Supreme Court of India
KHEM SINGH (D) THROUGH LRSversusSTATE OF UTTARANCHAL (NOW STATE OF UTTARAKHAND) & ANOTHER ETC.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 1024
- Decided
- 31 July 2025
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- B V NAGARATHNA
Holding
The proviso to Section 372 CrPC grants a victim and his legal heir both the right to prefer and to prosecute an appeal, allowing substitution of the heir and setting aside the abatement.
Summary
The original appellant, Khem Singh, had filed special leave petitions challenging the acquittal of three accused in a 1992 murder case. While the petitions were pending, Khem Singh died and his son, Raj Kumar, applied to set aside the abatement of the appeals and to be substituted as appellant. The Supreme Court examined whether the proviso to Section 372 of the CrPC confers on a victim and his legal heir the right not only to prefer but also to prosecute an appeal, and whether the abatement could be set aside despite the appellant’s death. Interpreting the proviso together with the definition of “victim” in Section 2(wa) CrPC, the Court held that a legal heir may continue the appeal, that the expression “right to prefer an appeal” includes the right to prosecute it, and that the delay in filing the substitution application could be condoned. Consequently, the abatement was set aside, the substitution was allowed, the High Court’s cryptic judgment was set aside, and the appeals were remanded for fresh hearing.
Issues considered
- The legal heir of a deceased victim may be substituted to continue prosecuting an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC.
- Whether the abatement of an appeal due to the death of the original appellant can be set aside and the delay condoned.
- Whether the phrase ‘right to prefer an appeal’ in the proviso to Section 372 CrPC also encompasses the right to prosecute the appeal.
- Whether Section 394(2) CrPC’s abatement provisions apply to appeals filed by victims or their heirs.
- The adequacy of the High Court’s judgment in the absence of detailed reasoning.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 2(wa), s. 372, s. 374(2), s. 377, s. 378, s. 386, s. 394
- Constitution of Indias. 136
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 307, s. 326, s. 452
Headnote
Issue for Consideration During pendency of these appeals, son of original appellant (since deceased) filed an application seeking setting aside of the abatement and for substitution. Whether the applicant is entitled to be substituted in place of so as to continue to prosecute these appeals. Headnotes† Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Proviso to s.372 – The applicant contended that having regard to the proviso to s.372 of the CrPC, the substitution applications may be allowed by condoning the delay in filing the
Subjects
VictimLegal heir of injured victimVictimologyProviso to Section 372 CrPCAppeals from convictionsAbatement of appealsSubstitution of appellantArticle 136 ConstitutionRight to prosecute an appeal
Judgment
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2108 : 2025 INSC 1024
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs
v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand)
& Another Etc.
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 1330-1332 of 2017)
31 July 2025
[B.V. Nagarathna* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
During pendency of these appeals, son of original appellant
(since deceased) filed an application seeking setting aside of the
abatement and for substitution. Whether the applicant is entitled to
be substituted in place of the original appellant so as to continue
to prosecute these appeals.
Headnotes†
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Proviso to s.372 – The
applicant contended that having regard to the proviso to s.372
of the CrPC, the substitution applications may be allowed
by condoning the delay in filing the said application – He
further contended that the original appellant was aggrieved
by the acquittal of accused nos.4, 3 and 2 respectively by
the High Court when, in fact, they had been convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment and fine by the Sessions
Court and hence, the original appellant herein preferred
these appeals:
Held: The expression ‘right to prefer an appeal’ in the proviso
to s.372 CrPC cannot be limited to mean ‘only the filing of an
appeal’ – Mere filing of an appeal in the absence of prosecution
of an appeal is of no avail – It does not fulfill the object with
which the proviso has been added to s.372 CrPC – Therefore,
the expression ‘the right to prefer an appeal’ to also include the
‘right to prosecute an appeal’ – Any curtailing of the legal right to
prosecute an appeal on the death of an original appellant by his
* Author
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2109
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
legal heir would make the proviso to s.372 CrPC wholly redundant
and in fact may result in a situation which is contrary to the entire
object with which the Parliament had inserted the proviso to s.372
CrPC – In this context, it is also relevant to note that the Parliament
has been conscious to expand the definition of the word ‘victim’
to not only include the victim himself who had suffered the loss
or injury but also to include his legal heir – There is no reason
to curtail the right of a legal heir, who had preferred the original
appeal, to be denied the right to prosecute the appeal – The
argument of the applicant that as heir of the original appellant,
who was an injured victim, he can prosecute these appeals, is
accepted – The applicant, who is seeking substitution, is the legal
heir of the victim who had preferred the appeal before this Court
and is also an injured victim – Therefore, the applicant is being
permitted to be substituted in place of the original appellant as
heir of the original appellant (who was a victim in the incident) –
In other words, even if the applicant was not an injured victim
in the said incident but has sought to prosecute these appeals
as heir of the injured victim (original appellant), he is permitted
to do so – The delay in filing the application for seeking setting
aside of the abatement is condoned – The abatement is set aside.
[Paras 9.3, 11, 12]
Constitution of India – Art.136 – When during pendency of
special leave petition or criminal appeals, the appellant dies,
whether the heir of the appellant must be given an opportunity
to prosecute the appeal:
Held: Art.136 of the Constitution deals with Special leave to appeal
by the Supreme Court – Sub-clause (1) of Art.136 begins with
a non-obstante clause and confers discretion on the Supreme
Court to grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree,
determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed
or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India – When
this power u/Art.136 is exercised by the Supreme Court by
granting leave, the special leave petition would get converted
into a criminal appeal – If during the pendency of the special
leave petition or the criminal appeal, the appellant dies, the heir
of the appellant must be given an opportunity to prosecute the
appeal irrespective of whether the heir is a victim of the criminal
offence – More significantly, the appeal heard pursuant to
2110 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Art.136 of the Constitution is not an appeal under Chapter XXIX
CrPC – In the circumstances of the present case, the applicant,
being heir of the victim, has the right to continue these appeals
irrespective of the fact that he is an injured victim – In that view of
the matter also, the application for substitution has to be allowed.
[Paras 11.5, 11.6]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.2(wa); 372, 377, 378,
386, 394 – Discussed. [Para 7]
Words and Phrases – Victim, victimology – Discussed.
[Paras 7.4, 7.5, 7.6.1]
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.148, 452, 302, 307, 149, 326, and 149 –
The private respondents herein who were accused nos.4,
3 and 2 respectively were convicted and sentenced by the
trial Court – Aggrieved, the respondents-accused preferred
criminal appeals before the High Court, which were allowed –
Correctness:
Held: The High Court ought to have considered the evidence on
record in light of the arguments advanced at the bar and thereafter
ascertained whether the Sessions Court was justified in passing
the judgment of conviction and imposing the sentence – The same
being absent in the impugned judgment, for that sole reason, the
judgment is set aside – The matters are remanded to the High
Court. [Paras 9, 12]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.374(2) – Independent
application of mind while hearing appeals:
Held: While hearing the appeals u/s.374(2) of the CrPC, the
High Court is exercising its appellate jurisdiction – There shall
be independent application of mind in deciding the criminal
appeal against conviction – It is the duty of an appellate court to
independently evaluate the evidence presented and determine
whether such evidence is credible – Even if the evidence is
deemed reliable, the High Court must further assess whether the
prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt –
The High Court though being an appellate Court is akin to a Trial
Court, must be convinced beyond all reasonable doubt that the
prosecution’s case is substantially true and that the guilt of the
accused has been conclusively proven while considering an appeal
against a conviction. [Para 6]
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2111
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
Case Law Cited
PSR Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam [1980] 2 SCR 873 : (1980)
3 SCC 141; Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry [1957]
1 SCR 488 : AIR 1957 SC 540 – followed.
Mallikarjun Kodagali (dead) represented through Legal
representatives v. State of Karnataka [2018] 13 SCR 1 : (2019)
2 SCC 752 – relied on.
Dr. Vimla v. State (NCT of Delhi) [1963] Supp. 2 SCR 585 : AIR
1963 SC 1572; Esher Singh v. State A.P. [2004] 2 SCR 1180 :
(2004) 11 SCC 585; Birichh Bhuian v. State of Bihar [1963]
Supp. 2 SCR 328 : AIR 1963 SC 1120; Chand Devi Daga v.
Manju K. Humatani [2017] 11 SCR 923 : (2018) 1 SCC 71; M.R.
