Holding

The Supreme Court held that the circumstantial evidence, including motive, admissible CDR, and properly recovered weapon, sufficiently proved the conspiracy, thereby upholding the conviction under s.302 r/w s.120B and s.201.

Summary

The appellant A-4, a young woman engaged to B.V. Girish, was unwilling to marry him and confided her grievance to friend A-1, who enlisted cousin A-3 and A-2 to murder the fiancé. The deceased was fatally injured with a steel rod on 3 December 2003; eyewitnesses were later discredited and the case hinged on circumstantial evidence, motive, call‑detail records (CDR), and the recovery of the weapon. The appellants challenged the conviction under IPC s.302 read with s.120B and s.201, arguing that the eyewitness testimony was unreliable, the CDR were inadmissible under Evidence Act s.65B(4), and the weapon recovery violated Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court held that the motive was established, the CDR complied with s.65B(4) and were admissible, the weapon recovery was valid, and the five golden principles of circumstantial evidence were satisfied, thereby upholding the conviction and life sentence. The Court dismissed the appeals but permitted the appellants to file pardon petitions under Article 161 of the Constitution.

Issues considered

Whether the conviction under IPC s.302 read with s.120B and s.201 for A-4 is justified on the basis of the circumstantial evidence presented.
Whether the eyewitness testimonies of PW-15 and PW-16 are reliable and can be relied upon.
Whether the Call Detail Records (CDR) are admissible under Evidence Act s.65B(4) and can be used as substantive evidence.
Whether the recovery of the steel rod (M.O.11) and the scooter (M.O.12) complies with Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
Whether the alibi raised by A-1 is proved.
Scope and ambit of the Governor's power to grant pardon under Article 161 of the Constitution of India.

Legislation cited

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023s. 473, s. 474
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 313
Constitution of Indias. 161
Evidence Act, 1872s. 27, s. 3, s. 65B(4)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 201, s. 302

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the conviction of the appellants by the High Court u/s.302 read with s.120-B, IPC and additionally, s.201, IPC for A-4 alone, is justified. Headnotes† Circumstantial Evidence – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302 deceased were engaged – Though A-4 was engaged to the deceased however, she was not willing to get married to him and expressed her grievance to A-1, her close friend – A-1 sought help from his cousin, A-3, who roped in his friend, A-2 and the accused persons murdered the deceased

Subjects

Murder of fiancéUnwilling to marryCircumstantial evidenceForced marriageEngagement ceremonyFatal injuries on headHomicidal death provedConspiracyEyewitnesses’ account discardedMotive establishedFalse plea of alibiPlea of alibiLink for circumstantial evidence provedQuestionable relationshipDestruction of evidenceCall Detail Records (CDR)Telecom Service Provider (TSP)Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act, 1872Article 161 of the Constitution of IndiaRight to seek pardonRecovery of steel rodDisclosure statementDegree of probabilityCourt witnessPower to pardon, reprieve, respite, remitStatutory powersConstitutional powersOcular evidenceUnnatural conductContradictionsAdmissibilityReliabilitySecondary evidenceOral and documentary evidenceCertificate produced under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act, 1872Exhaustive cross-examinationCrime constitutes a mental rebellion of norms and rulesDeviant behaviorRebellion against regulatory normsSocial constraintSocial stigma

Judgment

[2025] 7 S.C.R. 859 : 2025 INSC 830

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar
v.
State of Karnataka & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1029 of 2011)
14 July 2025
[M.M. Sundresh* and Aravind Kumar, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the conviction
of the appellants by the High Court u/s.302 read with s.120-B, IPC
and additionally, s.201, IPC for A-4 alone, is justified.

Headnotes†
Circumstantial Evidence – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302 r/w 120B,
s.201 – A-4 and the deceased were engaged – Though A-4
was engaged to the deceased however, she was not willing
to get married to him and expressed her grievance to A-1,
her close friend – A-1 sought help from his cousin, A-3, who
roped in his friend, A-2 and the accused persons murdered the
deceased – Accused were convicted u/s.120B and sentenced
to life imprisonment; A-2 alone was convicted u/s.302 and A-4
was additionally convicted u/s.201 – High Court modified the
conviction of the appellants to one u/s.302 r/w s.120B and
confirmed the sentence of life imprisonment – Correctness:
Held: Eyewitnesses’ account of the incident is discarded – The case
rests purely on circumstantial evidence – The link for circumstantial
evidence stands connected and proved, as the motive has been
duly established through the evidence of PW-23, a friend of A-4 from
Pre-University College who deposed in clear terms that A-4
confessed to him that she did not want to get married to the
deceased; the voluminous CDR stands proved through the evidence
of PW-24 and PW-25 and; the recovery of the weapon is also
proved – In view of the adequacy of the evidence on record, the
conviction of the appellants by the High Court u/s.302 read with
s.120-B, IPC and additionally, s.201, IPC for A-4 alone, as well as
the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon them is confirmed –
However, the appellants are permitted to file appropriate petitions

* Author
860 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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seeking to invoke the power of pardon u/Art.161 of the Constitution
of India. [Paras 54, 96, 98, 101]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.65B(4) – Call Detail Records (CDR) –
Admissibility:
Held: Though the compliance of s.65B is mandatory however, there
is no straitjacket formula to arrive at the conclusion of such due
compliance, with specific reference to the CDR – It is the duty of
the concerned Court to satisfy itself on such compliance, by taking
due note of the requisite certificate produced u/s.65-B(4) coupled
with the oral evidence adduced by the competent officer on behalf
of the Telecom Service Provider – The one who speaks in support
of such certificates, should have no other interest in the case and
therefore, has to be considered as a Court witness – In the present
case, PW-24 and PW-25 were holding a ‘responsible official position’
at the respective companies, as required u/s.65-B(4) – It is not
necessary for the said officers to be holding positions of technical
expertise, and is enough if they depose to the ‘best of their knowledge
or belief’ – Their testimonies with respect to the certificates and the
CDR remain clear, despite being subjected to exhaustive cross-
examination and, mere discrepancies per se would not lead the
Court to hold that there was no due compliance – Also, there was no
specific denial or explanation offered by even the accused persons,
when presented with the overwhelming evidence on the numerous
calls/SMSes showing the unusually high number of communications
exchanged between the accused persons during the relevant period
of time – On facts, the CDR furnished by both Reliance and Airtel
are admissible in accordance with s.65-B(4). [Paras 64-66]

Evidence – Call Detail Records (CDR) – Evidentiary value:
Held: While CDR data may not be construed as a substantive
piece of evidence, it is certainly to be used for appropriate
corroboration – One has to see the attending circumstances to
decide the evidentiary value of CDR – In a given factual scenario,
the Court can place heavy reliance upon the same for the purpose
of rendering a conviction however, proving the guilt depends upon
the degree of probability. [Para 86]

Circumstantial Evidence – Motive – Relevance:
Held: When a case is founded on circumstantial evidence, it is
imperative to establish the motive of the accused to commit the
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 861

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

offence as it serves as the foundation of the evidentiary chain
that ultimately leads to the implication of the accused. [Para 55]

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.27:
Held: The recovery of the steel rod (M.O.11) was made at the
instance of A-2 which was witnessed by PW-30 (an independent
witness) who duly affixed his signature on the seizure mahazar
marked as Exhibit P-87 – Both the Courts rightly accepted the
evidence of PW-30 which cannot be eschewed solely on the ground
that the other panch witness was not examined by the prosecution,
despite being cited as a witness – The recovery of M.O.11 was
effected from a secluded place in a military compound – It was
picked up from the bush, on being identified by A-2 – Merely
because A-1 was also present during the recovery, it cannot be said
that the recovery was effectuated on the basis of joint disclosure
made by A-1 and A-2, and thus, is inadmissible – Moreover, the
voluntary statements of A-1 and A-2 were also recorded separately
and marked as Exhibits – The argument of the appellants that the
link required u/s.27 is missing due to the absence of the panch
witnesses while recording the disclosure statements of the accused
is also not accepted, on the facts of the case, as the presence
of the witness to the disclosure statement is not a mandate and
only one of prudence – The mere absence of the witness to the
disclosure statement is hardly sufficient to hold that the recovery
itself is doubtful. [Paras 87, 88]

Evidence – Reliability of – Duty of Courts:
Held: Evidence is the material for unearthing the truth which is the
foundational duty of the Court – In order to do so, a fact has to be
proved by taking due note of the matters made available before
the Court – To prove a fact, the adequate parameter is the degree
of probability – Thus, the evidence adduced before the Court, can
be accepted either in toto or in part – Furthermore, it can also be
rejected – A Court shall apply its mind to the evidence available
to arrive at a just conclusion. [Paras 47, 48]
Constitution of India – Art.161 – Power of Governor to grant
pardons, etc., and to suspend, remit or commute sentences
in certain cases – Objective of – Scope and ambit of power
u/Art.161 – Power u/Art.161 vis-à-vis ss.473, 474, Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 corresponding to ss.432, 433,
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [Paras 14-16]
862 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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Criminal Law – Causes, effect of crime and its remedy –
Offences committed by women, reasons – Discussed.
[Paras 4-12]

Case Law Cited
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR
88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 – relied on.
Maru Ram v. Union of India and Ors. [1981] 1 SCR 1196 : (1981) 1
SCC 107; Shatrughan Chauhan and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors.
[2014] 1 SCR 609 : (2014) 3 SCC 1; Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v.
Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and Ors. [2020] 7 SCR 180 : (2020)
7 SCC 1; Sudershan Kumar v. State of H.P. (2014) 15 SCC 666;
Gireesan Nair and Ors. v. State of Kerala [2022] 8 SCR 599 :
(2023) 1 SCC 180; Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of
Bombay [1955] SCR 903 : AIR 1955 SC 104; Manzoor v. State
of Uttar Pradesh (1982) 2 SCC 72; Harendra Rai v. State of Bihar
and Ors. [2023] 11 SCR 583 : (2023) 13 SCC 563; Sahabuddin
and Another v. State of Assam [2012] 13 SCR 1067 : (2012) 13
SCC 213; Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2024] 6 SCR 164 : 2024
SCC OnLine SC 757; Kishore Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra
[2017] 1 SCR 330 : (2017) 3 SCC 760; Sajeev v. State of Kerala
[2023] 15 SCR 241 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1470; Rajesh Yadav
and Anr. v. State of U.P. [2022] 16 SCR 967 : (2022) 12 SCC 200;
Munish Mubar v. State of Haryana [2012] 9 SCR 193 : (2012)
10 SCC 464; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chhaakki Lal and Anr.
[2018] 12 SCR 184 : (2019) 12 SCC 326 – referred to.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Constitution of India; Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Evidence Act, 1872; Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords
Murder of fiancé; Unwilling to marry; Circumstantial evidence;
Forced marriage; Engaged; Engagement ceremony; Fatal injuries
on head; Homicidal deathproved; Conspiracy; Eyewitnesses’
account discarded; Motive established; False plea of alibi; Plea
of alibi; Link for circumstantial evidence proved; Questionable
relationship; Destruction of evidence; Call Detail Records (CDR);
Telecom Service Provider (TSP); Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 863

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

Act, 1872; Article 161 of the Constitution of India; Right to seek
pardon; Recovery of steel rod; Disclosure statement; Degree of
probability; Court witness; Power to pardon, reprieve, respite,
remit; Statutory powers; Constitutional powers; Ocular evidence;
Unnatural conduct; Contradictions; Admissibility; Reliability;
Secondary evidence; Oral and documentary evidence; Certificate
produced under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act, 1872;
Exhaustive cross-examination; Crime constitutes a mental rebellion
of norms and rules; Deviant behavior; Rebellion against the
regulatory norms; Deviant conduct; Shackled by social constraints;
Alienation; Feeling of disconnect from the community, society,
or social institutions; Alienated individuals; Breakdown of social
norms; Rapid social change; Offences committed by women;
Gendered response of victimization; Societal pressure; Unwarranted
marriage; Social constraint; Social stigma; Lack of education;
Inadequate financial support; Perceived notions about the value
system; Resistance against social order; Reform and rehabilitate
the deviant person; Poverty; Broken institutions; Treatment by
compassionate correction; Structural support; Opportunities for
genuine transformation; Facilitate an offender to be reintegrated
into society; Limited power of judicial review.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1029 of 2011
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.11.2010 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLA No. 722 of 2010
With
Criminal Appeal No(s). 1030 and 1225 of 2011 and Criminal Appeal
No. 2943 of 2025

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
R Nedumaran, S. Nagamuthu, Siddhartha Dave, Ranjit Kumar,
Jayant K. Sud, Sr. Advs. Y Arunagiri, Shreyas Kaushal,
M Sathishkumar, P. Soma Sundaram, T. V. Ratnam, Ms. Ranjeeta
Rohatgi, Nirnimesh Dube, Shreeyash Lalit, Ms. Sonia Dube, Lavam
Tyagi, Himanshu Vats, S. K. Kulkarni, M. Gireesh Kumar, Ankur
S. Kulkarni, Ms. Uditha Chakravarthy, Debdeep Banerjee, Kartik
Jasra, Prannit Stefano, Shayal Anand.
864 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Advs. for the Respondents:
Muhammed Ali Khan, A.A.G., Tomy Sebastian, Ms. Kiran Suri, Sr.
Advs., S.j. Amith, Punith B, Alwyn Sebastian, Ms. Vidushi Garg,
Dr. Mrs. Vipin Gupta, V. N. Raghupathy, Omar Hoda, Ms. Eesha
Bakshi, Uday Bhatia, Kamran Khan, Arjun Sharma, Ms. Jayanti
Singh, Ms. Gurbani Bhatia.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

M. M. Sundresh, J.

1. The voice of a young ambitious girl, muffled by a forced family
decision, created the fiercest of turmoil in her mind. This, backed by
an unholy alliance of a mental rebellion and wild romanticism, led to
the tragic murder of an innocent young man, while simultaneously
destroying the lives of three others.
2. A studied scrutiny of the charges, along with the evidence placed on
record led to the confirmation of the conviction rendered against the
appellants, by the High Court, for the major offence punishable under
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to
as the “IPC”) while upholding the decision delivered by the Court
of Sessions. The appellants who are before us seek to assail the
life sentence imposed upon them by the Division Bench of the High
Court of Karnataka.
3. We have heard learned Senior Counsel Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Mr. S.
Nagamuthu, Mr. Siddhartha Dave, and Mr. R. Nedumaran appearing
for the appellants, and learned Additional Advocate General (AAG)
Mr. Muhammed Ali Khan and learned Senior Counsel Mr. Tomy
Sebastian appearing for the respondents, at considerable length.
In the process, all the documents placed on record along with the
written arguments, are also taken due note of.

CRIME AND ITS CAUSES
4. A crime constitutes a mental rebellion of norms and rules that have
been created for the establishment of social order. It can be described
as a deviant behavior, triggered by causes which are both distant
and immediate. An idea of rebellion against the regulatory norms
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 865

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

imposed by the society, thus, leads to a deviant conduct, which
often happens through social conditioning and a series of habits.
It is the strained mind, irked by alienation and material deprivation,
that ignores the moral stage, all while focusing on the avoidance of
punishment which might be the consequence of being in pursuit of
a self-justified solution to the predicament which afflicts them.
5. There are multiple causes for a deviant behavior. To commit a crime,
there is always a cause which, very often, has no nexus with the
accused, who is shackled by social constraints thus, making him a
victim of his circumstances. Even the genealogy of individuals can
very well be influenced due to external environmental factors, such
as, family, economy, education and social mores. Deficiencies in
these factors are the primary causes for an offence that is ultimately
committed. But for these causes, an offence would not have been
committed, as it is nothing but a manifestation of the mind, body
and action. One can even say that multiple causes are responsible
for the crime, both external and internal, while an offender merely
plays a role in committing it.
6. Alienation in different forms is one of the major causes for a crime
being committed, upon feeling a disconnect from the community,
society, or social institutions. Alienated individuals often feel powerless
and neglected, which can lead them to feel rejected by the society
and its social norms. The breakdown of social norms contributes to
a deviant behaviour, especially when individuals lack clear moral
guidance from their communities. Since law keeps changing from
time to time, what is legal, may not necessarily be moral. Rapid social
change, orchestrated by law, often creates conducive conditions for
criminal behaviour.

