LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR.versusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

                  [2023] 12 S.C.R. 159 : 2023 INSC 818



                              CASE DETAILS

                LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR.
                                       v.
               STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.
                      (Civil Appeal No. 2644 of 2016)
                          SEPTEMBER 06, 2023
          [SURYA KANT AND J.K. MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
                               HEADNOTES
      Issues for consideration: Whether the impugned judgment of the
High Court negating the plea of land owner seeking ‘lapse’ of the acquisition
proceedings in terms of s. 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act is liable to be
interfered with; whether decision of Nagpur Improvement Trust refusing to
grant alternative plot, as directed by the High Court, requires interference; and
what suitable relief could be granted to land owner on account of delay caused in
determination of compensation despite time bound directions by the High Court.
      Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s. 11-A – Nagpur Improvement Trust
Act, 1936 – Acquisition under the State Act-NIT Act with the aid of LA
Act – Applicability of s. 11-A in the acquisition proceedings under the NIT
Act – On facts, notification issued u/s. 39 of the NIT Act in 1962, possession
was taken in the year 1970 and the road was constructed, in the year 1986
award passed in case of the other land owners and in 2013 an ex-parte award
passed – Plea of lapsing of acquisition proceedings by the land owner:
      Held: Provisions of s. 11-A of LA Act which provides for lapsing of the
land acquisition proceedings, would not be applicable where acquisition was
made under NIT Act – In view thereof, no error committed by the High Court in
negating the plea of lapsing of acquisition proceedings as raised by land owner.
[Paras 13 and 15]
      Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936
– Rejection of the request of the land owner for grant of alternate piece of
land by the Nagpur Improvement Trust, as directed by the High Court –
Interference with:


                                      159
160          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      Held: By the impugned order passed by the High Court, directions
were issued to NIT to consider the prayer for the grant of alternate land
to the land owner – Said prayer was rejected by the NIT, inter-alia stating
that grant of alternate land in lieu of compensation was not possible in the
absence of any provisions in the Act – Said plea does not have any statutory
backing under NIT Act, thus, refusal made by NIT does not warrant any
interference – After the rejection of the representation to grant alternate
land particularly in absence of any statutory backing, there is no inclination
to entertain the said plea – Nonetheless, the said prayer was not seriously
pressed by the land owner and prayer was confined to grant of adequate
compensation. [Para 16]
     Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936
– Delay caused in determination of compensation despite time bound
directions by the High Court – Publication of preliminary notification
in 1962, the possession of the subject land taken in 1970 and the road
was constructed which is in public use since then – Award passed in
1986, in the case of other land owners, discriminating the instant land
owner wherein even after directions of the High Court in 2009 to pass
an award, prayer for the grant of alternate plot was rejected by NIT,
and ‘ex-parte’ award was passed in 2013 during pendency of the instant
appeal and as such land owners could not get compensation of the land
since last five decades – Grant of suitable relief to the land owner:
      Held: In view of the said chain of events, the delay cannot be attributed
to the land owner – Value of the land which may be on the date of preliminary
notification cannot be equated on the date of passing of ‘ex-parte’ award
– As per s. 48-A of LA Act, if the award is not passed within a period of
two years from the date of final notification, compensation for the damages
suffered due to delay is to be determined as prescribed therein – Thus, to
meet the ends of justice, it is appropriate to mould the relief – ‘Ex-parte’
award would not be given effect to – Land Acquisition Officer to determine
the compensation afresh taking the market value of the subject land as on the
date of passing of ‘ex-parte’ award – Land owner also entitled to all other
statutory benefits as per the provisions of the LA Act to be calculated from
the date of preliminary notification, as also be entitled to compensation for
damages suffered in view of delay. [Paras 21, 27, 34 and 35]
               LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v.                              161
               STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

     Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Nagpur Improvement Trust Act,
1936 – s. 67 – Award of tribunal how to be determined – Acquisition of
land under NIT Act – Determination of compensation – Passing of an
award – Applicability of the said provisions of the LA Act:
      Held: s. 67 makes it clear that for determining the compensation and to
pass an award, the provisions of the LA Act would be applicable – Thus, LA
Act has its application to such extent for land acquired by the NIT subject to
the modifications made under the NIT Act – Applicability of s. 11 of LA Act
which deals with enquiry and award, and s. 16 of LA Act which deals with
power of Collector to take possession, even in acquisition under the NIT
Act is ‘sine qua non’ – While making an inquiry u/s. 11, the applicability of
s. 9 which deals with issuance of notice to persons interested, is an integral
procedure in the proceedings – Thus, for determination of compensation to
pass an award in case of acquisition of land under NIT Act, the applicability
of the said provisions of the LA Act has been duly recognised in s. 67 of
the NIT Act. [Para 17]
     Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Nagpur Improvement Trust Act,
1936 – Compulsory acquisition of land – Inordinate delay in granting
compensation to the land owner from the date of taking over of
possession – Duty of the State and the authorities:
      Held: Eminent domain of the State cannot be doubted – Right of the
land owner enshrined u/Art. 300-A and Art. 31-A has been recognized as a
human/civil right , thus if any individual is to be divested or deprived of the
said right by the State, it ought not be done without giving compensation
in accordance with law for the land so acquired for public purpose – While
striking a balance between eminent domain of the State and human/civil
rights of an individual, an obligation is on the State and its authorities to pass
an award within a reasonable time – On compulsory acquisition of land, if
the award is not passed within a reasonable time duly compensating such an
individual, it would cause grave hardship and it would adversely affect the
livelihood of the land loser – Delay in determining compensation uproots
the land losers, however, to meet the ends of justice and to rationalize the
equity, switching the date of market value in determining compensation is
found necessary. [Para 32]
162         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 12 S.C.R.



       LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES

      Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vasantrao and Others, (2002) 7 SCC 657
: [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 636; Bankatlal v. Special Land Acquisition Officer
and Another, (2014) 15 SCC 116 : [2014] 7 SCR 879 – relied on.
     Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others through Power-of-Attorney Holder
v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and Others, (2013) 1
SCC 353 : [2012] 13 SCR 29; Bhimandas Ambwani (Dead) through LRs v.
Delhi Power Company Limited, (2013) 14 SCC 195 : [2013] 1 SCR 996;
Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. State of U.P. and Another,
(2022) SCC Online SC 1408; K. Krishna Reddy and Others Vs. Special
Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra
Pradesh, (1988) 4 SCC 163:[1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 853 – referred to.
       OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
              ORDER AND APPEARANCES

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2644 of 2016.
   From the Judgment and Order dated 29.09.2009 of the High Court of
Bombay at Nagpur in WP No. 2022 of 1992.
      Appearances:
      Shekhar Naphade, Sr. Adv., Gagan Sanghi, Ms. Farah Hashmi,
Ms. Aishwarya Dash, Dr. Prashant Pratap, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advs.
for the Appellant.
     Dama Sheshadri Naidu, Sr. Adv., Satyajit A. Desai, Abhinav K.
Mutyalwar, Gajanan N. Tirthkar, Vijay Raj Singh Chauhan, Ms. Anagha S.
Desai, Sachin Patil, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande,
Bharat Bagla, Ms. Kirti Dadheech, Geo Joseph, Risvi Muhammed, Durgesh
Gupta, Advs. for the Respondents.
       JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
                             JUDGMENT
      J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.
     1. This appeal has been filed against the order dated 29.09.2009
passed in Writ Petition No. 2022 of 1992 by the High Court of Judicature
        LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF                         163
       MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

of Bombay at Nagpur Bench. The said Writ Petition was filed by the father
of the appellant/land owner (now deceased) seeking writ in the nature of
mandamus to declare the action of the respondents in taking over possession
of the subject land owned by him pursuant to acquisition made by respondent
no. 2 as illegal, arbitrary and without any authority of law. The land owner
also sought compensation @ Rs. 400-500/- per sq. ft. with commensurate
damages caused on account of mental agony suffered in last several years,
or in alternate, allotment of plot of equal dimension in the same vicinity.
During the pendency of the petition, the original writ petitioner died and
his legal heir (appellant herein) was substituted.
      2. The High Court observed that possession of land was taken in
1970 and the award in case of other land owners was passed in year 1986,
separating the case of appellant. Therefore, partly allowing the writ petition,
High Court directed respondent nos. 2 and 3 to complete the exercise for
grant of alternate plot on or before 31.01.2010 or otherwise determine
compensation on or before 30.04.2010 and pay damages as per Section 48-A
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘LA Act’) in
accordance with law.
     3. For ready reference and convenience, hereinafter we shall refer
the deceased father of the appellant as ‘land owner’; his legal heir as
‘appellant’; Respondent No. 1/State of Maharashtra as ‘State’; Nagpur
Improvement Trust/Respondent No. 2 as ‘NIT’ and Respondent No. 3/
Special Land Acquisition Officer as ‘SLAO’.
      4. The facts succinctly stated are that, in an auction dated 26.02.1943
held by the Commissioner Court of Wards, the landowner purchased two
plots bearing No. 8 admeasuring 9800 sq. ft. of Khasra No. 35/8 and No.
18 admeasuring 7248 sq. ft. of Khasra No. 35/9 at Mouza Khamla, District
Nagpur, Maharashtra on payment of Rs. 880/-. The said plots previously
belonged to ‘Ex-Malguzar Pande’. The sale deeds of both the plots were
executed by the representative of the Court of Wards in favour of the
landowner on 02.03.1944. Vide order dated 09.05.1962 passed by S.D.O.,
Nagpur, the revenue records were corrected and those plots were mutated
in the name of the landowner. NIT required the said land for ‘Ajni Street
Scheme’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘Scheme’) for which the notification
under Section 39 of Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 (hereinafter
164          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 12 S.C.R.


referred to as ‘NIT Act’) akin to Section 4 of the LA Act was published
on 12.07.1962 specifying Khasra Nos. 35/1 and 35/2 only. The final
declaration under Section 45 of the NIT Act akin to Section 6 of the LA
Act was published on 16.01.1969. After final declaration, NIT vide letter
dated 10.10.1969 requested the State for transfer of Khasra Nos. 35/1 and
35/2 to it for the Scheme, as it presumed the land to be Government Nazul
land. Sometime in the year 1970, NIT constructed the road on 5390 sq. ft.
of land of Khasra No. 35/8 which included plot No. 8 belonging to the land
owner. Thus, admittedly, after taking of possession of subject land, road was
constructed in 1970 on it and is in public use since then.
       5. In reply to letter dated 10.10.1969 written by NIT, the Collector,
District Nagpur on 31.05.1972 informed that transfer of land of Khasra
Nos. 35/1 & 35/2 is not possible because it is not Government land; in
fact, the said land belonged to and was occupied by Ex-Malguzar Pande.
Therefore, NIT was instructed to submit valuation report of the remaining
land. The land owners also received ‘no objection’ to sell other plot No. 18
of Khasra No. 35/9 from NIT on 21.02.1976 and sold it to one Anil Hinge
on 08.03.1976. For the sake of clarity, it is only ‘plot No. 8’, i.e., Khasra
no. 35/8 which is the subject land in the present appeal and not plot No. 18
of Khasra No. 35/9.
      6. The first notice dated 18.07.1974 issued by SLAO under Section
9(3) of LA Act was served to landowner and second notice dated 07.09.1974
was also served, however, none of the said notices specified that Khasra
No. 35/8 is also under acquisition. Nevertheless, the land owner without
prejudice to his rights, filed his statement of claim in Revision Case No.
82-86/71-72. The NIT in reference to its previous letter dated 10.10.1969,
again wrote to SLAO on 02.02.1977, requesting him to determine the
interests of land owners on Khasra nos. 35/1 and 35/2. Thereafter, third
notice dated 18.10.1977 under Section 9(3) of the LA Act was served to
the landowner, however, again there was no mention of Khasra no. 35/8. In
the said scenario, the landowner in reply to the notice, requested SLAO to
discharge his land from the acquisition proceedings primarily on the ground
that Khasra No. 35/8 was not reflected in all three notices. The said prayer
was opposed by NIT by response dated 19.04.1979, contending that Khasra
No. 35/8 was part of Khasra Nos. 35/1 and 35/2. However, the SLAO vide
        LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF                         165
       MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

