Holding

The lease had expired, the lessee lost his possessory right and became a trespasser/tenant at sufferance, the requisition order could not continue after the Act lapsed, and the "liberty to mention" does not allow the High Court to reopen the decided issue.

Summary

The appellants, K.L. Mimani and others, had a 50‑year lease of land in Howrah which was requisitioned under the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948. Their writ petition challenging the requisition was dismissed and an appeal was filed, but the lease expired by efflux of time during the pendency of the appeal. The 1948 Act subsequently lapsed, and the Calcutta High Court held that the requisition order could not continue, directing restoration of possession to the owners and granting a "liberty to mention" the matter. The High Court later ordered possession to be made over to the owners without prejudice to the lessee’s right to sue for recovery. The Supreme Court examined whether the lessee retained any lawful possession after the lease expired, the effect of the lapse of the requisition statute, and whether the "liberty to mention" could reopen the issue, ultimately holding that the lessee lost his possessory right, became a trespasser/tenant at sufferance, and that the requisition could not survive the expiry of the Act; consequently the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a lessee whose lease has expired by efflux of time retains lawful possession or becomes a trespasser/tenant at sufferance.
Whether the State must restore possession to the owner or the lessee after the requisition order becomes void due to the lapse of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948.
Whether the "liberty to mention" granted by the High Court permits reopening of issues already decided.
Effect of the lapse of a temporary statute on the continuance of a requisition order.
Whether the lessee is entitled to file a suit for recovery of possession after the lease expiry.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 47
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 108A, s. 116
West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948s. 3(1), s. 6(1), s. 7(3)

Subjects

lease expiryrequisitiontemporary statutepossessiontenant at sufferancetrespassliberty to mentionWest Bengal Land ActTransfer of Property ActArticle 136review under Order 47

Judgment

.A KEWAL CHAND rvtIMANI (D) BY LRS .
'V.
S.K. SEN AND ORS.

JULY:23, 2001

B [UMESH C. BANERJEE AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.]

West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948: Sections
3(1) and 6(1)-Land Requisition-Suit land leased to lessee for 50 years-
Subsequently said land requisitim~ed-Writ petition challenging order of
C requisition dismissed-Lease expir.~d by efflux of time during pendency of
appeal-Transpositions application, by owners as appellants to conduct the
appeal a/lowed-Meanwhile Act lapsed-High Court held requisition order
could not continue due to lapse of, Act and directed State Government and
Municipal Corporation to restore Rossession of suit land to the owner and/
D or occupier, as the case may be-High Court granted "liberty to mention"
the matter in case of difficulty-Subsequently, on the matter being mentioned,
High Court, in a second judgment,: directed making over of possession to the
owners without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties and
without prejudice to the rights of the lessee to file a suit for appropriate
proceedings for recovery-Correctness of-Held: As the lease has expired by
E efflux of time, the lessee has lost.' his possessory right-Hence, there is no
question of putting back the lessee on to the possession.

Transfer of Property Act, 1882:

Section I 16-Tenant ho/dint; over and te_nant-at-sufferance-Distinction
F between-Explained.
Possession-Juridical poss¢ssion-Jmplication of Held: Cannot always
be equated with lawful possession.

Acquisition and Requisiti~n-Distinction between-Held: Acquisition
G involves an element of permanency involving transfer of title-Whereas
requisition is of temporary duration without rights of ownership.

Practice and Procedure:

"Liberty to mention"- Scope and ambit of-Held: It is a legal process
H 1056
,J

K.L. MIMAJ'll v. S.K. SEN 1057
for shortening of litigation-It does not give jurisdiction to the court to A
reopen an issue already decided-Review of a judgement cannot be resorted
to on the basis of this liberty-Code of Civil procedure, I 908-0rder 4 7.

Words and Phrases:

"Trespass "-Meaning of B
The respondents-owners leased out their land to the appellants-lessees
for a period of 50 years. During the currency of the lease the suit land was
requisitioned under Section 3(1) of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and
Acquisition) Act, 1948. The appellant's writ petition challenging the order
of requisition was dismissed. During the pendency of the appeal before the C
High Court the lease expired by efflux of time. After expiry of about 9 years
the respondents filed an application for being transposed as appellants to
conduct the pending appeal, which was allowed. However, before pronouncement
of judgment the Act lapsed by efflux of time. Therefore, the High Court held
that the requisition order could riot continue due to lapse of the Act and
directed the State Government and Municipal Corporation to restore D
possession of suit land to the owner and/or occupier, as the ca~e may be. But
the High Court granted "liberty to mention" the matter in the event of any
difficulties. Subsequently, on the matter being mentioned on behalf of the
State and an application filed by owners for a direction to restore possession
to them, the High Court, directed ,making over of possession to the owners E
without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties and without
prejudice to the rights of the lessee to file a suit for appropriate proceedings
for recovery. Hence this appeal.

On behalf of the appellants it was contended that the High Court had
no jurisdiction to reopen the issue' on the ground of grant of "liberty to F
mention" the matter and that if possession has been taken from a particular
person the same ought to be allowed to be received back by that person and
none other.

On behalf of the respondents it was contended that under Section 6(1)
of the Act it was incumbent upon the state Government to make an inquiry G
and ascertain the factum of entitlement to possession and the possession
ought to be delivered in accordance therewith to the person concerned.

The following questions arose before this Court :-

(1) Whether a lessee, after expiry of lease by lapse of time, continues H
1058 SUPREMij COURT REPORTS
I
[2001) 3 S.C.R.

A to be in lawful possession of leasehold property, assuming there was no
· requisition of the premises; or alternatively is he a trespasser? And, if so,
can he be removed from the premises excepting by due process of law?

(2) Whether a lessee of a~ expired lease without a renewal clause be
termed to be a tenant holding qver, resulting thereby of reversal of status
B of former lessee to a tenant-hol~ing-over?

Dismissing the appeal, th¢ Court
. I

HELD: 1. Juridical possession while is a possession protected by law
against wrongful dispossession~ but cannot per se always be equated with
C lawful possession. (1062-HJ

.. MC. Chockalingam v. V. Manickavasagam, (1974) 1 SCC 48, relied
1

on.

