Holding

The selection was not vitiated by bias, but the ex‑parte cancellation violated the principle of audi alteram partem and such a procedural defect cannot be cured on appeal, leading to the appeals being allowed.

Summary

The case concerned the 1998 appointment of ten individuals as Shiksha Karmi Grade III teachers in Janpad Panchayat, Gaurihar, where the selection was challenged on grounds of alleged bias because some selection committee members were relatives of the appointees and for the lack of a hearing. The Collector set aside the appointments ex‑parte, citing the Panchayat Raj Act, and the decision was upheld by the Commissioner, but the appointees appealed. A split decision in the Supreme Court arose: one judge held the selection was vitiated by bias, the other held that the breach of audi alteram partem rendered the decision invalid. The larger bench examined the rule against bias, the necessity of a hearing, and whether a procedural defect could be cured on appeal. It concluded that the recusal of relatives eliminated any reasonable likelihood of bias, but the failure to give notice and a hearing violated the principle of audi alteram partem, a defect that cannot be cured at the revisional stage. Consequently, the Court set aside the Division Bench judgment, upheld the Collector’s ex‑parte cancellation as invalid, but declined to order a fresh inquiry due to the passage of time, allowing the appointees to retain their positions. The appeals were allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the selection was vitiated by violation of the rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua).
Whether there was a breach of the principle of audi alteram partem and whether demonstration of prejudice is required to establish such a breach.
Whether a breach of audi alteram partem at the initial stage can be cured at the revisional or appellate stage.

Legislation cited

Madhya Pradesh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995s. 5, s. 5(b), s. 9
Panchayat Raj Act Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993s. 100, s. 40(c)

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the selection is vitiated for violation of the first limb of natural justice i.e. rule against bias; whether it is a case of violation of the principle of audi alteram partem and is demonstration of prejudice necessary to succeed with a claim of violation of alteram partem; whether the breach of the principle of audi alteram partem at the original stage can be cured, at the revisional stage. Headnotes† Panchayat Raj Act Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 – Principle of natural justice – Rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua)

Subjects

Audi alteram partemRule against biasAllegation of bias/mere suspicion of biasPrinciples of natural justiceNemo judex in causa suaSelectionAppointmentSchool teachersShiksha karmi(s)Selection committeeRelatives of the candidatesFamily membersSelection not vitiatedInterference with selectionsProcedural improprietyRule of fair hearingRecuseRecusalResolution for recusalDoctrine of necessityJudicial review of administrative actionsCollectorIneffective hearingNotice not issuedWithout issuing notice to the selecteesAbsence of opportunity of hearingViolation of right of hearingPrejudiceFull jurisdiction

Judgment

[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1173 : 2025 INSC 126

Krishnadatt Awasthy
v.
State of M.P. & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 4806 of 2011)
29 January 2025
[Hrishikesh Roy,* Sudhanshu Dhulia and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the selection is vitiated for violation of the first limb of natural
justice i.e. rule against bias; whether it is a case of violation of the
principle of audi alteram partem and is demonstration of prejudice
necessary to succeed with a claim of violation of the principle of audi
alteram partem; whether the breach of the principle of audi alteram
partem at the original stage can be cured, at the revisional stage.

Headnotes†
Panchayat Raj Act Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 –
Principle of natural justice – Rule against bias (nemo judex
in causa sua) – Challenge was made to the validity of
appointments of the appellants as school teachers (Shiksha
Karmi Grade III) alleging that the selection process was vitiated
by bias as some of the members of selection committee were
close relatives of the appellants – Split verdict by two judge
bench of Supreme Court, wherein one of the Judge held that
selection of appellants was erroneously set aside, in breach
of principle of audi alteram partem whereas, the other upheld
the cancellation of the appointment of appellants and held
that the first limb of natural justice i.e. ‘rule against bias’ was
proved, as reasonable likelihood of bias was established –
Matter before the larger bench:
Held: Present is a case of allegation of bias/mere suspicion of
bias without any foundation – The Janpad Panchayat unanimously
passed a resolution mandating that members who had close
relatives among the candidates would recuse themselves from the
interview process – As a matter of fact, the concerned members
had recused and did not participate in the interview and did not
award any marks, thus, a reasonable likelihood of bias cannot
reasonably be inferred – Selection is not vitiated on account of

* Author
1174 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

violation of the nemo judex rule – Madhya Pradesh Panchayat
(Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995. [Paras 29, 30, 35, 37]

Principle of natural justice – Audi alteram partem – Violation of –
Appointment of the appellants was set aside by the Collector,
without issuing any notice, holding that the recruitment was
vitiated by bias as some of the members of selection committee
were close relatives of the appellants – Whether it is a case
of violation of the principle of audi alteram partem and is
demonstration of prejudice necessary to succeed with a claim
of violation of the principle of audi alteram partem:
Held: In the present case, there has been a gross violation of
the principle of audi alteram partem – In the absence of notice,
the breach strikes at the fundamental core of procedural fairness,
rendering the decision invalid – The selectees were not arrayed
and they could not contest the selection before the Collector – The
absence of opportunity of hearing at the initial stage prevented the
selectees to show that no relative had influenced their selection –
The vitiation of selection was not only a breach of the principles of
natural justice but also contrary to the express statutory provision
that required for an opportunity to show cause and an opportunity to
provide self-defence – The prejudice theory must be understood as
an exception to the general rule and cannot be the norm – Panchayat
Raj Act Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993. [Paras 29, 35, 54]

Principle of natural justice – Denial of, at the initial stage
if, can be cured by an appellate body – Appointment of the
appellants was set aside by the Collector without issuing any
notice – Revision petition filed by the appellants, dismissed –
Challenged before High Court, writ petition also rejected – Writ
appeal thereagainst was also dismissed – Eventually, split
verdict delivered by the bench of two judges of Supreme
Court – Matter before the larger bench:
Held: A defect at the initial stage cannot generally be cured at
the appellate stage – Even in cases where a ‘full jurisdiction’ may
be available at the appellate stage, the Courts must have the
discretion to relegate it to the original stage for an opportunity of
hearing – Therefore, in the present case, the ex-parte decision to
set aside the selection of the appellants was vitiated – However,
since the selection pertains to the year 1998, and the appellants
have continuously held office and performed their duties for over
twenty-five years under interim orders, remanding the matter
for a fresh inquiry not practical and will be an injustice to the
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1175

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

appointees – Panchayat Raj Act Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam,
1993. [Paras 67, 71]

Principle of natural justice – Denial of, at the initial stage
taints the decision-making process leading to flawed orders
at subsequent stages – Appointment of the appellants was set
aside by the Collector without issuing any notice – Revision
petition filed by the appellants, dismissed – Challenged
before High Court, writ petition also rejected – Writ appeal
thereagainst was also dismissed – Eventually, split verdict
delivered by the bench of two judges of Supreme Court –
Matter before the larger bench:
Held: The orders of the Collector and Commissioner in Revision
are practically identical – An ineffective hearing at the initial stage
tainted the entire decision-making process leading to flawed
orders at subsequent stages – Providing a hearing to the affected
individual, minimizes the risk of administrative authorities making
decisions in ignorance of facts or other relevant circumstances
allowing all pertinent issues to be brought to light – This process not
only aids the administration in arriving at correct decisions but also
enables courts to more effectively review such actions – Panchayat
Raj Act Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 – Madhya Pradesh
Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995 – r.5(b). [Para 66]
Principle of natural justice – Right to a fair hearing (audi
alteram partem) – Object of – For an allegation of bias to be
proved, fair hearing is imperative. [Paras 68, 69]
Doctrine of necessity – Applicability – Assumption of
impartiality to be contextual for the application of the doctrine
of necessity – Discussed. [Para 30]
Judicial review of administrative actions, discussed –
Selections made by expert bodies – Scope of interference
with, under writ jurisdiction. [Paras 14, 15]