order date 01.08.1981 separated the papers of the land owner. It is also on
record that NIT in furtherance to its letter dated 02.02.1977, informed SLAO
on 03.11.1981 that proposal for acquisition of Khasra Nos. 35/1 and 35/2
had been submitted and the interest of various persons shall be determined
including the land owner, however, the proposal with respect to Khasra No.
35/8 was still not submitted.
      7. The land owner awaiting a proposal from NIT, filed a claim on
25.11.1981 requesting grant of alternate plot in the same vicinity on the
ground that the possession of his land was taken in 1970 and as on date,
road is already constructed on the same. In response, NIT vide letter dated
02.06.1982 asked the land owner to prove his title without considering its
own reply dated 19.04.1979. Meanwhile, on 22.09.1986, SLAO passed an
award for adjoining pieces of land in Khasra Nos. 35/3 and 35/4 and since
the papers of land owner were separated, no award was passed with respect
to Khasra No. 35/8. Corrected city survey record dated 26.09.1986, recording
name of land owner in Khasra No. 35/8 was supplied to him. In view of the
corrected records, landowner again submitted a representation to NIT on
17.01.1987 and requested for alternate plot. In reply letter dated 06.03.1987,
NIT informed landowner that plot No. 8 in Khasra No. 35 belonging to land
owner was under acquisition, and alternate plot cannot be allotted. The land
owner was directed to approach SLAO for compensation for the said plot.
Having no clear response, the land owner sent a legal notice dated 02.09.1987
to NIT and sought details of acquisition proceedings under which his land
was acquired, however, it was of no avail. In the meantime, the land owner
made a representation to the Guardian Minister seeking allotment of an
alternate plot, which was forwarded to NIT. Pursuant thereto, NIT vide reply
dated 19.12.1988 to Guardian Minister admitted that the land of the land
owner is under acquisition but grant of alternative plot is not possible. Be
that as it may, correspondences were exchanged and finally NIT vide letter
dated 15.01.1990 apprised the land owner regarding pending acquisition
proceedings of his land. Land owner again submitted representation dated
25.07.1990 and 09.04.1991 for grant of alternate plot as compensation, but
again to no avail.
      8. Aggrieved by the inaction of authorities and delayed response
to his representations, on the advice of the advocate, land owner filed a
166           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2023] 12 S.C.R.


complaint before Consumer Forum, Nagpur, which was withdrawn for want
of jurisdiction. Thereafter, the land owner on 29.04.1992 filed ‘Writ Petition
No. 2022/1992’ before High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench praying the
above said reliefs. The State did not file any reply, however, SLAO filed a
reply and did not dispute the land acquisition notification for the Scheme.
The issuance of three notices under Section 9(3) of LA Act; the order dated
01.08.1981 passed by SLAO separating the papers of land owner as evident
from the records; the passing of the award dated 22.09.1986 in the case of
landowners of other Khasra Nos. 35/3 and 35/4 were neither denied nor
disputed. More so, the SLAO in its reply did not raise any plea of delay and
laches in filing the writ petition by landowner.
      9. So far as stand of NIT before the High Court is concerned, the
issuance of notifications for land acquisition was not controverted. It was
stated that Khasra No. 35 mentioned in the final Notification consisted of
total area of 8.56 acres of Khasra Nos. 35/1 and 35/2 out of which, 6.56
acres was Government land and the remaining land was of Ex-Malguzar
Pande. It was stated that the west side of High Court Road was laid down in
the compelling public need for the city of Nagpur. All the communications
between NIT, State, SLAO and land owner were not disputed. It was stated
that the request for a grant of the alternate plot was rightly declined and
the order passed by SLAO on 01.08.1981 was not an order of discharge.
Therefore, the land owner on the anvil of said order cannot contest that
his land was not acquired. The passing of the award on 02.09.1986 for
the land of other land holders was not denied. With respect to prayer for
grant of compensation @ Rs. 400 to Rs. 500 per. sq. ft., it was said that the
actual value of land may hardly be Rs. 125 to Rs. 150 per sq. ft. at relevant
time, hence, the compensation as sought is on the higher side. It was lastly
submitted that the writ petition has been filed after inordinate delay, therefore,
it ought to be dismissed on the ground of laches.
      10. The High Court by the impugned order partly allowed the writ
petition as referred above. Being aggrieved, the appellant is before this
Court assailing the said judgment. After notice in this appeal, NIT filed
counter affidavit, whereas, the prayer of the State to file counter affidavit
was declined vide order dated 07.12.2012 with the liberty to file additional
documents. During the pendency, the counsel for appellant on 03.07.2013
        LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF                           167
       MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

without prejudice gave up his claim of alternative plot provided NIT is
prepared to pay compensation as per current market rate. On request, time
was granted to counsel for NIT to seek instructions. In reply, additional
affidavit was filed by NIT stating that compensation as per market rate
is not possible, since it is a public body and informed the award granting
compensation @ Rs. 54,717/- has been passed.
     11. The appellant filed additional affidavit along with a valuation
report dated 16.07.2013 showing the current market value of land as in the
year 2013 as Rs. 3,93,45,696/-. In view of the inordinate delay in passing
of award from the date of notification and taking over of possession, prayer
is made to mould the relief in exercise of the powers under Article 142 of
the Constitution of India.
      12. After having heard learned counsel for the parties and in the facts
of the case, in our view, the following questions arise for consideration:
     i) Whether the impugned judgment of the High Court negating the plea
     of appellant seeking ‘lapse’ of the acquisition proceedings in terms of
     Section 11-A of LA Act is liable to be interfered with?
     ii) Whether decision of NIT refusing to grant alternative plot, as
     directed by the High Court, requires interference in this appeal?
     iii) Whether in the peculiar facts of the case, delay caused in
     determination of compensation despite time bound directions by the
     High Court, what suitable relief can be granted to appellant?
     IN REFERENCE TO QUESTION NO. 1
      13. It is not in dispute that the notification was issued under Section
39 of the NIT Act on 12.07.1962. Although the said notification is not on
record, but looking at the material brought, it is clear that the land of Khasra
No. 35/1 and 35/2 only, without mentioning Khasra No. 35/8 in the said
notification was proposed for acquisition. The final notification was issued
with same details. The possession of Khasra No. 35/8 was taken in the year
1970 and the road was constructed on 5390 sq. ft. utilising the entire land
of 9800 sq. ft of the said Khasra. It is relevant to note that vide Act of 68
of 1984, amendment in the LA Act was introduced adding Section 11-A,
whereby passing an award determining the compensation within period of
168           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.