2.l. The tw~ concepts o( acquisition and requisition cannot but be
D ascribed· to 'be tot~lly distinct land independent; whereas the acquisition
involves· an element of perman~ncy arid finality involving a transfer of title,
the concept of requisition is m~rely to take.over the domain or control over
the property without acquiringi the rights of ownership and must, by its very
nature,. be of temporary
• .
duratjon.
, I
[1064-H;
, ,
1065-AJ
·E .. 2.2; Upon an ord~r of Re~uisition being passed, the physical possession
;ofthe property stands tempo~arily transferred.to the State in ternis of the
~equisition Order, though, hovrever, ownership of the property remains with
the owners even during the time
I
~e requisition continues. In the
•
event,
however, of there being acq uisition after the order or requisition, the
1

ownership also stands vested 1>n to the acquisitioning authority.
F (1068-G-H; 1069-AJ
,. . . t.
. · 3.1. When the entire ap~eal stands disposed of there exits no scope of
reopening the issue on the basis of the liberty granted to mention the matter.
"Liberty to mention" cannot bk used as means to achieve an advantage which
G is not otherwise available in law - a question which stands finally decided
' · . · cannot be r~opened; neither the Court has ariy further jurisdiction once the
.· signature bas been appende<J on the judgment by oral mention. The issue
starids concluded as soon as 'the judgment is pronounced and the same is
signed. The words 'liberty t.~ mentiof have been, as a matter of fact, a
phraseology, which did come through judicial process without any definite
, H legal sanction for the purpos~ of clariQcation, if needed, but not otherwise.
K.L. M!MANI v. S.K. SEN 1059
'It is a legal process, which has been evolved for convenience and for shortening A
the litigation so that the parties are not dragged into further and further
course of litigation. [1070-C-D-EJ

3.2. The grant of "liberty to mention" the matter is to obliterate any
confusion or any difficulty being experienced in the matter - it does not give
the right a new to the party to agitate the matter further nor does it confer B
jurisdiction on the Court itself to further probe the correctness of the
decision arrived at. Review of a judgment cannot be had on the basis of this
liberty. The circumstances under which review can be had are provided
under 47 of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908. In any event, law is well
settled on this score that the power to review is not an inherent power and C
it must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication.
[1070-F-G)

Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR 1970
SC (1273) and State of U.P. v. Brahm. Datt Sharma, [1987) 2 SCC 179,
referred to. D
4. The word "trespass" in common English acceptation means and
implies unlawful or unwarrantable intrusion upon land. It is a trangression
of law or right, and a trespasser is a person, entering the premises of
another with knowledge that his entrance is in excess of the permjssion that
h.as been given to him. [1073-F) E
P. Ramanatha Aiyar: The Law Lexicon (The Encylopaedic Law
Dictionary with Legal Maxims and Words & Phrases, 2th Ed., 1997), Black's
law Dictionary 7th Edn. by Garner and Salmond on Tort, referred to.

5. Presently, the Law Courts are being guided by a justice-oriented F
approach, since the concept of justice is the call of the day and a need of the
hour. Justice is the goal of the jurisprudence-procesual/procedural as much
as substantive. Puritan approach has lost its significance in the present day
context; since justice ought to be the end product of equity and go to roots.
It is this complete justice between the parties, which stands statutorily
recognised in Section 108-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. G
[1075-A-B)

Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Raman/al Govindram, AIR (1975)
SC 1187; Balwantrai Chaman/al Trivedi v. M.N. Nagrashna, AIR (1960) SC
407 and Taherakhatoon v. Salambin Mohammad, (1999l2 SCC 635, relied
on. H

-----------~--- -- - - - - -
1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 l] 3 S.C.R.

A A.M. All;;on v. B.l. Sen, (1957] SCR 359, cited.
' . ,, ' '' !
6. The lessee bas lost bis possessory right .and the same stand~ shifted .._ .
on the State: Once, however, the possessory right is transferred or shifted
.. from the lessee and the lease deed stands terminated during this temporary .
interregnum when lessee was deprived of his possession, question of putting
B back the l.SSee on to the possession after the expiry of the lease in accordance
with the provisions of law does not and cannot arise. The Court bas to do
equity and in doing so, it bas to consider the fact-situation of the matter in
· issue and it is only thereafter pass certain orders thereof. There is not even
:·an iota of right existing in favour of the lessees to caU for their possessory
C '.' right. The right of the lessee stands obliterated by reason of effiux of time
coupled .with the .issuance of the r.equisition order which temporarily
, suspended the lessee's right to occupy though it does not put an end to the
lessees's right to own the premises unless of course, acquisition follows the
requisition order and the provisions oflaw on the basis of which the order
for requisition was passed also expired by lapse oftime. (1076-D-E-F-G]
D
7. The principle of jostice is an inbuilt requirement of justice delivery
' system and iod~gence and laxity on the part of the law Court would be an
unauthorised exercise of jurisdiction and thereby pu~ a premium to illegal
acts. While it is true that the intent oflegislature in the matter ofa defunct
. statute would not be a ~aterial consideration in the fact-situation of the
· E matter in issue but even assuming such an intent is relevant, Section 6 of
the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 categorically
refers, to· an ioqoicy as to the entitlement to obtain the possession. The
paramount requirement of the Statllte,'therefore, ..:as an inquiry by the State
Government as to the person/persons who appears to be entitled to obtain the
. F possession. Therefore, taking recourse even to the language of the defunct
statute, the legislature contemplated an inquiry~ obviously so because the ~·
.situation may change and the entitlement may also change; if the intent was
to apply the general principle that a person ought to be restored in possession
from whom the possession was taken, there was no difficulfy on the part of
the law makers to say so explicitly. State Government is put to inquiry- this
.G inquiry thus : to meet the unchanged facts and situations. (1077-C-D-E-F]
· 8. Holding over stands equivalent to the retenti~n of possession after
. determination of lease, but with the consent of the landlord - whereas, on
similar circumstances if the possession is without the consent of the landlord .w
then the same stands out to be a tenant-at-sufferance. Section 116 of the
·H Transfer of Property Act, 1882 does let a statutory recognition to the concept
--f
;

K.L. MIMANI v. S.K ..SEN [BANERJEE, J.)

or holding over. The present situation is not akin to a tenancy by way or A'
holding over the property or the lessee being even termed as a tenant-at- ;
sufferance. The lessees are not in possession even. There exists· a
differentiation between the lessee or a determined lease in possession and
a lessee dispossessed. The appellants-lessees stand admittedly dispossessed
from the leased premises. No right can be said. to ·accrue in favour of the
lessees - law courts will have to act within the limits of law and the courts B
try to take note of the moral fabric of the law~ 11079-A-B-C-D] .

RV. Bhupal Prasadv. Stat~ of A.P., 1199515 sec 698; referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4632 of C .
1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 17 .6.1997 of the Calcutta High
Court in F.M.A.T. No. 1850of1988. .

WITH
D

I ' C.P. (C) No. 417/99 and C.P. (C) No. 116 of2001.

Dipankar Guptc., Dr. A.M. Singhvi;K.K. Venugopal, R.F. Nariman, Ranjit
Kumar, L. Nageswara Rao, Tapas Ray, Yashank, Praveen Adhyaru, Senior
Advocates, Aseem Mehrotra, Sushi! Kumar Jain, Jayanth Muthraj, K.K.
Chakraborty, U. Banerjee, B.P. Nirbhoy, Bijan Kumar Ghosh, Salish Vig, G.S. E
Chatterjee, Raja Chatterjee, Ms. Aruna Mukherjee, H.K. Pur~ S.K. Bhattacharya, ,!
Parijat Sinha, Ms." Sarla Chandra, Ms. Praveena Gautam, Pramod B. AgarWala,
Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Maninder Singh and Bijoy Kumar Jain for the
appearing parties.

