Holding

The issuance of a summons under Section 70 is not the "initiation of any proceedings" under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act; only the issuance of a show‑cause notice marks the commencement of proceedings, so the summons are not barred.

Summary

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd., a security services company, received a show‑cause notice under Section 73 of the CGST Act from the State GST authority for alleged tax deficiencies. Subsequently, the Central GST authority conducted a search and issued two summons under Section 70 to the company's directors to produce documents. The petitioner challenged the summons, arguing that Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act bars any further proceedings on the same subject matter once the State authority has initiated proceedings. The Supreme Court examined the meaning of “initiation of any proceedings,” “subject matter,” and the scope of Section 70, concluding that only the issuance of a show‑cause notice constitutes the commencement of proceedings, not a summons or inquiry. Accordingly, the summons were not barred by the statutory provision, and the petition was dismissed. The Court also laid down guidelines for handling parallel investigations and clarified the two‑fold test for determining whether the subject matter is the same.

Issues considered

The issuance of a summons under Section 70 constitutes "initiation of any proceedings" within the meaning of Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act?
The meaning and scope of "subject matter" under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act
Whether parallel intelligence‑based enforcement actions by Central and State tax authorities are barred under Section 6(2)(b)
The distinction between an inquiry/investigation and formal proceedings under the CGST Act
Whether distinct infractions escape the bar of Section 6(2)(b) even if the tax liability is similar

Legislation cited

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017s. 59, s. 6(2)(b), s. 67, s. 70, s. 73, s. 74, s. 75(7)
State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017
Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017

Headnote

Issue for Consideration The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner herein, and declined from interdicting the summons dated 16.01.2025 and 23.01.2025 respectively, issued to the petitioner u/s.70 of the Central Goods and Services Act) by the Commissioner, Central Good and Services Tax, Delhi East Commissionerate (respondent no.1). Headnotes† Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – s.6(2)(b) – Bar under: Held: Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of s.6 of the CGST Act and the equivalent State enactments

Subjects

Section 6(2)(b) CGST ActSummons under Section 70Show cause noticeParallel proceedingsIntelligence based enforcementSubject matterCross‑empowermentSingle interfaceGST jurisdictionMultiplicity of proceedings

Judgment

[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1727 : 2025 INSC 982

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd.
v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.
(Special Leave Petition (C) No. 6092 of 2025)
14 August 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner
herein, and declined from interdicting the summons dated
16.01.2025 and 23.01.2025 respectively, issued to the petitioner
u/s.70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST
Act) by the Commissioner, Central Good and Services Tax, Delhi
East Commissionerate (respondent no.1).

Headnotes†
Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – s.6(2)(b) – Bar under:
Held: Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of s.6 of the CGST Act and the
equivalent State enactments bars the “initiation of any proceedings”
on the “same subject matter”. [Para 96(i)]

Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – Intelligence based
enforcement action – Parallel proceedings:
Held: Intelligence based enforcement action can be initiated by
any one of the Central or the State tax administrations despite the
taxpayer having been assigned to the other administration – Parallel
proceedings should not be initiated by other tax administration when
one of the tax administrations has already initiated intelligence-
based enforcement action. [Para 96(iii), (iv)]

Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – s.6(2)(b) –
Proceedings:
Held: All actions that are initiated as a measure for probing an
inquiry or gathering of evidence or information do not constitute
“proceedings” within the meaning of s.6(2)(b) of the CGST Act.
[Para 96(v)]

* Author
1728 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – s.6(2)(b) –
Expression “initiation of any proceedings”:
Held: The expression “initiation of any proceedings” occurring
in s.6(2)(b) refers to the formal commencement of adjudicatory
proceedings by way of issuance of a show cause notice, and does
not encompass the issuance of summons, or the conduct of any
search, or seizure etc. [Para 96(vi)]

Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – Expression “subject
matter”:
Held: The expression “subject matter” refers to any tax liability,
deficiency, or obligation arising from any particular contravention
which the Department seeks to assess or recover. [Para 96(vii)]

Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – s.6(2)(b) – When
the bar of Section 6(2)(b) would be immediately attracted:
Held: Where any two proceedings initiated by the Department
seek to assess or recover an identical or a partial overlap in the
tax liability, deficiency or obligation arising from any particular
contravention, the bar of s.6(2)(b) would be immediately attracted.
[Para 96(viii)]

Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – s.6(2)(b) – Distinct
infractions – Same subject matter:
Held: Where the proceedings concern distinct infractions, the
same would not constitute a “same subject matter” even if the tax
liability, deficiency, or obligation is same or similar, and the bar
under Section 6(2)(b) would not be attracted. [Para 96(ix)]

Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – ss.6(2)(b), 70 –
Scope and Ambit of “initiated any proceedings” u/s.6(2)(b) –
The Petitioner is a public limited company engaged in the
business of providing security services – On 18.11.2024,
petitioner received a show cause notice u/s.73 of the Act
from the respondent no.2, raising demand of Rs. 1,24,92,162/-
u/ss.50 and 74 of CGST Act, 2017 – Thereafter, two summons
dated 16.01.2025 and 23.01.2025 respectively were issued
by respondent no.1 to the petitioner directing one of the
directors of the petitioner to produce relevant documents –
Being aggrieved by the said summons the petitioner preferred
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1729

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

a writ petition before the High Court, on the ground that as
the respondent no. 2 had already made the investigation in
respect of the same issue and the respondent no. 1 does not
have the jurisdiction in view of s.6(2)(b) of the CGST Act –
Writ petition dismissed – High Court held that the expression
“any proceeding” in s.6(2)(b) cannot be construed to include
a search or investigation – The High Court further held that a
summons or investigation pursuant to a search constitutes
only a precursor to the formal proceedings – Correctness:
Held: s.6(2)(b) of the CGST Act precludes a proper officer under
the CGST Act to initiate any proceedings on a subject matter if
a proper officer under the SGST or the UGST Act has initiated
any proceedings on the same subject matter – Further, s.70 of
the CGST Act empowers a proper officer to summon any person
whose presence is considered necessary for giving evidence
or producing documents or any other relevant material in an
inquiry – The issuance of summons is one of the instruments
employed by the Department to obtain information, documents,
or statements in cases involving suspected tax evasion – Such
summons may be issued to the person under investigation or to
a person considered a witness in investigation against another
person – The legislature has used the term “inquiry” in s.70, as
at the stage of issuing a summons, the Department is primarily
engaged in gathering information regarding a possible contravention
of law, which may subsequently form the basis for proceedings
against an assessee– At the stage of issuing a summons, the
Department is yet to determine whether proceedings should be
initiated against the assessee – Such evidence-gathering and
inquiry do not constitute “proceedings” within the meaning of s.6(2)
(b) of the CGST Act – The mere issuance of a summons cannot
be equated with proceedings barred under the Act, as the subject
matter cannot be ascertained solely through summons – In the
present case, the petitioner was served with a show cause notice
dated 18.11.2024 by the respondent no. 2 u/s.73 of the CGST Act,
thereby initiating proceedings – The petitioner has impugned the
summons dated 16.01.2025 and 23.01.2025 respectively issued by
the respondent no. 1 for production of documents – At the summons
stage, it cannot be predicted with certainty that the subject matter
of the proceedings will be identical; the mere presence of an
overlapping aspect under investigation does not ipso facto render
the subject matter “same” – The High Court correctly held that the
1730 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

term “any proceedings” does not encompass summons issued
pursuant to a search or investigation, as at the stage of issuance
of summons the Department is merely engaged in gathering
information – A case of search is clearly distinct and separate from
proceedings initiated only after issuance of a show cause notice.
[Paras 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62]

Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – Show cause notice
under GST regime:
Held: A show cause notice is a document served on a noticee,
requiring them to explain why a particular action should not be
initiated against them – Under the GST regime, issuance of a show
cause notice is a mandatory precondition for raising a demand –
It forms the bedrock for proceedings related to the recovery of
tax, interest, and penalty – The notice ensures adherence to the
principles of natural justice by granting the assessee an opportunity
to present their case before any adverse action is taken – In
essence, it serves as both a procedural safeguard and a legal
necessity, marking the commencement of quasi-judicial adjudication
under the Act. [Para 65]

Notice – Show cause notice – Whether a show cause notice
can be vagaue:
Held: A show cause notice sets the law in motion concerning
the liability under the statute, containing charges that a specific
person is called upon to answer – In other words, it sets out the
alleged violations of legal provisions and requires the assessee to
explain why the duty should not be recovered from them – Thus,
a show cause notice cannot be vague, nor can any allegations
be made without evidence being commensurate with the gravity
of the charges levelled against the noticee. [Para 66]

Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – s.67 and s.74 –
Whether the mere issuance of summons imply that the
Department has decided to proceed against the taxpayer for
recovery of liability:
Held: In the facts of the present case, the mere issuance of
summons does not imply that the Department has decided to
proceed against the taxpayer for recovery of liability – Therefore,
issuance of summons, by no stretch, can be considered as the
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1731

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

initiation of proceedings, since at that stage, the Department still
retains the discretion not to initiate any proceedings – A mere
contemplation or possibility of initiating action cannot be equated
with “proceedings”, as doing so would undermine the framework
of cross-empowerment under the Act – Even when a discovery is
made during the search proceedings u/s.67 of the CGST Act, the
Department is required to bring such proceedings to a definitive
conclusion, either by issuing a show cause notice u/s.74 or by
dropping the matter altogether. [Para 74]
Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – Whether “subject
matter” within the meaning of s.6(2)(b) of the CGST Act includes
all matters dealt with in summons under the Act:
Held: It is abundantly clear from the purport of s.6(2)(b) of the
Act that “subject matter” needs to be understood in perspective of
initiation of proceedings – The proceedings stand initiated when a
show cause notice is issued with regard to a subject matter – It is
settled that the service of a show cause notice is made in order
to inform the noticee about the case that has been set up against
him, which he has to meet – Primacy is given to the cogency of a
show cause notice – The subject matter of the proceedings lies in
the contents of the notice – Hence, it ought to be exhaustive, so
much so that it is capable of presenting the case of the Revenue
in a nutshell – A show cause notice delineates the scope of the
proceedings in the expression of subject matter with which the
authority would be dealing – It would be impermissible for an
authority to invoke such rules, claims or grounds at a later stage
which do not figure in the show cause notice i.e, any ground,
reasoning or claim which does not figure out in the show cause
notice cannot be permitted to adversely affect the noticee – The
expression “subject matter” contemplates proceedings directed
towards determining the taxpayer’s liability or contravention,
encompassing the alleged offence or non-compliance together with
the relief or demand sought by the Revenue, as articulated in the
show cause notice through its charges, grounds, and quantification
of demand – Accordingly, the bar on the “same subject matter” is
attracted only where both proceedings seek to assess or recover
an identical liability, or even where there is the slightest overlap
in the tax liability or obligation – In other words, u/s.6(2)(b), the
“subject matter” is intrinsically tied to the determination of the
specific violation under scrutiny or the liability alleged to be unpaid –
1732 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

The statutory bar is triggered only when the two proceedings
against the same taxpayer are, in substance, directed towards
the very same or overlapping deficiency in tax discharge or the
identical contravention alleged – Where the proceedings concern
distinct infractions, each Department is entitled to proceed within
its respective statutory remit without infringing the prohibition.
[Paras 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87]

Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – ss.6(2)(b) – A
twofold test to determine whether a subject matter is “same”:
Held: First, the subject matter will be considered the same if an
authority has already proceeded on an identical liability of tax or
alleged offence by the assessee on the same facts; and secondly,
if the demand or relief sought is identical. [Para 88]

Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – s.6(2)(a) – Purpose
of:
Held: The provision serves a two fold purpose: first, to insulate
taxpayers from the prospect of being proceeded against by more
than one authority for the same subject matter; and secondly, to
vest in the officers functioning under the CGST Act, the SGST
Act, or the UTGST Act, to render a comprehensive order, thereby
avoiding multiplicity of proceedings – Such a construction is also in
consonance with the well-recognized principle of comity between
jurisdictions, which mandates that coordinate authorities must act
with mutual respect and due regard for each other’s domain, so
as to preclude the possibility of conflicting determinations on the
same issue. [Para 93]

Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – s.6(2)(b) – What is
the purport of an “Order” u/s.6(2)(a) of the CGST Act:
Held: The expression ‘order’, qualified by the terms “under this
Act”, occurring in the said provision admits of a broad construction,
so as to include every form of order which a proper officer is
competent to issue by virtue of the authority vested in them under
the statute – Such an interpretation is necessary to ensure that
the statutory mandate achieves its intended purpose of avoiding
multiplicity of proceedings and securing uniformity of adjudication
across the parallel enactments – Inasmuch as the CGST Act
vests the proper officer with authority to issue “orders” under
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1733

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

various provisions, it becomes imperative that such officer duly
apprises the jurisdictional counterpart of any action initiated by the
Department in relation to a taxable person who may otherwise fall
within the administrative domain of that officer – Given that the
statutory framework envisages a regime of cross-empowerment
amongst officers, the obligation so cast operates as a safeguard
against the prejudice which may arise from the initiation of parallel
or overlapping proceedings against the same taxpayer by different
wings of the Department. [Paras 94, 95]

Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – Guidelines – The
following guidelines to be followed in cases where, after the
commencement of an inquiry or investigation by one authority,
another inquiry or investigation on the same subject matter
is initiated by a different authority:
Held: a) Where a summons or a show cause notice is issued by
either the Central or the State tax authority to an assessee, the
assessee is, in the first instance, obliged to comply by appearing and
furnishing the requisite response, as the case may be – Because,
mere issuance of a summons does not enable either the issuing
authority or the recipient to ascertain that proceedings have been
initiated; b) Where an assessee becomes aware that the matter
being inquired into or investigated is already the subject of an inquiry
or investigation by another authority, the assessee shall forthwith
inform, in writing, the authority that has initiated the subsequent
inquiry or investigation; c) Upon receipt of such intimation from
the assessee, the respective tax authorities shall communicate
with each other to verify the veracity of the assessee’s claim – so
as this course of action would obviate needless duplication of
proceedings; d) If the claim of the taxable person regarding the
overlap of inquiries is found untenable, and the investigations
of the two authorities pertain to different “subject matters”, an
intimation to this effect, along with the reasons and a specification
of the distinct subject matters, shall be immediately conveyed in
writing to the taxable person; e) The taxing authorities are well
within their rights to conduct an inquiry or investigation until it
is ascertained that both authorities are examining the identical
liability to be discharged, the same contravention alleged, or the
issuance of a show cause notice; f) However, if the Central or the
State tax authority, as the case may be finds that the matter being
inquired into or investigated by it is already the subject of inquiry
1734 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

or investigation by another authority, both authorities shall decide
inter-se which of them shall continue with the inquiry or investigation;
g) However, where the authorities are unable to reach a decision
as to which of them shall continue with the inquiry or investigation,
then in such circumstances, the authority that first initiated the
inquiry or investigation shall be empowered to carry it to its logical
conclusion, and the courts in such a case would be competent to
pass an order for transferring the inquiry or investigation to that
authority; h) If it is found that the authorities are not complying with
these aforementioned guidelines, it shall be open to the taxable
person to file a writ petition before the concerned High Court u/
Art.226 of the Constitution of India; i) At the same time, taxable
persons shall ensure complete cooperation with the authorities –
It is incumbent upon them to appear in response to a summons
and/or reply to a notice. [Para 97]

Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 – s.6 – Framework
of single interface and cross-empowerment:
Held: The unique scheme and framework of the Goods and
Services Tax regime envisages two distinct concepts at its heart,
the concept of a “single interface” as-well as the concept of
“cross-empowerment” – The former relates to doing away of dual
administrative control over the collection as-well as assessment
of tax returns by tax payers, that had existed previously, in the
erstwhile scheme of indirect taxes in the form of value added
tax or VAT – Whereas, the latter, pertains empowering both the
Central and State tax administrations to simultaneously undertake
enforcement actions against a tax-payer – The underlying objective
of this arrangement was to simplify the taxpayer’s engagement with
the tax system by ensuring that all notices, audits, assessments,
and other proceedings are handled by a single authority, thereby
eliminating the complexity and duplication that would arise from
dual control – It was envisioned that a taxpayer should not be
compelled to respond to two different authorities for the same issue
or transaction – S. 6 of the CGST Act and the identical pari-materia
provision in the respective State and Union Territories statutes, is a
nuanced provision that enshrines both the concept as-well as the
contours of “single interface” system and “cross-empowerment” –
It delineates when and how the various officers appointed under
different corresponding legislations shall act as “proper officer” for
the purposes of the said legislation. [Paras 34, 37, 42]
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1735

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

Case Law Cited
Gorkha Security Services v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) [2014] 13 SCR
617 : (2014) 9 SCC 105; The Commissioner of Central Excise,
Bhubaneswar-I v. Champdany Industries Limited [2009] 14 SCR
211 : (2009) 9 SCC 466 – relied on.
G.K. Trading v. Union of India & Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine All
1907; K.T. Saidalavi v. State Tax Officer, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker
5674 – affirmed.
Kuppan Gounder P.G. Natarajan v. Directorate General of GST
Intelligence, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 17053; Anurag Suri v.
Director General of Goods and Services Tax Intelligence & Ors.,
2021 SCC OnLine Ori 2510; Indo International Tobacco Ltd. v.
Vivek Prasad, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 90; Rais Khan v. Add.
Commissioner, Enforcement, Wing-II, D.B. Civil Writ Petition
No. 3087/2024; M/s. R.P. Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. v. Superintendent,
CGST & CX, Circle-II, Group-10, 2022 SCC OnLine Cal 3108;
Tvl. Metal Trade Incorporation v. Special Secretary, Head of the
GST Council Secretariat, New Delhi, 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 8234;
Stalwart Alloys India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., 2024 SCC
OnLine P&H 15153; Kundlas Loh Udyog v. State of H.P., 2024
SCC OnLine HP 4810; Amit Gupta v. Union of India, 2023 SCC
OnLine Del 6664; Satyam Castings Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Director,
DGGI, Bhubaneshwar, 2024 SCC OnLine Ori 1624 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
Guidelines on Issuance of Summons under Section 70 of the
CGST Act issued by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes & Customs
(GST – Investigation Wing) dated 17.08.2022; P. Ramanatha
Aiyar’s, 6th Editionpage 4415-4420; Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th
Edition, page 1368 – referred to.

List of Acts
Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017.

List of Keywords
Bar unders. 6(2)(b) of Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017;
Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of s.6 of the Central Goods and Service
Tax Act, 2017; Intelligence based enforcement action; Parallel
proceedings; Show cause notice; Initiation of any proceedings;
1736 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Subject matter; Tax liability; Recovery of liability; Order; Proper
officer; Multiplicity of proceedings; Determination of whether the
subject matter is same; Subject matter within the meaning of Section
6(2)(b) of Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017; Summons;
Concept of cross-empowerment; Same subject matter; Framework
of single interface and Cross-empowerment; Proceedings within
the meaning of Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C)
No. 6092 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.02.2025 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in WP(C) No. 1082 of 2025

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner:
Sridhar Potaraju, Sr. Adv., Srinivas Kotni, Rishabh Dev Dixit, Rohit
Dutta, Gaichangpou Gangmei, Akshay Kumar, Aayush, Lalit Mohan,
Ms. Niharika Singh, Sai Swaroop, Gurdeep Singh.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.B. Pardiwala, J.

For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts:-
INDEX*

A. FACTUAL MATRIX ......................................................... 2
B. IMPUGNED ORDER ........................................................ 4
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER ..... 5
D. ANALYSIS ........................................................................ 9
I. Whether issuance of summons can be regarded
as “initiation of proceedings” within the meaning
of Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act? ...................... 9

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1737

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

a. Contrary Views of different High Courts on the
issue..................................................................... 9
i. Decisions interpreting the contours of
“proceedings” in contrast to “inquiry” or
investigation ................................................... 10
ii. Decisions interpreting “proceedings” in
association to “inquiry” or investigation ......... 21
b. Framework of single interface and cross-
empowerment of powers under Section 6 of the
CGST Act ............................................................. 30
c. Scope and Ambit of “initiated any proceedings”
under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act ............... 42
i. Reading of Circular dated 05.10.2018 .......... 50
II. Whether “subject matter” within the meaning of
Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act includes all matters
dealt with in summons under the Act? ................. 52
III. What is the purport of an “Order” under Section
6(2)(a) of the CGST Act? ......................................... 59
E. CONCLUSION .................................................................. 61

1. This matter was notified for admission on 06.03.2025. After hearing
the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner at length, and upon
a threadbare examination of the reasoning assigned by the High
Court, we decided to dismiss the Special Leave Petition. However,
considering the nature of the issue involved, we thought it appropriate
to assign reasons, and accordingly reserved the order.
2. This petition arises from the judgment and order passed by the
High Court of Delhi dated 07.02.2025 in W.P.(C) No. 1082 of 2025
(“Impugned Order”), by which the High Court dismissed the writ
petition filed by the petitioner herein, and declined from interdicting the
summons dated 16.01.2025 and 23.01.2025 respectively, issued to the
petitioner under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act,
2017 (for short, “the CGST Act”) by the Commissioner, Central Good
and Services Tax, Delhi East Commissionerate (respondent no. 1).
1738 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

A. FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The petitioner is a public limited company, incorporated under the
Companies Act, 2013 and is registered with the Delhi GST authorities
vide GSTIN: 07AADCA5862E2ZS. The company is engaged, inter
alia, in the business of providing security services.
4. On 18.11.2024, the petitioner received a show cause notice issued
under Section 73 of the CGST Act from the respondent no. 2 for
tax period April 2020-March 2021. The show cause notice raised
a demand of Rs. 1,24,92,162/- (aggregate of CGST, SGST, IGST)
alongwith the applicable interest and penalty under Sections 50 and
74 of the CGST Act respectively. The said show cause notice was
served on the ground that – (i) net tax under declared due to non-
reconciliation of turnovers in other returns and e-way bill information;
(ii) excess claim of ITC.
5. On 16.01.2025, a search was conducted at the registered premises
of the petitioner under Section 67(2) of the CGST Act by the officers
of respondent no. 1. A panchnama was drawn seizing electronic
gadgets and documents. Thereafter, summons under Section 70 of
the CGST Act was issued to four directors of the petitioner company
requiring them to produce documents.
6. On 23.01.2025, the petitioner received one another summons under
Section 70 of the CGST Act issued by the officer of respondent no. 1,
directing one of the directors of the petitioner to produce relevant
documents. The petitioner vide letter dated 24.01.2025 submitted a
letter addressed to the respondent no. 1 stating that the petitioner
is being investigated by the respondent no. 2, on similar grounds,
including ITC claimed from cancelled suppliers. The petitioner also
sought release of the seized electronic devices and documents.
7. Aggrieved by the summons dated 16.01.2025 and 23.01.2025
respectively, the petitioner preferred a writ petition before the High
Court of Delhi on the ground that as the respondent no. 2 had
already made the investigation in respect of the same issue and the
respondent no. 1 does not have the jurisdiction in view of Section
6(2)(b) of the CGST Act.

B. IMPUGNED ORDER
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1739

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

8. The High Court dismissed the writ petition preferred by the petitioner
and thereby declined to interfere with the summons issued to the
petitioner on 16.01.2025 and 23.01.2025 respectively. The Court
held that the expression “any proceeding” in Section 6(2)(b) cannot
be construed to include a search or investigation. The High Court
took the view that a summons or investigation pursuant to a search
constitutes only a precursor to the formal proceedings. It distinguished
such summons from assessment, noting that summons is primarily
intended to elicit information.
9. The High Court noted that the intent of the statute is to prevent
parallel proceedings relating to assessment, particularly those
initiated under Sections 73 and 74 respectively of the CGST Act or
any other analogous provisions. At the stage of issuing summons,
the authorities are merely engaged in gathering information from
the assessee based on the material collected thus far, as it is not
yet possible to determine the specific course of action the authority
intends to pursue.
10. Lastly, the High Court considered the decision of the High Court of
Jharkhand in Vivek Narsaria v. State of Jharkhand, reported in
2024 SCC OnLine Jhar 50, which was relied upon by the petitioner
to fortify his submissions. The Court held that the facts of the said
case were distinguishable from those of the present matter. In Vivek
Narsaria (supra), both the State and Central GST authorities were
conducting parallel inquiries, requiring the assessee to reverse the
input tax credit. The Court observed that the search in the present
case could not be construed as related to prior assessments or
the pending proceedings, as it was conducted subsequent to those
events.

C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
11. Mr. Sridhar Potaraju, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
petitioner, would argue that Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act expressly
prohibits parallel proceedings on the same subject matter by both
the State and the Central GST authorities. He submitted that the
summons issued by the respondent no. 1 concerning the subject
matter i.e., availability of input tax credit in respect of cancelled
dealers is barred under Section 6(2)(b), as the respondent no. 2
had already issued show cause notices on the same subject matter.
1740 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

12. Mr. Potaraju submitted that the petitioner does not dispute the
jurisdiction and authority of the Central GST authorities in respect
of subject matters not covered by the show cause notices issued
by the State authority. He further contended that the High Court
erred in interpreting Section 6(2)(b) as being limited to proceedings
under Sections 73 and 74 respectively, or other similar provisions.
Consequently, the High Court erroneously held that the statutory
bar under Section 6(2)(b) does not apply to summons issued under
Section 70 of the CGST Act.
13. Mr. Potaraju drew the Court’s attention to Section 146 of the CGST
Act to submit that that the common GST portal reflects complete
records and status of all proceedings initiated by either the State or
Central GST authorities. Accordingly, both the authorities are privy
to any proceedings on any given subject matter. In the present
case, the summons issued by the respondent no. 1 clearly specify
the subject matter, which is evidently identical to that already under
consideration of the respondent no. 2.
14. Further advancing his submission, Mr. Potaraju underscored the
importance of harmony as a foundational principle of cooperative
federalism, upon which the GST regime is structured. He submitted
that once either the State or Central authority initiates proceedings,
the other is expected to act in aid of those proceedings and provide
all necessary inputs to ensure their effective culmination. However,
the simultaneous exercise of jurisdiction in the form of a parallel
investigation on the same subject matter, he argued, runs contrary
to the principle of harmony.
15. Mr. Potaraju relied upon D.O. F.No. CBEC/20/43/01/2017-GST (Pt.)
dated 05.10.2018, issued by the Central Board of Excise & Customs,
Ministry of Finance, to fortify his submission that the mandate of
Section 6 of the CGST Act envisages a harmonious exercise of
powers by the State and Union authorities. The Circular reads thus;
“Dear Colleague,
It has been brought to the notice of the Board that there
is ambiguity regarding initiation of enforcement action by
the Central tax officers in case of taxpayer assigned to
the State tax authority and vice versa.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1741

