Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court was correct in acquitting the accused as there was no cogent evidence of abetment of suicide and the FIR could not be proved as substantive evidence through the investigating officer when the informant's death was unrelated to the FIR.

Summary

The mother of a deceased woman appealed against the High Court's order acquitting four accused of abetment of suicide under Sections 306, 498A and 34 of the IPC. The trial court had convicted them based on evidence of harassment, but the High Court set aside the conviction, finding no reliable proof of abetment. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court erred in its acquittal and whether the contents of a First Information Report (FIR) could be proved through the investigating officer when the informant died before testifying. The Court held that mere harassment does not satisfy the evidentiary threshold for abetment and that the FIR could not be read as substantive evidence under Section 67 of the Evidence Act unless the informant's death was linked to the FIR. Consequently, the Court found no error of law in the High Court's judgment and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

The correctness of the High Court's acquittal of the accused under Sections 306, 498A and 34 IPC.
Whether the contents of an FIR can be proved through the investigating officer when the informant dies before giving evidence, under Sections 67 and 32 of the Evidence Act.
The applicability of Section 113A of the Evidence Act to presume abetment of suicide in the absence of cogent evidence.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154, s. 162, s. 209
Evidence Act, 1872s. 113A, s. 145, s. 162, s. 32, s. 67, s. 8
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 306, s. 34, s. 498A

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to the correctness of the order passed by the High Court acquitting the respondents for the offence punishable u/ss.306, 498A, and 34 IPC; and incase the first informant dies before stepping into the witness box, whether the contents of such FIR can be and read into the evidence. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.306, 498A, 34 – Abetment of suicide – FIR by the father that his daughter committed suicide as she was constantly harassed by the respondents-husband, in-laws and first wife of the husband – Respondents

Subjects

Abetment of suicideFirst Information ReportInvestigating officer testimonySection 113A presumptionSection 67 Evidence ActSection 32 Evidence ActHarassment and crueltySubstantive evidence

Judgment

[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1643 : 2025 INSC 173

Lalita
v.
Vishwanath & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1086 of 2017)
30 January 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to the correctness of the order passed by the
High Court acquitting the respondents for the offence punishable
u/ss.306, 498A, and 34 IPC; and incase the first informant dies
before stepping into the witness box, whether the contents of such
FIR can be proved through the evidence of the Investigating Officer
and read into the evidence.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.306, 498A, 34 – Abetment of suicide –
FIR by the father that his daughter committed suicide as she
was constantly harassed by the respondents-husband, in-laws
and first wife of the husband – Respondents held guilty for
offence punishable u/ss.306, 498A rw s.34 – However, the
High Court acquitted them – Since father of the deceased died
before the trial commenced, the mother of the deceased-de
facto complainant, challenging the impugned judgment:
Held: No case made out for interference – No error of law committed
by the High Court in acquitting all the four accused persons – No
cogent or any reliable evidence on the basis of which it could be
said that the accused persons abetted the commission of suicide –
Mere harassment or cruelty not sufficient to infer abetment – There
has to be some credible evidence that the accused persons aided
or instigated the deceased in some manner to take the drastic step
of putting an end to her life – Even with the aid of presumption
u/s.113A of the Evidence Act, difficult to say that the accused
persons abetted the commission of suicide – Furthermore, the trial
court permitted the Investigating Officer to prove the contents of
the FIR and read into evidence as per s.67 of the Evidence Act –
Courts below incorrect in saying that in the absence of the first
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informant, the police officer can prove the contents of the FIR as
per s.67 of the Evidence Act – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.67, 113.
[Paras 20-22, 26]