Ajayan v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3373; National
Commission for Women v. State of Delhi [2010] 10 SCR 905 :
(2010) 12 SCC 599; Amanullah v. State of Bihar [2016] 2 SCR
1027 : (2016) 6 SCC 699; Manik Lal Majumdar v. Gouranga
Chandra Dey [2004] 2 SCR 742 : (2004) 12 SCC 448; State of
Uttar v. Ambarish (2021) 16 SCC 371; Shakuntala Shukla v. State
of Uttar Pradesh [2021] 6 SCR 87 : (2021) 20 SCC 818; State
Bank of India v. Ajay Kumar Sood [2022] 17 SCR 507 : (2023) 7
SCC 282 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
Black’s Law Dictionary; United Nations General Assembly’s
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and
Abuse of Power (1985); Advanced Law Lexicon by P Ramanatha
Aiyar, 6th Edition, Volume I; 154th Report of the Law Commission
of India of August, 1996; Justice Malimath Committee submitted
its report on ‘Reforms of Criminal Justice System’; Report of the
Committee on the Draft National Policy on Criminal Justice; 221st
Report of the Law Commission of India.
List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Constitution
of India.
List of Keywords
Victim; Legal heir of injured victim; Victimology; Proviso to Section
372 CrPC; Appeals from convictions; Abatement of appeals; Power
2112 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of Appellate Court; Appeal in case of acquittal; Injury; Order of
acquittal; Right to prefer appeal; Right to prosecute an appeal;
Substitution of legal heir; Article 136 of Constitution; Legal heir
of deceased.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No(s).
1330-1332 of 2017
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.09.2012 of the High
Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in CRLA Nos. 254, 258, and 259
of 2004
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ms. Neema, Aruni Poddar, Ekta Muyal, Anit Kumar, Mrs. Shivani
Kumari.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Ratnakar Dash, Mrs. Kawaljit Kochar, Sr. Advs., Manan Verma,
Dr. Ajay Veer Pundir, Ms. Anu Gupta, Ali Jethmalani, Ms. Sanjana
Wason, Anurag Tomar, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Bhargava
V. Desai, Anil Makhija, Shivam Sharma, Deepanshu, Utkarsh
Vats.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Nagarathna, J.
Being aggrieved by the common judgment dated 12.09.2012 passed
in Criminal Appeal Nos.254 of 2004, 258 of 2004, 259 of 2004 by
the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital, the original appellant
Khem Singh S/o Tarachand preferred these Special Leave Petitions
before this Court. By order dated 06.07.2017, leave was granted by
this Court and consequently, the Special Leave Petitions have been
converted to these Criminal Appeals.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2113
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
Facts in Brief:
2. For ease of reference, the private respondents herein, namely, i) Anil
@ Neelu; ii) Pramod; and iii) Ashok, who were accused Nos. 4, 3
and 2 respectively in S.T. No.133/1993 in the Court of Addl. District
& Sessions Judge, Haridwar (henceforth “Sessions Court”), are
henceforth referred to as ‘respondents-accused’. The other accused
in S.T. No.133/1993, who were acquitted by the Sessions Court, are
referred to as ‘other accused’.
2.1 Briefly stated, the facts of the case according to the prosecution
are that there was a long-standing previous enmity between
the respondents-accused and other accused and the original
informant and others. On 08.12.1992, there was some heated
exchange between them. The next day, i.e. on 09.12.1992, at
about 08.00 A.M., informant Tara Chand (P.W.1), his brother
Virendra Singh, and P.W.1’s son Khem Singh (P.W.3) were
attacked by the respondents-accused and the other accused
using guns, sharp weapons, and bricks. As a result, Virendra
Singh passed away, and P.W.1 and P.W.3 sustained injuries.
On the arrival of villagers, all the accused managed to escape.
2.2 The specific roles attributed to the respondents-accused are
that: i) Accused No.2, Ashok, fired on Virendra Singh using a
gun; ii) Accused No.3, Pramod, fired on P.W.3 using a gun; and
iii) Accused No.4, Anil @ Neelu, fired on Smt. Mithilesh, wife
of P.W.3. On a complaint given by P.W.1 Tara Chand, Case
Crime No.547/92 dated 09.12.1992 was registered at P.S.
Jwalapur, District Haridwar against all the accused persons.
The respondents-accused were charged under Sections 148,
452, 302, 307, 149, 326, and 149 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (hereinafter, “IPC”).
2.3 After examining all the material witnesses and after hearing
both the parties, the Sessions Court, vide judgment and order
dated 02.08.2004/04.08.2004 acquitted the other accused on
the ground that the role assigned to them was not fully proved.
However, the Sessions Court found that the case against the
respondents-accused was fully proved beyond all reasonable
doubt. The sentence passed against the respondents-accused
is as follows:
2114 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Name IPC Punishment granted [R.I. – Punishment
of the Section Rigorous Imprisonment; in default of
Accused found S.I. – Simple fine
guilty of Imprisonment]
S.302 R.I. for life + Rs.1000 fine
Ss.307/34 Five years R.I. + Rs. 1000 One month
Ashok
fine S.I. for each
(A2)
S.452 One month R.I. + Rs.1000 offence
fine
Pramod Ss.302/34 R.I. for life + Rs.1000 fine
(A3) & S.307 Five years R.I. + Rs. 1000 One month
Anil @ fine S.I. for each
Neelu S.452 One month R.I. + Rs.1000 offence
(A4) fine
2.4 Being aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Sessions
Court, the respondents-accused preferred Criminal Appeal
Nos.254, 258 and 259 of 2004 before the High Court of
Uttarakhand at Nainital. The High Court, vide common impugned
judgment and order dated 12.09.2012, allowed the criminal
appeals filed by the respondents-accused.
2.5 The second respondent in Criminal Appeal No.1330 of 2017
was appellant/Accused No.4-Anil @ Neelu in Criminal Appeal
No.254 of 2004 before the High Court. The second respondent
in Criminal Appeal No.1331 of 2017 was appellant/accused
No.3-Pramod in Criminal Appeal No.258 of 2004 before the
High Court. The second respondent in Criminal Appeal No.1332
of 2017 was appellant/accused No.2-Kali Ram in Criminal
No.259 of 2004 before the High Court. For ease of reference,
henceforth the second respondent in these appeals, who are
accused Nos.4, 3 and 2 respectively, are referred to as accused
in these appeals. The State’s Appeal No.47 of 2008 was also
disposed of by the High Court along with the aforesaid appeals.
INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NOS.11322/2025,
11329/2025 & 131604 OF 2025 IN CRIMINAL APPEAL
NOS.1330-1332 OF 2017:
2.6 During the pendency of these appeals, son of original appellant-
Khem Singh (since deceased) - Raj Kumar filed an application
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2115
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
seeking setting aside of the abatement and for substitution.
Consequently, IA No.11322/2025 (application for seeking setting
aside of the abatement), IA No.11329/2025 (application seeking
condonation of delay in filing application for setting aside of
abatement), and IA No.131604/2024 (application for substitution)
have been preferred.
Submissions:
3. Learned counsel for the applicant contended that having regard to
the proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(for short, “CrPC”), the substitution applications may be allowed
by condoning the delay in filing the said application. He further
contended that the original appellant was aggrieved by the acquittal
of accused Nos.4, 3 and 2 respectively by the High Court when, in
fact, they had been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment
and fine by the Sessions Court and hence, the original appellant
herein preferred these appeals.
3.1 It was also brought to our notice that these appeals assume
significance due to the fact that the State has not preferred any
appeal as against the judgment and order of acquittal passed by
the High Court by way of the impugned judgment and order. In
the circumstances, in view of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC as
well as the definition of ‘Victim’ laid down under Section 2(wa) of
CrPC as well as the principles adumbrated by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in PSR Sadhanantham vs. Arunachalam
(1980) 3 SCC 141 (“PSR Sadhanantham”), the substitution
applications may be allowed; the abatement may be set aside;
the delay in filing the applications for seeking setting aside of
the abatement may be condoned and the applicant may be
substituted in place of the original appellant and the appeals
may be heard on merits.
