M.NARAYANversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA

                         [2015] 4 S.C.R. 226


A                           M.NARAYAN

                                  v.
                      STATE OF KARNATAKA
B                (Criminal Appeal No.1207 of 2012)

                           APRIL 17, 2015

              [T.S. THAKUR AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.]
c Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 498A, 304 8 - Dowry Prohibition
  Act, 1961 - ss. 3, 4, 6 - Death of wife by hanging from the
  roof - Occurrence of incident barely two years after her
  marriage with the appellant-husband - Death in suspicious
o circumstances re/atable to the constant demand for dowry
  and harassment and ill-treatment unleashed on her -
  Acquittal by trial court- However, reversal of order of acquittal
  by High Court - Conviction and sentence of appellant-
  husband for commission of offences u!ss. 498A and 3048
E and ss. 3, 4, 6 of the 1961 Act- On appeal, held: Prosecution
  had been able to prove the culpability of the appellant vis-a-
  vis the charges beyond any reasonable doubt- Progression
  of events from before the marriage till the unnatural death of
  the hapless victim, provides an inseverable link inter se as
F a/so clearly demonstrates the buildup of the intolerable
  mental and physical torture on her, driving her to take refuge
  of such a drastic step - Evidence of the prosecution
  witnesses in this regard is coherent, consistent and compact
G - Thus, the order passed by the High Court is upheld -
  Evidence Act, 1872 - ss. 113A and 1138.

           Dismissing the appeal, the Court

           HELD: 1.1 The material witnesses PWs-2, 3, 4 and
H
                                 226
        M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                      227


10 do prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased          A
had been subjected to continuous harassment, assaults
and intimidation from a few months after the marriage,
so much so that being unable to bear the unbearable
cruelty, she did take the extreme step of eliminating
herself to seek alleviation from such physical and mental      B
torture. PWs-2, 3 and 10, in particular, are the relations
of both sides and, therefore, in the absence of any
overwhelming material on records to the contrary, there
is no reason whatsoever to disbelieve their versions
encompassing the progression of events from before
                                                               c
the marriage till the unfortunate end of the deceased. The
demand for dowry originated from before the marriage
and against a 'claim' of Rs.40,000/- and j3wellery, the
family of the deceased could garner Rs.25,000/- by way         o
of cash. Jewellery to the extent possible was also given.
This demand for dowry having its roots from before the
marriage, as the incidents thereafter as narrated by PWs-
2, 3 and 10 as disclosed to them by the deceased and
also witnesses to some of those demonstrate, assumed           E
virulent proportions culminating in the pathetic death of
the deceased. The gravamen of the testimony of PWs-2,
3 and 10 bearing on the essential facts constituting the
ingredients of the offences with which the appellant had
been charged has remained unshaken in their cross-             F
examination. Minor and stray inconsistencies in their
narration, does not destroy the substratum of their
version which otherwise do wholly furnish the required
materials to constitute the pre-requisites for the offences    G
under Sections 3048, 498A and Sections 3 and 4 of the
Act. The view the trial court, having regard to the gamut
of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, is not a
possible one. On the other hand, the conclusion reached
by the appellate court is the only possible deduction in       H
228        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A     the attendant facts and circumstances. [Para 19) [239-
      8-H; 240-A-8)

         1.2 Having regard to avowed objective of the Act
  along with the purpose of incorporation of Section 498A
B and 3048, IPC, along with Sections 113A and 1138 of
  the Evidence Act, the view so expressed is concurred
  with. [Para 28) [244-8)