CRIME AND WOMEN
7. We shall now concentrate specifically on the offences committed by
women. If the factors highlighted above are applied in the context of
a woman, it would result in heightened prejudices against her, leading
to a gendered response of victimization. A woman is pushed into a
dark corner by external elements, that contribute substantially to the
inequalities in her life. Thoughts of a woman would differ based on
the place, person and group that she interacts with. It is the social
norms and values which determine an action on her part, that is
nothing but a form of her expression.
866 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

8. We shall test this proposition through a simple example of a young
lady, who is desirous of spreading her ambitious wings, longing for
her own independence. A forced marriage, divorcing her from her
professional ambitions and curtailing her further education, would
certainly warrant a reaction. Such reactions would vary from one
woman to another, depending upon the circumstances. For instance,
a girl from a middle-class family might react differently compared to
one who hails from a poor, or even a rich family. Even amongst these
classifications, a decision made by a woman might vary depending
upon the impact brought about by the peculiar circumstances in
her life. Therefore, she might be put in a position where she would
have to choose either of the following options available to her.
After making an abortive attempt in getting the family to accept her
views, she may leave her parental home without notice, she may
turn violent, or even commit suicide. If societal pressure stops her
from undertaking any of these measures, and a marriage is forced
upon her, her agony would compound and escalate. An unwarranted
marriage thrust upon her is the worst form of alienation that she can
experience both mentally and physically.
9. In such an instance, a possible solution from her point of view would
be different. Social constraint might play a decisive role. Factors such
as social stigma, lack of education, inadequate financial support, and
perceived notions about the value system, might trigger a variety
of responses. These factors do not merely limit her choices—they
distort her very perception of freedom, making resistance seem
impossible or even immoral. In some cases, she may internalize
these pressures, believing that compliance is her only option. In
others, she may resist in subtle, often invisible ways—through
quiet despair, emotional withdrawal, or even clandestine acts of
defiance.

EFFECT OF A CRIME AND ITS REMEDY
10. As a crime is perceived to be an act of resistance against social order,
its impact is also felt by society, accordingly. There are primarily two
ways to deal with a crime. It can be done either by merely punishing
the offender, or by reforming him. Punishment is to be seen from
the perspective of the society, as well as the offender. When the
punishment is supported by law, it acts as a deterrent to crimes
being committed in the society.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 867

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

11. A mere punishment per se would not constitute a remedy for an act of
crime. It might change the offender’s legal or social status, but would
not be sufficient to address the root cause of his actions or remove the
psychological and emotional factors that made him commit the crime.
The idea therefore, is to reform and rehabilitate the deviant person
to bring him back into the fold of society. This reformative part, thus,
assumes a greater significance. It is more so, when the offender is
not entirely responsible for the causes which led to the crime.
12. Society, through its own systemic failures, inequalities, or neglect
often plays a role in shaping criminal behavior, and is also responsible
for the creation of such behaviour, whether through poverty, lack of
education, discrimination, or broken institutions. In that scenario, the
offender becomes a victim, requiring adequate measures for treatment
by compassionate correction, structural support, and opportunities
for genuine transformation. In an attempt to bring the individual back
into the social fold, responsibility has to be shared by every other
individual, ultimately rebuilding the bonds of community rather than
perpetuating cycles of alienation and punishment.

ARTICLE 161 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950
13. The Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the
“Constitution”) which is the supreme law of the land, encourages
the reformation of individuals, by granting them a new lease of life.
This is personified by Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution which
empowers the constitutional authorities to grant pardon to convicts. In
light of this, we would like to specifically elaborate on the underlying
principles pertaining to the powers vested with the Governor under
Article 161 of the Constitution.

Article 161 of the Constitution
“161. Power of Governor to grant pardons, etc., and
to suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain
cases.—
The Governor of a State shall have the power to grant
pardons, reprieves, respites or remissions of punishment or
to suspend, remit or commute the sentence of any person
convicted of any offence against any law relating to a
matter to which the executive power of the State extends.”
868 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

14. Article 161 of the Constitution has an in-built laudable objective. This
Article emphasizes the role of the State to facilitate an offender to
be reintegrated into society, after realizing his mistake. This power
is sovereign, and is to be exercised on the advice of the Council
of Ministers. Thus, it grants the Constitutional Court only a limited
power of judicial review.
15. Though the power conferred under Article 161 of the Constitution
might sound similar to the statutory powers available under
Sections 473 and 474 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (hereinafter referred to as the “BNSS”), corresponding to
Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter referred to as the “Cr.P.C’), its powers are much wider.
While statutory provisions govern classes of convicts collectively, the
prerogative of pardon is generally exercised discretely in specific
instances. Therefore, the scope of this power is much broader and
is to be applied on a case-to-case basis. A constitutional power
is fundamentally different and distinct from a statutory one. While
statutory powers are derived from laws enacted by legislatures
and remain subject to amendment or repeal, constitutional powers
originate from the Constitution itself. Therefore, the power to pardon,
reprieve, respite, remit etc. forms part of the constitutional ethos,
goal and culture. Unlike statutory provisions, which are tailored to
address specific scenarios or population demographics, constitutional
powers embody the State’s commitment to a broader ethical vision –
one that prioritizes humanity and equity, even in the administration
of punishment.

Maru Ram v. Union of India and Ors., (1981) 1 SCC 107
“72. We conclude by formulating our findings:
(1) We repulse all the thrusts on the vires of Section 433-A.
Maybe, penologically the prolonged term prescribed by the
section is supererogative. If we had our druthers we would
have negatived the need for a fourteen-year gestation
for reformation. But ours is to construe, not construct, to
decode, not to make a code.
(2) We affirm the current supremacy of Section 433-A over
the Remission Rules and short-sentencing statutes made
by the various States.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 869

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

(3) We uphold all remissions and short-sentencing passed
under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution but release
will follow, in life sentence cases, only on government
making in order en masse or individually, in that behalf.
(4) We hold that Section 432 and Section 433 are
not a manifestation of Articles 72 and 161 of the
Constitution but a separate, though similar power, and
Section 433-A, by nullifying wholly or partially these
prior provisions does not violate or detract from the
full operation of the constitutional power to pardon,
commute and the like.”
(emphasis supplied)

Shatrughan Chauhan and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., (2014)
3 SCC 1
“16. Articles 72/161 of the Constitution entail remedy
to all the convicts and are not limited to only death
sentence cases and must be understood accordingly. It
contains the power of reprieve, remission, commutation
and pardon for all offences, though death sentence
cases invoke the strongest sentiment since it is
the only sentence that cannot be undone once it is
executed.
17. Shri Andhyarujina, learned Senior Counsel, who
assisted the Court as amicus commenced his submissions
by pointing out that the power reposed in the President
under Article 72 and the Governor under Article 161 of
the Constitution is not a matter of grace or mercy, but is
a constitutional duty of great significance and the same
has to be exercised with great care and circumspection
keeping in view the larger public interest. He referred to the
judgment of the US Supreme Court in Biddle v. Perovich
[71 L Ed 1161 : 274 US 480 (1927)] as also the judgments
of this Court in Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989) 1
SCC 204 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 86 and Epuru Sudhakar v.
State of A.P., (2006) 8 SCC 161 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 438.
***
870 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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19. In concise, the power vested in the President under
Article 72 and the Governor under Article 161 of the
Constitution is a constitutional duty. As a result, it is
neither a matter of grace nor a matter of privilege but
is an important constitutional responsibility reposed
by the People in the highest authority. The power
of pardon is essentially an executive action, which
needs to be exercised in the aid of justice and not in
defiance of it. Further, it is well settled that the power
under Articles 72/161 of the Constitution of India is
to be exercised on the aid and advice of the Council
of Ministers.
***
47. It is clear that after the completion of the judicial
process, if the convict files a mercy petition to the
Governor/President, it is incumbent on the authorities
to dispose of the same expeditiously. Though no time-
limit can be fixed for the Governor and the President,
it is the duty of the executive to expedite the matter
at every stage viz. calling for the records, orders
and documents filed in the court, preparation of the
note for approval of the Minister concerned, and the
ultimate decision of the constitutional authorities. This
Court, in Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, (1989) 1 SCC
678 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 248, further held that in doing so,
if it is established that there was prolonged delay in the
execution of death sentence, it is an important and relevant
consideration for determining whether the sentence should
be allowed to be executed or not.”
(emphasis supplied)

16. From the above, we would only clarify that, notwithstanding the
existence of a Circular or a Rule introduced by way of a statutory
power under Section 473 of the BNSS, the constitutional powers
granted under Article 161 of the Constitution, can also be exercised
in a given case. Thus, even in cases where statutory mechanisms
exist, the constitutional mandate under Article 161 of the Constitution
remains inviolable and exercisable, in order to ensure that justice in
individual cases is not constrained by procedural norms.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 871