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

2. In this regard, GST Council in its 9th meeting held on
16.01.2017 had discussed and made recommendations
regarding administrative division of taxpayers and
concomitant issues. The recommendation in relation to
cross-empowerment of both tax authorities for enforcement
of intelligence based action is recorded at para 28 of
Agenda note no. 3 in the minutes of the meeting which
reads as follows:-
“viii. Both the Central and State tax administrations shall
have the power to take intelligence-based enforcement
action in respect of the entire value chain”
3. It is accordingly clarified that the officers of both Central
tax and State tax are authorized to initiate intelligence
based enforcement action on the entire taxpayer’s base
irrespective of the administrative assignment of the
taxpayer to any authority. The authority which initiates
such action is empowered to complete the entire process
of investigation, issuance of SCN, adjudication, recovery,
filing of appeal etc. arising out of such action.
4. In other words, if an officer of the Central tax authority
initiates intelligence based enforcement action against a
taxpayer administratively assigned to State tax authority,
the officers of Central tax authority would not transfer the
said case to its State tax counterpart and would themselves
take the case. to its logical conclusions.
5. Similar position would remain in case of intelligence
based enforcement action initiated by officers of State tax
authorities against a taxpayer administratively assigned to
the Central tax authority.
6. It is also informed that GSTN is already making changes
in the IT system in this regard.”
16. By relying on the decision in the Chief Commissioner of Central
Goods and Service Tax v. Safari Retreats Pvt. Ltd., reported in
(2025) 2 SCC 523, Mr. Potaraju further submitted that the CGST Act
is a special statute and constitutes a self-contained code. As such,
its provisions must be interpreted in a literal, plain, and strict manner.
A literal reading of Section 6(2)(b), he argued, clearly envisages a
1742 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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bar on the initiation of any proceedings by a proper officer under
the CGST Act on the same subject matter where proceedings have
already been initiated by a proper officer under the SGST Act.
17. Mr. Potaraju submitted that the legislature has consciously
employed the phrase “any proceedings”, which, in his view, is
intended to encompass all proceedings initiated under the relevant
GST enactment. The use of the word “any” in conjunction with
“proceedings” reflects the legislative intent to give the provision a
broad and inclusive scope. To buttress this submission, he relied on
the decision in K.P. Mohammed Salim v. CIT, reported in (2008)
11 SCC 573. Furthermore, Section 6 of the CGST Act, is part of
Chapter II of the Act which deals with Administration. As a sequitur,
it ought to apply to all the “proceedings” contemplated under the
subsequent provisions.
18. Lastly, Mr. Potaraju emphasized that officers under the GST regime
are governed by the provisions set out in Chapter II of the CGST Act.
He pointed out that the term “proper officer,” as defined in Section
2(91) of Chapter I, refers to any officer assigned with any function
under the Act. The CGST Act, he argued, does not draw distinctions
or impose limitations on the exercise of powers by a proper officer.
Rather, the definition operates as an overarching provision, uniformly
applicable across the various Chapters of the Act.
19. In such circumstance referred to above, he prayed that there being
merit in the present appeal, the same may be allowed and the
Impugned Order passed by the High Court may be set aside and
the summons dated 16.01.2025 and 23.01.2025 respectively be
declared as having been issued without jurisdiction.

D. ANALYSIS
20. Having heard the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and
having gone through the materials on record, the only question that
falls for our consideration is whether the action of respondent no.
1, as complained of, amounts to an “initiation of proceedings” in
respect of the “same subject matter” for the purposes of Section
6(2)(b) of the CGST Act.

I. Whether issuance of summons can be regarded as
“initiation of proceedings” within the meaning of Section
6(2)(b) of the CGST Act?
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1743

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

21. One of the principal contentions raised by the petitioner herein for
the purpose of assailing the Impugned Order is that the issuance of
summons amounts to “initiation of proceedings” within the meaning
of Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act.

a. Contrary Views of different High Courts on the issue
22. Before we proceed to answer the aforesaid contention canvassed
on behalf of the petitioner, it would be appropriate to first refer to the
decisions of various High Courts and the cleavage of opinion that have
been expressed as regards the scope of “initiation of proceedings”
within the meaning of Section 6 of the CGST Act.

i. Decisions interpreting the contours of “proceedings” in
contrast to “inquiry” or investigation
23. The High Court of Allahabad in G.K. Trading v. Union of India
& Ors., reported in 2020 SCC OnLine All 1907, examined the
interplay between Sections 6 and 70 respectively of the CGST Act.
The petitioner had received summons from the State GST authorities
to explain two instances of availed input tax credit. Simultaneously,
the petitioner was also summoned by the Central GST authorities to
tender a statement in connection with the inquiry being undertaken
by the Central GST authorities. Subsequent summons required the
petitioner to produce various documents; however, he failed to furnish
the requisite information.
The High Court held that the term “inquiry” as used in Section 70 of
the CGST Act is not synonymous with “proceedings” under Section
6(2)(b). The Court clarified that proceedings under Section 6(2)(b)
include actions relating to assessment, demand, and penalty, such
as those initiated under Sections 73 or 74 respectively of the Act.
Moreover, the Court interpreted the phrase “same subject matter”
in Section 6(2)(b) to refer to the same cause of action concerning
the same dispute being adjudicated before a proper officer. In the
Court’s view, the reference to “subject matter” implies an adjudicatory
proceeding founded on an identical cause of action. The relevant
observations read as under:
“10. The words “subject-matter”, “proceedings” and “inquiry”
have not been defined either under the State GST Act or
the Union Territory GST Act or the CGST Act. Therefore,
1744 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

these words have to be interpreted in the context of the
aforesaid Acts. The word “inquiry” in section 70 has a
special connotation and a specific purpose to summon any
person whose attendance may be considered necessary
by the proper officer either to give evidence or to produce
a document or any other thing. It cannot be intermixed
with some statutory steps which may precede or may
ensue upon the making of the inquiry or conclusion of
inquiry. The process of inquiry under section 70 is specific
and unified by the very purpose for which provisions of
Chapter XIV of the Act confers power upon the proper
officer to hold inquiry. The word “inquiry” in section 70 is
not synonymous with the word “proceedings”, in section
6(2)(b) of the UPGST Act/CGST Act.
xxx
12. Provisions of section 70 has been enacted for collecting
evidence in matters involving tax evasion which may also
lead to confiscation. After inquiry is completed and materials
for tax not paid or short-paid or erroneously refunded or
input-tax credit wrongly availed or utilized, by reason of
fraud or wilful misstatement or suppression of facts or
otherwise are found, then it may lead to demands and
recovery under section 73 or section 74, as the case may
be. When action for assessment, demand and penalty, etc.,
including action under section 73 or 74 is taken, that shall
amount to proceedings referable to section 6(2)(b) of the
Act but the inquiry under section 70 is not a proceeding
referable to section 6(2)(b) of the Act.
xxx
17. Thus, section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act prohibits separate
initiation of proceedings on the same subject-matter by
the proper officer under the CGST Act when proceeding
on the same subject-matter by the proper officer under
the State Act has been initiated, whereas section 70
of the UPGST/CGST Act merely empowers the proper
officer to summon any person in any inquiry. The word
“proceedings” used in section 6(2)(b) is qualified by the
words “subject-matter” which indicates an adjudication
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1745

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

process/proceedings on the same cause of action and for
the same dispute which may be proceedings relating to
assessment, audit, demands and recovery, and offences
and penalties, etc. These proceedings are subsequent
to inquiry under section 70 of the Act. The words “in any
inquiry” used in section 70 of the Act is referable to the
provisions of Chapter XIV, i. e., section 67 (power of
inspection, search and seizure), section 68 (inspection of
goods in movement), section 69 (power to arrest), section
71 (access to business premises) and section 72 (officers
to assist proper officers). Therefore, proper officer under
the UPGST Act or the CGST Act may invoke power under
section 70 in any inquiry. Prohibition of section 6(2)(b) of the
CGST Act shall come into play only when any proceeding
on the same subject-matter has already been initiated by
a proper officer under the UPGST Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)

24. The High Court of Madras in Kuppan Gounder P.G. Natarajan v.
Directorate General of GST Intelligence, reported in 2021 SCC
OnLine Mad 17053, dealt with a challenge to summons issued by
the respondent on the ground that the appellant’s company fell within
the state jurisdiction under the SGST Act, and the respondent is an
authority with the central jurisdiction. The Court held that the scope of
Sections 6(2)(b) and 70 respectively, are different and distinct, as the
former deals with any proceedings on a same subject matter, whereas,
the latter deals with power to summon in an inquiry and therefore,
the words “proceedings” and “inquiry” cannot interchangeably be
used to say that there is a bar to invoke the power under Section
70 of the CGST Act. The Court referred to the proceedings under
Section 67, 68, 69, 71 and 72 respectively as “inquiry”. It was further
observed that the prohibition under Section 6(2)(b) shall come into
play when any proceedings on the same subject matter had already
been initiated by a proper officer of another tax authority. The relevant
observations read as under:
“31. We need to take note of the word “inquiry” occurring
in Section 70 of the CGST Act and the proper officer
has power to summon any person whose attendance he
considers necessary to give evidence or to produce a
1746 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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document or any other thing in any inquiry, in the same
manner, as provided in the case of a Civil Court. The bar
contained under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act is with
regard to any proceedings initiated by a proper officer on
a subject matter, on the same subject-matter, the proper
officer under the Central Act cannot initiate any action
referred.
32. In our considered view, the scope of Section 6(2)(b)
and Section 70 is different and distinct, as the former deals
with any “proceedings on a subject matter/same subject
matter” whereas, Section 70 deals with power to summon
in an inquiry and therefore, the words “proceedings” and
“inquiry” cannot be mixed up to read as if there is a bar
for the respondent to invoke the power under Section 70
of the CGST Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)

25. The High Court of Orissa in Anurag Suri v. Director General of
Goods and Services Tax Intelligence & Ors., reported in 2021
SCC OnLine Ori 2510, dealt with a challenge to show cause notice
and subsequent orders issued by the State GST authority, despite
the Central GST authority already being seized of the matter. During
a search conducted at the petitioner’s business premises by the
Central GST authority, documents were seized and summons were
issued. The petitioner therein participated in the proceedings arising
therefrom. Subsequently, the State GST authority issued a show
cause notice alleging that tax dues had not been paid or had been
short-paid, that refunds had been erroneously released, or that the
input tax credit had been wrongly availed or utilized. The petitioner
was called upon to pay the tax along with interest and penalty. The
petitioner requested that the proceedings initiated by the State GST
authority be kept in abeyance until the conclusion of the proceedings
before the Central GST authority. Nevertheless, the State GST
authority proceeded to pass an order directing the petitioner to pay
the demanded amount.
The High Court noted that the period of enquiry by the Central GST
authority spanned from July 2017 to June 2018, whereas, the show
cause notice issued by the State GST authority pertained to March
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1747

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

2018. Therefore, there was an overlap in the periods under scrutiny.
In view of this, the High Court quashed the show cause notice and the
subsequent orders issued by the State GST authority. The relevant
observations read as under:-
“14. Counsel for the Opposite Parties does not dispute
that the circular dated 5th October, 2018 precludes the
State GST authorities from proceeding in the matter as
long as the Central authorities are seized of it. The only
submission by Mr. Chimanka is that the Appellant should
continue to cooperate with the Central GST authorities and
appear as and when required by them to do so.
15. Learned counsel for the Appellant states that the
Appellant has already been cooperating and would continue
to do so as far as the proceeding initiated by the DGGSTI
(Opposite Party No. 1) is concerned.
16. It may be noted that the period of enquiry as far as
Central tax authority is concerned is from July, 2017 to
June, 2018 whereas Opposite Party No. 3 has issued a
show cause notice specific for March, 2018 and, therefore,
there is also an overlapping of the periods.
xxx
18. For the reasons noted above, the Court quashes the
show cause notice dated 23rd July, 2019, the impugned
order dated 5th November, 2019 including the order dated
4th November, 2019 all passed by Opposite Party No. 3
and directs that till the conclusion of the proceeding initiated
against the Appellant by the DGGSTI, no coercive action be
taken against the Appellant by the Opposite Party No. 3.”
(Emphasis supplied)

26. In Indo International Tobacco Ltd. v. Vivek Prasad, reported in
2022 SCC OnLine Del 90, the petitioner approached the High Court
of Delhi, aggrieved by multiple search operations and summons.
A search was initially conducted by the Central GST authorities in
Gautam Buddha Nagar, followed by the issuance of a show cause
notice. Thereafter, the bank account of the petitioner was provisionally
attached and summons were issued to produce various documents.
1748 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Subsequently, the petitioner’s premises were subjected to searches by
multiple units of the Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI),
Lucknow Zonal Unit, DGGI, Delhi Zonal Unit, DGGI, Ghaziabad,
DGGI, Ahmedabad.
The Court observed that an assessee may fall within the jurisdiction
of a State Tax Officer, a Central Tax Officer, and a Central Tax
Officer having pan-India jurisdiction. In the context of Section 6,
the Court observed that the purport of Section 6 is to eliminate the
assessee from being subjected to multiple jurisdictions. However,
the Court further clarified that neither Section 6 nor the Circular
dated 05.10.2018 would apply to fact-situations where the inquiry,
investigation, or proceedings have implications extending beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the initiating officer. It categorically observed
that the Circular does not contemplate situations where actions, by
Central or State, or only Central or State, have a common thread
involving multiple taxpayers. In such cases, requiring an officer to
limit the scope of investigation to his territorial jurisdiction would
be impractical and would, in turn, subject the assessee to multiple
overlapping actions. The relevant observations read as under:
“64. The above circular is intended to give effect to the
mandate of section 6 of the CGST Act and the pari
materia provisions in the State Act(s). It states that the
mandate of section 6 shall apply even to the “intelligence
based enforcement action”. It clarifies that the Central
tax officers as also the State tax officers are authorized
to initiate intelligence based enforcement action on the
entire taxpayer’s base “irrespective of the administrative
assignment of the taxpayer to any authority” and that
the authority which initiates such action is empowered
to complete the entire process of investigation, issuance
of show-cause notice, adjudication, recover, etcetera. It
further clarifies that even though the taxpayer may be
administratively assigned to the other authority-State or
Centre as the case may be, the officer initiating “intelligence
based enforcement action” need not transfer the said case
to the authority otherwise having administrative assignment
over the taxpayer.
65. The above circular is one example where section 6
shall have its full play. In terms of section 6(1), the State
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1749