3.2 In this regard, learned counsel for the applicant also submitted
that the proviso to Section 372 CrPC which has the expression
‘the right to prefer an appeal’ would also include ‘the right
to prosecute an appeal’. In the circumstances, the right to
prosecute an appeal given to a legal heir of the victim must
also be construed to extend to a case where the legal heir of
the original appellant, who was also an injured victim in the
2116 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
instant case must be brought on record. Moreover, the applicant
is also an injured victim. It was contended that the delay in
filing the applications for setting aside of the abatement and
in filing the application for substitution was owing to the long
pendency of these appeals before this Court as well as due
to bona fide reasons. In this regard, learned counsel for the
applicant submitted that the reason as to why the applications
have to be allowed in these cases is also owing to the fact
that the High Court, by the impugned judgment, which is a
cryptic one as is evident by the manner in which the same
has been written, has allowed the appeals filed by the accused
and consequently acquitted them. In the circumstances, the
applications may be allowed and in the place of the original
appellant, who is since deceased, the applicant, his son, who
is also an injured victim may be substituted so as to prosecute
these appeals.
3.3 Per contra, learned senior counsel and learned counsel for the
respondent(s) vehemently objected to the applications being
allowed. In this regard, they drew our attention to Section
394 CrPC and contended that although the said provision
refers to an appeal filed against a conviction, sub-section
(1) of Section 394 CrPC deals with abatement of an appeal
on the death of an accused when the appeal was filed under
Sections 377 or 378 CrPC. The expression, “every other appeal
under this Chapter” in sub-section (2) of Section 394 CrPC
is significant inasmuch as the said sub-section lays down
that apart from an appeal filed under Section 377 or Section
378 CrPC, every other appeal under the Chapter shall finally
abate on the death of the appellant; that the CrPC has not
defined the expression “appellant”, and it could be either a
victim or a complainant, who is the appellant, or it could also
be the convict or the accused who is an appellant; that the
proviso expressly deals with a case where the accused or the
convict is the appellant and if he dies during the pendency
of the appeal, the legal heirs of such an accused can be
brought on record to continue the appeal and they can seek
an acquittal if the appeal had been filed under Section 377
or Section 378 CrPC or on any other ground. However, the
said proviso does not extend to a case where an appeal is
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2117
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
filed by a victim or a legal heir of a victim under the proviso to
Section 372 CrPC. It was further submitted that the expression
‘near relative’ in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 394
CrPC is of a wider connotation to include a parent, spouse,
lineal descendant, brother or sister, but such an expression
cannot be applied in the case of substitution of an original
victim who had preferred an appeal on his demise during the
pendency of his appeal.
3.4 In the above circumstances, they contended that the applications
may be dismissed. Consequently, the appeal may also be
dismissed as having abated since the original appellant has
died during the pendency of the appeals before this Court.
Points for Consideration:
4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, the following points
arise for our consideration:
(a) Whether the applicant is entitled to be substituted in place of the
original appellant so as to continue to prosecute these appeals?
(b) What order?
5. We have considered the arguments advanced at the bar in light of the
provisions of the CrPC. It is noted that while Sections 377 and 378
CrPC were on the statute book even at the time of the enforcement
of the CrPC, on the basis of the reports of the Law Commission,
an amendment was made to Section 372 CrPC by insertion of
the proviso thereto with effect from 31.12.2009. Consequently, the
definition of ‘victim’ was also inserted to Section 2(wa) of CrPC
which reads as under:
“2(wa)-”victim” means a person who has suffered
any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or
omission for which the accused person has been
charged and the expression “victim” includes his or
her guardian or legal heir;”
5.1 Simultaneously, proviso to Section 372 CrPC was inserted
which reads as under:
“372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided.-
No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a
2118 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code
or by any other law for the time being in force.
Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer
an appeal against any order passed by the Court
acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser
offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and
such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal
ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such
Court.”
5.2 A conjoint reading of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC in light
of the definition in Section 2(wa) of CrPC, would lead to the
conclusion that the expression ‘victim’ is not restricted to any
person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason
of the act or omission for which the accused person has been
charged. It also includes a person who is a guardian or legal
heir of a victim as defined above.
5.3 In the instant cases, the legal heir of the injured victim and
himself being an injured victim had preferred these appeals
as he had every right to do so particularly having regard to
amendment made to the CrPC with effect from 31.12.2009
by insertion of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. However, the
contentious issue in these cases is, whether a legal heir of a
legal heir, who had preferred these appeals, could also continue
to prosecute these appeals as during the pendency of these
appeals the original appellant has died. We are considering
this issue irrespective of the fact that the applicant who seeks
substitution as an appellant in these appeals is himself an
injured victim in the incident and in his own right could have
filed appeals against the acquittal of the accused. However, he
has filed the applications for substitution in place of his father
as a legal heir of an injured victim, the original appellant in
these appeals.
5.4 We have considered the arguments advanced at the bar in
light of the amendment made to Section 372 CrPC and also
the insertion of the expression ‘Victim’ by way of a definition
clause to Section 2 of the Act extracted above and generally in
light of Article 14 of the Constitution including the right to equal
opportunity before law and right to access to justice.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2119
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
6. In Mallikarjun Kodagali (dead) represented through Legal
representatives vs. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752
(“Mallikarjun Kodagali”), there is a reference to four reports that
have dealt with the rights of victims of crime and the remedies
available to them. The same may be briefly discussed as under:
i. The first report is the 154th Report of the Law Commission of
India of August, 1996. The said Report touched upon, inter
alia, compensation to be paid to the victim of crime, their
rehabilitation, etc.
ii. In March 2003, Justice Malimath Committee submitted its report
on ‘Reforms of Criminal Justice System’. Paragraph 2.21 in
the Chapter on Adversarial Rights under the sub-heading of
‘Victims Right to Appeal’, states as under:
“2.21. The victim or his representative who is a party
to the trial should have a right to prefer an appeal
against any adverse order passed by the trial court.
In such an appeal he could challenge the acquittal,
or conviction for a lesser offence or inadequacy of
sentence, or in regard to compensation payable to
the victim. The appellate court should have the same
powers as the trial court in regard to assessment of
evidence and awarding of sentence.”
There is also discussion on other rights of victims under the
Chapter titled, ‘Justice to Victims’. In paragraph 6.(14)(v), Justice
Malimath Committee made the following recommendations:
“6. (14)(v) The victim shall have a right to prefer an
appeal against any adverse order passed by the
court acquitting the accused, convicting for a lesser
offence, imposing inadequate sentence, or granting
inadequate compensation. Such appeal shall lie to
the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against
the order of conviction of such court.”
iii. In July 2007, a Report of the Committee on the Draft National
Policy on Criminal Justice was submitted which is also
known as ‘Professor Madhava Menon Committee Report’.
Observations with regard to providing victim-oriented criminal
justice and a balance between the constitutional rights of an
2120 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
accused and victim of crime have been discussed. One of the
suggestions made is that the victim must be impleaded in the
trial proceedings so that such a party would have a right to
file an appeal against an adverse order, particularly an order
of acquittal.
iv. In the 221st Report of the Law Commission of India submitted
in April, 2009, it has been noted that as the law then stood,
an aggrieved person could not file an appeal against an order
of acquittal. However, a revision petition could be filed. Noting
that the powers of a revisional court are limited and the process
involved is cumbersome, a recommendation was made by the
Law Commission that as against an order of acquittal passed
by a Magistrate, a victim should be entitled to file an appeal
before the revisional court. Similarly, in complaint cases, the
appeal should be provided to the Sessions Court instead of
the High Court. However, it was suggested that the aggrieved
person or complainant should have the right to prefer an appeal
with the leave of the appellate court.
v. It was further recommended that Section 378 CrPC requires an
amendment with a view to enable filing of appeals in complaint
cases also in the Sessions Court, of course, subject to the grant
of special leave by it. Limited scope of powers of a revisional
court under Section 401 CrPC was taken note of and it was
suggested that there is a need to amend the CrPC.
6.1 Taking note of the aforesaid reports, an amendment was brought
to Section 372 CrPC with effect from 31.12.2009 by adding a
proviso thereto.
6.2 The decisions of the Full Benches of the High Courts in the
matter of interpretation of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC are
highlighted by this Court in the case of Mallikarjun Kodagali.
There are also Division Bench decisions of the High Courts
taking different views.