The following Judgment/Order of the Court was delivered : F

, BANERJEE, J. While there is no divergence of opinion as regards
status of a former tenant and his possession is juridiCal and protected by
statute, the iss.~e in th'e contextual facts, however pertains to State
Government's obligation to restore possession. of the premises requisitioned
G
after termination of the requisition proceed.ings, namely to the owners or to
the tenant/lessees from whom possession was taken on the date of the order
.... of requisition. Mr. Dipankar Gupta, the learned senior Advocate appearing in
support of the appeal has been rather emphatic on his submission that the
State has such an obligation, Mr. Venugopal, Mr. RF Nariman and Mr. Ranjit
. Kumar, Senior Advocates, appearing for different respondents, in one tune H
,.-,.
•

1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 3 S.C.R.

A howe_ver sounded .a contra note. The High Court negated the submissions as
advanced before it that it is the tenant/lessee who is authorised to receive
back th~ possession from the State after the expiry of requisition in the
contextual facts and thus the appeal before this Court ..

Incidentally, juridical possession, spoken-off earlier in the paragraph,
B whiie. is a possession protected by law against wrongful dispos~ession, but
can not per-se always be equated with lawful possession. This has been the
clear opinion of 'this Court in M.C. Chockalingam & Ors., v. V.
Manickavasagam, [1974) 1 SCC 48. This Court in paragraph 14 of the report
observed :-

c "Mr. Gupta strenuously submits that 'lawful possession' can not be
divorced from an affinnative, positive legal right to possess the property
and since the lease had expired by efflux of time the tenant in this case
had no legal right to continue in possession.. In the context of Rule
13, we are clearly of opinion that a tenant on the expiry of the lease
D can not be said to continue in 'lawful possession' of the property
against the wishes of the landlord if such a possession is not otherwise
statutorily protected under the law against even lawful eviction through
Court process, such as under the Rent Control Act. Section 6 of the
Specific Relief Act does not offer such protection, but only, as stated
earlier, forbids forcible dispossession, even with the best of title."
E
This Court further went on to observe in paragraph 15 of the report as
below:-

" ......... Lawful possession cannot be established without the
concomitant existence of a lawful relationship between the landlord
F and the tenant. This relationship cannot be established. against the
consent of the landlord unless, however, in view of a special law, his
consent becomes irrelevant. Lawful possession is not litigious
possession and must have some foundation in a legal right to possess
the property which cannot be equated with a temporary right to
enforce recovery of the property in case a persqn is wrongfully or
G
forcibly dispossessed from it. This Court in Lalu Yeshwant Singh 's
case (supra) had not to consider whether juridical possession in that
case was also lawful possession. We are clearly of opinion that
juridical possession is possession protected by law against wrongful
dispossession but can not per se always be equated with lawful
H possession."
-f
K.L. MI MANI v. S.K. SEN [BANERJEE, J.] 1063

.. Adverting presently however, to the matter under consideration, be it
noted on the factual score that a vacant land in Howrah, West Bengal,
A

measuring about 8 Bighas approximately belonging to the Dawans as owners
was leased out to Mimanis for a period of 50 years commencing from 1st
January, 1939. The land admittedly was used for a local weekly market (or
'Hat' in popular parlance) known as 'Mangla Hat'. Interestingly the local
market used to assemble on every Tuesday and it is therefrom only the local
B
market got its nomenclature.
On the further factual score, it appears that in and around 20th/21st
November, 1987, the entire Mangla Hat was completely gutted by a devastating
fire and shortly thereafter on 24th November, 1987, an order of Requisition
under sub-Section ( 1) of Section 3 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and c
Acquisition) Act, 1948 was issued by the Collector, District Hawrah, West
Bengal and 25th November, i.e. on the very next day itself, a Writ Petition was
moved challenging the order of Requisition being Writ Petition No. 12527 (W).
of 1987. The writ petition was, however, dismissed by a learned Single Judge
of the High Court and the Mimanis thereafter preferred an appeal being No.
D
1850of1988 against the said judgment and order of the learned Single Judge
of the High Court. Incidentally, both the writ petition and the appeal were filed
by the Mimanis and noc by the owners though the latter were added as party-
respondents upon attribution of their status as landlord. The records depict
that the Appeal was pending in the High Court for quite some time and during
the pendency of which, the lease expired by efflux of time. The appeal was E
heard from time to time and hearing was concluded on 29th Mar9h, I 9<;6 but
before the judgment could be pronounced, one of the judges hearing out the
appeal was transferred from Calcutta High Court and as such the Bench could
not pronounce the judgment and it is only thereafter however, on 28th August,
1996 that the respondent Nos. 7-10 in the appeal viz., the owners, after the
>
expiry of about 9 years, filed an application for being transposed as appellant
F
to conduct the pending appeal and by an order dated 19th March, 1997, the
Division Bench allowed the application for transposition, though, however,
without prejudice to the rights of the appellants to contest and conduct the
appeal as appellants. Subsequently, the appeal was re-heard by a re-constituted
Division Bench of the High Court and the judgment was reserved by the G
Bench. During the pendency of the pronouncement of the .judgment, the·
Mimanis, however, moved this court under Article 136 against the order of
·-< transposition wherein this Court on 8th May, 1997 passed an order to the
following effect:

"The order against which the S.L.P. filed as an order on transposition H

0
1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A as appellants. The order itself indicates that the petitioners are at
liberty to raise all the objections. We see that even including the
transposition and their right to contest in the capacity as appellants
also is left open.

The petitioners are at liberty to have the matter adjudicated.
B The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed."

The necessity of transposition, the owners contended, cannot but be said to
be justified by reason of the factum of the expiry of lease by eff_lux of time.
The respondents contended that the interest in the indenture of lease, so far
C as the appellants were concerned, stand ceased and the latter had lost the
locus-stand to pursue the appeal and in the event the appeal was allowed to
be dismissed for non-prosecution by reason therefor - it would have definitely
prejudiced the rights of the owners. Mr. Gupta, however contended that this
effort to be on record as appellants has been utterly motivated, so as to decry
the possessory rights of the Mimanis. Leaving aside the present controversy
D as rt:gards transposition, be it noted that while one redeeming feature has
been to file an application for being transposed as appellant to conduct the
appeal after expiry of about 9 years as noticed above, another redeeming
feature on the factual score is the lapse of the Act of 1948 by efflux of time.

