Supreme Court of India
KUSHESHWAR DUBEYversusBHARAT COKING COAL LTD. & ORS.
- Citation
- 1988 INSC 263
- Decided
- 6 September 1988
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
Disciplinary proceedings based on the same facts as a pending criminal case should be stayed, and there is no absolute bar to simultaneous proceedings, but each case must be decided on its facts.
Summary
The appellant, an electrical helper at Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., was charged with assaulting a supervising officer and faced both a criminal prosecution and disciplinary proceedings initiated by his employer. He filed a civil suit seeking an injunction to stay the disciplinary action pending the outcome of the criminal case; the trial court granted the injunction, which was affirmed by the appellate court. The employer appealed, and the Patna High Court set aside the injunction, holding that there is no bar to simultaneous disciplinary and criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court held that although there is no absolute legal prohibition against concurrent proceedings, when both are based on the same facts, it is appropriate to stay the disciplinary inquiry to avoid prejudice. Consequently, the Court vacated the High Court’s order and restored the trial court’s injunction, allowing the appeal. The decision emphasized that a rigid rule cannot be applied to all cases and each situation must be assessed on its facts.
Issues considered
- Whether an employer is barred from initiating disciplinary proceedings against an employee while a criminal case based on the same facts is pending
- Whether a civil court can grant an injunction staying disciplinary proceedings pending the outcome of a criminal trial
- Whether a hard and fast rule can be laid down regarding the simultaneity of disciplinary and criminal proceedings
Subjects
disciplinary proceedingscriminal prosecutionsimultaneous proceedingsinjunctionstay ordernatural justiceemployer-employee disputecase law
Judgment
KUSHESHWAR DUBEY
v. A
BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. & ORS.
SEPTEMBER 6, 1988
(RANGANATH MISRA AND M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, JJ.) B
Disciplinary and criminal pr;;ceedings-Holding of-Simul-
taneously-Whether legal bar-Not advisable to evolve a hard and fast
rule valid for all cases.
The appelJant, an employee of Respondent No. 1; was subjected to
disciplinary proceedings as also a criminal prosecution simultaneously C
on the allegation that he physically assaulted a supervising officer. He
tiled a civil action in the trial court asking for injunction against the
disciplinary action pending criminal trial. The trial court stayed
further proceedings in the disciplinary action till disposal of the crimi-
nal case. In appeal, the appellate court affirmed the aforesaid order. D
However, the High Court allowed the Revision Application of the
Respondent and set aside the impugned order on the ground that there
is no bar for an employer to proceed with the departmental proceeding
with regard to the same allegation for which a criminal·case is pending.
Allowing the appeal to this Court, E
HELD: 1. The order of the High Court is vacated and that of the
trial court as affirmed in appeal is restored. The criminal action and the
disciplinary proceedings were grounded upon the same set of facts. The
disciplinary proceedings should have been stayed and the High Court
was not right in interfering with the trial court's order of injunction F
which had been affirmed in appeal. [826A-B)
2(i) While there could be no legal bar for simultaneous proceed-
ings being taken, yet, there may be cases where it would be appropriate
to defer disciplinary proceedings a.waiting disposal of the criminal case.
In the latter class of cases it would be open to the delinquent-employee G
to seek such an order of stay or injunction from the couri. [825E-F)
J 2(ii) Whether, 'in the facts and circumstances of a particular case,
there should or should not be such simultaneity of the proceedings
would then receive judicial consideration and the Court will decide in
the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the discipli- H
821
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A nary proceedings should be interdicted, pending criminal trial. [825F·G]
The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, [1960] 3
SCR 227; Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [1964] 7 SCR 555
and Jung Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari, [1969] 1SCR134, relied
upon.
B
Rama P. C. v. Superintendent of Police, Kolar & Anr., AIR 1967
54 Mysore 220; Ali Mohd. & Ors. v. Chairman T.A. & C. Udhampur,
[1981] 2 SLR 225; Moulindra Singh v. The Deputy Commissioner &
Ors., [1973] LIC 6 1564; Shaikh Kasim v. Superintendent of Post
Office, Chingletut, AIR 1965 Mad. 502; Khusi Ram v. Union of India,
[1974] LIC 553 and Project Manager, ONGC v. Lal Chand Wazir
c Chand Chandna, [1982] I SLR 654, referred to.
3. It is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and
fast, straight-jacket· formula valid for all cases and <1f general
application without regard to the particularities of the individual·
D situation.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3129
of 1988
From the Judgment and Order dated 7.7.1987 of the Patna High
E Court in Civil Revision No. 128 of 1987 (R).
R.K. Jain, Rakesh K. Khanna and R.P. Singh for the Appellant.
R.N. Sachthey and Anip Sachthey for the Respondents.
F The following Order of the Court was delivered:
ORDER
Special leave granted ..
G The appellant is an employee in the Balihari Colliery of the
Respondent No. 1 and in 1986 was working as an electrical helper. On
the allegation that .he physically assaulted a supervising officer by [
name S.K. Manda!, he was subjected to disciplinary proceedings as
also a criminal prosecution. Since the disciplinary proceeding as also
the criminal trial were taken simultaneously, the appellant filed a civil
H action in the court of Munsif at Dhanbad asking for injunction against
K. DUBEY v. BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. 823
the disciplinary action pending criminal trial. On 6.12.1986, the
A
Munsif made an order staying further proceedings in the disciplinary
action till disposal of the criminal case. The appeal of the Respondent
No. 1 against the order of learned Munsif was dismissed on 3 lst
March, 1987, by the appellate court. Thereupon the Respondent No. 1
moved the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction, The High Court by
its order dated 7. 7 .1987 held: B
"First information report was lodged against the opposite
party (appellant) and the same was pending before the
competent court. Meanwhile the petitioners (respondents)
started departmental proceeding against the opposite
party. The opposite party filed a suit before the trial court
for declaration that appointment of the Enquiry Officer c
was illegal and for restraining the petitioners permanently
from continuing with the departmental proceeding during
the pendency of the criminal case. That was allowed by the
trial court and confirmed by the lower court. There is rio
bar for an employer to proceed with the departmental D
proceeding with regard to the same allegation for which a
criminal case is pending.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the courts below
· were wrong in granting in junction in favour of the opposite
party. - E
In the result, this application is allowed and the order
impugned is set aside."
According to Mr. Jain for the appellant, the legal position settled
by this Court supported the stand that the disciplinary action had to be F
stayed till the criminal case was over. He relied upon the decisions in
The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, [1960] 3 SCR
227 and Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, [1964] 7 SCR 555. He
also referred in the course of his submission to the decisions of diffe-
rent High Courts in support of his propositions. Two cases out of the
several ones of the High Courts he relied upon are Khusi Ram v. G
Union of India, [1974] LIC 553 and Project Manager, ONGC v. Lal
] Chand Wazir Chand Chandna, [1982] 1 SLR 654. Pathak CJ., as he
then was', in the Himachal case indicated that· fair play required the
postponing of the criminal trial and Thakkar J. as our learned.brother
then was in the Gujarat case had also taken a similar view.
H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
We would like to point out that there are also authorities in
A support of the position that there is nothing wrong in parallel proceed-
ings being taken-one by way of the disciplinary proceeding and the
other in the criminal court. Reference may be made to decision of this
Court in Jang Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari, [1969] I SCR 134
and some decisions of High Courts such as Rama P. C. v. Superinten-
B dent of Police, Kolar & Anr., AIR 1967 54 Mysore 220; Ali Mohd. &
Ors. v. Chairman I.A. & C. Udhampur, [1981] 2 SLR 225; Moulindra
Singh v. The Deputy Commissioner & Ors., [1973] LIC 6 1564 and
Shaikh Kasim v. Superintendent of Police Office, Chingletut, AIR 1965
Mad. 502.
Mr. Jain ~on tended that we should settle the law in a straight
c jacket formula as judicial opinion appeared to be conflicting. We do
not propose to hazard such a step as that would create greater hardship
and individual situations may not be available to be met and thereby
injustice is likely to ensue.
D In the Delhi Cloth & General Mills' case (supra), it was pointed
out by this Court:
"It is true that very often employers st&y enquiries pending
the decision of the criminal trial courts and that is fair; but
we cannot say that principles of natural justice require that
E an employer must wait for the decision at least of the crimi-
nal trial court before taking action against an employee. In
Shri Bimal Kanta Mukherjee v. Mis. Newsman's Printing
Works, [1956] LAC 188, this was the view taken by the
Labour Appellate Tribunal. We may, however, add that if
the case is of a grave nature or involves questions of fact or
F law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the
employer to await the decision of lhe trial court, so that the
defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be
prejudiced ..... ".
In Tata Oil Mills' case (supra), Gajendragadkar, CJ, spoke for a
G three Judge Bench thus:
"There is yet another point which remains to be consi-
dered. The Industrial Tribunal appears to have taken the
view that since criminal proceedings had been started
[
against Raghavan, the domestic enquiry should have been
H stayed pending the final disposal of the said criminal pro-
K. DUBEY v. BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. 825
ceedings. As this Court has held in the Delhi Cloth and
A
General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, it is desirable that if the
incident giving rise to a charge framed against a workman
in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a criminal court, the
employer, should stay the domestic enquiry pending the
final disposal of the criminal case ..... ".
B
ln _Jang Bahadur's case {supra) this Court said:
"The issue in the disciplinary proceedings is whether the
employee is guilty of the charges on which it is proposed to.
take action against him. The same issue may arise for deci-
sion in a civil or criminal proceeding pending in a court.
But the pendency of the court proceeding does not bar the c
taking of disciplinary action. The power of taking such
action is vested in the disciplinary authority. The civil or
criminal court has no such power. The initiation and con-
tinuation of disciplinary proceedings in good faith is not
calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice D
in the pending court proceeding. The employee is free to
move the court for an order restraining the continuance of
the disciplinary proceedings. If he obtains a stay order, a
wilful violation of the order would of course amount to
contempt of court. In the absence of a stay order the disci-
plinary authority is free to exercise its lawful powers." E
The view expressed in the three cases of this Court seem to
support the position that while there could be no legal bar for simul-
taneous proceedings being taken, yet, there may be cases where it
would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting dis-
posal of the criminal case. In the latter class of cases it would be open F
to the delinquent-employee to seek such an order of stay or injunction
from the Court. Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular
case there should or should not be such simultaneity of the proceed-
ings would then receive judicial consideration and the Court will
decide in the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the
disciplinary proceedin-gs should be interdicted, pending criminal trial. G
As we have already stated that it is neither possible nor advisable to
J evolve a hard and fast, straight-jacket formula valid for all cases and of
general application without regard to the particularities of the
individual-situation. For the disposal of the present case, we do not
think it necessary to say anything more, particularly when we do not
intend to lay down any general.guideline. H
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A In the instant case, the criminal action and the disciplinary pro-
ceedings are grounded upon the same set of facts. We are of the view
that the disciplinary proceedings should have been stayed and the
High Court was not right in interfering with the trial court's order of
injunction which had been affirmed in appeal.
B
The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court is vacated
and that of the trial court as affirmed in appeal is restored. The appel-
lant shall be entitled to costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs.2,000.
We would like to point out that for the first time in this Court, the
enquiry report in the disciplinary proceedings was produced. We
c express no view about it.
M.L.A. Appeal allowed.
(
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