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Supreme Court of India

KIM WANSOOversusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.

Citation
2025 INSC 8
Decided
1 January 2025
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court must quash FIR No.64/2020 as the allegations do not prima facie disclose any offence against the appellant, and refusal to do so would constitute an abuse of process.

Summary

The appellant, a foreign national serving as Project Manager for Hyundai Engineering & Construction India LLP, was named in FIR No.64/2020 alleging conspiracy and cheating in a Rs 9‑crore payment default involving multiple subcontractors. The appellant sought quashing of the FIR on the ground that the allegations were vague, did not disclose any cognizable offence against him, and would constitute an abuse of process. The High Court refused to quash the FIR, directing that the appellant not be arrested until credible evidence was produced. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution and the inherent power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash criminal proceedings. Relying on precedents such as Bhajan Lal and Pepsi Foods, the Court held that where an FIR does not prima facie disclose an offence, the High Court must exercise its power to prevent miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and quashed the FIR and all subsequent proceedings against the appellant.

Issues considered

  • Whether the High Court erred in refusing to exercise its extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash FIR No.64/2020.
  • Whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, disclose a cognizable offence against the appellant.
  • Whether non‑interference would amount to an abuse of process and miscarriage of justice warranting quashing of the criminal proceedings.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Invocation of extraordinary power u/Art.226Quashing of criminal proceedingsForeign nationalDefault in paymentQuashing of FIRInherent power of the High Court u/s.482 CrPCAbuse of processVague allegationsMiscarriage of justice

Judgment

                    [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 8

                              Kim Wansoo
                                    v.
                     State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.
                      (Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 2025)
                               02 January 2025
              [C.T. Ravikumar* and Sanjay Kumar, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose as regards invocation of extraordinary power u/Art.
       226 of the Constitution to quash criminal proceedings.

                                  Headnotes†
       Constitution of India – Art.226 – Code of Criminal
       Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing of criminal proceedings –
       Invocation of extraordinary power u/Art.226 – FIR registered
       u/ss.406, 420, 323, 504, 506 and 120-B IPC against the accused,
       including the appellant-foreign national and Project Manager
       for defaulting in payment to the company – Appellant sought
       quashing of FIR – However, the High Court refused to quash
       FIR – Correctness:
       Held: Normally, quashing of criminal proceedings would be
       sought and would be done in exercise of the inherent power of
       the High Court u/s. 482 – But that does not mean that it could
       not be done only in invocation of the extraordinary power u/
       Art. 226 – Extraordinary power u/Art. 226 or the inherent power
       u/s. 482 could be exercised by the High Court, either to prevent
       abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends
       of justice – On facts, the High Court erred in refusing to exercise
       the extraordinary power u/Art. 226 to quash the FIR and all
       further proceedings in pursuance thereof, qua the appellant –
       Perusal of the FIR would reveal that the same did not disclose
       commission of offence as alleged without anything being added
       to the recitals thereof – Besides the vague allegations, the rest of
       them, even if taken as true, would not disclose the commission
       of any offence and make out a case against, the appellant –
       In such circumstances, asking the appellant to stand the trial
       would be nothing but an abuse of process of law and as such,

* Author
2                                                           [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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     non-interference by refusing to exercise the power to quash
     the FIR and further proceedings based thereon, would result in
     miscarriage of justice – Judgment passed by the High Court set
     aside – FIR and all further proceedings pursuant thereto, qua the
     appellant quashed and set aside. [Paras 6, 10, 12-14]

                             Case Law Cited
     State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1990 INSC 363 :
     [1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : AIR 1992 SC 604; Pepsi Foods Ltd. and
     Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors. 1997 INSC 714 : [1997]
     Supp. 5 SCR 12 : AIR 1998 SC 128; Eastern Spg. Mills v. Rajiv
     Poddar, AIR 1985 SC 1668; State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy
     2004 INSC 404 : [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 147 : (2004) 6 SCC 522;
     Mohammad Wajid and Another. v. State of U.P. and Anr., 2023 INSC
     683: [2023] 11 SCR 313 : 2023 SCC Online SC 951 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Constitution of India; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal
     Code, 1860.