The West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 under
E which the Requisition order was passed in exercise of the powers conferred
under the provisions of Section 3, the Act, was however, kept in the force
only up to March, 194 7 by virtue of the provisions of Sub-Section 4 of
Section 1 of the said Act. There is, therefore, a natural death of the statute
in question and the issue as to its effect has been detailed in the Bench
decision of the High Court, as pronounced on 21st May, 1997. The High Court
F relying upon the decision of this Court in S. Krishnan & Ors. v. The State
of Madras and Anr., AIR (1951) SC 301 observed that the requisition of the
premises in question was made "at a point of time when the life of the Act
was there, but after the life of the. Act has expired and when the Act was
allowed to die its natural death......... the property could not be allowed to be
G under Requisition ........... " In the present context, we are not, however, called
upon to"decide the issue and as such we need not delve in the matter further,
regard being had to the scope of the appeal as noticed herein before, though
however, the judgment of the Appellate Bench dated 21st May, 1997, (hereinafter ~·

referred to as the first judgment), mainly proceeded on the basis thereof.

H Incidentally, the two concepts of acquisition and requisition cannot but

0
K.L. MIMANI v. S.K. SEN (BANERJEE, J.] 1065
. be ascribed to be totally distinct and independent: whereas the acquisition A
involves an element of permanency and finality involving a transfer of titl.e:
--.
the concept of requisition is merely to take over the domain or control over
the property without acquiring the rights of ownership and must, by its very
nature, be of temporary duration.

The High Court concluded its first judgment by recording that the order
B
of Requisition could not continue any longer by reason of the lapse of the
Act as from 1st April 1997 and as such directed the State Government and
the Municipal Corporation to restore the possession of the property to "the
owner and/or the occupier, as the case may be, within 7 days from the date
of the Judgment". There was, however, "liberty to mention" the matter, C
obviously with an intent that in the event of there being any difficulty
experienced in the matter, the parties would be at liberty to bring the same
to the notice of the Court.

Shortly after the pronouncement of the judgment, however, the Collector, D
District-Howrah on 28th May, 1997 informed the Advocate for the Mirnanis
to remain present at the site to receive back the possession of the land at
premises No. 1 Strand Road being the premises in question. A copy of the
intimation was also forwarded to Advocates of the owners. The possession,
however, was to be delivered on 4th June, 1997 in terms of the letter noticed
above. The service of the letter, however, evoked a stiff opposition from the E
Advocates of the owners and the latter by a letter dated 29th May, 1997
informed the Collector about the non-compliance of the directions of the
Court since the Mimanis were otherwise not entitled to receive the possession
as they were neither the owners not the occupiers of the property. The last
paragraph of the letter seems to be of some relevance and the entire
controversy, presently, rests thereon. It is in that perspective that we deem F
it fit to reproduce the same herein below. The last paragraph reads as below:-

"Accordingly, your letter should have been addressed to the owners
of the property as aforesaid in terms of the order of the Hon 'hie
Division Bench, High Court, Calcutta. Therefore, your above letter G
dated 28.5.97 addressed to Bijoy Kumar Jain, Advocate for Ram Kishen
Mimani and Bulaki Das Mirnani should be treated as cancelled and
you are requested to issue a fresh letter addressing to our clients
Pranab Chandra Daw, Sm. Binapani Daw. Sm. Pranata Banik and Sm.
Pratima Halder of l 2B, Shih Krishna Daw Lane, Calcutta - 700007, in
terms of the order of the Hon'ble High Court dated 21.5.97, otherwise H
1066· SUPREME COURT REPORTS (200 I] 3 S.C.R.

A it will be treated as a non-compliance of the Hon'ble Court's direction

For Mis A.N. Dawn
Sd. S.G. Mookerjee"
·B Subsequently on the factual backdrop it appears that on 2nd June, 1997
a further letter was sent by the Advocates recording therein as below :

"Having regard to the said facts and keeping in view of the specific
order of the Hon'ble Appeal Court as regard to the restoration of
c possession in favour of the owner and/or occupier and not in favour
of the lessee whose lease has already expired as has been categorically
held in the order of the Hon'ble High Court, it is a duty cast upon
you by the Hon 'ble Appeal Court to deliver the said property to the
owners."

D It is on the above factual background and culminating in the letter dated
2nd June, 1997 that the Collector, Howrah sent the following note to the
Mimanis:

"Since Shri B.K. Jain by his letter dated 30.5.97 claimed restoration of
the subject land in favour of his clients, the Mimanis on the ground
E of being occupiers and Mis. A.N. Daw, Solicitor by his letters dated
29.5.97 and 2.6.97 claimed restoration of the land in favour of his
client, Binapani Dawn and others being recorded owners; and since
I am not in a position to implement the order of the Hon'ble High ·
Court dated 21.5.97 in view of the claims and counter-claims; and
since the order of the Hon'ble Court dated 21.5.97 directing restoration
F of possession of the land to owners and/or occupiers requires to be
clarified; the programme of delivery of possession which was
communicated to him by the memo under reference is kept in abeyance
till the required clarification is received from the Hon'ble Court or any
other clear direction is given by the Hon'ble Court."
G The records depict that on 23th May, 1997 the matter was, however,
mentioned before the Appellate Bench by the learned Advocate for the State
asking for an extension of time for making over the possession in terms of
the order and the High Court thereupon extended the time for handing over
the possession of the premises in question till one week after the vacation
H and the matter, however, was directed to appear one day after the reopening.
K.L. MIMANI v. S.K. SEN [BANERJEE, J.] 1067
Subsequently, however, a formal application was filed by the owners for a A
direction to restore possession of the premises in question to the owners.

It is on these state of facts the second judgment was pronounced by
the Appellate Bench which directs making over of possession to the owners
without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties and without
prejudice to the rights of the lessee to file a suit for appropriate proceedings B
for recovery or otherwise and/or to enforce an agreement for purchase of the
properties in accordance with law. The High Court allowed 48 hours time from
the date of the communication of the order and by reason wherefor on 17th
June itself a notice was sent to the owners requesting them to be present on
19th June, 1997 at 10.30 a.m. to receive the possession of the land at No. 1 C
Strand Road, Mimanis, however, being aggrieved by this order moved this
Court and maintenance of status quo was directed without creation of any
third party interest.

The long factual narration probably could have been avoided but we
deem it fit and proper to record the same for appreciation of the contentions D
as advanced before this Court. Mr. Gupta, appearing in support of the appeal
contended on the first count that general principles for making over possession
of requisitioned property have been overlooked and secondly, the
conclusiveness of the first judgment stands obliterated without recording of
any reason whatsoever and the High Court has thus fell into a clear error - E
these are the two basic submissions made in support of the appeal. Let us,
however, analyse the same in some greater detail. Mr. Gupta laid emphasis on
the "General principles" which obviously mean and imply that if possession
has been taken from a particular person the same ought to be allowed to be

.. received back by that particular person and none other. Apparently an
acceptable situation - but it does demand a scrutiny of facts - the facts, F
however, detail out the following :

(i) Existence of a lease for a specified period;
(ii) Requisition under a temporary statute of 1948;
(iii) On challenge to said order of requisition, learned Single Judge G
r
affirms the order impugned;
(iv) Appeal before the Appellate Bench of the High Court;
(v) Lease expires;
(vi) Appellate Bench of the High Court set aside the judgment of the H
1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I] 3 S.C.R.

