Holding

Section 6 removal of trustees appointed under Section 4(1)(e) is governed by the implicit doctrine of pleasure and does not require compliance with the procedural safeguards of Section 10 or the principles of natural justice.

Summary

Krishna was appointed a trustee of the Nagpur Improvement Trust for a five‑year term under Section 4(1)(e) of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936. The State Government removed him before the term expired by invoking Section 6 of the Act. Krishna challenged the removal, arguing that the removal should follow the procedure in Section 10 and that the doctrine of pleasure did not apply, thus violating natural justice. The High Court dismissed his writ petition, holding that Section 6 gave an independent power to remove trustees without the safeguards of Section 10. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the relationship between Sections 6 and 10, held that they operate in separate fields, and that removal under Section 6 is without stigma and is governed by the implicit doctrine of pleasure. Consequently, natural‑justice requirements such as a hearing do not arise, and the removal was upheld. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether Section 6 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 confers a power on the State Government to remove trustees appointed under Section 4(1)(e) at its pleasure, independent of the power and procedure laid down in Section 10.
Whether the doctrine of pleasure is applicable to removal under Section 6, thereby negating the requirement to afford a hearing under principles of natural justice.

Legislation cited

Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936s. 10, s. 4(1)(e), s. 4(2), s. 6

Subjects

doctrine of pleasurenatural justicetrustee removalstatutory interpretationNagpur Improvement Trust ActSection 6Section 10stigmaappointmentremoval

Judgment

A KRISHNA S/O BULAJI BORATE .
v.
ST ATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS.

JANUARY 23, 2001

B [A.P. MISRA AND D.P. MOHAPATRA, JJ.]

Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, J936: Sections 4{l)(e), 6,and IO.

Trustee-Removal of -Doctrine of Pleasure-Principles of natural
C Justice-Applicability-Trustee appointed for a term of 5 years under Section
4(/)(e) but removed under Section 6 before the end of his term-Prescribed
· procedure under Section JO not followed-Trustee not given any opportunity
before removal-Validity of-Held: The fields of Sections 6 and IO are >
separate- Removal under Section 6 is without stigma whereas removal
D under Section JO is with stigma-Therefore, Doctrine of Pleasure is implicit
in Section 6 and is applicable for removal under Section 6-0nce Doctrine
of Pleasure is applicable neither principal of natural justice steps in nor
question of giving opportunity arises-Hence, removal of trustee is valid.

Doctrines:
E Doctrine of Pleasure-Applicability of

The appellant-trustee was appointed as a trustee of the respondent-
Trust for a term of5 years under Section 4(1) (e) of the Nagpur Improvement
Trust Act, 1936 read with Section 6 of the Act. The State Government
F removed the appellant from the post of trustee under Section 6 before the
expiry of his term. The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the
appellant. Hence this appeal.

On behalf of the appellant it was contended that removal of the appellant
without giving him any opportunity and without following the procedure
G prescribed under Section 10 of the Act was violative of principles of natural
justice; and that without any explicit words in Section 6 doctrine of pleasure
could not be applied.

On behalf of the respondent it was contended that there was no stigma
while removing a trustee u/s 6 but there was a stigma when removed u/s 10;
H 504
KRISHNA S/0 BULAJI BORATE 1•. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 505
and that the doctrine of pleasure is impliCit in Section 6. A
The following question arose before this Court:

Whether Section 6 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936 confers
power on the state Government independent of the power of State Government
under Section 10 to remove the Trustees appointed under Section 4(1)(e) at B
the pleasure of the Government even before the Trustee concerned completes
a period of five years?

Dismissing the appeal, the Court.