two years was made necessary. In case the award has not been passed within
the specified period, it shall result in lapsing of acquisition proceedings. In
the present case, the acquisition was under the State Act, i.e., NIT Act with
the aid of LA Act, however, it’s applicability in such acquisition requires
consideration.
       14. The said issue of applicability of Section 11-A of the LA Act in
an acquisition proceeding carried under NIT Act has been decided by this
Court in the case of “Nagpur Improvement Trust Vs. Vasantrao and Others,
(2002) 7 SCC 657”, wherein it was clarified that the subsequent amendment
made by Act No. 68 of 1984 will have no effect on the acquisition made
under the State Act, which means the lapsing provision under Section 11-A
introduced by Act of 68 of 1984, does not apply to acquisition of land by
Nagpur Improvement Trust under NIT Act. The same principle has been
reiterated in “Bankatlal Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Another,
(2014) 15 SCC 116”, wherein it was held that the NIT Act is a complete code
in itself, except to apply the provisions of the LA Act that stood legislatively
incorporated in the said Act, and other provisions would not apply. It was
held that the subsequent amendment made by Act 68 of 1984 inserting
Section 11-A would have no effect on the acquisition made under NIT Act.
      15. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the
provisions of Section 11-A of LA Act which provides for lapsing of the land
acquisition proceedings, would not be applicable where acquisition was
made under NIT Act. In view of the foregoing discussion and settled law,
we are of the considered opinion that the High Court has not committed any
error in negating the plea of lapsing of acquisition proceedings as raised
by the appellant.
      IN REFERNECE TO QUESTION NO. 2
      16. By the impugned order dated 29.09.2009 passed by the High
Court, directions were issued to NIT to consider the prayer for the grant of
alternate land to the appellant. The said prayer was rejected by the Chairman,
NIT on 31.12.2009, inter-alia stating that grant of alternate land in lieu of
compensation is not possible in the absence of any provisions in the Act.
The said rejection has not been separately challenged by the appellant
and has attained finality. In our view also, the said plea does not have any
statutory backing under NIT Act, therefore, refusal made by NIT does not
        LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF                          169
       MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

warrant any interference. Be that as it may, on 03.07.2013, counsel for the
appellant without prejudice to his right made a statement that to amicably
resolve the controversy, the appellant was willing to give up the claim of
grant of alternate plot provided NIT is prepared to pay the current market
price as on 03.07.2013. Thereafter, time was sought by counsel for NIT to
seek instructions. After instructions, NIT filed its response on 02.08.2013
wherein the grant of an alternative plot was denied. As discussed, after the
rejection of the representation to grant alternate land particularly in absence
of any statutory backing, we are not inclined to entertain the said plea.
Nonetheless, the said prayer was not seriously pressed by the appellant and
prayer was confined to grant of adequate compensation. Therefore, question
no. 2 is answered accordingly.
     IN REFERNECE TO QUESTION NO. 3
      17. In the case at hand, compulsory acquisition of the subject land was
initiated issuing preliminary notification in 1962 and final notification in
January 1969 under the provisions of NIT Act with the aid of LA Act. As
per Section 59 of NIT Act, for any scheme, the NIT may acquire the land
with the previous sanction of the State Government under the LA Act as
modified by NIT Act. As per Section 61(b) of NIT Act, for the purpose of
acquiring the land, the provisions of LA Act shall apply subject to further
modifications as indicated in the Schedule. As per Section 67 of the NIT
Act, the provisions of the LA Act are made applicable for determination
of award for the land so acquired. The Schedule as referred to in Section
61 has made the modification in the LA Act. Some of the modifications
made in clause 6 adding Section 17-A and clause 14 adding Section 48-A
are relevant for the purpose of this case, in addition to other provisions as
referred hereinabove. Therefore, for ready reference, they are reproduced
as thus –
     “17-A. Transfer of land to Trust –
     In every case referred to in section 16 or section 17, the Collector
     shall, upon payment of the cost of acquisition, make over change of
     the land to the Trust and the land shall thereupon vest in the Trust,
     subject to the liability of the Trust to pay any further costs which may
     be incurred on account of its acquisition.”
170           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      “48-A. Compensation to be awarded when land not acquired within
      two years –
      (1) If within a period of two years from the date of the publication of
      the declaration under section 6 in respect of any land, the Collector
      has not made an award under section 11 with respect to such land,
      the owner of the land shall, unless he has been to a material extent
      responsible for the delay, be entitled to receive compensation for the
      damage suffered by him in consequence of the delay.
      (2) The provisions of Part III of this Act, shall apply so far as may be,
      to the determination of the compensation payable under this section.”
      Section 67 of the NIT Act makes it clear that for the purpose of
determining the compensation and to pass an award, the provisions of the LA
Act would be applicable. Thus, LA Act has its application to such extent for
land acquired by the NIT subject to the modifications made under the NIT
Act. In view of the provisions of the NIT Act, the preliminary notification
of the land acquisition shall be under Section 39, and the final Notification
shall be under Section 45 for compulsory acquisition as specified in Section
59 of the NIT Act. It is to be noted here that, Section 16 of the LA Act deals
with the power of Collector to take possession of the land after he has made
an award under Section 11 and the said land shall thereupon vest absolutely
in the Government free from all encumbrances. Section 17 of LA Act deals
with the special powers in case of urgency, but the said provision is not
relevant in the facts of the present case. Further, Section 17-A of the LA
Act as modified in the Schedule referred to in Section 61 of NIT Act adopts
the procedure specified in Section 16 or 17 of the LA Act. Section 17-A
prescribes that the Collector upon payment of the cost of acquisition shall
make over change of the land to the Trust and the land shall thereupon vest
in the Trust subject to discharge of liability and payment of any further cost
which may be incurred on account of acquisition. Therefore, the applicability
of Section 11 of LA Act which deals with enquiry and award, and Section
16 of LA Act which deals with power of Collector to take possession, even
in acquisition under the NIT Act is ‘sine qua non’. While making an inquiry
under Section 11, the applicability of Section 9 which deals with issuance
of notice to persons interested, is an integral procedure in the proceedings.
Hence, for the purpose of determination of compensation to pass an award in
        LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF                          171
       MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

case of acquisition of land under NIT Act, applicability of the said provisions
of the LA Act has been duly recognised in Section 67 of the NIT Act.
      18. As per Section 16 of the LA Act, the Collector on making an award
may take possession of the land to vest it in the Government. Similarly,
under Section 17-A added to Schedule of NIT Act, passing of an award is
a necessary pre-condition to vest the land with NIT. Further, Section 48-A
specifies that if award is not passed by the Collector within a period of two
years from the date of final notification, the land owner, if not responsible
for delay to a material extent, shall be entitled to receive compensation for
damages suffered by him in consequence of delay. The said damage would
be determined as per the provisions of Part-III of LA Act.
      19. In view of the said basic provisions if we see the facts of this case,
then it is not in dispute that the subject land was occupied by Ex-Malguzar
Pande. The land owner purchased the land in auction and sale deed was
executed in his favour by the Court of Wards. As per the order dated
09.04.1962 passed by the SDO, Nagpur, the revenue records were corrected
recording his name before issuance of preliminary notification. In the said
notification as well as in the final notification dated 16.01.1969, Khasra No.
35/8 was not mentioned. The NIT had taken possession and constructed
the road on the west side entrance of the High Court which is in public
use. After final notification, statutory notice under Section 9 of LA Act was
issued to all the persons interested. As per the mandate of law, such notice
shall contain particulars of the land needed for acquisition with an intent
to ask the affected parties to submit their respective claims and interests.
      20. In the instant case, three notices were issued to the land owners
including deceased land owner Loonkaran Gandhi on 18.07.1974,
07.09.1974 and 18.10.1977. However, as stated above, the said notices did
not mention Khasra No. 35/8. Since Khasra No. 35/8 was not mentioned,
land owner filed the application seeking discharge from acquisition
proceedings. Pursuant thereto, SLAO separated the claim of land owner
from other claimants emanating out of same notification. It is pertinent to
note that NIT vide letter dated 10.10.1969 informed the Collector, Nagpur
that Khasra Nos. 35/1 and 35/2 are Government Nazul land and asked for
transfer of such land in favour of NIT for the Scheme. In reply, the Collector,
Nagpur on 31.05.1972 informed that such land cannot be transferred since
172            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2023] 12 S.C.R.


it is not a government land and belongs to Ex-Malguzar Pande. Therefore, the
Collector requested NIT to submit a valuation report of the remaining land. The
NIT vide letter dated 02.02.1977 acknowledged and requested the SLAO to
determine the interest of the persons from Khasra Nos. 35/8 to 35/12. Later, NIT
submitted proposals for Khasra No. 35/1 and 35/2, but it is not on record why the
proceedings to determine compensation of Khasra No. 35/8 of the land owner
were not commenced.
      21. The correspondence also reflects that in absence of initiation of
proceedings for determination of compensation, land owner submitted a
representation to allot alternate land equal to the land of Khasra No. 35/8 in the
same locality which was denied on 06.03.1987. As per material placed, in cases
of other landowners, the award was passed on 22.09.1986 by SLAO with respect
to Khasra Nos. 35/3 and 35/4. Thus, it is apparent that possession was taken from
land owner without payment of compensation and the prayer for alternate piece
of land was rejected. It is also apparent that even up to filing the writ petition,
proceedings to award compensation of the land of Khasra No. 35/8 were not
commenced. On filing the Writ Petition, even during its’ pendency, action to
determine compensation was not started. Therefore, the High Court by the
impugned order directed NIT to consider the prayer for the grant of an alternate
plot, otherwise, SLAO to pass award on or before 30.04.2010. As directed by
the High Court, prayer for the grant of alternate plot was rejected by NIT, but
the award was not passed within the time given in the order by the High Court.
      22. In the given facts, the appellant filed this Special Leave Petition, wherein,
notice was issued on 22.03.2010. The NIT filed its counter-affidavit on 18.06.2012
contesting the case. On 03.07.2013, this Court passed an order as under –
      “Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner
      made a statement that without prejudice to his rights and with a view to
      amicably resolve the controversy, his client is willing to give up his claim
      provided the competent authority of the Nagpur Improvement Trust is
      prepared to pay the current market price.
            Shri Satyajit A. Desai, learned counsel appearing for the Nagpur
      Improvement Trust requests for an adjournment to seek instructions from
      the concerned authorities.
            Put up after two weeks.”
        LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF                        173
       MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

