Supreme Court of India
LAXMI DEVIversusSTATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
- Citation
- 2015 INSC 478
- Decided
- 3 July 2015
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- VIKRAMAJIT SEN
Holding
Even where land is taken under Section 17 (urgency), the Land Acquisition Act requires the tender of 80% estimated compensation, subsequent computation of full compensation, and the passing of an award under Section 11; failure to do so renders the acquisition void.
Summary
The appellants, land owners, challenged the State of Bihar’s acquisition of their land under the urgency provision of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, alleging that no award had been made despite a High Court direction in 1988 to do so within four months. The State argued that Section 17 allowed possession without an award and that the 80% estimated compensation required under Section 17(3A) had been paid. The Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme mandates the payment of the 80% estimate as a pre‑condition, followed by the computation of full compensation and the issuance of an award under Section 11, even for urgency acquisitions. Consequently, the 1987 acquisition was set aside for non‑compliance with Section 11A, and the State was ordered to commence fresh acquisition proceedings. The appeal was allowed.
Issues considered
- The applicability of Section 11A and the requirement of an award under Section 11 when land is acquired under the urgency provision of Section 17.
- Whether the State can rely on Section 17 to bypass the award and compensation procedure.
- Whether the land owners are entitled to fresh acquisition proceedings or restitution of possession.
Legislation cited
- Bihar Act No. 11, 1961 (amendment of Section 17)s. 17
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 11A, s. 17, s. 17(1), s. 17(2), s. 17(3), s. 17(3A), s. 17(3B), s. 17(4), s. 31, s. 4, s. 48, s. 5A, s. 6, s. 9
Subjects
Land acquisitionSection 17 urgencyCompensationSection 11 awardSection 11A limitationRight to propertyBiharStatutory complianceEquity
Judgment
~2015] 11S.C.R.179
LAXMIDEVI A
v.
STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 3385 of 2012)
B
JULY03, 2015
[VIKRAMAJIT SEN AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE,JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
s. 17 - Land expropriated by the State pursuant to the
exercise of special powers in cases of urgency contained in
s. 17 thereof for construction of residential quarters for State
officials - Award not passed within stipulated time making
the proceedings lapse - Subsequent notifications also lapsed
- Writ petition on the ground that resort to s. 17 was malafide
- Writ petition disposed of with direction to pass award within
4 months - Award not passed till date - On appeal, Held:
Appellants land owners were being denied just and fair
compensation for their land in proceedings which
commenced in 1987 despite the directions of the High Court
passed as early as in 1988 to pass an award within four
months - Respondent State ·is directed to initiate fresh
acquisition proceedings or take any other action available
to it in acc9rdance with law - This would upholds. 11 A even
in cases of acquisition u/s. 17 while preserving the
requirement of s. 17 that the unencumbered possession of
land remain vested in th~ Government - It also protects the
· rights 9f the landowners who had approached the court to
stop the government from undoing an emergency acquisition
while leaving in the cold equally aggrieved land owners
seeking to enforce their right to fair compensation for their
land - Even equity demands that the party bearing the
consequence of the delay in the award ought not to be the
179
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 11 S.C.R.
A innocent land owner but the errant State - Respondent State
is restrained from contending that the land is no longer
required by it or that it should revert to the appellants.
s. 11 A-Acquisition - Distinction between setting aside
B of acquisition and reversion of possession to the erstwhile
landowners.
Legislation: Held: A statute prescribes the manner in
which an action is to be performed, it must be carried out
c strictly in consonance thereto or not at all.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The right to file Objections to the Section
4 Notification, recognized by Section SA mandate that
D Objection must be filed within thirty days of the issuance
of the Notification. Section SA further obligates the
Collector to submit a Report to the Government in
respect of the Objections preferred by persons
interested in the land, as well as pertaining to any aspect
E of the nature of the land proposed to be acquired.
Section 6 envisages the making of a Declaration by the
appropriate Government to the effect that the specified
lands are needed for a public purpose, or for a Company;
F and post 1984, this Declaration has to be made within
one year of the date of the publication of the Section 4
Notification. Thereafter the Collector has to take Orders
for the acquisition of land and to mark and measure it.
Section 11 postulates the holding of an enquiry by the
G Collector into Objections on sundry grounds. Section
11A has been introduced by Act68of1984 prescrib!ng a
limitation of two years for the making of an Award by the
Collector. It is only post this event that Section 16
empowers the Collector to take possession of the land
H which thereupon vests absolutely in the Govarnment,
LAXMI LEV: v. STATE OF BIHAR 181
free from all encumbrances. Section 17 is not a pandect; A
it could have been devised by Parliament to be so, inter
alia, by the use of a non obstante clause, or in the
alternative by clear and unequivocal language. The
salient concomitants of Section 17(1) deserve
enumeration. Firstly, the Section is attracted even though B
an Award has not been made which clearly indicates that
the completion of this exercise has not been obliterated
or dispensed with but has been merely deferred. An
unambiguous and unequivocal statement could have
been made excluding the requirement of publishing an C
Award. Secondly, it is·available only on the expiration of
fifteen days from the issuance of the Section 9 notice.
Thi~ hiatus of fifteen days must be honoured as its
purpose appears to be to enable the affected or
0
aggrieved parties to seek appropriate remedy before
they are divested of the possession and the title over
their land. Thirdly, possession of the land can be taken
only if it is needed for public purpose, which term stands
defined in the preceding Section 3(f). A conjoint reading E
of Sections 17 and. 3(f) makes it apparent that urgency
provisions cannot be pressed into service or resorted
to if the acquisition of land is for Companies. Fourthly,
possession of such lands would vest in the Government
only when the foregoing factors have been formally and F
strictly complied with. This Section enables the
curtailment of a citizen's Constitutional right to property
and can be resorted to only if the provisions and
preconditions are punctiliously and meticulously
adhered to, lest the vesting be struck down and set aside G
by the Court in its writ jurisdiction. [Paras 5, 7, 8, 11, 12]
[192-F-H; 193-A; 194-E-G; 196,F; 201-C; 202-A-E, F-H]
2. Section 17(3) postulates that atthe time of taking
possession of lands under the urgency provision the H
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.
A Collector must offer compensation to the persons
interested in those lands. Section 17(3A) requires the
Collector to tender payment of eighty per cent of the
compensatio·n estimated by him, obviously and
pointedly, to the person interested in compensation for
B such land, unless the .Collector is precluded or
prevented from making such payments because of
exigencies enumerated in Section 31 of the L.A. Act. In
other words, the Collector cannot by way of first recourse
deposit the estimated compensation even in the Court
C to which the filing of a Reference under Section 18 is
provided. The use of the word "shall" indicates that the
provisions are prima facie mandatory in nature unless
the statute or the language employed in the Section
indicates otherwise. The language of sub-Section (3A),
0
inasmuch as it commences with the words "Before
taking possession of any land ..... ", makes it
incontrovertibly clear that what follows are the
prerequisities thereto. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that
E the statute has ordained a precise and particular
methodology which must be adhered to as a precursor
to divesting the owner of land of its possession and title.
It is axiomatic that if a statute prescribes the manner in
which an action is to be performed, it must be carried
F out strictly in consonance thereto or not at all. [Paras
13, 14] [202-F-H; 203-B-F]
3. But for the statutory enablement, the action could
not have been taken; ergo everything surrounding that
G empowerment must be meticulously performed.