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

or the Central Tax Officer as the case maybe, is also
authorised to act as the “proper officer” for the purposes of
the other Act-CGST or the SGST Act as the case maybe.
Therefore, when such officer initiates “intelligence based
enforcement action”, he acts and is empowered to so act
not only under the CGST Act but also under the SGST
or the UTGST Act. In terms of section 6(2)(a), he has to
pass a comprehensive order, both under the CGST and
the SGST/UTGST Act. In terms of section 6(2)(b), as he
has initiated “intelligence based enforcement action”, the
other jurisdiction officer must hold his hands and the officer
initiating such “intelligence based enforcement action”
need not transfer the case to the jurisdiction officer to
whom otherwise the taxpayer is administratively assigned.
xxx
67. A bare reading of section 6 of the CGST and the
abovementioned circular, on first blush, supports the
interpretation put forth by the learned senior counsel for
the appellants. However, in our opinion, neither section 6
of the CGST Act nor the circular dated October 5, 2018
is intended to nor can be given an over arching effect to
cover all the situations that may arise in the implementation
of the CGST and the SGST Acts. The circular cannot be
extended to cover all and myriad situations that may arise in
the administration and the functioning of the GST structure,
now being governed by the CGST Act ; the SGST Act ; the
UTGST Act ; and the IGST Act. Section 6 of the CGST Act
and the above said circular clearly has a limited application,
which is of ensuring that there is no overlapping exercise
of jurisdiction by the Central and the State Tax Officers. It
is to bring harmony between the Centre and the State in
the implementation of the GST regime, with the two not
jostling for jurisdiction over a taxpayer. It is, however, not
intended to answer a situation where due to complexity or
vastness of the inquiry or proceedings or involvement of
number of taxpayers or otherwise, one authority willingly
cedes jurisdiction to the other which also has jurisdiction
over such inquiry/proceedings/taxpayers.
1750 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

68. Neither section 6 of the CGST Act nor the SGST
Act nor the Circular dated October 5, 2018, therefore,
apply to the fact-situation presented by the two petitions
before us as they do not operate and are not intended
to operate in a situation where the “intelligence based
enforcement action” has repercussion or involvement
of taxpayers beyond the territorial jurisdictional limit
of the officer initiating such an action. It also does not
address a situation where two or more officers, may be
Central or State or only Central or State, initiate separate
“intelligence based enforcement action” but having a
common thread or involvement of multiple taxpayers, like
a case of conspiracy. In the first case, the officer initiating
the “intelligence based enforcement action” cannot travel
beyond his territorial jurisdiction. To strictly enforce section
6 and the above mentioned circular would therefore, lead
to compelling such officer to restrict his investigation and
findings and resultant action only to the taxpayer within his
territorial jurisdiction, thereby leading to an incomplete and
inconclusive investigation/action. In the above mentioned
second scenario, as all officers who have initiated
“intelligence based enforcement action” are otherwise
having jurisdiction over the taxpayer, strictly enforcing the
mandate of section 6 and the above mentioned circular,
will on the one hand subject the taxpayer to multiple
action(s) (which is completely contrary to the intent of
the Act as noted hereinabove), while on the other hand
lead to multiple authorities expending their time, energy
and resources investigating the same “intelligence” input,
may be even reaching to conflicting findings. It is settled
principle of interpretation of statute that the court must adopt
construction which will ensure smooth and harmonious
working of the statute and eschew the other which will
lead to absurdity or give rise to practical inconvenience or
friction or confusion in the working of the system. (Refer :
State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh AIR 1953 SC 10 ; Collector
of Customs, Baroda v. Digvijaysinhji Spinning & Weaving
Mills Ltd. AIR 1961 SC 1549)”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1751

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

27. The High Court of Kerala in K.T. Saidalavi v. State Tax Officer,
reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 5674, dealt with a case where
the Central GST authority had initiated an enquiry concerning
non-payment of GST, directing the production of certain records,
followed by the issuance of summons under Section 70 of the CGST
Act. During the pendency of this enquiry, the State GST authority
initiated proceedings under Section 74 of the respective State
GST enactment. The Court held that the initiation of an enquiry or
issuance of summons under Section 70 cannot be equated with the
initiation of proceedings for the purposes of Section 6(2)(b) of the
CGST Act. The term “initiation of any proceedings” is in reference to
the issuance of a notice. It further observed that the Circular dated
05.10.2018 did not appear to be in consonance with the mandate of
Section 6(2)(b) of the Act. The relevant observations read as under:
“7. […]Sub-section (2) of Section 6 with which we are
concerned, indicates that, where a proper officer under
the CGST Act has issued an order under the provisions
of the said Act, he shall also issue an order under the
State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory
Goods and Services Tax Act as the case may be under
the intimation to the jurisdictional officer of the State Tax
or the Union Territory Tax Authority as the case may be.
The Section further provides that where a proper officer
under the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union
Territory Goods and Services Tax Act has initiated any
proceedings on a subject matter, no proceedings shall
be initiated by the proper officer under the CGST Act on
the same subject matter. On a reading of the provisions,
unaided by the authority, I am unable to conclude that the
contention of the learned counsel for the appellants must
be accepted. The term ‘initiation of any proceedings’ is
no doubt a reference to the issuance of a notice under
the provisions of the CGST/SGST Acts and the initiation
of an enquiry or the issuance of summons under Section
70 of the CGST/SGST Acts cannot be deemed to be
initiation of proceedings for the purpose of Section 6(2)(b)
of the CGST/SGST Acts. I find support for this view from
the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in G.K Trading
Company (Supra) where the court held as follows;[…]”
(Emphasis supplied)
1752 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

28. The High Court of Rajasthan in Rais Khan v. Add. Commissioner,
Enforcement Wing-II, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3087/2024, dealt
with a challenge to the issuance of summons by the DGGI, on the
ground that the proceedings had already been initiated by the State
GST authority. The Court observed that the terms “proceedings”
under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act and “inquiry” under Section
70 cannot be conflated to imply a bar on the issuance of summons.
It held that the mere issuance of summons does not amount to
the initiation of proceedings under Section 6(2)(b). The relevant
observations read as under:
“11. In the judgments referred to by counsel for the
respondents, it is held that scope of Section 6(2)(b) and
Section 70 of the CGST Act is different and distinct, as
the former deals with any proceedings on subject matter,
whereas the latter deals with power to issue summon in
an inquiry and therefore, the words “proceedings” and
“inquiry” cannot be mixed up to read as if there is a bar
for the respondents to invoke the power under Section 70
of the CGST Act. In “G.K. Trading Company vs. Union of
India”, the Allahabad High Court has held that issuance
of summons is not initiation of proceedings referable to
under Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act. Similar is the view
of Madras High Court in “Kuppan Gounder P.G. Natarajan
vs. Directorate General of GST Intelligence, New Delhi”,
wherein, Court has also held that in issuance of summons
for conducting an inquiry and to obtain a statement from
the appellant cannot be construed to be bar under Section
6(2)(b) of the CGST Act.
12. In view of the above, we are of the considered view
that issuance of summons under Section 70 of the CGST
Act is not hit by Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act and
the present Civil Writ petition being devoid of merits is
accordingly dismissed. Stay application stands disposed.”
(Emphasis supplied)

ii. Decisions interpreting “proceedings” in association to
“inquiry” or investigation
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1753

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

29. The High Court of Calcutta in M/s. R.P. Buildcon Pvt. Ltd. v.
Superintendent, CGST & CX, Circle-II, Group-10, reported in
2022 SCC OnLine Cal 3108, dealt with an appeal wherein the
appellant therein, inter alia, sought quashing of notices issued by
the Central GST authority (Anti-Evasion) in respect of the financial
years 2017-18 to 2019-20, for which an audit under Section 65 of
the CGST Act had already been conducted by another wing of the
Central GST authority. The appellant also sought a declaration that
scrutiny of returns under Section 61 of the CGST Act could not have
been undertaken for the same period once an audit under Section
65 had been completed.
The Court observed that different wings of the same Department had
initiated action for the same period and held that audit falls within the
ambit of “proceedings” under Section 6(2)(b). Accordingly, it directed
that the two wings which had initiated proceedings subsequently be
restrained from proceeding further in respect of the said financial
years. The relevant observations read as under:
“7. Therefore, we are of the view that since the audit
proceedings under section 65 of the Act has already
commenced, it is but appropriate that the proceedings
should be taken to the logical end. The proceedings initiated
by the Anti Evasion and range office for the very same
period shall not be proceeded with any further.
xxx
10. It is made clear that the above direction is confined
only for the period covered for the financial years 2017-
2018, 2018-2019 and 2019-2020. If there are any other
material required by the second and third respondents for
a Department assessment period, it will be well open to
them to put the appellants on notice in that regard.”
(Emphasis supplied)

30. The High Court of Madras in Tvl. Metal Trade Incorporation v.
Special Secretary, Head of the GST Council Secretariat, New
Delhi, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 8234, considered a
challenge to summons issued by both the State and Central GST
authorities. The petitioner therein contended that simultaneous
proceedings by both authorities on the same subject matter were
1754 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

impermissible. The Court held that it was not permissible for the
State GST authorities to prosecute the petitioner therein again, as
the Central GST authority had already initiated action in respect
of the same matter. However, the Court granted the petitioner an
opportunity to participate in the proceedings initiated by the State
GST authority to ascertain whether both sets of proceedings indeed
pertained to the same subject matter. The relevant observations are
reproduced herein:
“5. Admittedly, no final decision has been taken by the fifth
respondent to initiate action against the appellant under
the TNGST Act, 2017. The appellant has only been called
upon to produce documents under the impugned Summons
dated 18-10-2022 and he has also been called to come
for personal hearing. Admittedly, the appellant has not
participated in the personal hearing and instead he has
chosen to file this Writ Petition, challenging the impugned
Summons. Necessarily, to substantiate his defence that he
cannot be once again prosecuted by the State Authority
under the TNGST Act, 2017, he has to participate in
the enquiry to be conducted by the fifth respondent and
only then it can be ascertained whether the proceedings
initiated by the Central and State Authority are one and
the same involving the same subject matter. Truth will
come out only when the appellant appears before the
respondent pursuant to the Summons received by him and
not otherwise. If it is the same subject matter, the State
Authority cannot prosecute the appellant once again as
the Central Authority has already initiated action against
the appellant in respect of the very same subject matter.
The appellant has sent a detailed reply on 27-10-2022
to the impugned Summons dated 18-10-2022 and even
without allowing the same to be considered by the fifth
respondent on merits, the appellant has approached this
Court prematurely by filing this Writ Petition.
6. As observed earlier, necessarily, the appellant will have
to participate in the personal hearing and state all his
objections with regard to the action launched by the State
Authority under the TNGST Act, 2017. Unless and until the
appellant participates in the impugned proceedings viz.,
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1755

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

the impugned Summons dated 18-10-2022, truth cannot
be unearthed with regard to the appellant’s contentions.”
(Emphasis supplied)

31. The High Court of Jharkhand in Vivek Narsaria (supra), dealt with
a petition wherein the petitioner therein sought a direction that the
proceedings be continued by the State GST authority, and not by
the Preventive Wing of the Central GST authority or the DGGI. An
inspection was initially carried out at the instance of the State GST
authorities, during which the books of account were requisitioned.
Subsequently, the petitioner was served with a notice by the
Preventive Wing of the Central GST authority directing reversal of
input tax credit along with interest and penalty, on the allegation of
purchases from non-existent entities. While both Departments were
seized of the matter, the DGGI conducted a search and effected
seizures. The petitioner therein was also summoned at regular
intervals by both the Preventive Wing of the Central GST authority
and the DGGI.
The High Court observed that the actions taken by any authority form
part of a chain of events occurring under the Act, and that every
enquiry or investigation initiated by any authority is interrelated. It
held that as the State authorities had initiated the same proceeding
for wrong/illegal availment of input tax credit, the DGGI does not
possess any special powers exceeding those conferred on the
officers of the State GST authorities. Accordingly, the Court directed
the Preventive Wing of the Central GST authority and the DGGI to
transfer their investigation in relation to the petitioner therein to the
State GST authorities. The relevant observations read as under:-
“14. Having heard the arguments advanced by respective
parties and having perused the documents brought on
record and the statements and averments made in the
respective counter-affidavits and materials available on
record, we find that bare perusal of section 6 of the Act,
especially section 6(2)(b), when read with the Clarification
dated October 5, 2018, further read with Clarification dated
June 22, 2020, when read together, it clearly denotes and
implies that it is a chain of a particular event happening under
the Act and every and any enquiry/investigation carried out
1756 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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at the behest of any of the Department are interrelated.
Even if, we accept the submission of respondent No. 5
that the proceedings initiated by respondent No. 5 is on
the basis of an information received from Noida; in that
event also, we are at loss to say that the DGGI is raising a
question about credibility and competence of the State GST
Authorities, in carrying out the investigation concerning
wrong/inadmissible availment of Input-tax Credit, inasmuch
as, the officers of the DGGI does not enjoy any special
power or privilege in comparison with the officers of the
State GST Authorities.
15. We are little hesitant to accept such argument,
inasmuch as, the State Authorities has also initiated the
same very proceeding for wrong/illegal availment of input-
tax credit. Undeniably, the proceedings at the instance
of State Authorities or the Preventive Wing or the DGGI
is at initial stage and the proceedings on the basis of
“Search and Seizure” by the State Authorities, is prior in
point of time. Hence, section 6(2)(b) read with clarification
dated October 5, 2018, adds to the issues raised by the
appellant herein and manifestly crystallizes that since all
the proceedings are interrelated, the State authorities
should continue with the proceedings.”
(Emphasis supplied)

