M/S BHARAT COKING COAL LTD.versusMAHENDRA PAL BHATIA AND ORS.

                         [2022] 13 S.C.R. 287                                287


                M/S BHARAT COKING COAL LTD.                                  A
                                    v.
              MAHENDRA PAL BHATIA AND ORS.
                    (Civil Appeal No. 5377 of 2015)
                            APRIL 01, 2022                                   B
  [HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
       Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1973: ss.2(h), 3 – Coal
mines – It is not the corporate houses or the business entities owning
coal-mines that are transferred to and vested in the Central
                                                                             C
Government, but it is the coal-mines that are transferred to and
vested in the Central Government – If the land fell within the
definition of the expression “mine” under the Nationalisation Act,
the same stood transferred to and vested in the Central Government
under s.3(1) – As could be seen from clause (xi) of s.2(h), even the
land and building used solely for the location of the management,            D
sale or liaison offices or for the residence of officers and staff are
also included in the definition of the word ‘mine’ – In the instant
case, the contention that the property was the private property of
one ‘J’ and that his occupation as Manager of a colliery was
irrelevant, would fall to the ground – The focus of s.2(h) r/w s.3(1)
                                                                             E
is on the property and not on who the owner of the property is –
Similarly, the objection that the land in question was not used as a
colliery is also irrelevant in view of the fact that clause (xi) of s.2(h)
uses the words “wherever situated”.
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
                                                                             F
       HELD 1. Section 3(1) of the Nationalisation Act, declares
that on the appointed day, which was 01.05.1973, the right, title
and interest of the owners in relation to the coal-mines specified
in the Schedule shall stand transferred to and shall vest absolutely
in the Central government free from all encumbrances. [Para
12][291-E]                                                                   G

     2. What was transferred to and vested in the Central
Government, were not corporate houses or business entities
owning coal-mines. What was transferred to and vested in the
Central Government were the coal-mines. In other words this
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                                   287
288            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A     Nationalisation Act, was little different from the statutory
      enactments nationalizing institutions such as banks, insurance
      companies etc. Therefore, the ownership of the land was
      immaterial. If the land fell within the definition of the expression
      “mine” under the Nationalisation Act, the same stood transferred
      to and vested in the Central Government under Section 3(1).
B
      [Para 13][291-G-H; 292-A]
            3. The contention that the property was the private property
      of one ‘J’ and that his occupation as Manager of a colliery was
      irrelevant, would fall to the ground. The focus of Section 2(h)
C     read with Section 3(1) is on the property and not on who the
      owner of the property is. Similarly, the objection that the land in
      question was not used as a colliery is also irrelevant in view of
      the fact that clause (xi) of Section 2(h) uses the words “wherever
      situated”. In any case the contention that the property was not
      part of a colliery, may be factually incorrect. [Paras 15 and 16][293-
D     D-E]
            4. In Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. vs. Madanlal Agrawal, this
      Court clarified that the extended meaning given to the word
      “mine” was to ensure that the activity of mining coal could be
      carried on in an uninterrupted fashion. This Court also cautioned
E     “that the Act should not be construed in a way to frustrate the
      working of the coal mines altogether, thereby stop or bring down
      production of coal by the nationalization of coal mines”. Therefore,
      the impugned orders of the High Court run contrary to the
      statutory prescriptions and hence liable to be set aside.
F     Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the impugned orders of the
      High Court are set aside and the writ petition filed by the
      respondents is dismissed. [Paras 18 and 19][294-D-F]
            Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Madanlal Agrawal (1997)
            1 SCC 177 : [1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 886- followed.
G
            New Satgram Engineering Works & Another v. Union
            of India & Ors. (1980) 4 SCC 570 : [1981] 1 SCR 406
            - referred to.


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    M/S BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. MAHENDRA PAL                                   289
                 BHATIA AND ORS.