First Information Report – Proving contents of FIR through
the Investigating Officer – Death of first informant before
stepping into the witness box, the contents of such FIR, if can
be proved through the evidence of the Investigating Officer
and read into the evidence:
Held: If the informant dies, the FIR can be, used as a substantive
evidence – Prerequisite condition must be fulfilled before the FIR is
taken as a substantive piece of evidence, the death of the informant
must have nexus with the FIR filed or somehow having some link
with any evidence regarding the FIR – FIR lodged by a deceased
person to be treated as substantial, its contents must be proved and
has to be corroborated – In case the death of the informant has no
nexus with the complaint lodged, he died a natural death and did
not succumb to the injuries inflicted on him in relation to a matter,
the contents of the FIR would not be admissible in evidence – In
such circumstances, the contents cannot be proved through the
Investigating Officer – Investigating Officer, in the course of his
deposition, should not be permitted to depose the exact contents
of the FIR so as to make them admissible in evidence – All that
is permissible in law is that the Investigating Officer can, in his
deposition, identify the signature of the first informant and that of
his own on the FIR and he can depose about the factum of the
FIR being registered by him on a particular date on a particular
police station – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.67. [Paras 32, 34, 35, 39]
Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.8, 32 – First Information Report –
Purpose – Importance as evidence – Explained. [Paras 29-31]

Case Law Cited
Ram Pyarey v. the State of Uttar Pradesh [2025] 1 SCR 484;
Damodar Prasad v. State of U.P. (1975) 3 SCC 851 : AIR 1975
SC 757; Munna Raja v. State of M.P. [1976] 2 SCR 764 : (1976)
3 SCC 104 : AIR 1976 SC 2199; Harkirat Singh v. State of Punjab
(1997) 11 SCC 215 : AIR 1997 SC 3231; Hazarilal v. State (Delhi
Administration) [1980] 2 SCR 1053 : (1980) 2 SCC 390 : AIR
1980 SC 873; Umrao Singh v. State of M.P., 1961 Criminal L.J.
270 – referred to.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1645

Lalita v. Vishwanath & Ors.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Evidence
Act, 1872.

List of Keywords
Abetment of suicide; Informant passed away before the trial
commenced; Abetted commission of suicide; Mere harassment or
cruelty; Presumption; First Information Report; Proving contents of
FIR through the Investigating Officer; Evidence of the Investigating
Officer; Substantive evidence.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1086 of 2017
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.03.2014 of the High Court
of Bombay at Aurangabad in CRLA No. 2837 and 125 of 2013

Appearances for Parties
Dilip Annasaheb Taur, Amol Y. Deshmukh, Advs. for the Appellant.
Uday B Dube, Sr. Adv., Ms. Sanyukta Suryavanshi, Kailas Bajirao
Autade, Samrat Krishnarao Shinde, Siddharth Dharmadhikari,
Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Order

1. This appeal is at the instance of the mother of the deceased (the de
facto complainant) seeking to assail the Judgment and order passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in
Criminal Appeal No.125/2013 by which the High Court allowed the
Criminal Appeal filed by the respondent - herein (original accused
persons) and thereby acquitting them of the offence punishable
under Sections 306, 498A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code (IPC).
2. It is the case of the appellant that the deceased Dev Kanya was
married to the Respondent No.1 – herein namely Vishwanath past
1½ years before the date of incident in question. It is her case that
1646 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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her daughter committed suicide she was incessantly harassed by her
husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law and first wife of the husband.
3. Upon First Information Report being registered by the father of
the deceased, the investigation started. The statements of various
witnesses were recorded by the police.
4. The inquest panchnama of the dead body of the deceased was
drawn in the presence of panch witnesses. The dead body was sent
for post-mortem. The post-mortem report revealed that the cause of
death was due to drowning. It is the case of the appellant that her
daughter committed suicide by jumping into a well. The clothes and
other articles were collected in the course of the investigation and
were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical analysis.
5. Upon completion of the investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed
against all the four accused persons.
6. The case came to be committed to the Court of Sessions under
Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr PC).
7. Upon committal, the case crime to be registered as Sessions Case
No.12/2012.
8. The Trial Court framed charge vide Exhibit ‘11’ to which all the
accused persons pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
9. The prosecution examined the following witnesses in the course of
the trial:-
1. Lalita Dadasaheb Bolke (Exh.27)
2. Rambhau Dhondiram Bolke (Exh.36),
3. Shivaji Bhaiamrao Pawar (Exh.40),
4. Dnyandev Hariram Patole (Exh.42),
5. Sonerao Kondiba Bodkhe (Exh.44),
6. Baasaheb Maruti Patole (Exh.45),
7. Dhondiram Bhanudas Bolke (Exh.46)
8. Dr. Blasahev Bhimrao Sawant (Exh.51) &
9. Brijpalsing Rajpalsing Thakur (Exh.54)
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1647

Lalita v. Vishwanath & Ors.