Mallikarjun Kodagali:
6.3 This Court in Mallikarjun Kodagali, speaking through Lokur,
J. for himself and Nazeer, J. referred to the Declaration of the
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2121
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
in the 96th Plenary Session on 29.11.1985. It was observed in
paragraphs 74, 75 & 76 as under:
“74. Putting the Declaration to practice, it is quite
obvious that the victim of an offence is entitled to
a variety of rights. Access to mechanisms of justice
and redress through formal procedures as provided
for in national legislation, must include the right to
file an appeal against an order of acquittal in a case
such as the one that we are presently concerned
with. Considered in this light, there is no doubt that
the proviso to Section 372 CrPC must be given life,
to benefit the victim of an offence.
75. Under the circumstances, on the basis of the
plain language of the law and also as interpreted by
several High Courts and in addition the resolution
of the General Assembly of the United Nations, it is
quite clear to us that a victim as defined in Section
2(wa) CrPC would be entitled to file an appeal before
the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against
the order of conviction. …
76. … The language of the proviso to Section 372
CrPC is quite clear, particularly when it is contrasted
with the language of Section 378(4) CrPC. The text
of this provision is quite clear and it is confined to an
order of acquittal passed in a case instituted upon a
complaint. The word “complaint” has been defined in
Section 2(d) CrPC and refers to any allegation made
orally or in writing to a Magistrate. This has nothing
to do with the lodging or the registration of an FIR,
and therefore it is not at all necessary to consider
the effect of a victim being the complainant as far
as the proviso to Section 372 CrPC is concerned.”
6.4 Consequently, the appeals in the said case were allowed
and the judgment and order of the High Court was set aside
and the matter was remanded to the High Court to hear and
decide the appeal against the judgment and order of acquittal
once again.
2122 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Analysis of the Relevant Provisions of CrPC:
7. Section 2 CrPC is the definition clause under which relevant definitions
are extracted as under:
“2. Definitions.—In this Code, unless the context
otherwise requires,—
xxx
(d) “complaint” means any allegation made orally or
in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking
action under this Code, that some person, whether
known or unknown, has committed an offence, but
does not include a police report.
Explanation.—A report made by a police officer
in a case which discloses, after investigation, the
commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be
deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by
whom such report is made shall be deemed to be
the complainant;
xxx
(n) “offence” means any act or omission made
punishable by any law for the time being in force and
includes any act in respect of which a complaint may
be made under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act,
1871 (1 of 1871);
xxx
24. Public Prosecutors.-
xxx
(8) The Central Government or the State Government
may appoint, for the purposes of any case or class
of cases, a person who has been in practice as an
advocate for not less than ten years as a Special
Public Prosecutor:
Provided that the Court may permit the victim to
engage an advocate of his choice to assist the
prosecution under this sub-section.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2123
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
CHAPTER XXIX
APPEALS
372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise
provided.—No appeal shall lie from any judgment
or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for
by this Code by any other law for the time being in
force:
Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer
an appeal against any order passed by the Court
acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser
offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and
such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal
ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such
Court.
xxx
377. Appeal by the State Government against
sentence.—(1) Save as otherwise provided in
sub-section (2), the State Government may, in any
case of conviction on a trial held by any Court other
than a High Court, direct the Public Prosecutor to
present an appeal against the sentence on the ground
of its inadequacy—
(a) to the Court of Session, if the sentence is passed
by the Magistrate; and
(b) to the High Court, if the sentence is passed by
any other Court.
(2) If such conviction is in a case in which the
offence has been investigated by the Delhi Special
Police Establishment, constituted under the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of
1946), or by any other agency empowered to make
investigation into an offence under any Central Act
other than this Code, the Central Government may
also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an
appeal against the sentence on the ground of its
inadequacy—
2124 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(a) to the Court of Session, if the sentence is passed
by the Magistrate; and
(b) to the High Court, if the sentence is passed by
any other Court.
(3) When an appeal has been filed against the
sentence on the ground of its inadequacy, the Court
of Session or, as the case may be, the High Court
shall not enhance the sentence except after giving
to the accused a reasonable opportunity of showing
cause against such enhancement and while showing
cause, the accused may plead for his acquittal or for
the reduction of the sentence.
(4) When an appeal has been filed against a sentence
passed under section 376, section 376A, section
376AB, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D,
section 376DA, section 376DB or section 376E of the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the appeal shall be
disposed of within a period of six months from the
date of filing of such appeal.
378. Appeal in case of acquittal.—(1) Save as
otherwise provided in sub-section (2), and subject to
the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (5),—
(a) the District Magistrate may, in any case, direct
the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal
to the Court of Session from an order of
acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of
a cognizable and non-bailable offence;
(b) the State Government may, in any case, direct
the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the
High Court from an original or appellate order
of acquittal passed by any Court other than a
High Court not being an order under clause (a)
or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of
Session in revision.
(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case
in which the offence has been investigated by the
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2125
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under
the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946
(25 of 1946), or by any other agency empowered to
make investigation into an offence under any Central
Act other than this Code, the Central Government
may, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), also
direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal—
(a) to the Court of Session, from an order of
acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of
a cognizable and non-bailable offence;
(b) to the High Court from an original or appellate
order of an acquittal passed by any Court other
than a High Court not being an order under
clause (a) or an order of acquittal passed by
the Court of Session in revision.
(3) No appeal to the High Court under sub-section (1)
or sub-section (2) shall be entertained except with
the leave of the High Court.
(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any
case instituted upon complaint and the High Court,
on an application made to it by the complainant in
this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the
order of acquittal, the complainant may present such
an appeal to the High Court.
(5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant
of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal
shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry
of six months, where the complainant is a public
servant, and sixty days in every other case, computed
from the date of that order of acquittal.
(6) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4)
for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order
of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order
of acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1) or under
sub-section (2).
xxx
2126 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
386. Powers of the Appellate Court.—After perusing
such record and hearing the appellant or his pleader,
if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor if he appears,
and in case of an appeal under section 377 or section
378, the accused, if he appears, the Appellate Court
may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground
for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may—
(a) in an appeal from an order or acquittal, reverse
such order and direct that further inquiry
be made, or that the accused be re-tried or
committed for trial, as the case may be, or find
him guilty and pass sentence on him according
to law;
(b) in an appeal from a conviction—
(i) reverse the finding and sentence and
acquit or discharge the accused, or order
him to be re-tried by a Court of competent
jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate
Court or committed for trial, or
(ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence,
or
(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter
the nature or the extent, or the nature and
extent, of the sentence, but not so as to
enhance the same—
(c) in an appeal for enhancement of sentence—
(i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit
or discharge the accused or order him to
be re-tried by a Court competent to try the
offence, or
(ii) alter the finding maintaining the sentence,
or
(iii) with or without altering the finding, alter
the nature or the extent, or, the nature and
extent, of the sentence, so as to enhance
or reduce the same;
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2127
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
(d) in an appeal from any other order, alter or
reverse such order;
(e) make any amendment or any consequential
or incidental order that may be just or proper:
Provided that the sentence shall not be enhanced
unless the accused has had an opportunity of
showing cause against such enhancement:
Provided further that the Appellate Court shall
not inflict greater punishment for the offence
which in its opinion the accused has committed,
than might have been inflicted for that offence
by the Court passing the order or sentence
under appeal.
394. Abatement of appeals. (1) Every appeal under
Section 377 or Section 378 shall finally abate on the
death of the accused.
(2) Every other appeal under this Chapter (except
an appeal from a sentence of fine) shall finally abate
on the death of the appellant:
Provided that where the appeal is against a conviction
and sentence of death or of imprisonment, and the
appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal,
any of his near relatives may, within thirty days of
the death of the appellant, apply to the Appellate
Court for leave to continue the appeal; and if leave
is granted, the appeal shall not abate.
Explanation.- In this section, “near relative” means a
parent, spouse, lineal descendant, brother or sister.”
7.1 Chapter XXIX of the CrPC deals with appeals. The said Chapter
delineates the statutory framework governing appeals. Section
372 CrPC unequivocally declares that no appeal shall lie from
any judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided
for by the CrPC itself or by any other law for the time being
in force. In fact, Section 372 CrPC speaks of an embargo on
the filing of an appeal from any judgment or order of a criminal
court except as provided for by the CrPC or by any other law
2128 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
for the time being in force. Section 372 CrPC is couched in a
negative language and it states that no appeal shall lie from
any judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided
for by the CrPC or by any other law for the time being in force.