      23. Later, on 22.07.2013, the NIT further sought time to seek
instructions in view of the statement made by the counsel for the appellant.
Thereafter on 02.08.2013, NIT filed additional affidavit in which reference
to ‘ex-parte’ award passed on 30.04.2013 was made for the first time and
it was stated that a sum of Rs. 54,717/- has been awarded to the appellant.
On 21.10.2013, during arguments, this Court found that there was an
inordinate delay in passing the award dated 22.09.1986 in the case of other
land owners. Therefore, an explanation was sought for delay of 17 years,
8 months and 13 days. The said order dated 21.10.2013 is relevant and
therefore reproduced as thus –
     “After the arguments were heard for some time, Shri Uday Dube,
     learned counsel for the State of Maharashtra made a request for short
     adjournment to enable his client to file an additional affidavit to explain
     17 years 8 months and 13 days delay between issue of notification under
     Section 45 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust, 1936 and passing of the
     award. Shri Dube further stated that he shall instruct the concerned
     officer to explain as to why appropriate award was not passed within
     the time specified in order dated 29.09.2009 passed by the High Court.
     The request of Shri Dube is accepted and the case is adjourned to
     1.11.2013..”
     24. In view of the above order, time to file additional affidavits and to
explain the delay was allowed to SLAO and NIT, which were filed by them
on 11.11.2013 and 04.12.2013 respectively. In the said additional affidavits,
the SLAO and NIT, both attributed delay to each other and also against the
appellant. Therefore, the Court after hearing passed the order on 03.01.2014,
which is reproduced as under –
     “The case was taken up on 21st October, 2013, the Court had passed
     the following order:
           “After the arguments were heard for some time, Shri Uday Dube,
           learned counsel for the State of Maharashtra made a request
           for short adjournment to enable his client to file an additional
           affidavit to explain 17 years, 8 months and 13 days delay between
           issue of notification under Section 45 of the Nagpur Improvement
           Trust, 1936 and passing of the award. Shri Dube further stated
174           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.


           that he shall instruct the concerned officer to explain as to why
           appropriate award was not passed within the time specified in
           order dated 29.09.2009 passed by the High Court.
           The request of Shri Dube is accepted and the case is adjourned
           to 1.11.2013.”
      Pursuant to the said order, explanation has been filed by the State which
      shows that there was disputes between the respondents due to which
      there was a delay of 17 years, 8 months and 13 days between issue of
      notification under Section 45 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust, 1936
      and passing of the award.
      In the circumstances, respondents are directed to explain as to why
      this Court will not grant suitable relief to the petitioners by directing
      the respondents as to allot equivalent alternative plots in the adjoining
      area or to pay the compensation on the basis of market value as on
      the date of award with solatium and interest, as per law.
      Affidavit may be filed within three weeks. Reply, if any, be filed within
      two weeks thereof.
      Post the matter after six weeks.”
      25. In response to the order, neither the State Government nor SLAO
submitted any explanation. It is only NIT who filed an additional affidavit
on 25.01.2014, inter-alia, stating that allotment of alternate plots in the
adjoining area is not possible and denied the payment of compensation as
per market value as existing on 03.07.2013. It was stated that it is only the
appellant who can be blamed for inordinate delay. In the said affidavit, the
causes of delay were crystallized in three slots, viz. between the issuance
of notifications till filing of writ petition; delay during the pendency of writ
petition; and delay between the date of order in the writ petition and passing
the award. On filing the said explanation and upon hearing the parties on
22.07.2014, this Court passed the following order –
      “Heard Mr. Shekhar Naphade learned senior counsel and Mr. Gagan
      Sanghi, learned counsel for the petitioner. Mr. Marlapalle learned
      senior counsel for Respondent No. 1 and Mr. Pallav Shishodia, learned
      senior counsel for Respondent No. 2 in part.
        LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF                          175
       MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

           The learned counsel for the parties shall file respective charts
     precisely putting forth why there was enormous delay in passing the
     award. We have asked learned counsel for the parties to undertake
     this exercise as we are of considered opinion that the compensation
     that is allowable under Section 48-A of the Nagpur Improvement Trust
     Act, 1936 may be applicable if a case is made out.
           List on 5th August, 2014.”
      26. In furtherance to the said order, it is only the appellant who filed
the chart and explained as to how and in what manner, the delay is caused.
It was further stated that only respondents are responsible for not passing the
award despite time bound directions given by the High Court. Conversely,
the SLAO passed an ex-parte award that too without any intimation or notice
as mandated by Section 12(2) of LA Act.
      27. After hearing the parties and upon perusal of the averments made
in the additional affidavits filed in furtherance of orders dated 03.07.2013,
21.10.2013 and 22.07.2014, it is clear that Respondents have taken more
than six and half years to issue final notification which was published on
16.01.1969. The possession had been taken immediately and the three
notices under Section 9 of LA Act were issued on 18.7.1974, 07.09.1974
and 18.10.1977 respectively. The award was passed in the case of other
land owners on 22.09.1986, leaving the case of land owner/appellant
herein. Thus, it is apparent that the period of seven years has been taken to
issue the notice under Section 9 to the appellant after the date of taking the
possession and the award was passed in the case of other land owners after
more than 17 years, separating the claim of the appellant. In view of the
said chain of events, the delay cannot be attributed to the appellant. More
so, the writ petition filed by land owner before High Court on 29.04.1992
was decided on 29.09.2009, i.e., after about 17 years. During the pendency
of the writ petition, the delay, if any, occurred, cannot be attributed to the
appellant, but it may reflect on conduct of respondents for not passing the
award even during such pendency. It is not out of place to observe that the
High Court has not outrightly disregarded the claim of the appellant for grant
of alternate plot in adjoining area and directed the NIT to take a decision.
In case, the allotment of plot was not possible, respondents were directed
to pass an award within the time frame. The NIT denied the alternate plot,
176           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.