                             List of Keywords
     Invocation of extraordinary power u/Art. 226; Quashing of criminal
     proceedings; Foreign national; Default in payment; Quashing of
     FIR; Inherent power of the High Court u/s. 482 CrPC; Extraordinary
     power u/Art. 226; Abuse of process; Vague allegations; Project
     Manager; Miscarriage of justice.

                            Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     15 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 26.08.2020 of the High Court
     of Judicature at Allahabad in CRLMWP No. 8063 of 2020

                         Appearances for Parties
     M. Shoeb Alam, Sr. Adv., Talha Abdul Rahman, M. Shaz Khan,
     Adnan Yousuf, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Pallav Shishodia, Sr. Adv., Divyesh Pratap Singh, Rajat Singh,
     Andleeb Naqvi, Sarthak Chandra, Arun Pratap Singh Rajawat,
     Danish Zubair Khan, Dr. Lokendra Malik, Advs. for the Respondents.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                          3

              Kim Wansoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.


                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment

     C.T. Ravikumar, J.

1.   Leave granted.
2.   This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated
     26.08.2020 in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.8063 of 2020 passed
     by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, refusing to quash FIR
     No.64/2020 registered at Police Station, Sadar Bazar, District Meerut.
     Furthermore, it was ordered thereunder thus: -
           “However, considering the allegations made in the FIR,
           the provisions of Section 157, Cr. P.C. and the view taken
           by the Apex Court in the case of Joginder Kumar v.
           State of U.P. 1994, Cr.L.J. 1981, it is directed that the
           petitioner shall not be arrested in the above case, till the
           credible evidence is not available against him during the
           investigation or till the submission of Police Report under
           Section 173(2), Cr. P.C., whichever is earlier.”
3.   On 14.10.2020, this Court issued notice and also stayed further
     proceedings based on the subject FIR. The said order is still in force.
4.   The facts leading to the impugned judgment read as under: -
     Hyundai Motor India Limited (for brevity, ‘HMIL’ only) awarded a
     contract for construction and development of a project work namely,
     Gurgaon, HMI Project, R.C. Works (hereafter referred to as, ‘the
     project’) to Hyundai Engineering & Construction India LLP (for short,
     ‘HEC India LLP’). Agreement dated 20.10.2017 was executed therefor,
     between the said companies and the appellant herein was the Project
     Manager of HEC India LLP. He is a foreign national. HEC India
     LLP, sub-contracted the work to KOTEC Automotive Services India
     Private Limited (for short, ‘KOTEC’) which in turn sub-contracted the
     RC constructions work to M/s. YSSS India Construction (for short,
     ‘YSSS’) and ‘YSSS’ further sub-contracted with M/s R.T. Construction,
     which is the complainant’s (respondent No.4 herein) entity, to obtain
     manpower. It is alleged in the subject FIR that ‘YSSS’ in connivance
     with the other accused defaulted payment to the complainant’s
     company. The subject FIR was registered under Sections 406, 420,
4                                                          [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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     323, 504, 506 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereafter,
     ‘the IPC’) against the accused, including the appellant herein on the
     allegation that ‘YSSS’, in connivance with the other accused defaulted
     payment to the company to the tune of Rs.9 Crores. Pursuant to the
     lodgement of the FIR, the appellant received notices dated nil, on
     06.08.2020 and 09.09.2020, issued under Section 91 of the Code
     of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereafter, ‘the Cr.P.C.’) calling upon
     him to produce certain documents. Though, the appellant produced
     documents in his possession before the Investigating Officer, he got
     further notices insisting for production of more documents which,
     according to him, are not in his possession. It is in the aforesaid
     circumstances and raising various contentions that the appellant
     approached the High Court seeking quashment of the FIR, which
     is produced in these proceedings as Annexure P-9.
5.   Multifarious contentions have been raised, unsuccessfully, by the
     appellant to support his prayer for quashment of the subject FIR
     before the High Court. He reiterated such contentions before us, as
     well. But before dealing with such contentions, as also the challenge
     against the impugned judgment it is only apposite to refer to the
     relevant recitals from the subject FIR, which read as follows: -
          “About all aforementioned people conniving with intention to
          cause loss to the Applicant and to make gain for themselves,
          hatching criminal conspiracy, committing cheating, fraud
          and. forgery against the Applicant and misappropriating
          Applicant’s money - Hon’ble Sir, This is to submit that
          Applicant Tahir, Partner M/s RT Construction, 202 B/9,
          Ground Floor, Thatwari Complex, Westend Road, Near
          Meerut Public School, Meerut ant, Meerut has been doing
          his) business from a long time. The Applicant has been doing
          business of construction for approximately the last 30 years.
          Applicant’s brother Nasir and Partner Ravindra to look after
          the said business along with the Applicant. Applicant has
          been providing various services in construction including
          providing services of skilled and unskilled labourers to
          other companies. Aforementioned No. - 6 SEUNG HWI,
          HER (Managing Director) YOU SEUNG SANG SA INDIA
          CONSTRUCTION PVT LTD (YSSS), which is a subsidiary
          company of the main company MS HUNDAI MOTOR
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                            5