             1.3 On a cumulative consideration of the relevant
c    aspects, factual and legal, the unhesitant opinion is that
    the prosecution had been able to prove the culpability
     of the appellant vis-a-vis the charges beyond any
     reasonable doubt. The progression of events from before
    the marriage till the unnatural death of the hapless
D   deceased, not only provides an inseverable link inter se
     but also unambiguously demonstrates the buildup of the
     intolerable mental and physical torture on her, driving
     her to take refuge of such a drastic step. The evidence
    of the prosecution witnesses in this regard is evidently
E   coherent, consistent and compact. There is nothing
    supervening to suggest that she did suffer from any
     mental imbalance or eccentricity so as to probabilise any
    -act of self-elimination without any compelling reason. On
F   the other hand, the evidence on record demonstrates in
    emphatic terms that she had been complaining of the
    appellant's persistent and hurtful demand for dowry and
     her pitiable condition, being subjected to continuous and
     ruthless harassment and ill-treatment resulting in severe
G   physical and mental torture. Thus, the conviction and
    sentence as recorded by the High Court is upheld. [Paras
    30, 31, 32) [244-G-H; 245-A-F]

        SurinderSingh v. State ofHaryana (2014) 4 SCC 129;
H       Kans Rajv. State of Punjab (2000) 5 SCC 207; Rajinder
        M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                        229



  Singh v. State of Punjab 2015(3) SCALE 174; Sher               A
  Singh v. State of Haryana (2015 (1) SCALE 250;
  Dinesh v. State of Haryana 2014 (5) SCALE 641 -
  referred to.
                 Case Law Reference                              B
2015(3) SCALE 17 4      Referred to.             Para 10
(2014) 4 SCC 129        Referred to              Para 29
(2000) 5 SCC 207        Referred to              Para 29
(2015 (1) SCALE 250     Referred to.             Para 29
2014 (5) SCALE 641      Referred to.             Para 29         c
      CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal
Appeal No. 1207 of2012

      From the Judgment and Order dated 15.02.2007 of the
High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Crl. Appeal No. 1076     D
of2000

       Rajesh Mahale, Krutin R. Joshi, fortheAppellant.

       Anitha Shenoy for the Respondent.                         E
       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       AMITAVA ROY, J. 1. Aggrieved by the reversal of the
verdict of his acquittal from the charge of having committed
the offences under Section 498A and Section 304B of the F
Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC') and
Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the appellant has mounted
this challenge against the judgment and order dated G
15.02.2007 rendered by the High Court of Karnataka at
Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No.1076 of 2000.

       2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

       3. The prosecution is traceable to an oral information    H
230       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2015] 4 S.C.R.



A lodged by Smt. Shivamma, the neighbour of the deceased
  Gangalaks~mamma (for short 'Ganga'}, to the effect that on
  her return to her house at about 5.30 p.m. on 08.09.1993, she
  found Ganga hanging by the neck by a rope from the roof. She
  also mentioned that a folding chair was found on the cot.
B According to the informant on this sight, she lost her
  consciousness and when she regained the same, she found
  that the body of Ganga had been meanwhile removed from
  the hook of the roof and had been laid in the house. She,
C however, expressed ignorance about the person or the agency,
  who/which had brought down the body.

          4. On receipt of this information, the Hebbal Police
  Station, Bangalore City, registered the same as UDR No.34/
D 1993 under Section 174 Cr.P.C. Autopsy on the dead body
  was conducted on 09.09.1993 at M.S. Ramaiah Medical
  College, Bangalore, which confirmed that the death was due
  to asphyxia as a result of hanging. The post mortem report
  also disclosed a ligature mark on the front, sides and back of
E neck of the deceased. The ligature material was identified to
  be a light green nylon rope measuring 286 ems in length and 4
  ems in diameter. Dr. J. Kiran, who performed the post mortem
  examination, mentioned in the report that the rope did fit into
  the ligature mark and was capable of bearing the weight of
F thebody.