A Single Judge with a direction to restore possession to the owner
and/or occupier as the case may be;
(vii) The governmental effort to give back the possession to Mimanis
by a letter dated 28th May; · ·
(viii) Two letters dated 29th May, 1977 and 2nd June, 1997 sent to the
B co11troller from the owners;
(ix) Collector's letter dated 3rd June asking the parties to obtain

(x)
clarification from the High Court;
In the meantime on 23rd May, State applies for extension oftime
-· ..
c and the Court grants till one week after the vacation though
directs the matter to appear one day after the reopening;
(xi) Subsequently, application moved and upon completion of
affidavits the second judgment was passed.

These few paragraphs reveal the entire factual backdrop of the appeal
D under consideration. The issue therefore is whether the general principles of
recovery of possession of a requisitioned property upon de-requisitioning
being effected would apply or not. We are unable to record our concurrence
with the same. The special factual feature of lease coming to· an end has a
definite impact and the matter is dealt with in detail on the basis therefor,
E hereinafter and suffice it however to record herein that the question of
applicability of the general principles in the contextual facts would not arise.
The lessee has ceased to be a lessee by reason of the expiry of the lease
by lapse of time: What then w<;mld be his status? Does the lessee continue
to be in awful possession of the leasehold property, assuming there was no
F requisition of the premises; or alternatively is he a trespasser? And if so, can
he be removed from the premises excepting by due process of law? The other
question which also arises, namely, can the lessee of an expired lease without
a renewal clause be termed to be a tenant holding over, resulting thereby of
reversal of status of former lessee to a tenant holding over-Undoubtedly,
interesting questions.
G Significantly be it noted at this juncture and before adverting to the
twin issues noticed above, that upon an order of Requisition being passed,
the physical possession of the property stands temporarily transferred to the
State in terms of the Requisition Order, though, however, ownership of the
property remains with the owners even during the time the requisition
H continues. In the event, however, of there being acquisition after the order
K.L. MIMANI v. S.K. SEN [BANERJEE, J.] 1069
of requisition, the ownership also stands vested on to the acquisitioning A
authority.

The lease deed in the facts of the matter under consideration was
executed in March, 1939 for a period of 50 years certain, commencing from
1.1.1939 without any clause for renewal and thus the lease expired on 31.12.1988 B
by efflux of time. The possession of the land admittedly in terms of the order
of requisition was taken on 25th November, 1987-obviously, within the
validity of the period indenture of lease,_ but by the time, the Appellate Bench
ordered restoration of possession of the property, the lease deed has come
to an end-what would be its effect, we have to turn round to twin issue
noticed above, before so doing however, be it noticed that different provisions C
of the defunct statute (as the statute may be presently ascribed by reason
of its expiry by efflux of time) has been relied upon to depict the intent of
the legislature and Mr. Venugopal appearing for the respondents relying upon
Section 6 of the lapsed temporary Statute of 1948, contended that it is
incumbent upon the State Government to make an inquiry and ascertain the
factum ofentitlement to possession and the possession ought to be delivered D
in accordance therewith to the person concerned. Mr. Venugopal, in
continuation contended that as a matter of fact on the expiry of the lease,
question of assertion of any right under the lease does not and cannot arise
and it is on this score the Respondents contended that the statute itself
advisedly used the words "who appeared to be entitled to possession" E
(Emphasis supplied). As such the State Government ought not to have even
attempted to make over the possession to Mimanis: Mr. Gupta on the other
hand relied upon Section 7(3) of the Act wherein a provision existed as
regards payment of compensation to every person interested in the land for
the requisition and damage done during the period ofrequisition-Mr. Gupta
'•
• contended that the factum of being disinterested in the land so far as the F
lessees are concerned after expiry of the lease does not and cannot arise. The
Statute, in the present context, invalidates itself by reason of the expirty of
period and as such none of the provisions can be invoked. Expiry by efflux
of time will have its effect as if it stands repealed and the law is well settled
in regard thereto since, the true effect of the word "repeal" connotes 'as if G
not there' in the Statute Book. The assessment of intention of legislature of
a repealed statute does not and cannot arise, more so having regard to the
fact situation of the matter under consideration.

Another aspect of some importance ought also to be delved into at this
stage, to wit, the effect of the liberty granted to mention the matter after the H
~- .
1

1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

'A judgment was delivered. It is on this score that Mr. Gupta, very strongly
~
contended that question reopening the issue by reason of the liberty would
not arise. As a matter of fact, it has been contended that by the aforesaid first
judgment, the High Court came to a definite finding that the property should
immediately be restored back to the possession of the owner of the property
arid/or the occupier, which cannot but mean the Mimanis, as the case may
B be-this direction as contained in the judgment by itself connotes final
disposal and denotes specifically the determination of the issue raised in the
matter. The High Court, Mr. Gupta contended, recorded that though many
·other points were argued and several case laws were Cited, but there was felt ~.,,,...

no necessity. for deciding those points as the appeal succeeded on the point
c of Order of requisition not been continued on the basis of a lapsed statute.
No doubt - a very convincing reason that when the entire appeal stands
disposed of there exists no scope of reopening the issue on the basis of the
liberty granted to mention the matter-doubt, there is none: 'Liberty to
mention' can not be used as a means to achieve an advantage which. is not
otherwise available in law-a question which. stands finally decided can not
D be reopened neither the Court has any further jurisdiction upon the signature
been appended on the judgment by oral mention. The issue stands concluded
as soon as the judgment is pronounced and the same is signed. Be it noted,
however, that the words "liberty to mention" has been as a matter of fact a t
phraseology, which did come through judicial process without any definite
E legal sanction for the purpose of clarification, if needed, but not otherwise.
It is a legal process which has been evolved for convenience 'and for shortening
the litigation so that the parties are not dragged into further and further
course of litigation, and it is in this context that the submissions of Mr. Gupta,
that the Court has no jurisdiction to reopen the issue on the ground of
availability of the legal phraseology of liberty to mention can not be brushed
F aside. As noticed herein before, the insertion of the above noted legal f
phraseology is t~ obliterate any confusion or any difficulty being experienced
in the matter-it does not give the right anew to the party to agitate the matter
further nor does it confer jurisdiction on the Court itself to further probe the
correctness of the decision arrived at. Review of a judgment can not be had
G on the basis of this liberty. The circumstances, under which review can be
had - are provided under Order 47 of the Code of Civil procedure. In any
event, law is well settled on this score that the power to review is not any
inherent power and it must be conferred by law either specifically or by ~.........

