KIM WANSOOversusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 8
- Decided
- 1 January 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- C T RAVIKUMAR
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the High Court must quash FIR No.64/2020 as the allegations do not prima facie disclose any offence against the appellant, and refusal to do so would constitute an abuse of process.
Summary
The appellant, a foreign national serving as Project Manager for Hyundai Engineering & Construction India LLP, was named in FIR No.64/2020 alleging conspiracy and cheating in a Rs 9‑crore payment default involving multiple subcontractors. The appellant sought quashing of the FIR on the ground that the allegations were vague, did not disclose any cognizable offence against him, and would constitute an abuse of process. The High Court refused to quash the FIR, directing that the appellant not be arrested until credible evidence was produced. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution and the inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash criminal proceedings. Relying on precedents such as Bhajan Lal and Pepsi Foods, the Court held that where an FIR does not prima facie disclose an offence, the High Court must exercise its power to prevent miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and quashed the FIR and all subsequent proceedings against the appellant.
Issues considered
- Whether the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash FIR No.64/2020.
- Whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, disclose a cognizable offence against the appellant.
- Whether non‑interference would amount to an abuse of process and miscarriage of justice warranting quashing of the criminal proceedings.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. s.155(2), s. s.156(1), s. s.157, s. s.173(2), s. s.482, s. s.91
- Constitution of Indias. Art.226
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. s.120-B, s. s.323, s. s.406, s. s.420, s. s.504, s. s.506
Subjects
Judgment
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 8
Kim Wansoo
v.
State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 2025)
02 January 2025
[C.T. Ravikumar* and Sanjay Kumar, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards invocation of extraordinary power u/Art.
226 of the Constitution to quash criminal proceedings.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Art.226 – Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing of criminal proceedings –
Invocation of extraordinary power u/Art.226 – FIR registered
u/ss.406, 420, 323, 504, 506 and 120-B IPC against the accused,
including the appellant-foreign national and Project Manager
for defaulting in payment to the company – Appellant sought
quashing of FIR – However, the High Court refused to quash
FIR – Correctness:
Held: Normally, quashing of criminal proceedings would be
sought and would be done in exercise of the inherent power of
the High Court u/s. 482 – But that does not mean that it could
not be done only in invocation of the extraordinary power u/
Art. 226 – Extraordinary power u/Art. 226 or the inherent power
u/s. 482 could be exercised by the High Court, either to prevent
abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice – On facts, the High Court erred in refusing to exercise
the extraordinary power u/Art. 226 to quash the FIR and all
further proceedings in pursuance thereof, qua the appellant –
Perusal of the FIR would reveal that the same did not disclose
commission of offence as alleged without anything being added
to the recitals thereof – Besides the vague allegations, the rest of
them, even if taken as true, would not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against, the appellant –
In such circumstances, asking the appellant to stand the trial
would be nothing but an abuse of process of law and as such,
* Author
2 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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non-interference by refusing to exercise the power to quash
the FIR and further proceedings based thereon, would result in
miscarriage of justice – Judgment passed by the High Court set
aside – FIR and all further proceedings pursuant thereto, qua the
appellant quashed and set aside. [Paras 6, 10, 12-14]
Case Law Cited
State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1990 INSC 363 :
[1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : AIR 1992 SC 604; Pepsi Foods Ltd. and
Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors. 1997 INSC 714 : [1997]
Supp. 5 SCR 12 : AIR 1998 SC 128; Eastern Spg. Mills v. Rajiv
Poddar, AIR 1985 SC 1668; State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy
2004 INSC 404 : [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 147 : (2004) 6 SCC 522;
Mohammad Wajid and Another. v. State of U.P. and Anr., 2023 INSC
683: [2023] 11 SCR 313 : 2023 SCC Online SC 951 – referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal
Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Invocation of extraordinary power u/Art. 226; Quashing of criminal
proceedings; Foreign national; Default in payment; Quashing of
FIR; Inherent power of the High Court u/s. 482 CrPC; Extraordinary
power u/Art. 226; Abuse of process; Vague allegations; Project
Manager; Miscarriage of justice.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
15 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.08.2020 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in CRLMWP No. 8063 of 2020
Appearances for Parties
M. Shoeb Alam, Sr. Adv., Talha Abdul Rahman, M. Shaz Khan,
Adnan Yousuf, Advs. for the Appellant.