32. The High Court of Punjab & Haryana in Stalwart Alloys India Pvt.
Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2024 SCC OnLine P&H
15153, held that any action taken by any Department amounts to
judicial proceedings but the Departments are within their right to initiate
proceedings and take them to their logical conclusion. In that case,
an enquiry had been initiated both by the State GST authority and
by multiple Zonal Units of the DGGI regarding the wrongful availment
of input tax credit. The petitioner filed a writ petition, pursuant to
which the State GST authority was directed to continue the enquiry
proceedings. In aid of this, the petitioner was directed to submit
records, including ledger accounts, sales and purchase invoices,
and proof of payment, up to 31 January 2021. Subsequently, fresh
search and seizure proceedings were undertaken by the DGGI. The
DGGI granted permission to the concerned Zonal Unit to conduct
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1757

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

a centralized investigation against the petitioner for the period
after 2019. In this context, the State GST authority transferred the
proceedings to the concerned Zonal Unit of the DGGI.
The High Court observed that the CGST Act does not contemplate the
transfer of proceedings from one proper officer to another. Accordingly,
no authority has the power to transfer a case from its jurisdiction
to another, nor can any authority direct such a transfer. The Court
held that actions taken by a proper officer under the Act were in the
nature of judicial proceedings, which cannot be transferred through
administrative orders. It further held that both the State and Central
GST authorities are vested with equal powers under the relevant
GST enactments, and once proceedings have been initiated by one
authority, the same cannot be transferred to another. The relevant
observations read as under:
“22. We have considered his submission but find ourselves
unable to accept the same in terms of scheme of the GST
Act. As noticed above, the GST Act of 2017 empowers
both the State authority as well as Central authority with
equal powers. Once we have held that the proceedings are
in the nature of judicial proceedings. The corollary, such
judicial proceedings cannot be transferred by administrative
actions. Merely because the DGGI has information relating
to similar fraudulent availment of ITC by other firms who
may be related to the firm against which the proceedings
have been initiated under section 74 of the HGST Act by
the State authority itself would not be a sufficient ground
to presume that the State GST authority would not be able
to conduct the proceedings or examine the culpability of
the firm against whom proceedings under section 74 of the
HGST Act have been initiated. Merely because there may
be other firm also against whom proceedings are initiated,
there is no concept of joint proceedings. In view of the
above, we do not subscribe to the contentions raised by
learned Assistant Solicitor General.
xxx
25. The import of the aforesaid Circular dated October 5,
2018 is to be understood to mean that when an inquiry is
conducted by a proper officer of the State and investigation
1758 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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is required to be done by the Central Tax Officer, the
Central Tax Officer would exercise the said power for the
purpose of investigation. However, it would not mean that
the proceedings being conducted by the State Tax Officer
would also be transferred to them. They would only be
in a position as investigating officer as is done in any
criminal case. Their report relating to their investigation
at the level of Pan India will have to be submitted to the
State Tax Officer who has initiated the proceedings and
as a State Tax Officer has the power to issue summons
and warrants of arrest which would be applicable to Pan
India. There is no reason to believe that the proceedings
in any manner would be hampered or would suffer as
against the company/firm against which proceedings have
been initiated under section 74 of the Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)

Further, the High Court interpreted the term “subject matter” as
used in Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act to refer to the nature of the
proceedings. In the facts of the case, the Court construed the subject
matter to be the proceedings initiated for the wrongful availment of
input tax credit. On this basis, it held that the DGGI was precluded
from initiating proceedings, even for a different period, where the
State GST authority had already initiated proceedings on the same
subject matter. The relevant observations read as under:
“29. In the opinion of this court, the word “subject-matter”
used in section 6(2)(b) of the Act would mean “the nature
of proceedings”. In the present case, thus, it would mean
the proceedings initiated for wrongful availment of input-
tax credit by fraudulent means. Thus, if the State has
already initiated proceedings by issuing notice under
section 74 of the Act for the period up to July 22, 2019,
for the same subject-matter, the DGGI cannot be allowed
to initiate proceedings for the availment of input-tax credit
by fraudulent means for the period from July 28, 2019 to
January 20, 2022. Such action, if allowed, would be contrary
to the provisions contained in section 6(2)(b) of the Act.”
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1759

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

33. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Kundlas Loh Udyog v.
State of H.P., reported in 2024 SCC OnLine HP 4810, dealt with
a case where the petitioner was issued summons by the State
GST authorities, directing him to furnish details of all suppliers from
September 2021, for the tax period spanning April 2019 to December
2023. Subsequently, the petitioner therein received summons
from the Central GST authority concerning supplies made by five
specific suppliers. The petitioner informed the Central authorities that
proceedings with respect to the named suppliers had already been
initiated by the State authorities and that the relevant documents
had been submitted to them. Nevertheless, the Central authorities
proceeded to block the input tax credit on account of the transactions
involving the said suppliers.
The Court held that Section 6(1) of the CGST Act empowers the
officers appointed under the State enactment to act as proper
officers for the purposes of the CGST Act as well. It observed that
the object of Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act is to prevent the cross-
empowerment in a manner that results in taxpayers being subjected
to parallel proceedings. The Court interpreted the term “subject
matter” to refer to the nature of the proceedings, and clarified that
if any new information is gathered by the latter authority, it ought to
be shared with the authority already seized of the investigation. The
relevant observations read as under:
22. Further in conformity with the scheme of cross
empowering officers under the said enactments, Clause
(a) of Section 6(2) of the Act also empowers a proper
officer to issue orders under the SGST Act and the said
Act. Similarly, officers under the SGST Act and the UGST
Act are also empowered to issue orders under the Act.
The only condition is that the issuance of such orders is
required to be intimated to the Jurisdictional Officer of the
central tax or the state tax, as the case may be.
23. To ensure that there are no multiple proceedings in
regard of the central and the state officers being authorized
as proper officers, Clause (b) of Section 6(2) of the Act
provides that where a proper officer under the SGST Act
and the UGST Act has initiated proceedings on a subject
matter, the proper officer under the Act would not initiate
proceedings “on the same subject matter”. This provision
1760 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

of CGST is also mirrored by Clause (b) of Section 6(2) of
the SGST Act and UGST Act as well. Thus, where a proper
officer under the CGST Act had initiated proceedings on
a subject matter, no proceedings would be initiated by
proper officer authorized under the SGST Act or UGST
Act on the same subject matter.
24. It is clear that the object of Section 6(2)(b) of the Act
is to ensure that cross empowerment of officers of Central
Tax and State Tax do not result in the taxpayers being
subjected to parallel proceedings.
25. Noticeably, Section 6 (2) (b) of the Act treats the
empowered officers under the SGTS/UGST Act at the
central level to be at par and does not prescribe for transfer
of investigation of the proceedings from State authority to
the Central authority or vice-versa.
26. The object of Section 6(2)(b) of the Act is to avoid
multiple proceedings by the Sales Tax Officer and Central
Tax Officer on the same subject matter and the Rules of
purposive interpretation requires Section 6(2)(b) of the Act
to be read in light of this object.
xxx
32. It would be an entirely different matter that if there
would have been another firm which has also been found
to be availing fraudulent ITC, then the central government
authorities would not be precluded from taking action
against that firm. The independent action against some
other firms would not impede the proceedings already
initiated by the State Tax Authorities. Any new information
which the respondent No. 2 may have gathered related to
fraudulent availment or passing on can always be informed
to the authorities, who already conducting the investigation,
inquiry and proceedings under Section 6(2) of the Act.
33. In my considered opinion, the word “subject-matter”
used in Section 6(2)(b) of the Act would mean, “the nature
of proceedings”. In the present case, it would thus mean
the proceedings initiated prior at any point of time vide
Annexure P-1 by respondent No. 1 and, therefore, for the
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1761

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

same subject matter, respondent No. 2 cannot be allowed
to initiate proceedings. Such action, if allowed, would be
contrary to the provisions contained in Section 6(2)(b) of
the Act.
(Emphasis supplied)

b. Framework of single interface and cross-empowerment of
powers under Section 6 of the CGST Act
34. The unique scheme and framework of the Goods and Services Tax
regime envisages two distinct concepts at its heart, the concept of
a “single interface” as-well as the concept of “cross-empowerment”.
The former relates to doing away of dual administrative control over
the collection as-well as assessment of tax returns by tax payers,
that had existed previously, in the erstwhile scheme of indirect taxes
in the form of value added tax or VAT. Whereas, the latter, pertains
empowering both the Central and State tax administrations to
simultaneously undertake enforcement actions against a tax-payer.
35. While at the first blush, both these concepts may appear to be in
contradiction to one another, however, a closer and more considered
examination of these concepts within the GST framework would
reveal that they are complementary to one another. Both these
concepts have been consciously adopted and incorporated within
the GST framework and have been designed to work in tandem for
achieving the avowed object of GST.
36. At the time of the framing of the Goods and Services Tax Act, it was
consciously decided that taxpayers should not be subjected to the
jurisdiction of both the Central and State tax authorities simultaneously.
To prevent the burden of dual administrative control and to streamline
compliance, the concept of a “single interface” was introduced. Under
this model, only one tax administration would exercise exclusive
control over a taxpayer in relation to all aspects of GST compliance.
This included matters pertaining to Central GST (CGST), State GST
(SGST), and Integrated GST (IGST).
37. The underlying objective of this arrangement was to simplify the
taxpayer’s engagement with the tax system by ensuring that all
notices, audits, assessments, and other proceedings are handled by
a single authority, thereby eliminating the complexity and duplication
1762 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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that would arise from dual control. It was envisioned that a taxpayer
should not be compelled to respond to two different authorities for
the same issue or transaction.
38. In the 5th GST Council Meeting held on 02.12.2016, the Chairman
of the Council emphasized that for the effective implementation of
the CGST and SGST, cross-empowerment was essential and should
extend across the entire value chain of the taxpayer. The Minister
from Karnataka observed that once the State administration had
conducted the audit of a taxpayer, there was no justification for the
matter to be transferred to the Central administration. The Secretary
suggested that the functions such as issuance of show cause notices
and passing of adjudication orders ought to be carried out by the
same tax administration that had undertaken the audit, scrutiny,
or enforcement, thereby maintaining continuity and administrative
coherence. The Minister from Tamil Nadu expressed the view that,
except in intelligence-based actions where both administrations were
to be empowered, dual control should be avoided in other processes
such as registration, return filing, scrutiny, audit, appeals, demand,
and refund.
39. At the 9th GST Council Meeting held on 16.01.2017, the Chairman
of the Central Board of Excise & Customs stated that the States had
agreed that both the Central and State tax administrations shall have
jurisdiction over the entire taxpayer base. He further emphasized
that neither administration should be completely excluded from any
segment of the value chain, so as to ensure proper checks and
balances. Towards the conclusion of the discussion on the agenda
of cross-empowerment, the Chairman noted that enforcement
functions would remain common to both administrations. The Council
accordingly agreed that both Central and State tax authorities would
be empowered to undertake intelligence-based enforcement actions
across the entire value chain of a taxpayer.
40. With a view to ensure single interface under the GST regime and to
avoid dual control over taxpayers, the GST Council, in its 9th Meeting,
resolved that a clear division of taxpayers between the Central and
State tax administrations be effected for all administrative purposes.
Simultaneously, the Council recognized the necessity of empowering
both the Central and State tax administrations to act on intelligence-
based enforcement actions across the entire value chain, regardless
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1763

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

of administrative allocation. This dual empowerment was intended to
maintain robust enforcement capabilities and prevent evasion, while
preserving the administrative clarity of the single interface system.
41. To ensure cross-empowerment across the CGST, SGST, and IGST
Acts, Section 6 was incorporated into the statute. Sub-section (1) of
Section 6 authorizes the officers appointed under the SGST Act or the
Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act (UTGST) to be “proper
officer” for the purposes of the CGST Act. The State GST and Union
Territory GST Acts also have similar provisions authorizing officers
appointed under the CGST Act to be proper officers for the purposes
of the respective State enactments. The provision reads thus:
“6. Authorisation of officers of State tax or Union territory
tax as proper officer in certain circumstances.––(1) Without
prejudice to the provisions of this Act, the officers appointed
under the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union
Territory Goods and Services Tax Act are authorised to
be the proper officers for the purposes of this Act, subject
to such conditions as the Government shall, on the
recommendations of the Council, by notification, specify.
(2) Subject to the conditions specified in the notification
issued under sub-section (1),––
(a) where any proper officer issues an order under
this Act, he shall also issue an order under the State
Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory
Goods and Services Tax Act, as authorised by the
State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union
Territory Goods and Services Tax Act, as the case
may be, under intimation to the jurisdictional officer
of State tax or Union territory tax;
(b) where a proper officer under the State Goods and
Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and
Services Tax Act has initiated any proceedings on a
subject matter, no proceedings shall be initiated by
the proper officer under this Act on the same subject
matter.
(3) Any proceedings for rectification, appeal and
revision, wherever applicable, of any order passed
1764 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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by an officer appointed under this Act shall not lie
before an officer appointed under the State Goods
and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods
and Services Tax Act.”
42. Section 6 of the CGST Act and the identical pari-materia provision
in the respective State and Union Territories statutes, is a nuanced
provision that enshrines both the concept as-well as the contours of
“single interface” system and “cross-empowerment”. It delineates when
and how the various officers appointed under different corresponding
legislations shall act as “proper officer” for the purposes of the said
legislation. Section 6 of the CGST Act has to be read with Circular
No. 01/2017 dated 20.09.2017 and Circular dated 05.10.2018 read
with Clarification F. No. CBEC-20/10/07/2019-GST dated 22.06.2020
by the Central Board of Indirect Taxes, GST Policy Wing.
43. In conformity with the scheme of cross-empowering officers, clause
(a) of sub-section (2) of Section 6 mandates that where a proper
officer issues an order under the CGST Act, he has to pass an order
under the SGST or UTGST Act respectively, under an intimation to the
jurisdictional officer of the State and Union Territory tax authorities.
Further, clause (b) of sub-section (2) bars a proper officer under the
CGST Act to initiate proceedings on a subject matter where a proper
officer under the SGST Act and UTGST Act has initiated proceedings
on the same subject matter.
44. In furtherance of the Council’s decision regarding the administrative
division of taxpayer base, the Circular No. 01/2017 dated 20.09.2017
was issued, laying down the framework for allocation of taxpayer
between the Centre and the States.
“Subject: Guidelines for division of taxpayer base between
the Centre and States to ensure Single Interface under
GST - regarding
Based on the decisions taken in the 9th Meeting of the
GST Council held on 16 January, 2017 and 21st Meeting of
the GST Council held on 9 September, 2017, the following
criteria should be followed for the division of taxpayer
base between the Centre and the States to ensure single
interface:
i. Of the total number of taxpayers below Rs. 1.5 crore
turnover, all administrative control over 90% of the
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1765