HELD : 1. The fields of Section 6 and Section JO of the Nagpur C
Improvement Trust Act, J936 are separate. The removal spoken under Section
6 is removal without any stigma while the removal under Section JO is
removal with penal consequences attaching stigma. If submission for the
appellant is accepted, viz. Section 6 empowers and Section JO lays down the
condition and procedure to remove, then removal of a trustee could only be D
for penal consequences and not otherwise. If that be so, there could be no
reason to enact Section 6 as Section 10 covers such cases. It is significant
that removal under Section 6 is confined only to such trustees who are
.C. covered under Section 4(J)(e) and who are also nominated by the State
Government. Rights of trustees falling under the aforesaid Clause (e) are
rights created under a statute and hence that very creator can always limit E
or curtail such rights. Jn such cases, if a trustee is removed, he cannot
project any grievance that no opportunity was given to him. If any right which
is a creature of statute is limited or curtailed by that very statute, in the
absence of any other right under that very statute or the Constitution of
India, such trustee cannot claim any right based on the principle of Natural F
Justice. 15J l-A-DI

2. The removal spoken in Section 6 of the Act casts neither stigma
nor lead to any penal consequences. This clearly reveals the doctrine of
pleasure, which is implicit in the Section. In any statute expression of the
will of the legislature may be explicit or it may be implicit. It is open for the G
courts, while interpreting any provision to spell or read with other provisions
of the statute if so intended to read implicitly, in the absence of any explicit
words that sub-serve the intent of the legislature. (511-D-EI

3. Once doctrine of pleasure is applicable neither the principle of
natural justice would step in or any question of giving opportunity before H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I] I S.C.R.

A removal would arise. It is significant that when stigma is cast then Section
10(3) specially provides for giving an opportunity to such incumbent before
passing an order of removal under Section 10, while there is no such
corresponding sub-section under Section 6. Thus intent of the legislature
is very clear which reinforces the inference that the doctrine of pleasure is
B implicit under Section 6. 1511-H; 512-A-Bf

Om Narain Agarwal v. Nagar Palika Shahjahanpur, 119931 2 SCC >
242, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal no. 788 of200l.
c
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.2.2000 of the Bombay High
Court in W.P . No. 444 of2000.
)

P.G. Palshikar, S.P. Puranik, R.G. Purinik, Nikhil Sakhardande,
Ms. Meenakshi Sakhardande and S.R. Grover for the Appellant.
D
Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General and Ashwani Kumar, S.V. Deshpande,
S.K. Mishra and Pramit Saxena for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
MISRA J. Leave granted.

This appeal raises the following question:

"Whether Section 6 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936
F (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') confers power on the State
Government independent of the power of State Government under
Section I 0, to remove the Trustees appointed under Section 4(1 )(e) at
the pleasure of the Government even before the Trustee concerned
compl1:tes a period of five years."
G
This appeal is direct~d against the judgment and order of the High
Court which dismissed the appellant's writ petition challenging the order
dated 9.2.2000 passed by the State Government (respondent no. I), removing
the appellant from the trust (respondent no. 2) created under the aforesaid
Act. The Preamble of the Act suggests, the Act was brought on the statute
H book to provide for the improvement and expansion of the town of Nagpur.
I-
KRISHNA S/O BULAJI BORATE,, STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [MISRA, J.] 507

The second respondent-trust was created under Section 3 of the said Act. A
Section 4 provides that the trust shall consist of nine Trustees of which one
shall be the Chairman. Out of nine such Trustees four persons are appointed
including the Chairman by the State Government under Sub-section (2) of
Section and 4 out of the said four persons not less than two shall have to
be non-officials residing within the limits of the area to which this Act applies. B
In the present case we are concerned with Clause(e) of sub-section (l) of
Section 4 to which the appellant beiongs. Section 6 specifies about the term
of the Chairman and the Trustees appointed under Clause( e) of sub-section
(I) of Section 4. It provides that term of the office under it of the Chairman
and of any Trustee shall be five years and both the Chairman and such
Trustee may be removed from the office by the State Government at any time C
before completion of such tem1. Section l 0 provides for the removal of
Trustees, a provision which would fall for consideration along with Section
6 of the Act. For the purpose of appreciating the controversy we are hereunder
reproducing Sections 4 ( l )( e ), 4(2), 6 and l 0:-

"Section 4(J)(e): Four persons appointed under sub-section (2) of D
whom not less than two shall be non-officials residing within the
limits of the area to which this Act applies.