Case Law Cited
State Bank of Patiala v. SK Sharma [1996] 3 SCR 972 : (1996)
3 SCC 364; AK Kraipak v. Union of India [1970] 1 SCR 457 :
(1969) 2 SCC 262; Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr
[1978] 2 SCR 272 : (1978) 1 SCC 405; Swadeshi Cotton Mills v.
Union of India [1981] 2 SCR 533 : (1981) 1 SCC 664; Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2 SCR 621 : (1978) 1 SCC 248;
SL Kapoor v. Jagmohan [1981] 1 SCR 746 : (1980) 4 SCC 379;
1176 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Dy. Comm. of Central Excise, Gauhati
and Ors. [2015] 6 SCR 437 : (2015) 8 SCC 519; State of UP v.
Sudhir Kumar Singh [2020] 13 SCR 571 : (2021) 19 SCC 706;
Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India [2023] 10 SCR
595 : (2023) 13 SCC 401; Institute of Chartered Accountants v. L.
K. Ratna [1986] 3 SCR 1049 : (1986) 4 SCC 537; State of U.P. v.
Mohammed Nooh 1958 SCR 595; Mysore State Road Transport
Corporation v. Mirja Khasim [1977] 2 SCR 282 : (1977) 2 SCC
457; Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [1989] Supp. 2 SCR 597 :
(1990) 1 SCC 613; J. Mohapatra & Co. v. State of Orissa [1985]
1 SCR 322 : (1984) 4 SCC 103; Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State
of Haryana [1985] Supp. 1 SCR 657 : (1985) 4 SCC 417; Kirti
Deshmankar v. Union of India [1990] Supp. 1 SCR 355 : (1991)
1 SCC 104; Gurdip Singh v. State of Punjab (1997) 10 SCC 641;
Utkal University v. Nrusingha Charan Sarangi [1999] 1 SCR 19 :
(1999) 2 SCC 193; Govt. of T.N. v. Munuswamy Mudaliar [1988]
Supp. 2 SCR 673 : (1988) Supp. SCC 651 : AIR 1988 SC 2232;
Bihar State Mineral Development Corporation v. Encon Builders
(I) (P) Ltd. [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 812 : (2003) 7 SCC 418; State of
A.P. v. McDowell & Company [1996] 3 SCR 721 : (1996) 3 SCC
709; Tata Cellular v. Union of India [1994] Supp. 2 SCR 122 :
(1994) 6 SCC 651; Mohd. Mustafa v. Union of India [2021] 11
SCR 163 : (2022) 1 SCC 294; Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. B.S.
Mahajan (1990) 1 SCC 305; Badrinath v. State of T.N. [2000] Supp.
3 SCR 573 : (2000) 8 SCC 395; National Institute of Mental Health
& Neuro Sciences v. K. Kalyana Raman (1992) Supp. 2 SCC
481; I.P.S. Dewan v. Union of India [1995] 2 SCR 532 : (1995) 3
SCC 383; UPSC v. Hiranyalal Dev [1988] 3 SCR 302 : (1988) 2
SCC 242; M.V. Thimmaiah v. UPSC [2007] 13 SCR 624 : (2008)
2 SCC 119; UPSC v. M. Sathiya Priya [2018] 6 SCR 701 : (2018)
15 SCC 796; Om Kumar v. Union of India [2000] Supp. 4 SCR
693 : (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039; Union of India v.
G. Ganayutham [1997] Supp. 3 SCR 549 : (1997) 7 SCC 463 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 1806; S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India [1990]
Supp. 1 SCR 44 : (1990) 4 SCC 594; Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co.
of India Ltd. v. Union of India [1976] Supp. 1 SCR 489 : (1976)
2 SCC 981; CCI v. SAIL [2010] 11 SCR 112 : (2010) 10 SCC
744; Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan [2010]
10 SCR 1070 : (2010) 9 SCC 496; Railway Electrification v. ECI
SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Co., 2024 SCC OnLine SC
3219; Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi [1957] 1 SCR 575 :
1957 SCC OnLine SC 10; Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India [1988]
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1177

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

1 SCR 512 : (1987) 4 SCC 611; Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing
Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School
[1993] 3 SCR 863 : (1993) 4 SCC 10; S Parthasarathi v. State
of AP [1974] 1 SCR 697 : (1974) 3 SCC 459; SK Golap and
Others v. Bhuban Chandra Panda, 1990 SCC OnLine Cal 264;
GN Nayak v Goa University [2002] 1 SCR 636 : (2002) 2 SCC
712; Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 131 :
(1985) 3 SCC 398; Charanjit Singh v. Harinder Sharma (2002) 9
SCC 732; Javid Rasool Bhat v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (1984) 2
SCC 682; Jaswant Singh Nerwal v. State of Punjab [1991] 1 SCR
411 : (1991) Supp. 1 SCC 313; State Govt. Houseless Harijan
Employees Association v. State of Karnataka [2000] Supp. 5
SCR 483 : (2001) 1 SCC 610; East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v.
Collector of Customs [1963] 3 SCR 338 : AIR 1962 SC 1893;
Uma Nath Pandey and Ors. v. State of UP [2009] 4 SCR 374 :
(2009) 12 SCC 40; Fareed Ahmed v. Ahmedabad Municipality
[1977] 1 SCR 71 : AIR 1976 SC 2095; Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v.
Government of Delhi [1975] 1 SCR 597 : (1975) 4 SCC 298;
Mysore SRT Corp v. Mirza Khasim [1977] 2 SCR 282 : AIR 1977
SC 747; Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah v. Reserve Bank of India
[1996] Supp. 4 SCR 443 : (1996) 9 SCC 650; United Planters’
Association of Southern India v. KG Sangameswaran [1997] 2
SCR 756 : (1997) 4 SCC 741; Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal
Corporation [1985] Supp. 2 SCR 51 : (1985) 3 SCC 545; Aligarh
Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan [2000] Supp. 2 SCR 684 :
(2000) 7 SCC 529 – referred to.
Hira Lal Patel v. Chief Executive Officer, District Panchayat,
Sarangarh (1998) 2 MP WN 39; Laxmidhar v. State of Orissa,
AIR 1974 Ori 127; Kashiram Dalmia v. State, AIR 1978 Pat 265;
G Rajalakshmi v. Appellate Authority, AIR 1980 AP 100; Serajuddin
Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1974 Cal 296 – referred to.
Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, 1985
AC 374; Dimes v. The Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal
(1852) 3 HLC 759; R v. Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy [1924]
1 KB 256; Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) v. Lannon (1969) 1
QB 577; Porter v. Magill (2002) 1 All ER 465; Ridge v. Baldwin
[1964] AC 40; Annamunthodo v. Oilfield Workers’ Trade Union
[1961] AC 945 (PC); Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders
(1970) 2 All ER 713; Calvin v. Carr (1979) 2 WLR 755; Lloyd v.
McMahon (1987) 1 AC 625; R v. Gough, 1993 AC 646; Australian
Workers’ Union v. Bowen (No. 2) (1948) 77 C.L.R. 601 – referred to.
1178 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Books and Periodicals Cited
H. W. R. Wade, Administrative Law (5th Edition); H W R Wade
and C F Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press,
11th ed, 2014); I.P. Massey, Administrative Law (8th Edition, 2012);
Lawrence H. Tribe, ‘American Constitutional Law’ (The Foundation
Press 1978) – referred to.

List of Acts
Panchayat Raj Act Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993; Madhya
Pradesh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995.

List of Keywords
Audi alteram partem; Rule against bias; Allegation of bias/mere
suspicion of bias; Principles of natural justice; Nemo judex in causa
sua; Selection; Appointment; School teachers; Shiksha karmi(s);
Selection committee; Relatives of the candidates; Family members;
Selection not vitiated; Interference with selections; Procedural
impropriety; Rule of fair hearing; Recuse; Recusal; Resolution for
recusal; Doctrine of necessity; Judicial review of administrative
actions; Collector; Ineffective hearing; Notice not issued; Without
issuing notice to the selectees; Absence of opportunity of hearing;
Violation of right of hearing; Prejudice; Full jurisdiction.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4806 of 2011
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.12.2008 of the High Court
of M.P at Jabalpur in WA No. 892 of 2008
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 4807, 4808 and 4809 of 2011

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Vivek Tankha, Sr. Adv., Neeraj Shekhar, Mrs. Kshama Sharma,
Ramendra Vikram Singh, Divyam Sikka, Amrendra Singh, Ram
Bachan Choudhary, Rajesh Maurya Singh, Rajesh Maurya.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ms. Mrinal Gopal Elker, Saurabh Singh, Shiv Vinayak Gupta,
Ms. Shruti Verma, Avdhesh Kumar Singh, Sanjay Kumar Visen,
Parth Sarathi, Gyanendra Vikram Singh, Ms. Soumya Gulati.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1179

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Hrishikesh Roy, J.

1. Heard Mr. Vivek Tankha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
appellant. The respondents are represented by Ms. Mrinal Gopal Elker,
learned counsel and Mr. Avdhesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel.
2. This matter is posted before this larger Bench on account of the
split verdict rendered on 4.4.2024 by the two learned Judges of
this Court. The case pertains to the validity of appointments made
for the post of school teachers (Shiksha Karmi Grade III) in Janpad
Panchayat, Gaurihar in the year 1998. Four Civil Appeals were filed
before this Court by ten persons, who are alleged to be the relatives
of the members of the selection committee and were placed in the
final select list of 249 Shiksha Karmis.
3. While Justice JK Maheshwari upheld the finding to set aside the
selection of Shiksha Karmis on account of the violation of the first
limb of the principle of natural justice i.e. rule against bias, Justice
KV Vishwanathan has however upheld the selection, citing inter alia,
a breach of the right to a fair hearing. Therefore, in this case, we are
confronted with a conflict between the two foundational principles of
natural justice i.e. rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua) and
the right to a fair hearing (audi alteram partem).