Possession of the land can be taken on grounds of
urgency if and only if there is contemporaneous
payment of eighty per cent of the estimated
compensation, otherwise making the acquisition
H vulnerable to vitiation because of the Taylor v. Taylor
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR 183
principle. The use of the word "estimated" in the Section A
delineates the distinction from "actual" compensation;
an estimate always remains a rough or approximate
1 calculation only or an approximate judgment and /or a
price specified as that which is likely to be charged. It
would do violence to the statute and fly in the face of B
common sense if an estimate is treated per se as a
conclusive calculation. Any doubt that may remain is
immediately dispelled upon a perusal of Section 17(38)
which clarifies that the estimated amount tendered/paid
under sub-Section (3A) will be taken into account for C
determining the amount of compensation and thereafter
logically permitting the shortfall or the excess to be
adju~ted. In other words, the amount of compensation
has to be determined and computed under the relevant
0
sections of the L.A. Act. A reading of sub-Section (4)
so.unds the death knell to the arguments put forward for
the Respondent State, iriasmuch as it allows the option
tci the appropriate Government to make the provisions
of Section 5A inapplicable. Paraphrased differently, even E
where the urgency provisions contained in Section 17
are resorted to, ordinarily the provisions of Section 5A
have to be adhered to, i.e. inviting and then deciding the
Objections filed by the landowners. Significantly, sub-
section (4) of Section 17 does not, as it very easily could F
have, exempt compliance with the publication of the
Declaration under Section 6 and the hearing of parties
preparatory to the passing of an Award under Sections
9 to 11 of the Act. There is, therefore, not even an iota of
doubt that remains pertaining to the absolute necessity G
of the passing of an Award under Section 11 of the L.A.
Act. The tender of the estimated compensation is the
precondition, the sine qua non, enabling the Government
to take possession of land under the foregoing
subsections; and must be followed by the exercise of H
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.
A computation of compensation in a procedure
corresponding to that in Section 11. [Para 14] 204-8-G;
20S-A-C]
4. The L.A. Act postulates that the urgency clause
8 can be pressed into service at two stages. Firstly,
ordinarily possession can be taken fifteen days after the
publication of the Section 9 notice. The decision to
procure possession on an urgency basis can be taken
by the Government either at the very inception of the
C proceedings or at any time preceding or
contemporaneous to the date of the issuance of the
Section 9 notice. In both these contingencies the
valuable right of the landowner to file Objections and
resist the acquisition by virtue of Section SA remains
D unimpaired. Secondly, the Government can invoke sub-
section (4) and dispense with the valuable Section SA
right; in which event, logical, cogent and well-reasoned
notings must be simultaneously articulated in writing for
taking this momentous and monumental decision. In the
E case in hand, since the land is located in the State of
Bihar, Section 17(1) enables possession to be taken on
the expiry of fifteen days of the publication of the Section
6 Declaration. [Para 1S] [20S-D-G]
F S. The Act enables, in this statutory sequence of
events, the owner of the land to approach the Court in a
challenge to the invocation of the urgency provisions.
Ubi jus ibi remedium, every grievance has a remedy in
law, is a legal maxim which is immediately recalled. The
G apparent infraction of the provisions of Section 9 of the
Act do not arise in the present case because of the Bihar
Amendment of Section 17. This is also in line with a plain
reading of Section 17(1), which states that "once
H possession of the land is taken by the Government under
Section 17, the land vests absolutely in the Government,
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR 185
free from all encumbrances". In Section 48(1) the taking A
over of the possession of the land is of seminal
sign.ificance in that the provision succinctly states that
"the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the
acquisition of any land the possession of which has not
been taken". Where the landowners do not assail the B
acquisition, it may be open to them to seek a mandamus
for payment to them, after a reasonable period, of the
remaining compensation, which will thereupon
metamorphose from a mere estimation to the actual
compensation for the expropriation. [Para 20, 21) [211- C
G-H; 212-A-D; 213-F-G]
6. The Appellants are being denied just and fair
compensation for their land in proceedings which
commenced in 1987, despite the directions of the High D
Court passed as early as in 1988 to pass an award within
fo'ur months. The raison d'etre behind the introduction
of S~ction 11Awas for the landowners to have a remedy
in the event of an award .not being passed expeditiously.
If Satendra Prasad Jain is interpreted to mean that Section E
11A will not apply to any acquisition under the urgency
provisions, landowners such as the Appellants will have
no protection, even if they are not paid full compensation
for their land for decades. This cannot be in keeping with F
the legislative intent behind this Section. Furthermore,
circumstances require this Court to reconsider its view
that even if the stated public interest or cause has ceased
to exist, any other cause can sullstitute it, especially
where the urgency provisions have been invoked. In G
allowing the acquisition of land that the Government
finds necessary to be set aside, it i~ not necessarily to
be held that the land revert to the Appellantis, as the
alternative ·of permitting the Government to keep
possession provided it re-acquires the land with a new H.
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.
A Section 4 notification exists. This option, particularly in
the present factual matrix, does the least violence to the
intent and content of the L.A. Act, in that it upholds
Section 11A even in cases of acquisition under Section
17 while pres3rving the requirement of Section 17 that
B the unencumbered possession of the land remain vested
in the Government. It also protects the rights of the
landowners, thus fulfilling the intent of Section 11A, while
allowing the Government to acquire land in cases of
emergencies withoufits title being challenged, which is
C the avowed intention of Section 17. Any other
interpretation of the law would serve to protect only
those landowners who had approached the Court to stop
the Government from undoing an emergency
acquisition, while leaving in the cold equally aggrieved
0
landowners seeking to enforce their right to fair
compensation for their land. Even equity demands that
the party bearing the consequence of the delay In the
Award ought not to be the innocent landowner, but the
E errant State. [Para 24, 25] [215-C-G; 216-C-G]
J.E.D. Ezra vs. The Secretary of State for India
(1902-1903) 7 CWN 249; Delhi Airtech Services
(P) Ltd .YS. StateofU.P 2012 (12) SCR 191: (2011)
9 SCC 354; Nandeshwar Prasad vs. State of U.P.,
F AIR 1964 SC 1217: 1964 SCR 425; Union of
India vs. Shiv Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564; Union of
India v. GM. Kokil 1984 SCR 292: 1984 (Supp)
SCC 196; Taylor vs. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch D 426;
Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor (1935-36) 63 IA
G 372; Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya
Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322: 1954 SCR 1038;
State of U.P v. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358;
Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kera/a 1999 (1)
SCR 1121: (1999) 3 SCC 422; Hussein
.H Ghadially v. State of Gujarat (2014) 8 SCC 425;
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR 187
Satendra Prasad Jain vs. State of U.P. 1993 (2) A
Suppl. SCR 336: (1993) 4 SCC 369; Lt. Governor
of Himacha/ Pradesh v. Avinash Sharma 1971
(1) SCR 413: (1970) 2 sec 149; Sanjay Singh
vs. U.P. Public Service Commission, Allahabad
2007 (3) SCC 720: 2007 (1) SCR 235; Krishena B
Kumarvs. Union of India 1990 (4) SCC 207: 1990
. (3) SCR 352 ; Sanjay Singh vs. U.P. Public
Service Commission, Allahabad 2007 (3) SCC
720: 2007 (1) SCR 235 ; Islamic Academy of
Education vs. State of Karnataka 2003 (6) SCC c
697: 2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 474; Allahabad
Oevelopment Authority vs. Naziruzzaman (1996)
6 SCC 424: 1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 435; General
Manager, Telecommunication vs. Dr. Madan·
D
Mohan Pradhan 1995 Supp (4) SCC 268: 1995
(5) Suppl. SCR 1; Banda Development Authority,
Banda vs. Mota Lal Agarwal (2011) 5 SCC 394:
2011 (7) SCR 435 - referred to.