Section 4(2): The Chairman and the four persons referred to in clause
(e) of sub-section (I) shall be appointed by the State Government by
notification. E
Section 6: The term of office of Chairman or of any Trustee appointed
under clause (e) of sub-section (I) of Section 4 shall be five years,
provided that the Chairman or any Trustee may be removed from
office by the State Government at any time before the completion of
such term. F
Sec/ion JO: The State Government may remove from the Trust any
Trustees other than an ex-officio Trustee who-

(a) refuses to act, or becomes incapable of acting as a Trustee, or
absents himself without the permission of the trust for more than G
three consecutive months from the meeting of the Trust or of
any Committee of which he is a member and is unable to explain
such absence to the satisfaction of the Trust, or

(b) is an undischarged insolvent or has compounded. with his
creditors, or H
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I] I S.C.R.

A (c) has been sentenced by a Criminal Court to imprisonment for
as term exc..:eding six months or to transportation, or has been
ordered to find security for good behaviour under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, such sentence or order not having
subsequently being reversed or remitted or the offender pardoned,
or
B
(d) has acquired or continued to hold without the permission in
writing of the State Government directly or indirectly or by a
partner, any share or interest in any contract or employment
with, by or on behalf to the Trust or the Municipal Committee,
or
c
(e) has acted as a trustee in a matter other than a matter referred to
in clause (iv) or clause (v) of the proviso to this sub-section in
which he had either directly or indirectly, a personal interest, as
a partner, employer, agent or counsel, or

D (f) has added in contravention of Section 20 or
(g) being a legal practitioner, in any suit or other proceedings, acts
or appears on behalf of any other person against the Trust, or
acts or appears on behalf of any other person in any criminal
proceedings instituted by or on behalf of the Trust:
E Provided that a person shall not be deemed for the purpose of this sub-
section to acquire, or continue to have, any share or interest in a contract or
employment by reasons only of his

F
(i) having a share or interest in any lease, sale or purchase of land
or buildings, or in any agreement for the same provided that
such share or interest was acquired before he became a Trustee,
or
.
(ii) having a share in a joint stock company which shall contract
with, or be employed by or on behalf of, the Trust, or

G (iii) having a share or interest in a newspaper in which an
advertisement relating to the affairs of the trust is inserted, or

(iv) holding a debenture or otherwise being interested in a loan
• I
raised by or on behalf of the trust, or

H (v) having a share or interest in the occasional sale of an article in
KRISHNA S/O BULAJI BORATE" STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [MISRA, J.) 509
which he regularly trades to the Trust to a value not exceeding, A
in any one year, such amount as the Trust, with the sanction of
the State Government, may fix in this behalf.

(2) The State Government may remove from the Trust a trustee who
in its opinion has so flagrantly abused in any manner his position as
a Trustee as to render his continuance as a Trustee detrimental to the B
public interest.

(3) Wherever the State Government proposes to take action under the
foregoing provisions of this section, an opportunity of explanation
shall be given to the Trustee concerned, and, when such action is C
taken the reasons therefor shall be placed on record.

(4) A Trustee, who remains absent without the permission of the Trust
for more than three consecutive months from the area to which this
Act extends, shall be deemed to have resigned his office."
D
On 4.10.1996 the appellant was appointed as Trustee of the second
respondent by the first respondent under sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the
Act and his t~rm was to expire on 3.10.2001. The submission for the appellant,
incorporated in this appeal is, that after election of State Legislature Assembly,
new national democratic Government came into power in the State of
Maharashtra and started undoing what was done by the previous Government E
under pressure of various political parties. On 9.2.2000 respondent no. 1
passed an order removing the appellant from the office of Trustee. The order
reads hereunder:

"In exercise of powers conferred on the Government by Section F
6 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, I 936 (C.P. & Berar Act No.
XXXVI of 1936) the Government of Maharashtra from the date of this
Notification cancel the appointment of S/Shri Pravin Barde and Krishna
Bulaji Borate, Nagpur as the Trustee of the Nagpur Improvement
i Trust.
G
By the order and in the name of the Governor of the Maharashtra
State."