I. RELEVANT FACTS
4. Initially, one Kunwar Vijay Bahadur Singh Bundela challenged the
preparation of the select list by filing an appeal before the Collector,
District Chhatarpur, who quashed the select list, vide order dated
31.8.1998 and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. Thereafter,
a fresh select list consisting of 249 candidates including the names
of appellants (and four others) was published on 16.9.1998 and
the appointment order was issued on 17.9.1998. The selection and
appointment of the appellants was challenged by an unsuccessful
candidate- Archana Mishra (Respondent No. 4 herein), before the
Collector, District Chatarpur, Madhya Pradesh, under Section 3 of
Madhya Pradesh Panchayat (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1995(for
short “Appeal and Revision Rules,1995) alleging that elements
of nepotism, corruption and bias have seeped into the selection
1180 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

process because of the composition of the selection committee. The
Collector, accepting the challenger’s contention vide order dated
02.06.1999, set aside the appellants’ appointment by concluding that
the recruitment was vitiated on account of bias and nepotism. The
Collector found fault with the composition of the selection committee,
some of whom were the family members of the appellants herein
and opined that the award of marks in the selection, was improper.
Relying on Section 40(c) and Section 100 of Panchayat Raj Act
Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 (for short “Adhiniyam, 1993),
it was noted that office bearers cannot facilitate financial gains to
relatives. The Collector further noted that:
‘…it is proved that the appointment of these relatives could
not be deemed to be according to the prescribed procedure
and the scheme and therefore, it is not necessary to call
them up’.
5. Relying on the MP High Court’s judgment in Hira Lal Patel v Chief
Executive Officer, District Panchayat, Sarangarh1, the Collector
without issuing notice to the selectees observed that if the appointment
is not made as per the scheme, it can be terminated without giving
any opportunity of hearing.
6. Aggrieved by the above interference with the selection, the appellants
filed a Revision petition before the Commissioner, Revenue, Sagar
Division under section 5 of the Appeal and Revision Rules,1995. The
selectees contended therein that without arraying them and without
affording them any hearing, the Collector could not have interfered
with the selection and this would be in violation of the principles of
natural justice. The Revision Petition was however dismissed by
the Commissioner vide order dated 14.3.2000. In the said order the
Commissioner observed in para (6) that the selection is contrary
to Section 40(C) of the Adhiniyam, 1993. The Revisional Authority
brushed aside the plea of non-joinder and of not affording opportunity
of hearing, by relying on the admission of the relationship of the
appellants with the members of the selection committee, as noted
in the reply filed by the Chief Executive Officer. Aggrieved by the
order of the Commissioner, the appointees filed a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the Madhya Pradesh
High Court which was however dismissed by the learned single judge

1 (1998) 2 MP WN 39
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1181

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

vide order dated 31.7.2008. Relying on State Bank of Patiala v SK
Sharma2, it was observed that the opportunity of hearing has to be
tested on the touchstone of actual prejudice being caused to the
writ petitioners. It was also noted that full opportunity of hearing was
granted at the Revisional stage by the Commissioner. According to
the learned Judge the Chief Executive officer’s reply established that
few selectees were relatives of Smt. Pushpa Dwivedi(Chairperson
of the selection Committee) and similarly, close relatives of Shri
Swami Singh(member of the Education Committee) such as his
sister-in-law, son, daughter-in-law and nephew were also among the
selected candidates. The Single Judge relied on the five-judge bench
decision of this Court in AK Kraipak v Union of India3(for short “AK
Kraipak”) where it was emphasized that the presence of interested
parties in the selection committee creates a reasonable likelihood of
bias, even if direct participation is limited. It was therefore concluded
that even though Smt. Pushpa Dwivedi(Chairperson) and Swami
Singh(member) recused themselves during interviews of their alleged
relatives, their presence on the committee could have influenced the
overall selection process.
7. The appellants then preferred a writ appeal which was dismissed by
the Division bench of the High Court on 15.12.2008. The Division
Bench noted inter alia that:
‘though it was imperative on the part of appellants to
implead the affected parties, yet as the affected parties
had been given full opportunity from all aspects by the
revisional forum as well as by the Learned Single Judge,
we do not think it apt and apposite to quash the order and
remand the matter to the Collector’.
8. Relying on decisions of this Court on bias4, the Division Bench
observed that bias is a state of mind at work and when the degree
of relationship is in quite proximity, bias has to be inferred.

2 (1996) 3 SCC 364
3 (1969) 2 SCC 262
4 A.K. Kraipak v Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 262; J. Mohapatra & Co. v. State of Orissa, (1984) 4 SCC
103, Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 417, Kirti Deshmankar v. Union of India,
(1991) 1 SCC 104, Gurdip Singh v. State of Punjab, (1997) 10 SCC 641, Utkal University v. Nrusingha
Charan Sarangi, (1999) 2 SCC 193, G.N. Nayak v. Goa University, (2002) 2 SCC 712, Govt. of T.N. v.
Munuswamy Mudaliar, (1988) Supp. SCC 651 : AIR 1988 SC 2232, Bihar State Mineral Development
Corporation v. Encon Builders (I) (P) Ltd., (2003) 7 SCC 418.
1182 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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9. Thereafter when the matter reached the Supreme Court, Justice
KV Vishwanathan concluded that the selection of appellants was
erroneously set aside, in breach of the principle of audi alteram partem.
It was further held that the principle must be adhered to at the original
stage. Furthermore, Rule 9 of the Appeal and Revision Rules, 1995
was not complied with. It was also observed that the orders of the
Collector & Commissioner made no reference either to definition
of ‘relative’ in explanation to Section 40(c) of Adhiniyam nor to the
resolution providing for recusal. Non-impleadment of parties amounted
to ‘no opportunity at all’ for hearing was the conclusion reached by
Justice KV Vishwanathan.
10. On the other hand, Justice J.K. Maheshwari upheld the decision to
cancel the appointment of the appellants and opined that the first
limb of natural justice i.e. ‘rule against bias’ was irrefutably proved,
as reasonable likelihood of bias was established. The plea of non-
impleadment was considered to be a useless formality. It was further
held that unless prejudice is demonstrated, mere non-joinder at the
initial stage does not violate the principles of natural justice.

II. SUBMISSIONS
11. The foundational contention of the appellants is that since their
appointments were cancelled without affording them any hearing
and without arraying them as a party in the challenge by the
respondent no. 4(Archana Mishra), the adverse decision taken
against the appellants, is legally unsustainable. Mr. Vivek Tankha,
the learned Senior Counsel would argue that an incorrect narrative
was the basis for the allegation made by the respondent No. 4,
about unfair selection. It is specifically pointed out that none of the
relatives of the candidates had participated during the selection
of the appellants. More importantly, the related persons had not
awarded any marks to influence the selection. Specifically adverting
to the marks obtained by the challenger and the selectees, the
appellants argue that it was a fair selection and that intervention
was unmerited.
12. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent, Mrinal Gopal
Elker, and Avdhesh Kumar Singh, would rely on Section 40(c) of the
Adhiniyam,1993 to project that the said section provides that ‘any
of the office bearers shall not cause financial gain to his relatives’.
According to them, the presence of close relatives in the selection
process vitiated the process of selection of Shiksha Karmis. They
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1183

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

projected that non-adherence to the principles of audi alteram partem,
if any, was cured by the proceedings before the commissioner wherein
appellants were given full opportunity. On that basis, it was submitted
that the non- granting of opportunity of hearing by the Collector at
the original stage was inconsequential. According to the respondent,
the reasonable likelihood of bias in selection is established by the
close relationship between the Committee members and the selected
candidates who have been awarded high marks in comparison to
other candidates in the interview process.

III. ISSUES
13. Going by the above submissions, the following broad issues fall for
our consideration:
A. Whether the selection is vitiated for violation of the first limb of
natural justice i.e. rule against bias?
B. Where it is a case of violation of the principle of audi alteram
partem? Is demonstration of prejudice necessary to succeed
with a claim of violation of the principle of audi alteram partem?
C. Whether the breach of the principle of audi alteram partem at
the original stage can be cured, at the Revisional stage?

IV. DISCUSSION
14. Judicial review of administrative actions are permissible on the
grounds of illegality, unreasonableness or irrationality and procedural
irregularity 5. Lord Diplock 6 succinctly described each of the
aforementioned grounds for judicial review as under:
“By “illegality” as a ground for judicial review I mean that
the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that
regulates his decision-making power and must give effect
to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable
question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those
persons, the Judges, by whom the judicial power of the
State is exercisable.