but even thereafter, the award was not passed within the time limit fixed by
the High Court. The award on record was passed by SLAO only when this
Court had taken cognizance in the matter. Therefore, even after the order of the
High Court, there is a delay of more than three years in passing of the award.
Thus, in our considered opinion, the delay cannot be said to be attributable
to the appellant.
      28. As per discussion made above and in the facts of this case, what
amount of compensation may be directed to the appellant herein needs to
be looked into. In this regard, in the case of compulsory acquisition of land,
the eminent domain of the State cannot be doubted. Simultaneously, right
of the land owner enshrined under Article 300-A and Article 31-A of the
Constitution of India which has been recognized as a human/civil right cannot
be overlooked. Therefore, if any individual is to be divested or deprived of
the said right by the State, it ought not be done without giving compensation
in accordance with law for the land so acquired for public purpose.
      29. In the above context, we can profitably refer the judgment of this
Court in the case of “Tukaram Kana Joshi and Others through Power-of-
Attorney Holder Vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and
Others, (2013) 1 SCC 353”. In the said case, this Court had the occasion to
consider the principles of eminent domain, absolute power and deprivation
of the rights to property of an individual. The relevant paragraphs of the said
judgment are reproduced as thus –
      “11. …..There is a distinction, a true and concrete distinction, between
      the principle of “eminent domain” and “police power” of the State.
      Under certain circumstances, the police power of the State may be used
      temporarily, to take possession of property but the present case clearly
      shows that neither of the said powers have been exercised. A question
      then arises with respect to the authority or power under which the State
      entered upon the land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts
      to encroachment, in exercise of “absolute power” which in common
      parlance is also called abuse of power or use of muscle power. To further
      clarify this position, it must be noted that the authorities have treated
      the landowner as a “subject” of medieval India, but not as a “citizen”
      under our Constitution.
                 *                 *                 *                *
       LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF                          177
      MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

     17. Depriving the appellants of their immovable properties was a clear
     violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. In a welfare State, statutory
     authorities are bound, not only to pay adequate compensation, but there
     is also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The
     non-fulfilment of their obligations would tantamount to forcing the said
     uprooted persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national
     activities as such sentiments would be born in them on account of such
     ill-treatment. Therefore, it is not permissible for any welfare State to
     uproot a person and deprive him of his fundamental/constitutional/
     human rights, under the garb of industrial development.
     18. The appellants have been deprived of their legitimate dues for
     about half a century. In such a fact situation, we fail to understand
     for which class of citizens the Constitution provides guarantees and
     rights in this regard and what is the exact percentage of the citizens of
     this country, to whom constitutional/statutory benefits are accorded,
     in accordance with the law.
     19.…..Even under valid acquisition proceedings, there is a legal
     obligation on the part of the authorities to complete such acquisition
     proceedings at the earliest, and to make payment of requisite
     compensation……”
      30. The said judgment has been referred in the case of “Bhimandas
Ambwani (Dead) through LRs Vs. Delhi Power Company Limited, (2013)
14 SCC 195”, wherein this Court had considered the aspect of inordinate
delay of about five decades in not granting the compensation to the land
loser from the date of taking over of possession and directed the respondent
to make the award treating the date of Section 4 notification as on the date
of order passed by this Court. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph
is reproduced as thus –
     “14. The instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment in
     Tukaram case [(2013) 1 SCC 353] and thus, entitled for restoration of
     possession of the land in dispute. However, considering the fact that
     the possession of the land was taken over about half a century ago
     and stood completely developed as Ms Ahlawat, learned counsel has
     submitted that a full-fledged residential colony of the employees of
     DESU has been constructed thereon, therefore, it would be difficult
178          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      for Respondent 1 to restore the possession. In such a fact situation,
      the only option left out to the respondents is to make the award
      treating Section 4 notification as, on this date i.e. 12-2-2013 and
      we direct the Land Acquisition Collector to make the award after
      hearing the parties within a period of four months from today. For
      that purpose, the parties are directed to appear before the Land
      Acquisition Collector c/o the Deputy Commissioner, South M.B.
      Road, Saket, New Delhi on 26-2-2013. The appellants is at liberty
      to fi le a reference under Section 18 of the Act and to pursue the
      remedies available to him under the Act. Needless to say that the
      appellants shall be entitled to all statutory benefits.
      31. Recently, the similar approach was adopted in the case of “Delhi
Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. State of U.P. and Another,
(2022) SCC Online SC 1408”, wherein 3-Judge Bench of this Court
in a reference while dealing with the divergent views of two Judges
relating to taking over of possession without following the mandate of
Section 17 of the LA Act, vis-a-vis violation of constitutional guarantee
to a citizen under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, the Court
answered the said reference as thus –
      25. On weighing all aspects of the matter, we deem it appropriate
      that it will serve the ends of justice to direct the respondents to
      determine the market value insofar as the appellant’s land is
      concerned by reckoning the relevant date as 09.06.2008 (i.e. the
      date on which the award was ultimately passed), by applying the
      yardstick under Act, 1894. It is made clear that only the market
      value be determined as on that date but for awarding the statutory
      benefits, it shall be calculated from the date of the original
      notifi cation since admittedly the appellant has been dispossessed
      on 04.02.2003 pursuant to the notifi cation dated 17.04.2002.
      Further, from the date on which the fresh award is passed pursuant
      to this judgment, the appellant would get the cause of action for
      seeking reference if dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation
      awarded. It is made clear that the determination of compensation,
      in this case, shall not give rise to any right in favour of any other
      land loser whose land was acquired under the same notification,
  LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF                           179
 MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

to seek for re-determination of compensation where the same has
already attained finality.
                             *        *           *     *
27. In the result, we pass the following order:
(i) The provision contained in Section 11A of Act, 1894 shall be applicable
to cases in which the acquiring authority has not complied with the
requirement of sub-section (3A) to Section 17 of Act, 1894 by tendering
and paying eighty per centum of the estimated compensation before taking
possession since possession in such cases cannot be considered to be taken
in accordance with law and the vesting is not absolute.
(ii) If the requirement is complied and possession is taken after tendering
and paying eighty per centum, though there is need to pass an award
and pay the balance compensation within a reasonable time, the rigour
of Section 11A of Act, 1894 will not apply so as to render the entire
proceedings for acquisition to lapse in the context of absolute vesting.
The right of land loser in such case is to enforce passing of the award
and recover the compensation.
(iii) In the instant case though Section 11A of Act, 1894 has become
applicable, in the changed circumstance we deem it proper to mould the
relief instead of holding the acquisition to have lapsed.
Hence for the reasons stated above, we direct as follows:
(a) The respondents shall construe 09.06.2008 as the relevant date
and determine the market value prevailing as on that date applying the
yardstick under Act, 1894 in respect of the acquired land.
(b) To calculate the statutory benefits on such amount including interest,
the same shall be determined by taking into consideration the date of
the Section 4 notification dated 17.04.2002 since the appellant was
dispossessed on 04.02.2003 pursuant to the same.
(c) The date on which the fresh award is passed pursuant to this judgment
and communicated shall be the date of cause of action for seeking
enhancement of compensation if the appellant is dissatisfied with the
quantum of compensation offered.
180          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2023] 12 S.C.R.