This order was challenged by the appellant through a writ petition
before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the writ petition (impugned
order) by holding that Section 6 is an independent power for the removal of H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 l] 1 S.C.R.

A a Trustee falling under Section 4(1 )(e), notwithstanding what is contained in
Section 10. The initial appointment of the appellant is under Section 4(2) :If
which is under the doctrine of pleasure hence in such termination there could
be no question of violation of any principle of natural justice. It further held,
when power is exercised u/s 6, the provisions of Section 10 are not attracted.
Hence before the impugned order there would not arise any question of
B giving opportunity, in effect there ~an not be any violation of the principle of
natural justice. Aggrieved by this the appellant has filed the present appeal.
,.
Learned senior counsel Mr. P.G. Paishikar, appearing for the appellant
submits, Section 6 specifies the tenure of a Trustee which is for a period of
c five years and removal referred therein could only be after following the
procedure specified under Section 10. In other words, Section 6 empowers the
State Government to remove but it could only be done through the procedure
as specified under Section 10. He submits both Section 6 and Section 10 use
the word 'remove' and being under the same chapter same meaning should
be given. The submission is, it is not in dispute that the appellant was
D removed as a Trustee without giving any opportunity, hence it is violative of
the principle of natural justice. Further in the absence of any such explicit
words in Section 6, the doctrine of pleasure could not be applied.

On the other hand learned Attorney General Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee submits
E that s.6 carves out a separate field for its application and is only for such
Trustees appointed under Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 4. Section
10 refers to the removal of Trustees other than ex-officio Trustees. The
distinguishing feature is, there is no stigma while removing a Trustee under
Section 6 but there is when removed under Section 10. Though Section 6 does
not explicitly state that removal is at the pleasure of the Government but is
F implicit within its frame and texture. This is reinforced by the fact that the
appointment under Clause (e) of sub-section (I) of Section 4 is by way of
nomination. The submission is, it is significant when Section 6 specifies
tenure of such trustee to be of five years it also confers power to curtail it
at any time before the completion of such term. This later power of removal
of such nominated Trustee, implicitly reveals it to fall under the doctrine of
G
pleasure.
~
In the present case, the appellant was appointed under sub-section (2)
of Section 4 read with Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section (4) and was
removed by order dated 9.2.2000 under Section 6 of the Act. Having considered
H the submissions for the parties and after perusing the language of the sections.
KRISHNA S/O BULAH BORATE v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [MISRA, J.] 511