5 State of A.P. v. McDowell & Company, (1996) 3 SCC 709; Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC
651; and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, 1985 AC 374 (HL); Mohd. Mustafa v.
Union of India, (2022) 1 SCC 294.
6 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, 1985 AC 374.
1184 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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By “irrationality” I mean what can by now be succinctly
referred to as “Wednesbury [Associated Provincial Picture
Houses v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)]
unreasonableness”. It applies to a decision which is so
outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral
standards that no sensible person who had applied his
mind to the question to be decided could have arrived
at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a
question that Judges by their training and experience
should be well equipped to answer, or else there would
be something badly wrong with our judicial system. To
justify the court’s exercise of this role, resort I think is
today no longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe’s ingenious
explanation in Edwards v. Bairstow [Edwards v. Bairstow,
1956 AC 14 : (1955) 3 WLR 410 (HL)] , of irrationality as
a ground for a court’s reversal of a decision by ascribing
it to an inferred though unidentifiable mistake of law by
the decision-maker. “Irrationality” by now can stand on its
own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may
be attacked by judicial review.
I have described the third head as “procedural impropriety”
rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural
justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards
the person who will be affected by the decision. This
is because susceptibility to judicial review under this
head covers also failure by an Administrative Tribunal
to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down
in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is
conferred, even where such failure does not involve
any denial of natural justice. But the instant case is not
concerned with the proceedings of an Administrative
Tribunal at all.”
15. It is equally well-settled that courts under its writ jurisdiction do not
interfere with selections made by expert bodies by reassessing the
comparative merits of the candidates. Interference with selections
is limited to decisions vitiated by bias, malafides and violation of
statutory provisions7. Additionally, this Court has also held that

7 Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. B.S. Mahajan (1990) 1 SCC 305; Badrinath v. State of T.N. (2000) 8 SCC
395; National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. K. Kalyana Raman (1992) Supp. 2 SCC
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1185

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

administrative action can be reviewed on the ground of proportionality
if it affects fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 and 21
of the Constitution of India8.
16. In this case, our primary focus is on procedural impropriety and in
particular, the breach of the principles of natural justice. The process
for arriving at a decision is equally significant as the decision itself. If
the procedure is not ‘fair’, the decision cannot be possibly endorsed.
The principles of natural justice as derived from common law which
guarantee ‘fair play in action’9, has two facets which include rule
against bias and the rule of fair hearing. Additionally, a reasoned
order has also been regarded as a third facet of the principles of
natural justice10 and holds utmost significance in ensuring fairness
of the process.

ISSUE A
17. The first issue that falls for our consideration is whether the selection
stands vitiated on the ground of violation of the rule against bias. It
must be borne in mind that when a statute specifies the procedure
for administrative decision making, the principles of natural justice
supplement but do not substitute the statutory procedure11. However,
even if the statute does not provide for the administrative procedure,
the authorities are bound to make decisions in adherence to the
principles of natural justice.
18. Let us now consider the relevant statutory provisions in the present
case which operate alongside the common law principles. The Madhya
Pradesh Panchayat Shiksha Karmis (Recruitment and Conditions of
Service) Rules, 1997 is framed in exercise of the powers conferred
by sub-section (2) of Section 53, sub-section (1) of Section 70 read
with subsection (1) of Section 95 of Adhiniyam, 1993 is apposite.
Rule 2(h) defines ‘Shiksha Karmi’ as under:

481; I.P.S. Dewan v. Union of India (1995) 3 SCC 383; UPSC v. Hiranyalal Dev (1988) 2 SCC 242; M.V.
Thimmaiah v. UPSC (2008) 2 SCC 119 and UPSC v. M. Sathiya Priya (2018) 15 SCC 796
8 Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham
(1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806
9 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248
10 S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 594; Siemens Engg. & Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of
India (1976) 2 SCC 981; CCI v. SAIL (2010) 10 SCC 744; Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed
Khan (2010) 9 SCC 496
11 AK Kraipak v Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 262
1186 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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“Shiksha Karmi” means the person appointed by Zila
Panchayat or Janpad Panchayat, as the case may be, for
teaching in the schools under their control.”
19. Rule 5 deals with ‘Methods of Selection and Recruitment’. Sub-rule 8
provides that the Selection Committee shall be constituted consisting
of members as specified in Schedule II by the Zila Panchayat or the
Janpad Panchayat, as the case ,may be. The relevant sub-Rule 9
reads as under:
(i) the Committee will assess the candidates called for
interview and award marks in the following manner:
“a) 60% marks for marks obtained in the qualifying
examination specified in Schedule II;
b) 25% marks for the teaching experience in the schools of
concerning Janpad Panchayat or Zila Panchayat. Similar
benefits will be given for teaching experience of equivalent
rural school. The decision of the Committee on the validity
and valuation of the certificate of teaching experience of
rural schools will be final;
c) 15% marks for oral test which may include the test for-
i) communication skills in local dialect
ii) knowledge of local environment
iii) general knowledge
iv) training and teaching aptitude and
v) any other test which the Selection Committee may
deem fit.
d) Other things remaining the same, preference, preference
will be given to candidates who possess certificate in B.
Ed, BTI or D. Ed.
e) All other things remaining the same, in the final selection,
those who have teaching experience of schools of Janpad
Panchayat or Zila Panchayat will be given preference.
(ii) Select list of each category shall be prepared on the
basis of above assessment in order of merit and shall
include 10% names in waiting list which shall be valid for
six months.”
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1187

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

20. The statutory Rules clearly specify the designation of those who must
be included in the selection committee, as outlined in Schedule II of
the Rules,1997. They are following:
“1. Chairperson, Standing Committee of Education of
Janpad Panchayat;
2. Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat;
3. Block Education Officer (Member Secretary);
4. Two specialists in the subject to be nominated by the
Standing Committee for Education of whom one shall be
woman; and
5. All members from the Standing Committee of whom
atleast one belongs to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes
or OBC, in case there is no SC/ST/OBC member in the
Standing Committee then the same shall be nominated
from the General Body.”
21. Therefore, ‘all members from the Standing Committee’ were required
to be a part of the selection committee. It is also important to note
that the following resolution was passed by the Standing Committee
on recusal:
“(C) Letter No. 423/S.T.98 dated 26.07.1998 of the
Collector, Chhatarpur was read over by Chief Executive
Officer, in which it has been mentioned that at the time of
recruitment of teachers those members and officers also
take part in the interview whose close relatives are the
candidates due to which the entire selection process is
likely to be affected. Therefore, the directions are given
toimmediately examine whether any candidate is the close
relative of the member of the Committee in the interview.
If any near relative of the member or the officer is the
candidate, then such member or officer should not be
present on the date of interview and any impartial person
should be kept in his place. The Committee unanimously
decided that if any close relative of any member, officer or
subject expert appears for interview then the marks to be
given by that member, officer or subject specialist should
be given by Chief Executive Officer and that member,
officer or subject expert shall not be present at the venue
of interview. This resolution has been passed unanimously.”
1188 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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22. Rule 40 deals with the removal of office bearers of Panchayat and
provides as under:
“40. Removal of office-bearers of Panchayat- (1) The State
Government or the prescribed authority may after such
enquiry as it may deem fit to make at any time, remove
an office bearer-
(a) if he has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge
of his duties; or
(b) if his continuance in office is undesirable in the interest
of the public: Provided that no person shall be removed
unless he has been given an opportunity to show cause
why he should not be removed from his office.
Explanation-For the purpose of this sub-section “Misconduct”
shall include-
(a) any action adversely affecting,-
(i) the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India; or
(ii) the harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood
amongst all the people of State transcending religious,
linguistic, regional, caste or sectional diversities; or
(iii) the dignity of women; or
(b) gross negligence in the discharge of the duties under
this Act;
[(c) the use of position or influence directly or indirectly
to secure employment for any relative in the Panchayat
or any action for extending any pecuniary benefits to any
relative, such as giving out any type of lease, getting any
work done through them in the Panchayat by an office-
bearer of Panchayat.
Explanation. - For the purpose of this clause, the expression
“relative” shall mean father, mother, brother, sister, husband,
wife, son, daughter, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother -in-
law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law : ]”
23. The explanation to clause(c) provides for the definition of the
expression ‘relative’ to mean ‘father, mother, brother, sister, husband,
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1189