              Kim Wansoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.


           INDIA GROUP, had issued a work order to the Applicant
           on 15.06.2018 because the Applicant has been providing
           labourers to Korean company for long time. Therefore, on
           basis of Applicant’s good will, aforementioned people sent
           work order on Applicant’s mail ID, photo copy of which
           was sent to the Applicant at bis. house at Meerut by the
           aforementioned person) through their employee. Applicant
           finalized final rates after discussing with all aforementioned
           persons and after the officers of aforementioned company
           agreed to it, contract was drafted in Meerut and work was
           assigned. Applicant’s company provided labourers as per
           requirements of the aforementioned company from August
           2018 till 2019, for which the Applicant made bills on time
           to time and gave to the aforementioned persons. The Bill
           was to the tune of approximately Rs 9 crore, of which the
           aforementioned company paid Rs.1,70,51,000/- to the
           Applicant from time to time. Thereafter, while misleading the
           Applicant, additional work to the tune of Rs 8,31,94,200/-
           was done. The Applicant gave good performance because
           the Applicant felt that it was a foreign company and India
           should not be maligned. After the work was completed,
           M/S YOU SEUNG SANG SA INDIA CONSTRUCTION
           PVT LTD (YSSS) issued cheques of approximately
           Rs.8,31,94,200/- in favour of Applicant’s partnership firm,
           all of which were dishonoured. Thea Applicant complained
           to M/S HUNDAI MOTOR INDIA, which is the main
           company, on which M/S YOU SEUNG SANG SA INDIA
           CONSTRUCTION PVT LTD (YSSS) was summoned and
           a reconciliation was made not to file any case and now
           our other company. MS KOTEC AUTOMOTIVE SERVICE
           INDIA (P) LTD shall make payment to you because M/S
           YOU SEUNG SANG SA INDIA CONSTRUCTION PVT
           LTD (YSSS) had largest liability towards the Applicant,
           which was to the tune of approximately Rs 8,31,94,200/-
           aforementioned company M/S HUNDAI MOTOR INDIA
           settled payments of 16 persons along with the Applicant
           and while accepting its responsibility nominated M/S Khaan
           OTEC AUTOMOTIVE SERVICE INDIA (P) LTD, which is a
           part of aforementioned company, to handle moneys. Officers
6                                                     [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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     of aforementioned company agreed that now payment of
     only Rs. 7,67,30,826/- shall be done to Applicant, to which
     the Applicant agreed. Of this, 40 per cent payment was
     to be done by the aforementioned company immediately
     and the remaining payment was to be made after two
     months. Officers of aforementioned companies reduced
     this reconciliation in writing and gave a copy of it to the
     Applicant and also gave two cheques of Rs. 61,38,446/-
     and Rs 2,45,53,864/- on 30.11.2019, of which cheque of
     Rs 61,38,446/- was encashed and the remaining cheque
     of Rs.2,45,53,864/- was dishonoured. The Applicant kept
     on visiting the aforementioned persons repeatedly but
     all aforementioned persons kept on giving excuses and
     avoiding the Applicant. Applicant and Applicant’s brother
     Nasir went to the. office of aforementioned persons on
     03.10.2019 to demand payment but the aforementioned
     persons misbehaved with Applicant, his brother and partner
     Ravindra Kumar, subjected them to obscenities and issued
     threat to kill them if they went there again. Also, there was
     no reply to several phone calls made. Applicant’s brother
     Nasir Ali Khan kept on visiting the office of aforementioned
     persons for remaining amount but “the aforementioned
     persons did not give any money to Applicant and his
     brother Nasir Ali Khan. Instead, on last visit to the office
     of aforementioned persons, aforementioned persons
     assaulted and abused Applicant’s brother, as; result of which
     applicant’s brother suffered serious trauma and because of
     which Applicant’s brother Nasir Ali Khan passed away on
     30.01.2020. Applicant has proof of acts ‘of aforementioned
     persons in the form of documents in his safe custody, all of
     which are enclosed to the Application. All aforementioned
     persons have indulged in criminal conspiracy and forged
     documents through their company to commit cheating, fraud
     and misappropriation against Applicant-and other persons.
     Applicant has lodged complaint in aforementioned matter at
     Sadar Bazar Police Station but no action has been taken
     till this date. Therefore, request is being made to Hon’ble
     Sir to kindly order Officer In-Charge of Sadar Bazar Police
     Station to register case against aforementioned persons
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                                        7

                  Kim Wansoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.


             under aforementioned sections and take stringent legal
             action against them and to help the Applicant to recover
             aforementioned amount from the aforementioned persons.”
                                                                 (underline supplied)
6.    It is worthwhile to refer to some of the decisions of this Court in regard
      to the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings before
      considering the rival contentions with reference to the allegations
      made in the subject FIR, as extracted above. It is true that normally,
      quashing of criminal proceedings would be sought and would be done
      in exercise of the inherent power of the High Court under Section
      482, Cr.P.C. But certainly, that does not mean that it could not be
      done only in invocation of the extraordinary power under Article
      226 of the Constitution of India. This position was made clear by
      this Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.1
      After considering the statutory provisions of Cr.P.C. and the earlier
      decisions of this Court, in the said decision this Court held that in
      the following categories of cases, the extraordinary power under
      Article 226 or the inherent power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. could
      be exercised by the High Court, either to prevent abuse of process
      of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This Court
      went on to observe and hold that it might not be possible to lay
      down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and
      inflexible guidelines or rigid formula and exhaustive list of myriad kinds
      of cases wherein such power should be exercised and encapsulate
      the following cases falling under such categories: -
             “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
             relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
             the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
             of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
             power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
             Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
             reproduced above, we give the following categories of
             cases by way of illustration wherein such power could
             be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of
             any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,


1    1990 INSC 363 : [1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : AIR 1992 SC 604;
8                                                     [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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     though it may not be possible to lay down any precise,
     clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
     guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
     of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
     exercised.
     (1) Where the allegations made in the first information
     report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
     face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
     facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
     the accused.
     (2) Where the allegations in the first information report
     and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not
     disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
     by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except
     under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
     155(2) of the Code.
     (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR
     or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
     same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
     make out a case against the accused.
     (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
     cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
     offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
     without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
     Section 155(2) of the Code.
     (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
     are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of
     which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
     that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
     accused.
     (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
     of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under
     which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution
     and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there
     is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
     providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
     aggrieved party.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                             9

                  Kim Wansoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.


             (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
             with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously
             instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance
             on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private
             and personal grudge.
7.    The said position was reiterated by this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd.
      and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors.2 This Court held
      therein that the High Court could exercise its power of judicial review
      in criminal matters and it could exercise this power either under Article
      226 of the Constitution or under Section 482, Cr. P.C. to prevent
      abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice.
      Furthermore, it was held that exercise of that power would depend
      upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
8.    In regard to quashing of criminal proceedings at the investigation
      stage itself, this Court in Eastern Spg. Mills v. Rajiv Poddar,3
      held that the High Court could interfere with the investigation, if
      non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice.
9.    In State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy,4 this Court again held
      that where an FIR did not disclose the commission of an offence
      without anything being added or subtracted from the recitals thereof,
      the said FIR could be quashed.
10. We have already extracted the relevant recitals in the subject FIR.
    Despite our microscopic examination of the allegations raised
    thereunder, except some vague allegations, no specific allegation
    could be seen made against the appellant herein or against the
    company by name ‘HEC India LLP’ wherein he was the Project
    Manager. That apart, a scanning of the subject FIR would reveal
    that after making some allegations, the complainant viz., the 4th
    respondent herein sought for registration of a case against the
    persons named therein, including the appellant herein to help the
    complainant/appellant herein to recover the amount mentioned
    therein. In this context, it is to be seen that the allegations therein
    would reveal that the complaint of committing default in payment


2    1997 INSC 714 : [1997] Supp. 5 SCR 12 : AIR 1998 SC 128;
3    AIR 1985 SC 1668
4    2004 INSC 404 : [2004] Supp. 3 SCR 147 : (2004) 6 SCC 522;
10                                                                 [2025] 1 S.C.R.

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       of an amount around Rs.9 Crores was not made against the
       appellant herein or against the company in which he was the Project
       Manager, whereas it was made against a different company/different
       companies.
11. In the contextual situation, it is also relevant to refer to the decision
    of this Court in Mohammad Wajid and Another. v. State of U.P. and
    Anr.,5 whereunder this Court, in so far as it is relevant, held thus: -
              “34……...it will not be just enough for the Court to look into
              the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the
              purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients
              to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In
              frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty
              to look into many other attending circumstances emerging
              from the record of the case over and above the averments
              and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to
              read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its
              jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of
              the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of
              a case but is empowered to take into account the overall
              circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the
              case as well as the materials collected in the course of
              investigation….”
12. On judging the case on hand with reference to the allegations
    extracted hereinbefore, in the light of the decisions referred supra,
    we have absolutely no hesitation to hold that the High Court clearly
    erred in refusing to exercise the extraordinary power under Article
    226 of the Constitution of India to quash the subject FIR No.64/2020
    and all further proceedings in pursuance thereof, qua the appellant.
13. A perusal of the subject FIR would reveal that the same did not
    disclose commission of offence(s) as alleged without anything
    being added to the recitals thereof. That apart, besides the vague
    allegations, the rest of them, even if taken as true, would not disclose
    the commission of any offence and make out a case against, the
    appellant. In such circumstances, asking the appellant to stand the



5     2023 INSC 683 : [2023] 11 SCR 313 : 2023 SCC Online SC 951;
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                        11

                 Kim Wansoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.


     trial will be nothing but an abuse of process of law and as such,
     non-interference by refusing to exercise the power to quash the FIR
     and further proceedings based thereon, would result in miscarriage
     of justice.
14. In such circumstances, this appeal is liable to be allowed and
    resultantly it is allowed and the judgment dated 26.08.2020 in Criminal
    Misc. Writ Petition No.8063 of 2020 is set aside. As a necessary
    sequel, the subject FIR No.64/2020 registered at Police Station,
    Sadar Bazar, District Meerut and all further proceedings pursuant
    thereto, qua the appellant stand quashed and set aside.
15. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand dispose of.

     Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain


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