         5. Be that as it may, on 10.09.1993 Shri Siddagangaiah,
  the maternal uncle of the deceased, lodged a complaint about
  the death of her niece Ganga on 08.09.1993 with the same
G Police Station. The information revealed that the deceased
  had been given in marriage to the appellant on 20.06.1991
  and that on that occasion, gold ornaments and cash of Rs.20,
  000/- had been given by way of dowry. It was alleged that for
  about six months after the marriage, the couple lived happily
H
         M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                           231
                  [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

and thereafter the husband of the deceased (the appellant            A
herein) developed some illicit relationship with another girl of
Nayak community and as a consequence, started to despise
the deceased and often assaulted her in an inebriated
condition besides intimidating and harassing her by
demanding Rs.50, 000/- as dowry. It was mentioned as well            B
that about two months prior to the demise of the deceased,
she had come to the village of the informant and had stayed
there for a month for being unable to bear the harassment
meted out to her by her husband. The informant asserted that         C
during that time, the deceased had disclosed to him and his
wife about the persistent demand of the appellant-husband
for Rs.50,000/- by way of dowry. The informant mentioned as
well about an incident of about the same time, i.e. two months
before the incident, when the appellant-husband had visited          o
their house at Dasanapura village in the midnight in an
intoxicated state, holding a knife in hand. According to the
informant, the appellant threatened to kill her (deceased) and
the family members if the deceased was not able to arrange
for Rs.50,000/-. The informant mentioned as well of another          E
incident thereafter, when the deceased had come to their house
stating that her husband had tried to murder her and also
showed to them the marks of assault on her body. The informant
stated too that the deceased had disclosed to them that unless
Rs.50,000/- as demanded by her husband was paid, he would            F
kill her. According to the informant, he thereafter did visit the
house of the appellant whereupon the deceased had repeated
her apprehension that ifthe amount of Rs.50,000/-was not
paid, she would be continuously harassed and intimidated.            G
The informant also mentioned that on 09.09.1993 at about 5.00
p.m., one of his relatives, Seenappa, having conveyed to them,
the news of the death of his niece (Ganga) by hanging, he with
his parents went to the house of the deceased at about 12.30
p.m. and saw the dead body lying there. Contending that all of       H
232         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 4 S.C.R.



A     them had noticed a ligature mark around the neck of the
      deceased and that she had died in suspicious circumstances
      relatable to the constant demand for dowry and the harassment
      and ill-treatment unleashed on her, suitable legal action was
      sought for. The police on this information registered CR.
B     No.318/93 under Section 304(8), IPC.

              6. Investigation followed and after completion thereof,
      charge sheet was filed against the appellant under Sections
      3048 and 498A, IPC as well as 3, 4 and 6 of the Act. The
C     appellant, on being confronted with the charge, denied the
      same for which he was made to stand trial. The prosecution
      examined several witnesses, including Dr. J. Kiran who had
      performed the post mortem examination, as PW-1, the
      informant Siddagangappa as PW-2, Govindaiah, grandfathe~
0
      of the deceased as PW-3, Govindappa, nephew of PW-3, as
      PW-4, Yeshodha, niece of the deceased as PW-10, as well
      as the Investigating Officer. Amongst others, the post mortem
      report (Ext. P-1) and the information/complaint referred to
E     hereinabove were proved at the trial. The appellant abided by
      his denial in course of his examination under Section 313,
      Cr.P.C., but did not adduce any evidence in defence.

              7. The learned trial court, on an appraisal of the
F     evidence on record, disbelieved the case of the prosecution
      and consequently recorded the finding of acquittal of the
      appellant qua all the charges. It was of the view that the
      contradictions in the testimony of PWs-3, 4 and 10 did render
      the prosecution case wholly untrustworthy. It rejected the case
G     of the prosecution also on the ground that the allegations for
      demand of dowry had been leveled only after the incident and
      not prior thereto. That the prosecution had failed to adduce
      any evidence pertaining to the accusation that the appellant
      had developed illicit relationship with another girl, was also
H
          M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                       233
                   [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

