KIRPAL SINGHversusGOVERNMENT OF INDIA, NEW DELHI & ORS.

          [2024] 11 S.C.R. 1329 : 2024 INSC 944

                    Kirpal Singh
                          v.
         Government of India, New Delhi & Ors.
           (Civil Appeal No(s). 12849-12856 of 2024)
                        21 November 2024
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Manoj Misra, JJ.]


                      Issue for Consideration
 Whether the period commencing from 20.10.2011 to 20.01.2012
 should be condoned u/s.14 of the Limitation Act while reckoning
 the period of limitation for filing objections under Arbitration and
 Conciliation Act, 1996 incorporated in the National Highways Act,
 1956.

                             Headnotes†
 Limitation Act, 1963 – s.14 – Arbitration and Conciliation
 Act, 1996 – s.34 and s.37 – National Highways Act, 1956 –
 A land belonging to appellant was acquired under the NH
 Act leading to passing of an award dated 25.07.2011 – A
 Regular First Appeal was filed before the High Court on
 20.10.2011 on an erroneous understanding – The Registry
 of the High Court notified certain defects on 09.11.2011 and
 it is said to have been received by the concerned Advocate
 only on 20.01.2012 – Appellant filed an application u/s.34
 of the Arbitration Act before the District Judge, however,
 the same was dismissed on the ground that it was barred by
 limitation – Correctness:
 Held: When the substantive remedies u/ss.34 and/or 37 of the
 Arbitration Act are by their very nature limited in their scope due
 to statutory prescription, it is necessary to interpret the limitation
 provisions liberally, or else, even that limited window to challenge
 an arbitral award will be lost – The remedies u/ss.34 and 37 are
 precious – Courts of law will keep in mind the need to secure and
 protect such a remedy while calculating the period of limitation for
 invoking these jurisdictions – Applying s.14 of the Limitation Act,
 there is sufficient cause for excluding the period commencing from
 20.10.2011 to 23.02.2012 – In view of the fact that this period is
 excluded, the appellant will be entitled to the statutory remedy
 u/s.34 of the Act. [Paras 10, 11]
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                             Case Law Cited
     Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary,
     Irrigation Department and Others [2008] 5 SCR 1108 : 2008 (7)
     SCC 169 – relied on.
     Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. [2001] Supp. 3 SCR
     619 : 2002 (1) RCR (Civil) 124 – referred to.

                               List of Acts
     Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; National Highways Act,
     1956; Limitation Act, 1963.

                            List of Keywords
     Section 14 of Limitation Act, 1963; Section 34 of Arbitration and
     Conciliation Act, 1996; Period of limitation; Exclusion of period;
     Arbitration; Sufficient Cause.

                           Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No(s). 12849-
     12856 of 2024
     From the Judgment and Order dated 19.10.2019 of the High Court
     of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in FAO Nos. 800 of 2013, 1278
     of 2015, 1290 of 2015, 7453 of 2014, 7454 of 2014, 2887 of 2015
     and 8136 of 2014

                        Appearances for Parties
     Chritarth Palli, Nilanjan Sen, Vijay Kumar Dwivedi, Deepak Samota,
     Shubham Bhalla, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Alok Sangwan, Sumit Kumar Sharma, Rajat Sangwan, Sunny
     Kadiyan, Advs. for the Respondents.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Order

1.   Leave granted.
2.   These appeals arise from the judgment and order passed by the
     High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh dated 19.10.2019
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                          1331

            Kirpal Singh v. Government of India, New Delhi & Ors.


       in FAO Nos. 800/2013, 7453, 7454, 8136/2014, 1278, 1290, 2000
       and 2887/2015. The short question that arises for consideration is
       whether the period commencing from 20.10.2011 to 20.01.2012
       should be condoned under Section 14 of the Limitation Act while
       reckoning the period of limitation for filing objections under Arbitration
       and Conciliation Act, 19961 incorporated in the National Highways
       Act, 1956.2
3.     The facts relevant for our decision are that the land belonging to the
       appellant was acquired under the NH Act leading to passing of an
       award dated 25.07.2011. Application for a certified copy of the award
       was made on 12.08.2011 and the same was received on 08.09.2011.
       Thereafter, a Regular First Appeal was filed before the High Court
       on 20.10.2011 on an erroneous understanding.
4.     The Registry of the High Court notified certain defects on 09.11.2011
       and it is said to have been received by the concerned Advocate
       only on 20.01.2012. It is only thereafter when the appellant came
       to know about the appropriate action available to him, being the
       statutory remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, and he
       took steps and instituted proceedings under Section 34 of the said
       Act on 23.02.2012.
5.     The District Judge took up the application under Section 34 of the
       Act and by his order dated 16.05.2012 dismissed the same on the
       ground that it is barred by limitation as determined by this Court in
       the case of Union of India Vs. Popular Construction Co.3 The
       appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act was also dismissed
       by the order impugned before us.
6.     Mr. Gaurav Agarwal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
       appellant has submitted that his client is entitled to the exclusion
       of period from 20.10.2011 to 20.01.2012 under Section 14 of the
       Limitation Act. For this purpose, he relied on the judgment of this
       Court in Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Principal
       Secretary, Irrigation Department and Others.4 The relevant portion
       of the judgment is quoted hereunder:


1    Hereinafter referred to as “the Arbitration Act”
2    Hereinafter referred to as “the NH Act”
3    [2001] Supp. 3 SCR 619 : 2002 (1) RCR (Civil) 124
4    [2008] 5 SCR 1108 : (2008) 7 SCC 169
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        “23. At this stage it would be relevant to ascertain whether
        there is any express provision in the Act of 1996, which
        excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation
        Act. On review of the provisions of the Act of 1996 this
        Court finds that there is no provision in the said Act which
        excludes the applicability of the provisions of Section 14
        of the said Act…..
        Hence, Section 43 incorporating the Limitation Act will
        apply to the proceedings in the arbitration as it applies
        to the proceedings of a suit in the court. Sub-section (4)
        of Section 43, inter alia, provides that where the court
        orders that an arbitral award be set aside, the period
        between the commencement of the arbitration and
        the date of the order of the court shall be excluded in
        computing the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963,
        for the commencement of the proceedings with respect
        to the dispute soc submitted. If the period between the
        commencement of the arbitration proceedings till the award
        is set aside by the court, has to be excluded in computing
        the period of limitation provided for any proceedings with
        respect o the dispute, there is no good reason as to why
        it should not be held that the to provisions of Section 14
        of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application
        submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, more
        particularly d where no provision is to be found in the Act
        of 1996, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of
        the Limitation Act, to an application made under Section
        34 of the Act. It is to be noticed that the powers under
        Section 34 of the Act can be exercised by the court only if
        the aggrieved party makes an application. The jurisdiction
        under Section 34 of the Act, cannot be exercised suo
        motu. The total period of four months within which an
        application, for setting aside an arbitral award, has to be
        made is not unusually long. Section 34 of the Act of 1996
        would be unduly oppressive, if it is held that the provisions
        of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to
        it, because cases are no doubt conceivable where an
        aggrieved party, despite exercise of due diligence and good
        faith, is unable to make an application within a period of
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                                1333

           Kirpal Singh v. Government of India, New Delhi & Ors.


              four months. From the scheme and language of Section
              34 of the Act of 1996, the intention of the legislature to
              exclude the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act
              is not manifest. It is well to remember that Section 14 of
              the Limitation Act does not provide for a fresh period of
              limitation but only provides for the exclusion of a certain
              period. Having regard to the legislative intent, it will have to
              be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation
              Act, 1963 would be applicable to g an application submitted
              under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside an
              arbitral award.”
7.    On the other hand, Mr. Rajat Sangwan, learned counsel appearing
      for respondent Nos.1 and 2 (National Highway Authority of India)
      has vehemently contended that the periods of limitation under the
      Arbitration Act are sacrosanct and these provisions are strictly
      interpreted by the Courts. He would further submit that, even
      assuming that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is applicable, the
      benefit of the said section cannot be extended beyond 20.10.2011.
      In other words, his submission is that the period commencing from
      09.11.2011 to the filing of Section 34 petition being 23.02.2012,
      should not be condoned.
8.    Further, Mr. Rajat Sangwan, would also submit that the language
      of Section 14 is mandatory and on the basis of the said provision
      it cannot be said that the appellant has exercised due diligence
      in approaching the Court by filing the Section 34 petition. He also
      argued that strict enforcement of time-lines under the Arbitration
      Act are recognized and incorporated under the National Highways
      Act. For this purpose, he referred to sub-section 7 of Section 3(G)
      of the NH Act.
9.    Having considered the matter in detail, we are of the opinion that
      the issue is covered by the decision of this court in Consolidated
      Engg. Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Dept.5 (supra).
10. We may hasten to add that when the substantive remedies under
    Sections 34 and/or 37 of the Arbitration Act are by their very nature




5    [2008] 5 SCR 1108 : 2008 (7) SCC 169.
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      limited in their scope due to statutory prescription,6 it is necessary to
      interpret the limitation provisions liberally, or else, even that limited
      window to challenge an arbitral award will be lost. The remedies
      under Sections 34 and 37 are precious. Courts of law will keep in
      mind the need to secure and protect such a remedy while calculating
      the period of limitation for invoking these jurisdictions.
11. Applying Section 14 of the Limitation Act, we hold that there is
    sufficient cause for excluding the period commencing from 20.10.2011
    to 23.02.2012. In view of the fact that this period is excluded, the
    appellant will be entitled to the statutory remedy under Section 34
    of the Act.
12. In view of the above, we allow the appeals, set aside the judgment
    and order passed by the High Court in FAO Nos. 800/2013(O&M),
    2000/2015(O&M), 1278/2015(O&M), 1290/2015(O&M),
    7453/2014(O&M), 7454/2014(O&M), 2887/2015(O&M) and 8136/2014
    (O&M) dated 19.10.2019 and also the order of the District Judge,
    Jalandhar dated 16.05.2012 and restore the Section 34 petition in
    Arbitration No.3435/2012 to its original number. We further direct
    the District Judge, Jalandhar to issue notice to all the parties, hear
    them and decide the petition as per law.
13. With the above observations, the civil appeals are disposed of.
14. There shall be no order as to costs.

      Result of the case: Appeals disposed of.



      †
          Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan




6   Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.