Case Law Reference E
2012 (12) SCR 191 referred to. Para 1
1964 SCR 425 referred to. Para 6
·(2014) 6 sec 564 referred to. Para 6
1984 SCR 292 referred to. Para 11 F ·'
1954 SCR 1038 referred to. Para 14
AIR 1964 SC 358 referred to. Para 14
1999 (1) SCR 1121 referred to. Para 14
(2014) 8 sec 425 referred to .. Para 16 G
1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 336 referred to. Para 16
1971 (1) SCR 413 referred to. Para 17
2007 (1) SCR 235 referred to. Para 18
1990 (3) SCR 352 referred to. · Para 19 H
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 11 S.C.R.
A 2007 (1) SCR 235 referred to. Para 23
2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 474 referred to. Para 23
1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 435 referred to. Para 23
1995 (5) Suppl. SCR 1 referred to. Para 23
B 2011 (7) SCR 435 referred to. Para 23
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
3385of2012
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.09.2010 in Civil
C Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 4474 of 2006 of the High Court of
Judicature at Patna.
Neeraj Jain, Vankita Subramoniam, Ajay Kumar, Avinash
Kumar for the Appellant.
D
Gopal Singh, Rash mi Sriva.stava for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J. 1. The legal nodus that we are
E called upon to unravel in this Appeal is whether the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (L.A. Act for brevity) as amended from
time to time, requires an Award to be passed even in respect
cf lands expropriated by the State pursuant to the exercise of
special powers in cases of urgency contained in Section 17
F thereof. It is indeed ironical that what was, as far back as in
1987, perceived as an imperative, urgent and exigent
necessity, justifying the steamrolling of the rights of citizens,
has proved substantially to be a fallow and ill-conceived
G requirement even after the passage of three decades; till date,
tracts of the acquired land remain unutilized; the initially
declared purpose of construction of residential quarters for
State officials having novated to portions of the land being
used as helipads for 'State Dignitaries'. We must not forget
H that even though ownership of property has ceased to be
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VlKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 189
conceived of as a Fundamental Right, it continues to receive A
Constitutional protection. It is also the regrettable reality that
Governments are increasingly relying on rulings of this Court
to the effect that even if the public purpose providing the
predication for the compulsory acquisition of a citizen's land
has proved to be an illusion or misconception, another purpose B
can conveniently be discovere.d or devised by the State for
retention by it of the expropriated land. Our opinion intends to
insulate genuinely urgent projects from lapsing and not to
annihilate the constitutional rights of the individual from the might C
of the State even though it transgresses the essence of the
statute. It has become alarmingly commonplace for lands to
be expropriated under the banner of urgency or even under
the normal procedure, only to be followed by a withdrawal or
retraction from this exercise enabling a favoured few to harvest
0
the ill-begotten windfall. The ambivalence or cleavage of
opinion of this Court in Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. vs. State
of UP (2011) 9 sec 354 on the necessity to pay the erstwhile
owners of land of even its unilaterally assessed value has
emboldened and spurred the State into contending before us E
that no sooner the urgency mantra is mouthed, no other
provision of the L.A. Act has any relevance or efficacy, including
the legal necessity of passing an Award.
2. We shall succinctly narrate the salient facts of the F
Appeal before us. The State Government had by means of
Notification No.2/86-87 dated 18.11.1987 and 3/86-87 dated
18:11.1987 initiated steps for acquiring tracts of lands in Mouza
Sansarpur and in Hardas Chak. These Notifications had
Simultaneously excluded the provisions of Section 5A of the· G
L.A. Act from applying to the acquired lands, which, because
of the significance of its language, is reproduced below:
"This Notification is hereby issued under the provisions
of section 4 of th.e Bihar Act No.11, 1961 as amended
H
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.
A Act No.1, 1894 for those persons who are concerned
with it.
The map of the above land can be seen in the office
of the Land Acquisition Officer, Khagaria. Government
.of Bihar do hereby authorize the Land Acquisition Officer,
B
Khagaria and his staff and the office bearers of the
Executive Engineer Bhawan Nirman Khagaria in the
preliminary investigation of this project that they should
conduct the survey of the land after entering it and they
c are directed to all the cicts specified under section 2 of
the Section 4 of the above Act.
And whereas it is the opinion of the Governor of Bihar
that the above mentioned barren land/agricultural land
and its part thereof is necessary for immediate
D acquisition. Therefore, it is directed under sub section 4
of the section 17 of the above Act that the provisions of
the section 5A of the above act shall not apply to the
above land/lands".
E 3. This first Notification under Section 4 came to be
followed by subsequent Notifications, lucidly illustrating the
understanding of the Respondent State that the preceding
Notification had lapsed by operation of the statute. The
Respondent State issued a Notification under Section 4 of the
F L.A. Act on 16.9.1999 in respect of which the Appellants filed
Objections under Section 5A on a consideration of which the
·· Land Acquisition Officer had opined that the Notification issued
in 1987 could not be continued with as the Award had not been
passed with.in the stipulated time period thereby making it
G necessary to issue the 1999 Notification. This Notification also
expired because a Declaration under Section 6 had not been
promulgated within one year. Hence yet another Notification
was published on 13.8.2001, for which the Appellants filed their
'
H Objections under Section 5A yet again. This Notification also
lapsed, since the sequence of events as contemplated in the
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 191
L.A. Act had not been duly completed. Once again, in 2004, A
fresh steps were initiated for acquisition which also expired
for the same reason. The Respondent State now vainly essays
to take unfair and ill-founded advantage of decisions and
opinions of this Court to contend that the subject acquisition
stands completed in all respects, thereby endeavouring, illegally B
in our considered opinion, to avoid performance of their
statutory obligations of computing compensation and then
paying it.
4. The Impugned Order accepts the version of the C
Respondent that large parcels of these lands have been utilized
for constructing residential quarters for senior Officers of the
State, and that the Appellant has been paid eighty per cent of
the compensation, although twenty per cent supposedly still
remains outstanding. Per contra, it is the contention of the D
Appellant that the incontrovertible position that portions of the
land have remained unutilized for decades is clearly indicative
of the fact that they are not reql.lired by the State any more.
Within a week of the publication of the Section 4 Notification,
that is on 24.11.1987, notices under Section 17(1) of the L.A. E
Act were also issued, which resulted in the filing of writ petitions
in the following year, in which it was contended that resort to
Section 17 of the L.A. Act was mala fide, and that
compensation, as envisaged in the statute itself, had not even F
been tendered to the oyvners. It is significant that in CWJC
No.4007 of 1988, a Division Bench of the High Court of
Judicature at Patna had directed on 12.7.1988 that the Award
for compensation must be made within four months. It is riot in
dispute that an Award has, till date, not been passed even G
though that direction has attained finality. The Writ Petition
was disposed of observing - (i) possession of the land had
already been taken by the State; (ii) eighty per cent
compensation had been paid to the Appellants; (iii) the
remainder twenty per cent along with interest would be paid to H
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201S] 11 S.C.R.
A the owners on their appearance before the Land Acquisition
Officer; (iv) they would be entitled to raise the claim of higher
interest considering that the land had been acquired in 1987;
and (v) Appellant was entitled to raise objections with respect
to the value of the land. In ·view of these directions, it was
B palpably clear to all the parties, especially the State
Government, that the entitlement to raise objections with
respect to the value of the land was possible only once
proceedings connected with and preparatory to passing an
Award on Section 11 reached its culmination. It seems facially
C obvious to us that since the State has not assailed these
directions it ought not to be permitted to canvas in this Appeal
that the passing of an award is unnecessary in cases where
the State has taken recourse to the urgency provisions
contained in Section 17 of the Act. A perusal of the Counter
0
Affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Bihar makes it patently
evident that an award as contemplated in Section 11 of the
L.A. Act has not been passed; and that Notifications under
Section 4 have again been.passed subsequent to the two
E Notifications detailed above.