 noted in support of his exoneration from the charges.             A

          8. In the appeal against such acquittal preferred by the
 State of Karnataka, to reiterate, the High Court of Karnataka
 has returned a finding of guilt against the. appellant, thus,
 convicting him under 7 Sections 498A and 3048 of the IPC as B
 well as under Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Act. By the decision
 assailed, the appellant has been awarded sentence of
 imprisonment: (a) for seven years with a fine of Rs.5,000/- for
 the offence under Section 3048, lPC,; (b) three years with a
-fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence under Section 498A, IPC,; C
 (c) five years and a fine of Rs.25,000/- for the offence under
 Section 3 of the Act; and (d) six months with a fine of Rs.1, 000/
 - for the offence under Section 4 of the Act. Provision to undergo
 further imprisonment in case of default in payment of fine was
                                                                    0
 also made. All the sentences, however, were ordered to run
 concurrently. Relief by way of set-off against the sentence
 awarded for the period of custody suffered by him at the time
 of trial was, however, extended to the appellant.

         9. It has been assiduously urged by the learned counsel E
for the appellant that the order of acquittal having been
recorded by the learned trial court on an appropriate evaluation
of the evidence on record, the High Court had fallen in gross
error in reversing the same. According to the learned counsel, F
though death was as a result of suicide committed by the
deceased and that too after little over two years of marriage,
as the other essential ingredients of the offences with which
the appellant had been charged were not proved, the learned
trial court had rightly acquitted him. Referring to the testimony G
of PWs-2, 3, 4 and 10, in particular, the learned counsel
insisted that in the face of the contradictions on material terms,
the prosecution version had b.een rendered wholly untrustworthy
and that the High Court had erred in law and on facts in
                                                                   H
234       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 4 S.C.R.


A   reversing the acquittal of the appellant. The learned counsel
    has argued that in the absence of any reliable and convincing
    evidence pertaining to demand for dowry and harassment or
    cruelty meted out to the deceased, the view entertained by the
  , High Court to the contrary is patently erroneous and if the
B impugned judgment and order is allowed to stand it will result
    in travesty of justice. Without prejudice to the above, learned
    counsel has maintained that the view expressed by the learned
    trial court, in the conspectus of the evidence on record, being
C assuredly a plausible one, it is not a case of reversal of acquittal
    as has been decisively enunciated by a plethora of judicial
    pronouncements and, thus, on this count as well the impugned
    judgment and order is liable to be interfered with.

           10. In reply, learned counsel forthe State while Rndorsing
0
  the sustainability of the impugned decision has emphatically
  argued that the prosecution had amply established the charges
  against the appellant. Dismissing the minor inconsistencies
  in the testimony of PWs-2, 3, 4 and 10 to be wholly
E inconsequential, the learned counsel has asserted that the view
  entertained by the learned trial court was 11ot a possible one
  and, thus, was rightly overturned in appeal in the interest of
  justice. According to the learned counsel for the State, the
  evidence on record unmistakably established all the ingredients
F of the offences with which the appellant had been charged
  rendering the conclusion of guilt arrived at by the High Court to
  be the yield of the only view possible. Adverting to the facts
  bearing on the persistent demand for dowry, harassment and
  ill-treatment qua the deceased as authenticated by the
G testimony of the prosecution witnesses, learned counsel has
  insisted that the appellant had been rightly convicted on the
  charges leveled against him. It being not a case where the
  view entertained by the learned trial court was one of the two
H permitted by the materials on record, the plea against
          M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                          235
                   [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

 interference therewith based on the precedential dicta outlining    A
 the parameters of scrutiny in an appeal against 10 acquittal,
 is wholly misplaced and, thus, untenable, she urged. Reliance,
 to reinforce the above submissions, was placed on the
 decision of this Court in Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab
 [2015(3) SCALE 174].                                                B

         11. The materials on record as laid before this Court
  and the rival assertions have been duly analysed. Following
  the sequence of events as stand admitted, there is no room
  fordoubtthatthe unfortunate incident in which death had visited, C
· Ganga, was barely over two years of her marriage with the
  appellant. That the death had been otherwise than under normal
  circumstances is also indubitable.