. ...__ We have no hesitation to hold, that the field of Section 6 and Section 10 are A
separate. The removal spoken under Section 6 is removal without any stigma
' while the removal under Section I 0 is removal with penal consequences
attaching stigma. If submission for the appellant is accepted, viz. Section 6
empowers and Section I 0 lays down condition and procedure tel remove then
removal of trustee could only be for penal consequences and not otherwise.
If that be so, there could be no reason to enact Section 6 as Section I0 covers B
such cases. It is significant, the removal under Section 6 is confined only to
such Trustees who are covered und,er Clause (e) of sub-section (I) of Section
4 and who are also nominated by the State Government. Rights of trustees
falling under the aforesaid Clause (e) are rights created under a statute and
hence that very creator can always limits or curtails such right. In such cases, c
if a Trustee is removed, he cannot project any grievance that no opportunity
was given to him. If any right whiGh is creature of statute, is limited or
curtailed by that very statute in the absence of any other right under that very
statute or the Constitution of India, such Trustee cannot claim any right
based on the principle of Natural Justice.
D
The removal spoken here neither casts any stigma nor lead to any
penal consequences. This clearly reveals doctrine of pleasure which is implicit
in this section. In any statute expression of the will of the legislature may be
explicit or it may be implicit. It is open for the courts, while interpreting any
provision to spell or read with other provisions of the statute if so intended E
to read implicitly, in the absence of any explicit words that subserve the intent
of the legislature.
·;
In the present statute Section 6 refers to the trustee falling under Clause
(e), sub-section (I) Section 7 refers to Trustees falling under Clauses (b) and
• (c) and sub-section (2) refers to Trustees falling under Clause (d) and sub- F
section (:i) refers to Trustees falling in Clause (t) of sub-section (I) of Section
4 and Section I0 refers to cases ofremoval of trustees by way of stigma, and
Section 11 refers to the disability of such removed trustees. In view of this
we have no hesitation to hold that removal of Trustee under Section 6 is
based on the principle of doctrine of pleasure. We may only strike a note here G
if the legislature would have used some other words for the word 'removed'
for expressing curtailment of the tenure of such trustee in Section 6, this
possible confusion would not have arisen.

Once doctrine of pleasure is applicable neither the principle of natural
justice would step in nor any question of giving opportunity before removal H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (200 I] I S.C.R.

A would arise. It is significant when stigma is cast then SUB-SECTION (3) of
Section I 0 specially provides for giving an opportunity to such incumbent
before passing an order of removal under Section I0, while there is no such
corresponding sub-section under Section 6. Thus intent of legislature is very
clear which reinforces the inference which we have drawn that doctrine of
B pleasure is implicit under Section 6. In Om Narain Agarwal and Ors. v.
Nagpur Palika, Shahjahanpur and Ors., (1993] 2 SCC 242, this Court was
considering the provisions of Section 9 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916
as introduced by U.P. Act 19of1990, which made provision for the nomination
of two women members by the State Government, and fourth proviso provides
that the nomination of such two members is at the pleasure of the State
C Government This Court held:
"The initial nomination of the two women members itself depend on
the pleasure and subjective satisfaction of the State Government. If
such appointments made initially by nomination are based on political
considerations, there can be no violation of any provision of the
D Constitution in case the legislature authorised the State Government
to terminate such appointment at its pleasure and to nominate new
members in their place. The nominated members do not have the will
or authority to any residents of the Municipal Board behind them as
may be present in the case of an elected member............. But so far as
the nominated members are concerned, the legislature in its wisdom
E has provided that they shall hold office during the pleasure of the
Government. It has not been argued from the side of the respondents
that the legislature had no such power to legislate the fourth proviso.
The attack is based ori Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.

In our view, such provision neither offends any Article of the
F
Constitution nor the same is against any public policy or democratic
norms enshrined in the Constitution. There is also no question of any
violation of principles of natural justice in not affording any
opportunity to the nominated members before their removal nor the
removal under the pleasure doctrine contained in the fourth proviso
G to Section 9 of the Act puts any stigma on the performance or
character of the nominated members. It is done purely on political
considerations."

This decision clearly covers the point as against the appellant.

H Learned senior counsel for the appellant tried to distinguish this case
KRISHNA S/O BULAJI BORA TE v. STA TE OF MAHARA~HTRA [MISRA, J.] 513
by submitting that doctrine of pleasure was incorporated in the section itself. A
In our opinion this does not make any difference. It may be in this case
doctrine of pleasure is explicit but if on another' statute it is implicit, which
we have held in this case, the same principle would be equally applicable.
Accordingly we do not find any merit in this submission.

For the aforesaid reasons we hold the present appeal has no merit and B
the High Court was right in dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.
We hold the removal of the appellant as Trustee of the second respondent
by order dated 9.2.2000 was valid. The appeal is dismissed. Costs on the
parties.

V.S.S. Appeal dismissed.