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

wife, son, daughter, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-
in-law, son-in-law or daughter-in-law’. Rule 100 of the Adhiniyam
which has some relevance reads thus:
“100. Penalty for acquisition by a member, office bearer
or servant of interest in contract. - If a member or office
bearer or servant of Panchayat knowingly acquires, directly
or indirectly any personal share or interest in any contract
or employment, with, by or on behalf of a Panchayat without
the sanction of or permission of the prescribed authority
he shall be deemed to have committed an offense under
Section 168 of the Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860).”
24. Having noted the relevant statutory provisions, a brief survey of the
jurisprudence on the appropriate test for bias and the applicable
standard of proof would now be in order before the statutory law and
the common law principles are applied to the facts of the present case.
25. The principle of nemo judex causa sua found its origin in English law.
In Dimes v. Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal12, the House of
Lords in a case concerning pecuniary interest observed that the rule
against bias extends not only to actual bias but also to the appearance
of bias. This principle was later extended to other forms of interest in R
v. Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy13 where it was held that ‘even a
suspicion that there has been improper interference with the course of
justice’, would lead to the vitiation of proceedings. Lord Hewart noted
that it is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be
done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. Lord
Denning in Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) v Lannon14 noted that,
‘if right minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there
was a ‘real likelihood of bias’ on his part, he should not sit. And if he
does sit, his decision does not stand’. It was further held that ‘there
must be circumstances from which a reasonable man would think it
likely or probable that the justice, or chairman as the case may be,
would, or did, favour one side at the expense of the other.’
26. The emphasis on ‘likely or probable’ as noted by Lord Denning,
was considered in R v Gough15 (for short “Gough”) where the Court

12 Dimes v. The Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 HLC 759
13 [1924] 1 KB 256
14 (1969) 1 QB 577
15 R v. Gough, 1993 AC 646
1190 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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shifted the focus to the possibility of bias rather than its probability.
The test articulated in Gough(supra), was whether there was a ‘real
danger of bias’ rather than a ‘real likelihood’ of bias. It prioritised
the court’s assessment of bias over the perception of a fair-minded
and informed observer emphasising that the court ‘personifies the
reasonable man’. This test was criticised in other common law
jurisdictions for veering away from the public perception of bias.
The House of Lords modified the said test in Porter v Magill16 and
pronounced as under:
“The Court must first ascertain all the circumstances which
have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased,
it must then ask whether those circumstances would lead
to a fair minded and informed observer to conclude that
there was a real possibility that the Tribunal was biased.”
27. Indian Courts have consistently adopted the ‘real likelihood’ test
to determine bias17. In a recent decision in Central Organisation
for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) A Joint
Venture Co.18, a constitution bench of this Court speaking through
DY Chandrachud CJ(of which one of us was a member), summarised
the Indian position thus:
“Although there have been vacillations about the test in
England, the Indian courts have been largely consistent
in their approach by applying the test of real likelihood of
bias or reasonable apprehension of bias. Recently, the
court has used the real danger of bias test. However,
the above discussion shows that there is no significant
difference between the real danger of bias test and the real
possibility of bias test if the question of bias is inferred from
the perspective of a reasonable or fair-minded person.”
28. Turning now to the facts of the present case, let us first examine
whether the selection can be set aside if there are circumstances
which would give rise to a reasonable likelihood of bias from the
perspective of a fair-minded person:

16 (2002) 1 All ER 465
17 Manak Lal v Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi 1957, SCC OnLine SC 10; Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (1987) 4
SCC 611; Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary
School (1993) 4 SCC 10; S Parthasarathi v. State of AP (1974) 3 SCC 459; SK Golap and others v
Bhuban Chandra Panda, 1990 SCC OnLine Cal 264; GN Nayak v Goa University (2002) 2 SCC 712
18 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3219
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1191

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

(i) The resolution for recusal, passed unanimously by the Janpad
Panchayat would be a relevant and an important factor that
reflects on the efforts to ensure impartiality in the selection
process. The resolution mandated that members who had close
relatives among the candidates would recuse themselves from
the interview process, with their responsibilities being delegated
to the Chief Executive Officer. In this manner, the Panchayat
addressed the concern and perception of bias in the mind of
a fair-minded observer. Recusal is an acceptable mechanism
and serves to eliminate any reasonable likelihood of bias. It
was however argued that the counter affidavit filed by the Chief
Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, attaching the certificate
given by the Sarpanch of the Panchayat, acknowledges the
relationship of the selected/appointed candidates with the
members of selection committee giving rise to a reasonable
conclusion of bias. However, when the concerned person has
recused and did not award any marks, it is difficult for us to
accept a contention on a so-called relative, influencing the
selection.
(ii) The statutory definition of ‘relative’, as per the Adhiniyam,1993
was not specifically adverted to by the adjudicatory forums. This
was an important omission as few candidates do not fall within
the scope of this definition of ‘relative’. Thus, the challenge of
bias gets diluted further.
(iii) It has also been argued that marks obtained by the Complainant
in the interview was more than the marks obtained by the
appellants. These facts could have been demonstrated by
the appellants (selectees) before the Collector, if they were
arrayed as the affected party and opportunity of hearing was
provided to them.
29. In a scenario such as this where the members did not participate in
the interview, a reasonable likelihood of bias in our opinion cannot
reasonably be inferred. While it is true that actual bias need not be
proved, this appears to be a case of allegation of bias without any
foundational footing. We must also be mindful of the fact that the
absence of opportunity of hearing at the initial stage, has prevented
the selectee to show that no relative had influenced their selection. It
also disables this Court to examine the issue holistically to conclusively
determine bias.
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30. It must also be emphasized that the nemo judex rule is subject to the
rule of necessity and yields to it19. In J Mohapatra v State of Orissa20,
the Court recognized that the doctrine of necessity serves as an
exception to the rule against bias. In a matter like this, the doctrine of
necessity would also be squarely attracted since the statute explicitly
mandates the composition of the selection Committee, as outlined
in Schedule II of the Rules. The doctrine of necessity recognizes
that decision-making bodies need to function even in circumstances
where potential conflicts of interests may arise. Here as earlier noted,
the concerned members recused and did not award any marks. It
must however be borne in mind that the doctrine of necessity is an
exception and must be applied bearing in mind the circumstances
in a given case. The size of the jurisdiction must also be taken into
account for the application of the doctrine of necessity. In this regard,
Forsyth and Wade21 have noted that in small jurisdictions, qualified
persons may be few in number and likely to be known to the parties
making the ‘fair minded and informed observer’ test impractical. The
doctrine of necessity is where such considerations of size should be
considered rather than in the distortion of the test.
31. The assumption of impartiality must not also be an abstract analysis
but should equally consider the contextual background, for the
application of the doctrine of necessity. This is a selection at a village
level where it is very likely, that people involved would know each
other. In Charanjit Singh v Harinder Sharma22, a public interest action
was filed challenging the selection of clerks, firemen, drivers, peons
and instructors for the Municipal Council in Mansa, a small town in
Punjab by a selection committee which had relatives of some of the
selectees on it. The High Court had quashed the decision but the
Supreme Court noted that in a small town like Mansa, it would be
difficult to constitute a Selection Committee of total strangers. The
relative of some candidate or the other is bound to find a place on
the Committee. Therefore, the Court is required to see whether the
prescribed balancing mechanism was followed when a relative of
the member of the Selection Committee was being considered. The
Rules required that when such a candidate appeared, the concerned

19 Union of India v Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398; Swadesh Cotton Mills v Union of India (1981) 1 SCC
664
20 (1984) 4 SCC 103
21 H. W. R. Wade, Administrative Law (5th Edition)
22 (2002) 9 SCC 732
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1193

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

selection committee member should recuse from the proceedings
and such a candidate could only be appointed after obtaining the
approval of the Regional Deputy Director, Local Government. This
was seen as an acceptable mode to rule out bias in selection or
selections being influenced by a relative.
32. Reliance has been placed on the landmark decision in Kraipak(supra)
that significantly expanded the scope of judicial review of administrative
decisions. This ruling was cited in Javid Rasool Bhat v. State of Jammu
& Kashmir23 where the Court distinguished Kraipak(supra) as under:
“Great reliance was placed by the learned counsel on A.K.
Kraipak & Ors. V. Union of India on the question of natural
justice. We do not think that the case is of any assistance to
the petitioners. It was a case where one of the persons, who
sat as member of the Selection Board, was himself one of
the persons to be considered for selection. He participated
in the deliberations of the Selection Board when the
clams of his rivals were considered. He participated in the
decisions relating to the orders of preference and seniority.
He participated at every stage in the deliberations of the
Selection Board and at every stage there was a conflict
between his interest and duty. The court had no hesitation
coming to the conclusion that there was a reasonable
likelihood of ibis and therefore, there was a violation of
the principles of natural justice. In the case before us, the
Principal of the Medical College, Srinagar, dissociated
himself from the written test and did not participate in the
proceedings when his daughter was interviewed. When
the other candidates were interviewed, he did not know
the marks obtained either by his daughter or by any of the
candidates. There was no occasion to suspect his bona
fides even remotely. There was not even a suspicion of
bias, leave alone a reasonable likelihood of bias. There
was no violation of the principals of natural justice.”
33. A five-judge constitution bench of this Court in Ashok Kumar Yadav v
State of Haryana24 endorsed the decision in Javed Rasool(supra)
and held that when a near relative of a member of the Public Service