necessary implication. In this context, reference may be made to the decision
in Patel Narshi Thakershi & Ors. v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, AIR
H (1970) SC.1273.
K.L. MIMANI v. S.K. SEN [BANERJEE, J.] 1071
In continuation of his submissions, Mr. Gupta further contended that A
after the pronouncement of the first judgment, the Court has no jurisdiction
to nullify its own order passed either and placed strong reliance on the
decision in State of UP. v. Brahm Datt Shanna & Anr., [1987] 2 SCC 179. The
question which fell for consideration in Sharma 's case (supra) was whcrther
notice dated January 29, 1986 was invalid and was liable to be quashed. The B
Learned Single Judge of he Allahabad High Court quashed the notice on the
ground that the allegations specified in the show cause notice, whether the
same had been the subject matter of departmental enquiry resulting in the
respondent's dismissal from service and since dismissal order stood quashed
in the Writ ?etition, it was not open to the Government to take proceeding
for imposing any embargo on the Writ Petitioner's pensionary right on the C
basis of self same charges. This Court, however, did not lend its concurrence

- with the vi<;ws taken by the High Court, since while quashing the order of
dismissal, the High Court did not quash the proceeding, but the same was
quashed by reason of the fact that the Writ Petitioner was not afforded any
opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment and as the High
Court did not enter into validity of the charges or findings recorded against D
the Writ Petitioner during the enquiry held against him, question of any legal
bar against State in following the course of action as has been followed would
not arise. It is on these facts, this Court further in paragraph 10 of the report.
observed :-
E
"10. The High Court's order is not sustainable for yet another reason.
Respondents' writ petition challenging the order of dismissal had
been finally disposed of on August 10, 1984, thereafter nothing remained
pending before the High Court. No miscellaneous application could be
filed in the writ Petition to revive proceedings in respect of subsequent
events after two years. If the respondent was aggrieved by the notice F
dated January 29, 1986 he could have filed a separate petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the notice
as it provided as separate cause of action of him. The respondent was
not entitled to assail validity of the notice before the High Court l:>y
means of a miscellaneous application in the writ petition which ll.ad G
already been decided. The High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain
the application as no proceedings were pending before it. The High
Court committed error in entertaining the respondent's application
which was founded on a separate cause of action. When proceedings
stand terminated by final disposal of writ petition it is not open to the
court to reopen the proceedings by means of a miscellaneous H
I . ')--
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I] 3 S.C.R.

A application in respect of a matter which provided. a fresh cause of
action. If this principle is not followed there would be confusion and
chaos and the finality of proceedings would cease to have any
meaning."

Significantly, the High Court in impugned Judgment observed as below:-
B
"In the instant case, the appeal at the instance 'of the Mimanis was
not maintainable and that this court had no power to grant any
relief on the appeal filed by the Mimanis .as 011 the date when the
judgment was delivered, the Mimanis had no such subsisting legal
c right. If the court could not maintain the appeal as the instance of
the Mimanis. (emphasis supplied) the question is whether the court
can pass an order granting relief in favour of that party indirectly, or
in other words, even though the Mimanis are not entitled to any relief,
has the court power to direct restoration of possession in favour of
Mimanis. If the appeal was maintainable at the instance of the Mimanis,
D there was no difficulty in passing an order directing restoration of the
. property to the Mimanis who were the lessees and who were in
possession on the date of requisition. But because of the changed
circumstances and loss of the life of the Act and interest of the
Mimanis the Mimanis could not be given any relief by this court in
E this appeal; ifthe court could not grant any relief, to the Mimanis, can
the Court direct that the property should be handed over to the ...
Mimanis. The decisions cited by Mr. Mukherjee in this regard. have
no manner of application as it is not a case that the lessor or the
owner had forcibly taken over possession. The possession is still in
the hands of the State, and after the lapse of the Act, the court has I-
F to direct the restoration of the possession to the persons concerned."

While strong c;iticism has been levelled by Mr. Gupta, against the
observations as emphasised above, and we also do feel justifiably so, but
significantly the matter was argued at great length on the merits as well. The
G Learned Advocates appearing for the respondents, however, contended that
in any event the possession was to be delivered to the Mirnanis, the Mimanis
will have to have some right to obtain the possession and it is in this context,
the respondents contended that but by reason by expiry of the lease period
and without there being any renewal clause, question of making over
possession to the Mimanis, would not arise. Tne right of the Mimanis would
H be dealt with, however, while dealing with twin issues as noticed herein before
K.L. MIMANI v. S.K. SEN [BANERJEE, J.] 1073
but presently we do feel it ·convenient to record that strictly speaking in the A
contextual facts, the second judgment of the High Court is not warranted by
reason of the specific direction as contained in the first judgment. Liberty to
apply cannot be taken recourse to, as noticed hereinbefore more fully, to have
the matter re-heard and the issue judged further. The judgment has been
pronounced and in terms of the judgment, it was on the Government to decide
the issue. In the normal course of events, we should have thought that when J3
the matter has been brought to the notice of the Court, the Court should have
taken the same stand as was already in the judgment to win decision of the
State Government as to the ~ntitlement of the possession of the property;
unfortunately that has not been done - a step rather difficult to appreciate.
We would have event at this stage, also directed the State Government to C
carry out the direction as contained in the first judgment but since the matter
has been argued at length on merits before this Court and by reason of the
efflux of time, we deem it fit to examine the issue· ourselves under Article 136
of the Constitution and it is in this perspective that the twin issues referred
to above ought to be considered.
D
Let us now come to the twin issues as noticed above for assessing the
acceptability or otherwise of the judgment on merits-What were the rights
of the Mimanis?: As trespassers-who are however trespassers? Admittedly,
the possession is with the State Government and there is no dispute in regard
thereto. It is true that a trespasser even can not be evicted without due
process of law. But can the Mimanis be ascribed to be trespassers on the E
facts of the matter under consideration?

The word 'trespass' in common English acceptation means and implies
unlawful or unwarrantable intrusion upon land. It is a transgression of law or
right, and a trespasser is a p,erson, entering the premises of another with
knowledge that his entrance is .in excess of the permission that has been F
given to him. The Law Lexicon (The Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary with Legal
Maxims and Words & Phrases, 2nd Edition, 1997 by P. Ra~anatha Aiyar) has,
however, the following to note:

"Trespass in its largest and most extensive sense, signifies any G
transgression or offence against the law of nature, of society, or the
country in which we live; whether it relates to a man's person or his
''>-/ property. Therefore, beating another is a trespass; for which an action
of trespass in 'assault and battery will lie. Taking or detaining a man's
goods are respectively trespasses, for which an action of trespass on
the case in drover and conversion, is given by the Law; so, also, non- H
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A performance of promises or undertakings is a trespass, upon which an ....
action of trespass on the case in assumesit is grounded, and, in _,.....__

general, any misfeasance, or act of one man, whereby another is
injuriously affected or damnified, is a transgression, or trespass, in its
largest sense; for which an action will lie. (3 Comm. c.12, Tomlins Law
Die.)"
B
Black's Law Dictionary (Seventh Edition by Gamer) records a meaning
to the word 'trespass' as an unlawful act committed against a person and
property of another: The Dictionary also quotes a passage from Salmond on ....,...
Tort and which we may' also profitably record here for assessment of situation
c and for proper appreciation of the import of the word 'trespass'. The passage
reads as below :

"The term trespass has been used by lawyers and laymen in three
senses of varying
. degrees
, of generality. ( 1) In its widest and original
signification it includes any wrongful act-any infringement or
D transgression of the rule of right. This use is common in·the Authorised
Version of the Bible, and was presumably familiar when that version
was first published. But it never obtained recognition in the technical
~-
language of the law, and is now archaic e".en in popular speech. (2)
In a· second and narrower signification-its true legal sense-the term
means any legal wrong for which the appropriate remedy was a writ
E of trespass - viz. any_ direct and forcible injury to person, land, or
chattels. (3) The third and narrowest meaning of the term is that in
which, in accordance with popular speech, it is limited to one particular
kind of trespass in the second sense-viz., the tort of trespass to land
(trespass quare clausum fregit)". R.F.V. Heuston, Salmond on the Law
F of Torts 4 (17th ed. 1977)." f''
Significantly, Salmond also in his Law of Torts, stated that the word
'trespasser' has an ugly sound, as it covers wickedness in the innocence and
the duty of the occupier also varies according to the nature of the trespass.

The issue, however,. involved in the present context ·tentres round
G
Section 108A of the Transfer of Property Act which provides the rights and
"\iabilities of the lessee on the determination of the lease. The statute has been
rather specific to the fact that there is existence of a bounded obligation to y·
put the lessor into possession of the property, and it is on this score that Mr.
Nariman, the Learned Senior Advocate appearing for one of the respondents
H very strongly contended that the Statute has created an enforceable obligation
K.L. MIMANI v. S.K. SEN [BANERJEE, J.] 1075
and question of acting contra to the provisions of law does not and can not A
-· arise. It is on this score, the issue of complete justice between the parties has
been brought to our notice. It is tr~te knowledge that presently, the Law
Courts are being guided by a justice oriented approach, since the concept of
justice is the call of the day and a need of the hour. Justice is the goal of
jurisprudence-procesual/procedural as much as substantive. Puritan approach
has lost its significance in the present day context; since justice ought to be B
the end product of equity and go to roots. It is this complete justice between
the parties which stands statutorily recognised in Section 108A as noticed
........
above (please see the observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation, Ahmedabad & Ors. v. Raman/al Govindram etc., AIR (1975) SC
1187. ~

Incidentally, the justice oriented approach is not of recent origin; Four
decades ago Wanchoo, J. in Balvantrai Chimanla/ Trivedi, Manager, Raipur
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Ahmedabad v. M.N. Nagrashna & Ors., AIR (1960)
SC 407 in paragraph 5 of the report observed:-
D
"The question then arises whether we should interfere in our
jur~sdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution, when we are satisfied
that there was no failure of justice. In similar circumstances this court
refused to interfere and did not go into the question of jurisdiction
on the ground that this Court could refuse interference unless it was
satisfied that the justice of the case required it: see A.M. Allison v. E
B.L. Sen, [1957] SCR 359: (S) AIR (1957) SC 227. On a parity of
reasoning we are of opinion that as we are not satisfied that the
justice of the case requires interference in the circumstances, we
should refuse to interfere with the order of the High Court dismissing
the writ petition of the appellant... ........ " F
In a fairly recent decision, this Court in Taherakhatoon (d) by LRs. v.
Salambin Mohammad, [1999] 2 SCC 635 in paragraph 17 of the report has the
following to state :-

"17. The above principles were followed and reiterated by a three- G
Judge Bench in Hem Raj v. State of Ajmer holding that even after the
appeal is admitted and special circumstances exist, and that, if the$
is no interference, substantial and grave injustice•will result-;i°nd that
the case has features of sufficient gravity to warrant ~ review of the
decision appealed against on merits. Only then would this Court
exercise its overriding powers under Article 136". H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] 3 S.C.R.

A Mr. Nariman in elucidation of Section 108 Q of the Act contended that
the lease has expired and there is no question -of any doubt about the same,
by reason wherefor, the Mimanis have lost the right title and interest over and
in respect of the lease hold property being the subject matter of dispute and
having regard to the provisions of Section 108Q of the Act. The requirement
B of the concept of justice being of prime consideration, a short and simple
question as to the existence of a right in favour of Mimanis after the expiry
of the lease would-answer the issue. Mr. Gupta's emphasis that Mimanis have
a legal protected possessory right, however, in out view can not be sustained,
though as a proposition of law it is well settled that a person who is in
possession or a tenant, whose lease had expired but not having been evicted
C in accordance with the law has legal protected and possessory right.

Further a person, whose lease has expired is still entitled to maintain
possessory right so long as and until he be evicted by due process of law,
various decisions have been cited before this Court, but we do not consider
them relevant in the matter. under consideration. The factual aspect of the
D matter has to be gone into to make the provisions of law or judicial precedence
applicable-the proposition which is noticed above pertains to the possessory
right and eviction in accordance with law. The lessee has lost his possessory
right and the same stands shifted on to the State : Once, however, the
possessory right is transferred or shifted from the lessee and the lease deed
E stands terminated during this temporary interregnum when lessee was deprived
.of its possession, question of putting back, the lessee on to the possession,
after the expiry of the lease in accordance with the provisions of law, does
not and can not arise. The Court has to do equity and in doing so, it has to
consider the fact-situation of the matter in issue and it is only thereafter pass
certain orders thereof. There is not even iota of right existing in favour of the
F Mimanis to call for its possessory right. The right of the lessee stand obliterated
by reason of efflux of time coupled with the issuance of the requisition order
which temporarily suspended the lessee's right to occupy though does not
put an end to the lessor's right to own the premises unless of course,
acquisition follows the requisition order and the provisions of law on the
G basis of which the order for requisition was passed also expired by lapse of
time.

Significantly, the lessee addressed a letter to the Chief Minister of the
State of Bengal, wherein it was stated "the above place was taken on a lease
from Dawn family by Kanhaiyalal and Surajmal Mimanis, the patterns of the
H firm for a period of 50 years commencing from 1939, on the terms and conditions
K.L. MIMANI v. S.K. SEN [BANERJEE, J.] 1077
contained in the said lease ........the said lease is due to expire on 31st December, A
1988 ........ There is no renewal clause in the said lease, and the same has not
been renewed ....... " Does this letter imply a right or a mere plea before the
Chief Minister to help the Mimanis in the matter? There must,be some
semblance of right at least and that right must continue till the Judgment is
pronounced, because on the day of the pronouncement of the Judgment, the
Court can pass appropriate order only in the event of entitlement of such B
judgment, but not otherwise. The Mimanis were in fact not entitled to obtain
the possession on the date of the judgment by reason of the expiry of the
deed of lease and how can that right be enforced by. the Court in the event
of non entitlement thereof-there is no satisfactory reply thereto.
c
The principle of justice is an inbuilt requirement of justice delivery
system and indulgence and laxity on the part of the law Courts would be an
unauthorised exercise of jurisdiction and thereby put a premium to illegal acts.
While it is true that the intent of legislature in the matter of a defunct statute
would not be a material consideration in the fact-situation of the matter in
issue and as noticed earlier, but even assuming such an intent is relevant D
Section 6 of the Act 1~48 categorically refers to an inquiry as to the entitlement
to obtain the possession. The language itself of the statute is to be noticed;
to wit; " ........ .is to be released from requisition, State Government may, after
making such inquiry, if any, as it considers necessary, specify by order in
writing the person, who appears to it to be entitled to the possession of such E
land". The paramount requirement of Statute, therefore, was an inquiry by the
State Government as to the person/persons who appears to be entitled to
obtain the possession. Therefore, taking recourse even to the language of the
defunct statute, the legislature contemplated an inquiry-why is it so,
obviously; the situation may change and the entitlement may also change;
~ .if the intent was to apply the general principle that a person ought to be F
restored in possession from whom the possession was taken, there was
no difficulty on the part of the law makers to say so explicitly. State
Government is put to inquiry-this inquiry thus: to meet the unchanged facts
and situations.
G
Thus in any event, the right to be restored with status quo ante in
favour of Mimanis stands contra to the basic principles of law.

"I Coming back to the second of the twin issues as noticed above, namely,
can the Mimanis be termed to be a tenant holding over incidentally, the act
of holding over in any event after the expiration of the term does not necessarily H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A create tenancy of any kind: if the lessee remains in possession after the
determination of the term and for all practical purposes, he becomes a te~ant
at sufferance. This Court in R. V. Bhupa/ Prasad v. State of A.P. and Others,
[I 995] 5 SCC 698 had the occasion to deal with this concept of tenancy at
sufferance. In paragraph 8 of the report, this Court observed :-
'
B ·•'g'. Tenant at sufferance is one who comes into possession of land.
-. by lawful title, but who holds it by wrong after the termination of the
term ~r expirty of the lease by efflux of time. The tenant at sufferance
is, therefore, one who wrongfully continues in possession after the
extinction of a lawful title. There is little difference between him and
c a trespasser. In Mulla's Transfer of Property Act (7th Edn.) at page
633, the position o~ tenancy at sufferance has been stated thus; A
tenancy at sufferance
., is merely a fiction to avoid .continuance
- . in
possession operating as a trespass. It has been described as the least
and lowest interest which can subsist in reality. It, therefore, cannot
be created by contract and arises only by
• I" I .
implication of law when a
D. person who has been in possession under a lawful title continues in
'possession after that title has be~n determined, without the consent
of the person entitled. A tenancy at sufferance does not create th~
relationship of landlord and t\'!nant. At page 769,, it is stated regarding )-

'the right of a tenant h_olding ov~r thus. The act of holding over after
the expiration of the term does not necessarily create a tenancyI of anyI
E .
kind. If the lessee remaining in possession after the determination of
the term, the common law rule is that he is a tenant on sufferance. ' The I

expression "holding ove( is used in he sense of retaining possession.
A distinction•
should b~ d~awn
... .
between a tenant I
continuing
•
in .
possession after the determination of the lease, without the consent
F of the landlord -and a tenant doing so with the landlord's ~on sent. The
former is called a tenant by sufferance in the language of the English
law and the latter class of tenants is called _a tenant holding over or
a tenant at will. The lessee holding over with the consent of the lessor
is in a better position than a inere tenant at will. The tenancy on
sufferance is converted into a tenancy at will by the assent of the
G
landlord, but the relationship of t_he landlord and tenant is not
established until the rent _was paid and accepted .. The assent of the
landlord to the continuance of the tenancy after the determination of
the tenancy would create a ~ew tenancy. The possession of a tenant
who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may
H not have a right to continue to possession after the termination of the
K.L. MIMANI v. S.K. SEN [BANERJEE, J.) 1079
tenancy, his possession is juridical." A
There is thus, however, a subtle difference resultantly a definite
distinction between a tenant holding over and a tenant-at-sufferance, as
noticed above in Bhupal Prasad's decision (supra): Holding over stands
equivalent to the retention of possession after determination of lease, but
with the consent of the landlord - whereas, on similar circumstances if the B
possession is without the consent of the landlord then the same stands out
to be a tenant-at-sufferance. Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act does
let a statutory recognition to the concept of holding over: is the situation
-,... presently a skin to a tenancy by way of holding over the property or the
Mimanis be even termed as a tenant-at-sufferance - the answer obviously, in C
the facts of the matter under consideration, can not but be in the negative-
Are the Mimanis in possession? The answer again can not, but be in the
negative. There exists a differentiation between the lessee of a determined
lea~e in possession and a lessee dispossessed. Mirnanis stands, admittedly
disp"ossessed from the lease premises. Can any right be said to accrue in
favour of the Mimanis-the answer cannot but be an emphatic 'no' - law D
courts will have to act within the limits of law and the courts try to take note
of the moral fabric of the law.

One other short issue also came up for consideration, namely, institution
of a suit for specific performance by one of the Mirnanis (Mohan Lal Mimani)
on the basis of an allegation that there was an oral agreement between the E
Mimanis and the owners for sale of the property. As the records depict that
the application for injunction in the suit for specific performance though taken
out but was dismissed upon hearing and the order of dismissal stands accepted
by reason of there being no further proceedings by way of appeal thereafter.
The suit for specific performance, however, (Title suit number 1991/97) was
.
-i. dismissed for default and though an application for restoration has been filed,
the records depict no order has been passed thereon and the same is still
F

pending.

This factual element has been brought on record in the preceeding
paragraph, to note the factum of initiation of the suit by only one of the G
Mimanis and the others have even not chosen to file separate written
statements: The conduct thus exemplify the seriousness of the concerned
parties. In any event, we do not wish to go into the same, neither any detailed
discussion is also called for having regard to the issue raised in the matter.
'+
The Appellate Bench of the High Court has passed the order upon preservation
of the rights and contentions of the parties and specifically without prejudice H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) 3 S.C.R.

A to the rights of the lessee to file suit or appropriating proceedings for recovery
or otherwise or to enforce the agreement for purchase of the properties in
accordance with the law and we do also feel it convenient to record such a
reservation of right.

In the premises we are unable to Ieng any concurrence in support of
B the appeal. The appeal, therefore, fails and is thus dismissed without prejudice,
however, to the rights and contentions of the parties in the pending matter
or in the matter of initiation of any proceedings or in the matter of enforcement
of any agreement or otherwise in accordance with law. Each party, however,
to pay and bear its own cost.
c v.s.s. i
Appeal dismissed.