Pallav Shishodia, Sr. Adv., Divyesh Pratap Singh, Rajat Singh,
Andleeb Naqvi, Sarthak Chandra, Arun Pratap Singh Rajawat,
Danish Zubair Khan, Dr. Lokendra Malik, Advs. for the Respondents.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 3
Kim Wansoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
C.T. Ravikumar, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated
26.08.2020 in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.8063 of 2020 passed
by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, refusing to quash FIR
No.64/2020 registered at Police Station, Sadar Bazar, District Meerut.
Furthermore, it was ordered thereunder thus: -
“However, considering the allegations made in the FIR,
the provisions of Section 157, Cr. P.C. and the view taken
by the Apex Court in the case of Joginder Kumar v.
State of U.P. 1994, Cr.L.J. 1981, it is directed that the
petitioner shall not be arrested in the above case, till the
credible evidence is not available against him during the
investigation or till the submission of Police Report under
Section 173(2), Cr. P.C., whichever is earlier.”
3. On 14.10.2020, this Court issued notice and also stayed further
proceedings based on the subject FIR. The said order is still in force.
4. The facts leading to the impugned judgment read as under: -
Hyundai Motor India Limited (for brevity, ‘HMIL’ only) awarded a
contract for construction and development of a project work namely,
Gurgaon, HMI Project, R.C. Works (hereafter referred to as, ‘the
project’) to Hyundai Engineering & Construction India LLP (for short,
‘HEC India LLP’). Agreement dated 20.10.2017 was executed therefor,
between the said companies and the appellant herein was the Project
Manager of HEC India LLP. He is a foreign national. HEC India
LLP, sub-contracted the work to KOTEC Automotive Services India
Private Limited (for short, ‘KOTEC’) which in turn sub-contracted the
RC constructions work to M/s. YSSS India Construction (for short,
‘YSSS’) and ‘YSSS’ further sub-contracted with M/s R.T. Construction,
which is the complainant’s (respondent No.4 herein) entity, to obtain
manpower. It is alleged in the subject FIR that ‘YSSS’ in connivance
with the other accused defaulted payment to the complainant’s
company. The subject FIR was registered under Sections 406, 420,
4 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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323, 504, 506 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereafter,
‘the IPC’) against the accused, including the appellant herein on the
allegation that ‘YSSS’, in connivance with the other accused defaulted
payment to the company to the tune of Rs.9 Crores. Pursuant to the
lodgement of the FIR, the appellant received notices dated nil, on
06.08.2020 and 09.09.2020, issued under Section 91 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereafter, ‘the Cr.P.C.’) calling upon
him to produce certain documents. Though, the appellant produced
documents in his possession before the Investigating Officer, he got
further notices insisting for production of more documents which,
according to him, are not in his possession. It is in the aforesaid
circumstances and raising various contentions that the appellant
approached the High Court seeking quashment of the FIR, which
is produced in these proceedings as Annexure P-9.
5. Multifarious contentions have been raised, unsuccessfully, by the
appellant to support his prayer for quashment of the subject FIR
before the High Court. He reiterated such contentions before us, as
well. But before dealing with such contentions, as also the challenge
against the impugned judgment it is only apposite to refer to the
relevant recitals from the subject FIR, which read as follows: -
“About all aforementioned people conniving with intention to
cause loss to the Applicant and to make gain for themselves,
hatching criminal conspiracy, committing cheating, fraud
and. forgery against the Applicant and misappropriating
Applicant’s money - Hon’ble Sir, This is to submit that
Applicant Tahir, Partner M/s RT Construction, 202 B/9,
Ground Floor, Thatwari Complex, Westend Road, Near
Meerut Public School, Meerut ant, Meerut has been doing
his) business from a long time. The Applicant has been doing
business of construction for approximately the last 30 years.