23 (1984) 2 SCC 682
24 (1985) 4 SCC 417
1194 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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Commission is a member of the Selection Committee, it will be enough
if the concerned member desists from interviewing his relation. He
should withdraw from the committee when his relative appears for
the interview and he should not participate in discussion in regards
to the merit of the candidate and even the marks should not be
disclosed to the concerned member.
34. Similarly, in Jaswant Singh Nerwal v State of Punjab25, the father
of one of the selected candidates was in the selection committee
conducting the interview. However, he did not participate in the
deliberation when his son appeared for viva voce. It was held therein
that selection was thus not vitiated.
35. Guided by the above ratios, on facts, this clearly appears to be a
case of mere suspicion of bias particularly on account of the fact
that the Janpad Panchayat unanimously passed a resolution for
recusal of the concerned member. It must also be borne in mind
that rule against bias is itself considered as a ground for recusal.
The selectees were not arrayed and they couldn’t contest the
selection before the Collector, in the absence of a complete picture
on the process, it is all the more difficult to deduce that there was
a reasonable likelihood of bias. In light of the aforesaid reasons,
our conclusion in this matter is that the selection is not vitiated on
account of violation of the nemo judex rule.

ISSUE B
36. This brings us to the second limb of the principle of natural justice
i.e. audi alteram partem and whether the demonstration of prejudice
is mandatory for raising a claim of violation of right of hearing. The
principle of audi alteram partem lies at the very heart of procedural
fairness, ensuring that no one is condemned or adversely affected,
without being given an opportunity to present their case. The decision
in Ridge v Baldwin26 is regarded as a significant landmark decision in
British administrative law and is often referred to as a magna carta
of natural justice. This decision has resonated deeply in the Indian
legal context where natural justice principles are firmly entrenched
with constitutional guarantees.

25 (1991) Supp. 1 SCC 313
26 [1964] AC 40
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1195

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

37. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr27 (for short ‘Mohinder
Gill’), this Court observed that:
“Today in our jurisprudence, the advances made by natural
justice far exceed old frontiers and if judicial creativity
belights penumbral areas, it is only improving the quality
of government by injecting fair play into its wheels.. law
lives not in a world of abstractions but in a cosmos of
concreteness and to give up something good must be
limited to extreme cases. If to condemn unheard is wrong, it
is wrong except where it is overborne by social necessity.”
38. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India28, this Court held:
“this rule of fair play must not be jettisoned save in very
exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so
demands. The Court must make every effort to salvage
this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with
situational modifications.”
39. Justice Bhagwati in Maneka Gandhi v Union of India29, described
natural justice as a profound ‘humanising principle’ designed to
imbue the law with fairness and ensure justice. This principle has
garnered widespread recognition across democratic societies and
has evolved into a universally accepted rule, influencing areas of
administrative decision-making.
40. Wade and Forsyth30 discuss the essence of good and considerate
administration as under:
“Judges are naturally inclined to use their discretion when
a plea of natural justice is used as the last refuge of a
claimant with a bad case. But that should not be allowed
to weaken the the basic principle that fair procedure comes
first, and that it is only after hearing both sides that merits
can be properly considered. In the case of a tribunal which
must decide according to, it may be justifiable to disregard
a breach of natural justice where the demerits of the claim
are such that it would in any case be hopeless. But in the

27 (1978) 1 SCC 405
28 (1981) 1 SCC 664
29 (1978) 1 SCC 248
30 H W R Wade and C F Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 11th ed, 2014)
1196 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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case of a discretionary administrative decision, such as
dismissal of a teacher or expulsion of a student, hearing
their case will often soften the heart of the authority and
alter their decision, even though it is clear from the outset
that punitive action would be justified. This is the essence
of a good and considerate administration, and the law
should take care to preserve it.”
41. The opportunity of hearing is considered so fundamental to any
civilised legal system that the courts have read the principles of
natural justice into an enactment to save it from being declared
unconstitutional on procedural grounds31.
42. It has been argued before us that if the failure to provide hearing
does not cause prejudice, observing the principle of natural justice
may not be necessary. In this context, a three judge bench of this
Court in SL Kapoor v Jagmohan32 speaking through Justice Chinappa
Reddy considered such arguments to be ‘pernicious’ and held that ‘the
non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and
proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice
is unnecessary’ . The Supreme Court, however, has drawn out an
exception where ‘on admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion
is possible, and under the law, only one penalty is permissible, then
the Court may not compel the observance of natural justice’33.
43. Professor IP Massey34 has commented on this shift as under:
“Before the decision of the Highest Court in SL Kapoor v
Jagmohan, the rule was that the principles of natural justice
shall apply only when the an administrative action has
caused some prejudice to the person, meaning thereby
that he must have suffered some ‘civil consequences’.
Therefore, the person had to show something extra in order
to prove ‘prejudice’ or civil consequences. This approach
had stultified the growth of administrative law within an
area of highly practical significance. It is gratifying that
in Jagmohan, the Court took a bold step in holding that

31 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545
32 (1980) 4 SCC 379
33 Swadeshi Cotton Mills v Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 664; Aligarh Muslim University v Mansoor Ali Khan
(200) 7 SCC 529
34 I.P. Massey, Administrative Law (8th Edition,2012)
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1197

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

a separate showing of prejudice is not necessary. The
non-observance of natural justice is in itself prejudice
caused. However, merely because facts are admitted or
are undisputable it does not follow that the principles of
natural justice need not be observed.”
44. In Bank of Patiala v SK Sharma35, the Supreme Court observed
that where an enquiry is not convened by any statutory provision
and the only obligation of the administrative authority is to observe
the principles of natural justice, the Court/tribunal should make a
distinction between a total violation of the rule of fair hearing and
violation of the facet of that rule. In other words, a distinction must
be made between ‘no opportunity’ or ‘no adequate opportunity’.
In the case of the former, the order passed would undoubtedly be
invalid and the authority may be asked to conduct proceedings afresh
according to the rule of fair hearing. But in the latter case, the effect
of violation of a facet of the rule of fair hearing has to be examined
from the standpoint of prejudice.
45. In Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. Dy. Comm. Of Central Excise, Gauhati
and Ors.36, this Court dealt with the prejudice question as under:
“42. So far so good. However, an important question
posed by Mr Sorabjee is as to whether it is open to the
authority, which has to take a decision, to dispense with
the requirement of the principles of natural justice on the
ground that affording such an opportunity will not make
any difference? To put it otherwise, can the administrative
authority dispense with the requirement of issuing notice by
itself deciding that no prejudice will be caused to the person
against whom the action is contemplated? Answer has to
be in the negative. It is not permissible for the authority to
jump over the compliance of the principles of natural justice
on the ground that even if hearing had been provided it
would have served no useful purpose. The opportunity of
hearing will serve the purpose or not has to be considered
at a later stage and such things cannot be presumed
by the authority. This was so held by the English Court
way back in the year 1943 in General Medical Council v.

35 (1996) 3 SCC 364
36 (2015) 8 SCC 519
1198 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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Spackman [1943 AC 627]. This Court also spoke in the
same language in Board of High School and Intermediate
Education v. Chitra Srivastava [(1970) 1 SCC 121]……”
46. In a more recent decision in State of UP v Sudhir Kumar Singh37,
the position of law was summarised as under:
“(1) Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the
judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The
breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself,
without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is
thereby caused.
(2) Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law
embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per
se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here
again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in
the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived
not only in individual interest, but also in public interest.
(3) No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of
the breach of natural justice where such person does not
dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by
reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of
non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases
in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice
can therefore be said to have been caused to the person
complaining of the breach of natural justice.
(4) In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted
or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible,
the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or
remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This
conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of
the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies
natural justice to a person.
(5) The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere
apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant.
It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a
definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from
the non-observance of natural justice.”