        12. In the instant appeal, it is not incumbent though for    D
 this Court to re-scrutinize the evidence, the present being a
 case of reversal of acquittal, we have construed it to be
 expedient to undertake that exercise albeit to the extent
 essential. This is more so having regard to the inalienable         E
 ingredients of the offences with which the appellant had been
 charged and eventually convicted by the High Court.

         13. The testimony of PWs-2, 3, 4 and 10 in particular
  having a vital bearing on the accusations constituting the
  offences would, therefore, be revisited. The narration on oath F
  by PW-2, Siddagangappa, is in substantial reiteration of his
  version in the complaint pertaining to the facts relatable to
• marriage, dowry demand of the appellant, harassment, assault
  and intimidation to the deceased by him and eventual G
  commission of suicide by her. The witness had introduced
  himself to be the uncle of the appellant, the latter being the son
  of his cousin brother. He is the maternal uncle too of th>---·
  deceased. He claimed to have reared the deceased after she
  had lost her mother. /\ccording to this witness, the appellant H
236         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 4 S.C.R.



A     about 3 or 4 months prior to the marriage had demanded
      Rs.40,000/- in cash and also jewelleries by way of dowry, to
      which he had agreed to give Rs.25,000/- in cash accompanied
      by jewelleries. The witness deposed that about twenty days
      before the celebration of the marriage, he gave cash of
B     Rs.25,000/- to the appellant. He testified that after six months
      of the marriage, the appellant started assaulting the deceased,
      coercing her to bring Rs.50,000/- from him (witness) to
      purchase cows for his dairy. Thewitness stated that the
C     appellant thereafter repeated this conduct for about 10/12
      times and also sent the deceased to fetch this amount from
      him. The witness has expressly stated on oath that these facts
      have been revealed to him by the deceased. The witness
      stated that this harassment and assaults did continue thereafter
o     for about 1to1-1/2 years till Ganga had committed suicide,
      the situation having become intolerable for her. The witness
      also deposed to have accompanied his parents to the
      matrimonial house of ~he deceased after receiving the
      information of her death. That he also on the same date lodged
E     a complaint with the Hebbal Police Station was stated by him.

         14. In cross-examination, the witness deposed to have
  sold away their land for a sum of Rs.80,000/- out of which
  Rs.40,000/- had been spent for making gold ornaments. That
F in order to meet the expenses of marriage the family had sold
  away standing trees for about Rs.15,000/-, was stated as well.
  He, however, indicated that the deceased though had
  discontinued her studies at an early age and was a little •
  sensitive by nature, had acquaintantes in the neigbourhood.
G That she was a little upset for being unable to bear a child was
  also stated by this witness.

              15. PW-3, Govindaiah, is by relation a distant- cousin
      of the accused. He too is the grandfather of the deceased. He
H
         M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                      237
                  [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

reiterated on oath that the appellant before the marriage had A
been demanded Rs.40,000/- byway of dowry and that against
the same, a sum of Rs.25,000/-was paid. The witness stated
further that in additionthereto, jewelleries had been given at
the marriage. According to this witness, before the expiry of
about one year from the date of marriage, the deceased had B
visited his house and had told him that she was being harassed
by her husband, who was demanding from her an additional
amount of Rs.50,000/- by way of dowry for developing his dairy
business. The witness, in reply, expressed his financial C
incapability. He, however, stated that during the stay of the
deceased with him for a period of about one week, the appellant
had come to the house and had created a pandemonium under
the influence of liquor and had threatened to assault him and
the deceased, reiterating his demand for Rs.50,000/-. This D
happened, according to the witness, also in the presence of
Gangappa, Govindappa and Seenappa. This witness further
stated that eight days after the said incident, the appellant
came to his house and took the deceased with him whereafter
within one week Ganga committed suicide. This witness E
deposed to have seen the dead body of the deceased in the
house of the appellant. He affirmed that PW-2 had lodged a
complaint in connection with the incident. He opined as well
that Ganga had committed suicide because of the intolerable
harassment and ill-treatment meted out to her by the appellant F
for failing to meet his illegal demand of additional dowry.

          16. PW-4, Govindappa, is the nephew of PW-3
Govindaiah. His evidence-in-chief is limited to the extent of
his visit to the matrimonial home of the deceased after receiving G
the information of her death. This witness was declared hostile
and was cross-examined in course of which he generally
denied the statements made by him during the investigation
inculpating the appellant.
                                                                  H
238         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 4 S.C.R.



A              17. PW-10, Yeshodha, is the aunt of the deceased,
      besides being the wife of Siddagangappa (PW-2). She
      reaffirmed the testimony of PWs-2 and 3 about the demand of
      a sum of Rs.40,000/- by the appellant and his parents as dowry
      before the marriage, together with jewellery. She stated as well
B     that as finally settled, an amount of Rs.25,000/- by cash and
      jewelleries handed over to the appellant and his father about a
      week prior to the marriage. This witness stated that after four
      months after the marriage when Ganga visited her house, she
C     had revealed that she was being subjected to harassment and
      assaults by the appellant in connection with demand for an
      additional amount of Rs.50,000/- in cash for the improvement
      of his dairy business. This witness deposed as well that about
      7-8 months thereafter Ganga had visited them again and had
D     reiterated her complaint of harassment, abuse and assault by
      the appellant for the same reason. According to this witness,
      on the same day the appellant visited their house late in the
      night and had taken Ganga from there. She stated that about
      two months prior to the incident, Ganga had again come to
E     their house and had confided in her that the same cruel
      treatment had been continuing. This witness deposed that a
      little more than a month thereafter, the appellant came to their
       house and created a furore in connection with his demand for
       Rs.50,000/- and also threatened to kill Govindaiah (PW-3) if
F     the amount was not paid. This witness stated that this happened
      also in the presence of Gangappa (PW-3), Govindappa (PW-
      4) and one Srinivas. According to this witness, Ganga met an
      unnatural death about a month thereafter. She stated as well
G     that on their visit to the matrimonial house of the deceased
      they saw a ligature mark around her neck.

             18. As adverted to hereinabove, the medical opinion in
      clear terms evinced that the deceased had died due to
H     asphyxia as a result of hanging. The ligature marks were also
         M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                           239
                  [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

seen on the front, sides and back of neck of the deceased.           A

         19. The material witnesses whose testimony has been
synopsized above, i.e. PWs-2, 3, 4 and 10, in our estimate,
do prove beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased had
been subjected to continuous harassment, assaults and                B
intimidation from a few months after the marriage, so much so
that being unable to bear the unbearable cruelty, she did take
the extreme step of eliminating herself to seek alleviation from
such physical and mental torture. PWs-2, 3 and 10, in particular,
are the relations of both sides and, therefore, in the absence       C
of any overwhelming material on records to the contrary, there
is no reason whatsoever to disbelieve their versions
encompassing the progression of events from before the
marriage till the unfortunate end of the deceased. Noticeably,
                                                                     0
the demand for dowry originated from before the marriage and
against a 'claim' of Rs.40,000/- and jewelleries, the family of
the deceased could garner Rs.25,000/- by way of cash.
Jewelleries to the extent possible were also given. This demand
for dowry having its roots from before the marriage, as the          E
incidents thereafter as narrated by PWs-2, 3 and 10, as being
disclosed to them by the deceased and also being witnesses
to some of those demonstrate, assumed virulent proportions
culminating in the pathetic death of the deceased. The
gravamen of the testimony of PWs-2, 3 and 10 bearing on the          F
essential facts constituting the ingredients of the offences with
which the appellant had been charged has remained unshaken
in their cross-examination. Minor and stray inconsistencies in
their narration, in our opinion, does not destroy the substratum
of their version which otherwise do wholly furnish the required      G
materials to constitute the pre-requisites for the offences under
Sections 3048, 498A and Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. The
view adopted by the learned trial court, in our opinion, having
regard to the gamut of the evidence adduced by the                   H
240         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2015] 4 S.C.R.



A     prosecution, is not a possible one. On the other hand, we are
      of the view that the conclusion reached by the learned trial court
      is the only possible deduction in the attendant facts and
      circumstances.

B           20. Sections 3048 and 498A of the IPC are set out
      hereunder at this juncture for ready reference:-

        "304B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman
        is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs
c       otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven
        years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before
        her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by
        her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in
        connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall
D       be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative
        shall be deemed to have caused her death.

         Explanation.-For the purpose of this sub-section,
        "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of
E       the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28of1961 ).

         (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
         imprisonment for a term which shall

         not be less than seven years but which may extend to
F
         imprisonment for life.

        498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
        subjecting her to cruelty.-Whoever, being the
        husband or the relative of the husband of a woman,
G
        subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with
        imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years
        and shall also be liable to fine.

        Explanation.-For the purpose of this section, "cruelty"
H
        M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                           241
                 [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

  means-                                                            A

   (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
  to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
  injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
  physical) of the woman; or                                        B

  (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
  with a view to coercing her or any person related to her
  to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
  security or is on account of failure by her or any person         c
  related to her to meet such demand."

        21. Whereas under Section 304B defining 'dowry
death', there will be a statutory presumption against the
husband for having caused the death of a woman resulting D
from burns or bodily injury or occurring otherwise than under
normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage
accompanied by the proof that soon before her death she had
been subjected to cruelty or harassment by him or any of his
relatives for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, E
Section 498A provides for punishment to the husband or his
relative, if the woman has been subjected to cruelty. As per the
Explanation attached to Section 498A, IPC, 'cruelty' has been
defined to mean any willful conduct which is of such a nature
as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause F
grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
physical) to her or harassment of the woman with a view to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet such demand.

       22. 'Dowry' as used in Section 304B, IPC, has been           G
assigned the meaning as, according to it, in Section 2 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Section 2 of the Act defining
'dowry' is quoted hereinbelow:-
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242          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2015] 4 S.C.R.



A        "2 Definition of 'dowry'. -In this Act, "dowry" means
         any property or valuable security given or agreed to be
         given either directly or indirectly-~

         (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the
B        marriage; or

         (b) by the parent of either party to a marriage or by any
         other person, to either party to the marriage or to any
         other person, at or before 1 [or any time after the marriage
c        in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but
         does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons
         to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.

         4[***]
D
         Explanation //.-The expression "valuable security" has
         the same meaning as in section 30 of the Indian Penal
         Code (45of1860)."

             23. As is evident from the definition so provided, 'dowry'
E     shorn of all details, in the plainest form, signifies any property
      or valuable security having an inextricable nexus with the
      marriage.

         24. Section 3 of the Act prescribes penalty for any
F person who gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry
  after the enforcement thereof. This section excludes its
  application vis-a-vis the presents given at the time of marriage
  to the bride/bridegroom without any demand having been
G made in that regard and if such presents are entered in a list .
  maintained in accordance with the rules framed under the Act.
  The penalty for demand, directly or indirectly, of any dowry from
  the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride/bridegroom
  has been enjoined by Section 4 of the Act.
H
        M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                         243
                [AMITAVA ROY, J.. ]

         25. A combined reading of the above provisions attests A
the salutary legislative intendment of not only discouraging any
demand for dowry either directly or indirectly but also penalizing
any such act. The obvious concern of the legislature on this
growing social menace based on demand for dowry, and the
resultant macabre fall outs eventuated in the incorporation of B
Sections 498A and 304B by successive amendments of the
Indian Penal Code by Act of 46 of 1983 and Act 43 of 1986
respectively. Not only Section 304B enjoins a statutory
presumption of the guilt of the husband on the proof of the C
eventualities as mentioned therein, Section 113B of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 fortifies such presumption in the probative
perspedives. Section 304B, IPC, and Section 113B of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, do supplement each other to
effectuate the legislative mandate of statutory presumption of o
guilt, the contingencies warranted being present.

       26. Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
permits a court to presume that the husband of a woman or
any of his relative had abetted her to commit suicide if it is    E
shown that she had resorted to the such act within a period of
seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband
or such relative of his had subjected her to cruelty.

        27. This Court, amongst others, in Rajinder Singh F
(supra) after an exhaustive survey of the judicial
pronouncements on the purport of the expression 'dowry' as
noticed hereinabove, has enunciated that any money or
property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons
mentioned in Section 2 of the Act, at or before or at any time G
after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death
of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection with
or in relation to the marriage unless the facts of a given case
clearly and unequivocally point otherwise, thus defining the
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244         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 4 S.C.R.



A     content of the word for its application.

              28. Having regard to avowed objective of the Act along
      with the purpose of incorporation of Section 498A and 3048,
      IPC, along with Sections 113Aand 1138 of the Indian Evidence
8     Act, 1872, we are in respectful agreement with the view so
      expressed.

          29. Qua the words 'soon before' appearing in Section
  1138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 3048 of
c the IPC, it is no longer res integra that the same is laden with
  the notion of proximity test, but not synonymous with the term
  'immediately before'. It has been inter alia stated also in
  Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana [(2014) 4 SCC 129) that
  though the applicability of this expression would obviously
D depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, it ought
  to mean that the time interval cannot be stretched to any period.
  This Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207],
  while dwelling upon the import of the words 'soon before death'
  observed that there ought to be a proximate and live link
E between the impact of cruelty based on dowry demand and
  the consequential death. That these words, however, should
  receive a fair and pragmatic construction keeping in mind the
  great social evil that has led to the enactment of Section 3048
F was highlighted by this Court in Sher Singh v. State of Haryana
  [(2015 (1) SCALE 250]. In Dinesh v. State of Haryana [2014
  (5) SCALE 641 ], it was underscored that the expression 'soon
  before' cannot be lodged in a straitjacket formula so as to fix
  any time for its relevance and applicability .
G
          30. On a cumulative consideration of the relevant
  aspects, factual and legal, as addressed to hereinabove, we
  are, thus, of the unhesitant opinion that the prosecution had
  been able to prove the culpability of the appellant vis-a-vis the
H charges beyond any reasonable doubt.
             M. NARAYAN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA                         245
                      [AMITAVA ROY, J.]

         31. To reiterate, the progression of events from before A
the marriage till the unnatural death of the hapless deceased,
not only provides an inseverable link inter se but also
unambiguously demonstrates the buildup of the intolerable
mental and physical torture on her, driving her to take refuge of
such a drastic step. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses B
in this regard is evidently coherent, consistent and compact.
The materials on record though indicate that the deceased
had lost her mother at a young age and was denied the love
and affection of her father who married for the second time C
and was also a little sensitive and self-centered, there is nothing
supervening to suggest that she did suffer from any mental
imbalance or eccentricity so as to probabilise any act of self-
elimination without any compelling reason. On the other hand,
the evidence on record demonstrates in emphatic terms that o
she had been complaining of the appellant's persistent and
hurtful demand for dowry by way of an additional amount of
Rs.50,000/- and her pitiable condition, being subjected to
continuous and ruthless harassment and ill-treatment resulting
in severe physical and mental torture.                              E

         32. In view of the above, we hereby affirm the conviction
and sentence as recorded by the High Court in toto. In the
result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The appellant's bail
bond stands discharged and he is hereby ordered to surrender           F
before the learned trial court to serve out the sentence awarded.
All follow up steps be taken forthwith.

Nidhi Jain                                        Appeal dismissed.
                                                                       G