Section 372 CrPC is a preface to the chapter on appeals
which in substance states that an appeal can be filed only in
accordance with what has been stated in the provisions to follow
Section 372 CrPC. The proviso to Section 372 was introduced
by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008
(Act 5 of 2009), which came into effect from 31.12.2009. By
virtue of this amendment, a limited right of appeal has been
conferred upon the victim of an offence. On a reading of the
proviso to Section 372 CrPC, it is apparent that a victim shall
have a right to prefer an appeal against: (i) any order passed
by the court acquitting the accused; or (ii) convicting for a
lesser offence; or (iii) imposing inadequate compensation.
Such appeal shall lie to the court to which an appeal ordinarily
lies against the order of conviction of such court. In fact, with
effect from 31.12.2009 when clause (wa) to Section 2 CrPC
was inserted to the definition of victim, proviso to Section 24
was also added which provides that the Court may permit
the victim to engage an advocate of his choice to assist the
prosecution under the said sub-section.
7.1.1 Further, with effect from 31.12.2009, Section 357A and
Section 357B were inserted to the CrPC in the form of
victim compensation scheme for providing compensation
to the victim or his dependants who have suffered
loss or injury as a result of the crime and who require
rehabilitation. The compensation payable by the State
Government under Section 357A is in addition to the
payment of fine to the victim of offences under Section
326A, Section 376AB, Section 376D, Section 376DA and
Section 376DB of the Indian Penal Code. Also, Section
357C states that all hospitals, public or private, whether
run by the Central Government, the State Government,
local bodies or any other person, shall immediately
provide first-aid or medical treatment, free of cost, to
the victims of any offence covered under the aforesaid
Sections.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2129
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
7.2 While Section 374 CrPC deals with appeals from convictions
with which we are not concerned in this case, what is of
relevance is Section 378 CrPC which, inter alia, deals with an
appeal in case of acquittal. The remedy of an appeal against an
acquittal is couched in certain conditions which are evident on
a reading of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 378 CrPC vis-
à-vis an appeal that could be filed by a complainant. However,
the Parliament in its wisdom amended Section 372 CrPC by
adding a proviso thereto by virtue of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Amendment) Act 2008 (5 of 2009), (with effect from
31.12.2009). It is hence necessary to unravel the definition of
victim in clause (wa) of Section 2 of the CrPC which was also
introduced along with proviso to Section 372 CrPC. A victim is
defined to mean a person who has suffered any loss or injury
caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused
person has been charged and the expression ‘victim’ includes
his or her guardian or legal heir.
7.3 The expression ‘injury’, as defined in Section 44 of the IPC
includes:
“Any harm whatever illegally caused to any
person, in body, mind, reputation or property.”
7.3.1 Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines injury to include
property damage, bodily harm, or violation of a legal right.
7.3.2 Additionally, the United Nations General Assembly’s
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims
of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985) provides a broad
and inclusive definition of victim. According to Article 1
of the Declaration:
“Victim means persons who, individually or
collectively, have suffered harm through acts
or omissions which involve physical or mental
injury, emotional distress, economic loss or
substantial impairment of their fundamental
rights.”
7.3.3 Further, Article 2 extends the definition of victim to include
immediate family members, dependents, or those who
have intervened to assist a victim in crisis.
2130 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
7.4 On a reading of the definition of ‘victim’, it is clear that the
said expression is initially exhaustive and thereafter inclusive.
The expression ‘victim’ means a person who has suffered
any loss or injury. The loss or injury could be either physical,
mental, a financial loss or injury. The expression ‘injury’ could
also be construed as a legal injury in a wider sense and not
just a physical or a mental injury. The loss or injury must be
caused by reason of an act or omission for which the accused
person has been charged. Thus, it can be both by a positive
act or negatively by an omission which is at the instance of
the accused and for which such accused has been charged.
Further, the expression ‘victim’ also includes his/her guardian
or legal heir in the case of demise of the victim.
7.5 Thus, the expression ‘victim’ has been couched in a broad
manner so as to include a person who has suffered any loss or
injury. The expressions ‘loss’ or ‘injury’ themselves are of a very
broad import which expressions also enlarge the scope of the
expression ‘victim’. Further, the expression ‘victim’ includes not
only the person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by
reason of any act or omission for which the accused person has
been charged but also includes his or her guardian or legal heir
which means that the definition of victim is inclusive in nature.
7.6 Having regard to the insertion of the proviso to Section 372
CrPC, we find that in the case of a victim who seeks to file an
appeal, he or she could proceed under the proviso to Section
372 CrPC in the circumstances mentioned therein and need
not prefer an appeal by invoking Section 378(4) CrPC which
is in respect of appeals to be filed by a complainant. It may be
that the complainant is a victim in certain cases and therefore,
the victim has the right to file an appeal under the proviso to
Section 372 CrPC and need not proceed under Section 378(4)
CrPC. However, if the complainant is not a victim and intends
to file an appeal, in such a case a complainant would have to
proceed under Section 378 CrPC which circumscribes the right
to file an appeal by virtue of the conditions which are stipulated
under the said Section.
7.6.1 The word ‘victim’ is derived from the latin word “victima”
and originally contained the concept of sacrifice. In
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2131
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
more contemporary times, the term ‘victim’ has been
expanded to imply a victim of war, an accident, a scam,
etc. As a scientific concept, according to Criminologist B.
Mendelsohn (1976), a victim may be viewed as containing
four fundamental criteria which are as follows:
• The nature of the determinant that causes the suffering.
The suffering may be physical, psychological, or both,
depending on the type of injurious act.
• The social character of the suffering. This suffering
originates in the victim’s and others’ reaction to the
event.
• The nature of the social factor. The social implications
of the injurious act can have a greater impact,
sometimes, than the physical or psychological
impact.
• The origin of the inferiority complex. This term,
suggested by Mendelsohn, manifests itself as a
feeling of submission that may be followed by a
feeling of revolt. The victim generally attributes his
injury to the culpability of another person.
Victimology thus is a social-structural way of viewing crime, the
law, the criminal and the victim. Insofar as the injury is concerned,
apart from there being short time and long time physical injuries,
there could also be economic or financial loss which are also
injuries within the meaning and definition of victim under clause
(wa) of Section 2 CrPC. We could also place reliance on
Dr. Vimla vs. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 1963 SC 1572, wherein
the expression “injury” has been explained to mean something
other than economic loss i.e., deprivation of property, whether
movable or immovable, or of money, and to include any harm
whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or such
others. In short, it is a non-economic or non-pecuniary loss.
7.7 Further, while analysing the expression ‘victim’, it is noted that it
is with reference to an accused person who has been charged.
Under the CrPC, the expression ‘charge’ is defined under clause
(b) of Section 2 which reads as under:
2132 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“2. Definitions.—In this Code, unless the
context otherwise requires,—
xxx
(b) “charge” includes any head of charge when
the charge contains more heads than one;
7.7.1 Besides the omnibus meaning, the CrPC does not define
what a charge is. However, judicial pronouncements tell
us that a charge is actually a precise formulation of the
specific accusation made against a person who is entitled
to know its nature at the earliest stage. The charge is
against a person in respect of an act committed or omitted
in violation of penal law forbidding or commanding it. In
other words, a charge is an accusation made against
a person in respect of offence alleged to have been
committed by him, vide Esher Singh vs. State A.P.,
(2004) 11 SCC 585. In Birichh Bhuian vs. State of Bihar,
AIR 1963 SC 1120, this Court observed that a charge is
not a mere abstraction but a concrete accusation against a
person in respect of an offence and that joinder of charges
is permitted under certain circumstances, whether joinder
is against one person or different persons.
7.7.2 In Advanced Law Lexicon by P Ramanatha Aiyar,
6th Edition, Volume I, a charge is defined to mean an
expression as applied to a crime, sometimes used in a
limited sense, intending the accusation of a crime which
precedes a formal trial; to mean a person charged with
an accusation of a crime. In a fuller and more accurate
sense, the expression charge includes the responsibility
for the crime. As a formal complaint, a charge signifies
an accusation, made in a legal manner of legal conduct,
either of omission or commission by the person charged.
A person charged with a crime means something more
than being suspected or accused of a crime by popular
opinion or rumour and implies that the offence has
been alleged against the accused parties according to
the forms of law. The purpose of a charge is to tell an
accused person as precisely and consciously as possible
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2133
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
of the matter with which he is charged with. Thus, the
expression charge includes the element of offence and
also reference to the person who is alleged to have
committed the offence.