37 (2021) 19 SCC 706
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1199

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

47. The aforementioned principles on the ‘prejudice exception’ must not
be however be understood as infringing upon the core of the principle
of audi alteram partem. In this regard, the constitutionalisation of
administrative law and the doctrinal shifts spearheaded in Maneka
Gandhi(supra) were succinctly observed in a recent judgment in
Madhyamam Broadcasting Ltd. v. Union of India38, as under:
“55.1. Firstly, procedural fairness was no longer viewed
merely as a means to secure a just outcome but a
requirement that holds an inherent value in itself. In view
of this shift, the courts are now precluded from solely
assessing procedural infringements based on whether
the procedure would have prejudiced the outcome of
the case. [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379;
“The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to
any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of
denial of natural justice is unnecessary; also see Swadeshi
Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664 : AIR
1981 SC 818] Instead, the courts would have to decide
if the procedure that was followed infringed upon the
right to a fair and reasonable procedure, independent of
the outcome. In compliance with this line of thought, the
courts have read the principles of natural justice into an
enactment to save it from being declared unconstitutional
on procedural grounds. [Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal
Corpn., (1985) 3 SCC 545; C.B. Gautam v. Union of India,
(1993) 1 SCC 78; Sahara India (Firm) (1) v. CIT, (2008) 14
SCC 151; Kesar Enterprises Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011)
13 SCC 733]
55.2. Secondly, natural justice principles breathe
reasonableness into the procedure. Responding to the
argument that the principles of natural justice are not static
but are capable of being moulded to the circumstances,
it was held that the core of natural justice guarantees a
reasonable procedure which is a constitutional requirement
entrenched in Articles 14, 19 and 21. The facet of audi
alteram partem encompasses the components of notice,
contents of the notice, reports of inquiry, and materials that

38 (2023) 13 SCC 401
1200 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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are available for perusal. While situational modifications are
permissible, the rules of natural justice cannot be modified
to suit the needs of the situation to such an extent that the
core of the principle is abrogated because it is the core
that infuses procedural reasonableness. The burden is on
the applicant to prove that the procedure that was followed
(or not followed) by the adjudicating authority, in effect,
infringes upon the core of the right to a fair and reasonable
hearing. [See para 12 of Bhagwati, J.’s judgment in Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.]”
48. Pertinently on the issue, a five judge bench of this Court in
CORE(supra) described the object of observing the principles of
natural justice as under:
“80. …The object of observing the principles of natural
justice is to ensure that “every person whose rights are
going to be affected by the proposed action gets a fair
hearing.” The non-observance of natural justice is itself
a prejudice to any person who has been denied justice
depending upon the facts and circumstances of each
case. The principle of procedural fairness is rooted in
the principles of the rule of law and good governance. In
Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v. Union of India(2023)
13 SCC 401 , this Court held that the requirement of
procedural fairness “holds an inherent value in itself.”
49. Returning to the facts of the present case, the Collector records in
his order that even though the selected ‘relatives’ have not been
made parties, ‘it is proved that the appointment of these relatives
could not be deemed to be made according to the scheme’ and
hence it is not necessary to provide an opportunity of hearing.
This was reiterated by the Commissioner in his Revisional order.
The Division Bench in its order also notes that it was imperative
to implead the affected parties. As noted by Justice Vishwanathan,
Respondent No. 4(Archana Mishra) ought to have impleaded the
candidates who were selected and appointed and even if she didn’t
array the affected parties, the Collector should have given an order
for impleadment of the selectees. The facts here are not such where
only one position emerges. It is a case of disputed facts. Significantly
the legal effect of recusal was not examined in the orders and it is
difficult to speculate what the conclusion of the Collector and the
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1201

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

Revisional authority would have been, if they were posted of the
recusal resolution.
50. Moreover, the question about whether prejudice was caused due to
non-observance of the principles of natural justice could not be raised
where such principles are incorporated into statutory procedure39. In
this regard, Rule 9 is crucial and reads as under:
“9. Power of appellate or revisional authority.- The
appellate or revisional authority after giving an opportunity
to parties to be heard and after such further enquiry, if
any, as it may deem necessary subject to the provisions
of the Act and the rules made thereunder, may confirm,
vary or set aside the order or decision appealed against.”
51. Considering the above, Justice Vishwanathan rightly notes as under:
“At least at the stage when the Collector identified all the
14 names, Rule 9 of the A&R Rules, ought to have been
complied with and notices ought to have been issued giving
an opportunity to the selected candidates to set out their
version and thereafter hold such enquiry as the Collector
may deem necessary. This was also not done. This is all
the more when only the appointment of the 14 candidates
of the 249 appointees/candidates were set aside on the
ground that 33 they were relatives and it was not a case
of setting aside of the entire selection.
It is well settled that in service matters when an
unsuccessful candidate challenges the selection process,
in a case like the present where the specific grievance
was against 14 candidates under the category of relatives
and when the overall figure was only 249, at least the
candidates against whom specific allegations were made
and who were identified ought to have been given notices
and made a party. This Court has, even in cases where
the selected candidates were too large, unlike in the
present case, held that even while adjudicating the writ
petitions at least some of the selected candidates ought
to be impleaded even it is in a representative capacity.
It has also been held that in service jurisprudence, if an

39 State Govt. Houseless Harijan Employees Association v State of Karnataka (2001) 1 SCC 610
1202 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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unsuccessful candidate challenges the selection process
the selected candidates ought to be impleaded. [See J.S.
Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2011) 6
SCC 570 (para 31) and Prabodh Verma and Others vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (1984) 4 SCC 251
(para 28) and Ranjan Kumar and Others vs. State of Bihar
and Others, 2014:INSC:276 = (2014) 16 SCC 187 (paras
4,5,8,9 & 13)] This is not a case where the allegation was
that the mischief was so widespread and all pervasive
affecting the result of the selection in a manner as to make
it difficult to sift the grain from the chaff. It could not be
said and it is not even the case of the State that it was
not possible to segregate the allegedly tainted candidates
from the untainted candidates. [See Union of India and
Others vs. G. Chakradhar, (2002) 5 SCC 146 (paras 7 &
8), Abhishek Kumar Singh vs. G. Pattanaik and Others,
2021:INSC:305 = (2021) 7 SCC 613 (para 72).”
52. In a catena of cases, significantly a clear distinction has been crafted
by this Court between the service of notice and the requirement of
fair hearing40. The respondents rely on SK Sharma(supra) which
highlights the circumstances when non-adherence to the principle
of natural justice, will not be fatal. It must however be borne in mind
that S.K. Sharma (supra) was not a case of total denial of opportunity
unlike in the present case. In fact, as Justice Vishwanathan rightly
notes in S.K. Sharma (supra), after noticing the classic case of Ridge
vs. Baldwin41 , this Court expressly records that where there is a
total violation of principles of natural justice, the violation would be
of a fundamental nature. Therefore, SK Sarma(supra) did not deal
with the violation of the first limb of Audi Alteram Partem principles,
a situation of non-service of notice. The judgment in fact explicitly
records that “a distinction ought to be made between violation of
the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such, and
violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction
between “no notice” “no hearing” and “no adequate hearing” or
to put it in different words, “no opportunity” and “no adequate
opportunity”, was highlighted. The judgement in SK Sharma(supra)

40 East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1962 SC 1893; Uma Nath Pandey and
Ors. v state of UP (2009) 12 SCC 40
41 1964 AC 40
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1203

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

is therefore inapplicable to the present matter which is a case of
no notice whatsoever.
53. The statutory provision also clearly provided for an opportunity of
hearing:
“40. Removal of office-bearers of Panchayat- (1) The State
Government or the prescribed authority may after such
enquiry as it may deem fit to make at any time, remove
an office-bearer-
(a) if he has been guilty of misconduct in the discharge
of his duties; or
(b) if his continuance in office is undesirable in the interest
of the public:
Provided that no person shall be removed unless he has
been given an opportunity to show cause why he should
not be removed from his office.”
[emphasis supplied]

54. In the absence of notice, the breach strikes at the fundamental
core of procedural fairness, rendering the decision invalid unless
exceptional circumstances justify such deviation. The vitiation of
selection was not only a breach of the principles of natural justice
but also contrary to the express statutory provision that required for
an opportunity to show cause and an opportunity to provide self-
defence. The prejudice theory must be understood as an exception
to the general rule and cannot therefore be the norm. In view of the
foregoing, a gross violation of the principle of audi alteram partem
is noticed in the present case.

ISSUE C
55. The next issue that falls for our consideration is whether the denial of
natural justice at the initial stage can be cured by an appellate body.
The earliest decision on the issue was delivered by the High Court of
Australia in Australian Workers’ Union v Bowen42. Bowen contested
his dismissal by the General Council of the Union, claiming bias
because the Union Secretary acted as both prosecutor and judge.