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

taxpayers shall vest with the state tax administration
and 10% with the Central tax administration; the state
ii. In respect of the total number of taxpayers above
Rs. 1.5 crore turnover, all administrative control shall
be divided equally in the ratio of 50% each for the
Central and the State tax administration;
iii. The division of taxpayers in each State shall be
done by computer at the State level based on stratified
random sampling and could also take into account
the geographical location and type of the taxpayers,
as may be mutually agreed;[…]”
45. While the latter decision that both the Central and State tax
administrations shall have power to take intelligence-based
enforcement action in respect of the entire value chain is reflected in
the Circular dated 05.10.2018, as reproduced above, and Clarification
F. No. CBEC-20/10/07/2019-GST dated 22.06.2020 by the Central
Board of Indirect Taxes, GST Policy Wing, which reads thus:
“To
The Principal Director General,
Directorate General of GST Intelligence,
2nd Floor. Wing- VI, West Block- VIII R.K. Puram, New
Delhi- 110066
Sir,
Subject: Reference form DGGI on Cross empowerment
under GST. reg.
I am directed to refer to DGGI letter F.No.574/CE/66/2020/
Inv./15308 dated 26.05.2020 on the issues related to
cross empowerment of officers in terms of provisions of
section 6 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017
(hereinafter referred to as “the CGST Act”).
2. Issue raised in the reference is whether intelligence
based enforcement actions initiated by the Central Tax
officers against those taxpayers which are assigned to
the State Tax administration gets covered under section
6(1) of the CGST Act and the corresponding provisions of
1766 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the SGST/UTGST Acts or whether a specific notification is
required to be issued for cross empowerment on the same
lines as notification No. 39/2017-CT dated 13.10.2017
authorizing the State Officers for the purpose or refunds
under section 54 and 55 of the CGST Act.
3.1 The issue has been examined in the light of relevant
legal provisions under the CGST Act, 2017. It is observed
that Section 6 of the CGST Act provides for cross
empowerment of State Tax officers and Central Tax officers
and reads as:-
“6. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of this Act, the
officers appointed under the State Goods and Services
Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services
Tax Act are authorised to be the proper officers for
the purposes- of this Act, Subject to such conditions
as the Government shall, on the recommendations
of the Council, by Notification specify.
3.2. Thus in terms of sub-section (1) of section 6 of the
CGST Act and sub-section (1) of section 6 of the respective
State GST Acts respective State Tax officers and the
Central Tax officers respectively are authorised to be the
proper officers for the purposes of respective Acts and
no separate notification is required for exercising the said
powers in this case by the Central Tax Officers under the
provisions of the State GST Act. It is noteworthy in this
context that the registered person in GST are registered
under both the CGST Act and the respective SGST/
UTGST Act.
3.3 The confusion seems to be arising from the fact
that, the said sub-section provides for notification by the
Government if such cross empowerment is to be subjected
to conditions. It means that notification would be required
only if any conditions are to be imposed. For example,
Notification No. 39/2017-CT dated 13.10.2017 restricts
powers of the State Tax officers for the purposes of refund
and they have been specified as the proper officers only
under section 54 and 55 of the CGST Act and not under rule
96 of the CGST Rules, 2017 (IGST Refund on exports). If
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1767

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

no notification is issued to impose any condition, it means
that the officers of State and Centre have been appointed
as proper officer for all the purpose of the CGST Act and
SGST Acts.
4. Further, it may kindly be noted that a notification under
section 6(1) of the CGST Act would be part of subordinate
legislation which instead of empowering the officer under
the Act, can only be used to impose conditions on the
powers given to the officers by the section. In the absence
or any such conditions, the power of Cross- empowerment
under section 6(1) of the CGST Act is absolute and not
conditional.
Yours faithfully,
(Sumit Bhatia)
Deputy Commissioner (GST)”
46. The GST regime operates on the principle of self-assessment, as
enshrined in Section 59 of the CGST Act, hence, all provisions are
to be read in consonance, and not in derogation of Section 59. The
provision reads thus:
“59. Self-assessment.—Every registered person shall
self-assess the taxes payable under this Act and furnish a
return for each tax period as specified under section 39.”
47. The concept of “cross-empowerment” has been retained within the
GST framework in order to maintain a robust enforcement mechanism
and prevent any scope of evasion of taxes. For this purpose, both
the Central and State tax administrations have been armed with
the power to initiate intelligence-based enforcement action i.e., an
action that is predicated on information of tax evasion emanating
from the value chain or chain of transactions rather than from any
administrative scrutiny by way of audit of accounts or returns.
48. Such gathering of intelligence is intended to be a non-intrusive
exercise. The Department relies on data analytics, validation with
third-party data, and other methods to collect actionable intelligence
via analytical tools, human intelligence, modus operandi alerts as
well as information through past detections. Taxpayers must be
mindful that intelligence about evasion of tax cannot be procured
from them through issuance summons or other non-descript letters
and correspondence.
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49. Any action arising from the audit of accounts or detailed scrutiny of
returns falls within the first category, and proceedings in such cases
are to be initiated by the tax administration to which the taxpayer is
assigned. In contrast, when proceedings are based on intelligence
relating to tax evasion, they can be initiated by either the Central or
the State tax administration.
50. To put simply, Section 6 of the CGST Act provides for the
cross-empowerment of powers between the Central and State
tax administrations. However, for the purpose of administrative
convenience, the GST Council has sought to divide the taxpayer
base between the two administrations through a circular. Nonetheless,
with respect to intelligence-based enforcement actions, both the
Central and the State tax authorities are empowered to act across
the entire value chain.
51. We clarify with a view to obviate any confusion that, when we say
intelligence-based enforcement action is any action that does not
arise from audit of accounts or detailed scrutiny of returns, we do
not for a moment say, that there is no scope for tax administration to
undertake scrutiny of returns or audit of accounts. Both the Central
and the State tax administration are well empowered to undertake
such actions, as long as these actions are initiated on the basis of
any intelligence relating to tax evasion.
52. The High Court of Delhi in the decision of Amit Gupta v. Union of
India, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6664, succinctly interprets
Section 6 of the CGST Act. The relevant observations read thus:
“24. It is clear from Section 6(1) of the Act that it contains
a non obstante clause and also empowers officers
appointed under the State Goods and Services Tax Act,
2017 (hereafter “the SGST Act”) or the Union Territory
Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (hereafter “the UGST
Act”) to be appointed as proper officers for the purposes
of the Act.
25. Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act
expressly provides that if a proper officer issues an order
under Act, he shall also issue an order under the SGST
Act or the UGST Act as authorised by the said enactments
under intimation of the jurisdictional officer.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1769

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

26. In conformity with the scheme of statutes in respect
of Goods and Services Tax Act (the Act, the SGST Act
and the UGST Act) officers under any of the said statutes
can be authorised as proper officers for the purposes of
proceeding under the other GST statutes as well. Section
6(1) of the Act empowers the officers appointed under the
SGST Act and the UGST Act to act as proper officers for
the purposes of the Act. Section 6 of the SGST Act and
the UGST Act mirrors Section 6 of the Act. Consequently,
the officers under the said enactments are also authorised
as proper officers under the Act.
27. In conformity with the scheme of cross-empowering
officers under the said enactments, clause (a) of Section
6(2) of the Act also empowers a proper officer to issue
orders under the SGST Act and the said Act. Similarly,
officers under the SGST Act and the UGST Act are also
empowered to issue orders under the Act. The only
condition is that the issuance of such orders is required
to be intimated to the jurisdictional officer of the central
tax or the State tax, as the case may be.
28. To ensure that there are no multiple proceedings in
regard of the central and the State officers being authorised
as proper officers, clause (b) of Section 6(2) of the Act
provides that where a proper officer under the SGST Act
and the UGST Act has initiated proceedings on a subject-
matter, the proper officer under the Act would not initiate
proceedings “on the same subject-matter”. This provision
of CGST is also mirrored by clause (b) of Section 6(2) of
the SGST Act and UGST Act as well. Thus, where a proper
officer under the CGST Act had initiated proceedings on
a subject-matter, no proceedings would be initiated by
proper officer authorised under the SGST Act or UGST
Act on the same subject-matter.”
(Emphasis supplied)

53. At the cost of repetition, sub-section (1) of Section 6 stipulates the
general power, encompassing both the single-interface mechanism
and cross-empowerment, inasmuch as each “proper officer” may
1770 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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act as a proper officer under the SGST Act or the UTGST Act, and
vice versa. Clause (a) of sub-section (2) further reinforces this by
mandating that where a proper officer issues an order under the
CGST Act, he must simultaneously pass a corresponding order under
the SGST or UTGST Act, with due intimation to the jurisdictional
officer of the State or Union Territory tax authorities. Clause (b) of
sub-section (2) yet again affirms the principle of cross-empowerment,
albeit operating within the narrower confines of intelligence-based
enforcement action.

iii. Scope and Ambit of “initiated any proceedings” under
Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act
54. Before addressing what constitutes “proceedings” under Section 6(2)
(b) of the CGST Act, it is apposite to first consider the petitioner’s
contention that the phrase “any proceedings” is intended to encompass
all proceedings initiated under the relevant GST enactments. We may
reproduce the provision in discussion;
“(2) Subject to the conditions specified in the notification
issued under sub-section (1),––
xxx
(b) where a proper officer under the State Goods and
Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services
Tax Act has initiated any proceedings on a subject matter,
no proceedings shall be initiated by the proper officer under
this Act on the same subject matter.”
55. Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act precludes a proper officer under
the CGST Act to initiate any proceedings on a subject matter if a
proper officer under the SGST or the UGST Act has initiated any
proceedings on the same subject matter. The CGST Act does not
define the term “proceedings”. In context with this provision, the
Chairman of the 11th GST Council Meeting, held on 04.03.2017,
while discussing the approval of the Draft Central Goods and Services
Tax Law, opined that that there should be an express or implied bar
to prevent a taxpayer from being subjected to proceedings before
multiple officers for the same dispute.
56. Section 70 of the CGST Act empowers a proper officer to summon any
person whose presence is considered necessary for giving evidence
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1771

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

or producing documents or any other relevant material in an inquiry.
The issuance of summons is one of the instruments employed by
the Department to obtain information, documents, or statements
in cases involving suspected tax evasion. Such summons may be
issued to the person under investigation or to a person considered
a witness in investigation against another person.
57. A summons is not the culmination of an investigation, but merely a
step in its course. It is in this context that the legislature has used the
term “inquiry” in Section 70, as at the stage of issuing a summons, the
Department is primarily engaged in gathering information regarding
a possible contravention of law, which may subsequently form the
basis for proceedings against an assessee. Since the objective is to
collect information, the Department has, in certain instances, advised
resorting to a letter of requisition in place of a formal summons.
58. At the stage of issuing a summons, the Department is yet to determine
whether proceedings should be initiated against the assessee. Such
evidence-gathering and inquiry do not constitute “proceedings” within
the meaning of Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act. The mere issuance
of a summons cannot be equated with proceedings barred under
the Act, as the subject matter cannot be ascertained solely through
summons. That said, summons should not be issued in routine
matters or for documents readily available on the GST portal. They
ought to be issued after much thought and consideration as to the
exact information required. We acknowledge that the issuance of
multiple, cyclostyled summons may indicate a roving inquiry.
59. We affirm and appreciate the view taken by the High Court of
Allahabad in G.K. Trading (supra) and the High Court of Kerala in
K.T. Saidalavi (supra) respectively. The High Court of Allahabad
rightly held that the issuance of summons cannot be conflated with
a statutory step taken upon conclusion of an inquiry. Similarly, the
High Court of Kerala was correct in holding that initiation of inquiry
or the issuance of summons does not amount to the initiation of
“any proceedings”. The phrase “initiation of any proceedings” refers
specifically to the issuance of a notice under the relevant provisions
of the GST enactment.
60. At this juncture, we wish to refer to the Guidelines on Issuance of
Summons under Section 70 of the CGST Act issued by the Central
Board of Indirect Taxes & Customs (GST – Investigation Wing) dated
1772 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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17.08.2022. In view of the facts of the present case in hand, we
would like to inject thrust into the Guidelines dated 17.08.2022, and
direct the concerned Departments to adhere to the said Guidelines,
in both letter and spirit.
61. In the present case, the petitioner was served with a show cause
notice dated 18.11.2024 by the respondent no. 2 under Section
73 of the CGST Act, thereby initiating proceedings. The petitioner
has impugned the summons dated 16.01.2025 and 23.01.2025
respectively issued by the respondent no. 1 for production of
documents. At the summons stage, it cannot be predicated with
certainty that the subject matter of the proceedings will be identical;
the mere presence of an overlapping aspect under investigation does
not ipso facto render the subject matter “same”.
62. The High Court correctly held that the term “any proceedings” does
not encompass summons issued pursuant to a search or investigation,
as at the stage of issuance of summons the Department is merely
engaged in gathering information. We are in agreement with the
finding that a case of search is clearly distinct and separate from
proceedings initiated only after issuance of a show cause notice.
63. We may now proceed to elaborate on our understanding of “initiation
of any proceedings” within the meaning of Section 6(2)(b) of the
CGST Act. P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s, 6th Edition, page 4415-4420,
defines “proceedings” as under:-
“It is not a technical expression with defined meaning
attached to it but the one ambit of whose meaning will
be governed by the statute. The word “proceedings” can
be given a narrow or wide import depending upon the
nature and scope of an enactment in which it is used and
in the particular context of the language of the enactment
in which it appears.”
(Emphasis supplied)