                          Case Law Reference                                      A
[1981] 1 SCR 406                     referred to           Para 17
[1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 886              followed              Para 18
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5377
of 2015.                                                                          B
      From the Judgment and Order dated 19.02.2015 of the High Court
of Jharkhand at Ranchi in L.P.A. No. 272 of 2013.
      Anupam Lal Das, Sr. Adv., Amit Sharma, Dipesh Sinha, Anirudh
Singh, Ms. Pallavi Barua, Krishanu Barva, Advs. for the Appellant.
                                                                                  C
     Arijit Mazumdar, Shambo Nandy, Abhinav Mukerji, Advs. for the
Respondents.
       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.
       1. What was contemplated to be a summary proceeding for the                D
eviction of unauthorized occupants from public premises under the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter
referred to as the “Act”), having turned out to be a frustrating legal
marathon spread over a period of 38 years, eventually culminating in the
High Court setting aside the orders of eviction passed under the Act, the         E
Government Company which initiated the proceedings way back in 1984,
has come up with the above appeal.
      2. We have heard Mr. Anupam Lal Das, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant and Mr. Shambo Nandy, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents.                                                    F
       3. The Parliament enacted the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act,
1973, (hereinafter referred to as the “Nationalisation Act”) providing
for the acquisition and transfer of the right, title and interest of the owners
in respect of coal mines specified in the Schedule. The Schedule to the
Nationalisation Act contained a list of about 711 coal mines located in           G
different parts of the country. The Schedule also contained the names
and addresses of the owners of each of those mines and the amount
payable to those owners in terms of Section 8 of the Nationalisation Act.
Serial No.92 of the Schedule contained the name of the coal mine “East
Godhur”. The owner of the coal mine was indicated to be “East Godhur
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290            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A     Colliery Company (Private) Limited, P.O. Dhandad” and the amount of
      compensation payable to the owner was also shown as Rs.4000/.
            4. In the year 1984, the Estate Officer, Dhanbad initiated
      proceedings in Case No.210 of 1984 under the provisions of the Act,
      against Bhatia brothers and others, on the ground that they are un-
B     authorised occupants of plot nos. 553, 554, 555, 556 and 559 to 564
      located in Village Matkuria, District Dhanbad. These proceedings
      culminated in an order of eviction dated 18.09.1985.
            5. But this order was set aside by the District Court, Dhanbad in
      an appeal under Section 9 of the Act, by an order dated 04.12.1986 and
C     the matter was remanded back to the Estate Officer.
            6. The Estate Officer passed a fresh order dated 08.03.1989
      dropping the eviction proceedings on the ground that the respondents
      were authorized occupants. But the said order of the Estate Officer
      was set aside by the District Court by an order dated 08.08.1990 in an
D     appeal filed by the appellant herein under Section 9 of the Act.
            7. But the order of the District Court was set aside by the High
      Court by an order dated 17.07.1998 in a writ petition filed by the
      respondents and the matter got back to the District Court by way of
      remand for a fresh disposal.
E           8. The District Court passed an order dated 28.09.2000 allowing
      the appeal of the appellant herein and directing eviction. This order of
      the District Court was set aside by a learned Single Judge of the High
      Court by an order dated 20.06.2013 in a writ petition filed by the
      respondents. The said order of the learned Single Judge was confirmed
F     by the Division Bench in an intra-court appeal by judgment dated
      19.02.2015, which is what is impugned before us in the above appeal.
             9. The only question which the Estate Officer, the District Court
      and the High Court dabbled with, was as to whether the property in the
      occupation of the respondents and their predecessor in interest was
      covered by the definition of the expression “mine” in Section 2(h) of the
G
      Nationalisation Act. This question arose in the context of two limited
      facts namely,
            (i) The property in question was purchased by an individual by
      name Jamini Mohan Majumdar, under a registered sale deed dated
      05.02.1945, long prior to 01.05.1973, the date of coming into force of the
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    M/S BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. MAHENDRA PAL                               291
      BHATIA AND ORS. [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

Nationalisation Act. In this sale deed dated 05.02.1945 Jamini Mohan          A
Majumdar’s occupation was described as “Manager”, East Godhur
Colliery;
       (ii) The said Jamini Mohan Majumdar sold the property in question
under four different sale deeds dated 17.01.1984. It was only thereafter
that proceedings under the Act, were initiated.                               B
       10. In view of the above two facts, the objection raised by the
respondents to the proceedings under the Act was that the property was
a private property, not forming part of a “mine”. Reliance was also
placed upon the Report of the Court Commissioner, according to which
there was no mark of any colliery in the disputed land and that there was     C
a two storey building on the disputed plot, with Godhur Colliery being
located 3 Kilometers away.
      11. In other words the objection of the respondents was two-fold
namely, (i) that the property did not belong to the company which owned
the East Godhur Coal Mine; and (ii) that the land in question was not         D
used as a coal-mine.
       12. But, unfortunately for the respondents, both the objections
cannot stand in the light of the statutory prescriptions. Section 3(1) of
the Nationalisation Act, declares that on the appointed day, which was
01.05.1973, the right, title and interest of the owners in relation to the    E
coal-mines specified in the Schedule shall stand transferred to and shall
vest absolutely in the Central government free from all encumbrances.
Section 3(1) of the Nationalisation Act, 1973 reads as follows:-
      “3. Acquisition of rights of owners in respect of coal mines.-
      (1) On the appointed day, the right, title and interest of the owners   F
      in relation to the coal mines specified in the Schedule shall stand
      transferred to, and shall vest absolutely in, the Central Government
      free from all incumbrances.”
                         xxxx              xxxx             xxxx
       13. As could be seen from the vesting provision, what was              G
transferred to and vested in the Central Government, were not corporate
houses or business entities owning coal-mines. What was transferred to
and vested in the Central Government were the coal-mines. In other
words this Nationalisation Act, was little different from the statutory
enactments nationalizing institutions such as banks, insurance companies
                                                                              H
292            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A     etc. Therefore, the ownership of the land was immaterial. If the land fell
      within the definition of the expression “mine” under the Nationalisation
      Act, the same stood transferred to and vested in the Central Government
      under Section 3(1).
            14. The definition of the expression “mine” under Section 2(h) of
B     the Nationalisation Act, is very wide. It reads as follows:-
            2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise
            requires,—
            xxx            xxx             xxx