Applicant’s brother Nasir and Partner Ravindra to look after
the said business along with the Applicant. Applicant has
been providing various services in construction including
providing services of skilled and unskilled labourers to
other companies. Aforementioned No. - 6 SEUNG HWI,
HER (Managing Director) YOU SEUNG SANG SA INDIA
CONSTRUCTION PVT LTD (YSSS), which is a subsidiary
company of the main company MS HUNDAI MOTOR
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 5
Kim Wansoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
INDIA GROUP, had issued a work order to the Applicant
on 15.06.2018 because the Applicant has been providing
labourers to Korean company for long time. Therefore, on
basis of Applicant’s good will, aforementioned people sent
work order on Applicant’s mail ID, photo copy of which
was sent to the Applicant at bis. house at Meerut by the
aforementioned person) through their employee. Applicant
finalized final rates after discussing with all aforementioned
persons and after the officers of aforementioned company
agreed to it, contract was drafted in Meerut and work was
assigned. Applicant’s company provided labourers as per
requirements of the aforementioned company from August
2018 till 2019, for which the Applicant made bills on time
to time and gave to the aforementioned persons. The Bill
was to the tune of approximately Rs 9 crore, of which the
aforementioned company paid Rs.1,70,51,000/- to the
Applicant from time to time. Thereafter, while misleading the
Applicant, additional work to the tune of Rs 8,31,94,200/-
was done. The Applicant gave good performance because
the Applicant felt that it was a foreign company and India
should not be maligned. After the work was completed,
M/S YOU SEUNG SANG SA INDIA CONSTRUCTION
PVT LTD (YSSS) issued cheques of approximately
Rs.8,31,94,200/- in favour of Applicant’s partnership firm,
all of which were dishonoured. Thea Applicant complained
to M/S HUNDAI MOTOR INDIA, which is the main
company, on which M/S YOU SEUNG SANG SA INDIA
CONSTRUCTION PVT LTD (YSSS) was summoned and
a reconciliation was made not to file any case and now
our other company. MS KOTEC AUTOMOTIVE SERVICE
INDIA (P) LTD shall make payment to you because M/S
YOU SEUNG SANG SA INDIA CONSTRUCTION PVT
LTD (YSSS) had largest liability towards the Applicant,
which was to the tune of approximately Rs 8,31,94,200/-
aforementioned company M/S HUNDAI MOTOR INDIA
settled payments of 16 persons along with the Applicant
and while accepting its responsibility nominated M/S Khaan
OTEC AUTOMOTIVE SERVICE INDIA (P) LTD, which is a
part of aforementioned company, to handle moneys. Officers
6 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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of aforementioned company agreed that now payment of
only Rs. 7,67,30,826/- shall be done to Applicant, to which
the Applicant agreed. Of this, 40 per cent payment was
to be done by the aforementioned company immediately
and the remaining payment was to be made after two
months. Officers of aforementioned companies reduced
this reconciliation in writing and gave a copy of it to the
Applicant and also gave two cheques of Rs. 61,38,446/-
and Rs 2,45,53,864/- on 30.11.2019, of which cheque of
Rs 61,38,446/- was encashed and the remaining cheque
of Rs.2,45,53,864/- was dishonoured. The Applicant kept
on visiting the aforementioned persons repeatedly but
all aforementioned persons kept on giving excuses and
avoiding the Applicant. Applicant and Applicant’s brother
Nasir went to the. office of aforementioned persons on
03.10.2019 to demand payment but the aforementioned
persons misbehaved with Applicant, his brother and partner
Ravindra Kumar, subjected them to obscenities and issued
threat to kill them if they went there again. Also, there was
no reply to several phone calls made. Applicant’s brother
Nasir Ali Khan kept on visiting the office of aforementioned
persons for remaining amount but “the aforementioned
persons did not give any money to Applicant and his
brother Nasir Ali Khan. Instead, on last visit to the office
of aforementioned persons, aforementioned persons
assaulted and abused Applicant’s brother, as; result of which
applicant’s brother suffered serious trauma and because of
which Applicant’s brother Nasir Ali Khan passed away on
30.01.2020. Applicant has proof of acts ‘of aforementioned
persons in the form of documents in his safe custody, all of
which are enclosed to the Application. All aforementioned
persons have indulged in criminal conspiracy and forged
documents through their company to commit cheating, fraud
and misappropriation against Applicant-and other persons.
Applicant has lodged complaint in aforementioned matter at
Sadar Bazar Police Station but no action has been taken
till this date. Therefore, request is being made to Hon’ble
Sir to kindly order Officer In-Charge of Sadar Bazar Police
Station to register case against aforementioned persons
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 7
Kim Wansoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
under aforementioned sections and take stringent legal
action against them and to help the Applicant to recover
aforementioned amount from the aforementioned persons.”
