat High Court in Rajya General Kamgar Manda/ and Ors.
  v. Vice President, Packart Press Div. Amba/al Sarabhai En-
  terprises, Baroda and Ors. (1995 II CLR 613) further held that
c merely because review application is rejected, reference can-
  not be said to be barred under Section 25-N(6) of the Act and,
  accordingly, directed the specified authority to refer the matter
  for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal in accordance with
  Section 25-N(6) of the Act.
D       Stand of the appellant both before the learned Single Judge
  and the Division Bench was that once the review application is
  disposed of, there is no scope for further making a reference in
  view of the clear language of Section 25-N(6) which provides
  for the alternatives and does not empower a reference after the
E review petition is rejected. Both learned Single Judge and the
  Division Bench held to the contrary.
        3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that both
  learned Single Judge and the Division Bench lost sight of the
  fact that the language of the provision is very clear and the de-
F terminative expression used is "or". It is submitted that if the
  view of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench is ac-
  cepted it would mean substitution of the word 'and' for 'or'.
        4. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand
  submitted that the position is no longer res integra and in view
G
  of the decision· of this Court in Orissa Textile & Steel Ltd. v.
  State of Orissa and Ors. (2002 (2) sec 578), it is submitted,         ...
  the view of learned Single Judge and the Division Bench does
  not suffer from any infirmity. The reference is intended as an
  additional protection. Considering the fact that though the scope
H
              M/S CABLE CORP. OF INDIA LTD. v. ADDITIONAL 1187
            COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

         for review is limited, which is evident from the fact that unlike      A
         other reference a period of 30 days is provided. This indicates
         the urgency.
               5. The factual position need not be referred to in detail in
         view of the fact that fate of this case depends upon interpreta-
         tion of Section 25-N(6).                                               B
    ,.
               6. Section 25-N(6) of the Act reads as follows:

               "The appropriate government or the specified authority
               may, either on its own motion or on the application made
               by the employer or any workman, review its order granting        c
               or refusing to grant Qermission under sub-section (3} or
               refer the matter or, as the case may be, cause it to be
               referred, to a Tribunal for adjudication.

               Provided that where a reference has been made to a
                                                                                D
               Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award
               within a period of thirty days from the date of such
               reference."

                                                (Underlined for emphasis)
               7. In Excel Wear v: Union of India and Ors. (1978 (4) SCC        E
         224) this Court considered the legality of Section 25-0 and 25-
         Ras it stood then. It was held that those provisions were viola-
         tive of Section 19(1 )(g) of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in
         short the 'Constitution'). It was held that steps under Section
         25-N as it stood then cannot be read into Section 25-0.                F

                8. In Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. And Ors. v.
         Meenakshi Mills Ltd. And Anr (1992 (3) SCC 336) the scope
         and ambit of Section 25-N as it stood then prior to its substitu-
         lion by Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1984 was consid-
                                                                                G
i        ered. Section 25-0 was recast with effect from 21. 8.1984 by
         Act 46 of 1982. Similarly, changes were brought in Section 25-
         N by Act 49 of 1984 w.e.f. 18.8.1984. Und9r Section 25-N(5)
         finality is given subject to sub-section (6). A plain reading of the
         provision shows that two options are available i.e. to decide
                                                                                H
    1188       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2008] 8 S.C.R.


A   itself or refer to the Tribunal. It cannot be said that the Tribunal is   ,;.
    an additional forum for fresh look at the matter.

          9. In Orissa Textile and Steel case (supra) the constitu-
    tional validity of Section 25-0 of the Act was under consider-
    ation.
B
          10. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed great
    reliance on paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of the judgment to con-
    tend that this Court had accepted the interpretation given by the
                                                                               "
    High Court.
c       11. On a close reading of the judgment it is clear that in the
  said case the issues presently under consideration did not fall
  for consideration. What was stated in essence was that the pro-
  visions for amended Section 25-0 relates to review and refer-
  ence would be in addition to judicial review under Article 226 or
D Article 32 of the Constitution. The Court was really considering
  the question as to whether provisions for review and reference
  were in addition to judicial review. It never said that they are
  cumulative and not alternative.
           12. The word 'or' is normally disjunctive and 'and' Is nor-
E mally conjunctive. But at times they are read as vice versa to
  give effect to the manifest intention of the Legislature as dis-
  closed from the context. As stated by Scrutton, L.J.: "You do
  sometimes read 'or' as 'and' in a statute. But you do not do it
  unless you are obliged because 'or' does not generally mean
F 'and' and 'and' does not generally mean 'or'. And as pointed
  out by Lord Halsbury the reading of 'or' as 'and' is not to be
  resorted to, "unless some other part of the same statute or the
  clear intention of it required that to be done". But if the literal
  reading of the words produces an unintelligible or absurd result
G 'and' may be read for 'or' and 'or' for 'and' even though the re-
  suit of so modifying the words is less favourable to the subject
  provided that the intention of the Legislature is otherwise quite
                                                                              ..
  clear. Conversely if reading of 'and' as 'or' produces grammati-
  cal distortion and makes no sense of the portion following 'and',
H 'or' cannot be read in placed 'and'. The alternatives joined by
       MIS CABLE CORP. OF INDIA LTD. v. ADDITIONAL 1189
     COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

 'or' need not always be mutually exclusive.                          A
       13. In Fakir Mohd. (dead) by Lrs. V Sita Ram (2002 (1)
 SCC 741) it was held that the word 'or' is normally disjunctive.
 The use of the word 'or' in a statute manifests the legislative
 intent of the alternatives prescribed under law.
                                                                      B
        14. Had the Legislature intended that the reference could
  be made after the Government or the Specified Authority deals
  with the review power, it would have said so specifically by spe-
. cific words. It could have provided for a direct reference. The
  parameters of review are different from a reference.                c
       15. A plain reading of the provision makes the position
 clear that two courses are open. Power is conferred on the ap-
 propriate Government to either on its own motion or on an ap-
 plication made, review its order or refer the matter to the Tribu-
 nal. Whether one or the other of the courses could be adopted        D
 depends on the fact of each case, the surrounding circum-
 stances and several other relevant factors.
       16. Under sub-section (6) of Section 25-N it is open to the
 appropriate Government or the Specified Authority to review its
 order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-sec-        E
 tion (3).

       17. When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unam-
 biguous, i.e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one mean-
 ing, Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespec-       F
 tive of consequences. [See: State of Jharkhand v. Govind Singh
 (AIR 2005 SC 294), Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta (2005 (2)
 sec 271)).
      18. In Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11 Cl&F 85, at page
 143 Tindal C.J. observed as follows:                                 G
      "If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and
      unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to
      expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense.
      The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare
                                                                      H
    1190       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2008) 8 S.C.R.

                                                                             )L
A          the intent of the lawgiver."
                                                                         +
          19. When a language is plain and unambiguous and ad-
    mits of only one meaning no question of construction of a stat-
    ute arises, for the Act speaks for itself.

B         20. As observed in Nathi Devi's case (supra) if the words          "
    used are capable of one construction, then it would not be open
    to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on        .
    the ground that such construction is more consistent with the
    alleged object and policy of the Act. The spirit of the law may
c   well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit
    can certainly be not given effect to in opposition to the plain
    language of the sections of the Act.
          21. In view of analysis made above, the inevitable result is
    that the appeal deserves to be allowed which we direct.
D
    R.P.                                            Appeal allowed.      ~