8. Section 378 CrPC is a specific provision dealing with appeals.
Sub-section (4) of Section 378 CrPC is pertinent. It states that if an
order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon a complaint
and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant
in that behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of
acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High
Court. The limitation period for seeking special leave to appeal is six
months where the complainant is a public servant and sixty days in
every other case, computed from the date of the order of acquittal.
Sub-Section (6) states that if, in any case, the application under
sub-section (4) for grant of special leave to appeal from an order of
acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie
under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (2) of Section 378 CrPC.
8.1 A reading of section 378 CrPC would clearly indicate that in
case the complainant intends to file an appeal against the order
of acquittal, his right is circumscribed by certain conditions
precedent. When an appeal is to be preferred by a complainant,
the first question is, whether the complainant is also the victim
or only an informant. If the complainant is not a victim and the
case is instituted upon a complaint, then sub-section (4) requires
that the complainant must seek special leave to appeal from
an order of acquittal from the High Court. As noted under sub-
section (6), if the application under sub-section (4) for grant of
special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal is refused,
no appeal from that order of acquittal would lie, inter alia, under
sub-section (1) of Section 378 CrPC. However, if the complainant
is also a victim, he could proceed under the proviso to Section
372 CrPC, in which case the rigour of sub-section (4) of Section
378 CrPC, which mandates obtaining special leave to appeal,
would not arise at all, as he can prefer an appeal as a victim
as a matter of right. Thus, if a victim who is a complainant
proceeds under Section 378 CrPC, the necessity of seeking
special leave to appeal would arise but if a victim, whether he
is a complainant or not, files an appeal in terms of proviso to
2134 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Section 372 CrPC, then the mandate of seeking special leave
to appeal would not arise.
8.2 The reasons for the above distinction are not far to see and
can be elaborated as follows:
Firstly, the victim of a crime must have a right to prefer an
appeal which cannot be circumscribed by any condition
precedent except as provided under the provision of the
CrPC.
Secondly, the right of a victim of a crime must be placed
on par with the right of an accused who has suffered a
conviction, who, as a matter of right can prefer an appeal
under Section 374 CrPC. A person convicted of a crime
has the right to prefer an appeal under Section 374
CrPC as a matter of right and not being subjected to any
conditions. Similarly, a victim of a crime, whatever be the
nature of the crime, must have a right to prefer an appeal
as per the CrPC.
Thirdly, it is for this reason that the Parliament thought
it fit to insert the proviso to Section 372 CrPC without
mandating any condition precedent to be fulfilled by the
victim of an offence, which expression also includes the
legal representatives of a deceased victim who can prefer
an appeal.
On the contrary, as against an order of acquittal, the State,
through the Public Prosecutor, can prefer an appeal even
if the complainant does not prefer such an appeal, though
of course such an appeal is with the leave of the court.
However, it is not always that the State or a complainant
would prefer an appeal. But when it comes to a victim’s
right to prefer an appeal, the insistence on seeking special
leave to appeal from the High Court under Section 378(4)
CrPC would be contrary to what has been intended by the
Parliament by insertion of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC.
Fourthly, the Parliament has not amended Section 378
CrPC which deals with appeals against acquittal to
circumscribe the victim’s right to prefer an appeal just as
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2135
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
it has with regard to a complainant or the State filing an
appeal. On the other hand, the Parliament has inserted the
proviso to Section 372 CrPC so as to envisage a superior
right for the victim of an offence to prefer an appeal on the
grounds mentioned therein as compared to a complainant.
9. The right to prefer an appeal is no doubt a statutory right and such
a right in an accused against a conviction is not merely a statutory
right but can also be construed to be a fundamental right under
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. If that is so, then the right of
a victim of an offence to prefer an appeal cannot be equated with
the right of the State or the complainant to prefer an appeal unless
the victim is also the complainant. Hence, the statutory rigours for
filing of an appeal by the State or by a complainant against an order
of acquittal cannot be read into the proviso to Section 372 CrPC so
as to restrict the right of a victim to file an appeal on the grounds
mentioned therein, when none exists.
9.1 As already noted, the proviso to Section 372 CrPC was inserted
in the statute book only with effect from 31.12.2009. The object
and reason for such insertion must be realised and must be given
its full effect to by a court. In view of the aforesaid discussion,
we hold that the victim of an offence has the right to prefer an
appeal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC, irrespective of
whether he is a complainant or not. Even if the victim of an
offence is a complainant, he can still proceed under the proviso
to Section 372 CrPC and need not advert to sub-section (4) of
Section 378 CrPC.
9.2 We find that on the recommendation made by the Law
Commission, the Parliament inserted the proviso in order to
give an independent right to a victim to prefer an appeal under
the circumstances mentioned under the proviso. This is de hors
an appeal that could be filed by the complainant under Section
378(4) CrPC. The object and purpose of giving an independent
right to a victim to prefer an appeal is particularly in a case
where a complainant may not file an appeal and the State also
would decide not to prefer an appeal as against the acquittal or
award of a lesser sentence to an accused. If we bear in mind
the object with which the amendment has been made by the
2136 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Parliament, we find that the victim has every right to prefer
an appeal as against a conviction for a lesser offence or for
imposing inadequate compensation or even in the case of an
acquittal of an accused as stated in the proviso to Section 372
CrPC. There is no doubt that in the instant cases they are cases
of acquittal of the accused by the High Court.
9.3 The expression ‘right to prefer an appeal’ in the proviso to Section
372 CrPC cannot be limited to mean ‘only the filing of an appeal’.
Mere filing of an appeal in the absence of prosecution of an appeal
is of no avail. It does not fulfill the object with which the proviso
has been added to Section 372 CrPC. Therefore, we interpret
the expression ‘the right to prefer an appeal’ to also include the
‘right to prosecute an appeal’. Then, if during the pendency of an
appeal, the original appellant dies, can it be said that his legal heir
cannot be substituted so as to prosecute the appeal further? Any
curtailing of the legal right to prosecute an appeal on the death
of an original appellant by his legal heir would make the proviso
to Section 372 CrPC wholly redundant and in fact may result in
a situation which is contrary to the entire object with which the
Parliament had inserted the proviso to Section 372 CrPC. In
this context, it is also relevant to note that the Parliament has
been conscious to expand the definition of the word ‘victim’ to
not only include the victim himself who had suffered the loss or
injury but also to include his legal heir. When a legal heir, who
is not a complainant or an injured victim, can prefer an appeal
then why not his legal heir on the death of the legal heir who
had preferred the appeal be permitted to prosecute the appeal?
We see no reason to curtail the right of a legal heir, who had
preferred the original appeal, to be denied the right to prosecute
the appeal. In the instant cases, the applicant, who is seeking
substitution, is the legal heir of the victim who had preferred the
appeal before this Court and is also an injured victim.
Relevant Judicial Dicta:
10. A Constitution Bench of this Court in PSR Sadhanantham, speaking
through Krishna Iyer, J., observed that in a murder case, when an
appeal against acquittal was not filed by the State but by a brother
of the deceased, a private citizen, who is neither a complainant nor
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2137
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
the first informant, could invoke the special power under Article 136
of the Constitution for leave to appeal against an acquittal, the same
would not violate Article 21 of the Constitution. The facts of the said
case were that the petitioner therein was acquitted of a murder charge
by the High Court but the brother of the deceased — not the State
nor even the first informant — moved this Court under Article 136,
got leave and had his appeal heard which resulted in the petitioner
(accused) being convicted and sentenced to life term under Section
302 IPC. A writ petition was filed by the accused challenging the
locus standi of the brother of the deceased in moving this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution.
10.1 It was observed that Article 136 of the Constitution is of
composite structure wherein power-cum-procedure is in-built
which vests power in this Court to entertain a petition and
prescribes a mode of hearing so characteristic of the Court
process. When a motion is made for leave to appeal against
an acquittal, this Court has to appreciate the gravity of the peril
to personal liberty involved in that proceeding. The Court will
also pay attention to the person who seeks such leave from
the Court, his motive and his locus standi and the weighty
factors which persuade the Court to grant special leave. The
Court may not, save in special situations, grant leave to one
who is not eo nomine a party on the record.