S. An overview of the L.A. Act discloses that it is divided
into VIII Parts/Chapters. Part II commences with Section 4,
which postulates the publication of a preliminary notification,
F whereupon Officers of the State are authorized to enter and
survey the lands proposed to be acquired and carry out
activities ancillary to that purpose; and Section S obligates
the Officials to compensate for damages caused as a
consequence thereof. The right to file Objections to the Section
G 4 Notification, recognized by Section SA, was introduced into
the L.A. Act by Act 38 of 1923, and this provision was again
amended by Act 68 of 1984 to mandate that Objection must
be filed within thirty days of the issuance of the Notification.
Section SA further obligates the Collector to submit a Report
H to the Government in respect of the Objections preferred by
LAX.Ml DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J J 193
persons interested in the land, as well as pertaining to any A
aspect of the nature of the land proposed to be acquired.
6. The insertion of Section 5A seems to have been
spurred on by the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta
High Court in J.E.D. Ezra vs. The Secretary of State for India B
(1902-1903) 7 CWN 249. In that case, the properties of Ezra
were sought to be acquired under the pre-amended provision
for expansion of the offices of the Bank of Bengal. In the
challenge to the. said acquisition; it was argued that the person
whose property was going to be taken away should be allowed C
a hearing on the principles of natural justice. However the
Court held that it could not grant relief in the absence of any
provision in the Act enabling or envisaging or mandating that
such an opportunity should be made available to the
landowners. In order to remedy this shortcoming in Act of 1894, D
an amendment by way of incorporation of Section 5A was
introduced on 11th July, 1923. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons for the said Amendment is as follows:
"The Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 does not provide E
that person having an interest in land which it is proposed
to acquire, shall have the right of objecting to such
acquisition; nor is Government bound to enquire into
and consider any objections that may reach them. The
object of this Bill is to provide that a Local Government F
shall not declare, under section 6 of the Act, that any land
is needed for a public purpose unless time has been
allowed after the notification under section 4 for persons
interested in the land to put in objections and for such
objections to be considered by the Local Government." G
(Gazette of India, Pt. V, dated 14th July, 1923, page 260)
The importance of Section 5A cannot be
overemphasised. It is conceived from natural justice and has
matured into manhood in the maxim of audi alteram partem, H
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.
A i.e. every person likely to be adversely affected by a decision
must be granted a meaningful opportunity of being heard. This
right cannot be taken away by a side wind, as so powerfully
and pellucidly stated in NandeshwarPrasadvs. State ofU.P.,
AIR 1964 SC 1217. So stringent is this right that it mandates
B that the person who heard and considered the Objections can
alone decide them; and not even his successor is competent
to do so even on the basis of the materials collected by his
predecessor. Furthermore, the decision on the Objections
should be available in a self contained, speaking and reasoned
C order; reasons cannot be added to it later as that would be
akin to putting old wine in new bottles. We can do no better
than commend a careful perusal of Union of India vs. Shiv
Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564, on these as well as cognate
D considerations.
7. Section 6 envisages the making of a Declaration by
the appropriate Government to the effect that the specified
lands are needed fora public purpose, or fora Company; and
post 1984, this Declaration has to be made within one year of
E the date of the publication of the Section 4 Notification. We
are not concerned in this Appeal with the Provisos or
Explanations to Section 6 or to other sub-Sections and shall
therefore not advert to them any further. Thereafter the Collector
F has to take Orders for the acquisition of land and to mark and
measure it. Section 9 enjoins the Collector to cause public
notice to be given of his intention to take possession of the
land and to entertain claims for compensation. Section 11
post4lates the holding of an enquiry by the Collector into
G ObjeCtions on sundry grounds. For the purposes with which
we are presently concerned, amendments to Section 6 and
the insertion of the new Section 11 A, both of which prescribe
a time limit within which requisite action has to be taken by the
Government justify special mention. The prefatory note -
H Statement of Qbjects and Reasons of Act No.68 of 1984 as
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 195
are relevant are reproduced: [Current Central Legislation A
Vol.10 1984 • 3,5,6,9]
Prefatory Note - Statement of Objects and Reasons -
With the enormous expansion of the State's role in
promoting public welfare and economic development B
since independence, acquisition of land for public
purposes, industrialisation, building of institutions, etc.,
has become far more numerous than ever before. While
this is inevitable, promotion of public purpose has to be
balanced with the rights of the individual whose land is c
acquired, thereby often depriving him of his means of
livelihood. Again, acquisition of land for private
enterprises ought not to be placed on the same footing
as acquisition for the State or for an enterprise under it.
The individual and institutions who are unavoidably to D
be deprived of their property rights in land need to be
adequately compensated for the loss keeping in view
the sacrifice they have to make for the larger interests of
the community. The pendency of acquisition '
proceedings for long periods often causes E ·
hardship to the affected parties and renders
unrealistic the scale of compensation offered to
them.
The main proposals for amendment are as follows:-
F
(iii) A time-limit of one year is proposed to be provided
for completion of all formalities between the issue of the
preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and
the declaration for acquisition of specified land under
Section 6( 1) of the Act. G
(v) It is proposed to provide for a period of two years
from the date of publication of the declaration under
Section 6 of the Act within which the Collector should
. make his award under the Act. If no award is made within
that period, the entire proceedings forthe acquisition of H
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.
A the land would lapse.· He has also been empowered to
correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes in the award
within a certain period from the date of the award.
(vi) The circumstances under which the Collector should
take possession of the land before the award is made in
B
urgent cases are being enlarged to include a larger
variety of public purposes.
(ix) Considering that the right of reference to the civil
court under Section 18 of the Act is not usually taken
c advantage of by inarticulate and poor people and is
usually exercised only by the comparatively affluent
landowners and that this causes considerable inequality
in the payment of compensation for the same or similar
quality of land to different interested parties, it is proposed
D to provide an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose
land is covered under the same notification to seek re-
determination of compensation, once any one of them
has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation
from the reference court under Section 18 of the Act.
E
(Emphasis added)
8. Section 11A has been introduced by Act 68 of 1984
prescribing a limitation of two years for the making of an Award
F by the Collector. It is only post this event that Section 16
empowers the Collector to take possession of the land which
thereupon vests absolutely in the Government, free from all
encumbrances. We may clarify that the word 'vest' has two
connotations - the first and primary one relates to possession
G of land; and the second, an adjunctory one, pertains additionally
to the title of that land. But this distinction has not been drawn
in India since this Court has held in several cases that 'vesting'
in the circumstances with which we are presently concerned,
covers and encompasses the possession as well as the title
H of the land.
. LAXMI DEVI v. SI.ATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 197
9. !tis in this progression that the L.A. Act provides for A
special powers in the case of perceived urgency, in terms of
Section 17, which we shall reproduce for facility of reference.
"17. Special powers in cases ofurgency.-(1) In cases
of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government, so B
directs, the Collector, though no such award has been
made, may on the expiration of fifteen days from the
publication of the notice mentioned in section 9, sub-
section (1), take possession of any land needed for a
public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest c
absolutely in the Government, free from all
encumbrances.