42 Australian Workers’ Union v Bowen (No. 2) (1948) 77 C.L.R. 601
1204 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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While the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration ruled
in his favour, the decision was overturned on appeal. The appellate
court held that the Secretary’s role did not violate the rule against
bias and, even if it had, any flaw in the original proceedings was
remedied by a fair appeal to the Annual Conference, which Bowen
did not dispute.
56. Thereafter, in a case involving a trade union dispute, Lord Denning
in Annamunthodo v Oilfield Workers’ Trade Union43, ruled that a flaw
in natural justice during the initial hearing could not be remedied by
an appeal.
57. Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders44 (for short “Leary”) is
a leading authority on the point that a failure of natural justice at
the initial stage cannot be cured at the appellate stage. The case
involved the plaintiff’s expulsion by a Branch Committee of his trade
union, at a meeting about which he was unaware. He approached the
Appeals Council for relief against the order of the branch Committee,
which conducted a full rehearing but upheld the Branch Committee’s
decision. The plaintiff then filed a writ, seeking declarations that his
expulsion from union membership as well as his position as area
organizer was unlawful, invalid, and void. Megarry J framed the
question thus:
“if a man has never had a fair trial by the appropriate trial
body, is it open to an appellate body to discard its appellate
function and itself give the man the fair trial that he has
never had?. If the rules and the law combine to give the
member the right to a fair trial and the right of appeal,
why should he be told that he ought to be satisfied with
an unjust trial and a fair appeal?... Even if the appeal is
treated as a hearing de novo, the member is being stripped
of his right to appeal to another body from the effective
decision to expel him’
58. It was held that the proper course in such a situation would be to
hear the matter afresh:
“If one accepts the contention that a defect of natural
justice in the trial body can be cured by the presence of

43 [1961] AC 945 (PC)
44 (1970) 2 All ER 713
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1205

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

natural justice in the appellate body, this has the result
of depriving the member of his right of appeal from the
expelling body. If the rules and the law combine to give
the member the right to a fair trial and the right of appeal,
why should he be told that he ought to be satisfied with
an unjust trial and a fair appeal? Even if the appeal is
treated as a hearing de novo, the member is being stripped
of his right to appeal to another body from the effective
decision to expel him. I cannot think that natural justice
is satisfied by a process whereby an unfair trial, though
not resulting in a valid expulsion, will nevertheless have
the effect of depriving the member of a right of appeal
when a valid decision to expel him is subsequently made.
Such a deprivation is a powerful result to be achieved by
what in law is a mere nullity; and it is no mere triviality
that might be justified on the ground that natural justice
does not mean perfect justice. As a general rule, at all
events, I hold that a failure of natural justice in the trial
body cannot be cured by a sufficiency of natural justice
in an appellate body.”
59. In Calvin v Carr45(for short “Calvin”), the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council only gave a qualified endorsement to the Leary
principle. In Lloyd v McMahon46, Lord Templeman considered the
Calvin principle but commented that instead of laying down general
principles, the question arising in that case must be answered by
considering the particular statutory provisions applicable therein. In
that case, a distinction was drawn between full appeals where all the
evidence may be examined and limited appeals on questions of law
only or where the appellate body does not investigate findings of fact.
60. Indian courts have applied the Leary principle as a rule47 and
the Calvin principle as an exception48. This is more so due to the

45 (1979) 2 WLR 755
46 (1987) 1 AC 625
47 Institute of Chartered Accountants v. L.K. Ratna (1986) 4 SCC 537; Fareed Ahmed v Ahmedabad
Municipality, AIR 1976 SC 2095; Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v Government of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC 298;
Mysore SRT Corp v Mirza Khasim, AIR 1977 SC 747; Laxmidhar v State of Orissa, AIR 1974 Ori 127;
Kashiram Dalmia v State, AIR 1978 Pat 265; G Rajalakshmi v Appellate Authority, AIR 1980 AP 100;
Serajuddin Co. v State of Orissa, AIR 1974 Cal 296
48 Charan Lal Sahu v Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 613; Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah v Reserve Bank of
India (1996) 9 SCC 650; United Planters’ Association of Southern India v KG Sangameswaran (1997) 4
SCC 741
1206 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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institutional structure as the writ court does not usually go into
facts and judicial review of administrative action is limited to the
decision-making process and not the decision itself. In our view,
the provision for an appeal should not rest on the assumption
that the appellate body is infallible. When one party is denied the
opportunity to present their case, the initial decision fails to provide
meaningful guidance to the appellate authority, in achieving a fair
and just resolution.
61. In this context, Professor Wade49 has observed as under:
“In principle, there ought to be an observance of natural
justice at both stages… If natural justice is violated at the
first stage , the right to appeal is not so much a true right
to appeal as a corrected initial hearing: instead of fair trial
followed by appeal., the procedure is reduced to an unfair
trial followed by fair trial”
62. Professor Laurence Tribe50 had pertinently observed that whatever
the outcome, a valued human interaction in which the affected person
experiences atleast the satisfaction of participating in the decision
that vitally concerns her is of utmost importance:
“Both from the right to be heard and the right to be told
why, are analytically distinct from the right to secre a
different outcome; these rights to interchange express the
elementary idea that to be a person, rather than a thing,
is at atleast to be consulted about what is done with one.”
63. In Institute of Chartered Accountants v. L. K. Ratna51, the Indian
Supreme Court endorsed the position adopted by Megarry J. Rejecting
the argument that an appeal to the High Court under Section 22A of
the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949, could rectify the initial defect,
Pathak J. declared the order null, void, and of no effect. This ruling
was consistent with two earlier Supreme Court decisions in State
of U.P. v. Mohammed Nooh52 and Mysore State Road Transport
Corporation v. Mirja Khasim53, both of which established that an
appeal cannot validate what is clearly a nullity.

49 H. W. R. Wade, Administrative Law ((Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982)
50 Lawrence H. Tribe, ‘American Constitutional Law’ ((The Foundation Press 1978)
51 (1986) 4 SCC 537
52 [1958] SCR 595
53 (1977) 2 SCC 457
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1207

Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors.

64. The Supreme Court has invoked the Calvin principle only in exceptional
circumstances. For instance, in Charan Lal Sahu v Union of India54
in a case concerning a challenge to the validity of the Bhopal Gas
Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, the Court applied
the Calvin principle, given the fact that the settlement fund was held
to be sufficient to meet the needs of just compensation to the victims
of the Bhopal gas leak tragedy, it was held that the grievance on
the score of not hearing the victims first would not really survive. It
recorded that “to do a great right” after all it is permissible sometimes
“to do a little wrong”.
65. What is also of fundamental importance in the present case is that
Rule 5(b) clearly provided that application for revision could be only
entertained on the point of law and not on facts:
“(b) An application for revision by any party shall only be
entertained if it is on the point of law and not on facts.”
66. Additionally, a perusal of the order(s) of the Collector and
Commissioner in Revision would also show that they are practically
identical. An ineffective hearing at the initial stage therefore taints
the entire decision-making process leading to a cascade of flawed
orders at subsequent stages. Providing a hearing to the affected
individual, minimizes the risk of administrative authorities making
decisions in ignorance of facts or other relevant circumstances, as
it allows all pertinent issues to be brought to light. This process not
only aids the administration in arriving at a correct decisions but also
enables courts to more effectively review such actions. The primary
purpose of natural justice is to assist the administration in reaching
sound decisions at the outset, reducing the likelihood of decisions
being overturned later. Its significance lies in fostering fair and well-
informed decision-making at the very first instance.
67. Following the above discussion, it must be concluded that a defect
at the initial stage cannot generally be cured at the appellate stage.
Even in cases where a ‘full jurisdiction’ may be available at the
appellate stage, the Courts must have the discretion to relegate it
to the original stage for an opportunity of hearing. Therefore, the
ex-parte decision to set aside the appellants selection stands vitiated.

54 (1990) 1 SCC 613
1208 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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V. CONCLUSION
68. The principle of audi alteram partem is the cornerstone of justice,
ensuring that no person is condemned unheard. This principle
transforms justice from a mere technical formality into a humane
pursuit. It safeguards against arbitrary decision-making, and is needed
more so in cases of unequal power dynamics55.
69. An allegation of bias, can only be proved if facts are established
after giving an opportunity of hearing. This process requires a fair
and transparent procedure in which the concerned parties are given
an adequate opportunity to present their case. Such an opportunity
allows the accused party or the affected individuals to respond to the
allegations, provide evidence, and clarify any misgivings regarding
the decision-making process. Therefore, for an allegation of bias to
be proved, it is imperative that the procedural safeguards of a fair
hearing are observed allowing for establishment of the relevant facts.
70. In light of the foregoing, we uphold the opinion of Justice KV
Vishwanathan allowing the appeal(s) and setting aside the judgment
of the Division Bench. Resultantly, this Court is not able to endorse
the opinion rendered by Justice JK Maheshwari.
71. Since the selection pertains to the year 1998, and the appellants have
continuously held office and performed their duties for over twenty-five
years under interim orders, remanding the matter for a fresh inquiry
would hardly be a practical exercise and will be an injustice to the
appointees. The time lag can be better appreciated by bearing in
mind that one of the appellants has already superannuated.
72. The matters stand answered and allowed on the above terms. Parties
to bear their own cost.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey

55 Upendra Baxi, ‘Preface: The Myth and Reality of the Indian Administrative Law’, in IP Massey(ed)
‘Administrative Law’ (8th edn, EBC 2012)