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
17. During the month of December 2003, Shubha Shankar (hereinafter
referred to as “A-4”), a young girl aged 20 years, was studying
in the 5th semester of integrated course, B.A., LL.B. at BMS Law
College, Bangalore. PW-10, B.S. Shankarnarayan, is the father
of A-4, and an Advocate. PW-12, Vijayalakshmi, is her mother.
Arun Verma (hereinafter referred to as “A-1”) was also a student
of the same college as A-4, studying in the 1st semester. PW-22,
N. Dhanashekaran, is his father who was working as a Labour
Officer during the said period. At the relevant point of time, Dinesh
@ Dinakaran (hereinafter referred to as “A-3”), was a young man
aged 28 years, who had been recently married, and had a child.
PW-14, Uttam Prakash, is his father and PW-13, Bhavani, is his
wife. A-3 and A-1 are cousins, as the sister of PW-14 is the mother
of A-1. Venkatesh (hereinafter referred to as “A-2”) was a teenager
aged 19 years. PW-17, Anandan, is his father. B.V. Girish (hereinafter
referred to as the “deceased”) was a young man aged 26 years,
working as a software engineer at Intel. PW-6, B. Venkatesha, is his
father and PW-5, B.V. Ramesh is his elder brother.
18. A-4 and her family, along with the deceased and his family were
residents of the same locality in Bangalore, Karnataka. Considering
the long-standing cordial relations between the two families, the
parents of A-4 extended a proposal to the parents of the deceased
during the month of October 2003 for the marriage of A-4 with the
deceased. Both the families consented to the said proposal on
20.11.2003, and fixed the date of the engagement ceremony as
30.11.2003. As decided, the engagement ceremony of A-4 and the
deceased took place on 30.11.2003 at “Udupi Hall” in the presence
of their close friends and relatives. Several photographs, as well as
video footage, were captured during the ceremony. The marriage of
A-4 and the deceased was decided to be solemnized on 11.04.2004.
19. Two days after the engagement ceremony, on the evening of
03.12.2003, A-4 asked the deceased to take her for dinner to T.G.I.
Friday’s Hotel (hereinafter referred to as “T.G.I.F. Hotel”) which
was situated near Intel, the company where he was working. The
deceased agreed to take her and informed his parents and PW-5
about their plan. He picked her up from her house on his scooter
at around 06:30 PM, and subsequently, they went to have dinner
at T.G.I.F. Hotel.
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20. Post dinner, between 09:30 PM - 09:40 PM, the deceased and
A-4 informed their parents that they had eaten dinner and were
returning home. On their way back, they stopped at the “Air View
Point” located at the Airport Ring Road to watch the landing of
aeroplanes. At that time, the deceased received fatal injuries on his
head at the hands of an unknown assailant, who fled after inflicting
the injuries, using a steel rod. A-4, with the help of passers-by,
stopped a Maruti car, shifted the deceased to the backseat of the
car and admitted him in the Manipal Hospital located at the Airport
Road. A-4 informed her father PW-10 about the occurrence, who
in turn, passed on the information to PW-12. She also informed
PW-5 about the same. On receiving the information, PW-5 took
his parents and the mother of A-4 to the hospital. By then, PW-10
had also reached the hospital from his office. Around 02:00 AM
in the intervening night between 03.12.2003 and 04.12.2003, all
of them returned home except for PW-10 and PW-5 who stayed
back at the hospital. In the early morning of 04.12.2003, PW-6,
PW-12 and A-4 returned to the hospital. At about 08:05 AM, the
deceased was declared dead. PW-5 lodged a written complaint at
the police station, based on the information received from A-4, on
the basis of which the First Information Report (hereinafter referred
to as the “FIR”) was registered against unknown persons for the
offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. The said FIR was
registered by the police Inspector PW-31, K.A. Nanaiah, who was
the 1st Investigating Officer (hereinafter referred to as the “I.O.”).
Upon investigating, A-1 to A-4 were arrested on 25.01.2004. PW-31
continued the investigation till 17.02.2004, after which the case file
was handed over to Dawood Khan, PW-32, who was the subsequent
I.O. in the case. A chargesheet was filed on 17.04.2004, followed
by a supplementary one on 10.01.2005.
21. Charges were framed by the Trial Court against all the accused
persons under Section 120-B, and Section 302 read with Section
120-B of the IPC, while A-4 was additionally charged for the offence
punishable under Section 201 of the IPC. 33 witnesses out of 64
listed witnesses were examined before the Trial Court on behalf of
the prosecution, while 3 witnesses were examined on behalf of the
defence. In total, 111 Exhibits were marked by the prosecution and
17 Material Objects (hereinafter referred to as “M.O.”) were placed
before the Trial Court. 64 Exhibits were marked by the defence. All
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the accused were duly informed of the incriminating materials placed
against them during the course of recording their statement under
Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.
22. The case of the prosecution for proving the guilt of the accused before
the Trial Court was based on the premise that A-4 was not willing to
get married to the deceased and thus, expressed her grievance to
her close friend, A-1. A-1, upon seeing her plight, sought help from
his cousin, A-3. A-3 roped in his friend, A-2 in order to eliminate the
deceased, so as to stop his marriage with A-4 and thus, the accused
persons, in conspiracy with each other, committed the murder of
the deceased.
23. On 03.12.2003, A-4, while returning with the deceased on his
scooter after dinner, took him to the “Air View Point” located at the
Airport Ring Road to watch the landing of aeroplanes. A-1 and A-2
were following them on a scooter (M.O.12), as A-4 was constantly
updating A-1 regarding their whereabouts by way of continuous
SMSes. A-3 was continuously tracking and giving instructions to A-1
and A-2 throughout the evening by way of voice calls and so, all
the accused persons were in constant touch with each other right
before the occurrence, which took place sometime between 09:40
PM and 10:00 PM. While the deceased and A-4 were watching the
landing of aeroplanes, A-2 struck the deceased multiple times with
a steel rod (M.O.11), while A-1 was waiting for him on the scooter.
Then, A-2 sat on the scooter behind A-1 as the pillion rider and
they subsequently fled the scene. The occurrence was seen by
two eyewitnesses, PW-15 and PW-16. After the occurrence, the
deceased was admitted to the hospital by A-4, and he succumbed
to his injuries on the morning of the following day.
24. For proving the said theory, the prosecution mainly relied upon
the evidence of PW-8, PW-11 and PW-23 to establish motive, the
Call Detail Records (hereinafter referred to as the “CDR”) showing
the extensive communications between the accused persons from
25.11.2003 to 04.12.2003, the eye-witness testimonies of PW-15
and PW-16, and the recovery of the steel rod and the scooter at the
instance of the accused.
25. PW-8, Hema is the beautician who applied mehendi for A-4 on
29.11.2003 and also dressed up A-4 for the engagement ceremony
on 30.11.2003. She deposed that at the time of applying mehendi
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on 29.11.2003, A-4 hugged her and told her that she was not willing
to get married to the deceased, and requested her to do anything to
stop the marriage. A-4 also told PW-8 that even if the engagement
were to take place, she would run away and get married to her friend,
A-1. PW-8 informed about the same to PW-9, Umasashi who is the
maternal aunt of A-4. However, PW-9 asked PW-8 to keep quiet as
the engagement had already been fixed, and this would affect the
status of the family. PW-8 deposed that on 30.11.2003, when she
had gone to the house of A-4 for applying makeup, A-4 told her that
if Girish died, the engagement would stop and she would be able
to flee with A-1, and his associates would help them do so. PW-8
added that after the death of Girish, when she had gone to the house
of A-4 on 05.12.2003, A-4 told her that she had escaped from the
marriage as Girish had died as per her wishes, and she could live
happily for the next two years.
26. PW-11, Sheetal Rajagopal is a friend of A-4 from the days of her music
classes. She deposed that A-4 had not invited her to the engagement
ceremony. Thus, she was not aware of the same. However, she
stated that one Kamala, a servant who was working at the house
of A-4, informed her about the engagement and thus, PW-11 called
up A-4 over the telephone and congratulated her. However, A-4 told
her that she was unhappy with the idea of the said marriage, and
PW-11 made no further enquiry about it.
27. PW-23, Pramod Dixit is a friend of A-4 from Pre-University College.
He deposed that they were bosom friends, and in constant touch
with each other. He had also attended the engagement ceremony
on 30.11.2003. He stated that prior to the engagement, when he
had spoken to A-4 on the phone, she confided in him stating that
she did not like the lifestyle of the deceased as he disliked visiting
expensive hotels and restaurants, whereas she was someone who
wanted a fun-loving lifestyle. She also expressed to him that she
did not want to get married at such a young age.
28. The CDR brought on record by the prosecution showed that
voluminous calls/SMSes were exchanged between all the accused
persons during the period ranging from 25.11.2003 to 04.12.2003.
It showed continuous calls/SMSes, especially between A-1 and A-4.
29. PW-15 and PW-16 testified to the effect that at about 09:45 PM on
the night of 03.12.2003, when they were returning home on their
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two-wheeler, they saw A-2 hit the deceased with a steel rod on the
back of his head, while A-4 was standing at a slight distance away
from them. The deceased then fell unconscious. On raising an
alarm, A-2 ran away and sat behind A-1 on the scooter, and they
fled the scene. PW-15 also added that he helped A-4 by stopping a
car which was passing by, and placed the deceased in the backseat
of the car with the help of an auto-rickshaw driver. He then drove
the scooter of the deceased to his house and with the help of his
tenant, informed the Intel security officers who came to his house
and collected the belongings of the deceased. PW-16 deposed that
he left with the two-wheeler of PW-15.
30. After the accused persons were arrested on 25.01.2004, M.O.11 and
M.O.12 which were used for the commission of the offence, were
recovered by PW-31 pursuant to the disclosure statements made
by A-1 and A-2 under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(hereinafter referred to as the “IEA”).
31. On 13.07.2010, the Trial Court convicted the appellants for the
offence punishable under Section 120-B of the IPC and sentenced
them to undergo life imprisonment. A-2 alone was convicted and
sentenced to life for the offence punishable under Section 302 of
the IPC. Additionally, A-4 was convicted for the offence punishable
under Section 201 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of 3 years, with the sentences imposed to
run concurrently. The Trial Court rendered the conviction by accepting
all the materials put forth by the prosecution as discussed above,
with substantial reliance placed upon the CDR and eye-witness
testimonies. The Trial Court also found the plea of alibi raised by
A-1 to be false, and the evidence of PW-9, PW-10 and PW-12 to
not be reliable as they were interested witnesses.
32. Appeals were filed before the High Court, both by the State as
well as the appellants. While dismissing the appeals filed by the
appellants, the High Court was pleased to allow the appeal filed by
the State in part, while modifying the conviction of the appellants
to one under Section 302 read with Section 120-B of the IPC. The
sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon the appellants was
confirmed. Assailing the aforesaid decision of the High Court which
broadly concurred with that of the Trial Court, the present appeals
have been filed.
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ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANTS
33. For the sake of brevity, we propose to cumulatively deal with the
arguments made by the respective Senior Counsel appearing for
the appellants.
34. The testimonies of PW-15 and PW-16 have to be disbelieved as they
are planted witnesses. There is a delay in recording their statements
under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C, especially with respect to PW-16,
as his statement was recorded two months after the occurrence,
despite his availability throughout the said period. The conduct of
PW-15 also makes it difficult to believe his presence at the place of
occurrence as, instead of informing the police regarding the incident,
PW-15 took the scooter of the deceased to his house, leaving behind
his own two-wheeler with PW-16. Despite being an ex-serviceman,
he did not take any step whatsoever to report the incident to the
police. In fact, it is the I.O. who called him up on the morning of
the next day, even before the registration of the FIR by PW-5, and
asked him to give his statement as he was an eye-witness to the
incident. The source from which the police came to know about the
same remains unknown. The evidence of PW-15 also shows that he
was known to PW-31 earlier, which casts a doubt on his credibility.
There is no clarity in the evidence of PW-15 regarding the presence
of PW-16. Additionally, all the witnesses who could have testified to
the presence of PW-15 and PW-16 at the place of occurrence, like
the occupants of the car in which the deceased was taken to the
hospital, the tenant of PW-15 and the Intel security officers have
conveniently not been examined by the prosecution, for the reasons
best known to them.
35. The evidence adduced by PW-8 is wholly unreliable being contrary
to the evidence of PW-9, PW-10, PW-12, PW-6 and PW-31. Her
presence at the engagement ceremony has not been proved by the
prosecution either by the production of her diary, or the photographs
taken on the day of the engagement, making her very presence
doubtful. There was an inordinate delay in recording her statement
as it was recorded only on 14.01.2004, even though she received
the information from A-4 on 05.12.2003 itself, with no explanation for
such delay. She has contradicted herself on quite a few occasions,
especially with respect to the information given by her to PW-6 and
PW-31.
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36. The evidence of PW-11 is tainted, as she is an interested witness
known to the family of the deceased, evident from the fact that
she was accompanied by the sister of the deceased to the Trial
Court. Kamala, from whom she got the information regarding the
engagement of A-4, has neither been cited as a witness, nor has
she been examined by the prosecution. Though she deposed that
she had not attended the engagement ceremony, the evidence of
PW-10 and PW-12 say otherwise. Her statement was recorded by
the police much belatedly in February, 2004.
37. The evidence of PW-23 cannot be relied upon, as he has made a
statement out of threat and coercion by the police. His statement
recorded by the police is silent about his communication with A-4 after
the occurrence. Additionally, his mobile phone was not even secured
or seized by the I.O., despite the numerous SMSes exchanged
between him and A-4.
38. The reliance placed by the Courts below on the CDR, has no legal
basis. The witnesses who deposed in support of the CDR, being PW-
24 and PW-25, were not competent to do so. Merely because they
were working with the Telecom Service Provider (hereinafter referred
to as the “TSP”) at the relevant point of time, their evidence ought
not to be accepted, especially when the competent officers were
available. The certificates issued by the TSPs are not in compliance
with Section 65-B of the IEA. With respect to the certificate issued by
M/s. Reliance Infocomm Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Reliance”),
it is submitted that the certificate dated 29.09.2004 was issued by
PW-24 instead of Mr. Ramani, the nodal officer who had actually
extracted the data and sent the same to the police. This is a serious
error on the part of the investigating agency, as the said Mr. Ramani
was working at Reliance till October 2004 and therefore, should
have issued the certificate being the only competent officer to do
so. It is admitted by PW-24 that the CDR were actually stored in the
main server in Bombay, and the output taken therefrom was sent
via e-mail to him, after which the printout was taken from the said
e-mail. However, the certificate issued by Reliance fails to mention
the same and thus, does not satisfy the requirements under Section
65-B(4) of the IEA. Similarly, the certificate issued by M/s. Airtel
Bharti Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Airtel”) also does not satisfy
these requirements, as there is no mention of the device from which
the output was taken, and the manner in which it was taken. It has
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not been issued in the prescribed format. With respect to the CDR
furnished by Airtel, the same suffers from material irregularities and
errors, which show that it has been tampered with by way of a manual
intervention. This is supported by the admission made by PW-25 that
he had made handwritten entries for the data pertaining to the tower
location at the behest of the police. The said data provided by the
CDR is also fundamentally unreliable and cannot be used against the
appellants as, PW-25 admitted during his cross-examination that the
tower has a coverage radius of approximately 6-7 kilometres, which
represents an extraordinarily vast area, meaning that any individual
within a span of 12-14 kilometres in diameter could potentially be
serviced by the said tower. The CDR, even if admissible, do not per
se implicate the appellants and thus, no inference can be drawn on
that basis.
39. With respect to the recovery of M.O.11, an argument was made
to the effect that the said recovery cannot be sustained, as the
disclosure statements under Section 27 of the IEA were made jointly
by both A-1 and A-2. M.O.11 was subsequently recovered from an
open space pursuant to their statements. The link required under
Section 27 of the IEA is missing as the panch witnesses to the
recovery of M.O.11 cannot prove whether the recovery was made
pursuant to the disclosure statement of the accused as the same
was not recorded in their presence. It was also openly shown to
PW-15 at the police station, without properly securing it by way of
sealing. There are material contradictions in the evidence as the
FSL Report of M.O.11 records the presence of bloodstains on the
steel rod, while PW-18, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem,
deposed that he could not find any bloodstain on the same. Similarly,
there is no clarity in the evidence as to whether M.O.11 is a steel
rod or a steel pipe. The recovery of M.O.12 from the house of A-1
also cannot be believed as the said scooter was being used by
his sister, DW-3 in Tamil Nadu. The identification of the scooter by
PW-15 and PW-16 is also highly doubtful as they could not state
the registration number of the vehicle.
40. If the evidence of PW-15 and PW-16 is disbelieved, then it will be a
case of circumstantial evidence. There is no sufficient link to connect
all the accused. Even as per the case of the prosecution, A-2 was
in touch with A-3 alone, except for a few occasions where A-1 also
communicated with A-2, and only one communication was made by
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A-4 to A-2 during the entire alleged period of conspiracy. Furthermore,
A-4 was also talking to the deceased. The prosecution has not
been able to prove the motive as well, if one was to disbelieve the
evidence of PW-8, PW-11 and PW-23. As against A-3, except for
the CDR, there is no other material to implicate him. Certainly, this
is a case where this Court has to extend the benefit of doubt, as
both the Courts below have not taken into consideration the relevant
materials. In support of their contentions, the learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the appellants relied upon the decisions of this Court
in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and
Ors., (2020) 7 SCC 1, Sudershan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2014)
15 SCC 666, Gireesan Nair and Ors. v. State of Kerala, (2023)
1 SCC 180, Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay,
AIR 1955 SC 104 and Manzoor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982)
2 SCC 72.

ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS
41. Learned AAG and learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the
respondents submitted that though there are material discrepancies
available, the Court will have to see the evidence available as a whole.
The presence of A-4 at the place of occurrence is not in dispute. It is
a fact which has also been proved by the evidence of PW-5, PW-6,
PW-10 and PW-12, supported by the Accident Register. Therefore,
the homicide of the deceased, and the presence of A-4 along with
the deceased at the place of occurrence stands proved.
42. The testimonies of eye-witnesses PW-15 and PW-16 are consistent
with the medical evidence available on record. There are concurrent
findings of the Courts below with regards to the quality of their
evidence. Moreover, being neutral witnesses with no prior relation to
the deceased, they have no reason to falsely implicate the accused.
43. The motive of A-4 to commit the murder of the deceased along with
the other accused is proved by the testimonies of PW-8, PW-11
and PW-23. The evidence of PW-8 showed that not only was A-4
unwilling to marry the deceased, but also wanted to elope with A-1.
PW-11 also testified regarding the resentment of A-4 towards her
marriage with the deceased. The testimony of PW-23, who is in fact
a confidant of A-4, is also consistent with the testimonies of PW-8
and PW-11. Thus, there is no reason to discredit his testimony.
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44. The testimonies of PW-24 and PW-25, being the competent officers,
established the authenticity of the CDR, which were duly proved by
way of the requisite certificates under Section 65-B of the IEA. The
Courts below upheld the evidentiary value of these records, concluding
that the volume, the timing of calls, and SMSes exchanged, strongly
indicated a premeditated conspiracy amongst the accused.
45. The recovery of M.O.11 and M.O.12 at the instance of the accused
has been consistently believed by both the Courts below. The
medical evidence on record also corroborates the usage of M.O.11
to inflict the injuries on the deceased. Further, the plea of alibi and
the defence raised by A-1 pertaining to the recovery of M.O.12 has
been disbelieved by both the Trial Court and the High Court.
46. Considering the recovery coupled with the eye-witnesses’ account,
duly supported by the CDR and the evidence on motive, which have
been accepted by both the Courts below, there is no need for any
interference. In support of their contentions, the learned counsel
appearing for the respondents placed reliance upon the decisions
of this Court in Harendra Rai v. State of Bihar and Ors., (2023)
13 SCC 563, Sahabuddin and Another v. State of Assam, (2012)
13 SCC 213, Anees v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 757, Kishore Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra, (2017) 3 SCC
760 and Sajeev v. State of Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1470.

EVIDENCE AND ITS RELIABILITY
47. Before analyzing the evidence on record, we deem it fit to discuss
the relevant principles applicable to the facts and circumstances
of the present appeals. It is the foundational duty of the Court to
make an endeavor and find out the truth. Evidence is the material
for unearthing the truth. In order to do so, a fact has to be proved
by taking due note of the matters made available before the Court.
To prove a fact, the adequate parameter is the degree of probability.
Rajesh Yadav and Anr. V. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200.
“Principles of law
11. Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872:
“3. Interpretation clause.—In this Act the following
words and expressions are used in the following
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senses, unless a contrary intention appears from
the context—
...................................................................................
“Evidence”.—“Evidence” means and includes—
(1) all statements which the Court permits or requires
to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to
matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are
called oral evidence;
(2) all documents including electronic records
produced for the inspection of the Court; such
documents are called documentary evidence.
“Proved”.—A fact is said to be proved when, after
considering the matters before it, the Court either
believes it to exist, or considers its existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the
circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the
supposition that it exists.
“Disproved”.—A fact is said to be disproved when,
after considering the matters before it, the Court
either believes that it does not exist, or considers its
non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought,
under the circumstances of the particular case, to act
upon the supposition that it does not exist.”
12. Section 3 of the Evidence Act defines “evidence”,
broadly divided into oral and documentary. “Evidence”
under the Act is the means, factor or material, lending a
degree of probability through a logical inference to the
existence of a fact. It is an “adjective law” highlighting and
aiding substantive law. Thus, it is neither wholly procedural
nor substantive, though trappings of both could be felt.
13. The definition of the word “proved” though gives
an impression of a mere interpretation, in effect, is
the heart and soul of the entire Act. This clause,
consciously speaks of proving a fact by considering
the “matters before it”. The importance is to the
degree of probability in proving a fact through the
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consideration of the matters before the court. What is
required for a court to decipher is the existence of a
fact and its proof by a degree of probability, through
a logical influence.
14. Matters are necessary, concomitant material factors
to prove a fact. All evidence would be “matters” but not
vice versa. In other words, matters could be termed as a
genus of which evidence would be a species. Matters also
add strength to the evidence giving adequate ammunition
in the Court’s sojourn in deciphering the truth. Thus, the
definition of “matters” is exhaustive, and therefore, much
wider than that of “evidence”. However, there is a caveat,
as the court is not supposed to consider a matter which
acquires the form of an evidence when it is barred in law.
Matters are required for a court to believe in the existence
of a fact.
15. Matters do give more discretion and flexibility to the
court in deciding the existence of a fact. They also include
all the classification of evidence such as circumstantial
evidence, corroborative evidence, derivative evidence,
direct evidence, documentary evidence, hearsay evidence,
indirect evidence, oral evidence, original evidence,
presumptive evidence, primary evidence, real evidence,
secondary evidence, substantive evidence, testimonial
evidence, etc.
16. In addition, they supplement the evidence in proving the
existence of a fact by enhancing the degree of probability.
As an exhaustive interpretation has to be given to the
word “matter”, and for that purpose, the definition of the
expression of the words “means and includes”, meant
to be applied for evidence, has to be imported to that of
a “matter” as well. Thus, a matter might include such of
those which do not fall within the definition of Section 3,
in the absence of any express bar.
17. What is important for the court is the conclusion
on the basis of existence of a fact by analysing the
matters before it on the degree of probability. The
entire enactment is meant to facilitate the court to
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come to an appropriate conclusion in proving a fact.
There are two methods by which the court is expected
to come to such a decision. The court can come to
a conclusion on the existence of a fact by merely
considering the matters before it, in forming an opinion
that it does exist. This belief of the court is based upon
the assessment of the matters before it. Alternatively,
the court can consider the said existence as probable
from the perspective of a prudent man who might act
on the supposition that it exists. The question as to
the choice of the options is best left to the court to
decide. The said decision might impinge upon the
quality of the matters before it.
18. The word “prudent” has not been defined under
the Act. When the court wants to consider the second
part of the definition clause instead of believing the
existence of a fact by itself, it is expected to take the
role of a prudent man. Such a prudent man has to
be understood from the point of view of a common
man. Therefore, a Judge has to transform into a
prudent man and assess the existence of a fact after
considering the matters through that lens instead of
a Judge. It is only after undertaking the said exercise
can he resume his role as a Judge to proceed further
in the case.
19. The aforesaid provision also indicates that the
court is concerned with the existence of a fact both
in issue and relevant, as against a whole testimony.
Thus, the concentration is on the proof of a fact for
which a witness is required. Therefore, a court can
appreciate and accept the testimony of a witness on
a particular issue while rejecting it on others since it
focuses on an issue of fact to be proved. However, we
may hasten to add, the evidence of a witness as whole
is a matter for the court to decide on the probability
of proving a fact which is inclusive of the credibility
of the witness. Whether an issue is concluded or not
is also a court’s domain.
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Appreciation of evidence
20. We have already indicated different classification of
evidence. While appreciating the evidence as aforesaid
along with the matters attached to it, evidence can be
divided into three categories broadly, namely, (i) wholly
reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly
reliable nor wholly unreliable. If evidence, along with
matters surrounding it, makes the court believe it is
wholly reliable qua an issue, it can decide its existence
on a degree of probability. Similar is the case where
evidence is not believable. When evidence produced
is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, it might
require corroboration, and in such a case, court can
also take note of the contradictions available in other
matters.
21. The aforesaid principle of law has been enunciated in
the celebrated decision of this Court in Vadivelu Thevar v.
State of Madras, 1957 SCR 981 : AIR 1957 SC 614: (AIR
p. 619, paras 11-12)
“11. In view of these considerations, we have no
hesitation in holding that the contention that in a
murder case, the court should insist upon plurality of
witnesses, is much too broadly stated. Section 134
of the Indian Evidence Act has categorically laid it
down that ‘no particular number of witnesses shall
in any case, be required for the proof of any fact’.
The legislature determined, as long ago as 1872,
presumably after due consideration of the pros
and cons, that it shall not be necessary for proof
or disproof of a fact to call any particular number
of witnesses. In England, both before and after the
passing of the Evidence Act, 1872, there have been
a number of statutes as set out in Sarkar’s Law of
Evidence — 9th Edn., at pp. 1100 and 1101, forbidding
convictions on the testimony of a single witness. The
Indian Legislature has not insisted on laying down
any such exceptions to the general rule recognized
in Section 134 quoted above. The section enshrines
the well-recognised maxim that “Evidence has to be
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 885

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weighed and not counted”. Our Legislature has given
statutory recognition to the fact that administration of
justice may be hampered if a particular number of
witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom
that a crime has been committed in the presence of
only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are
not of uncommon occurrence, where determination
of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence.
If the Legislature were to insist upon plurality of
witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single
witness only could be available in proof of the crime,
would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion
of the presiding Judge comes into play. The matter
thus must depend upon the circumstances of
each case and the quality of the evidence of
the single witness whose testimony has to be
either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony
is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there
is no legal impediment to the conviction of the
accused person on such proof. Even as the
guilt of an accused person may be proved by
the testimony of a single witness, the innocence
of an accused person may be established on
the testimony of a single witness, even though
a considerable number of witnesses may be
forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case
for the prosecution. Hence, in our opinion, it is
a sound and well-established rule of law that
the court is concerned with the quality and not
with the quantity of the evidence necessary for
proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking,
oral testimony in this context may be classified
into three categories, namely:
(1) Wholly reliable.
(2) Wholly unreliable.
(3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly
unreliable.
12. In the first category of proof, the court should
have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either
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way — it may convict or may acquit on the testimony
of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach
or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or
subornation. In the second category, the court equally
has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in
the third category of cases, that the court has to
be circumspect and has to look for corroboration
in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct
or circumstantial. There is another danger in
insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective
of the quality of the oral evidence of a single
witness, if courts were to insist on plurality
of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be
indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses.
Situations may arise and do arise where only a
single person is available to give evidence in
support of a disputed fact. The court naturally
has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if
it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and
free from all taints which tend to render oral
testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty
to act upon such testimony. The law reports
contain many precedents where the court had to
depend and act upon the testimony of a single
witness in support of the prosecution. There are
exceptions to this rule, for example, in cases
of sexual offences or of the testimony of an
approver; both these are cases in which the oral
testimony is, by its very nature, suspect, being
that of a participator in crime. But, where there
are no such exceptional reasons operating, it
becomes the duty of the court to convict, if it is
satisfied that the testimony of a single witness is
entirely reliable. We have, therefore, no reasons to
refuse to act upon the testimony of the first witness,
which is the only reliable evidence in support of the
prosecution.”
(emphasis supplied)
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48. Thus, the evidence adduced before the Court, can be accepted either
in toto or in part. Furthermore, it can also be rejected. A Court shall
apply its mind to the evidence available to arrive at a just conclusion.

DISCUSSION
49. We shall first consider the ocular evidence available before us
comprising of the testimonies of the eyewitnesses, PW-15 and PW-16.

i. Eye-Witness Testimonies of PW-15 and PW-16
50. PW-15 and PW-16 are the two witnesses who are stated to have been
present at the place of occurrence. We have carefully considered
the evidence adduced by them. The more closely we scrutinize the
testimonies of these witnesses, the less we find ourselves relying
on them. This is due to their unnatural conduct and the material
discrepancies found between their testimonies. PW-15, despite
being an ex-service man and an eyewitness to the incident, did not
taken any step whatsoever to report the same to the police. Rather
strangely, he took pains to take the scooter driven by the deceased
back home and handed it over to his tenant, Mr. Naveen who has
also not been examined by the prosecution, despite being a cited
witness. On going through the laptop and visiting cards recovered
from the scooter of the deceased, PW-15 called the Intel security
officer, Radhakrishnan, who came and collected the laptop and
scooter. He has also not been examined by the prosecution, even
though he was a cited witness. All the while, neither did PW-15 call
the police nor did he ask his tenant to call the police. Instead, he
was contacted by PW-31 at about 8:30 AM-9:00 AM on 04.12.2003
shortly after the death of the deceased, who told him to give his
statement whenever called for. However, PW-15 could not offer any
explanation as to how PW-31 got to know his residential number
or the fact that he had witnessed the incident. What is strange is
that the FIR itself was lodged only at 10:30 AM on the basis of the
complaint given by PW-5, the brother of the deceased, which makes
one question as to how PW-31 came to know about the presence
of PW-15 at the place of occurrence, even before the registration
of the FIR. His statement was recorded only on 05.12.2003, even
though he was contacted by the police on 04.12.2003 itself. Suffice
it is to state that it is impossible for us to accept the evidence of
PW-15 on the basis of the discussion made above.
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51. PW-16 is another eyewitness whose statement was not recorded
by the police for more than two months, until 21.02.2004. This was
unusual as PW-15 had intimated him about the call he received from
the police on 04.12.2003 itself and the recording of his statement
on 05.12.2003. It is also pertinent to note that not only was he
meeting PW-15 regularly for a few days after the incident, but had
also attended office throughout the said period, indicating that he
was very much available, and yet failed to give his statement to the
police earlier. The so-called reasons assigned by him for the delay
in giving his statement are also contradictory. First, he states that it
was due to the fact that he was under stress owing to some personal
problems. Immediately thereafter, he states that it was because he
did not have the time to do so. The said reasons are not acceptable,
as the police knew about his presence much earlier. Apart from
his unnatural conduct, there are also material contradictions in the
evidence of PW-15 and PW-16 on the identification of A-1 and A-2.
We also find that there is no clarity in the evidence of PW-15 on the
presence of PW-16.
52. In light of what has been discussed above, we can observe that many
of the cited witnesses, including the occupants of the car in which
the deceased was taken to the hospital, the tenant of PW-15 and
the Intel security officer, who could have testified to the presence of
PW-15 and PW-16 on that fateful night, have not been examined by
the prosecution, for the reasons best known to them.
53. Though we find numerous other serious contradictions in the evidence
of PW-15 and PW-16, we do not wish to go into it any further, as we
have absolute clarity that their presence at the place of occurrence
is highly doubtful and therefore, cannot be relied upon.
54. As we have discarded the eyewitnesses’ account of the incident, we
must note now that the case rests purely on circumstantial evidence.
Thus, we must scrutinize the remaining evidence available by keeping
in mind the five golden principles laid down by this Court in Sharad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116.
(1) “the circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn must or should be and not
merely ‘may be’ fully established,
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused,
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that is to say, they should not be explainable on
any other hypothesis except that the accused
is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis
except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete
as not to leave any reasonable ground for the
conclusion consistent with the innocence of
the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the
accused.”
(emphasis supplied)

ii. Motive
55. When a case is founded on circumstantial evidence, it is imperative
to establish the motive of the accused to commit the offence. This
is because it serves as the foundation of the evidentiary chain that
ultimately leads to the implication of the accused.

Munish Mubar v. State of Haryana, (2012) 10 SCC 464
“30. In a case of circumstantial evidence motive
assumes great significance and importance for the
reason that the absence of motive would put the court
on its guard and cause it to scrutinise each piece of
evidence very closely in order to ensure that suspicion,
emotion or conjecture do not take the place of proof.
However, the evidence regarding existence of motive
which operates in the mind of an assassin is very often
not within the reach of others. The said motive may not
even be known to the victim of the crime. The motive
may be known to the assassin and no one else may
know what gave birth to such evil thought in the mind of
the assassin. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the
evidence indicating the guilt of the accused becomes
untrustworthy and unreliable, because most often it
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is only the perpetrator of the crime alone, who has
knowledge of the circumstances that prompted him
to adopt a certain course of action, leading to the
commission of the crime. Therefore, if the evidence
on record suggests sufficient/necessary motive to
commit a crime, it may be conceived that the accused
has committed the same.”
(emphasis supplied)

56. On the evidence available on motive, PW-8, PW-11 and PW-23 are
the witnesses who have been relied on by the prosecution to prove it.
57. We shall first examine the evidence of PW-8. Firstly, we find her
evidence to be tainted, as she was already known to the father of the
deceased, PW-6 who stated that he knew her from 4-5 years ago as
they used to see each other in the park while walking. Secondly, not
only does she state that she had attended the engagement ceremony
of A-4 on 30.11.2003, but also goes to the extent of stating that she
had sat in the first row and that photos and videos were taken of the
same. However, the prosecution has not made any attempt to prove
her presence at the ceremony by producing the said photographs
or videos. None of the other witnesses have testified about her
presence at the ceremony. Thus, her very presence at the engagement
ceremony itself is highly doubtful. Thirdly, there is a huge delay in
the recording of her statement by the police, as the same was done
only on 14.01.2004. Fourthly, apart from the contradictions in her
own testimony, there are material contradictions with the testimonies
of PW-6 and PW-31 regarding the place and manner in which her
statement was recorded by the police. PW-8 states that her statement
was recorded by the police at her house in January 2004. However,
this is contradicted by PW-6 who deposed that her statement was
recorded by PW-31 and ACP Pemmaiah when she had visited his
house in December 2003. She then states that she had conveyed
the information about the murder of the deceased to PW-6 on the
same day that she had gone to his house in December 2003. But
then, she contradicts herself by stating that she had not conveyed
the said information to anyone other than the inmates of her house,
until the police recorded her statement on 14.01.2004. She further
states that the police was already present at the house of PW-6
when she had arrived; however, despite her attempt to speak to
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 891

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them, they did not record her statement at that juncture and did so
only a month thereafter, which appears to be rather unusual. This is
contradicted by PW-6 who states that he had informed PW-31 over
the telephone when PW-8 had come to give some information on the
murder of the deceased and the police reached his house only after
the arrival of PW-8. PW-31 also contradicts her version by stating
that it was PW-8 who had denied recording her statement on that day
and not vice versa. Though there can be some justification for her
contradictions with the testimonies of PW-9, PW-10 and PW-12 who
are interested witnesses, the fact remains that it is also contradictory
to the evidence of PW-31 and PW-6. We find further contradictions
between her statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C
and her testimony before the Court. We find the conduct of PW-8
to be unnatural as well, similar to the observations made by us on
the conduct of PW-15 and PW-16.
58. Regarding PW-11, we find her evidence to be unreliable too, due
to the existence of material discrepancies with that of the other
witnesses. Firstly, she states for the first time before the Court that
it was Kamala, a servant from the house of A-4, who had informed
her regarding the engagement of A-4 with the deceased. However,
the said Kamala has neither been cited as a witness nor examined
by the prosecution to establish the said theory. While she deposes
that she did not attend the engagement ceremony, the evidence of
PW-10 and PW-12 would suggest otherwise, as they had deposed
that she had attended the engagement ceremony as a guest of
PW-6. She was also accompanied by the sister of the deceased,
Sunitha to the Trial Court which lends credence to the case of the
defence that she did attend the ceremony on behalf of the family
of the deceased. She also testifies that it was Sunitha and PW-6
who had visited her house soon after she had seen the incident on
television, and asked her to recount what she knew. She adds that
they were the ones who had informed the police about the same,
and to her surprise, the police visited her home four or five days
later, which makes the manner in which her statement was recorded
by the police a little odd as well. There is also a huge delay in
recording her statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C, as it was
only recorded in February 2004. Therefore, the observations made
by us on the conduct of the abovementioned witnesses extends to
PW-11 as well.
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59. This leaves us with the evidence of PW-23, Pramod Dixit, who
went to Pre-University College with A-4. He deposed in clear terms
that A-4 confessed to him that she did not want to get married to
the deceased, as she felt that they were not compatible. While the
deceased had a conservative lifestyle, she wanted a luxurious one,
visiting expensive hotels and restaurants. She also disclosed to him
that she did not want to get married at such a young age. We are
inclined to rely much on this evidence, as we find it to be natural. This
is owing to the fact that unlike the aforementioned witnesses, there
is nothing on record to show that PW-23 had any prior relationship
with the family of the deceased and unlike PW-8 and PW-11, who
were not so well-known to A-4, it is not in dispute that PW-23 was
close to A-4 and had not only been in touch with A-4 but also her
father, PW-10. A-4 has admitted the same in her statement recorded
under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. Thus, there was no reason for PW-
23 to have testified against his friend, A-4. Secondly, the evidence
of PW-23, which is inclusive of his testimony and the e-mail sent by
him to PW-10 on 18.04.2004, marked as Exhibit D-51 categorically
establish that A-1 and A-4 were close to each other. Though the
extent of the relationship is not known, one could easily infer the bond
between A-1 and A-4, and that they were constantly in touch with
each other. It is one thing to say that the evidence is not sufficient
enough to show that they were in a relationship, but it is sufficient
to show that A-4 was disinclined towards her marriage with the
deceased and A-1 was a close confidant of hers. PW-23 also goes
to the extent of mentioning in his e-mail sent to the father of A-4
that he did not have a good opinion about A-1, but was hesitant to
tell A-4 about the character of A-1, fearing that she might mistake
him to be making false allegations out of jealousy. Therefore, we are
inclined to rely on the evidence of PW-23 to not only demonstrate
that A-4 was unwilling to marry the deceased, but also to show the
close relationship between A-1 and A-4. At this juncture, we would
also like to refer to the admission made by PW-10 in his testimony
that A-1 used to come to his house for doing moot court rehearsals
with A-4, which establishes that A-1 and A-4 were close to each other.

iii. Call Detail Records
60. Having found the motive to commit the offence proved, we shall
now concentrate on the CDR available on record, which shows the
extensive communications exchanged between the accused persons
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 893

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before the incident, on the day of the incident and after the incident.
We would like to go in-depth on this aspect, as the case now rests
on circumstantial evidence, having disbelieved the testimonies of
the eye-witnesses.
61. Apart from the meticulous arguments made by learned Senior
Counsel, Mr. Tomy Sebastian appearing on behalf of the complainant,
much effort has also been undertaken by our Office with respect
to the correlation of the CDR, already filed and taken on record.
Records from the months of October, November and December 2003
have been taken and an endeavor has been made to ascertain the
conspiracy hatched amongst the accused persons.
62. On a perusal of the relevant oral and documentary evidence on
record, we have no doubt in holding that the prosecution has duly
proved that A-1 was in possession of and the user of mobile phone
bearing No. 9845017289, A-2 was the possessor and user of mobile
phone bearing No. 08036940211, A-3 was the possessor and user of
mobile phone bearing No. 08036860795, and A-4 was the possessor
and user of mobile phone bearing No. 9845570337. The TSP of the
mobile phones used by A-1 and A-4 was Airtel and the TSP of the
mobile phones used by A-2 and A-3 was Reliance.
63. Before we analyze the evidence available by way of CDR, it is
imperative to prove that the admissibility of the said evidence was
strictly in accordance with Section 65-B of the IEA, as the information
pertaining to these CDR is stored in huge servers, which cannot
be produced before the Court, and are thus, produced by way of
printouts which qualify as secondary evidence.

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and
Ors., (2020) 7 SCC 1
“32. Coming back to Section 65-B of the Evidence Act,
sub-section (1) needs to be analysed. The sub-section
begins with a non obstante clause, and then goes on
to mention information contained in an electronic record
produced by a computer, which is, by a deeming fiction,
then made a “document”. This deeming fiction only takes
effect if the further conditions mentioned in the section
are satisfied in relation to both the information and the
computer in question; and if such conditions are met, the
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“document” shall then be admissible in any proceedings.
The words “… without further proof or production of the
original …” make it clear that once the deeming fiction is
given effect by the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned
in the section, the “deemed document” now becomes
admissible in evidence without further proof or production
of the original as evidence of any contents of the original,
or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would
be admissible.
33. The non obstante clause in sub-section (1) makes
it clear that when it comes to information contained in
an electronic record, admissibility and proof thereof
must follow the drill of Section 65-B, which is a special
provision in this behalf — Sections 62 to 65 being
irrelevant for this purpose. However, Section 65-B(1)
clearly differentiates between the “original” document —
which would be the original “electronic record” contained
in the “computer” in which the original information is
first stored — and the computer output containing such
information, which then may be treated as evidence of the
contents of the “original” document. All this necessarily
shows that Section 65-B differentiates between the original
information contained in the “computer” itself and copies
made therefrom — the former being primary evidence,
and the latter being secondary evidence.
34. Quite obviously, the requisite certificate in sub-
section (4) is unnecessary if the original document itself
is produced. This can be done by the owner of a laptop
computer, a computer tablet or even a mobile phone,
by stepping into the witness box and proving that the
device concerned, on which the original information is
first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases
where “the computer”, as defined, happens to be a part
of a “computer system” or “computer network” (as defined
in the Information Technology Act, 2000) and it becomes
impossible to physically bring such network or system
to the court, then the only means of proving information
contained in such electronic record can be in accordance
with Section 65-B(1), together with the requisite certificate
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 895

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under Section 65-B(4). This being the case, it is necessary
to clarify what is contained in the last sentence in para
24 of Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 :
(2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1
SCC (L&S) 108 which reads as “… if an electronic record
as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62
of the Evidence Act …”. This may more appropriately be
read without the words “under Section 62 of the Evidence
Act,…”. With this minor clarification, the law stated in para
24 of Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 :
(2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1
SCC (L&S) 108 does not need to be revisited.
***
60. It may also be seen that the person who gives this
certificate can be anyone out of several persons who
occupy a “responsible official position” in relation
to the operation of the relevant device, as also the
person who may otherwise be in the “management
of relevant activities” spoken of in sub-section (4) of
Section 65-B. Considering that such certificate may
also be given long after the electronic record has
actually been produced by the computer, Section
65-B(4) makes it clear that it is sufficient that such
person gives the requisite certificate to the “best of
his knowledge and belief”. [Obviously, the word “and”
between knowledge and belief in Section 65-B(4) must
be read as “or”, as a person cannot testify to the best of
his knowledge and belief at the same time.]
61. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate
required under Section 65-B(4) is a condition precedent
to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic
record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer,
(2014) 10 SCC 473 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2015) 1
SCC (Cri) 24 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108 , and incorrectly
“clarified” in Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2
SCC 801 : (2018) 2 SCC 807 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 346 :
(2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 351 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 860 : (2018) 1
SCC (Cri) 865. Oral evidence in the place of such certificate
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cannot possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a mandatory
requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle in
Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426, which has been
followed in a number of the judgments of this Court, can
also be applied. Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly
states that secondary evidence is admissible only if led in
the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise
would render Section 65-B(4) otiose.
***
82. But Section 65-B makes the admissibility of the
information contained in the electronic record subject to
certain conditions, including certification. The certification
is for the purpose of proving that the information which
constitutes the computer output was produced by a
computer which was used regularly to store or process
information and that the information so derived was
regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course
of the said activities.”
(emphasis supplied)

64. There is no doubt that the compliance of this provision is mandatory.
However, there is no straitjacket formula to arrive at the conclusion
of such due compliance, with specific reference to the CDR. It is the
duty of the concerned Court to satisfy itself on such compliance, by
taking due note of the requisite certificate produced under Section
65-B(4) of the IEA, coupled with the oral evidence adduced by the
competent officer on behalf of the TSP. One must understand that
in contrast to the other prosecution witnesses, the one who speaks
in support of such certificates, has no other interest in the case and
therefore, has to be considered as a Court witness, having no axe to
grind with anyone. He deposes on behalf of the TSP, concentrating
only with respect to the certificate issued. Thus, in the absence of
any fundamental flaw in his testimony, with competency to depose
on behalf of the TSP, the Court is expected to take due note of it,
accordingly.
65. In the case at hand, while scrutinizing the evidence pertaining to
the admissibility of CDR, it is crucial to keep in mind that we are
dealing with an offence which was committed in the year 2003, when
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 897

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technology and the laws governing it were still at a nascent stage.
On a perusal of the documentary evidence, we find that both the
TSPs have furnished the requisite certificates under Section 65-B(4)
of the IEA, marked as Exhibit P-50 and Exhibit P-83, and we are duly
satisfied with the compliance made thereunder. A certificate not given
in the prescribed format per se will not make it invalid, especially
when the authenticity of these marked documents is not in dispute.
The competent officers on behalf of Reliance and Airtel have also
deposed affirmatively with respect to the said certificates, as PW-24
and PW-25 respectively. PW-24 was holding the position of Head of
Marketing & Sales and Co-ordinator for Statutory Legal Enforcement
Agencies at Reliance, Bangalore. PW-25 was holding the position of
Assistant Manager as the Nodal Officer of Airtel, Bangalore. Thus,
both the witnesses were holding a ‘responsible official position’ at
the respective companies, as required under Section 65-B(4) of the
IEA. It is not necessary for the said officers to be holding positions
of technical expertise, and is enough if they depose to the ‘best of
their knowledge or belief’. The contention raised by the appellants
that Mr. Ramani was the only competent officer to depose on behalf
of Reliance is without substance, as the evidence of PW-24 clearly
states that Mr. Ramani had left the organisation and thus, PW-24
being the successor-in-office became the competent officer. It is not
in dispute that PW-24 and PW-25 are the representatives of the
respective TSPs. Their testimonies with respect to the certificates
and the CDR remain unmistakably clear, despite being subjected to
exhaustive cross-examination and, mere discrepancies per se would
not lead us to hold that there was no due compliance. With respect
to the certificate furnished by Reliance, the appellants raised an
argument that it was not in conformity with Section 65-B(4) of the IEA,
as it did not mention that the main server was located in Bombay,
from which the data had been extracted and sent via email to the
concerned office in Bangalore. This argument does not hold much
water, as this process of extraction and transfer of data was done by
authorized employees of the TSP through an electronically defined
process, as per established procedures. The alleged discrepancies
in certain portions of the CDR, as pointed out by the appellants,
cannot eschew the evidence in its entirety. Moreover, it is nobody’s
case that the entries in the CDR are factually incorrect, nor is there
any dispute over the author of these entries. It is also to be kept
in mind that there was no specific denial or explanation offered by
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even the accused persons, when presented with the overwhelming
evidence on the numerous calls/SMSes exchanged between them,
while recording their statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.
Thus, we are inclined to hold that on the facts of the instant case,
the CDR furnished by both Reliance and Airtel are admissible in
accordance with Section 65-B(4) of the IEA.
66. As we have established the admissibility of the CDR, we may
proceed with the evaluation of the voluminous data on CDR, placed
on record by the prosecution, showing the unusually high number
of communications exchanged between the accused persons
during the relevant period of time. On a meticulous analysis of
the same, we find that the results are astounding. For the sake
of convenience, we would like to categorize the communications
appended in Annexure ‘A’ on the basis of the time period during
which they were exchanged, as following: October 2003 (Table 1),
01.11.2003 to 15.11.2003 (Table 2) and 16.11.2003 to 24.11.2003
(Table 3). However, for the period between 25.11.2003 to 06.12.2003
(Table 4 – Table 14), we would like to analyze it on a day-to-day
basis, as the prosecution seeks to prove the conspiracy between
the accused persons, especially placing reliance on the CDR
pertaining to the said period. To avoid prolixity, we do not wish to
repeat the phone numbers of the persons while discussing the CDR
and instead, refer to them by the person itself.
67. The CDR pertaining to the month of October 2003 in Table 1 show
the number of calls made by A-4 to A-1, and also by A-3 to A-1. We
also take note of the communications made by A-4 to the deceased.
The emerging pattern is that it is A-4 who had called A-1 most of the
time. Similarly, A-4 has also made calls to the deceased. However,
what is to be taken note of specifically, is the difference in the timing
of the calls made to A-1 and the deceased. On doing so, we find
that A-4 has made majority of the calls to the deceased only during
the daytime, while the calls made to A-1 are both during the daytime
and the odd hours of the night.
68. Between 01.11.2003 and 15.11.2003, as seen in Table 2, the
frequency of communications exchanged between A-1 and A-4
increased multifold, while the ones between A-4 and the deceased
decreased significantly. For the said period, there are a whopping 92
communications between A-1 and A-4, as against only 44 with the
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 899

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

deceased. Here again, it can be inferred that several communications
have been exchanged between A-1 and A-4 during the odd hours
of the night.
69. The frequency of communications between A-1 and A-4 increased
even more between 16.11.2003 to 24.11.2003, as seen in Table 3.
A total of 98 communications have been logged between them, as
against only 22 with the deceased. We would like to draw attention
to the glaring disparity in the frequency of their communications
as, according to the evidence of PW-5 and PW-10, A-4’s parents
had made a proposal to the parents of the deceased regarding the
marriage during the month of October 2003 itself. The same was
finalized on 20.11.2003, when both the families gave their consent
to the marriage proposal, and the engagement ceremony was fixed
on 30.11.2003. While one would expect a rise in communication
between the deceased and A-4 after their pre-engagement rituals,
the call records exhibit a completely different story. For instance,
on 23.11.2003, 9 communications have been exchanged between
A-4 and A-1, while A-4 contacted the deceased only twice. Similarly,
on 24.11.2003, 16 communications have been exchanged between
A-4 and A-1, as against only 3 with the deceased, which leads us to
arrive at the conclusion that A-4 was not interested in her marriage
with the deceased, and instead shared a close relationship with A-1.
It is to be noted that in a majority of these communications, it is A-4
who has contacted A-1 and not vice versa.
70. Now, we shall come to the data available for 25.11.2003 in Table 4.
Here again, A-3 has communicated with not only A-1, but also A-4
by way of voice calls. A-1, being in contact with A-3 from 23.11.2003,
roped him into the plan and on 25.11.2003, A-3 has made direct
contact with A-4 for the first time. On the very same day itself, A-3
has made 9 voice calls to A-4, one after the other, and in short
intervals. Thus, it can be inferred that A-3 has actively entered into
the conspiracy on the said date. We wish to emphasize on the same,
as A-3 is a complete stranger to A-4, and there was no occasion or
reason for them to have been in touch.
71. On 26.11.2003, as mentioned in Table 5, there have been further
communications between A-4 and A-1 by way of 7 SMSes and 1
voice call. Strangely, there was only one communication made by
A-4 to the deceased.
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72. On 27.11.2003, as mentioned in Table 6, A-4 contacted the deceased
only once, while continuing her communication with A-1 via SMS.
The communication between A-3 and A-4 also continued as A-3
has made 8 calls to A-4. We can observe that one call is made
immediately after the other, inter se the accused persons.
73. On 28.11.2003, as observed in Table 7, a total of 33 calls/SMSes
were exchanged between the accused persons, excluding A-2.
A total of 19 communications were exchanged between A-1 and
A-4, including both SMSes and voice calls, while there were only 5
communications between A-4 and the deceased. It is to be noted
that A-1 and A-4 have also engaged in conversations during the odd
hours of the night. A total of 10 voice calls were made between A-3
and A-1, out of which majority of the calls were initiated by A-3. It is
crucial to note that out of the 4 voice calls between A-3 and A-4, 3
calls were initiated by A-4.
74. Analysis of the CDR for 29.11.2003, a day before the engagement
ceremony, as mentioned in Table 8, would show that a total of 11
communications were exchanged between A-4 and A-1, including
10 SMSes and 1 voice call. All the communications were initiated
by A-4. Between A-3 and A-4, there were a total of 6 voice calls. We
also take note of the calls between A-3 and A-1. It is interesting to
note the emerging pattern in some of the calls between the accused,
as they have been made one after the other.
75. We would like to emphasize a little more on the CDR for 30.11.2003
in Table 9, as it was the date of the engagement ceremony of A-4 with
the deceased. Till 29.11.2003, we could find that the communication
was exclusively between A-1, A-3 and A-4. On analyzing the CDR
for 30.11.2003, we find that A-2 has come into the picture for the
first time. At this juncture, we would like to refer to the evidence
of PW-14, the father of A-3, who admitted that there was a prior
friendship between A-3 and A-2. Thus, we would like to infer that
it was A-3 who roped A-2 into the plan. On the said date, there
were a total of 8 communications between A-4 and A-1, inclusive
of both SMSes and voice calls. This shows the unnatural conduct
of A-4, as even on the day of her engagement ceremony with the
deceased, she was fervently communicating with A-1, lending
corroboration to the evidence of PW-23 that she was not willing
to marry the deceased.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 901

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

76. We would also like to draw specific attention to A-4’s conduct during
the engagement ceremony. Firstly, the photographs taken during the
ceremony marked as Exhibit P-15, clearly show that A-4 was holding
her phone in her hands throughout the ceremony. Secondly, as per
the evidence of PW-10, the engagement ceremony commenced
around 7:00 PM. The CDR show that even during the engagement
ceremony, A-4 has attended 3 calls made by A-3 between 7:00 PM
to 9:00 PM. Qua the other communications, A-3 has made 2 calls
to A-2 and it is to be noted that right after making these calls to A-2,
A-3 has contacted A-4 twice, which shows that they were acting in
furtherance of their conspiracy.
77. The CDR for 01.12.2003 and 02.12.2003 in Tables 10 and 11
respectively, show the communications between all the accused
persons. On 01.12.2003, there were a total of 5 communications
between A-4 and A-1, including 3 voice calls and 2 SMSes, as
against only one communication between A-4 and the deceased.
There were also 3 calls between A-1 and A-3, and 2 calls between
A-3 and A-2, all initiated by A-3.
78. For the CDR of 02.12.2003, we would first like to draw attention
to the sharp contrast between the frequency of the calls/SMSes
on the other days and the frequency of the same on 02.12.2003
showing a dramatic rise, whereby a total of 56 communications
were exchanged, several of them taking place one after the other.
It is to be noted that this was just a day before the murder of the
deceased, and thus, it can be inferred that the accused persons
were communicating in preparation for the murder. We note that out
of the same, 34 communications were exchanged between A-1 and
A-4. It can be seen that as we get closer to the date of the incident,
there has been active communication on the part of A-2 as well,
since a total of 11 communications were exchanged between A-1
and A-2, out of which 7 were voice calls and 4 were SMSes, and 5
voice calls were also made by A-3 to A-2.
79. Strangely, there were no communications at all between A-1 and
A-2 prior to 02.12.2003, but just a day before the incident, 11
communications have been exchanged between them, when they
are admittedly strangers. We also take note of the SMS sent by A-4
to A-2. Several of these calls/SMSes have been made consecutively
by different accused persons, hinting at a synchronized coordination
between them.
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80. 03.12.2003 is the date of the unfortunate incident, which is not in
dispute. The CDR for the same finds place in Table 12. We find
that there were countless communications exchanged between the
accused persons on the said day.
81. Between A-1 and A-4 alone, there were 54 communications, of
which 45 were SMSes and 9 were voice calls. We would like to do
a detailed breakdown of the CDR available for this date, as this was
the day the terrible incident took place. For the same, we would like
to first establish some foundational facts which are not in dispute.
As per the testimonies of PW-5, PW-6 and PW-10, the deceased
left with A-4 for the dinner at around 06:30 PM. Admittedly, A-4 and
the deceased were together throughout the period ranging from
06:30 PM up until the incident took place. Then, PW-10 has also
stated in his testimony that A-4 called him and informed about the
incident sometime between 09:45 PM-10:00 PM. The CDR show
that there was a call between A-4 and PW-10 at about 09:56 PM,
and the last communication between A-1 and A-4 before the said
call took place at 09:39 PM, which leads us to the conclusion that
the incident took place sometime between 09:39 PM to 09:56 PM.
Thus, we would like to draw specific attention to the communications
exchanged between the accused after 06:30 PM. A-1 and A-4 have
exchanged 38 SMSes from 06:37 PM to 09:39 PM continuously, one
after the other, with an average gap of only 2-7 minutes in between
each message.
82. It is rather strange that A-4 was continuously exchanging messages
with A-1, during the entire period that she was with the deceased,
who was her fiancé at the time. This lends credence to the case
of the prosecution that she was giving information to A-1 regarding
their whereabouts. Obviously, there were no voice calls made during
the said period, as she could not talk to A-1 on the phone with the
deceased beside her. With respect to A-1 and A-2, 4 communications
have been exchanged between them, with the last call at 05:42 PM.
No calls/SMSes were exchanged after that, which brings us to the
inference that they were together during the entire period after that.
A-3 has made 3 calls to A-2 after 06:30 PM, at 07:39 PM, 08:39 PM
and the last one at 09:25 PM, right before the occurrence.
83. After the last communication between A-1 and A-4 at 09:39 PM,
there is complete silence with no communication between any of
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 903

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

the accused until 09:56 PM, when A-4 informed her father about the
incident. The sudden silence between the accused during this crucial
period lends credence to the theory put forth by the prosecution that
the murder of the deceased was committed by the accused persons
in conspiracy. The CDR would also reveal that, after the occurrence,
A-4 chose not to inform A-1 about the incident, notwithstanding the
numerous communications between them prior to the occurrence,
but informed only her father, PW-10. This, we find, is a conduct
which is rather very strange. At this juncture, we would also make
a reference to the tower location of the calls made by the accused
persons. As per the CDR and the evidence of PW-25, the calls
made by A-1 and A-4 were recorded from the Carlton Tower located
at the Airport Road. Similarly, the calls made/received by A-2 were
recorded from the tower in the Domlur area which covers the Airport
Road in its radius. Though this does not prove the presence of the
accused at the exact place of occurrence, it does prove that A-1 and
A-2 were in close proximity of the place of occurrence. Therefore,
though the same is not a substantive piece of evidence, it definitely
adds muscle to the prosecution’s version.
84. Now, we shall consider the CDR available for the period after the
occurrence. It has been observed that the communications between
the accused have suddenly dried up after the occurrence. After the
deceased was assaulted on the head, A-4 admitted the deceased in
the hospital at 10:10 PM, as stated in the Accident Register marked
as Exhibit P-86. As per the evidence of PW-6, A-4 along with her
mother and other family members of the deceased left the hospital
around 02:00 AM, and returned to the hospital at around 07:00 AM
in the morning. The CDR for 04.12.2003 in Table 13 shows that
even during this time, A-4 has sent messages to A-1, in the late
night and early morning, which lends credence to the prosecution’s
theory that A-4 wanted to update A-1 on the critical condition of the
deceased. Subsequently, A-3 has made back-to-back calls to both
A-1 and A-2 throughout the morning.
85. On 05.12.2003, as observed in Table 14, the communication between
A-1 and A-4 became almost nil, with only one communication made
by A-1 to A-4, and a few more between A-1 and A-2. On 06.12.2003,
as mentioned in Table 14, there was only a solitary communication
between A-1 and A-4.
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86. From the aforesaid materials, it is impossible for us to come to any
other conclusion, than the one put forth by the prosecution, as the
communications between the accused persons are too many, having
a distinct pattern, following one after the other and even during odd
hours of the night. The sudden rise in communications on the date of
the incident and even a day prior to it, followed by a sudden drop in
the communications on the very night of the unfortunate incident and
days thereafter, consistently point only towards the guilt of the accused
and serve as proof of the conspiracy that was hatched to murder
the deceased. At this juncture, we would like to point out that while
CDR data may not be construed as a substantive piece of evidence,
it is certainly to be used for appropriate corroboration. One has to
see the attending circumstances to decide the evidentiary value of
CDR. For example, where the evidence is so overwhelming and the
conduct of an accused is such that he is bound to give a sufficient
explanation for it, but fails to do so, as in the instant case, the CDR
might even take the position of substantive evidence. Therefore, in
a given factual scenario, the Court can place heavy reliance upon
the same for the purpose of rendering a conviction. Suffice it is to
state that proving the guilt depends upon the degree of probability.

iv. Recovery of M.O.11 and M.O.12
87. Though substantial arguments have been made on M.O.11 and
M.O.12, we are inclined to uphold the recovery. It is the case of
the prosecution that A-2 was the pillion rider who got down from
the scooter (M.O.12) and attacked the deceased using the steel
rod/pipe (M.O.11). It is not in dispute that the recovery of M.O.11
was made at the instance of A-2. The same was witnessed by
PW-30, who has duly affixed his signature on the seizure mahazar
marked as Exhibit P-87. Both the Courts have rightly accepted the
evidence of PW-30, who is an independent witness. The evidence
of PW-30 cannot be eschewed solely on the ground that the other
panch witness was not examined by the prosecution, despite being
cited as a witness. The recovery of M.O.11 has been effected from
a secluded place in a military compound. It was picked up from
the bush, on being identified by A-2. Merely because A-1 was also
present during the recovery, one cannot say that the recovery was
effectuated on the basis of joint disclosure made by A-1 and A-2,
and thus, is inadmissible. Herein, it is pertinent to point out that the
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 905

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

‘voluntary’ statements of A-1 and A-2 were also recorded separately
and marked as Exhibit P-94 and Exhibit P-95 respectively.

Kishore Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra, (2017) 3 SCC 760
“35. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (SCC pp.
711-12, para 145), this Court has held that a joint
disclosure or simultaneous disclosures, per se, are
not inadmissible under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act. A person accused need not necessarily be a single
person, but it could be a plurality of the accused. The
Court held that a joint or simultaneous disclosure is a
myth, because two or more accused persons would not
have uttered informatory words in chorus. When two
persons in custody are interrogated separately and
simultaneously and both of them may furnish similar
information leading to the discovery of fact which
was reduced into writing, such disclosure by two or
more persons in police custody do not go out of the
purview of Section 27 altogether. What is relevant is
that information given by one after the other without
any break, almost simultaneously, as in the present
case and such information is followed up by pointing
out the material things by both of them then there is
no good reason to eschew such evidence from the
regime of Section 27. Whether that information is
credible is a matter of evaluation of evidence. The
courts below have accepted the prosecution version in this
behalf, being credible. Suffice it to say that the disclosure
made by Accused 3 about the relevant fact, per se, is not
inadmissible.”
(emphasis supplied)

88. The argument raised by the appellants that the link required under
Section 27 of the IEA is missing due to the absence of the panch
witnesses while recording the disclosure statements of the accused
is also not acceptable, on the facts of the case, as the presence of
the witness to the disclosure statement is not a mandate and only
one of prudence. The mere absence of the witness to the disclosure
statement is hardly sufficient to hold that the recovery itself is doubtful.
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89. We also find that the argument made to the effect that PW-18 did
not find any bloodstain on the weapon during his examination will
not hold water as the role of the doctor in this scenario is rather
different. The police sent the weapon to him only to seek his opinion
as to whether the injuries on the deceased were caused by M.O.11,
to which he has rightly deposed in support of his report that the
said weapon could have inflicted the injuries on the deceased. With
respect to the presence of the bloodstain, we are inclined to rely
on the FSL Report, as the report is prepared by technical experts
after analysing the weapon using the appropriate equipment, and
not merely on the basis of seeing it with the naked eye.
90. With respect to the sealing of M.O.11, we find from the records that it
was sufficiently sealed with the letter ‘N’ and also corresponds to the
sample sent while tallying with the description. This is evident from
all the requisitions made by the police and the FSL Report, where
it has been clearly mentioned that M.O.11 was sealed and the seal
was intact. Since we have already disbelieved the evidence of PW-
15, his account about M.O.11 being kept unsecured in the Police
Station is also not tenable. The argument that there is no clarity as
to whether M.O.11 is a steel rod or a steel pipe is immaterial as the
external appearance of a steel rod and a steel pipe is one and the
same. If it is hollow inside, then it is a steel pipe, otherwise it is a
steel rod. Here, on the basis of the description of the weapon, we
can say that M.O.11 is a steel pipe as it is hollow. PW-30 and PW-
31 have clearly testified to the same effect before the Court. The
contention raised regarding the delay in sending the weapon to the
FSL is also irrelevant as mere delay in sending the weapon to FSL
cannot be a ground to discard the evidence pertaining to recovery,
which is otherwise cogent as stated by this Court in State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Chhaakki Lal and Anr., (2019) 12 SCC 326.
“34. For reversing the verdict of conviction, the High Court
has pointed out that there was delay in sending the seized
gun and pistol (recovered on 1.3.2006) which was sent to
the FSL only on 19.4.2006. The High Court has doubted
the case of prosecution by observing that apart from delay
in sending the seized guns/pistol, there is no material
showing as to where the seized weapons were kept during
the period from 1.3.2006 to 19.4.2006. Such delay in
sending the recovered weapons to FSL could only be
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 907

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

an omission or lapse on the part of the Investigating
Officer. Such omissions or lapses in the investigation
cannot be a ground to discard the prosecution case
which is otherwise credible and cogent….”
(emphasis supplied)

91. The recovery of M.O.12, was made from the house of A-1 in the
presence of PW-30, pursuant to the disclosure statement of A-1.
The said factum has been confirmed by PW-30 and PW-31 in their
testimony before the Court. The defence raised by A-1 that M.O.12
belonged to his sister DW-3, as it was gifted by their parents in
her marriage, and was being used by her in Tamil Nadu cannot be
believed as the National Insurance Company based in Bangalore
continued to be the insurer of the vehicle at the relevant point in
time. Further, no evidence was brought on record by the defence to
show that DW-3 had given any intimation to the RTO in Tamil Nadu
to prove that she had shifted the vehicle from the State of Karnataka
to the State of Tamil Nadu. Thus, having found no merit, we reject
the defence raised by A-1, accordingly. Based on the discussion
made above, we are inclined to uphold the recovery of M.O.11 and
M.O.12. Now, what is left to be considered by us is the conduct of the
accused and the plea of alibi raised by A-1 which are relevant facts.

v. Conduct of A-4
92. Firstly, the conduct of A-4 is rather strange for a person who was
continuously in touch with A-1 by way of numerous calls/SMSes on
a daily basis not only during the period when her marriage proposal
with the deceased was under consideration, but also after getting
engaged to him. Secondly, we also find her conduct to be unnatural
on the day of the incident, as she was constantly communicating
with A-1 when she had gone out for dinner with her then fiancé,
the deceased. However, she consciously stopped communicating
with A-1 immediately after the incident took place. Even when her
fiancé was on his deathbed, A-4 was communicating with A-1 and
such conduct of hers is inconsistent with her innocence and speaks
volumes about their questionable relationship. Thirdly, we also find
that A-4, has caused destruction of evidence in order to screen
herself and the others from punishment as all the messages in the
phone recovered from A-4, especially the ones exchanged on the
908 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

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day of the incident, were found to be deleted. The same was the
situation with the phone used by A-1, M.O.13. PW-10 further admits
in his cross-examination that there were no messages in the inbox or
outbox of M.O.10 when he surrendered the phone to the Investigating
Officer on 26.01.2004. PW-33, being the technical expert, has also
affirmed that the messages on the phone can only be deleted by
manual operation. If the said messages were exchanged between
the accused for any other bona fide purpose, then it was incumbent
upon the accused to explain the same before the Court, which they
have failed to do. Thus, the absence of the messages on the phones,
coupled with the failure of the accused to offer sufficient explanation
for their extensive communications right before the incident, would
lead us to draw an adverse inference against A-1 and A-4.

vi. Plea of Alibi
93. Similarly, the Courts rightly drew an adverse inference against A-1
upon finding that the plea of alibi raised by him was not proved through
the evidence of PW-22 and DW-1. PW-22, the father of A-1, had
deposed that A-1 was at the HAL hospital on the night of 03.12.2003
as his father-in-law had been admitted there. Thus, in order to prove
the said plea of alibi, the discharge summary was marked as Exhibit
D-60 and DW-1, who was the Medical Superintendent at the said
hospital, was examined by the defence. However, Exhibit D-60 did
not contain anything to show that A-1 was present at the hospital
during the period in question and DW-1 also admitted in his cross-
examination that the hospital did not maintain any records to show
as to who had visited the patient at the hospital. Thus, we conclude
that A-1 had raised a false plea of alibi.
94. From the discussion made above, it is clear that the foundational
facts are not in dispute. The case of the prosecution with respect
to the homicidal death of the deceased stands duly proved by
way of the post-mortem report marked as Exhibit P-35 and the
deposition of PW-18 in support of the same which would reveal that
the deceased suffered as many as six injuries in total, ‘Injury No.2’
being the vital injury on the head, and the cause of death was coma
as a result of the said head injury. No challenge has been raised
by the appellants on the said medical evidence. Similarly, it is the
case of A-4 herself that she was with the deceased during the time
of occurrence. This is not only her own case, but also the case of
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 909

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

her parents who deposed as PW-10 and PW-12. The said fact is
also supported by the Accident Register, marked as Exhibit P-86,
which proves that it was A-4 who had admitted the deceased to the
hospital on the night of 03.12.2003. PW-29 further supports the said
fact by deposing with respect to the Accident Register. Thus, the
occurrence itself and the presence of A-4 with the deceased during
the time of occurrence is not in dispute. To that extent, we can also
say that A-4 was a witness to the incident as she had stated in the
spot seizure mahazar marked as Exhibit P-14, that she had seen
someone running after assaulting the deceased. Despite being in
close proximity of the deceased at the time of occurrence, it is rather
strange to note that A-4 was left completely unscathed, despite her
stand that both of them were attacked, while the deceased received
as many as six injuries. The said fact shows the complicity of A-4 in
the crime, especially when the defence has failed to establish any
other motive for the homicide of the deceased.
95. Therefore, on the facts assessed above, we find that a case has
been made out for confirming the conviction of the appellants.
We are inclined to hold so, notwithstanding our disapproval of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution, including the testimonies of
PW-8, PW-11, PW-15 and PW-16.
96. Thus, we hold that the link for circumstantial evidence stands
connected and proved, as the motive has been duly established
through the evidence of PW-23, the voluminous CDR stands
proved through the evidence of PW-24 and PW-25 who withstood a
lengthy and exhaustive cross-examination, and the recovery of the
weapon also stands proved. Even in the statements of the accused
recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C, there was no acceptable
explanation given by them for the numerous communications
exchanged between them during the period ranging from 25.11.2003
to 04.12.2003. Insofar as A-3 is concerned, we are inclined to hold
that not only did he orchestrate the entire operation for the murder of
the deceased by pulling the strings discreetly, but was also actively
monitoring, directing and supervising the other accused. He was not
only communicating with A-2, but also A-1 and A-4. The CDR show
that a total of 34 voice calls have been made between A-3 and A-4
during the entire period ranging from 25.11.2003 to 03.12.2003,
with no communications either before or after the said period. The
said evidence is particularly overwhelming and cannot be brushed
910 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

aside, as admittedly, there was no prior relationship between
them, and there was no occasion for them to have communicated
extensively when they were strangers to each other, with nothing in
common, belonging to different strata of the society. It is A-3, who
communicated extensively with A-1, A-2 and A-4. Though arguments
have been made by the appellants to the effect that the prosecution
has not been able to prove his profession, what is sufficient for us
is the crucial role played by A-3.
97. With respect to A-2, he came into the picture at a much later point of
time. It is the case of the prosecution that this teenager was roped
in at the instance of A-3 to hit the final nail in the coffin. We wish
to observe that A-2 was a teenager hailing from an impoverished
community, and was engaged in the loading and unloading of goods,
as per the evidence of his father PW-17. The connection between A-2
and A-3 also stands proved as admitted by PW-14 in his testimony
and thus, we are unable to acquit A-2, due to the recovery and the
CDR which stand against him.
98. As stated above, A-4 was in constant communication with not only
A-1, but also A-3. She was very much in the knowhow of things
and the said communication continued till the final act. Once A-4
expressed her grievance to A-1, he got in touch with A-3, who
facilitated the plan accordingly, by utilizing the service of A-2. In the
said course, A-4 has also engaged in the destruction of evidence,
as discussed above, in order to screen herself and the others from
legal punishment. As we are satisfied with the adequacy of the
evidence on record, though for different reasons, we are inclined to
uphold the conviction and sentence rendered by the High Court in
the impugned judgment. Accordingly, the appeals stand dismissed
by confirming the conviction of the appellants rendered by the High
Court under Section 302 read with Section 120-B of the IPC and
additionally, Section 201 of the IPC for A-4 alone. The sentence of
life imprisonment imposed upon them also stands confirmed.