      (d) The compensation determined in this case shall not give the cause
      of action to any other land loser whose land is acquired under the same
      notification to seek re-determination of compensation.
      (e) The appellant shall be entitled to the cost incurred in these
      proceedings.”
      32. In view of the judgments referred above, this Court while striking
a balance between eminent domain of the State and human/civil rights of an
individual, has put an obligation on the State and its authorities to pass an
award within a reasonable time. It is observed that, on compulsory acquisition
of land, if the award is not passed within a reasonable time duly compensating
such an individual, it would cause grave hardship and it would adversely affect
the livelihood of the land loser. In the said judgments, because of inordinate
delay in passing the awards, the Court had changed the date of preliminary
notification ordinarily applicable in determining the market value of land for
assessing amount of compensation, to the date of the judgment of the Court,
and/or the date of award passed belatedly. This Court has recognized the
right of the citizen after taking possession of the land without payment of
compensation. As observed, the delay in determining compensation uproots
the land losers, however, to meet the ends of justice and to rationalize the
equity, switching the date of market value in determining compensation by
the orders of the Court is found necessary.
      33. In the case of “K. Krishna Reddy and Others Vs. Special Deputy
Collector, Land Acquisition Unit II, LMD Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh,
(1988) 4 SCC 163”, this Court has conceptualized the effect of non-
determination and payment of compensation immediately to a land loser. The
Court observed that if there is inordinate delay in determination as well as
payment of compensation, it diminishes the purchase power as well as value
of Rupee due to rising inflation. Therefore, the utility to compensate such
land loser with equal value cannot be ruled out. In the said case, the Court
has observed as thus –
      “12. …..After all money is what money buys. What the claimants could
      have bought with the compensation in 1977 cannot do in 1988. Perhaps,
      not even one half of it. It is a common experience that the purchasing
      power of rupee is dwindling. With rising inflation, the delayed payment
      may lose all charms and utility of the compensation. In some cases,
        LOONKARAN GANDHI (D) THR. LR. v. STATE OF                         181
       MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.[J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

     the delay may be detrimental to the interests of claimants. The Indian
     agriculturists generally have no avocation. They totally depend upon
     land. If uprooted, they will find themselves nowhere. They are left high
     and dry……..”
       34. If we take clue from the above referred judgments and the
observations made, the principles as enunciated squarely applies in the case
on hand. For the sake of clarity and at the cost of repetition, looking to the
records before us, it is clear that the preliminary notification was published
on 12.07.1962 followed by final notification on 16.01.1969. The possession
of the subject land was taken in 1970 and the road was constructed which is
in public use since then. In the case of other land owners, award was passed
on 22.09.1986, discriminating the land owner/appellant herein. Even after
directions of the High Court in order dated 29.09.2009 to pass an award by
30.04.2010, it was passed ‘ex-parte’ after three years on 30.04.2013 during
pendency of this appeal without adhering to the mandate of Section 12(2) of the
LA Act. Consequently, appellant could not get compensation of the land since
last five decades. In view of the said conduct, we are of the considered view
that the value of the land which may be on the date of preliminary notification
cannot be equated on the date of passing of ‘ex-parte’ award. As per Section
48-A of LA Act, which is legislatively applicable as per the Schedule of NIT
Act, it is clear that if the award is not passed within a period of two years
from the date of final notification, compensation for the damages suffered
due to delay is required to be determined as prescribed therein. Therefore,
in the peculiar facts of this case and to meet the ends of justice, we deem it
appropriate to mould the relief and direct that the SLAO shall pass a fresh
award taking market value as on the date when the ‘ex-parte’ award was
passed, i.e., 30.04.2013. Needless to observe that, other statutory benefits
shall be reckoned and payable from the date of preliminary notification as per
the provisions of the LA Act. We are also of the firm view that the appellant
shall be entitled for compensation for damages due to delay as specified under
Section 48-A of the LA Act within a period of four months.
     35. Accordingly, in view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is
allowed in part with the following directions –
     1. As the land has been acquired under the NIT Act, therefore, in view of
        judgment of Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra) & Bankatlal (supra),
182            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 12 S.C.R.


          the benefit of Section 11-A of LA Act (lapse of land acquisition
          proceedings), shall not be available to the appellant and the findings
          in this regard recorded by the High Court are hereby affirmed.
      2. The rejection of request of appellant for grant of alternate piece of
         land by NIT, does not warrant any interference in the facts of this
         case.
      3. The ‘ex-parte’ award dated 30.04.2013 shall not be given effect to
         and the SLAO is hereby directed to determine the compensation
         afresh. For the said purpose, SLAO shall take the market value
         of the subject land as on the date of passing of ‘ex-parte’ award,
         i.e., 30.04.2013 and determine the compensation affording an
         opportunity to the appellant and NIT.
      4. The appellant shall also be entitled to all other statutory benefits as
         per the provisions of the LA Act which shall be calculated from the
         date of notification as prescribed by law.
      5. The appellant shall also be entitled to compensation for damages
         suffered in view of delay as per Section 48-A of LA Act as modified
         by Schedule of NIT Act.
      6. The said exercise be completed by the SLAO within a period of
         four months from the date of appearance, for which the parties are
         directed to appear on 25.09.2023.
      7. Pursuant to this judgment and on passing the award as directed, if
         the appellant is dissatisfied, the cause of action to seek reference for
         enhancement shall be from the date of communication of the fresh
         award.
      8. The other land owners whose land were acquired under the same
         notification and who have received compensation will not be entitled
         to seek re-determination of compensation in view of this judgment.
      36. All the pending applications, if any, shall stand dismissed. No order
as to costs.


Headnotes prepared by:                                      Appeal partly allowed.
Nidhi Jain