64. We may quote an extract from the Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Edition,
page 1368, it stated as under:-
“An act which is done by the authority or direction of the
court, express or implied; an act necessary to be done in
order to attain a given end; a prescribed mode of action
for carrying into effect a legal right.”
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1773

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

65. A show cause notice is a document served on a noticee, requiring
them to explain why a particular action should not be initiated against
them. Under the GST regime, issuance of a show cause notice is a
mandatory precondition for raising a demand. It forms the bedrock
for proceedings related to the recovery of tax, interest, and penalty.
The notice ensures adherence to the principles of natural justice by
granting the assessee an opportunity to present their case before any
adverse action is taken. In essence, it serves as both a procedural
safeguard and a legal necessity, marking the commencement of
quasi-judicial adjudication under the Act.
66. A show cause notice sets the law in motion concerning the liability
under the statute, containing charges that a specific person is called
upon to answer. In other words, it sets out the alleged violations of
legal provisions and requires the assessee to explain why the duty
should not be recovered from them. Thus, a show cause notice
cannot be vague, nor can any allegations be made without evidence
being commensurate with the gravity of the charges levelled against
the noticee.
67. It sets forth the framework for the proceedings proposed to be
undertaken and provides the noticee with an opportunity to submit
their explanation before the adjudicating authority. It outlines the
background for the initiation of such proceedings, whether arising from
an audit of accounts by the internal audit wing, scrutiny of returns,
or intelligence gathered by officers of the Audit and Intelligence
Commissionerate. It is further mandated that the authority issuing
the notice must meticulously set out all relevant legal provisions
under which the alleged contraventions are framed. The materials
obtained through summons and relied upon for issuing the show
cause notice must be appended and disclosed to the assessee.
In essence, a show cause notice enumerates the charges levelled
against the notice.
68. An assessee may be held liable to pay tax along with interest
pursuant to an audit, scrutiny, or investigation. This liability can be
discharged either through self-assessment or by way of assessment
conducted by the Department. The Act contemplates the issuance
of a show cause notice under Sections 73, 74, and 76 respectively,
wherein the assessee is afforded one or more opportunities to pay
the demanded tax amount. Upon such payment, all proceedings in
respect of the said notice stand concluded.
1774 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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69. Once a show cause notice is issued under a specific provision and
the reply submitted in response is duly considered by the adjudicating
authority, the liability is then determined through the issuance of an
order of adjudication, commonly referred to as an ‘Order-in-Original’.

Tax/Duty

Not Levied Short Levied Not Paid Short Paid Erroneously Input Tax
Refunded Credit Wrongly
availed/utilised

Department Assessee voluntarily
contemplates action pays with interest and
penalty, if applicable

Issue of Show Cause Notice No SCN
(SCN)

70. The above flowchart, prepared and published by the Comptroller and
Auditor General of India in Report No. 1 of 2021 (Indirect Taxes –
Goods and Services Tax, Central Excise and Service Tax), illustrates
that in cases involving determination of tax not levied, or short levied,
or not paid, or short paid, or erroneously refunded, or input tax credit
wrongly availed or utilized, the assessee can discharge the liability
by voluntarily paying tax alongwith interest and, where applicable,
penalty; failing which, the Department contemplates an action. At this
stage, the Department initiates action aimed towards ascertaining
the tax liability and issuing a show cause notice accordingly.
71. We are cognizant of Circular No. 31/05/2018 – GST dated 09.02.2018,
issued by Central Board of Excise and Customs, Department of
Revenue, which states that the officers of Audit Commissionerate
and DGGI can issue show cause notices. Ergo, by virtue of being
designated as proper officers, the officers of the DGGI are also
empowered, in their capacity as Central Tax officers, to issue
show cause notices. We may reproduce the relevant extract of the
concerned Circular hereinbelow:
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1775

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

“6. The central tax officers of Audit Commissionerates
and Directorate General of Goods and Services Tax
Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as “DGGSTI”) shall
exercise the powers only to issue show cause notices. A
show cause notice issued by them shall be adjudicated
by the competent central tax officer of the Executive
Commissionerate in whose jurisdiction the noticee is
registered. In case there are more than one noticees
mentioned in the show cause notice having their principal
places of business falling in multiple Commissionerates, the
show cause notice shall be adjudicated by the competent
central tax officer in whose jurisdiction, the principal place
of business of the noticee from whom the highest demand
of central tax and/or integrated tax (including cess) has
been made falls.”
72. The statutory framework of the CGST Act does not admit of any
interpretation of the phrase “initiation of proceedings” under Section
6(2)(b) other than one which ties it to the issuance of a show cause
notice. An action qualifies as ‘proceedings’ only when it is undertaken
with the object of attaining a determinate outcome. In the present
context, the issuance of a show cause notice partakes the character
of proceedings, as it is inherently required to culminate in a definitive
determination; there must exist a point of finality or conclusion thereto.
73. Proceedings, by their very nature, cannot be said to be initiated in
the absence of certainty, nor can they culminate without adherence
to the principles of natural justice. A show cause notice marks the
commencement of a process that culminates in an order passed
by the adjudicating authority. The legislative intent to prevent the
subjugation of a taxpayer to parallel proceedings and to avoid
contradictory orders can only be realized only when the Department
is clear about the subject matter it seeks to pursue, a certainty that
arises only at the stage of issuance of the show cause notice.
74. In the facts of the present case, the mere issuance of summons does
not imply that the Department has decided to proceed against the
taxpayer for recovery of liability. Therefore, issuance of summons,
by no stretch, can be considered as the initiation of proceedings,
since at that stage, the Department still retains the discretion not
to initiate any proceedings. A mere contemplation or possibility of
1776 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

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initiating action cannot be equated with “proceedings”, as doing so
would undermine the framework of cross-empowerment under the
Act. Even when a discovery is made during the search proceedings
under Section 67 of the CGST Act, the Department is required to
bring such proceedings to a definitive conclusion, either by issuing
a show cause notice under Section 74 or by dropping the matter
altogether.

i. Reading of Circular dated 05.10.2018
75. While dealing with the present matter, we came across judgments of
various High Courts wherein various counsel relied on the Circular
dated 05.10.2018 to do both challenge and defend actions taken
by the Department. In the present matter, the learned Counsel
for the petitioner by relying on the same Circular submitted that
the respondent no. 1 could not have initiated proceedings on a
subject matter on which the respondent no. 2 had already initiated
proceedings. The Circular reads thus:
“Dear Colleague,
It has been brought to the notice of the Board that there
is ambiguity regarding initiation of enforcement action by
the Central tax officers in case of taxpayer assigned to
the State tax authority and vice versa.
2. In this regard, GST Council in its 9th meeting held on
16.01.2017 had discussed and made recommendations
regarding administrative division of taxpayers and
concomitant issues. The recommendation in relation to
cross-empowerment of both tax authorities for enforcement
of intelligence based action is recorded at para 28 of
Agenda note no. 3 in the minutes of the meeting which
reads as follows:-
“viii. Both the Central and State tax administrations shall
have the power to take intelligence-based enforcement
action in respect of the entire value chain”
3. It is accordingly clarified that the officers of both Central
tax and State tax are authorized to initiate intelligence
based enforcement action on the entire taxpayer’s base
irrespective of the administrative assignment of the
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1777

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

taxpayer to any authority. The authority which initiates
such action is empowered to complete the entire process
of investigation, issuance of SCN, adjudication, recovery,
filing of appeal etc. arising out of such action.
4. In other words, if an officer of the Central tax authority
initiates intelligence based enforcement action against a
taxpayer administratively assigned to State tax authority,
the officers of Central tax authority would not transfer the
said case to its State tax counterpart and would themselves
take the case. to its logical conclusions.
5. Similar position would remain in case of intelligence
based enforcement action initiated by officers of State tax
authorities against a taxpayer administratively assigned to
the Central tax authority.
6. It is also informed that GSTN is already making changes
in the IT system in this regard.”
76. The said Circular is premised on the administrative division of the
taxpayer base, as explained in Circular No. 01/2017 dated 20.09.2017.
We would like to underscore that this division of the taxpayer base
does not operate as a bar to the initiation of enforcement action by
Central Tax officers against a taxpayer assigned to the State Tax
authority, and vice versa.
77. Enforcement action undertaken by any Department is ordinarily based
on intelligence as elucidated by us in paragraph 48 of this judgment,
and the authority initiating such action is empowered to carry the
matter to its logical conclusion. The term “logical conclusion” does
not invariably refer to an order of assessment in every case. Rather,
it denotes the decision arrived at by the officers of the Department,
having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.

II. Whether “subject matter” within the meaning of Section
6(2)(b) of the CGST Act includes all matters dealt with in
summons under the Act?
78. In the 11th GST Council Meeting, the Council agreed that in respect
of any dispute involving tax liability under both the CGST Act and the
SGST Act, only a single order shall be passed. Accordingly, where
a Central tax officer passes an order, necessarily encompassing
1778 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the demand for tax under the SGST Act, the corresponding State
tax officer shall be precluded from passing a separate order on the
same dispute. It was in furtherance of this understanding that Section
6 of the CGST Act was enacted. We may reproduce the provision
in discussion;
“(2) Subject to the conditions specified in the notification
issued under sub-section (1),––
xxx
(b) where a proper officer under the State Goods and
Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services
Tax Act has initiated any proceedings on a subject matter,
no proceedings shall be initiated by the proper officer under
this Act on the same subject matter.”
79. What emerges from the foregoing discussion is the implicit
understanding that the subject matter in question pertains to the
determination of tax liability, referred to as “dispute”. This reinforces
the legislative intent of ensuring that an order passed under the
statute will be comprehensive in nature, more particularly, covering
the entirety of the dispute so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings,
conflicting determinations, or jurisdictional overlap.
80. The High Court of Allahabad, in G.K. Trading (supra), interpreted
the phrase “subject matter” to mean ‘cause of action’ in relation
to the same dispute in a proceeding before a proper officer under
the relevant GST enactment. The relevant extracts are reproduced
hereinbelow:
“14. Thus, the phrase “subject-matter”, or the phrase “on
the same subject- matter”, used in section 6(2)(b) of the
UPGST Act/CGST Act with reference to any proceedings,
means same cause of action for the same dispute involved
in a proceeding before proper officer under the UPGST
Act and the CGST Act.
xxx
17. Thus, section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act prohibits separate
initiation of proceedings on the same subject-matter by
the proper officer under the CGST Act when proceeding
on the same subject-matter by the proper officer under
the State Act has been initiated, whereas section 70
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1779

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

of the UPGST/CGST Act merely empowers the proper
officer to summon any person in any inquiry. The word
“proceedings” used in section 6(2)(b) is qualified by the
words “subject-matter” which indicates an adjudication
process/proceedings on the same cause of action and for
the same dispute which may be proceedings relating to
assessment, audit, demands and recovery, and offences
and penalties, etc.[…]”
(Emphasis supplied)

81. In Satyam Castings Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Director, DGGI,
Bhubaneshwar, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Ori 1624, the High
Court of Orissa also equated “subject matter” with ‘cause of action’.
The relevant extracts are reproduced hereinbelow:
“21. The relevant fact to be borne in mind is the subject-
matter of the proceeding. If the subject-matter of the
proceeding is entirely different, there is no bar to the
maintainability of the proceeding. What is barred is the
initiation of the proceeding on the same subject-matter
by the proper officer. The words “subject-matter” can be
equated with words “cause of action”. The reason behind
barring the initiation of proceeding on the same subject-
matter by the proper officer under the State Goods and
Services tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services
tax Act seems to be that the possibility of the final decision
in the two proceedings being different cannot be totally
ruled out which would create confusion. In the case of
Vallabh Das v. Dr. Madan Lal reported in [(1970) 1 SCC
761 : AIR 1970 SC 987.] , it is held that the expression
“subject-matter” is not defined in the Civil Procedure Code.
That expression includes the cause of action and the relief
claimed. Unless the cause of action and the relief claimed
in the second suit are the same as in the first suit, it cannot
be said that the subject-matter of the second suit is the
same as that in the previous suit.”
(Emphasis supplied)