(2) Whenever, owing to any sudden change in the channel
of any navigable river or other unforeseen emergency, it
0
becomes necessary for any Railway Administration to
acquire the immediate possession of any land for the
maintenance of their traffic or for the purpose of making
thereon a river-side or ghat station, or of providing
convenient connection with or access to any such station, E
or the appropriate Government considers it necessary
to acquire the immediate possession of any land for the
purpose of maintaining any structure or system pertai11ing
to irrigation, water supply, drainage, road communication
or electricity, the Collector may, immediately after the F
publication of the notice mentioned in sub-section (1) and
with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government,
enter upon and take possession of such land, which shall
thereupon vest absolutely in the Government fre;e from
all encumbrances: G
Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of
any building or part of a building under this sub-section
without giving to the occupier thereof at least forty-eight
hours' notice of his intention so to do, or such longer notice H
as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 11 S.C.R.
A to remove his movable property from such building
without unnecessary inconvenience.
(3) In every case under either of the preceding sub-
sections the Collector shall at the time of taking
possession offer to the persons interested compensation
B
forthe standing crops and trees (if any) on such land and
for any other damage sustained by them caused by such
sudden dispossession and not excepted in section 24;
and, in case such offer is not accepted, the value of such
c crops and'trees and the amount of such other damage
shall be allowed for an awarding compensation for the
land under the provisions herein contained.
(3A) Before taking possession of any land under sub-
section (1) or sub-section 92), the Collector shall, without
D prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (3),-
(a) tender payment of eighty per centum of the
compensation for such land as estimated by him to the
persons interested entitled thereto, and
E (b) pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or
more of the contingencies mentioned in section 31 , sub-
section (2),
and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions
F of section 31, sub-section (2) (except the second proviso
thereto), shall apply as they apply to the payment of
compensation under that section.
(3B)The amount paid or deposited under sub-section
(3A), shall be taken into account for determining the
G amount of compensation required to be tendered under
section 31, and where the amount so paid or deposited
exceeds the compensation awarded by the Collector
under section 11, the excess may, unless refunded within
three months from the date of Collector's award, be
H
recovered as an arrear of land revenue.
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.) 199
(4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the A
appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate
Government may direct that the provisions of section 5A
shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a. declaration
may be made under section 6 in respect of the land at B
any time after the date of the publication of the notification
under section 4, sub-section (1 )."
Sub-sections (3A) and (3B) have been introduced into
the LA.Act byAct6Bof 1984with effect from 24.9.1984. c
10. The L.A. Act, as amended by the State of Bihar by
the Bihar Act 11 of 1961, is also being reproduced below for
the purpose of clarity:
"17. Special powers in cases of urgency. -(1) In cases D
of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so
directs the Collector, though no such award has been
made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the
publication of the declaration mentioned in section 6, or
with the consent in writing of the person interested, at E
any time after the publication of the notification under
Section 4 in the village in which the land is situated, take
possession of any waste or arable land needed for public
purposes or for a company. Such land shall thereupon
vest absolutely in the Government free from· all F
encumbrances.
Explanation.-This sub-section shall apply to any waste
or arable land, notwithstanding the existence thereon of
forest, orchard or trees. G
(2)Whenever it becomes necessary for the purpose of
protecting life or property from flood, erosion or other
natural calamities or for the maintenance of
communication other than a railway communication or it
becomes necessary for any Railway Administration H
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.
A (other than the Railway Administration of the Union), owing
to any sudden change in the channel of any navigable
river or other unforeseen emergency for the maintenance
of their traffic or for the purpose of making thereon a
riverside or ghat station, or providing convenient
8 connection with or access to any such station, to acquire
the immediate possession of any land, the Collector may,
immediately after the publication of the declaration
mentioned in s. 6 or, with the consent in writing of the
person interested, given in the presence of headman of
c the village or mukhiya and sarpanch as defined in the
Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (Bihar Act VII of 1948), at
any time after the publication of the notification under
section 4 in the village in which the land is situated and
with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government,
D
enter upon and take possession of such land which shall
thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from
all encumbrances:
Provided that the Collector shall not take possession of
E any building or part of a building under this sub-section
without giving to the occupier thereof at least forty-eight
hours' notice of his intention to do so, or such longer notice
as may be reasonably sufficient to enable such occupier
to remove his movable property from such building
F without unnecessary inconvenience.
(3) In every case under the proceeding sub-sections the
Collector shall, at the time of taking possession offer to
the persons interested, compensation for the standing
crops on such land and for any damage sustained by
G them caused by such sudden dispossession and not
accepted in section 24; and in case such offer is not
accepted, the value of such crops and the amount of such
other damage shall be allowed for in awarding
compensation for the land under the provisions herein
H
contained.
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 201
(4) In the case of any land to which in the opinion of the A
appropriate Government, the provisions of sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the provisions of
section 5A shall not apply where the appropriate
Government so directs to where possession of the land
has been taken with the consent of the person interested. B
Sub-sections (3A) and (38) have not been amended viz-
a-viz the State of Bihar and continue to apply even in that State.
11. Section 17 is not a pandect; it could have been C
devised by Parliament to be so, inter alia, by the use of a non
obstante clause, or in the alternative by clear and unequivocal
language. In Union of India v. G. M. Kokil 1984 (Supp) SCC
196 this Court has opined that a "non obstante clause is a
legislative device which is usually employed to give overriding 0
effect to certain provisions over some contrary provisions that
may be found either in the same enactment or some other
enactment, that is to say, to avoid the operation and effect of
all contrary provisions." Alternatively, Sections 9, 11, 11Aetc.
could have been made subject to Section 17, although both E
cumbersome and clumsy, but has not been so done.
12. ThesalientconcomitantsofSection 17(1)deserve
enumeration. Firstly, the Section is attracted even though an
Award has not been made which, it appears to us, clearly F
indicates that the completion of this exercise has not been
obliterated or dispensed with but has been merely deferred.
An unambiguous and unequivocal statement could have been
made excluding the requirement of publishing an Award.
Secondly, it is available only on the expiration of fifteen days G
from the issuance of the Section 9 notice. This hiatus of fifteen
days must be honoured as its purpose appears to be to enable
the affected or aggrieved parties to seek appropriate remedy
before they are divested of the possession and the title over
their land. The Government shall perforce have to invite and H
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.
A then consider Objections preferred under Section SA, which
procedure as painstakingly and steadfastly observed by this
Court constitutes the Constitutional right to property of every
citi.:en; inasmuch as Section 17(4) enables the obliteration of
this valuable light, this Court has repeatedly restated that valid
B and pressing reasons must be present to justify the invocation
of these provisions by the Government. Thirdly, possession
of the land can be taken only if it is needed for public purpose,
which term stands defined in the preceding Section 3(f). A
conjoint reading of Sections 17 and 3(f) makes it apparent to
C us that urgency provisions cannot be pressed into s~~rvice or
resorted to if the acquisition of land is for Companies; however
we must be quick to add that this question does not arise
before us. Fourthly, possession of such lands would vest in
the Government only wheri the foregoing factors have been
0
formally and strictly complied with. This Section enables the
curtailment of a citizen's Constitutional right to property and
can be resorted to only ifthe provisions and preconditions are
punctiliously and meticulously adhered to, lest the vesting be
E struck down and set aside by the Court in its writ jurisdiction,
on the application of the Taylor vs. Tay/or(1875) 1 Ch D 426
and several judgments of this Court which has followed this
decision (supra).
F 13. Section 17(2) enables the use of the urgency
provisions in some other contingencies also, which we may
term as 'emergency' in contradistinction to 'urgency', with which
we are not currently concerned. Section 17(3) consists of
myriad ingredients; by using the word "shall" Parliament has
G clarified that what follows compulsorily requires adherence,
the non-compliance of which will lead to vitiating all the action
ostensibly taken under this provision. These requirements are
that at the time of taking possession of lands under the urgency
provision the Collector must offer compensation to the persons
H interested in those lands. It is relevant to underscore that this
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 203
provision does not postulate, as of first recourse, depositing A
compensation with any branch of the Government or for that
matter even with the Reference Court. The compensation
must first be tendered or offered to the persons interested in
the standing crops and· trees etc. on the subject land.
B
14. Section 17(3A) came to be introduced into the
statute by Act 68 of 1984. It requires the Collector to tender
payment of eighty per cent of the compensation estimated by
him, obviously and pointedly, to the person interested in
compensation for such land, unless the Collector is precluded C
or prevented from making such payments because of
exigencies enumerated in Section 31 of the LA.Act. In other
words, the Collector cannot by way of first recourse deposit
the estimated compensation even in the Court to which the
filing of a Reference under Section 18 is provided. The use of D
the word "shall" indicates that the provisions are prima facie
mandatory in nature unless the statute or the language
employed in the Section indicates otherwise. The language
of sub-Section (3A), inasmuch as it commences with the words
"Before taking possession of any land ..... ", makes it E
incontrovertibly clear that what follows are the prerequisities
thereto. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the statute has
ordained a precise and particular methodology which must
be adhered to as a precursor to divesting the owner of land of F
its possession and title. It is axiomatic that if a statute
prescribes the manner in which an action is to be performed,
it must be carried out strictly in consonance thereto or not at
all. This legal principle has been articulated over a century
ago in Taylor v. Taylor and has admirably and in fact G
unquestionably withstood the test of time. It was approved by
the Privy Council in NazirAhmadv. King Emperor(1935-36)
63 IA 372 and subsequently applied by three Judge Benches
in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh AIR
1954 SC 322, State of U.P v.. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC H
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 11 S.C.R.
A 358, Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kera/a ( 1999) 3 SCC
422 and most recently in Hussein Ghadially v. State of Gujarat
(2014) 8 SCC 425. Simply put, but for the statutory
enablement, the action could not have been taken; ergo
everything surrounding that empowerment must be
B meticulously performed. Possession of the land can be taken
on grounds of urgency if and only if there is contemporaneous
payment of eighty per cent of the estimated compensation,
otherwise making the acquisition vulnerable to vitiation
because of the Taylor v. Taylor principle. The use of the word
C "estimated" in the Section delineates the distinction from
"actual" compensation; an estimate always remains a rough
or approximate calculation only [Black's Law Dictionary], or
an approximate judgment and /or a price specified as that
D which is likely to be charged. It would doviolencetothestatute
and fly in the face of common sense if an estimate is treated
per seas a conclusive calculation. Any doubt that may remain
is immediately dispelled upon a perusal of Section 17(38)
which clarifies that the estimated amount tendered/paid under
E sub-Section (3A) will be taken into account for determining
the amount of compensation and thereafter logically permitting
the shortfall or the excess to be adjusted. In other words, the
amount of compensation has to be determined and computed
under the relevant sections of the L.A. Act. A reading of sub-
F Section (4) sounds the death knell to the arguments put forward
for the Respondent State, inasmuch as it allows the option to
the appropriate Government to make the provisions of Section
5A inapplicable. Paraphrased differently, even where the
urgency provisions contained in Section 17 are resorted to,
G ordinarily the provisions of Section 5A have to be adhered to,
i.e. inviting and then deciding the Objections filed by the
landowners. Significantly, sub-Section (4) of Section 17 does
not, as it very easily could have, exempt compliance with the
publication of the Declaration under Section 6 and the hearing
H of parties preparatory to the passing of an Award under
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 205
Sections 9 to 11 of the Act. There is, therefore, not even an A
iota of doubt that remains pertaining to the absolute necessity
of the passing of an Award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act.
We are in no manner of doubt, and we reiterate, that the tender
of the estimated compensatiori is the precondition, the sine
qua non, enabling the Government to take possession of land B
under the foregoing subsections; and must be followed by the
exercise of computation of compensation in a procedure
corresponding to that in Section 11. We shall revert to the
question ofwhetherthe constraints contained in Section 11A
will also apply to acquisitions in which Section 17 has been C
resorted to.
15. The L.A. Act postulates that the urgency clause can
be pressed into service at two stages. Firstly, ordinarily
possession can be taken fifteen days after the publication of D
the Section 9 notice. The decision to procure possession on
an urgency basis can be taken by the Government either at
the very inception of the proceedings or at any time preceding
or contemporaneous to the date of the issuance of the Section
9 notice. In both these contingencies the valuable right of the E
landownerto file Objections and resist the acquisition by virtue
of Section 5A remains unimpaired. Secondly, the Government
can invoke sub-Section (4) and dispense with the valuable
Section 5A right; in which event, logical, cogent and well- F
reasoned notings must be simultaneously articulated in writing
·for taking this momentous and monumental decision. We
must immediately clarify that in the case in hand, since the
land is located in the State of Bihar, Section 17(1) enables
possession to be taken on the expiry of fifteen days of the G
publication of the Section 6 Declaration.
16. Since heavy reliance has been placed by the State
on Satendra Prasad Jain VS .. State of U.P. (1993) 4 sec
369 and Lt. Governor of Him~chal Pradesh v. Avinash Sharma H
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.
A (1970) 2 sec149, we must sedulously determine their ratios.
This would therefore be the apposite time and place for a brief
discussion on the contours and connotations of the term ratio
decidendi, which in Latin means "the reason for deciding".
According to Glanville Williams in 'Learning the Law', this
B maxim "is slightly ambiguous. It may mean either (1) rule that
the judge who decided the case intended to lay down and apply
to the facts, or (2) the rule that a later Court concedes him to
have had the power to lay down." In G.W. Patons'
Jurisprudence, ratio decidendi has been conceptualised in a
C novel manner, in that these words are "almost always used in
contradistinction to obiter dictum. An obiter dictum, of course,
is always something said by a Judge. It is frequently easier to
show that something said in a Judgment is obiter and has no
binding authority. Clearly something said by a .Judge about
0
the law in his judgment, which is not part of the course of
reasoning leading to the decision of some question or issue
presented to him for resolution, has no binding authority
however persuasive it may be, and it will be described as an
E obiter dictum." 'Precedents in English Law' by Rupert Cross
and JW Harris states - "First, it is necessary to determine all
the facts of the case as seen by the Judge; secondly, it is
necessary to discover which of those facts were treated as
material by the Judge." Black's Law Dictionary, in somewhat
F similar vein to the aforegoing, bisects this concept, firstly, as
the principle or rule of law on which a Court's decision is
founded and secondly, the rule of law on which a latter Court
thinks that a previous Court founded its decision; a general
rule without which a case must have been decided otherwise.
G
17. A Constitution Bench has also reflected on the true
nature of ratio decidendi in Krishena Kumar vs. Union of India,
1990 (4) sec 207, as is discernable from the following
passages:
H
. LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 207
. 19. The doctrine of precedent, that is being bound by a A
previous decision, is limited to ti'le decision itself and as.
to what is necessarily involved in it. It does not mean that
this Court is bound by the various reasons given in
support of it, especially when they contain "propositions
wider than the case itself required''. This was what Lord B
Selborne said in Caledonian Railway Co. v. Walker's·
Trustees and Lord Halsbury ·in Quinn v. Leathern. Sir
Frederick Pollock has also said : "Judicial authority
belongs not to the exact words used in this or that
judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to C
-the principles accepted and applied as necessary
grounds of the decision." ·
20. In other words, the enunciation of the reason or
principle upon which a question before a court has been o
decided is alone binding as a precedent. The ratio
decidendi is the underlying principle, namely, the general
reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision
is based on the test or abstract from the specific
peculiarities of the particular case which gives rise to E
the decision. The ratio decidendi has to be ascertained
by an analysis of the facts of the case and the process of
reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a
pre-existing rule of .law, either statutory or judge-made,
and a rriinor premise consisting of the material facts of F
the case under immediate consideration. If it is not clear,
it is not the duty of the court to spell it out with <;lifficulty in
order to be bound by it.
18. The following paragraph from the determination of G
the Three-Judge Bench in Sanjay Singh vs. U. P. Public Service
Commission, Allahabad, 2007 (3) SCC 720, is instructive and
is reproduced for ~his reason -
H
208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.
A 10. The contention of the Commission also overlooks
the fundamental difference between challenge to the final
order forming part of the judgment and challenge to the
ratio decidendi of the judgment. Broadly speaking, every
judgment of superior courts has three segments, namely,
B (1) the facts and the point at issue; (i1) the reasons for the
decision; and (iii) the final order containing the decision.
The reasons for the decision or the ratio decidendi is
not the final order containing the decision. In fact, in a
judgment of this Court, though the ratio deciclendi may
c point to a particular result, the decision (final order relating
to relief) may be different and not a natural consequence
of the ratio decidendi of the judgment. This may happen
either on account of any subsequent event or the need to
mould the relief to do-complete justice in the matter. It is
D
the ratio decidendi of a judgment and not the final order
in the judgment, which forms a precedent...
19. We also commend a careful reading of the following
paragraphs from the decision of the Constitution Bench in
E Islamic Academy of Education vs. State of Kamataka, 2003
(6) sec 697, which we shall reproduce for facility:
139. A judgment, it is trite, is not to be read as a statute.
The ratio decidendi of a judgment is its reasoning which
F can be deciphered only upon reading the same in its
entirety. The ratio decidendi of a case or the principles
and reasons on which it is based is distinct from the relief
finally granted or the manner adopted for its disposal.
(See Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor irrigation
G Division v. N. C. Budhara1)
140. In Padma Sundara Rao v. State of T.Nit is stated:
(SCC p. 540, paragraph 9)
"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech
H or judgment as though they are words in a legislative
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 209
enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial A
utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a
particular case, said Lord Morris in Herrington v. British
Railways Board(Sub.nom British Railways Board v.
Herrington). Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or
different fact may make a world of difference between B
conclusions in two cases."
(See also Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Jagdamba Oil
Mills)
141. In General Electric Co. v. Renusagar Power Co it C
was held: (SCC p. 157, paragraph 20)
"As often enough pointed out by us, words and
expressions used in a judgment are not to be construed
in the same manner as statutes or as words an.d
0
expressions defined in statutes. We do not have any
doubt that when the words 'adjudication of the merits of
the controversy in the suit' were used by this Court in
State of U.P. v. Janki Saran Kai/ash Chandra tl;ie words
were not used to take in every adjudication which brought E
to an end the proceeding before the court in whatever
manner but were meant tci cover only such adjudication
as touched upon the real dispute between the parties
which gave rise t6 the action. Objections to adjudication
of the disputes between the parties, on whatever ground, F
are in truth not aids to the progress of the suit but hurdles
· to such progress. Adjudication of such objections cannot
be termed as adjudication of the merits of the controversy
in the suit. As we said earlier, a broad view has to be
taken of the principles involved and narrow and technical G .
interpretation which tends to defeat the object of the
legislation must be avoided."
142. In Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. State of WB it was
held: H
210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.
A "No doubt, the law declared by this Court binds courts in
India but it should always be remembered that this Court
does not enact."
(See also Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab
and Hameed Joharan v. Abdul Salam)
B
1.43. It will not, therefore, be correct to contend, as has
been contended by Mr Nariman, that answers to the
questions would be the ratio to a judgment. The answers
to the questions are merely conclusions. They have to
c be interpreted, in a case of doubt or dispute with the
reasons assigned in support thereof in the body of the
judgment, wherefor, it would be essential to read the other
paragraphs of the judgment also. It is also permissible
for this purpose (albeit only in certain cases and if there
D exist strong and cogent reasons) to look to the pleadings
of the parties.
144. In Keshav ChandraJoshiv. Union of/ndia this Court
when faced with difficulties where specific guidelines had
E been laid down for determ.ination of seniority in Direct
Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. v. State of
Maharashtra held that the conclusions have to be read
along with the discussions and the reasons given in the
bocly of the judgment.
F 145. It is further trite that a decision is an authority
for what it decides and not what can be logically
deduced therefrom."
(emphasis supplied)
G 20. The plea before us from the Appellants is that the
land should revert to them under Section 11A, since an Award
under Section 11 has still not been made despite the passage
of almost three decades from the date of the subject
H Notification. This Court has continuously held that once land
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 211
has vested in the State, the question of re-vesting its A
possession in the erstwhile landowners is no longer available
as an option to the State. This legal position was em;nciated
close to a half century ago in Avinash Sharma and has been
subsequently reiterated in numerous judgments. Paragraph
4 of the aforementioned Judgment is worthy of reproduction, B
and its reading will bear out that what was primarily in the
contemplation of this Court wa~ the possession of the land in
contradistinction to its title.
"4. In the present case a notification under Section 17(1)c
and (4) was issued by the State Government and
possession Which had previously been taken must, from
the date of expiry of fifteen days from the publication of
the notice under Section 9(1), be deemed to be in the
possession of the Government. We are unable to agree . D
that where the Government has obtained possession
illegally or under some unlawful transaction and a
notification under Section 17(1) is issued the land does
not vest in the Government free from all encumbrances.
We are of the view that when a notification under Section E
17(1) is issued, on the expiration of fifteen days from the
publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9(1), the
· possession previously obtained will be .deemed to be
the possession of the Government under Section 17(1)
of the Act and the land will vest in the Government free F
from all encumbrances".
' Ordinarily, possession of land can only be taken after the
expiry of fifteen days from the publication of the notice
envisaged in Section 9. We mention th is for the reason *hat G
the Act enables, in this statutory sequence of events, the owner
of the land to approach the Court in a chalien~e to the invocation
of the urgency provisions. Ubi jus ibi remedium, every
grievance has a remedy in law, is a legal maxim which is
H
212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 11 S.C.R.
A immediately recalled. We must hasten to add that the apparent
infraction of the provisions of Section 9 of the Act do not arise
in the present case because of the Bihar Amendment of
Section 17.
B 21. This is also in line with a plain reading of Section
17(1 ), which states that "once possession of the land is taken
by the Government under Section 17, the land vests absolutely
in the Government, free from·all encumbrances". In Section
48( 1) the taking over of the possession of the land is of seminal
C significance in that the provision succinctly states that "the
Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition
of any land the possession of which has not been taken". The
next sub-Sectio,n covers calculation of compensation for the
aborted occupation. The same position came to bEl reiterated
D in Satendra Prasad Jain by a Three Judge Bench of this
Court. The acquisition proceedings including the exclusion of
Section SA had obtained the imprimatur of the Allahabad High
Court; the urgency and public purpose had received curial
concurrence. Possession of the land was taken by the State
E from the landowners. Previously, the Special Leave Petition
filed by the landowners had been dismissed by this Court.