10.1.1 This Court observed that the strictest vigilance over
abuse of the process of the Court is necessary, as
ordinarily meddlesome bystanders should not be
granted a “visa”, but access to justice to every bona
fide seeker is a democratic dimension of remedial
jurisprudence. It was further observed that while
the criminal law should not be used as a weapon in
personal vendettas between private individuals, in
the absence of an independent prosecution authority
easily accessible to every citizen, a wider connotation
of the expression “standing” is necessary for Article
136 to further its mission.
10.1.2 Pathak, J. (as he then was) writing a separate
judgment for himself and Koshal, J. considered the
question whether a brother of a deceased person,
2138 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
who had been murdered, possessed the right to
petition under Article 136 of the Constitution for
special leave to appeal against an acquittal of the
accused. It was observed that this question touched
directly on the nature of the crime and of a criminal
proceeding. When entertaining a petition for special
leave to appeal by a private party against an order of
acquittal, certain factors to be borne in mind were also
enumerated. It was opined that the judicial process
under Article 136 ought not to be invoked for the
satisfaction of private revenge or persona vendetta.
Nor can it be permitted as an instrument of coercion
where a civil action would lie. In every case, this Court
is bound to consider what is the interest which brings
the petitioner to this Court and whether the interest
of the public community will benefit by the grant of
special leave. This Court should closely scrutinise
the motives and urges of those who seek to employ
its process against the life or liberty of another. The
Court should entertain a special leave petition filed
by a private party, other than the complainant, in
those cases only where it is convinced that the public
interest justifies an appeal against the acquittal and
that the State has refrained from petition for special
leave for reasons which do not bear on the public
interest but are prompted by private influence, want
of bona fide and other extraneous considerations.
Therefore, locus standi of the petitioner must be
recognised in law. It was observed that the petitioner
therein had failed to establish that there was a case
for interfering with the judgment of this Court allowing
the appeal and hence, the writ petition was dismissed.
10.2 In Chand Devi Daga vs. Manju K. Humatani, (2018) 1 SCC
71, the original complainant had died during the pendency of
the criminal miscellaneous petition before the High Court which
was filed against the order of the Sessions Court rejecting the
criminal revision against the order of the Magistrate dismissing
the complaint. The High Court allowed the interlocutory
application filed by the legal representatives of the petitioner
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2139
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
in the criminal miscellaneous petition. The respondent before
the High Court, being aggrieved by the said order, had filed
an appeal before this Court. Referring to Section 256 CrPC,
this Court observed that even in case of trial of summons
case, it is not necessary or mandatory that after the death of
the complainant, the complaint has to be rejected. Under the
proviso to the said Section, the Magistrate can proceed with
the complaint. That a similar provision with regard to trial of
warrant cases by the Magistrate is not provided for under the
CrPC but the Magistrate has the power to discharge a case
where the complainant is absent under Section 249 which is,
however, hedged with a condition that “the offence may be
lawfully compounded or is not a cognizable offence”. Therefore,
there is no indication that on the death of the complainant, the
complaint has to be rejected in a warrant case. Referring to
certain other judicial dicta, this Court observed that the High
Court did not commit any error in allowing the legal heirs of the
complainant to prosecute the criminal miscellaneous petition
before the High Court and consequently, dismissed the appeal.
10.3 In M.R. Ajayan vs. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine SC
3373, this Court considered the locus of a private individual
seeking exercise of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of
the Constitution. Placing reliance on National Commission for
Women vs. State of Delhi, (2010) 12 SCC 599; Amanullah vs.
State of Bihar, (2016) 6 SCC 699 (“Amanullah”) and PSR
Sadhanantham, it was observed that the appellant therein had
locus standi to prosecute the special leave petition before this
Court. Referring to the observations of this Court in Amanullah,
it was stated that it may not be possible to strictly enumerate
as to who all will have locus to maintain an appeal before this
Court invoking Article 136 of the Constitution of India as that
would depend upon the factual matrix of each case, as each
case has its unique set of facts. In other words, any person
having a bona fide connection with the matter, to maintain
the appeal with a view to advance substantial justice, must
be permitted to do so.
10.4 We take note of the aforesaid judgments of this Court which
are judgments rendered in the context of Article 136 of the
2140 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Constitution of India as they would squarely apply to the
present case as apart from the original appellant herein the
applicant (injured victim) could have also preferred a Special
Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in
his own right but instead he is now seeking to prosecute these
Criminal Appeals as an heir of the original appellant who was
a victim. Although PSR Sadhanantham is a case which arose
in a petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India,
nevertheless the question which arose therein is similar to the
question in the present case and therefore, the observations
therein squarely apply.
11. We are conscious of the fact that the applicant who is seeking
substitution in the instant case is not only the son and heir of the
original appellant who preferred these appeals but is also an injured
victim in the incident which occurred on 09.12.1992 in respect of
which these appeals have been filed. Therefore, the applicant
could have filed these appeals assailing the judgment of acquittal
passed by the High Court in his individual capacity as an injured
victim. However, the applications for substitution have been filled
in order to continue the prosecution of these appeals as the heir
of the original appellant who was also an injured victim. Hence,
the detailed discussion that we have made is in acceptance of the
argument of learned counsel for the applicant that as heir of the
original appellant, who was an injured victim, he can prosecute
these appeals. Therefore, the applicant is being permitted to be
substituted in place of the original appellant as heir of the original
appellant (who was a victim in the incident). In other words, we
observe that even if the applicant was not an injured victim in the
said incident but has sought to prosecute these appeals as heir of
the injured victim (original appellant), he is permitted to do so. We
therefore say, coincidentally, the applicant is also an injured victim
in the incident. In view of the above discussion, we do not accept
the contention of learned senior counsel for the respondent-accused
that the applicant herein would have to separately file appeals before
this Court as an injured victim and in that capacity only and not as
heir of the original appellant.
11.1 Secondly, another contention of learned senior counsel for
the respondent-accused is that under Section 394(2) CrPC,
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2141
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
the expression “every other appeal” other than an appeal
filed under Section 377 CrPC or Section 378 CrPC shall
finally abate applies to an appeal filed by a victim. We do
not think the same can be simply applied to an appeal filed
by a victim or an heir of the victim. Although, sub-section (2)
of Section 394 CrPC states that “every other appeal under
this Chapter shall finally abate on the death of the appellant”,
it cannot be related to an appeal filed by a victim or on the
death of the victim/appellant. This is because Sections 377
and 378 CrPC respectively deal with an appeal filed by the
State Government against sentence and an appeal in case
of acquittal. Such appeals are filed against the accused and
therefore, when the accused dies, such appeals would abate.
The expression “every other appeal” must therefore, relate to
an appeal which is not filed under Section 377 or Section 378
CrPC. Such an appeal is an appeal against a conviction such
as under Section 374 CrPC and on the death of the appellant
who is the accused, such appeal would abate. The proviso
to sub-section (2) of Section 394 CrPC however, states, that
even if the accused-appellant dies during the pendency of
the appeal, any of his near relatives may continue the appeal
and the appeal may not abate. In other words, the heirs of the
deceased accused-appellant have been permitted to continue
the appeals so as to seek an acquittal and realise the fruits
of such an acquittal which could be even in monetary terms
despite the death of the accused-appellant.
11.2 If the same logic is to apply to the proviso to Section 372
CrPC, it would imply that the heirs of a victim can also pursue
an appeal filed under that provision as the definition of victim
under Section 2(wa) includes the heir of a victim.
11.3 The expression “prefer an appeal” in proviso to Section
372 CrPC has to be given an expanded meaning to include
prosecution of an appeal or effectively pursue an appeal.
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the word “prefer” means
“to bring before; to prosecute; to try; to proceed with. Thus,
preferring an indictment signifies prosecuting or trying an
indictment; - Manik Lal Majumdar vs. Gouranga Chandra
Dey, (2004) 12 SCC 448.
2142 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
11.4 We may usefully refer to Constitution Bench Judgment of this
Court in Garikapati Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR
1957 SC 540 wherein it was observed thus:
“23. From the decisions cited above the following
principles clearly emerge:
(i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal
and second appeal are really but steps in a series of
proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and
are to be regarded as one legal proceeding.
(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of
procedure but is a substantive right.
(iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the
implication that all rights of appeal then in force are
preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the
career of the suit.
(iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a
right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant
and exists as on and from the date the lis commences
and although it may be actually exercised when the
adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be
governed by the law prevailing at the date of the
institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law
that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date
of the filing of the appeal.
