Supreme Court of India

KESHAV BHAURAO YEOLE (D) BY LRS.versusMURALIDHAR (D) & ORS.

Citation: 2023 INSC 939
Decided: 19 October 2023
Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Bench: S RAVINDRA BHAT

Holding

The landlord’s holding of 13 acres of jirayat land does not exceed one economic holding, his income is principally agricultural, and therefore the landlord’s right to resume land is governed by Section 33B(5)(b), entitling the heirs to 8.34 acres of Survey No. 291.

Summary

The appellants, legal heirs of a landlord, sought possession of leased agricultural lands for personal cultivation after the landlord’s death. The landlord had issued a termination notice only for Survey No. 291, but the tenants occupied both Survey No. 291 and Survey No. 290/1‑2. Lower authorities differed on whether the landlord’s holding exceeded one economic unit and on the applicable statutory provisions, leading to a remand by the High Court to re‑examine the bona‑fide requirement. The Supreme Court held that the landlord’s holding was 13 acres of jirayat land, which is below the one‑unit economic holding threshold, and that his principal income was from agriculture, so Section 33B(5)(b) – not Sections 31A‑31D – governed the dispute. Applying the formula in Section 33B(5)(b), the Court calculated that the heirs were entitled to 8.34 acres of Survey No. 291. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court order, granted the appeal, and directed the authorities to restore possession to the appellants.

Issues considered

Whether the landlord’s holding exceeds one economic holding under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948.
Whether the landlord’s principal source of income is agriculture or agricultural labour.
Whether the High Court was justified in remanding the case to re‑examine the bona‑fide requirement for personal cultivation in view of the landlord’s death.
Which statutory provision – Section 33B(5)(b) or Sections 31A‑31D – governs the landlord’s right to terminate tenancy and resume possession.

Legislation cited

Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948s. 2(2D), s. 2(6A), s. 29, s. 31, s. 31A, s. 31B, s. 31C, s. 31D, s. 33B, s. 43A, s. 4B, s. 5, s. 6, s. 7
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966s. 2(12)

Subjects

landlord‑tenant lawpersonal cultivationeconomic holdingsection 33Bsection 31notice of terminationbona fide requirementstatutory interpretationremandpossession

Judgment

[2023] 14 S.C.R. 935 : 2023 INSC 939

CASE DETAILS
KESHAV BHAURAO YEOLE (D) BY LRS.
v.
MURALIDHAR (D) & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 11104 of 2014)
OCTOBER 19, 2023
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT AND ARAVIND KUMAR, JJ.]
HEADNOTES

Issue for consideration: Whether the High Court was justiﬁed
in ordering remand of the matter for examination of afresh bonaﬁde
requirement of the heirs of the landlord for personal cultivation, in light of
the changed circumstances-death of landlord; and whether the holding of
the landlord exceeds one economic holding and whether the landlord earns
his livelihood principally by agriculture or by agricultural labour.
Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 – s. 43A –
Application under – Dispute between the legal heirs of the original
landlord and the tenants of leased lands – Survey No. 291 leased
for sugarcane cultivation, while the other Survey leased for general
cultivation, for 13 years – Expiration of lease period – Issuance of notice
as regards Survey No. 291 by the landlord to terminate the tenancy for
personal cultivation, however possession not vacated – Proceedings for
resumption of lands by the landlord – Original authority directed the
restoration of 22 acres of the suit land to the landlord, based on the
premise that both parties had an equal area for personal cultivation
– Said ﬁnding upheld by the appellate authority but modiﬁed the
restored land to 17 acres 17 guntas – Thereafter, in Revision, the case
was remanded – High Court also ordered remand of the matter for
examination afresh of the bonaﬁde requirement of the heirs of the
landlord for personal cultivation – Correctness:
Held: Holding of the landlord is 13 acres of jirayat land – Only such
land which a person holds (is in possession) as an owner or tenant, must be
taken into account – Land leased to the tenants cannot be said to be held
935
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

by the landlord either as an owner, or as a tenant – s. 6 provides that one
unit of economic holding in the context of jirayat land is equivalent to a
holding of 16 acres – Thus, the holding of the landlord cannot be said to be
in excess of one unit of economic holding – Original authority held that the
landlord’s principal source of income is from agriculture, which was upheld
by the appellate authority and the revisional authority – As per s. 33(B)(5)
(b), the landlord’s entitlement to terminate tenancy and recover possession
of land leased is only to the extent ‘of so much thereof as would result in
both the landlord and the tenant holding thereafter in the total an equal
area for personal cultivation’ – Original authority and appellate authority
disagreed on the extent of land to be resumed to the landlord – In deciding the
extent of land to be restored, the Original authority was correct in applying
the provision contained in s. 33B(5)(b) but erred in its interpretation and
application – Appellate authority could not have applied s. 31B since the
application of s. 31B stands excluded by s. 43A and the amended notiﬁcation
– Further, from the evidence on record, the landlord has 13 acres of jirayat
land, which he holds as owner – Litigation having been pending for nearly
50 years – Relegating the parties to the authorities would add acrimony
between the parties, as such the formula prescribed u/s.33B(5)(b) is applied
to allocate the respective shares of the parties – Also, the High Court erred
in remanding the case by considering, events which occurred subsequent
to the date of ﬁling of the petition – It was unnecessary for the revisional
authority to remand the case – Impugned order passed by the High Court
set aside – Legal heirs of original landlord entitled to 8.34 Acres in Survey
No.291. [Para 24-31]
Interpretation of statutes – Interpretation of phrase ‘economic
holding’ in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948
– Importing of the deﬁnition of ‘to hold land’ from the Maharashtra
Land Revenue Code, 1966:
Held: Preamble in the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966
suggests that the object of the enactment was ‘to unify and amend the law
relating to land and land revenue in the State of Maharashtra – The Act
was brought in with the object of amending ‘the law relating to tenancies
of agricultural lands and to make certain other provisions in regard to those
lands’ – Under several provisions of the Act, reference is required to be made
KESHAV BHAURAO YEOLE (D) BY LRS. v. MURALIDHAR 937
(D) & ORS.