(underline supplied)
6. It is worthwhile to refer to some of the decisions of this Court in regard
to the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings before
considering the rival contentions with reference to the allegations
made in the subject FIR, as extracted above. It is true that normally,
quashing of criminal proceedings would be sought and would be done
in exercise of the inherent power of the High Court under Section
482, Cr.P.C. But certainly, that does not mean that it could not be
done only in invocation of the extraordinary power under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. This position was made clear by
this Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.1
After considering the statutory provisions of Cr.P.C. and the earlier
decisions of this Court, in the said decision this Court held that in
the following categories of cases, the extraordinary power under
Article 226 or the inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. could
be exercised by the High Court, either to prevent abuse of process
of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This Court
went on to observe and hold that it might not be possible to lay
down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
inflexible guidelines or rigid formula and exhaustive list of myriad kinds
of cases wherein such power should be exercised and encapsulate
the following cases falling under such categories: -
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could
be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of
any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,
1 1990 INSC 363 : [1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : AIR 1992 SC 604;
8 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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though it may not be possible to lay down any precise,
clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there
is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 9
Kim Wansoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.
7. The said position was reiterated by this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd.
and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors.2 This Court held
therein that the High Court could exercise its power of judicial review
in criminal matters and it could exercise this power either under Article
226 of the Constitution or under Section 482, Cr. P.C. to prevent
abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice.
Furthermore, it was held that exercise of that power would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
8. In regard to quashing of criminal proceedings at the investigation
stage itself, this Court in Eastern Spg. Mills v. Rajiv Poddar,3
held that the High Court could interfere with the investigation, if
non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice.
9. In State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy,4 this Court again held
that where an FIR did not disclose the commission of an offence
without anything being added or subtracted from the recitals thereof,
the said FIR could be quashed.
10. We have already extracted the relevant recitals in the subject FIR.
Despite our microscopic examination of the allegations raised
thereunder, except some vague allegations, no specific allegation
could be seen made against the appellant herein or against the
company by name ‘HEC India LLP’ wherein he was the Project
Manager. That apart, a scanning of the subject FIR would reveal
that after making some allegations, the complainant viz., the 4th
respondent herein sought for registration of a case against the
persons named therein, including the appellant herein to help the
complainant/appellant herein to recover the amount mentioned
therein. In this context, it is to be seen that the allegations therein
would reveal that the complaint of committing default in payment
2 1997 INSC 714 : [1997] Supp. 5 SCR 12 : AIR 1998 SC 128;
3 AIR 1985 SC 1668
4 2004 INSC 404 : [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 147 : (2004) 6 SCC 522;
10 [2025] 1 S.C.R.
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of an amount around Rs.9 Crores was not made against the
appellant herein or against the company in which he was the Project
Manager, whereas it was made against a different company/different
companies.
11. In the contextual situation, it is also relevant to refer to the decision
of this Court in Mohammad Wajid and Another. v. State of U.P. and
Anr.,5 whereunder this Court, in so far as it is relevant, held thus: -
“34……...it will not be just enough for the Court to look into
the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients
to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In
frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty
to look into many other attending circumstances emerging
from the record of the case over and above the averments
and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to
read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of
the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of
a case but is empowered to take into account the overall
circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the
case as well as the materials collected in the course of
investigation….”
12. On judging the case on hand with reference to the allegations
extracted hereinbefore, in the light of the decisions referred supra,
we have absolutely no hesitation to hold that the High Court clearly
erred in refusing to exercise the extraordinary power under Article
226 of the Constitution of India to quash the subject FIR No.64/2020
and all further proceedings in pursuance thereof, qua the appellant.
13. A perusal of the subject FIR would reveal that the same did not
disclose commission of offence(s) as alleged without anything
being added to the recitals thereof. That apart, besides the vague
allegations, the rest of them, even if taken as true, would not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a case against, the
appellant. In such circumstances, asking the appellant to stand the
5 2023 INSC 683 : [2023] 11 SCR 313 : 2023 SCC Online SC 951;
[2025] 1 S.C.R. 11
Kim Wansoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
trial will be nothing but an abuse of process of law and as such,
non-interference by refusing to exercise the power to quash the FIR
and further proceedings based thereon, would result in miscarriage
of justice.
14. In such circumstances, this appeal is liable to be allowed and
resultantly it is allowed and the judgment dated 26.08.2020 in Criminal
Misc. Writ Petition No.8063 of 2020 is set aside. As a necessary
sequel, the subject FIR No.64/2020 registered at Police Station,
Sadar Bazar, District Meerut and all further proceedings pursuant
thereto, qua the appellant stand quashed and set aside.
15. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand dispose of.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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