(v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only
by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly
or by necessary intendment and not otherwise.”
11.5 More importantly, Article 136 of the Constitution deals with
Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court. Sub-clause (1)
of Article 136 begins with a non-obstante clause and confers
discretion on the Supreme Court to grant special leave to
appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence
or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court
or tribunal in the territory of India. When this power under
Article 136 is exercised by the Supreme Court by granting
leave, the special leave petition would get converted into a
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2143
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
criminal appeal. If during the pendency of the special leave
petition or the criminal appeal, the appellant dies, the heir
of the appellant must be given an opportunity to prosecute
the appeal irrespective of whether the heir is a victim of the
criminal offence. More significantly, the appeal heard pursuant
to Article 136 of the Constitution is not an appeal under Chapter
XXIX CrPC.
11.6 In the circumstances, we find that in the instant case, the
applicant, being heir of the victim, has the right to continue
these appeals irrespective of the fact that he is an injured victim.
In that view of the matter also, we find that the application for
substitution has to be allowed.
11.7 However, if in a situation, the complainant who has preferred an
appeal under Section 378 CrPC dies, what would be the fate
of the appeal is not a question which arises in this case and
therefore, we keep the said question open to be adjudicated
in any other appropriate case.
12. In the circumstances, the delay in filing the application for seeking
setting aside of the abatement is condoned. The abatement is
set aside. The application for substitution of applicant is allowed.
Consequently, the applicant is permitted to be brought on record
as the legal representative of the original appellant, apart from he
being an injured victim also. Appellant’s counsel to file amended
memo of parties.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1330-1332 OF 2017:
The appellant herein, who is the legal heir of the original appellant
(and a victim of the incident that occurred on 09.12.1992) has been
substituted to prosecute these appeals which have been filed being
aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal of the accused vide order
dated 12.09.2012 passed in Criminal Appeal Nos.254 of 2004, 258
of 2004, 259 of 2004 by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant made a two-fold submission: firstly,
he contended that even without going into the merits of the case,
the manner and tenor of the judgment may be considered; that this
is a judgment of a High Court which was considering a first appeal
against a judgment and order of conviction which appeals were filed
2144 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
by respondents - accused; that in a cryptic manner, the judgment
has been delivered by the High Court acquitting the respondents –
accused. That this Court in a catena of cases has observed that
even if a judgment confirming the judgment of a Sessions Court is
to be rendered by the High court and thereby dismissing the first
appeal which has been preferred under Section 374 CrPC, the appeal
would have to be considered based on the evidence on record and
thereafter possibly the High Court could dismiss such an appeal. But
here is a case where the High Court has reversed the judgment of
the Sessions Court inasmuch as the judgment and sentence of life
imprisonment has been set aside and a complete acquittal given
to the respondents - accused without there being any reasons and
marshalling of the facts and the evidence on record. In this regard,
he drew our attention to paragraph 7 of the impugned judgment and
submitted that the findings in paragraph 7 of the impugned judgment
are de hors any basis in the absence of there being a discussion of
the facts and evidence on record. In the circumstances, he submitted
that this Court if it is so inclined may consider remanding of the
matter without going into the merits of the case.
3. The second submission of learned counsel for the appellant is, in the
event this Court is not inclined to accept the first submission, then
the appeal can be taken up on merits. Learned counsel submitted
that even on merits, the High Court could not have given a judgment
of acquittal by reversing the judgment of the Sessions Court. He
therefore submitted that the impugned judgment may be set aside
and the judgment of the Sessions Court may be restored.
4. Per contra, learned senior counsel and learned counsel appearing
for the respondents-accused who have been acquitted, vehemently
contended that there is no merit in the submissions made by
appellant’s counsel. They drew our attention to the fact that the
High Court may have given the judgment pithily but it is not without
substance. Merely because the impugned judgment is short and
not lengthy cannot make it an erroneous judgment so long as the
reasoning is evident and there is a basis for the findings arrived at.
In the circumstances, this Court may not accept the first contention
of the appellant and hence, they contended that they are ready
to argue the matter on merits so that this Court could confirm the
judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2145
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted that, no doubt
the State has not preferred an appeal against the judgment of
acquittal as against the respondents - accused before this Court.
However, the State had preferred an appeal against the acquittal
of six other accused and that appeal was dismissed but in these
appeals filed by the appellant herein, the State is supporting the
appellant. Learned counsel for the respondent – State submitted
that having regard to the submissions advanced by the respective
counsel and learned counsel for the parties, this Court may consider
remanding the matter to the High Court so that all parties would
get an opportunity to put forth their respective cases and the High
Court could consider the appeal afresh and in accordance with law
and come to its conclusion.
6. While hearing the appeals under Section 374(2) of the CrPC, the
High Court is exercising its appellate jurisdiction. There shall be
independent application of mind in deciding the criminal appeal against
conviction. It is the duty of an appellate court to independently evaluate
the evidence presented and determine whether such evidence is
credible. Even if the evidence is deemed reliable, the High Court
must further assess whether the prosecution has established its
case beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court though being an
appellate Court is akin to a Trial Court, must be convinced beyond
all reasonable doubt that the prosecution’s case is substantially true
and that the guilt of the accused has been conclusively proven while
considering an appeal against a conviction.
As the first appellate court, the High Court is expected to evaluate
the evidence including the medical evidence, statement of the victim,
statements of the witnesses and the defence version with due care.
7. While the judgment need not be excessively lengthy, it must reflect
a proper application of mind to crucial evidence. Albeit the High
Court does not have the advantage to examine the witnesses
directly, the High Court should, as an appellate Court, re-assess the
facts, evidence on record and findings to arrive at a just conclusion
in deciding whether the Trial Court was justified in convicting the
accused or not. We are also cognizant of the large pendency of
cases bombarding our courts. However, the same cannot come in
the way of the Court’s solemn duty, particularly, when a person’s
liberty is at stake.
2146 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
8. This Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Ambarish, (2021) 16
SCC 371 held that while deciding a criminal appeal on merits,
the High Court is required to apply its mind to the entirety of the
case including the evidence on the record before arriving at its
conclusion. In this regard, we may also refer to the orders passed
by this Court in Shakuntala Shukla vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(2021) 20 SCC 818 and State Bank of India vs. Ajay Kumar
Sood, (2023) 7 SCC 282.
9. We find that the High Court ought to have considered the evidence
on record in light of the arguments advanced at the bar and thereafter
ascertained whether the Sessions Court was justified in passing
the judgment of conviction and imposing the sentence. The same
being absent in the impugned judgment, for that sole reason, we
set aside the same.
10. We therefore find that the first contention advanced by the learned
counsel for the appellant and the submission made by learned counsel
for the respondent-State has to be accepted for the reason that the
respondents-accused in these appeals respectively would also have
another opportunity in the appeals that they had filed before the
High Court. In the circumstances, while holding that the impugned
judgment of the High Court is cryptic and de hors any reasoning in
coming to the findings in paragraph 7 of the said judgment, we set
aside the said judgment without expressing anything on the merits
of the case.
11. We allow the appeals filed on the aforesaid limited ground.
12. The matters are remanded to the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital.
13. The High Court is requested to rehear the appeals filed by the
respondents/accused respectively in these appeals by also giving
an opportunity to the appellant herein to make his submission in
the said appeals as well as the State to make its submission in
the matter.
14. We once again clarify that we have not made any observations on
the merits of the matter.
15. All contentions on both sides are left open to be advanced before
the High Court.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 2147
Khem Singh (D) Through LRs v.
State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) & Another Etc.
16. Since the incident is of the year 1992 and the impugned order is
dated 12.09.2012 and we are remanding the matter to the High Court,
we request the High Court to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously
as possible.
17. Since we have set aside the judgment dated 12.09.2012 passed
by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Appeal
Nos.254 of 2004, 258 of 2004, 259 of 2004, the accused Nos.4, 3
and 2 respectively shall remain on bail. However, accused Nos.4,
3 and 2 shall appear before the concerned Principal District and
Sessions Judge, Haridwar and execute fresh bonds for a sum of
Rs.15,000/- each with two like sureties each and subject to other
conditions imposed by the concerned Principal District and Sessions
Judge, Haridwar.
These appeals are allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
Result of the case: Appeals allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan
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