to the Code – Provisions contained in the Act and the Code operate in an
overlapping sphere and fertilize each other – Words used in the Code and
the expressions appearing under the Act, when read harmoniously, it would
indicate that the expressions in both the enactments are complementary and
supplementary to each other – Thus, the Act and Code are in pari materia
to each other, and the deﬁnition of ‘to hold land’ is drifted from the Code
for the purpose of interpreting the phrase, ‘economic holding’ in the Act –
Thus, when s. 2(6A) of the Act and s. 2(12) of the Code are read together,
the economic holding of a person would be computed by taking account
of the lands possessed (whether actual or not) by such person, whether as
owner or tenant. [Para 22]
LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES
Devidas Narayan More v. Chunnilal Bhailal Wani AIR 1973 Bom
195 – approved.
Maruti Namdeo Gade v. Dattatraya Maval (1976) 78 Bom LR 602;
Hariba Keshav Barbole v. Motibhai Deepchand AIR 1975 Bom 137;
Bhavani Housing Cooperative Society v. Bangalore Development Authority,
ILR 2006 KAR 1352; Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava (2001) 2 SCC
604 : [2001] 1 SCR 923; Shakuntala Bai v. Narayan Das (2004) 5 SCC 772
: [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 114 – referred to.
OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED
ORDER AND APPEARANCES
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11104 of
2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 29.07.2005 of the High Court of
Bombay at Aurangabad in WP Nos. 471 of 1996 and 2193 of 1981.
Appearances:
Vijay Hansaria, Sr. Adv., M. Y. Deshmukh, Ms. Kanya Jhawar, Ms.
Manjeet Kirpal, Mrs. Adviteeya Sharma, Nandkumar N. Deshmukh,
Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advs. for the Appellants.
Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, Adv. for the Respondents.
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT
JUDGMENT
ARAVIND KUMAR, J.
1. The appellants are the legal heirs of original landlord, Keshav
Bhaurao Yeole (hereinafter referred to as “landlord” for ease of reference).
Survey No. 291 (admeasuring 26 acres 13 guntas) and Survey No. 290/1 &
290/2 (admeasuring 8 acres 21 guntas) had been given on lease to Respondent
Nos. 2 & 5 (now deceased) namely Murlidhar Damodar Modhave &
Bhausaheb Damodar Modhave and Respondent No.1 namely Kundalik
Damodar Modhave (now deceased) respectively, (hereinafter referred to
as “tenants”) through two separate lease deeds dated 30.08.1962, for a
period of 13 years. The lease in respect of Survey No. 291 was speciﬁcally
executed for cultivation of sugarcane crop, whereas the lease for Survey
No.290/1 & 290/2 were for cultivation, generally.
2. On the expiration of the tenure of the lease, a notice (dated
05.09.1975) for termination of tenancy (hereinafter referred to as ‘notice’)
had been issued to the tenants. The landlord sought to recover possession
for the purpose of personal cultivation. It was stated in the notice that the
tenanted land was the principal source of income for the family and that
their livelihood was dependent on the cultivation of such lands. It is critical
to note at the very outset that the notice pertained to land bearing Survey
No.291 only and no separate notice of termination of tenancy was issued
in respect of land bearing Survey No. 290/1 & 290/2.
3. Since the tenant did not voluntarily relinquish his possession in
response to the notice, the landlord initiated proceedings 1 for resumption of
tenanted lands before the Court of Tenancy Awal Karkun, Rahuri (hereinafter
referred to as ‘original authority’) under Section 29 read with Section 43A(1)
(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 2. (for short
‘the Act’). Through these proceedings, the landlord had sought to recover

1 Tenancy Case No. 2/1977
2 The Act has since been renamed as the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands
Act, 1948 by Maharashtra Act 24 of 2012
KESHAV BHAURAO YEOLE (D) BY LRS. v. MURALIDHAR 939
(D) & ORS. [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

possession of lands leased under both lease deeds, that is, Survey No. 291
and Survey No. 290/1 & 290/2.
4. In order to decide the lis, the original authority had framed four issues
for consideration. The issues framed and summary of ﬁndings in respect of
each issue are tabulated hereinbelow for ease of reference:
Issues Findings
1. Whether the applicant is the Yes, suit lands were owned by applicant.
landlord of the suit land?
2. Whether the opponents are the Only Opponents no. 1,2,5 are tenants of
tenants of the suit land? the land in dispute; no evidence led to
prove that there was a partition in the joint
family of the tenants
3. W h e t h e r t h e n o t i c e s f o r Yes,notice for termination of tenancy
termination of tenancy are served had been served on Opponents no.
upon the opponents and are valid 1,2,3 on 24.10.75, 24.9.75 and 30.9.75
one? respectively and notice is a valid notice
4. Whether the landlord requires the Yes, landlord has proved that he requires
suit lands? land for bonaﬁde personal cultivation

5. Ultimately, the original authority allowed the application of the
landlord3 and directed that 22 acres of the suit lands4 (33 acres 21 guntas)
was to be restored to him. The direction for restoration of 22 acres of the
suit land was on the premise that the applicant (landlord) was ‘entitled for
possession of so much of land as would result in both the landlord and tenants
holding thereafter in the total and equal area for personal cultivation’. The
reasoning of the original authority in this regard is extracted below:
“The lands held by the opponents individually are measuring (23
ac. 29 gts. 9H. 83 R.) The land held by applicant is 13A 11 Gts.
The applicant is entitled for possession of so much of the land as
would result in both the landlord and tenants holding thereafter in
the total and equal area for personal cultivation. The area of the land
in dispute is 33 A 21 gts. I, therefore, order that 22 A 00 gts. Twenty
two acres of the land out of the land in dispute should be restored to

3 Order dated 17.04.1978 in Tenancy Case No.2/77
4 Sum total of land bearing Survey No. 291 and Survey No. 290/1&290/2
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

the landlord i.e., applicant. I further order that the possession of the
land may be given to the applicant, not earlier than sixty days after
the close of the year.”
6. Both the landlord and the tenant preferred appeals against the order
of the original authority. The appeals were ﬁled in the Court of Assistant
Collector, Rahuri Division, Ahmednagar (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the
appellate authority’). The landlord preferred an appeal5 on the ground that
the possession had not been granted in respect of the entire suit land. The
tenant, on the other hand, had sought for interference6 on the ground that
notice for termination of tenancy was invalid and that the landlord did not
require the lands for bonaﬁde personal cultivation as he was already in
possession of a substantial extent of revenue-bearing lands.
7. The appellate authority, vide a common judgment dated 21.11.78,
upheld the ﬁndings of the original authority but modiﬁed the extent of land,
which was to be restored to the landlord. It held that the landlord was entitled
to possession of 17 acres 17 guntas of the suit land. The appellate authority
notes that the original authority’s direction for restoration of 22 acres of suit
land proceeded on a misinterpretation of Section 31B of the Act.
8. Against the decision of the appellate authority, the landlord and
the tenant ﬁled revision applications before Member of the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal, Pune (for short, the ‘revisional authority’).It was
contended on behalf of the tenant7 that the notice was issued only in respect
of Survey No. 291 and that there was no separate notice in respect of Survey
No.290/1&290/2. It was further argued that the original authority ought to
have framed an issue as to whether the subject in dispute was to be governed
by notiﬁcation dated 14.2.1958 or the notiﬁcation as amended on 08.10.1969
(for short ‘amended notiﬁcation’) – the extent of land which could be ordered
to be resumed was dependent on the relevant notiﬁcation which applied, and
therefore, in the absence of any ﬁnding on this question, both the authorities
fell into grave error in their determination of the ﬁnal outcome. Accordingly,
it was prayed that the case be remanded back to the original authority for

5 TNC A. No. 32/78
6 TNC A. 24/78
7 Revision No.7/79
KESHAV BHAURAO YEOLE (D) BY LRS. v. MURALIDHAR 941
(D) & ORS. [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

framing of an appropriate issue on the relevant notiﬁcation applicable.
On behalf of the landlord8, it was urged that there was no justiﬁcation for
remand since the question sought to be decided was a question of law and
the revisional authority could, by itself, decide this issue.
9. Upon examination of the contentions urged by both the sides, the
revisional authority allowed the application ﬁled on behalf of the tenant,
dismissed the application of the landlord and accordingly, ordered that the
case be remanded to the original authority ‘for framing issues under the
provisions of Section 31A to 31D of the Tenancy Act, 1948 in respect of
Survey No. 291 only’. The original authority was directed to give its ﬁnding
on the said issue.
10. The order of the revisional authority was based on the following
reasons. The revisional authority found that the notice was issued only in
respect of Survey No. 291 and therefore, the application of the landlord for
restoration of possession of lands bearing Survey No. 290/1&290/2 could
not have been entertained by the original authority. In the absence of a valid
notice, the original authority lacked jurisdiction to entertain the landlord’s
application for resumption of land. It found that the landlord’s holding is
more than one unit of economic holding and therefore, he is not entitled to
application of beneﬁcial provisions as provided in the amended notiﬁcation
dated 08/10/969. It was also noticed that the outcome of the dispute was
directly linked to the question of the relevant notiﬁcation applicable, that
is, whether the original notiﬁcation or the amended notiﬁcation governed
the facts in issue, and therefore, a clear ﬁnding on that question was most
expedient.
11. The landlord challenged the order passed by the revisional authority
in writ proceedings before the High Court of Judicature of Bombay. During
the pendency of writ proceedings, both, the original landlord as well as
original Respondent Nos.2 & 5 namely, Murlidhar Damodar Modhave &
Bhausaheb Damodar Modhave,expired. Their legal heirs were brought on
record through applications for substitution. The High Court set aside all
orders passed by the authorities below and ordered for remand of the case
before the original authority. However, the reasons which persuaded the

8 Revision No.3/79
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

High Court to order remand were completely diﬀerent from that which
motivated the revisional authority to do. So it was directed that the original
authority shall consider the matter afresh and examine if the heirs of the
landlord had any bonaﬁde requirement for personal cultivation in light of the
changed circumstances (death of landlord). In ordering so, the High Court
relied on Maruti Namdeo Gade v. Dattatraya Maval9 and Hariba Keshav
Barbole v. Motibhai Deepchand.10 It was held therein that if landlord had
died pending eviction proceedings, the bonaﬁde requirement of lands for
personal cultivation had to be demonstrated and proved afresh by the heirs
of the landlord.
12. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court dated 29.07.2005,
the landlord ﬁled a special leave petition before this Court. Leave to appeal
was granted by Order dated 9.12.2014.
13. We have heard Mr. Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant-landlord and Mr. Ravinder Keshavrao Adsure, learned counsel
for the respondents.
14. The submissions of Mr. Vijay Hansaria, learned Senior Counsel
for the appellant-landlord can be summarized in the following points:
 The High Court fell into error in relying on the decisions in
the case of Maruti Namdeo Gade (supra) and Hariba Keshav
Barbole (supra). The date for determining the bonaﬁdes of the
requirement of lands for personal cultivation ought to have been
determined as on date of ﬁling the application and subsequent
events thereon, like death of the landlord, ought not to have any
bearing on the decision of the dispute.
 Both the original authority and the appellate authority had
recorded a ﬁnding that the landlord’s holding does not exceed
one economic holding. In that context, the revisional authority
went beyond its jurisdictional boundaries in disturbing the said
ﬁnding and holding that the landlord’s holding exceeds one unit
of economic holding.

9 (1976) 78 Bom LR 602.
10 AIR 1975 Bom 137
KESHAV BHAURAO YEOLE (D) BY LRS. v. MURALIDHAR 943
(D) & ORS. [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

 Even though the land leased in respect of Survey No. 290/1 &
290/2 are not for sugarcane cultivation, while determining the
extent of land to be resumed to the landlord as per Section 33B(5)
(b), the original authority is required to consider the total holding
of both the landlord and the tenant.
15. The learned counsel for the respondent-tenant has supported the
impugned order and has canvassed the following contentions:
 The notice for termination of tenancy dated 05.09.1975 having
been issued only in respect of land bearing Survey No. 291, the
scope of adjudication of this dispute must be limited to such land,
as has been rightly noticed by the revisional authority.
 The High Court and the revisional authority were justiﬁed in
remanding the case to the original authority since the facts
necessary to decide whether the landlord’s holding was in excess
of one unit of economic holding, was not forthcoming from the
evidence on record.
 The landlord held several other lands other than lands leased to the
tenant, and was earning income through non-agricultural sources,
which fact can be inquired into only on remand of the case. The
holding of the landlord was clearly in excess of one economic
unit, and therefore, Section 31A-31D has to be applied. Since the
original authority has not framed any issue in this regard, it was
essential that the case be remanded back for fresh determination.
16. Undisputedly, the notice for termination of tenancy has been issued
only in respect of Survey No. 291 and it did not relate to Survey No.290/1
& 290/2. In fact, we have perused the original records and the original
notice dated 05.09.1975 and are satisﬁed that termination notice has been
issued only in respect of Survey No.291 and there is not even a whisper
with regard to Survey No.290/1 & 290/2 in the notice dated 05.09.1975.
This fact had been rightly noticed in the order of the revisional authority.
Therefore, we shall proceed to consider the dispute only in so far as Survey
No. 291 is concerned.
17. Having considered the rival submissions canvassed by both sides
and the material on record, the following issue falls for consideration:
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

“Whether the holding of the landlord exceeds one economic holding
and whether the landlord earns his livelihood principally by agriculture
or by agricultural labour?”
18.To adjudicate the above issues, it becomes necessary to examine
the relevant provisions and notiﬁcations issued under the provisions of
the Act. The relevant provisions of the Act include Section 2(2D), Section
2(6A), Section 4B, Section 5, Section 6, Section 7, Section 29, Section 31,
Section 31A, Section 31B, Section 33B, Section 43A. It would be of beneﬁt
to consider the notiﬁcation issued by the State Government in exercise of
powers under Section 43A (3) on 14.02.1958 and the amendment brought
out to this notiﬁcation on 08.10.1969 which has been relied upon by the
appellant and which has a direct bearing on the issue. Hence, the relevant
provisions as well as the notiﬁcation are extracted hereinbelow:
AMENDED NOTIFICATION DATED 08/10/1969
“Lease of land granted for cultivation of sugarcane or the growing
of fruits or ﬂowers or for the breeding of livestock referred to in Sec.
43-A (1)(b) to which the provisions of Sec. 43A (1) apply.
Sec. 43A (3) of the B.T. & A.L. Act, 1948.- No. T N C.5157/173483- M.
in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (30 of sec. 43-A, of
the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bom. LXVII
of 1948), the Government of Bombay hereby directs that the leases
referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of the said sec. 43A and
to which the provisions of sub-section (1) of the said sec. 43A and to
which the provisions of sub-section (1) of said sec. 43-A apply shall
be subject to the following conditions namely:-
Conditions as to the duration and termination of lease:-
“1. No such lease of land shall be liable to be terminated on the ground
that the period ﬁxed by agreement or usage for its duration has expired.
2. If a lessor bona ﬁde requires an land so leased by him for cultivating
it personally or for any non-agricultural use, such lease may, subject
to the conditions mentioned in Secs. 31-A, 31-B, 31-C and 31-D be
terminated by the lessor by giving the lessee [a month’s] notice in
writing stating therein the reasons for the termination of the lease:
KESHAV BHAURAO YEOLE (D) BY LRS. v. MURALIDHAR 945
(D) & ORS. [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

[Provided that, if the holding of lessor does not exceed one
economic holding and such lessor earns his livelihood principally
by agriculture or by agricultural labour, the conditions mentioned
in sec. 31-A and 31-B shall not apply but the lessor’s right to resume
land shall be subject to the conditions mentioned in clauses (b) and
(c) of sub-section (5) of sec. 33-B, with this modiﬁcation that clause
(c) of the said sub-section (5) shall be read as if for the words “the
commencement date” appearing therein the words, letters, ﬁgures
and brackets “the date Government Notiﬁcation, Revenue and
Forests Department, No. TNC. 6769/9667-M, Spl. Dated the 8 th
October, 1969” were substituted.]
1. Submitted for the words “one year” by G.N. No. TNC 6796/9667
(Spl.) of 8.10.69.
2. Added by G.N. of 1.10.1969.”
Relevant provisions of Tenancy Act, 1948
“Section 2(2D) - “ceiling area” means in relation to land held by a
person whether as an owner or tenant or partly as owner and partly
as tenant the area of land ﬁxed as ceiling area under section 5 or 7;
Section 2(6A) - “economic holding” means in relation to land held by a
person, whether as an owner or tenant, or partly as owner and partly as
tenant, the area of land ﬁxed as an economic holding in section 6 or 7;
Section 5 - Ceiling area
(1) For the purposes of this Act, the ceiling area of lands shall be,––
(a) 48 acres of jirayat land, or
(b) 24 acres of seasonally irrigated land or paddy or rice land, or
(c) 12 acres of perennially irrigated land.
(1) Where the land held by a person consists of two or more kinds of
land speciﬁed in sub-section (1), the ceiling area of such holding shall
be determined on the basis of one acre of perennially irrigated land
being equal to two acres of seasonally irrigated land or paddy or rice
land, or four acres of jirayat land.
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

Explanation.–– In calculating the ceiling area, warkas land shall be
excluded.
Section 6 - Economic holding
(1) For the purposes of this Act, an economic holding shall be,––
(a) 16 acres of jirayat land, or
(b) 8 acres of seasonally irrigated land, or paddy or rice land, or
(c) 4 acres of perennially irrigated land.
(1) Where the land held by a person consists of two or more kinds
of land speciﬁed in sub-section (1), an economic holding shall be
determined on the basis applicable to the ceiling area under sub-section
(2) of section 5.
Explanation.–– In calculating an economic holding, warkas land shall
be excluded.
Section 31 - Landlord’s right to terminate tenancy for personal
cultivation and non- agricultural purpose
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 14 and 30 but
subject to sections 31A to 31D (both inclusive), a landlord (not being
a landlord within the meaning of Chapter III-AA) may, after giving
notice and making an application for possession as provided in sub-
section (2), terminate the tenancy of any land (except a permanent
tenancy), if the landlord bona-ﬁde requires the land for any of the
following purposes :––
(a) for cultivating personally, or
(b) for any non-agricultural purpose.
(1) The notice required to be given under sub-section (1) shall be in
writing, shall state the purpose for which the landlord requires the
land and shall be served on the tenant on or before the 31st day of
December 1956. A copy of such notice shall, at the same time, be
sent to the Mamlatdar. An application for possession under section
29 shall be made to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of
March 1957.
KESHAV BHAURAO YEOLE (D) BY LRS. v. MURALIDHAR 947
(D) & ORS. [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

(2) Where a landlord is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to
mental or physical disability then such notice may be given and an
application for possession under section 29 may be made,––
(i) by the minor within one year from the date on which he attains
majority;
(ii) by the succesor-in-title of a widow within one year from the date
on which her interest in the land ceases to exist;
(iii) within one year from the date on which mental or physical
disability ceases to exist; and
Provided that where a person of such category is a member of a joint
family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply if at least one
member of the joint family is outside the categories mentioned in the
sub-section unless before the 31st day of March 1958 the share of such
person in the joint family has been separated by metes and bounds and
the Mamlatdar on inquiry, is satisﬁed that the share of such person in the
land is separated having regard to the area, assessment, classiﬁcation
and value of the land, in the same proportion as the share of that person
in the entire joint family property, and not in a large proportion.
Section 31A - Conditions of termination of tenancy
The right of a landlord to terminate a tenancy for cultivating the
land personally under section 31 shall be subject to the following
conditions :––
(a) If the landlord at the date on which the notice is given and on
the date on which it expires has no other land of his own or has not
been cultivating personally any other land, he shall be entitled to take
possession of the land leased to the extent of a ceiling area.
(b) If the land cultivated by him personally is less than a ceiling area,
the landlord shall be entitled to take possession of so much area of the
land leased as will be suﬃcient to make up the area in his possession
to the extent of a ceiling area.
(c) The income by the cultivation of the land of which he is entitled to
take possession is the principal source of income for his maintenance.
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

(d) The land leased stands in the record of rights or in any public record
or similar revenue record on the 1st day of January 1952 and thereafter
during the period between the said date and the appointed day in the
name of the landlord himself, or of any of his ancestors 2[but not of
any person from whom title is derived, whether by assignment or Court
sale or otherwise], or if the landlord is a member of a joint family, in
the name of a member of such family.
(e) If more tenancies than one are held under the same landlord, then the
landlord shall be competent to terminate only the tenancy or tenancies
which are the shortest in point of duration.
Section 31B - No termination of tenancy in contravention of Bom.
LXII of 1947 or if tenant is member of co-orperative farming
society
In no case a tenancy shall be terminated under section 31––
(1) in such manner as will result in leaving with a tenant, after
termination, less than half the area of the land leased to him, or
(2) in such a manner as will result in a contravention of the provisions
of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of
Holdings Act, 1947, or in making any part of the land leased a fragment
within the meaning of that Act, or co-operative farming society.
(3) if the tenant has become a member of a co-operative farming society
and so long as he continues to be such member.
Section 31C - Landlord not entitled to terminate tenancy for
personal cultivation of land left with tenant
The tenancy of any land left with the tenant after the termination of
the tenancy under section 31 shall not at any time afterwards be liable
to termination again on the ground that the landlord bona ﬁde requires
that land for personal cultivation.
Section 31D - Apportionment of rent after termination of tenancy
for land left with tenant
If, in consequence of the termination of the tenancy under section
31, any part of the land leased is left with the tenant, the rent shall be
KESHAV BHAURAO YEOLE (D) BY LRS. v. MURALIDHAR 949
(D) & ORS. [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

apportioned in the prescribed manner in proportion to the area of the
land left with the tenant.
Section 33B - Special rights of certiﬁcated landlord to terminate
tenancy for personal cultivation
(1) xxx
(2) xxx
(3) xxx
(4) xxx
(5) The right of a certiﬁcated landlord to terminate a tenancy under this
section shall be subject to the following conditions, that is to say,––
(a) If any land is left over from a tenancy in respect of which other land
has already been resumed by the landlord or his predecessor-in-title,
on the ground that other land was required for cultivating it personally
under section 31 (or under any earlier law relating to tenancies then
in force), the tenancy in respect of any land so left over shall not be
liable to be terminated under sub-section (1).
(b) The landlord shall be entitled to terminate a tenancy and take
possession of the land leased but to the extent only of so much thereof
as would result in both the landlord and the tenant holding thereafter
in the total an equal area for personal cultivation––the area resumed
or the area left with the tenant being a fragment, notwithstanding, and
notwithstanding anything contained in section 31 of the * Bombay
Preventation of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act,
1947.
(c) The land leased stands in the Record of Rights (or in any public
record or similar revenue record) on the 1st day of January 1952 and
thereafter until the commencement date in the name of the landlord
himself, of any of his ancestors (but not of any person from whom title
is derived by assignment or Court sale or otherwise), or if the landlord
is a member of a joint family, in the name of a member of such family.
(6) xxx
(7) xxx
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

Section 43A - Some of the provisions not to apply to leases of
land obtained by industrial or commercial undertakings, certain
co-operative societies or for cultivations of sugar- cane or fruits
or ﬂowers
(1) The provisions of sections 4B, 8, 9, 9A, 9B, 9C, 10, 10A, 14, 16,
17, 17A, 17B, 18, 27, 31 to 31D (both inclusive), 32 to 32R, (both
inclusive) [33A, 33B, 33C] 43, 63, 63A, 64 and 65, shall not apply to––
(a) land leased to or held by any industrial or commercial undertaking
(other than a Co-operative Society) which in the opinion of the
State Government bona ﬁde carried on any industrial or commercial
operations and which is approved by the State Government;
(b) leases of land granted to any bodies or persons other than those
mentioned in clause (a) for the cultivation of sugarcane or the growing
of fruits or ﬂowers or for the breeding of livestock;
(c) to lands held or leased by such co-operative societies as are
approved in the prescribed manner by the State Government which
have for their objects the improvement of the economic and social
conditions of peasants or ensuring the full and eﬃcient use of land
for agriculture and allied pursuits.
(2) xxx
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), it
shall be lawful for the State Government to direct, by notiﬁcation in the
Oﬃcial Gazette that the leases or lands, as the case may be, to which
the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) apply, shall be subject to
such conditions as may be speciﬁed in the notiﬁcation, in respect of––
(a) the duration of the lease;
(b) the improvements to be made on the land and the formation of co-
operative farming societies for that purpose and ﬁnancial assistance
to such societies;
(c) the payment of land revenue, irrigation cess, local-fund cess and any
other charges payable to the State Government or any local authority; or
KESHAV BHAURAO YEOLE (D) BY LRS. v. MURALIDHAR 951
(D) & ORS. [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

(d) any other matter referred to in sections mentioned in sub-section
(1).”
19. Clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 43A would indicate that
lease of land granted for the cultivation of sugarcane would result in the
exemption of the provisions indicated in sub-Section (1) of Section 43A.
In other words, the provisions indicated in sub-Section (1) of 43A is not
attracted in respect of the leases of land granted for the cultivation of
sugarcane or the leases of land as speciﬁed in Chapter IIIA. The legislature
in its wisdom, has thought it ﬁt to make an exception to the exemption clause
as incorporated in sub-Section (3) of Section 43A(3). It enables the State
Government to issue a notiﬁcation providing for conditions, subject to which,
the leases referred to in Chapter IIIA would be governed by. Therefore, it is
crucial for us to examine the notiﬁcation dated 14.02.1958 as amended on
08.10.1969, which came to be issued by the State Government under the
enabling source of power provided in Section 43A(3). In this regard, we
must examine the applicability of the proviso to condition No.2 stipulated
thereunder which came to be introduced through the amendment in the
year 1969.
20. According to the aforesaid proviso, if the holding of the landlord
does not exceed one economic holding and the landlord’s principal source of
income is dependent on agriculture or agricultural labor, then, it follows, as
per the amended notiﬁcation, that the conditions mentioned in Section 31A&
31Bshall not govern the present dispute and the lessor’s right to resume
land shall be subject to conditions set out in Section 33B(5)(b) and (c). If
the holding of the landlord exceeds one economic holding or his principal
source of income is not dependent on agriculture, then, Section 31A-31D
will govern the present dispute.
21. The fact ﬁnding authorities have concluded that the landlord holds
13 acres of jirayat land, apart from the land leased out to the tenant under
the two lease deeds. The deﬁnition of ‘economic holding’ in Section 2(6A)
requires us to account for the total land held by a person, whether as an owner
or tenant. There is no deﬁnition in the Act for the expression ‘land held’.
However, we ﬁnd the expression ‘to hold land’ deﬁned in the Maharashtra
Land Revenue Code, 1966 (for short ‘the Code’). It reads as under:
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

“to hold land” or “to be a land-holder or holder of land” means to be
lawfully in possession of land, whether such possession is actual or
not.”
22. In Bhavani Housing Cooperative Society v. Bangalore
Development Authority, ILR 2006 KAR 1352, the Karnataka High Court
while considering the question as to whether the deﬁnition of a particular
phrase can be imported into a particular enactment from a diﬀerent
enactment, has held that if the Acts are pari materia to each other, then the
deﬁnition of one Act can be imported to the other Act. The preamble in the
Code suggests that the object of the enactment was ‘to unify and amend
the law relating to land and land revenue in the State of Maharashtra.’
The Act, on the other hand, was brought in with the object of amending
‘the law relating to tenancies of agricultural lands and to make certain
other provisions in regard to those lands’. Under several provisions of
the Act, reference is required to be made to the Code. In that sense, the
provisions contained in the Act and the Code operate in an overlapping
sphere and fertilize each other. The words used in the Code and the
expressions appearing under the Act, when read harmoniously, it would
indicate that the expressions in both the enactments are complementary
and supplementory to each other. Therefore, it would not be incorrect to
say that the Act and Code are in pari materia to each other, and therefore,
we proceed to import the deﬁnition of ‘to hold land’ from the Code and
import it for the purpose of interpreting the phrase, ‘economic holding’
in the Act.
22A. When Section 2(6A) of the Act and Section 2 (12) of the Code
are read together, the economic holding of a person would be computed
by taking account of the lands possessed (whether actual or not) by such
person, whether as owner or tenant. In the facts of this case, the landlord
has claimed that, as an owner, he held 13 acres of jirayat land.
23. The tenant has not led any evidence to show that the landlord
holds any land as a tenant. Further, no evidence has been led to contradict
the fact that the landlord holds land as an owner, in excess of 13 acres
of jirayat land. Therefore, we ought to proceed on the premise that the
holding of the landlord is 13 acres of jirayat land. The revisional authority
KESHAV BHAURAO YEOLE (D) BY LRS. v. MURALIDHAR 953
(D) & ORS. [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

has misinterpreted the word ‘holding’. In determining the holding of the
landlord, it has taken into account the land leased to the tenant and has, on
that basis, concluded that the holding of the landlord is in excess of one unit
of economic holding. As we have explained above, only such land which
a person holds (is in possession) as an owner or tenant, must be taken into
account. The land leased to the tenants cannot be said to be held by the
landlord either as an owner, or as a tenant.
24. Section 6 of the Act provides that one unit of economic holding in
the context of jirayat land is equivalent to a holding of 16 acres. It is thus
clear that the holding of the landlord cannot be said to be in excess of one
unit of economic holding. The original authority has recorded a ﬁnding that
the landlord’s principal source of income is from agriculture. This ﬁnding has
not been disturbed or challenged by the appellate authority or the revisional
authority. Since the twin conditions provided in the proviso as found in the
amended notiﬁcation stand satisﬁed, the outcome of the dispute will have
to be decided in accordance with Section 33(B)(5)(b) and not according to
Section 31A and 31B.
25. According to Section 33(B)(5)(b), the landlord’s entitlement to
terminate tenancy and recover possession of land leased is only to the extent
‘of so much thereof as would result in both the landlord and the tenant
holding thereafter in the total an equal area for personal cultivation’. The
original authority and appellate authority have disagreed on the extent
of land to be resumed to the landlord. In deciding the extent of land to
be restored, the original authority has applied the provision contained
in Section 33(B)(5)(b), whereas the appellate authority has applied the
provision contained in Section 31B. According to us, the original authority
was correct in applying the provision contained in Section 33B(5)(b)
but has fallen into error in its interpretation and application of the said
provision. The appellate authority could not have applied Section 31B since
the application of 31B stands excluded by Section 43A and the amended
notiﬁcation, as we have discussed above. Now, the question still remains
as to how much land must be restored to the landlord. This question will
turn on the interpretation to be laid on the language contained in Section
33(B)(5)(b) and the construction of expression : ‘in the total anequal area
for personal cultivation’?
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

26. The tenant may hold land for personal cultivation from three
sources: (a)land which he himself owns; (b) land which is let out to him
by his landlord or (c) land which is let out to him by another landlord or
another certiﬁcated landlord. Similarly, the landlord can hold land from two
sources. He may hold land which he himself owns and land which is let out
to him by another landlord (land held as a tenant). While computing the
lands held by the landlord and tenant, are we to take into account the lands
held by them from all possible sources? The Full Bench of the Bombay
High Court had an occasion to interpret the provision contained in Section
33B(5)(b) of the Act in great detail, in the case of Devidas Narayan More
v. Chunnilal Bhailal Wani.11 It came to be held as under:
“32. Next it was urged that upon the interpretation which we are putting
and which was placed upon cl. (b) of sub-s. (5) by the Division Bench
in Rambhau’s case it would be impossible to apply the principle in
the case of joint tenants or joint landlords, as for instance where A the
landlord has leased out jointly to tenants B, C and D six acres of his
land; the landlord has no land under personal cultivation, but tenant B
has 4 acres of his own, tenant C has 4 acres of his own but tenant D has
no other land except the land leased. In such a case how was equality
going to be achieved between the landlord and the joint tenants? We
must confess that the law did not contemplate such a case at all but
its injunction nonetheless is quite clear that the tenancies must be
terminated, the landlord and “the tenant holding thereafter in the total
an equal area for personal cultivation”. The only way in which equality
can be achieved in such cases is to notionally divide the land leased
between the three joint tenants and assume that 2 acres have been leased
to each tenant by the landlord and then work out the equities between
the landlord and each tenant. Thus it will have to be held that notionally
tenants B, C and D each has 2 acres of the leased land. Thus tenant B
will have 2 acres of leased land plus 4 acres of his own; tenant C the
same and tenant D only two acres of the leased land. From B and C
the landlord cannot take back anything more than the land leased so
they must each give up two acres of the leased land. Tenant C has no

11 AIR 1973 Bom 195
KESHAV BHAURAO YEOLE (D) BY LRS. v. MURALIDHAR 955
(D) & ORS. [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

other land except the leased land. Therefore he must give half his share
of the land leased i.e. half of two acres viz. one acre only and retain
the remaining one acre. Thus tenants B and C who have each 4 acres
of their own will each have to give up 2 acres of the land leased and
tenant D half of his two acres i.e. one acre. Thus, the landlord will be
entitled to get back 5 acres out of the land leased while tenants B and
C will have left 4 acres each and tenant D only one acre. Any other
computation will bring about greater inequity. In the example given
the tenancies of B and C would in the sequel be wholly terminated.
If the total land leased as a whole and the total land in the possession
of the joint tenants is taken into account without the notional division
which we have suggested then the total land in the possession of the
joint tenants would be 6 acres of leased land plus 8 acres of their own
and if the landlord is held to be entitled to resume on the basis of the
total land thus held he would resume the whole six acres leased by
him but in that event the tenant D would be left entirely without any
land. This would work greater hardship on the poorer tenant.”
27. From the evidence on record, we know that the landlord has 13
acres of jirayat land, which he holds as owner. The tenants in Survey No.
291 were Mr. Murlidhar Damodhar Modhe and Mr. Bhausaheb Damodar
Modhe. The tenant in Survey No.290/1&290/2 was one, Mr. Kundalik
Damodar Modhe.
28. Having regard to the aforesaid analysis of law, we are of the
considered view that this litigation is pending for nearly 50 years and as
such relegating the parties to the authorities would only add salt to the
wound or acrimony between the parties would continue to haunt the future
generations and as such we have undertaken the exercise of applying the
formula prescribed under Section 33B(5)(b) as illustrated in Chunnilal
Bhailal Wani case (supra) of the Act to allocate the respective shares of
the parties on the basis of not only admission found from the depositions
recorded at the earliest point of time but also on the revenue records which
has been relied upon by the authorities for undertaking such exercise and as
such we have arrived at the following entitlement of property by tabulating
the same and the description of entitlement has also been narrated in the
foot-note to the table.
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

(In Acres)
A B C E
Name Land leased Land owned Land owned Land to be
under registered by Tenant by Landlord allowed to
lease deed Dated (As per (Keshav Landlord out
30/08/1962 revenue Bhaurao of the Leased
(total extent records Yeole) out portion
26 Acres 13 available
Guntas) at page
No.241(A)
Notional Share
and 261(A) )
as per Chunnilal
Bhailal Wani
case
Muralidhar 13.06 11.21 13.11 5.28
Damodar
Modhave
Bhausaheb 13.06 6.17 13.11 3.06
Damodar
Modhave
Total Leased out land which is to be restored to landlord 8.34

Method of calculation as per the Full Bench Judgment in Chunnilal
Bhailal Wani Case (supra):
A+B+C = X/2 = Y-C = E
 Murlidhar Damodar Modhave: 13.06+11.21+13.11 = 37.38\2 =
18.39 – 13.11 = 5.28
 Bhausaheb Damodar Modhave: 13.06+6.17+13.11 = 32.34\2 =
16.17 – 13.11 = 3.06
As we have already discussed above, the determination has to be
conﬁned only to Survey No.291, in as much as the notice has been held by
revisional authority and High Court to be conﬁned only to Survey No.291
and the lessees in reference to the said lease, being Shri. Bhausaheb Damodar
Modhave and Murlidhar Damodar Modhave, the extent of their individual
holdings alone would have to be taken into consideration though, some of
the records would reﬂect the said two persons holding certain lands jointly
KESHAV BHAURAO YEOLE (D) BY LRS. v. MURALIDHAR 957
(D) & ORS. [ARAVIND KUMAR, J.]

with others. Hence, for the purposes of computation we have conﬁned only
to the two revenue records available in the original ﬁle, namely, the account
extract of Form No.8A relating to the year August 1977 since the deposition
of the landlord came to be recorded on 09.06.1977, 20.06.1978 and that of
the respondent on 22.08.1977. When such an exercise is undertaken, the
irresistible conclusion which is to be drawn would be that the appellant
would be entitled to 8.00 Acres 34 Guntas as computed above which is in
tune with principles enunciated in the full Bench Judgement of Bombay
High Court in Devidas Narayan More (supra).
29. We do not think that the High Court was correct in remanding the
case, in its entirety to the original authority on the ground that the landlord
having died pending eviction proceedings, his heirs had to demonstrate
afresh, the bonaﬁde requirement of leased lands for personal cultivation.
In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava12, this Court, while considering
an eviction petition ﬁled by the landlord against his tenant, laid down the
principle that the crucial date for deciding the bona ﬁdes of the requirement
of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. Events occurring
subsequent to this date have no bearing on the issue as to whether the
eviction was a bona ﬁde requirement. It was reasoned therein that if every
subsequent development was to be accounted for in the post-petition period,
there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in the
litigative slow-process system subsists. Therefore, the High Court fell into
grave error in ordering remand of the case by considering, events which
occurred subsequent to the date of ﬁling of the petition.
30. We may also record here that it was unnecessary for the revisional
authority to remand the case for framing an issue on the applicability of
Section 31A-31D. The applicability of those provisions was dependent
on the question of whether the landlord’s holding exceeded one unit of
economic holding. That question was merely one of law, the fact of the
landlord’s holding having already come on record before the original
authority. The revisional authority could have taken upon itself the task
of deciding the question and disposing oﬀ the dispute before itself. Be
that as it may.

12 2001 2 SCC 604; See also Shakuntala Bai v. Narayan Das, 2004 5 SCC 772, Para 10
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

31. In light of the discussion and analysis made above, we allow this
appeal by setting aside the impugned order dated 29.07.2005 passed in
Writ Petition No.2193 of 1981 (Bombay) by the High court of Judicature
of Bombay and the application ﬁled by the original landlord under Section
43A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1956 is allowed in
part and hold that appellants (legal heirs of original landlord) are entitled to
8.34 Acres in Survey No.291 and the jurisdictional tehsildar shall take steps
to handover physical possession of the said land to the appellants as indicated
herein expeditiously and at any rate within an outer limit of three months
from the date of receipt of this Order. All pending IAs stand disposed of. The
appellants would be entitled to proceed against the respondents in respect
of Survey No.290/1 and 290/2 in accordance with law and contentions of
both parties are kept open. Parties are directed to bear their respective costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Appeal allowed.
Nidhi Jain

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