82. However, we shall now proceed to interpret the term “subject matter”
as employed in Section 6(2)(b) of the Act. It is abundantly clear from
1780 [2025] 8 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

the purport of the said section that “subject matter” needs to be
understood in perspective of initiation of proceedings. In other words,
subject matter of the proceedings. In the preceding paragraphs of
this judgment, we have stated that proceedings stand initiated when
a show cause notice is issued with regard to a subject matter. We
say so because an issuance of a show cause notice is the first stage
whereby the Revenue for the very first time elaborately pens down
various grounds and charges it is alleging against the assessee,
who is invited to show cause as to why adverse action must not
be taken against him on the basis of the apprehensions that the
authority contemplates.
83. We shall now consider the contents of a show cause notice, bearing
in mind the manner in which they facilitate the determination of the
subject matter of the proceedings. In Gorkha Security Services v.
Govt. (NCT of Delhi), reported in (2014) 9 SCC 105, this Court
poignantly explained the cardinal principles behind the issuance of
a show cause notice. It held that the service of a show cause notice
is made in order to inform the noticee about the case that has been
set up against him, which he has to meet. The relevant paragraphs
have been supplied below:
“Contents of the show-cause notice
21. The central issue, however, pertains to the requirement
of stating the action which is proposed to be taken. The
fundamental purpose behind the serving of show-cause
notice is to make the noticee understand the precise case
set up against him which he has to meet. This would require
the statement of imputations detailing out the alleged
breaches and defaults he has committed, so that he gets
an opportunity to rebut the same. Another requirement,
according to us, is the nature of action which is proposed
to be taken for such a breach. That should also be stated
so that the noticee is able to point out that proposed action
is not warranted in the given case, even if the defaults/
breaches complained of are not satisfactorily explained.
When it comes to blacklisting, this requirement becomes
all the more imperative, having regard to the fact that it
is harshest possible action.
(Emphasis supplied)
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1781

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

84. Primacy is given to the cogency of a show cause notice. The subject
matter of the proceedings lies in the contents of the notice. Hence,
it ought to be exhaustive, so much so that it is capable of presenting
the case of the Revenue in a nutshell. In The Commissioner of
Central Excise, Bhubaneswar-I v. Champdany Industries Limited,
reported in (2009) 9 SCC 466, while deciding upon the classification
of jute carpets, this Court noted that in the failure of mentioning the
application of certain tests which the Revenue relied upon in the
proceedings before the Court, the Revenue cannot rely on such tests
at a later stage. A show cause notice must lay down the foundation
of the case. Such is the importance of a show cause as a starting
point in proceedings. The relevant extracts have been supplied below:
“50. Apart from that, the point on Rule 3 which has been
argued by the learned counsel for the Revenue was not
part of its case in the show-cause notice. It is well settled
that unless the foundation of the case is made out in the
show-cause notice, Revenue cannot in Court argue a case
not made out in its show-cause notice. See: Commissioner
of Customs, Mumbai v. Toyo Engineering India Limited
MANU/SC/3625/2006 : (2006) 7 SCC 592, para 16.
51. Similar view was expressed by this Court in the case
of Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur v. Ballarpur
Industries Ltd. MANU/SC/3595/2007 : (2007) 8 SCC 89.
In paragraph 27 of the said report, learned Judges made
it clear that if there is no invocation of the concerned
rules in the show-cause notice, it would not be open to
the Commissioner to invoke the said Rule.”
(Emphasis supplied)

85. From the above exposition of law, we can safely conclude that a
show cause notice delineates the scope of the proceedings in the
expression of subject matter with which the authority would be dealing.
It would be impermissible for an authority to invoke such rules, claims
or grounds at a later stage which do not figure in the show cause
notice. That is to say, any ground, reasoning or claim which does not
figure out in the show cause notice cannot be permitted to adversely
affect the noticee. Such recognition has even been made statutorily,
as per sub-section (7) of Section 75 of the Act, which reads as thus:
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“75. General provisions relating to determination of tax.—...
xxx
(7) The amount of tax, interest and penalty demanded in
the order shall not be in excess of the amount specified
in the notice and no demand shall be confirmed on the
grounds other than the grounds specified in the notice.”
86. The expression “subject matter” contemplates proceedings directed
towards determining the taxpayer’s liability or contravention,
encompassing the alleged offence or non-compliance together with
the relief or demand sought by the Revenue, as articulated in the
show cause notice through its charges, grounds, and quantification
of demand. Accordingly, the bar on the “same subject matter” is
attracted only where both proceedings seek to assess or recover
an identical liability, or even where there is the slightest overlap in
the tax liability or obligation.
87. In other words, under Section 6(2)(b), the “subject matter” is
intrinsically tied to the determination of the specific violation under
scrutiny or the liability alleged to be unpaid. The statutory bar is
triggered only when the two proceedings against the same taxpayer
are, in substance, directed towards the very same or overlapping
deficiency in tax discharge or the identical contravention alleged.
Where the proceedings concern distinct infractions, each Department
is entitled to proceed within its respective statutory remit without
infringing the prohibition. Where the proceedings concern distinct
infractions, each Department is entitled to proceed within its respective
statutory remit without infringing the prohibition.
88. In order to bolster such embodiments of Section 6(2)(b) at large, we
lay down a twofold test, discernible from our discussion above, to
determine whether a subject matter is “same”: first, the subject matter
will be considered the same if an authority has already proceeded on
an identical liability of tax or alleged offence by the assessee on the
same facts; and secondly, if the demand or relief sought is identical.
89. In the present case, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contended
that the subject matter of the proceedings pertained to the availability
of input tax credit in respect of cancelled dealers. However, this
contention fails for two reasons: first, the summons, on its own, cannot
reveal the subject matter; and secondly, the subject matter can be
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1783

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

ascertained only from the show cause notice. The apprehension of
the petitioner cannot be countenanced merely because a facet of
the ongoing inquiry overlaps with the subject matter of the show
cause notice already issued.
90. Upon crystallization of the subject matter through a show cause
notice issued pursuant to an intelligence, no other tax authority
may assume jurisdiction over it, provided it is ascertainable that the
consequences of any further departmental action would be subsumed
within the same subject matter.

III. What is the purport of an “Order” under Section 6(2)(a) of
the CGST Act?
91. Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the CGST Act stipulates
that where any proper officer issues an order under the CGST Act,
he must issue an order under the SGST Act or the UGST Act in
order to intimate the jurisdictional officer of the State tax or Union
territory tax. The provision reads thus:
“(2) Subject to the conditions specified in the notification
issued under sub-section (1),––
(a) where any proper officer issues an order under this
Act, he shall also issue an order under the State Goods
and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and
Services Tax Act, as authorised by the State Goods
and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and
Services Tax Act, as the case may be, under intimation to
the jurisdictional officer of State tax or Union territory tax;”
92. In construing Section 6(2)(a), it is imperative to have due regard to
the legislative intent permeating the GST enactments. Section 6, in
particular, advances the objective of establishing a unified national
market for goods and services and to prevent taxpayers from
the undue hardship of being subjected to the rigours of multiple
jurisdictions.
93. The provision serves a twofold purpose: first, to insulate taxpayers
from the prospect of being proceeded against by more than one
authority for the same subject matter; and secondly, to vest in the
officers functioning under the CGST Act, the SGST Act, or the UTGST
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Act, to render a comprehensive order, thereby avoiding multiplicity
of proceedings. Such a construction is also in consonance with
the well-recognized principle of comity between jurisdictions, which
mandates that coordinate authorities must act with mutual respect and
due regard for each other’s domain, so as to preclude the possibility
of conflicting determinations on the same issue.
94. To give effect to the above intent, Section 6(2)(a) is couched in
terms that are both enabling and mandatory. It confers upon, and
simultaneously obliges, the proper officer to issue a corresponding
order under the SGST Act or the UTGST Act in cases where an
order is being issued under the CGST Act. The expression ‘order’,
qualified by the terms “under this Act”, occurring in the said provision
admits of a broad construction, so as to include every form of order
which a proper officer is competent to issue by virtue of the authority
vested in them under the statute. Such an interpretation is necessary
to ensure that the statutory mandate achieves its intended purpose
of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and securing uniformity of
adjudication across the parallel enactments.
95. Inasmuch as the CGST Act vests the proper officer with authority
to issue “orders” under various provisions, it becomes imperative
that such officer duly apprises the jurisdictional counterpart of any
action initiated by the Department in relation to a taxable person who
may otherwise fall within the administrative domain of that officer.
Given that the statutory framework envisages a regime of cross-
empowerment amongst officers, the obligation so cast operates as
a safeguard against the prejudice which may arise from the initiation
of parallel or overlapping proceedings against the same taxpayer by
different wings of the Department.

E. CONCLUSION
96. We summarize our final conclusion as under: -
i. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the CGST Act
and the equivalent State enactments bars the “initiation of any
proceedings” on the “same subject matter”.
ii. Any action arising from the audit of accounts or detailed scrutiny
of returns must be initiated by the tax administration to which
the taxpayer is assigned.
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1785

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

iii. Intelligence based enforcement action can be initiated by any
one of the Central or the State tax administrations despite the
taxpayer having been assigned to the other administration.
iv. Parallel proceedings should not be initiated by other tax
administration when one of the tax administrations has already
initiated intelligence-based enforcement action.
v. All actions that are initiated as a measure for probing an
inquiry or gathering of evidence or information do not constitute
“proceedings” within the meaning of Section 6(2)(b) of the
CGST Act.
vi. The expression “initiation of any proceedings” occurring
in Section 6(2)(b) refers to the formal commencement of
adjudicatory proceedings by way of issuance of a show cause
notice, and does not encompass the issuance of summons, or
the conduct of any search, or seizure etc.
vii. The expression “subject matter” refers to any tax liability,
deficiency, or obligation arising from any particular contravention
which the Department seeks to assess or recover.
viii. Where any two proceedings initiated by the Department seek
to assess or recover an identical or a partial overlap in the
tax liability, deficiency or obligation arising from any particular
contravention, the bar of Section 6(2)(b) would be immediately
attracted.
ix. Where the proceedings concern distinct infractions, the same
would not constitute a “same subject matter” even if the tax
liability, deficiency, or obligation is same or similar, and the bar
under Section 6(2)(b) would not be attracted.
x. The twofold test for determining whether a subject matter is
“same” entails, first, determining if an authority has already
proceeded on an identical liability of tax or alleged offence by
the assessee on the same facts, and secondly, if the demand
or relief sought is identical.
97. We issue the following guidelines to be followed in cases where, after
the commencement of an inquiry or investigation by one authority,
another inquiry or investigation on the same subject matter is initiated
by a different authority.
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a. Where a summons or a show cause notice is issued by either
the Central or the State tax authority to an assessee, the
assessee is, in the first instance, obliged to comply by appearing
and furnishing the requisite response, as the case may be.
We say, so because, mere issuance of a summons does not
enable either the issuing authority or the recipient to ascertain
that proceedings have been initiated.
b. Where an assessee becomes aware that the matter being
inquired into or investigated is already the subject of an inquiry
or investigation by another authority, the assessee shall forthwith
inform, in writing, the authority that has initiated the subsequent
inquiry or investigation.
c. Upon receipt of such intimation from the assessee, the respective
tax authorities shall communicate with each other to verify the
veracity of the assessee’s claim. We say, so as this course of
action would obviate needless duplication of proceedings and
ensure optimal utilization of the Department’s time, effort, and
resources, bearing in mind that action initiated by one authority
enures to benefit of all.
d. If the claim of the taxable person regarding the overlap of
inquiries is found untenable, and the investigations of the two
authorities pertain to different “subject matters”, an intimation
to this effect, along with the reasons and a specification of
the distinct subject matters, shall be immediately conveyed in
writing to the taxable person.
e. The taxing authorities are well within their rights to conduct an
inquiry or investigation until it is ascertained that both authorities
are examining the identical liability to be discharged, the same
contravention alleged, or the issuance of a show cause notice.
Any show cause notice issued in respect of a liability already
covered by an existing show cause notice shall be quashed.
f. However, if the Central or the State tax authority, as the case
may be finds that the matter being inquired into or investigated
by it is already the subject of inquiry or investigation by another
authority, both authorities shall decide inter-se which of them
shall continue with the inquiry or investigation. In such a
[2025] 8 S.C.R. 1787

M/s Armour Security (India) Ltd. v.
Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate & Anr.

scenario the other authority shall duly forward all material and
information relating to its inquiry or investigation into the matter
to the authority designated to carry the inquiry or investigation
to its logical conclusion. We say, so because, the taxable
person except for being afforded the statutory protection from
duplication of proceedings, otherwise has no locus to claim
which authority should proceed with the inquiry or investigation
in a particular matter.
g. However, where the authorities are unable to reach a decision as
to which of them shall continue with the inquiry or investigation,
then in such circumstances, the authority that first initiated
the inquiry or investigation shall be empowered to carry it to
its logical conclusion, and the courts in such a case would
be competent to pass an order for transferring the inquiry or
investigation to that authority.
h. If it is found that the authorities are not complying with these
aforementioned guidelines, it shall be open to the taxable person
to file a writ petition before the concerned High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
i. At the same time, taxable persons shall ensure complete
cooperation with the authorities. It is incumbent upon them to
appear in response to a summons and/or reply to a notice.
98. Before parting with this matter, we deem it appropriate to make
certain suggestions concerning the common IT infrastructure shared
by the Central and State tax authorities. It is imperative that the
Departments act in harmony and maintain heightened vigilance
with respect to intelligence inputs received by them, so as to give
full effect to the legislative intent underlying the GST regime. Such
coordination would also serve to mitigate the unnecessary hardship
caused to taxpayers by overlapping proceedings and lack of inter-
Departmental communication.
99. The DGGI may consider adopting necessary measures to develop
a robust mechanism for seamless data and intelligence sharing
between the Central and State authorities, including provision for
real-time visibility to both authorities of any action taken pursuant to
an intelligence input, thereby advancing the objectives of harmony
and cooperative federalism.
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100. Accordingly, the present petition is disposed of in the above terms.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Petition disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan