Holding

Non‑delivery of an alternative plot does not amount to an "unfair trade practice" within the meaning of Section 2(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

Summary

The Ludhiana Improvement Trust (Trust) had initiated a Model Town Extension Scheme that involved acquiring land from several co‑operative societies, including Shakti Co‑operative House Building Society (Society). The land of the societies was later exempted from acquisition under Section 56 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. The Trust subsequently allotted plots to the societies but failed to provide an alternative plot for Plot No. 32, which was subject to a civil suit and owned by a third party. The Society filed a complaint before the consumer fora, which held that the Trust’s refusal to allot an alternative plot amounted to an "unfair trade practice" under Section 2(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Trust had no contractual obligation to allot plots after the exemption, that the Society was not a consumer for the purpose of the Act, and that a finding of unfair trade practice requires cogent material, not mere inference. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the consumer tribunals.

Issues considered

Whether the Trust’s failure to allot an alternative plot to the Society constitutes an "unfair trade practice" under Section 2(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
Whether the Society qualifies as a "consumer" within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
Whether the Trust was contractually obligated to allot plots to the Society after the land was exempted from acquisition under Section 56 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922.

Legislation cited

Consumer Protection Act, 1986s. 21(b), s. 2(1)(d), s. 2(r)
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969s. 36A
Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922s. 56

Subjects

unfair trade practiceconsumer protectionland acquisitionco‑operative societyplot allotmentburden of proofPunjab Town Improvement Act

Judgment

'
[2009] 6 S.C.R. 12

A LUDHIANA IMPROVEMENT TRUST, LUDHIANA & ANR.
V.
SHAKTI CO-OPERATIVE HOUSE BUILDING SOCIETY
LTD.
(Civil Appeal No. 1866 of 2002)
B APRIL 13, 2009
[D.K. JAIN AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.] ..
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 :
c
s. 2(r) - Unfair trade practice - Scope of- Held: A finding
of unfair trade practice should be supported by cogent
material - Inferential finding is npt sufficient to attract s. 2(r).

Unfair trade practice - Land belonging to co-operative
D Societies - Acquisition of by Trust - On condition to allot plots
to the Co··operative Societies - Abandonment of acquisition
- Later Trust allotting the plots as a condition of acquisition,
except one plot - Society asking for allotment of alternative
plot in lieu of the one. plot - Complaint before consumer forum
E - allowed and affinned by appellate fora - On appeal, Held:
Non allotment of alternative plot does not amount to unfair
trade practice - Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922- s. 56.

Words and Phrases - 'Unfair trade practice' - Meaning
F of, in the context of Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
Appellant-Trust, pursuant to formulation of a Model
Town Extension Scheme, initiated land acquisition
proceedings. Lands owned by co-operative societies,
including the land owned by respondent co-operative
G society, were notified as part of the land proposed to be
acquired. Before passing of the award, by Government
notification land belonging to certain societies, including
respondent-Society, were exempted from acquisition.
Thereafter, respondent-Society requested the Trust to
H 12
LUDHIANA IMPROVEMENT TRUST v. SHAKTI 13
CO-OP. HOUSE BUil. SOCIETY LTD.
·'°' @!lgt plots to their members as certain portions of their A
land were under encroachment, and the same was
denied. After new Chairman of the Trust assumed the
office, the ploto wore allotted to the reapondont·Socloty
except one plot (plot No. 32) because tho same was
declared to be belonging to third party by court decroo. B
Respondent requested the Trust to allot alternative plot
In lieu of plot No. 32. As there was no response to that,
,, respondent filed a compliant before consumer forum.
Distri.ct forum allowed the complaint and directed the
~~pellant-Trust to allot alternative plot. The order was
c
affirmed by State Consumer Commission as well as
National Consumer Commission. Hence the present
appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court
D
HELO: _1. Non-delivery of a plot In lieu of Plot No. 32
by the appellanf:.Trust to the respondent-Society does not
amount to 11 unfair trade practice" within the meaning of
Section 2 (r) of Consumer Protection Act, 1986. [Para 11)
[21·G-H; 22·A] E
2. The definition of the term 'unfair trade practice' has
been specifically provided In Section 2 (r) of Consumer
~
Protection Act. Any trade practice which Is adopted for
the purpose of promoting the sale, use or supply of any
goods or for the provision of any service, by adopting F
any unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice has to
be treated as "unfair trade practice" for which an action
under the provisions of the Act would lie, provided, the
complainant is able to establish that he is a consumer
within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. [Para 12) G
[22-B; 22·0-E]
Mis Lakhanpal National Ltd. v. M.R. T.P. Commission
and Anr. (1989) 3 sec 251, relied on.
H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.
..
A 3. It is true that the Consumer Protection Act being a
benevolent piece of legislation intended to protect the
consumers from exploitation, the provisions thereof
should receive a liberal construction; technicalities
should be E!schewed and grievances of the consumers
B deserve to be redressed expeditiously. Yet, the power
exercised by the three consumer fora for redressal of
consumer complaints being quasi-judicial in nature, they
are required to take into consideration all the relevant
factors and the material brought on record by both the
C parties. The averments in the complaint by the consumer
cannot be taken as a Gospel truth. To support a finding
of "unfair trade practice", there has to be some cogent
.material before the Commission and any inferential
finding is not sufficient to attract Section 2 (r) of the Act.
The burden of proof, the nature of proof and adequacy
D thereof depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. [Para 16) [23-F-H; 24-A-B]

4. It is manifest from the orders of the State and
District Forum that both the fora have proceeded on the
E assumption that there was an obligation on the part of
the appellant to develop and deliver possession of 151
plots, including Plot No. 32, to the respondent. Their
presumption was based on letter dated 23rd October, )
1990 from appellant to the respondent, communicating
F delivery of possession of 151 plots which included Plot
No. 32 also. They failed to appreciate that on passing of
order by the State Government u/s. 56 of the Punjab Town
Improvement Act, 1922, the acquisition proceedings in
respect of respondent's land stood abandoned and it
G reverted back to the respondent on fulfillment of certain
conditions, enumerated in appellant's letter dated 23rd
October, 1990. The exemption notification did not
contemplate that the appellant trust was to allot plots to
the members of the respondent-Society, whose land had
H been exempted from acquisition under the said
LUDHIANA IMPROVEMENT TRUST v. SHAKTI 15
CO-OP. HOUSE BUil. SOCIETY LTD.
notification. The only obligation on the appellant was to A
ensure that the colony of the respondent comes up in
consonance with the overall layout plan of the scheme.
[Para 17] [24-E-H; 25-A]

5. Apart from the fact that Resolution No. 594, dated
8
. 29th August, 1990 stood annulled vide order dated 29th
May, 1997 passed by the Department of Local
Government, Government of Punjab, the scheme for
development was scrapped, no evidence was led by the
respondent to show that all the conditions stipulated in
; letter dated 23rd October, 1990 had been complied with. C
J As a matter of fact, it had been highlighted in the report
submitted by the enquiry officer that the appellant was
under no obligation to allot plots to the societies whose
land had been exempted because after the abandonment
of acquisition in terms of Section 56(1) of the Punjab D
Town Improvement Act, 1922 they had failed to recover
full development charges from some of the societies and
even the members of the societies also appeared to be
bogus. [Para 17] [25-B-E]
E
6. In view of the Civil Suit in respect of the land out
of which Plot No. 32 had been carved out having been
decreed in favour of the landowner, it was clear that the
said piece of land did not belong to the Society, which
could be placed at the disposal of the appellant for F
development and yet, it seems that in connivance with the
officials of the appellant, they succeeded in getting it
included in their list of allotted plots with an ulterior
motive to get a plot in lieu thereof. All these were relevant
factors which have been ignored by all the three fora and,
therefore, their finding that the non-delivery of Plot No. G
32 or an alternative plot in lieu thereof amounted to "unfair
trade practice" on the part of the appellant-Trust, cannot
be sustained. Even the implication of abandonment of
acquisition under Section 56 and the annulment of
H
16 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C,R..

A Resolution No. 694, dated 29th Auguet, 1P$0 by the State
Govornmant have not been taken Into oonelderatlon l:>y
any of tho throo fora. There la no material on record to
roturn a finding that tho appellant had Indulged In 11 unf11lr
trade pra9tlco". [Para 17] [28·E·Hi 28·A]
B Case Law Reference:
(1989) 3 sec 2s1 relied on Para 13
CIVIL: APPELLATE JURISOICTION : Civil Appeal No.
C 1866 of 2002.
From· the Judgment & Order dated 22.03.2001 of the
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commi!ision, N~w
Delhi in Revision Petition No. 705 of 1999.
D Pradeep Gupta, Suresh Bharti and K.K. Mohan for the
Appellant.::
JagjitSingh Chhabra for the Respondent.
'J

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
e:
D.K. JAIN, J. 1. This appeal by special leave is directed
against tlie order dated 22nd March, 2001 passed by the
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New
Def hi, hereinafter referred to as "the Commission" whereby the
F Revision Petition No. 705 of 1999 filed by the appellants
against the decision of the State Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, Punjab (for short "the State
Commission") directing delivery of possession of a plot of land
to the respondent has been dismissed.
G 2. Material facts, giving rise to the appeal are as under:
3. In the year 1970, the appellant-Ludhiana Improvement
Trust, Ludhiana, hereinafter referred to as "the Trust", formulated
a scheme, styled as Model Town Extension Scheme Part II. For
H
).
LUDHIANA IMPROVEMENT TRUST v. SHAKTI 17
CO-OP. HOUSE BUil. SOCIETY LTD. [O.K JAIN, J.]
_,.
the said purpose, proceeqings for acquisition of land in certain A
- villages were initiated: Lands owneid by several co·operativa
hQu$.JnQ·~ee!~U&~ Y'ere also· notified as part of the land
proposed to be acqufred. However, before the announcement
of awards In respect of the lands to be acquired,
representatl~ms were niadll, by s.everal socleitles to the Trust as B
also to the Government seeking exemption of their land from·
acquisition. The Trust acceded to the request by some of the
societies and recommended to the Government that the land
of these societies be exempted from acquisition, which yv-as
accepted by the Government. The respondent Society was also c
amongst those societies who were granted exemption.
Notwithstanding making of th.e awards, the Trust neither took
possession of the land belonging to the respondent nor paid
- any compensation. Subsequently in the year 1981-82, the
Government also issued a notification under Section 56 of the D
Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 for abandonment of
proposal for acquisition of lands belonging'fo these societies,
the respondent Society being one of them. The exemption was
on certain terms and conditions with which we are not directly
concerned in thi~ appeal.
E

- ..
4. It appears thc;it after the issue of the said exemption
notification, the respondent Society requested the Trust to allot
plots to their members as .large portions ·onheir land were under
encroachment. Apparently, the request of the Society was not
legally correct inasmuch as due to the exemption, the Society F
remained owner of their land and the Trust was neither
competent nor under any obligation to allot plots to them. Thus,
the Trust did not accept the request of the Society for allotment
of plots and till the year 1990 nothing tangible seems to have
happened. However, when one B.D. Aggarwal took over as G
J Chairman of the Improvement Trust, the process for allotting
plots to certain societies suddenly gained momentum. So much
so, the land of one Society was exchanged with the land of
another Society and plots were allotted even on the land
belonging to the Trust. In the case of the respondent Society, H
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A as per condition of exemption, the Society could carve out plots
in area admeasuring upto 23,000 sq. yds. but the Trust carved
out 154 plots in 23,800 sq. yds. Out of these, 123 plots were
given to the Society including 25 plots in the land belonging to
other societies and 3 plots on Trust's land. It seems that the
B Society was not satisfied with the said allotment, inasmuch as
its stand was that the Trust, through its Chairman had taken over
the land of the Society by acquisition and had promised to allot
about 151 plots. Out of 151 plots the possession of one plot
bearing No. 32, measuring 150 sq. yds situated in Model Town
c Extension Part II Block C, Dugri Road, Ludhiana, was not given
by the Trust to the Society on the ground that a suit in respect
of the private land, which was subject matter of Plot No. 32 had
been filed. The said civil suit was decreed and land on which
Plot No. 32 had been carved out was held to be belonging to
D one Gurcharan Singh. After the decree, the Society requested
the appellant to allot alternative plot to them in lieu of Plot No.
32.

5. Having failed to get any response from the appellant,
on 1st March, 1996, the Society, through its secretary filed a
E complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal
Forum ("District Forum" for short) under the Consumer
Protection Act, 1!386 (for short "the Act") for issuing a direction
to the appellant to allot an alternative plot in lieu of Plot No. 32.

F 6. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that when the
irregularities committed by the former Chairman and Executive
Officer of the Trust came to the notice of the Government, vide
his order dated 19th December, 1996, the Principal Secretary,
Local C3overnment directed the Director, Local Government to
G conduct an inquiry into the affairs of the Trust. The enquiry officer
found grave irregularities in allotment of plots by the said two
office bearers of the appellant in connivance with the
management of the societies. Some of the irregularities listed
by the enquiry officer, and which have significant bearing on the
H • present appeal are extracted below.
LUDHIANA IMPROVEMENT TRUST v. SHAKTI 19
CO-OP. HOUSE BUil. SOCIETY LTD. [D.K JAIN, J.]
A

•.
"Firstly, the Trust was under no obligation to allot plots to A
the societies whose land has been exempted because
after the abandonment of acquisition u/s 56(1 ), the
societies continued to be the owners of their land. The
notification of exemption no where states that the Trust will
allot plots to the societies whose land has been exempted. B
The only obligation placed on the Trust is to ensure that
... the colony of the Society comes up in consonance with the
over-all lay out plan of the scheme. This colony is to come
up in Society's own land. Therefore, there was no need for
the Trust to allot plots to the societies. The fact that the c
Trust has deliberately taken upon itself the burden of
allotting plots to the various societies when it had no
obligation to do so clearly shows that all this had been
done with an ulterior motive.

Secondly, the Trust had no legal competence to exchange D
the land of one Society with the land of another because
due to the exemption it was not the owner of this land.
However, by allotting one Society exempted land to other
societies, the Trust officials have made illegal allotments.
This situation would have not arisen, if all the plots of the E
r Society had been carved out in its own land and given to
the Society. In that case, the Court would not have even
1 entertained the claim of the Society that the Trust should
give alternative plots. Now the trust will have to fight tough
' legal battles to counter the illegal acts of the Trust officials. F
Thirdly, there was no logical reason for allotting plots to
any Society in the Trust land. Instead of getting the lay out
plan revised Shri B.D. Aggarwal and Shri K.R. Garg, E.O.
allotted 54 plots measuring 8000 sq. yds. falling in Trust
G
land to some of the Co-op. Societies without taking any
sale money. This gifting away of valuable Trust land has
caused heavy financial !oss to the Trust.
Fourthly, the Trust officials did not bother to recover full
development charges from some of the societies as per H
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A letter of allotment. Nor did they bother to execute any
agreement for fulfillment of condition laid down for
exemption and for vesting of the open land of the Socioty
In the trust en per lotter of allotment. In tho absencp of this
agroemont somo of tho ooclotloo oro axploltlng tho
B situation and In some caseo havo evon oold off land which
was meant to be kept vacant for parks etc.

Fifthly, from the perusal of the affidavit filed by the members
of the societies it appears that many of the members of
the societies are bogus and further enquiry in to this aspect
c will also reveal grave irregularities."

7. It seems that thereafter criminal cases were registered
against thEI said B.D. Aggarwal, K.R. Garg on the basis of th~
said report. The District Forum, vide order dated 30th July,
D 1997, allowed the complaint and directed the appellant to allot
an alternative plot in an equally developed scheme within three _.,
months and pay cost of Rs. 2000.

8. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant went In
E appeal to the State Commission. The State Commission vide
order dated 30th July, 1997 held that though the Society was
given the exemption, the area was developed by the Trust and
it was then offered to the Society in the form of possession of
151 residential plots of 150 sq. yds. each, and therefore, not ~
F handing over a plot in lieu of Plot No.32 amounted to "unfair
trade practice" on the part of the appellant Trust. Thus, the
decision of the District Forum was affirmed. As noted earlier,
the National Commission has dismissed appellant's petition on
the ground that since both the fora below have given their verdict
G in favour of the respondent there was no ground for
interference. Being aggrieved, the appellant-Trust and its
Chairman are before us in this appeal.

9. Mr. Pradeep Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the
appellants strenuously urged that the National Commission, as
H
LUDHIANA IMPROVEMENT TRUST v. SHAKTI 21
CO-GP. HOUSE BUil. SOCIETY LTD. [D.K JAIN, J.]
" also the State and District Forums erred in relying on appellant's A
-,
letter dated 23rd October, 1990, whereunder 151 plots were
purportedly offered to the respondent for further allotment to its
bona. fide members. The said offer was pursuant to and in
furtherance of the Government Notification No. 747, dated 7th
October, 1982 which was adopted by the Trust vide Resolution· B
No. 594, dated 29th August, 1990 without appreciating that the
+ said resolution had been spetifically rescinded by the State
Government vide Memo dated 29th May, 1997. It was
submitted that even If it was assumed that the appellant had
devised a plan to develop the land belonging to the societies, c
yet it could not be said that there was any "unfair trade practice''
by the Trust because, admittedly, the Society had itself failed
to comply With the terms and conditions stipulated in appellant's
letter dated 23rd October, 1990. It was pleaded that neitfieifuH
development charges were paid nor the requisite documents
.,.. D
were executed by the Society or its members. It was also
contended that since a complicated question of fact was
involved, this could be adjudicated only in a Civil Suit and not
in summary proceedings before the three Consumer fora.
10. Per contra, Mr. Jagjit Singh Chhabra, learned counsel E
appearing for the respondent supported the decision by the
District Forum, as affirmed by the State. and National
Commissions. It was contended that having offered plots vide
letter dated 23rd October, 1990, the appellant could not resile
from its obligation under the said communication and having ·. F
allotted Plot No. 32, it was bound to deliver its possession or
of some other plot in lieu thereof, notwithstanding· ~nnulment of
Resolution No. 594, dated 29th August, 1990 by virtue of letter
dated 29th May, 1997. Lastly, it was argued that all the three
fora having ·recorded concurrent findings in favour of the G
-4 ~
..
respondent, this Court should be loath to interfere therewith.
11. Thus, the short question to be examined is whether non-
delivery of a plot in lieu of Plot No. 32 by the appellant to the
respondent amounts to "unfair trade practice" within the
H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 6 S.C.R.

A meaning of Section 2(r) of the Act? "'
,-
12. Prior to the substitution of Clause (r) in sub-Section (1)
of Section 2 of the Act with retrospective effect from 18th June,
1993, there was no separate definition of the term "unfair trade
practice" and the said term was given the same meaning as in
B
Section 36A of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
Act, 1969 (for short "the MRTP Act"). But now after the said
amendment, the definition of the term has been specifically ..._
provided in Section 2(r), although the definition is practically
verbatim reproduction of the definition in Section 36A of the
c MRTP Act. The basic ingredients of "unfair trade practice" are:
(i) it must be a trade practice; (ii) the trade practice must be
employed for the purpose of promoting the sale, use or supply
of any goods or for the provision of any service; and (iii) the
trade practice adopts any unfair method or unfair or deceptive
D practice including any of the practices enumerated in clauses
(1) to (6) of Section 2(r) of the Act. Therefore, any trade practice ...
which is adopted for the purpose of promoting the sale, use or
supply of any goods or for the provision of any service, by
adopting any unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice has
E to be treated as "unfair trade practice" for which an action under
the provisions of the Act would lie, provided, the complainant
is able to establish that he is a consumer within the meaning
of Section 2(1)(d) of the Act.
~
13. The scope of the term "unfair trade practice" as used
F
in Section 36A of the MRTP Act was considered by this Court
in Mis Lakhanpa/ National Ltd. v. M. R. T.P. Commission &
Anr. 1 and it was observed thus:

"When a problem arises as to whether a particular act can
G be condemned as an unfair trade practice or not, the key
to the solution would be to examine whether it contains a ~
false statement and is misleading and further what is the
effect of such a representation made by the manufacturer
H 1. (1989) 3 sec 251.
LUDHIANA IMPROVEMENT TRUST v. SHAKTI 23
CO-OP. HOUSE BUil. SOCIETY LTD. [D.K JAIN, J.]
,<\
on the common man? Does it lead a reasonable person A
in the position of a buyer to a wrong conclusion? The issue
can not be resolved by merely examining whether the
representation is correct or incorrect in the literal sense.
A representation containing a statement apparently correct
in the technical sense may have the effect of misleading B
the buyer by using tricky language. Similarly a statement,
which may be inaccurate in the technical literal sense can,
convey the truth and sometimes more effectively than a
. literally correct statement. It is, therefore, necessary to
examine whether the representation, complained of, c
contains the element of misleading the buyer. Does a
reasonable man on reading the advertisement form a
belief different from what the truth is? The position will have
to be viewed with objectivity, in an impersonal manner''.

14. At this juncture, we may also note that though a mild D
\ attempt was made by the learned counsel for the appellant to
argue that the respondent Society could not be treated as a
"consumer'' within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) but when his
attention was invited to the exhaustive definition of the word
"consumer" in the said Section, particularly, in clause (ii) thereof, E
learned counsel did not press the point. Moreover, this issue
having not been raised before any of the fora, having regard
to the facts of the present case, we do not propose to deal with
the question.
F
15. Having examined the matter in the light of the factual
scenario, noted above, W«3 are of the opinion that answer to the
question formulated above has to be in the negative.

16. It is true that the Consumer Protection Act being a
benevolent piece of legislation intended to protect the G
consumers from exploitation, the provisions thereof should
receive a liberal construction; technicalities should be
eschewed and grievances of the consumers deserve to be
redressed expeditiously. Yet, the power exercised by the three
consumer fora for redressal of consumer complaints being H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 6 S.C.R;

A quasi-judicial in nature, they are required to take into
consideration all the relevant factors and the material brought
on record by both the parties. The averments in the complaint
by the consumer cannot be taken as a Gospel truth. To support
a finding of "unfair trade practice", there has to be some cogent
B material before the Commission and any inferential finding is
not sufficient to attract Section 2(r) of the Act. Of course, the
burden of proof, the nature of proof and adequacy thereof
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

17. In the present case, in its brief order, the National
C Commission has held that since both the fora have upheld the
contention of the respondent Society to the effect that it is
entitled to allotment of alternative plot in lieu of Plot No. 32 in
the same scheme, there is no ground to interfere in exercise
of its jurisdiction under Section 21 (b) of the Act. Unfortunately,
0 we have not been able to decipher from the order of the
Commission and for that matter even from the orders of the
District Forum and State Commission, any reason in support
of the conclusion that the appellant was obliged to deliver to
the respondent possession of Plot No. 32 or an alternative plot
E in lieu thereof. It is manifest from the orders of the State and
District Forum that both the fora have proceeded on the
assumption that there was an obligation on the part of the
appellant to develop and deliver possession of 151 plots,
including Plot No. 32, to the respondent. Their µresumption was
F based on letter dated 23rd October, 1990 from appellant to the
respondent,. communicating delivery of possession of 151 plots
which included Plot No. 32 also. They failed to appreciate that
on passing of order by the State Government under Section 56
of the Punjab Town lmprovemen~ Act, 1922, the acquisition
G proceedings in respect of respondent's land stood abandoned
and it reverted back to the respondent on fulfilm1ant of certain
conditions, enumerated in appellant's letter dated 23rd
October, 1990. It is amply clear that the exemption notification
did not contemplate that the appellant trust was to allot plots to
H the members of the respondent Society, whose land had been
LUDHIANA IMPROVEMENT TRUST v. SHAKTI 25
x
CO-OP. HOUSE BUIL. SOCIETY LTD. [D.K JAIN, J.)
exempted from acquisition under the 3aid notification. The only A
obligation on the appellant was to ensure that the colony of the
respondent comes up in consonance with the overall layout plan
of the scheme. In furtherance of that object, it seems that the
appellant formulated the scheme for development of the l~nd;
perhaps developed it and vlde letter dated 23rd October, 1990, B
delivered the plots to the respondent on fulfilling certain
conditions Including payment of development charges. Apart
from the fact that Resolution No. 594, dated 29th August, 1990
stood annulled vide order dated 29th May, 1997 passed by the
Department of Local Government, Government of Punjab, the c
scheme for development was scrapped, no evidence was led
by the respondent to show that all the conditions stipulated in
letter dated 23rd October, 1990 had been complied with. As a
matter of fact, it had been highlighted in the report submitted
by the enquiry officer that the appellant was under no obligation
D
':' to allot plots to the societies whose land had been exempted
because after the abandonment of acquisition in terms of
Section 56(1) of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 they
had failed to recover full development charges from some of
the societies and even the members of the societies also
appeared to be bogus. Furthermore, in view of the Civil Suit in E
respect of the land out of which Plot No. 32 had been carved
out having been decreed in favour of the landowner, it was clear
that the said piece of land did not belong to the Society, which
could be placed at the disposal of the appellant for development
and yet, it seems that in connivance with the officials of the F
. appellant, they succeeded in getting it included in thair list of
allotted plots with an ulterior motive to get a plot in lieu thereof.
We are convinced that all these were relevant factors which
have been ignored by all the three fora and, therefore, their
finding that the non-delivery of Plot No. 32 or an alternative plot G
in lieu thereof amounted to "unfair trade practice" on the part of
the appellant Trust, cannot be sustained. It is evident that even
the implication of abandonment of acquisition under Section 56
and the annulment of Resolution No. 594, dated 29th August,
1990 by the State Government have not been taken into H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A consideration by any of the three fora. In our judgment, there is
no material on record to return a finding that the appellant had
indulged in "unfair trade practice".

18. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed and
the impugned order passed by the Commission , affirming the
8
finding of the State Commission and the District Forum that the
appellant had indulged in "unfair trade practice", attracting
Section 2(r) of the Act, is set aside with costs, quantified at
Rs.20,000/-.
C K.K.T. Appeal allowed.