10. The prosecution also led the following documentary evidence in
support of its case:-
1. Copy of sale deed of S. no. 24/2 admeasuring 1 H.2 R. dated
21/11/2009 at Exh. 28.
2. Copy of sale deed of S.o. 24/2 admeasuring 1 H. OR. Dated
21/11/2009 at Exh. 29.
3. Copy of mutation entry of S. No. 24/2 admeasuring 1 h. 2 r.
at Exh.30.
4. Copy of mutation entry of S. No. 24/2 admeasuring 1 H. O.
R. at Exh. 31.
5. Copy of mutation entry dated 29/3/2011 at Exh. 32.
6. Copy of mutation entry dated 30/4/2011 at Exh. 33.
7. Copy of 7/12 extract of S. No. 24/2 at Exh. 34
8. Complaint dated 29/8/2011 at Exh. 35.
9. Spot Panchanam Dated. 29/8/2011 at Exh. 41
10. Inquest Panchanama dated 29/8/2011 at Exh. 43
11. Provisional cause of death certificate at Exh. 52
12. Post mortem report at Exh. 53
13. Chemical Analyzers’ report at Exh. 33/1.
14. Copy of affidavit of Devkanya w/o Vishwanath Borade at
Article-’A’.
15. Copy of consent deed at Article ‘B’
11. Upon closure of the recording of the oral evidence, the further
statements of all the accused persons were recorded by the Trial
Court under Section 313 of the Code.
12. Upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence on
record, the Trial Court held all the four accused persons guilty of
the offence enumerated above and sentenced them to undergo 10
years of rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.1000/-.
13. The accused persons, being dissatisfied with the Judgment and
order of conviction passed by the Trial Court, went in appeal before
the High Court.
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14. The High Court upon re-appreciation and re-evaluation of the oral
as well as documentary evidence on record allowed the appeal and
acquitted all the four accused persons of the charges enumerated
above.
15. The State did not deem fit to challenge the Judgment and order of
acquittal passed by the High Court.
16. The mother, i.e., the appellant herein is here before this Court with
the present appeal.
17. At this stage, it is relevant to note that although the first information
report was lodged by father of the deceased yet before the trial
commenced, he passed away.
18. In such circumstances, the mother thought# fit to come before this
Court seeking to challenge the impugned Judgment and Order of
acquittal passed by the High Court.
19. We heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, the
learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.1 to 4 (original
accused persons) and the learned counsel appearing for the State
of Maharashtra.
20. We are of the view that no error not to speak of any error of law
could be said to have been committed by the High Court in acquitting
all the four accused persons.
21. There is no cogent or any reliable evidence on the basis of which
it could be said that the accused persons abetted § the commission
of suicide.
22. Mere harassment or cruelty is not sufficient to infer abetment ‡. There
has to be some credible evidence that the accused persons aided
or instigated the deceased in some manner to take the drastic step
of putting an end to her life.
23. We do not rule out the possibility of the husband pressurizing the
deceased to transfer the land once again on his name. However,
even such instances, by themselves, may not be sufficient to come
to the conclusion that the deceased was left with no alternative but
to commit suicide.

# Ed. Note: “thought” instead of “though” in terms of subsequent corrigendum.
§ Ed. Note: “abetted” instead of “abated” in terms of subsequent corrigendum.
‡ Ed. Note: “abetment” instead of “abetement” in terms of subsequent corrigendum.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1649

Lalita v. Vishwanath & Ors.

24. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would rely upon
Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short ‘the Evidence
Act’).
25. In one of our recent pronouncements in the case of Ram Pyarey
v. the State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 1408 of 2015,
decided on 09.01.2025, we have explained the true purport of Section
113A of the Evidence Act, more particularly in what manner it shall
be applied. We quote the relevant observations:-
“It is relevant to note that under Section 113B, the Court
shall presume dowry death unlike Section 113A where the
provision says that Court may presume abetment of suicide.
This is the vital difference between the two provisions
which raises presumption as regards abetment of suicide.
When the Courts below want to apply Section 113A of
the Evidence Act, the condition precedent is that there
has to be first some cogent evidence as regards cruelty
& harassment. In the absence of any cogent evidence
as regards harassment or abetment in any form like
aiding or instigating, the court cannot straightway invoke
Section 113A and presume that the accused abetted the
commission of suicide.”
26. Even with the aid of presumption under Section 113A of the
Evidence Act, it is difficult to say that the accused persons abetted
the commission of suicide. It is possible that the deceased might
have felt bad because the first wife came back to the matrimonial
home and being hyper sensitive might have taken the extreme step
to commit suicide.
27. Before we close this matter, we deem it necessary to explain one very
important aspect of the procedural law so far as it relates to proving
the contents of the First Information Report through the Investigating
Officer. In other words, if the first informant has passed away before
stepping into the witness box, then whether the contents of such
First Information Report can be proved through the evidence of the
Investigating Officer and read into the evidence.
28. In the case on hand, as noted above, the First Information Report
was lodged by the father of the deceased. However, before the
father could step into the witness box, he passed away. In such
circumstances, the Trial Court permitted the Investigating Officer to
1650 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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prove the contents of the First Information Report Exhibit-35 and
read into evidence as per Section 67 of the Evidence Act.
29. The basic purpose of filing a First Information Report is to set the
criminal law into motion. A First Information Report is the initial step
in a criminal case recorded by the police and contains the basic
knowledge of the crime committed, place of commission, time of
commission, who was the victim, etc. The term ‘First Information
Report’ has been explained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
by virtue of Section 154, which lays down that:
“Every information relating to the commission of a
cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge
of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or
under his direction, and be read over to the informant and
every such information, whether given in writing or reduced
to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person
giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a
book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State
Government may prescribe in this behalf.
30. F.I.Rs. can be registered by a victim, a witness or someone else with
the knowledge of the crime. The police can record three different
kinds of statements. The first kind of statement is one which can be
recorded as an F.I.R., the second kind of statement is one which
can be recorded by the police during the investigation, and the
third kind of statement is any kind of statement which would not fall
under any of the two categories mentioned above. Evidence is the
matter of testimony manifesting the fact on a particular precision
or circumstances. The First Information Report is not by itself a
substantial piece of evidence and the statement made therein
cannot be considered as evidence unless it falls within the purview
of Section 32 of the Evidence Act. It is an admitted fact that the
original first informant did not die because of the injuries caused
by the respondents ⁋. The relative importance of a First Information
Report is far greater than any other statement recorded by the police
during the course of the investigation. It is the foremost information
the police gets about the commission of an offence and which can be
used to corroborate the story put-forward by the first informant under

⁋ Ed. Note: “did not die because of the injuries caused by the respondents.” instead of “because of the
injuries caused by the applicants” in terms of subsequent corrigendum.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1651

Lalita v. Vishwanath & Ors.