C           (h) “ mine” means any excavation where any operation for the
            purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being
            carried on, and includes—
            (i) all borings and bore holes;
            (ii) all shafts, whether in the course of being sunk or not;
D
            (iii) all levels and inclined planes in the course of being driven;
            (iv) all open cast workings;
            (v) all conveyors or aerial ropeways provided for bringing into or
            removal from a mine of minerals or other articles or for the
E           removal of refuse therefrom;
            (vi) all lands, buildings, works, adits, levels, planes, machinery and
            equipments, instruments, stores, vehicles, railways, tramways and
            sidings in, or adjacent to, a mine and used for the purposes of the
            mine;
F           (vii) all workshops (including buildings, machinery, instruments,
            stores, equipment of such workshops and the lands on which such
            workshops stand) in, or adjacent to, a mine and used substantially
            for the purposes of the mine or a number of mines under the
            same management;
G           (viii) all coal belonging to the owner of the mine, whether in stock
            or in transit, and all coal under production in a mine;
            (ix) all power stations in a mine or operated primarily for supplying
            electricity for the purpose of working the mine or a number of
            mines under the same management;
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    M/S BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. MAHENDRA PAL                               293
      BHATIA AND ORS. [V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J.]

      (x) all lands, buildings and equipments belonging to the owner of       A
      the mine, and in, adjacent to or situated on the surface of, the
      mine where the washing of coal obtained from the mine or
      manufacture, therefrom, of coke is carried on;
      (xi) all lands and buildings[ other than those referred to in sub-
      clause (x), wherever situated, if solely used for the location of the   B
      management, sale or liaison offices, or for the residence of officers
      and staff, of the mine;
      (xii) all other fixed assets, movable and immovable, belonging to
      the owner of a mine, wherever situated, and current assets,
      belonging to a mine, whether within its premises or outside.”           C
        15. As could be seen from clause (xi) of Section 2(h), even the
lands and buildings used solely for the location of the management, sale
or liaison offices or for the residence of officers and staff were also
included in the definition of the word “mine”. Therefore, the contention
that the property was the private property of Jamini Mohan Majumdar,          D
and that his occupation as Manager of a colliery was irrelevant, would
fall to the ground. The focus of Section 2(h) read with Section 3(1) is on
the property and not on who the owner of the property is.
       16. Similarly, the objection that the land in question was not used
as a colliery is also irrelevant in view of the fact that clause (xi) of      E
Section 2(h) uses the words “wherever situated”. In any case the
contention that the property was not part of a colliery, may be factually
incorrect. The sale deed dated 05.02.1945 by which Jamini Mohan
Majumdar purchased the property in question contains a very specific
recital which reads as follows:
                                                                              F
      “…This deed witnesseth that in the schedule land in view of the
      ongoing colliery workings the fertility of the schedule land has
      been reduced for that reason and for monetary reason being in
      special need and having no alternative when I offered for absolute
      sale of the land in schedule as receipt of consideration price of
      Rs.575/- on this day by way of absolute sale this sale deed is          G
      being executed in your favour. You are at liberty to carry on all
      nature of colliery work both underground and surface and
      enjoy the name TO HAVE AND HOLD the same to and upto
      the purchaser absolutely and forever in any manner whatsoever
      without any hindrance or interruption from us together with all
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294               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 13 S.C.R.


A              right, benefit, easement, privileges, liberties which he hereto begins
               enjoyed…’’
            Therefore, the respondents cannot now rely upon the Report of a
      Court Commissioner who carried out inspection probably after two/three
      decades of nationalization.
B            17. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon
      the judgment of this Court in New Satgram Engineering Works &
      Another vs. Union of India & Ors.1, in support of his contention that
      the question whether something is a “mine” or not is essentially a question
      of fact and that when the facts are seriously controverted it was
C     appropriate for the High Court to relegate the parties to the civil court.
             18. Though paragraph 16 of the decision in New Satgram (supra)
      appears to support the contention of the respondents by highlighting the
      difference between the language employed in clauses (vii) and clause
      (xi) of Section 2(h), a subsequent decision of this Court (also of a 3
D     member bench) in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. Madanlal Agrawal2,
      steers clear any air of suspicion. In this case, this Court clarified that the
      extended meaning given to the word “mine” was to ensure that the
      activity of mining coal could be carried on in an uninterrupted fashion.
      This Court also cautioned “that the Act should not be construed in a
      way to frustrate the working of the coal mines altogether, thereby
E     stop or bring down production of coal by the nationalization of
      coal mines”.
              19. Therefore, the impugned orders of the High Court run contrary
      to the statutory prescriptions and hence liable to be set aside. Accordingly,
      the appeal is allowed, the impugned orders of the High Court are set
F     aside and the writ petition filed by the respondents is dismissed. The
      order of eviction shall stand confirmed. There will be no order as to
      costs.

      Devika Gujral                                                    Appeal allowed.
G     (Assisted by : Shubhanshu Das, LCRA)




      1
          (1980) 4 SCC 570
      2
H         (1997) 1 SCC 177