Ironically, the subsequent stance of the State was that the
acquisition of land under the urgency provisions was required
F to be set aside for the reason that the State had failed to pass
an Award under Section 11 within two years and had also failed
to pay eighty per cent of the estimated compensation required
under Section 17(3A). Whilst the State endeavoured to
withdraw from the acquisition, the erstwhile landowners
G opposed it. This Court directed the State "to make and publish
an award in respect of the said land within twelve weeks from
today". The abovementioned discussion bears out that this
Court was concerned only with the issue of the land beil'!fl
returned by the State to the erstwhile owner. It does not go so
H far as to limit or restrict the rights of landowners to fair
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.) 213
compensation fcir their expropriated property, as that is a A
Constitutional right which cannot be nullified, neutralised or
diluted. We think it justified to again refer to the opinion in
Satendra Prasad Jain that - "Section 11A cannot be so
construed as to leave the Government holding title to the land
without the obligation to determine compensation, make an B
-award and pay to the owner the difference between the amount
of the award and the amount of eighty per centqf the estimated
compensation." The secorid issue, one that we feel must be
kept in mind in the interpretation in the law laid down by this
Court, is the factual matrices involved in both Satendra Prasad C
Jain and Avinash Sharma. In both these precedents, as well
as in innumerable others that have relied upon them, the
· •. · Government's attempt was to misuse its own omissions to
'· · ~'i achieve its own oblique purposes. It was in this context that
0
"'futs Court ~ed to accede to the pleas of the Government.
This Court poignantly repelled the State's attempt to nullify the
acquisition on the predication of its non-compliance with
Sections 16 and 17(3A). The judicial intent was not to cause
any loss to landowners, but to protect them. The pernicious E
practice that was becoming rampant, that is to make partial
compliance with the statute and to follow the acquisition
procedure in a piecemeal manner, and then to argue that its
own lapses rendered its acquisition illegal, was roundly
repulsed. Although this strictly constitutes obiter, we think it F
appropriate to clarify that where the landowners do not assail
the acquisition, it may be open to them to seek a mandamus
for paymentto them, after a reasonable period, of the remaining
compensation, which will thereupon metamorphm;e from a
mere estimation to tt)e actual compensation for the G
expropriation.
22. The Constitution Bench of this Court had to interpret
Section 17 irl Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U.P.
·.· (1967) 1 SCR 373, but in somewhat different circumstances. · 1-i
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 11 S.C.R.
A The State proposed to take over large trncts of land "for
limestone quarry" on urgency basis; by virtue of Section 17(4),
Section 5A was held not to be available. The Collector of
Mirzapurwas directed by the Notification under Section 17(1)
of the Act to take possession of the "waste or arable land"
B even in the absence of an Award being published. The
Constitution Bench held that the limestone quarries belonging ·
to the Appellant, which were proposed to be acquired, could
not possibly be conceived of or categorised as "waste or arable
land, the acquisition, inasmuch as it proceeded under Section
c 17, could not pass muster of law. What is very pertinent for the
present purposes is that the Constitution Bench had declined
issuance of a mandamus commanding the State to restore
possession of the land to theAppellant, not because this was
inconceivable or impermissible in law or because of any
0
provisions in the L.A. Act, but rather because the lands had
validly vested in the State of U.P. under the U.P. Zamindari
Abolition and Land ReformsAct, 1951. The conundrum of the
restoration of the land had directly arisen before the Constitution
E Bench and since it declined the prayer for other reasons, it
follows that there is no constraint or impediment for the grant
of an appropriate Writ in this regard. This will fortify our
distillation of the ratio desidendi of Satendra Prasad Jain
which is circumscribed and restricted to the extent that the State
F is not empowered to withdraw from an acquisition once it has
taken possession of the said lands.
23. We do, however, recognize that Satendra Prasad
Jain has been interpreted more broadly in the past. In
G Allahabad DevelopmentAuthorityvs. Naziruzzaman (1996) 6
SCC 424, General Manager, l'elecommunication vs. Dr. Madan
Mohan Pradhan 1995 Supp (4) SCC 268, and Banda
Development Authority, Banda vs. Mota Lal Agarwal (2011) 5
SCC 394, this Court has dismissed the landowners' challenges
H to the respective acquisitions on the basis of Avinash Sharma
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR [VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.) 215
and Satendra Prasad Jain.· It is pertinent to note that all three A
of these cases were brief in their explanations of Avinash
Sharma and Satendra Prasad Jain, and did not examine
their rationes decidendi, their innate contradictions, their
intentions or their consequences at any length. We thus feel it
appropriate to rely on our own detailed exploration of these B
cases, as opposed to simply placing rel.iance on the largely
contradictory case law that has developed over the years. It
was for this reason ttiat we had revisited the curial concept of ·
ratio decidendi.
c
24. The scenario before us depicts the carelessness
-and the callousness of the State, quite different from the
situation in Satendra Prasad Jain ahd Avinash Sharma.
The Appellants herein are .being· denied just and fair
compensation for their land in proceedings which commenced D
in 1987, despite the directions of the High Court passed as
early as in 1988 to pass an award within four months. The
raison d'etre behind the introduction of Section 11A was for
the landowners to have a remedy in the event of an award not
being passed expeditiously. If Satendra Prasad Jain is E
interpreted to mean that Section 11A will not apply to any
acquisition under the urgency provisions, landowners such as
the Appellants before us will have no protection, even if they
are not pa.id full compensation for their land for decades. This F
cannot be in keeping with the legislative intent behind this
Section. Furthermore, keeping empirical evidence,in sight, we
make bold to opine that circumstances require this Court to
reconsider its view that even if the stated public interest or
cause has ceased to eicist, any other cause can substitute it, G
especially where the urgency provisions have been invoked.
25. We feel it imperative to distinguish between the
setting aside of an acquisition and the reversion of possession
·to the erstwhile landowners. While. the L.A. Act ·and the H
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 11 S.C.R.
A judgments discussed above do not allow for the latter, we are
of the considered opinion that this does not necessarily imply
that the former is also not an option. Both the abovementioned
cases dealt with a factual situation in which the Government
was_ attempting to set the acquisition of the land at naught so
· B that they would not have to pay compensation to acquire it.
Setting aside of the acquisition in those cases was tantamount
to reverting the possession· to the original owners. In this
·scenario, however, the two do not have to go hand in hand. In
· allowing the acquisition of land that the Government finds
C necessary to be set aside, we would not necessarily be holding
that the land revert to the Appellants, as the alternative of
permitting the Government to keep possession provided it re-
acquires the land with a new Section 4 notification exists. This
option, particularly in the present factual matrix, does the least
0
violence to the intent and content of the L.A. Act, in that it
upholds Section 11A even in cases -of acquisition under
Section 17 while preserving the requirement of Section 17 that
the unencumbered possession of the land remain vested in
E the Government. It also protects the rights of the landowners,
thus fulfilling the intent of Section 11A, while allowing the
Government to acquire land in cases of emergencies without
its title being challenged, which is the avowed intention of
Section 17. Any other interpretation of the law would serve to
F protect only those landowners who had approached the Court
to stop the Government from undoing an emergency
acquisition, while leaving in the cold equally aggrieved
landowners seeking to enforce their right to fair compensation
for their land. Even equity demands that the party bearing the
G consequence of the delay in the Award ought not to be the
innocent landowner, butthe errant State.
26. While we presently refrain from passing any orders
or direction pertaining to or interfering with the possession of
H the Government over the subject land, the acquisition dated
LAXMI DEVI v. STATE OF BIHAR .[VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.] 217
18.11.1987 is set aside for non-compliance with the provisions A
of Section 11_A of the L.A. Act. As all the subsequent
Notifications by the Respondent State having lapsed, the
Respondent State is directed to initiate fresh acquisiton
proceedings c;ir take any other action available to it in
accordence with law within six weeks from today. The B
Respondent State is restrained from contending that the land
is no longer required by it or that it should revert to the
Appellants. The Appeal
. . is allowed in these terms.
Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.
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