Section 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict his version by facts
under Section 145 of the Evidence Act in case he is summoned as
a witness in the case by the Court. It may happen that the informant
is the accused himself. In such cases, the First Information Report
lodged by him cannot be used as an evidence against him because
it is embodied in the basic structure of our Constitution that a person
cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself.
31. In certain cases, the First Information Report can be used under
Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act or under Section 8 of the Evidence
Act as to the cause of informant’s death or as a part of the informant’s
conduct. Section 32 of the Evidence Act reads as under:-
“32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person
who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.
Statements, written or verbal, of facts in issue or relevant
facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be
found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence,
or whose presence cannot be procured without an amount
of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of
the case, the court considers unreasonable, or who is
kept out of the way by the adverse party, are themselves
relevant facts in the following cases:”
(1) When it relates to cause of death:- When the statement
is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to
any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted
in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person’s
death comes into question. Such statements are relevant
whether the person who made them was or was not, at the
time when they were made, under expectation of death,
and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which
the cause of his death comes into question.
(2) Or is made in course of business:- When the statement
was made by such a person in the ordinary course of
business and, in particular, and without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing provisions of this clause, when
it consists of any entry or memorandum made by him in
books kept in the ordinary course of business.
(2A) Or is made in discharge of professional duty etc.:-
When the statement consists of an entry or memorandum
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made by such person in the discharge of professional duty
or of an acknowledgement written or signed by such person
in respect of the receipt of money, goods, securities or
property of any kind, or of a document used in commerce,
written or signed by him or of the date of a letter or other
document usually dated, written or signed by him.
(3) Or against interest of maker:- When the statement is
against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the person
making it, or when, if true, it would expose him or would
have exposed him to a criminal prosecution or to a suit
for damages.
Explanation: A recital as regards boundaries of immovable
property in document containing such statements, as to
the nature or ownership or possession of the land of the
maker of the statement or of adjoining lands belonging to
third persons, which are against the interests of the maker
of the statement, are relevant and it is not necessary that
the parties to the document must be the same as the
parties to the proceedings or their privies.”
(4) Or gives opinion as to public right or custom, or matters
of general interest:- When the statement gives the opinion
of any such person as to the existence of any public right
or custom or matter of public or general interest, of the
existence of which, if it existed, he would have been likely to
be aware, and when such statement was made before any
controversy as to such right, custom or matter had arisen.
(5) Or relates to existence of relationship:- When the
statement relates to the existence of any relationship by
blood, marriage or adoption between persons as to whose
relationship a [by blood, marriage or adoption] the person
making the statement had special means of knowledge,
and when the statement was made before the question
in dispute was raised.
(6) Or is made in will or deed relating to family affairs:- When
the statement relates to the existence of any relationship
by blood, marriage or adoption between persons deceased
and is made in any will or deed relating to the affairs of
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1653

Lalita v. Vishwanath & Ors.

the family to which any such deceased person belonged,
or in any family pedigree, or upon any tombstone, family
portrait or other thing on which such statements are usually
made, and when such statement was made before the
question in dispute was raised.
(7) Or in documents relating to transactions mentioned in
section 13, clause (a): When the statement is contained
in any deed, will or other document, being a deed, will
or other document which relates to any transaction by
which a right or custom was created, claimed, modified,
recognized, asserted or denied or which was inconsistent
with its existence, as mentioned in clause (a) of section 13.
Explanation I:- Such statement is relevant where the
question in the proceeding now before the court is as to
the existence of the right or custom or if such statement
related to facts collateral to the proceeding and it is not
necessary that the parties to the document must be the
same as the parties to the proceeding or their privies.
Explanation II:- A recital as regards boundaries of
immovable property in a document containing such
statement, as to the nature or ownership or possession
of the land of the maker of the statement or of adjoining
lands belonging to third persons, shall be relevant and it
is not necessary that the parties to the document must be
the same as the parties to the proceeding or their privies.”
(8) Or is made by several persons and expresses feelings
relevant to matter in question.-
When the statement was made by a number of persons,
and expressed feelings or impressions on their part relevant
to the matter in question.

Illustrations
(a) The question is whether A was murdered by B: or
(b)
A dies of injuries received in a transaction in the course
of which she was ravished. The question is whether she
was ravished by B: or
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The question is, whether A was killed by B under such
circumstances that a suit would lie against B by As
widow.
Statements made by A as to the cause of his or her death,
referring respectively to the murder, the rape and the
actionable were under consideration, are relevant facts.
(b) The question is as to the date of As birth.
An entry in the diary of a deceased surgeon regularly
kept in the course of business, stating that, on a given
day he attended A’s mother and delivered her of a son,
is a relevant fact.
(c) The question is, whether A was in Calcutta on a given
day.
A statement in the diary of a deceased solicitor, regularly
kept in the course of business, that, on a given day, the
solicitor attended A at a place mentioned in Calcutta, for
the purpose of conferring with him upon specified business,
is a relevant fact.
(d) The question is, whether a ship sailed from Bombay
harbour on a given day.
A letter written by a deceased member of a merchant’s
firm by which she was chartered to their correspondents
in London, to whom the cargo was consigned, stating that
the ship sailed on a given day from Bombay harbour, is
a relevant fact.
(e) The question is, whether rent was paid to A for certain
land.
A letter from A’s deceased agent to A, saying that he had
received the rent on A’s account and held it at As orders,
is a relevant fact.
(f) The question is, whether A and B were legally married.
The statement of a deceased clergyman that he married
them under such circumstances that the celebration would
be a crime, is relevant.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1655

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(g) The question is, whether A, a person who cannot be
found, wrote a letter on a certain day. The fact that a letter
written by him is dated on that day, is relevant.
(h) The question is, what was the cause of the wreck of
a ship.
A protest made by the Captain, whose attendance cannot
be procured, is a relevant fact.”
32. If the informant dies, the First Information Report can be,
unquestionably, used as a substantive evidence. A prerequisite
condition must be fulfilled before the F.I.R. is taken as a substantive
piece of evidence i.e. the death of the informant must have nexus
with the F.I.R. filed or somehow having some link with any evidence
regarding the F.I.R. This is what has been explained by this Court
in the case of Damodar Prasad v. State of U.P. [(1975) 3 SCC
851 : AIR 1975 SC 757].
33. There are plethora of decisions taking the view that an F.I.R. can be
a dying declaration if the informant dies of his injuries after lodging
the same. [See Munna Raja v. State of M.P. ((1976) 3 SCC 104 : AIR
1976 SC 2199)].
34. Another important thing is that for an F.I.R. lodged by a deceased
person to be treated as substantial, its contents must be proved. It
has to be corroborated and proved for there to be any value of the
same in the case. The F.I.R. can be used by the defence to impeach
the credit of the person who lodged the F.I.R. under Section 154(3)
of the Evidence Act. In case the death of the informant has no
nexus with the complaint lodged i.e. he died a natural death and did
not succumb to the injuries inflicted on him in relation to a matter,
the contents of the F.I.R. would not be admissible in evidence. In
such circumstances, the contents cannot be proved through the
Investigating Officer. The Investigating Officer, in the course of his
deposition, should not be permitted to depose the exact contents
of the F.I.R. so as to make them admissible in evidence. All that
is permissible in law is that the Investigating Officer can, in his
deposition, identify the signature of the first informant and that of
his own on the First Information Report and he can depose about
the factum of the F.I.R. being registered by him on a particular date
on a particular police station.
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35. It is absolutely incorrect on the part of the Trial Court and the High
Court to say that in the absence of the first informant, the police
officer can prove the contents of the F.I.R. as per Section 67 of the
Evidence Act.
36. In the case of Harkirat Singh v. State of Punjab [(1997) 11 SCC
215 : AIR 1997 SC 3231], this Court observed as under:-
“In our considered view, the High Court was not justified
in treating the statement allegedly made by Kharaiti Ram
during inquest proceedings as substantive evidence in view
of the embargo of Section 162, Cr. P.C. Equally unjustified
was the High Courts reliance upon the contents of the FIR
lodged by Walaiti Ram who, as stated earlier, could not be
examined during the trial as he had died in the meantime.
The contents of the FIR could have been used for the
purpose of corroborating or contradicting Walaiti Ram if
he had been examined but under no circumstances as a
substantive piece of evidence.”
37. In the case of Hazarilal v. State (Delhi Administration) [(1980) 2 SCC
390 : AIR 1980 SC 873], this Court, in para 7, observed as under:-
“The learned counsel was right in his submission about
the free use made by the Courts below of statements of
witnesses recorded during the course of investigation.
Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure imposes a
bar on the use of any statement made by any person to a
Police Officer in the course of investigation at any enquiry
or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at
the time when such statement was made, except for the
purpose of contradicting the witness in the manner provided
by S. 145 of the Indian Evidence Act. Where any part of
such statement is so used any part thereof may also be
used in the re-examination of the witness for the limited
purpose of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-
examination. The only other exception to this embargo on
the use of statements made in the course of an investigation
relates to the statements falling within the provisions of
S. 32 (1) of the Indian Evidence Act or permitted to be
proved under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Section 145 of the Evidence Act provides that a witness
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1657

Lalita v. Vishwanath & Ors.

may be cross-examined as to previous statements made
by him in writing and reduced into writing and relevant to
matters in question, without such writing being shown to
him or being proved but, that if it is intended to contradict
him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing
can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are
to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. The
Courts below were clearly wrong in using as substantive
evidence statements made by witnesses in the course of
investigation. Shri. H.S. Marwah, learned counsel for the
Delhi Administration amazed us by advancing the argument
that the earlier statements with which witnesses were
confronted for the purpose of contradiction could be taken
into consideration by the Court in view of the definition of
“proved” in Section 3 of the Evidence Act which is, “a fact
is said to be proved when, after considering the matters
before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers
its existence so probable that a prudent man, ought, in
the circumstances of the particular case to act upon the
supposition that it exists”. We need say no more on the
submission of Shri. Marwah except that the definition of
proved does not enable a Court to take into consideration
matters, including statements, whose use is statutorily
barred.”
38. We have to our benefit a very lucid and erudite judgment of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Umrao Singh v. State
of M.P. [1961 Criminal L.J. 270]. In this case, the petitioners Umrao
Singh and Kunwarlal were convicted of the offence punishable under
Section 323 of the Penal Code and sentenced to two months rigorous
imprisonment. The case of the prosecution was that on 27th August
1959, the petitioners named above belaboured Barelal who had
gone out to graze his cattle, and who was blamed by the accused
to have caused damage to their crops. Barelal, however, died a
natural death after six months of the occurrence, but before he could
be examined as a witness. It was contended that the F.I.R. lodged
by Barelal could not be considered by the Courts below and that
the evidence of the solitary witness, Pannala was unreliable, as he
was not mentioned in the list of witnesses filed by the prosecution.
In this set of facts, the Court observed as under:-
1658 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

“4. It is true that the first information report is not by itself
a substantive piece of evidence and the statement made
therein cannot be considered as evidence unless it falls
within the purview of S. 32 of the Evidence Act. It is an
admitted fact that Barelal did not die because of the injuries
caused by the petitioners. Section 32 was inapplicable.
5. It is true that in the list of witnesses Pannalal’s name has
been mis-spelt as ‘Dhannalal’, but this doubt is removed
when the first information report is looked into. There,
Pannalal’s name is mentioned. Shri. Dey contends that it is
not permissible to look at the F.I. R. at all. In my opinion this
argument cannot be accepted. It is proved by Ram Ratan
P.W. 6 that he recorded the report which was lodged by
Barelal There is a distinction between factum and truth of
a statement. It has been aptly pointed out by Lord Parker
C.J. in R. v. Willis (1960) 1 W.L.R. 55 that evidence of a
statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself
called as witness may or may not be hearsay.
It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the
evidence is to establish what is contained in the statement;
it is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to
establish by the evidence not the truth of the statement but
the fact that it was made. According to Ram Ratan, Barelal
mentioned Pannalal’s name to him. Applying the above
dictum, Ramratan’s evidence is inadmissible to prove that
Pannalal was in fact present at the time of the occurrence;
but Ram Ratan’s statement is admissible to prove that
Barelal had mentioned the name of Pannalal to the witness.”
39. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that no case is
made out for interference.
40. In the result, this Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain