KULDEEP SINGHversusG.M., INSTRUMENT DESIGN DEVELOPMENT AND FACILITIES CENTRE & ANR.

               [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 873


                      KULDEEP SINGH                              A
                              v.
    G.M., INSTRUMENT DESIGN DEVELOPMENT AND
               FACILITIES CENTRE & ANR.
             (Civil Appeal No. 10231 of 2010)
                                                                 B.
                   ,DECEMBER 03, 2010

    [P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]

     Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - s. 10 - Reference of
disputes to Board, Courts or Tribunals - Termination of C
workman - Several representations made by workman to
various authorities - Reference of disputes to Labour Court
by State Government - Labour Court held that the services
of the workman was terminated without complying with s.25F
and, therefore, the termination order was illegal, null and void D .
but ultimately dismissed the claim of the workman on the
ground of delay of five and a half years in making reference
- Order upheld by High Court - On appeal held: There is no
prescribed time limit for reference of industrial dispute uls. 10
- In view of the particulars furnished as also the explanation · E
offered by the workman, the delay was not so culpable as to... '
disentitle him any relief - Workman directed to be reinstated
with consequential service benefits but without back wages - ·
Delayllaches.

     The respondent-management terminated the services F
of the appellant-workman. The appellant made several
representatives to various authorities. Thereafter, the
State Government referred the dispute between the
appellant and the respondent to the Labour Court. The
Labour Court held that the respondent-management is an G
industry within the meaning of s. 2 (j) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947; that the appellant had rendered the '
duties for more than 240 days in the 12 preceding months ·
but the management terminated his services without
                             873                                 H



                                                                     ..
    874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL) S.C.R.

A complying with the provisions of s. 25F of the Act and,
  thus, was illegal null and void and deserves to be set
  aside. However, the Labour Court dismissed the claim of
  the appellant on the ground of delay of five and a half
  years in making the reference. The High Court dismissed
s the writ petition filed by the appellant for reinstatement
  with full back wages and other benefits. Therefore, the
  appellant filed the instant appeal.

        Allowing the appeal, the Court

C       HELD: 1.1. It is clear that the Labour Court, on
  appreciation of oral and documentary evidence,
  concluded that the termination of the appellant-workman
  Is Illegal, null and void and deserves to be set aside. This
  finding became final 1 since the Management did not
D question the same by way of writ petition. Undoubtedly,
  the Management has to follow the provisions of the Act
  while effecting termination, in fact, which was accepted
  by the Labour Court and the Management did not
  challenge the same before any forum. [Paras 10 and 20]
E [882-B; 889-B]
        .1.2. By making various representations from the day
  when the services of the appellant were terminated and
  till his last representation dated 16.07.1996 to the Manager,
  the workman has proved that he was agitating his
F termination one way or other with all the authorities
  concerned. The particulars furnished clearly show that
  the appellant/workman was fighting for his cause before
  the Management as well as with the State Government
  including the Chief Secretary and the Minister of the
G concerned Department. Ultimately, the State Government
  made a reference on 22.11.1999 to the Labour Court for
  adjudication. [Para 19] [888-E-F]

      1.3. There is no prescribed time limit for the
H appropriate Government to exercise its powers under
                                                                 /
  KULDEEP SINGH v. G.M., INST. DESIGN DEVELOPMENT        875
              AND FACILITIES CENTRE
  I

  I
   Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is more A
  so in view of the language used, namely, if any industrial
  dispute exists or is apprehended, the appropriate
  government 'at any time' refer the dispute to a Board or
  Court for enquiry. The reference sought for by the
  workman cannotbe said to be delayed or suffering from s
. a1 lapse when law does not prescribe 1any period of
  limitation for raising a dispute under Section 10 of the
  Act. The real test for making a reference is whether at the
  time of ~he reference, dispute exists or not and when It
   is made, it is presumed that the State Government is . c
  satisfied with the ingredients of the provision, thus, the
   Labour Court cannot go behind the reference. It is not
   open to the Government to go into the merit of the
  dispute concerned and once it is found that an industrial
  dispute exists then it is incumbent on the part of the
  Government to make reference. It cannot itself decide the D
  merit of the dispute and it is for the appropriate Court or
   Forum to decide the same. The satisfaction of the
  appropriate authority in the matter of making reference
   under Section 10(1) of the Act is a subjective satisfaction. E
   Normally, the Government cannot decline to make .
   reference for laches committed by the workman. If
  adequate reasons are shown, the Government is bound ·
  to refer the dispute to the appropriate Court or Forum for
  adjudication. Even though, there is no limitation
  prescribed for reference of dispute to the Labour Court/ F
  Industrial Tribunal, even so, it is only reasonable that the
  disputes should be referred as soon as possible after
  they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have
  failed, particularly, when disputes relate to discharge of
  workman. If sufficient materials are not put forth for the G
  enormous delay, it would certainly be fatal. However, in
  view of the explanation offered by the workman, in the
  case on hand, the delay has not been so culpable as to
   disentitle him any relief. In view of the details furnished
  and the explanation offered, the workman cannot be H
    876    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R


A blamed for the delay and he was all along hoping that one
  day his grievance would be considered by the
  Management or by the State Government.[Para 21) [889-
  C-H; 890-A-C]

       1.4. The award of the Labour Court insofar as holding
8
  that the reference by the State Government is bad and
  incompetent being raised so belatedly and dismissing
  the claim statement on this ground and the order of the
  High Court upholding the said order of the Labour Court
C and dismissing the writ petition filed by the workman, is
  set aside. In view of the conclusion of the Labour Court
  with regard to the issues decided in favour of workman
  holding that the Management terminated his services
  without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of
  the Act and the said order is illegal, null and void
D deserves to be set aside, the appellant-workman is
  directed to be reinstatement with consequential service
  benefits but without back wages. [Para 22) [890-E-F]

       Sapan Kumar Pandit vs. UP. State Electricity Board and
E Ors. (2001) 6 SCC 222; Mis Western India Match Co. Ltd.
  vs. The Western India Match Co. Workers Union and Ors.
  (1970) 1 SCC 225; Nedungadi Bank Ltd. vs. K. P.
  Madhavankutty and Ors. (2000) 2 SCC 455; Haryana State
  Coop. Land Development Bank vs. Nee/am (2005) 5 SCC
F 91; S. M. Nilajkar and Ors. vs. Telecom District Manager,
  Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 27 - referred to.

                        Case Law Reference:
          (2001) s sec 222     Referred to.        Para 15
G         (1970) 1 sec 225     Referred to.        Para 15
          (2000) 2 sec 455     Referred to.        Para 16
          (2005) 5 sec 91      Referred to.        Para 18
H         (2003) 4 sec 21      Referred to.        Para 20
  KULDEEP SINGH v. G.M., INST. DESIGN DEVELOPMENT 877
              AND FACILITIES CENTRE

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.                A
 10231 of 2010.

      From the Judgment & Order dated 31.10.2006 of the High
 Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in C.W.P.No. 8774
 of 2005.                                                           B

      B.S. Mor, R.C. Kaushik for the Appellant.

      Shish Pal Laler, Balbir Singh Gupta for the Respondents.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                    c
      P. SATHASIVAM, J. 1. Leave granted.

       2. This appeal is filed against the judgment and order of
  the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh dated
, 31.10.2006 in CWP No. 8774 of 2005 wherein the Division           D
  Bench of the High Court confirmed the award passed by the
  Labour Court, Ambala and dismissed the-writ petition filed by
  the appellant herein for reinstatement with full back wages and
  other consequential benefits.
                                                                    E
 3. Brief facts:

      (a) It is the case of one Sh. Kuldeep Singh, the appellant/
      workman, that on 08.10.1990, he was appointed as Data
      Entry Operator on daily wages and he worked as such till
      28.11.1991 and thereafter on ad-hoc basis and worked up       F
      to 26.05.1992 without any break when his services were
      terminated by the Instrument Design Development and
      Facilities Centre (IDDC)-the respondent/management
      herein. According to him, no notice or compensation in lieu
      thereof was given for terminating his services though he      G
      had worked for 240 days in the preceding 12 months.
      According to the appellant workers junior to him were
      retained and even fresh appointments were made after the
      termination of his services which is in violation of
      provisions of Sections 25F to H of the Industrial Disputes    H
            I
    878    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A         Act, 1947 (in short "the Act").

          (b) It is the case of the respondent/Management that the
          appellant/workman was working on daily wages to meet
          the exigencies of work and his contract of employment was
          on day to day basis and that the workman did not render
B
          duty for requisite number of days in the 12 preceding
          months as claimed. It was further denied that any worker
          junior to the appellant was retained in service or any fresh
          appointment was made.
c         (c) On 12.12.2003, the Labour Court, after adverting to the
          reference made by the Governor of Haryana as to the non-
          employment of the appellant and after framing necessary
          issues has held that the respondent/Management is an
          industry within the meaning of Section 20) of the Act and
D         found that the workman rendered the duty for more than
          240 days in the 12 preceding months but the Management
          terminated his services without complying with the
          provisions of Section 25F of the Act, so the order
          impugned is illegal, null and void and deserves to be set
E         aside. Having found so on the material issues 1, 5 and 6
          in favour of the workman, however, on the ground of delay
          in raising the demand and finding that the reference is bad
          and incompetent being raised so belatedly dismissed the
          claim of the workman.
F         (d) Aggrieved by the dismissal of his claim, the workman
          filed Civil Writ Petition No. 8774 of 2005 before the High
          Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh. By the
          impugned judgment dated 31.10.2006, the Division Bench
          of the High Court by holding that the unexplained inordinate
G         delay has rendered the dispute in question as patently
          stale accepted the award of the Labour Court and
          dismissed the writ petition. Questioning the same, the
          workman has filed the above appeal by way of special
          leave.
H
  KULDEEP SINGH v. G.M., INST. DESIGN DEVELOPMENT 879
      AND FACILITIES CENTRE [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
     4. Heard Mr. S.S. Mor, learned counsel for the appellant/           A
 workman and Mr. Shishpal Laler, learned counsel for the
 respondent/Management.

      5. The point for consideration in this appeal is whether the
 Labour Court and the High Court justified in rejecting the claim
                                                                         8
 of the workman merely on the ground of delay when the Labour
 Court concluded in categorical terms that the termination of the
 services of the workman by the Management without complying
 with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act is illegal, null and
 void and deserves to be set aside.
                                                                         c
        6. It is not in dispute that the appellant was terminated from
 service w.e.f. 26.05.1992. It is the claim of the workman that
 he has worked as Data Entry Operator from 08.10.1990 to
 28.11.1991 and thereafter, on ad hoc basis from 28.11.1991
 to 26.05.1992 and since he had worked for more than 240 days            o
 iri 'the 12 preceding months and his juniors were retained in
 service and fresh appointments were also made after his
 ti!lrmination, .the act of the Management is in violation of the
 provisions of Section 25 F to H of the Act.

       7. After prolonged correspondence, the Governor of                E
· Haryana illI exercise of power conferred under Section 10(1)(c)
  of the Act, has made the following reference between the
  appellant/workman and the respondent/Management to the
  Labour Court, Ambala for adjudication by way of notification
  bearing No. 62638 dq,ted 22.11.1999:                                   F
        '
      "Whether the termination of services of the workman
      Kuldeep Singh is valid and justified, if not so, to what relief
      including back wages is he entitled?"
                                                                         G
      8. Before considering the order of reference, it is
 worthwhile to refer Section 10 of the Act. Chapter-Ill of the Act
 ~peaks about reference of Disputes to Boards, Courts or
 Tribunals. We are concerned with Section 10 (1) which reads '
 as under:
                                                                         H
    880     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A         "10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or
          Tribunals.- (1) Where the appropriate Government is of
          opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is
          apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing-

           (a)   refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a
B
                 settlement thereof; or

           (b)   refer any matter appearing to be connected with or
                 relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or

c          (c)   refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be
                 connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it
                 relates to any matter specified in the Second
                 Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or

           (d)   refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be
D                connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether
                 it relates to any matter specified in the Second
                 Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for
                 adjudication:

E                xxxxxxxx"

    Based on the above provision, on the application of the
    workman, the Government of Haryana made the above
    reference to the Labour Court, Ambala. On receipt of the
F reference from the State Government, the Court assigned it as
    reference No. 254 of 1999. Both the workman and the
 ·" Management filed their written statements before the Labour
    Court. The Labour Court, based on the claim of both the
    workman and the Management framed the following issues for
    trial:-
G
            (1) Whether the termination of services of workman
                Kuldeep Singh is valid and justified? If not so to
                what relief including back wages is he entitled?

H          (2)   Whether the reference is not maintainable asj
KULDEEP SINGH v. G.M., INST. DESIGN DEVELOPMENT 881
    AND FACILITIES CENTRE [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

             alleged in preliminary objection No1 of the written   A
             statement? OPM

      (3)    Whether the respondent-Management is an
             industry, if so, to what effect? OPM

      (4)    Whether the reference is bad on account of delay      B
             and laches as alleged in preliminary objection No.2
             of the WS? OPM

      (5)     Whether the workman was appointed on ad hoc
            . basis and against a specific work and after the      c
              completion of work his services came to an end
              and if so, to what effect? OPM
                                      '
      (6)    Whether the workman did not complete mandafory ·
             240 days as alleged? OPM
                                                                   D
      9. Before the Labour Court, both the parties led evidence
in support of their respective claims. The workman, as WW-1,
reiterated about his service particulars as stated in his claim
petition and also marked documents A-E in support of his
claim. On the other hand, one Balbir Singh, S.O., was examined     E
as MW-1 on the side of the Management. Appointment letter
of the workman was marked as Exs.M1 & M2. The relevant
pages of the attendance register are marked as Exs. M3 to
M16. MW-1 asserted that the Management never removed the
workman from service and he has not rendered the duty for          F
240 days in the p~eceding 12 months. After considering the
claim of both parties in the form of oral and documentary
evidence, in respect of issues 1, 5 and 6, the Labour Court, in
para 19, has concluded thus:           '

 , "Workman rendered the duty for more than 240 days in            G
   the 12 preceding months, as I held above, but the
   Management terminated his services without complying
   with the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial
   Disputes Act, so the order impugned is illegal, null and
   void and deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, issue           H
    882    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A         Nos. 1, 5 & 6 are decided in favour of workman."

         10. It is clear that the Labour Court, on appreciation of oral
    and documentary evidence, has concluded that the termination
    of the workman i.e. the appellant herein is illegal, null and void
    and deserves to be set aside. This finding has become final
8
    since the Management did not question the same by way of
    writ petition.

       11. It is not in dispute that with regard to issue No.3, the
  Labour Court has concluded that the Management-the
C respondent herein is an industry within the meaning of Section
  20) of the Act.

       12. The Labour Court has concluded that the workman had
  raised the demand of reference after more than five and a half
o years of his termination and has not offered plausible and
  convincing explanation. On the other hand, it is the claim of the
  workman that though his services were terminated on
  26.05.1992, all along, he was agitating the issue with the i
  Government in one form or other and by making representation            l
E to various authorities. Having found the termination void and
  contrary to the provisions of the Act, the Labour Court dismissed '
  the claim of the workman only on the ground of delay.

         13. The appellanUworkman has furnished the following
    information to show that after termination, he made several
F   representations to various authorities. They are:

           (i)     Representation dated 10.06.92 to the Hon'ble
                   Minister of respondents' department.

           (ii)    Representation dated 11.05.93 to the Chief
G
                   Secretary of Haryana State.

           (iii)   Representation dated 7.12.94 to the General
                   Manager, IDDC., Ambala

H          (iv)    Representation dated 4.1095 to the General
 KULDEEP SINGH v. G.M., INST. DESIGN DEVELOPMENT 883
     AND FACILITIES CENTRE [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

             Manager, ID.D.C., Ambala                                  A

      (v)    Representation dated 16. 7 .96 to the Manager,
             HARTON, Chandigarh.

             Besides that, he attempted for the same job twice
             as under:                                                 B

      (i)    Applied and interviewed for the same post out of 4
             vacancies advertised in the Tribune dated
             19.09.92.

      (ii)   Applied and interviewed for the same post out of
                                                                       c
             60 vacancies in the Sunday Tribune dated
             14.5.1995.

   The factual details have not been seriously denied by the
Management.                                                            D

     14. We have already noted that the Labour Court held that
the appellant has completed 240 days in 12 preceding months
and the respondent/Management terminated his services
without complying with the provisions of Section 25(f) of the Act      E
and that the order of termination dated 26.05.1992 is illegal,
null and void and deserves to be set aside but only on the
ground of delay rejected his claim in its entirety.

      15. Let us consider whether the Labour Court and the High
Court justified in rejecting the claim of the workman only on the      F
ground of delay in making the ref~i'ence, more particularly, when
the Labour Court found that tile termination is bad and contrary
to the Act. It is not in dispute that there is no limitation
prf;!scribed for making reference to the Government under
Section 10 of the Act. It is useful to refer to the decision of this   G
Court in Sapan Kumar Pandit vs. U.P. State Electricity Board
and Others, (2001) 6 SCC 222 which is directly on the point
in the case on hand. In that case, the appellant was appointed
as a Clerk on 01.01.1974 in the Electricity Distribution Division,
Mathura of the U.P. State Electricity Board, but his services          H
    884     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A were terminated on 17.. 07.1975. He raised an industrial dispute
  that the termination of his services was 111egal. The State
  Government, by an order dated 29.03.1993, referred the
  dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication as per Section 4-
  K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.
B
       "Whether termination of the appellant on 17.07 .1975 by the
       employer was proper and legal; if not so, to what reliefs
       the workman is entitled?"

          The Labour Court took up the reference as Adjudication
c         Case No. 158 of 1993. The respondent Board filed a writ
          petition before the Allahabad High Court assailing the
          aforesaid reference order and also praying for quashing
          the adjudication case pending in the Labour Court. The
          appellant was arrayed as Respondent No. 5 in the writ
D         petition. A Single Judge of the High Court took the view
          that the delay is so inordinate that the dispute has ceased
          to exist by efflux of time and hence no reference under the
          U.P. Act should have been made. Accordingly, the order
          of reference passed by the Government was quashed by
E         the High Court holding that the workman kept silent for
          more than 15 years and he woke up only after the petition
          of other co-workmen was allowed and he made no efforts
          to get his dispute referred to the Industrial Tribunal or
          Labour Court. By holding so, allowed the writ petition of
F         the Management. The decision further shows that along
          with the appellant, the Board retrenched ten other workmen.
          Though the Industrial Tribunal passed an award granting
          retrenchment compensation and certain further other
          reliefs, the Union was not satisfied with the said award and
G
          they filed a writ petition in 1980 before the High Court of
          Allahabad. On 28.04.1988, the High Court allowed that writ
          petition and held that retrenchment was bad in law and the
          workmen concerned are entitled to be reinstated. Though
          the Board filed special leave petition in this Court which
          was dismissed in 1989. According to the appellant, he was
H
KULDEEP SINGH v. G.M., INST. DESIGN DEVELOPMENT           885
    AND FACILITIES CENTRE [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

   entertaining the expectation that the Board would ~xtend A
   the same benefit to him. He was proceeding with his
   request to the Board that he should be treated on par with
   eight workmen some of whom were reemployed by the
   Board. When the appellant found that this was not done,
   he approached the Conciliation Officer appointed by the B
   State Government. His application for condoning the delay
   in initiating conciliation proceeding was disallowed by the
   Conciliation Officer. However, the Deputy Labour
   Commissioner went to his rescue as the delay was
   condoned and the conciliation proceedings were revived.       c
   Thi.s happened on 28.01.1992. It was in ·the aforesaid
   background that the State Government made the reference
   for adjudication on 29.03.1993. Section 4-K of the U.P.
   Industrial Disputes Act is almost in tune with Section 10
   of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and also there is no
                                                               0
   time limit fixed for making the reference for a dispute for
   adjudication. Considering the identical words i.e., "at any
   time" used in Section .1 O (1) of the Act and Section 4 of
   the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, considered the main
   question namely, "Was the industrial dispute in existence E
   on the date of reference for adjudication?" While
   considering the same, a three-Judge Bench decision of
   this Court as to the scope of the very same provision,
   namely, Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act
   was cited before the Bench. In Mis Western India Match
    Co. Ltd. vs. The Western India Match Co. Workers Union F
   and Ors., (1970) 1 SCC 225 =AIR 1970 SC 1205, the
   learned Judges made the following observations:-

   "Therefore, the expression 'at any time', though seemingly
   without any limits, is governed by the context in which it    G
   appears. Ordinarily, the question of making a reference
   would arise after conciliation proceedings have been
   gone through and the Conciliation Officer has made a
   failure report. But the Government need n~t wait until such
   a procedure has been completed. In an urgent case, it can     fi
    886 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A      'at any time', i.e., even when such proceedings have not
       begun or are still pending, decide to refer the dispute for
       adjudication. The expression 'at any time' thus takes in
       such cases as where the Government decides to make a
       refere~ce without waiting for conciliation proceedings to
B      begin or to be completed. As already stated, the
       expression 'at any time' in the context in which it is used
       postulates that a reference can only be made if an
       industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. No reference
       is contemplated by the section when the dispute is not an
c      industrial dispute, or even if it is so, it no longer exists or
       is not apprehended, for instance, where it is already
       adjourned or in respect of which there is an agreement or
       a settlement between the parties or where the industry in
       question is no longer in existence."
D      Based on the interpretation of the three-Judge Bench, it
       was concluded:
        "15. There are cases in which lapse of time had caused
        fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept
E       the dispute alive during the long interval, it is reasonably
        possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute
       .ceased to· exist after some time. But when the dispute
        remained alive though not galvanised by the workmen or
        the union on account of other justified reasons, it does not
F       cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. In this case,
        when the Government has chosen to refer the dispute for
        adjudication under Section 4-K of the U.P. Act the High
        Court should not have quashed the reference merely on
        the ground of delay. Of course, the long delay for making
G       the adjudication could be considered by the adjudicating
        authorities while moulding its reliefs. That is a different
        matter altogether. The High Court has obviously gone
        wrong in axing down the order of reference made by the
        Government for adjudication. Let the adjudicatory process
        reach its legal culmination."
H
      KULDEEP SINGH v. G.M., INST. DESIGN DEVELOPMENT 887
          AND FACILITIES CENTRE [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

     After saying so, allowed the appeal of the workman and set           A
     aside the judg,fient of the High Court.
/,
          16. Learned counsel appearing for the Manag~
     heavily relied on the decision of this Court in Nedungadi £3,J;rtk
     Ltd. vs. K.P. Madhavankutty and Others, (2000} 2 s,.ce 455,
                                                                          8
     particularly, the ultimate conclusion in para 6whiQ:tfeads thus:

         "6. Law does .not prescribe anf'time-t'imit for the
         appropriate Government to exercise its powers· under
         Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be
         exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which       C
         had since been settled. Power is to be exercised
         reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us
         to be no rational basis on which the Central Government
         has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about
         seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from          D
         service. At the time reference was made no industrial
         dispute existed or could be even said to have been
         apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the
         subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act.
         As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would               E
         depend on the facts and circumstances of eacn case.
         When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be
         rather incon~yuous that the reference be made under
         Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present
         one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute          F
         pending at the time when the reference in question was
         made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was
         that two other employees who were dismissed from service
         were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were
         dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere                 G
         mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising
         an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent."

          17. Though this decision lays down that law does not
     prescribe any time limit for appropriate Government to exercise
     its power under Section 10 of the Act, the Court has concluded       H
     888     SUPREMr' COURT RFPORTS [7010) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A    that the said power is to be e:;ercised reasonably and in a
     rationalei manner. In that case, the Central Government
     exercised its power after a lapse of about seven years of the
     order dismissing the workman from service. A perusal of the
     said decision shows that the workman has not furnished
B    adequate reasons/materials for such a long delay and the only
     ground advanced by him was that two other similarly placed
     employees dismissed from service were reinstated.

           18. It is true that following the decision in Nedungadi Bank
C    Ltd. (supra), another two-Judge Bench of this Court in Haryana
     State Coop. Land Development Bank vs. Nee/am, (2005) 5
     JCC 91 accepted the similar claim of the Management and
     non-suited the workman on the ground of delay.

          19. We have already pointed out that there is no limitation
[J   prescribed in the Act or in any other local Act prescribing such
     period. V!e have also referred to the materials placed by the
     workman. By making various representations from the day
     when his services were terminated and till his last
     represer1tation dated 16.07.1996 to the Manager, HARTON,
E    Chandigarh the workman has proved that he was agitating his
     termination one way or other with all the authorities concerned.
     The particulars furnistieJ clea1 ly show that the appellant/
     workman was fighting for his cause before the Management as
     well as with the State Government including the Chief Secretary
F    and the Minister of the concerned Department. Ultimately, the
     State Government has made a reference on 22. 11.1999 to the
     Labour Court for adjudication.

       20. The view expressed in Sapan Kumar Pandit (supra)
  which is identical to our case has been considered and followed
G in the subsequent decision, namely, S.M. Nilajkar and Others
  vs. Telecom Dist1ict Manager, l'.amataka, (2003) 4 SCC 27.
  In both the decisions, the principles laid down in Nedungadi
  Bank (supra) have been considered and distinguished. We
  have already mentioned that in Sapan Kumar Pandit (supra),
H this Court followed the principles enunciated in three-Judge
 KULDEEP SINGH v. G.M., INST. DESIGN DEVELOPMENT 889 ·.
     AND FACILITIES CENTRE[P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

Bench decision of Western Indian Match Co. (supra). At this           A
juncture, it is useful to remind and reiterate the finding rendered
by the Labour Court on issue Nos. 1, 5 and 6 holding that the
termination of the services of the workman/appellant herein
without complying with the provisions of Section 25F is illegal,
null and void and deserves to be set aside. Undoubtedly, the          B·
 Management has to follow the provisions of the Act while
effecting termination, in fact, which was accepted by the Labour
Court and the Management has not challenged the same before
any forum.

      21. In view of the above, law can be summarized that there      C
is no prescribed time limit for the appropriate Government to
exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is more so
in view of the language used, namely, if any industrial dispute
exists or is apprehended, the appropriate government "at any
time" refer the dispute to a Board or Court for enquiry. The          D
reference sought for by the workman cannot be said to be
delayed or suffering from a lapse when law does not prescribe
any period of limitation for raising a dispute under Section 10
of the Act. The real test for making a reference is whether at
the time of the reference dispute exists or not and when it is        E
made it is presumed that the State Government is satisfied with
the ingredients of the provision, hence the Labour Court cannot
go behind the reference. It is not open to the Government to
go into the merit of the dispute concerned and once it is found
that an industrial dispute exists then it is incumbent on the part    F
of the Government to make reference. It cannot itself decide
the merit of the dispute and it is for the appropriate Court or
Forum to decide the same. The satisfaction of the appropriate
authority in the matter of making reference under Section 10(1)
of the Act is a subjective satisfaction. Normally, the Government     G
cannot decline to make reference for !aches committed by the
workman. If adequate reasons are shown, the Government is
bound to refer the dispute to the appropriate Court or Forum
for adjudication. Even though, there is no limitation prescribed
for reference of dispute to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal,     H
    890     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A even so, it is only reasonable that the disputes should be
  referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after
  conciliation proceedings have failed, particularly, when disputes
  relate to discharge of workman. If sufficient materials are not
  put forth for the enormous delay, it would certainly be fatal.
B However, in view of the explanation offered by the workman, in
  the case on hand, as stated and discussed by us in the earlier
  paragraphs, we do not think that the delay in the case on hand
  has been so culpable as to disentitle him any relief. We are
  also satisfied that in view of the details furnished and the
c explanation offered, the workman cannot be blamed for the
  delay and he was all along hoping that one day his grievance
  would be considered by the Management or by the State
  Government.

       22. In the light of the above discussion and conclusion, we
D set aside the award of the Labour Court insofar as holding that
  the refeirence by the State Government is bad and incompetent
  being raised so belatedly and dismissing the claim statement
  on thii; ground and the order of the High Court dated
  31.10.2006 in C.W.P. No. 8774 of 2005 affirming the said
E order of the Labour Court and dismissing the writ petition filed
  by the workman. In view of the conclusion of the Labour Court
  with regard to Issue Nos. 1, 5 and 6 deciding in favour of
  workman holding that the Managementterminated his services
  without complying with the provisions of Section 25F of the Act
F and the said order is illegal, null and void deserves to be set
  aside, we order reinstatement of the appellant-workman with
  consequential service benefits but without back wages within
  a period of eight weeks. Since the appellant is fighting for his
  survival for more than a decade, we award a cost of Rs.50,000/
G - to be paid by the respondent-Management directly to the
  appellanUworkman within the same period.

           23. The appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned above.

    N.J.                                          Appeal allowed.
H