MOVING FORWARD
99. We do not wish to end our judgment by merely rendering a conviction.
We do believe that this Court has a little more role to play. Considering
that we started our discussion keeping in mind that this unfortunate
event would not have occurred, had the family been more sympathetic
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 911

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

in understanding the mental predilection and disposition of A-4, it is
important for us to make certain observations. Ultimately, A-4 was
unable to make a decision for herself, despite being an individual
who had attained majority. Having said so, we cannot condone her
action as it resulted in the loss of an innocent life of a young man.
We would only state at this juncture, that A-4 was made to commit
this offence by adopting the wrong course of action in order to
address her problem. Years have rolled on since the occurrence of
the crime, which was in 2003.
100. The appellants, who committed the offence with adrenaline pumping
in their veins, have now reached the middle age. Two out of the four
accused persons were teenagers at the time of occurrence, while A-4
had barely crossed that phase. A-3 was a man aged 28 years, and
was recently married with one child. As a Court, we seek to view the
matter from a different perspective, only for the purpose of giving a
new lease of life to the appellants who have committed a heinous
crime, notwithstanding the availability of other alternative avenues to
resolve the problems faced by A-4. We have also been informed that
they have not been put to adverse notice thereafter. Their conduct
in the prison is also not adverse. They were not born as criminals,
but it was an error of judgment through a dangerous adventure
which led to the commission of a heinous crime. It is difficult for us
to decide at this stage who influenced the other, although there is
a clear meeting of minds.
101. In light of the same, we would like to facilitate the appellants’ right to
seek pardon by permitting them to file appropriate petitions before
His Excellency the Hon’ble Governor of Karnataka. We would only
request the constitutional authority to consider the same, which
we hope and trust would be done by taking note of the relevant
circumstances governing the case.
102. Accordingly, we grant eight weeks’ time from the date of this judgment,
for the appellants to file appropriate petitions seeking to invoke the
power of pardon under Article 161 of the Constitution. Till these
petitions are duly considered and decided, the appellants shall not
be arrested and their sentence shall remain suspended.
103. The appeals stand dismissed, with the aforesaid liberty.
104. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
912 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

ANNEXURE ‘A’

Table 1
October 2003

SI No DATE TIME FROM TO
1. 03.10.2003 06:01 PM A3 A1
2. 12.10.2003 08:44 AM A3 A1
3. 15.10.2003 02:24 PM A3 A1
4. 22.10.2003 03:48 PM A3 A1
5. 22.10.2003 10:55 PM A3 A1
6. 25.10.2003 05:59 PM A4 Deceased
7. 25.10.2003 08:23 PM A4 Deceased
8. 25.10.2003 08:29 PM A4 Deceased
9. 25.10.2003 08:34 PM A4 Deceased
10. 25.10.2003 09:29 PM A4 Deceased
11. 25.10.2003 11:56 PM A4 A1
12. 26.10.2003 07:58 AM A4 Deceased
13. 26.10.2003 08:42 AM A4 Deceased
14. 26.10.2003 10:05 AM A4 Deceased
15. 26.10.2003 10:11 AM A4 Deceased
16. 26.10.2003 05:16 PM A3 A1
17. 26.10.2003 01:38 AM A4 A1
18. 26.10.2003 01:38 AM A4 A1
19. 27.10.2003 11:38 AM A4 A1
20. 27.10.2003 05:30 PM A3 A1
21. 27.10.2003 07:09 PM A3 A1
22. 27.10.2003 09:38 PM A3 A1
23. 27.10.2003 10:01 PM A4 Deceased
24. 27.10.2003 10:11 PM A4 Deceased
25. 27.10.2003 10:15 PM A4 Deceased
26. 27.10.2003 10:37 PM A4 Deceased
27. 27.10.2003 11:22 PM A4 Deceased
28. 28.10.2003 01:45 PM A4 Deceased
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 913

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

29. 28.10.2003 02:38 PM A4 A1
30. 28.10.2003 05:24 PM A4 Deceased
31. 28.10.2003 10:30 PM A4 A1
32. 28.10.2003 11:01 PM A4 A1
33. 28.10.2003 11:07 PM A4 Deceased
34. 29.10.2003 10:24 AM A4 A1
35. 29.10.2003 02:29 PM A4 A1
36. 29.10.2003 02:56 PM A4 A1
37. 29.10.2003 08:22 PM A4 A1
38. 29.10.2003 09:27 PM A4 A1
39. 29.10.2003 10:40 PM A4 Deceased
40. 29.10.2003 10:44 PM A4 A1
41. 30.10.2003 05:51 PM A4 A1
42. 30.10.2003 07:02 PM A4 Deceased
43. 30.10.2003 11:19 PM A4 A1
44. 31.10.2003 09:10 AM A4 A1
45. 31.10.2003 09:36 AM A4 A1
46. 31.10.2003 12:05 PM A4 Deceased
47. 31.10.2003 01:40 PM A4 Deceased
48. 31.10.2003 08:44 PM A4 A1
49. 31.10.2003 10:37 PM A4 A1
50. 31.10.2003 10:55 PM A4 Deceased

Table - 2
01.11.2003-15.11.2003

SI No. DATE TIME FROM TO
1. 01.11.2003 12:35 AM A1 A4
2. 01.11.2003 01:52 PM A4 Deceased
3. 01.11.2003 03:41 PM A4 A1
4. 01.11.2003 04:09 PM A4 Deceased
5. 01.11.2003 07:02 PM A4 A1
6. 01.11.2003 07:03 PM A4 A1
914 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

7. 01.11.2003 08:20 PM A4 Deceased
8. 01.11.2003 09:17 PM A4 A1
9. 01.11.2003 11:30 PM A4 A1
10. 01.11.2003 11:36 PM A4 Deceased
11. 01.11.2003 11:41 PM A4 A1
12. 02.11.2003 01:40 AM A1 A4
13. 02.11.2003 10:45 AM A4 Deceased
14. 02.11.2003 05:07 PM A4 Deceased
15. 02.11.2003 06:16 PM A4 A1
16. 02.11.2003 08:13 PM A4 Deceased
17. 02.11.2003 10:47 PM A4 Deceased
18. 03.11.2003 07:44 AM A4 Deceased
19. 03.11.2003 11:03 AM A4 A1
20. 03.11.2003 05:58 PM A4 A1
21. 03.11.2003 07:24 PM A4 Deceased
22. 03.11.2003 10:45 PM A4 Deceased
23. 03.11.2003 11:44 PM A4 A1
24. 04.11.2003 08:59 AM A4 Deceased
25. 04.11.2003 09:49 AM A4 A1
26. 04.11.2003 09:53 AM A4 A1
27. 04.11.2003 05:34 PM A4 A1
28. 05.11.2003 11:54 AM A4 Deceased
29. 05.11.2003 03:10 PM A4 Deceased
30. 05.11.2003 03:44 PM A4 Deceased
31. 05.11.2003 04:00:15 PM A4 A1
32. 05.11.2003 4:00:17 PM A4 A1
33. 05.11.2003 06:56 PM A4 Deceased
34. 05.11.2003 06:58 PM A4 Deceased
35. 05.11.2003 08:21:26 PM A4 A1
36. 05.11.2003 08:21:28 PM A4 A1
37. 05.11.2003 08:35 PM A4 Deceased
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 915

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

38. 05.11.2003 08:36 PM A4 Deceased
39. 05.11.2003 08:52:47 PM A4 A1
40. 05.11.2003 08:52:49 PM A4 A1
41. 05.11.2003 09:19 PM A4 A1
42. 05.11.2003 09:34 PM A4 A1
43. 05.11.2003 10:34 PM A4 Deceased
44. 06.11.2003 9:17 AM A4 Deceased
45. 06.11.2003 09:32 AM A4 A1
46. 06.11.2003 10:57:49 AM A4 A1
47. 06.11.2003 10:57:53 AM A4 A1
48. 06.11.2003 10:57:55 AM A4 A1
49. 06.11.2003 11:24 AM A4 A1
50. 06.11.2003 11:12 PM A4 Deceased
51. 07.11.2003 08:50 AM A4 Deceased
52. 07.11.2003 07:22:45 PM A4 Deceased
53. 07.11.2003 07:22:47 PM A4 Deceased
54. 07.11.2003 08:46 PM A4 Deceased
55. 07.11.2003 09:49 PM A4 Deceased
56. 07.11.2003 11:33:13 PM A4 A1
57. 07.11.2003 11:33:16 PM A4 A1
58. 07.11.2003 11:43 PM A4 A1
59. 08.11.2003 01:06 AM A4 A1
60. 08.11.2003 09:33 AM A1 A4
61. 08.11.2003 01:11 PM A4 Deceased
62. 08.11.2003 03:18 PM A4 Deceased
63. 08.11.2003 04:43 PM A4 A1
64. 08.11.2003 05:08:48 PM A4 A1
65. 08.11.2003 05:08:50 PM A4 A1
66. 08.11.2003 05:10 PM A4 Deceased
67. 08.11.2003 05:11 PM A4 Deceased
68. 08.11.2003 07:11 PM A4 Deceased
916 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

69. 08.11.2003 07:19 PM A4 Deceased
70. 08.11.2003 08:49 PM A4 Deceased
71. 08.11.2003 09:27 PM A4 A1
72. 08.11.2003 10:04:01 PM A4 A1
73. 08.11.2003 10:04:03 PM A4 A1
74. 09.11.2003 12:43 AM A1 A4
75. 09.11.2003 03:51 AM A1 A4
76. 09.11.2003 10:26 AM A4 A1
77. 09.11.2003 03:38 PM A4 A1
78. 09.11.2003 08:17 PM A4 A1
79. 09.11.2003 10:11:46 PM A4 A1
80. 09.11.2003 10:11:47 PM A4 A1
81. 09.11.2003 11:35 PM A1 A4
82. 10.11.2003 03:25 PM A4 A1
83. 10.11.2003 04:18 PM A4 A1
84. 10.11.2003 05:50 PM A4 A1
85. 10.11.2003 06:05 PM A4 A1
86. 10.11.2003 09:57 PM A4 A1
87. 10.11.2003 09:59:41 PM A4 A1
88. 10.11.2003 09:59:44 PM A4 A1
89. 10.11.2003 10:42 PM A4 A1
90. 10.11.2003 11:10:30 PM A4 A1
91. 10.11.2003 11:10:33 PM A4 A1
92. 11.11.2003 12:12 PM A4 A1
93. 11.11.2003 02:13 PM A4 A1
94. 11.11.2003 05:24 PM A4 A1
95. 11.11.2003 07:48 PM A4 A1
96. 11.11.2003 08:11 PM A4 Deceased
97. 11.11.2003 11:18:34 PM A4 A1
98. 11.11.2003 11:18:37 PM A4 A1
99. 11.11.2003 11:32 PM A1 A4
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 917

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

100. 12.11.2003 02:09 PM A4 A1
101. 12.11.2003 02.11 PM A4 A1
102. 12.11.2003 02:20 PM A4 A1
103. 12.11.2003 02:36 PM A4 A1
104. 12.11.2003 04:00 PM A4 A1
105. 12.11.2003 05:09 PM A4 A1
106. 12.11.2003 05:53 PM A4 A1
107. 12.11.2003 10:21 PM A4 A1
108. 12.11.2003 11:11 PM A4 A1
109. 12.11.2003 11:35 PM A4 Deceased
110. 13.11.2003 08:08 AM A1 A4
111. 13.11.2003 07:11 PM A4 A1
112. 13.11.2003 07:12:00 PM A4 A1
113. 13.11.2003 07:12:04 PM A4 A1
114. 13.11.2003 08:04 PM A4 Deceased
115. 13.11.2003 10:20:03 PM A4 A1
116. 13.11.2003 10:20:05 PM A4 A1
117. 13.11.2003 10:59 PM A4 A1
118. 13.11.2003 11:13 PM A1 A4
119. 14.11.2003 03:15 PM A4 Deceased
120. 14.11.2003 07:53 PM A4 A1
121. 14.11.2003 08:37:39 PM A4 A1
122. 14.11.2003 08:37:43 PM A4 A1
123. 14.11.2003 08:37:45 PM A4 A1
124. 14.11.2003 11:06:58 PM A4 A1
125. 14.11.2003 11:07:01 PM A4 A1
126. 15.11.2003 12:40 AM A4 A1
127. 15.11.2003 08:30 AM A4 A1
128. 15.11.2003 09:04:06 AM A4 A1
129. 15.11.2003 10:14 AM A4 Deceased
130. 15.11.2003 12:47 PM A1 A4
918 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

131. 15.11.2003 03:25 PM A4 Deceased
132. 15.11.2003 04:29 PM A4 Deceased
133. 15.11.2003 09:46 PM A4 Deceased
134. 15.11.2003 10:44 PM A4 Deceased
135. 15.11.2003 10:49 PM A4 Deceased
136. 15.11.2003 11:38 PM A4 A1

Table - 3
16.11.2003-24.11.2003

SI No. DATE TIME FROM TO
1. 16.11.2003 12:03 PM A4 Deceased
2. 16.11.2003 03:40 PM A4 A1
3. 16.11.2003 06:09:25 PM A4 A1
4. 16.11.2003 06:18:06 PM A4 A1
5. 16.11.2003 06:25:41 PM A4 A1
6. 16.11.2003 07:26:23 PM A4 A1
7. 16.11.2003 07:40 PM A4 Deceased
8. 16.11.2003 09:16 PM A4 Deceased
9. 16.11.2003 09:24 PM A4 Deceased
10. 16.11.2003 09:35 PM A4 Deceased
11. 16.11.2003 09:49 PM A4 Deceased
12. 16.11.2003 10:08:41 PM A4 A1
13. 17.11.2003 09:53 AM A4 A1
14. 17.11.2003 10:25 AM A4 A1
15. 17.11.2003 03:34 PM A4 Deceased
16. 17.11.2003 03:38 PM A4 A1
17. 17.11.2003 04:25 PM A1 A4
18. 17.11.2003 10:55:54 PM A4 A1
19. 17.11.2003 10:55:56 PM A4 A1
20. 17.11.2003 11:21 PM A4 A1
21. 17.11.2003 11:39 PM A4 A1
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 919

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

22. 17.11.2003 11:42 PM A4 A1
23. 18.11.2003 09:26 AM A4 A1
24. 18.11.2003 09:46:39 AM A4 A1
25. 18.11.2003 09:46:41 AM A4 A1
26. 18.11.2003 10:34 AM A4 A1
27. 18.11.2003 06:47:42 PM A4 A1
28. 18.11.2003 06:47:45 PM A4 A1
29. 18.11.2003 07:30 PM A4 Deceased
30. 18.11.2003 07:45 PM A4 Deceased
31. 19.11.2003 08:21:37 AM A4 A1
32. 19.11.2003 08:21:39 AM A4 A1
33. 19.11.2003 09:35 AM A4 A1
34. 19.11.2003 09:40:00 AM A4 A1
35. 19.11.2003 09:40:09 AM A4 A1
36. 19.11.2003 09:40:13 AM A4 A1
37. 19.11.2003 09:42:07 AM A4 A1
38. 19.11.2003 09:42:20 AM A4 A1
39. 19.11.2003 09:42:34 AM A4 A1
40. 19.11.2003 11:06 AM A4 A1
41. 19.11.2003 11:17:46 AM A4 A1
42. 19.11.2003 11:17:49 AM A4 A1
43. 19.11.2003 11:33 AM A4 A1
44. 19.11.2003 02:23 PM A4 A1
45. 19.11.2003 04:52 PM A4 A1
46. 19.11.2003 09:37 PM A4 Deceased
47. 19.11.2003 11:03:37 PM A4 A1
48. 19.11.2003 11:03:40 PM A4 A1
49. 19.11.2003 11:07 PM A4 A1
50. 20.11.2003 10:24 AM A4 Deceased
51. 20.11.2003 10:37:13 AM A4 A1
52. 20.11.2003 10:37:16 AM A4 A1
920 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

53. 20.11.2003 12:32 PM A4 A1
54. 20.11.2003 12:59 PM A4 A1
55. 20.11.2003 01:14 PM A4 A1
56. 20.11.2003 01:29 PM A4 A1
57. 20.11.2003 01:46 PM A4 A1
58. 20.11.2003 01:47 PM A4 A1
59. 20.11.2003 03:51 PM A4 Deceased
60. 20.11.2003 03:56 PM A4 A1
61. 20.11.2003 07:20 PM A4 Deceased
62. 20.11.2003 11:48 PM A4 A1
63. 20.11.2003 11:49 PM A4 A1
64. 21.11.2003 09:53 AM A4 A1
65. 21.11.2003 04:18:54 PM A4 Deceased
66. 21.11.2003 04:18:56 PM A4 Deceased
67. 21.11.2003 07:58 PM A4 A1
68. 21.11.2003 08:07 PM A4 A1
69. 21.11.2003 08:38:18 PM A4 A1
70. 21.11.2003 08:38:20 PM A4 A1
71. 21.11.2003 08:43 PM A4 A1
72. 21.11.2003 08:50 PM A4 A1
73. 21.11.2003 11:02:19 PM A4 A1
74. 21.11.2003 11:02:22 PM A4 A1
75. 21.11.2003 11:58 PM A4 A1
76. 22.11.2003 09:30:34 AM A4 A1
77. 22.11.2003 09:30:36 AM A4 A1
78. 22.11.2003 10:35 AM A4 A1
79. 22.11.2003 10:46 AM A4 A1
80. 22.11.2003 11:43 AM A4 A1
81. 22.11.2003 03:16 PM A4 Deceased
82. 22.11.2003 04:00 PM A4 Deceased
83. 22.11.2003 07:41:08 PM A4 A1
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 921

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

84. 22.11.2003 07:41:11 PM A4 A1
85. 22.11.2003 09:57:50 PM A4 A1
86. 22.11.2003 09:57:52 PM A4 A1
87. 22.11.2003 10:21 PM A4 A1
88. 22.11.2003 11:35 PM A1 A4
89. 22.11.2003 11:44:07 PM A4 A1
90. 22.11.2003 11:44:09 PM A4 A1
91. 23.11.2003 12:43 PM A4 A1
92. 23.11.2003 12:55 PM A4 A1
93. 23.11.2003 02:07 PM A4 A1
94. 23.11.2003 03:56 PM A4 A1
95. 23.11.2003 04:36 PM A4 A1
96. 23.11.2003 04:42 PM A4 A1
97. 23.11.2003 08:17 PM A3 A1
98. 23.11.2003 09:22:35 PM A4 A1
99. 23.11.2003 09:22:38 PM A4 A1
100. 23.11.2003 09:36 PM A4 Deceased
101. 23.11.2003 09:47 PM A4 Deceased
102. 23.11.2003 10:31 PM A3 A1
103. 23.11.2003 11:18 PM A4 A1
104. 24.11.2003 01:20 AM A4 A1
105. 24.11.2003 01:23 AM A4 A1
106. 24.11.2003 01:35 PM A4 A1
107. 24.11.2003 01:44 PM A4 Deceased
108. 24.11.2003 01:45 PM A4 A1
109. 24.11.2003 01:48 PM A4 Deceased
110. 24.11.2003 03:12 PM A4 A1
111. 24.11.2003 04:12 PM A3 A1
112. 24.11.2003 05:45 PM A3 A1
113. 24.11.2003 05:46 PM A3 A1
114. 24.11.2003 06:55 PM A4 A1
922 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

115. 24.11.2003 06:59 PM A4 Deceased
116. 24.11.2003 07:10 PM A4 A1
117. 24.11.2003 07:17 PM A4 A1
118. 24.11.2003 07:26 PM A4 A1
119. 24.11.2003 07:34 PM A4 A1
120. 24.11.2003 08:57 PM A4 A1
121. 24.11.2003 09:08 PM A4 A1
122. 24.11.2003 09:26 PM A4 A1
123. 24.11.2003 09:55 PM A4 A1
124. 24.11.2003 10:09 PM A1 A4
125. 24.11.2003 11:20 PM A4 A1

Table - 4
25.11.2003

S No. TIME FROM TO SMS/V
1. 10:21 AM A3 A1 V
2. 11:01 AM A3 A1 V
3. 03:03 PM A4 Deceased SMS/V
4. 04:24 PM A3 A1 V
5. 04:25 PM A3 A1 V
6. 06:18 PM A4 Deceased SMS/V
7. 09:04 PM A3 A4 V
8. 09:16 PM A3 A4 V
9. 09:17 PM A3 A4 V
10. 09:19 PM A3 A4 V
11. 09:23 PM A3 A4 V
12. 09:26 PM A3 A4 V
13. 09:28 PM A3 A4 V
14. 09:29 PM A3 A4 V
15. 09:32 PM A4 A1 SMS
16. 09: 40 PM A3 A4 V
17. 11:20 PM A1 A4 V
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 923

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

Table - 5
26.11.2003

S No. TIME FROM TO SMS/V
1. 09:06 AM A3 A1 V
2. 09:10 AM A4 A1 SMS
3. 09:26 AM A4 A1 SMS
4. 11:02 AM A4 A1 SMS
5. 11:07 AM A4 A1 SMS
6. 11:33 AM A3 A1 V
7. 12:13 PM A4 A1 SMS
8. 03:40 PM A4 Deceased SMS/V
9. 03:52 PM A4 A1 SMS
10. 04:27 PM A4 A1 SMS
11. 06:30 PM A3 A1 V
12. 09:13:29 PM A3 A1 V
13. 09:13:57 PM A3 A1 V
14. 09:38 PM A1 A4 V

Table - 6
27.11.2003

S No. TIME FROM TO SMS/V
1. 10:17 AM A3 A1 Residence V
2. 03:23 PM A3 A1 V
3. 05:43 PM A3 A4 V
4. 06:04 PM A4 A1 SMS
5. 06:33 PM A3 A4 V
6. 06:52 PM A3 A4 V
7. 07:00 PM A3 A4 V
8. 07:06 PM A4 Deceased SMS/V
9. 07:13 PM A3 A4 V
10. 07:17 PM A3 A4 V
11. 07:19 PM A3 A4 V
12. 07:49 PM A3 A4 V
924 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

13. 08:36 PM A4 A1 SMS
14. 08:42 PM A4 A1 SMS
15. 09:22 PM A4 A1 SMS
16. 11:11 PM A3 A1 V

Table - 7
28.11.2003

S No. TIME FROM TO SMS/V
1. 12:09 AM A1 A4 V
2. 12:12 AM A4 A1 V
3. 09:09 AM A4 A1 SMS
4. 09:18 AM A4 A1 SMS
5. 09:31 AM A4 A1 SMS
6. 09:44 AM A4 A1 SMS
7. 10:05 AM A4 A1 SMS
8. 10:22 AM A3 A1 V
9. 12:44 PM A3 A4 V
10. 12:53 PM A4 A3 V
11. 01:40 PM A4 A3 V
12. 02:31 PM A4 Deceased SMS/V
13. 02:56 PM A3 A1 V
14. 03:45 PM A3 A1 V
15. 04:00 PM A4 A3 V
16. 04:34 PM A4 Deceased SMS/V
17. 04:37:02 PM A4 Deceased SMS/V
18. 04:37:29 PM A4 Deceased SMS/V
19. 04:38 PM A1 A3 V
20. 05:08 PM A3 A1 V
21. 05:45 PM A1 A3 V
22. 06:06 PM A4 A1 SMS
23. 06:16 PM A1 A3 V
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 925

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

24. 06:22 PM A4 Deceased SMS/V
25. 06:40 PM A1 A3 V
26. 07:03 PM A4 A1 SMS
27. 07:09 PM A4 A1 SMS
28. 07:17 PM A4 A1 SMS
29. 07:40 PM A4 A1 SMS
30. 07:44 PM A4 A1 SMS
31. 07:53 PM A1 A3 V
32. 08:24 PM A4 A1 SMS
33. 09:23 PM A4 A1 V
34. 09:35 PM A3 A1 V
35. 11:41 PM A4 A1 SMS
36. 11:57 PM A4 A1 SMS
37. 11:57 PM A4 A1 SMS
38. 11:59 PM A1 A4 V

Table - 8
29.11.2003

S No. TIME FROM TO SMS/V
1. 08:53 AM A3 A4 V
2. 09:05 AM A4 A3 V
3. 09:06 AM A3 A1 V
4. 09:12 AM A4 Deceased SMS/V
5. 01:16 PM A4 A1 V
6. 01:59 PM A4 A1 SMS
7. 02:02 PM A4 A1 SMS
8. 02:25 PM A4 Deceased SMS/V
9. 03:00 PM A4 A1 SMS
10. 03:33 PM A4 Deceased SMS/V
926 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

11. 06:53 PM A4 Deceased SMS/V
12. 06:55 PM A4 A1 SMS
13. 06:58 PM A4 A1 SMS
14. 07:07 PM A1 A3 V
15. 07:15 PM A4 A1 SMS
16. 07:27 PM A4 A1 SMS
17. 08:07 PM A4 A1 SMS
18. 08:07 PM A3 A4 V
19. 08:30 PM A3 A4 V
20. 08:41 PM A3 A4 V
21. 08:45 PM A3 A4 V
22. 09:16 PM A3 A1 V
23. 09:17 PM A1 A3 V
24. 09:20 PM A4 A1 SMS
25. 09:51 PM A4 A1 SMS

Table - 9
30.11.2003 (Date of the Engagement Ceremony)

S No. TIME FROM TO SMS/V
1. 08:51 AM A4 A1 SMS
2. 09:11 AM A4 A1 V
3. 10:22 AM A1 A4 V
4. 10:39 AM A4 Deceased SMS/V
5. 10:48 AM A4 A1 SMS
6. 12:49 PM A4 A1 SMS
7. 01:00 PM A3 A1 V
8. 02:38 PM A4 A1 SMS
9. 04:04 PM A4 A1 SMS
10. 07:42 PM A3 A4 V
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 927

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

11. 08:22 PM A3 A2 V
12. 08:29 PM A3 A2 V
13. 08:46 PM A3 A4 V
14. 08:49 PM A3 A4 V
15. 10:53 PM A4 A1 SMS

Table - 10
01.12.2003

SI No. TIME FROM TO SMS/V
1. 12:11 PM A3 A1 V
2. 12:13 PM A3 A2 V
3. 01:40 PM A3 A2 V
4. 05:06:50 PM A1 A4 SMS/V
5. 07:45 PM A4 Deceased V
6. 08:39:53 PM A1 A4 SMS/V
7. 09:03 PM A3 A1 V
8. 10:47 PM A3 A1 V
9. 10:53 PM A4 A1 SMS
10. 10:56 PM A1 A4 SMS
A-4
11. 11:51 PM A1 V
Residence

Table – 11
02.12.2003

SI No. TIME FROM TO SMS/V
1. 08:37 AM A4 A1 SMS
2. 10:18 AM A1 A4 SMS
3. 10:35 AM A1 A4 SMS
4. 10:39 AM A4 A1 V
5. 11:20 AM A3 A2 V
6. 11:21 AM A3 A1 V
928 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

7. 01:11 PM A1 A4 SMS
8. 01:12 PM A4 Deceased V
9. 01:22 PM A4 A3 V
10. 03:11 PM A1 A3 V
11. 03:41 PM A4 A1 SMS
12. 03:45 PM A3 A2 V
13. 03:49 PM A3 A4 V
14. 03:50 PM A3 A4 V
15. 03:54 PM A3 A2 V
16. 04:29 PM A3 A2 V
17. 04:53 PM A3 A2 V
18. 05:05 PM A1 A4 SMS
19. 05:12 PM A4 A1 SMS
20. 05:37 PM A4 A1 SMS
A4
21. 05:44 PM A1 V
Residence
22. 06:32 PM A1 A2 V
23. 06:37 PM A4 A1 SMS
24. 06:37 PM A1 A4 SMS
25. 06:46 PM A1 A4 V
26. 06:49 PM A4 Deceased SMS
A4
27. 06:50 PM A1 V
Residence
28. 06:52 PM A1 A2 V
29. 06:59 PM A1 A4 SMS
30. 07:03 PM A1 A2 V
31. 07:42 PM A1 A2 V
32. 07:44 PM A1 A2 V
33. 07:44 PM A1 A4 V
34. 07:55 PM A4 A2 SMS
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 929

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

35. 07:58 PM A1 A4 V
A4
36. 07:59 PM A1 V
Residence
A4
37. 08:06 PM A1 V
Residence
A4
38. 08:14 PM A1 V
Residence
A4
39. 08:15 PM A1 V
Residence
A4
40. 08:20 PM A1 V
Residence
41. 08:28 PM A1 A2 SMS
42. 08:28 PM A1 A2 SMS
43. 08:29 PM A1 A2 SMS
44. 08:31 PM A1 A2 SMS
45. 08:40 PM A1 A2 V
46. 08:59 PM A4 A1 SMS
47. 09:05 PM A4 A1 SMS
A4
48. 09:13 PM A1 V
Residence
49. 09:23 PM A1 A4 SMS
50. 09:24 PM A4 A1 SMS
51. 09:52 PM A1 A4 SMS
52. 09:52 PM A1 A4 SMS
A2
53. 10:08 PM A1 V
Residence
A4
54. 10:42 PM A1 V
Residence
55. 11:21 PM A4 A1 SMS
56. 11:21 PM A4 A1 SMS
57. 11:24 PM A1 A4 SMS
58. 11:30 PM A4 A1 SMS
930 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Table - 12
03.12.2003

SI No. TIME FROM TO SMS/V
1. 8:50 AM A4 A1 SMS
2. 10:33 AM A4 A1 V
Residence
3. 10:36 AM A4 A1 V
Residence
4. 12:17 PM A4 A1 V
Residence
5. 12:22 PM A4 A1 V
Residence
6. 12:31 PM A4 A1 V
Residence
7. 01:06 PM A4 A1 SMS
8. 01:09 PM A1 A4 SMS
9. 01:11 PM A4 A1 SMS
10. 01:32 PM A4 A1 V
Residence
11. 01:38 PM A4 A1 SMS
12. 01:53 PM A4 A1 V
Residence
13. 02:10 PM A1 A4 SMS
14. 02:11 PM A4 A1 V
Residence
15. 03:07 PM A4 A1 SMS
16. 03:16 PM A1 A4 V
17. 03:23 PM A1 A2 SMS
18. 03:30 PM A1 A2 SMS
19. 03:39 PM A1 A2 SMS
20. 03:44 PM A3 A2 V
21. 04:52 PM A3 A1 V
22. 05:16 PM A3 A1 V
23. 05:22 PM A3 A1 V
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 931

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

24. 05:32 PM A4 Deceased V
25. 05:33 PM A4 Deceased V
26. 05:42 PM A1 A2 V
Residence
27. 05:46 PM A3 A1 V
28. 05:54 PM A3 A2 V
29. 06:01 PM A3 A4 V
30. 06:16 PM A4 Deceased V
31. 06:25 PM A4 Deceased V
32. 06:37 PM A1 A4 SMS
33. 06:41 PM A4 A1 SMS
34. 06:46 PM A1 A4 SMS
35. 06:51 PM A4 A1 SMS
36. 06:54 PM A1 A4 SMS
37. 06:56 PM A4 A1 SMS
38. 07:03 PM A1 A4 SMS
39. 07:05 PM A4 A1 SMS
40. 07:12 PM A1 A4 SMS
41. 07:21 PM A1 A4 SMS
42. 07:28 PM A1 A4 SMS
43. 07:37 PM A4 A1 SMS
44. 07:39 PM A3 A2 V
45. 07:39 PM A1 A4 SMS
46. 07:42 PM A4 A1 SMS
47. 07:44 PM A1 A4 SMS
48. 07:45 PM A1 A4 SMS
49. 08:05 PM A1 A4 SMS
50. 08:12 PM A1 A4 SMS
51. 08:13 PM A4 A1 SMS
52. 08:16 PM A1 A4 SMS
53. 08:17 PM A4 PW-10 V
54. 08:20 PM A1 A4 SMS
932 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

55. 08:22 PM A4 A1 SMS
56. 08:23 PM A1 A4 SMS
57. 08:26 PM A4 A1 SMS
58. 08:32 PM A1 A4 SMS
59. 08:33 PM A4 A1 SMS
60. 08:38 PM A1 A4 SMS
61. 08:39 PM A3 A2 V
62. 08:40 PM A4 A1 SMS
63. 08:44 PM A1 A4 SMS
64. 08:47 PM A4 A1 SMS
65. 08:49 PM A1 A4 SMS
66. 08:55 PM A4 A1 SMS
67. 08:58 PM A1 A4 SMS
68. 09:07 PM A4 A1 SMS
69. 09:08 PM A1 A4 SMS
70. 09:10 PM A1 A4 SMS
71. 09:14 PM A1 A4 SMS
72. 09:25 PM A3 A2 V
73. 09:39 PM A1 A4 V
74. 09:56 PM PW-10 A4 V

No. of communications on the date of the incident

Accused persons No. of SMS No. of calls Total
A1 and A4 45 SMS 9 calls 54
A1 and A3 0 4 calls 4
A1 and A2 3 SMS 1 call 4
A3 and A2 0 5 calls 5
A4 and A3 0 1 call 1
A4 and A2 0 0 0
A4 and deceased 0 4 calls 4
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 933

Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka & Anr.

No. of communications between 06:37 PM to 09:39 PM

Accused persons No. of SMS No. of calls Total

A1 and A4 38 SMS 0 38

A1 and A3 0 0 0

A1 and A2 0 0 0

A3 and A2 0 3 calls 3

A4 and A3 0 0 0

A4 and A2 0 0 0

A4 and deceased 0 0 0

Table - 13
04.12.2003

SI No. TIME FROM TO SMS/V

1. 02:10 A.M A4 A1 SMS

2. 02:10 AM A4 A1 SMS

3. 06:41 AM A4 A1 SMS

4. 06:51 AM A4 A1 SMS

5. 08:36 AM A3 A2 V

6. 08:42 AM A3 A1 V

7. 09:14 AM A3 A2 V

8. 10:04 AM A3 A1 V

9. 10:12 AM A3 A2 V

10. 03:28 PM A1 Residence A2 V

11. 04:18 PM A4 A1 SMS

12. 04:48 PM A1 A3 V
934 [2025] 7 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Table - 14
05.12.2003 & 06.12.2003

SI No. DATE TIME FROM TO
1. 05.12.2003 10:05 AM A1 A4
2. 05.12.2003 02:47 PM A1 A2
3. 05.12.2003 02:48 PM A1 A2
4. 05.12.2003 02:49 PM A1 A2
5. 05.12.2003 04:36 PM A1 A2
6. 05.12.2003 04:37 PM A1 A2
7. 05.12.2003 04:38 PM A1 A2
8. 05.12.2003 04:39 PM A1 A2
9. 06.12.2003 08:15:32 PM A1 A4

***

Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey