Holding

In death of a minor child, income and parental loss cannot be mathematically computed; the Tribunal's award stands and is not interfered with.

Summary

A claim petition under Sections 166, 140 and 141 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was filed by the husband of Kaushalya Devi after their 14‑year‑old son died in a road accident. The driver, Karan Arora, was a minor without a licence; the Tribunal held the driver not liable but held the vehicle owner liable, awarding Rs 1,00,000 with 12% interest and rejecting the insurer's defence. The husband’s appeal was dismissed; after his death, his wife appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court examined whether compensation for a child’s death could be calculated on projected earnings and parental loss, citing precedents that such calculations are speculative and that the age of the parents is the relevant factor. Applying the principles from Satender and Lata Wadhwa, the Court found no basis to alter the Tribunal’s award and dismissed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether compensation for the death of a minor child can be assessed on the basis of projected future earnings and parental loss.
Whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal’s award of Rs 1,00,000 is just and reasonable under the Motor Vehicles Act.
Whether the insurer is liable when the driver is a minor without a licence.
Whether an appeal can be entertained after the death of the original claimant.

Legislation cited

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 140, s. 141, s. 166, s. 168

Subjects

Motor accident compensationMinor driver liabilityInsurance liabilityAssessment of damagesFuture earningsJust compensationMotor Vehicles ActParental claim

Judgment

._
A KAUSHALYA DEVI
V.
""
SHRI KARAN ARORA AND ORS.

MAY 14, 2007

B [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.]

Motor Vehicles Act, l 988:
~
•
s.166 r!w ss. 140 and 141-Motor accident-Death of a child of 14
c years-Driver of vehicle also a minor-Tribunal holding that insurer had no
liability-Owner held liable to pay compensation assessed at rupees one
lakh with l 2 % interest from the date of claim till realization-Held, in case
of young children neither income of deceased child nor loss suffered by
parents is capable of mathematical computation, and relevant factor would
be age ofparents-On facts, claimant husband of appellant since has already
D
died, quantum awarded by Tribunal not interfered with.

A claim petition in terms of Section 166, 140 and 141 of the Motor ~

Vehicle Act, 1988 was filed by husband of the appellant that their son aged
14 years died as a result of a motor accident. The driver, the owner and the
E insurer of the v;;hicle were impleaded as respondent nos. 1 to 3 whereas the
appellant was arrayed as respondent no. 4. During the hearing of the claim
petition it came to light that the driver was the minor having no licence. The
Tribunal held the owner of the vehicle liable and awarded rupees one lakh
compensation alongwith 12% interest from the date of claim till realization.
The appeal filed by the claimant was dismissed. The claimant since died; his
F wife, the mother of the deceased, filed the instant appeal.

l>ismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: In cases where parents are claimants, relevant factor would be
age of parents, in cases of young children of tender age, in view of
G uncertainties abound, neither the income of the deceased child is capable of
assessm~nt on estimated basis nor the financial loss suffered by the parents
is capable of mathematical computation. Applying the principles indicated in
Satender's case* to the facts of the instant case and the fact that the husband
of the appellant has already died, there is no scope for interference with the
../ '
H 570

I
KAUSHALYADEVlv.KARANARORA[PASAYAT,J.] 571

quantum awarded. (Para 9, 11 and 13) [575-A, B, C) A
*New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satender and Ors., AIR (2007) SC
324 and Lata Wadhwa and Ors. v. State ofBiharand Ors., [2001] 9 SCC 197,
relied on.

*State ofHaryana and Anr. v. Jasbir Kaur and Ors., [2003) 7 SCC 484, B
referred to.

*Mallett v. McMongale, (1970) AC 166; Davies v. Taylor, (1974) AC
207 and Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collerie Ltd., (1942) 1 All ER
657, referred to.
c
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2479 of2007.

From the Final Judgment and Order dated 08.01.1999 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in F.A. F.O. No. 2439of1998.

Himanshu Gupta and Shivaji M. Jadhav for the Appellant. D
Sachin Jain and Dr. Kailash Chand for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted. E
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench
of the Punjab. and Haryana High Court which dismissed the appeal filed by
the husband of the appellant. In the appeal, appellant was respondent no.4.

3. The background facts in a nutshell are as follows: F
A claim petition was filed by the husband of the appellant, namely,
Balwant Singh in terms of Sections 166, 140 and 141 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 (in short the 'Act'). In the claim petition, the present appellant was
impleaded as respondent no.4 while the driver of the vehicle no. HR 41/3347
and the owner of the vehicle were impleaded as respondents I and 2. The G
United India Insurance Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'insurer')
was impleaded as respondent no.3. In the claim petition f:led on 15 .3 .1997
which was registered on 17.3 .1997, it was alleged that the son of Balwant
Singh (claimant) and the present appellant, died as a result of the vehicular
accident in which the aforesaid car was involved. The deceased was aged H
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 6 S.C.R.

A about 14 years and was the only son of the appellant. The accident took place
on 5.2.1997 when Karan Arora (respondent no. I) came to the house of the
claimant and requested the deceased to accompany him in his car. The car
was being driven by the said Karan Arora. The vehicle met with an accident.
The deceased lost his life. A claim ofRs.10,00,000/- was made. On receipt of
B the notice from the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Chandigarh (in short the
'Tribunal') responses were filed by the respondents. Respondent no.2 i.e. the
owner of the vehicle stated that the driver was a minor and the claim petition
was not maintainable against him. Though some other points were urged they
were treated not to be of consequences by the Tribunal. The insurer took the
stand that since the death of the deceased was never intimated to the insurer
C and also about the alleged accident, the petition appears to have been a
collusive petition. The claim in the claim petition was that the deceased was
earning Rs. I0,000/- per month. The insurer took the stand that it was not liable
as it was the admitted stand that the driver did not have any driving licence.
The present appellant as respondent no.4 accepted the claim in the claim
D petition and prayed that the same be accepted and indicated that she was
entitled to share in the amount of compensation.

4. The Tribunal on consideration of the rival stand came to hold that ~
the accident took place in the manner described. Since the driver was a minor
he did not have any liability but the owner of the vehicle was liable to pay
E compensation as per the award. It was further held that the insurer has no
liability as the drivf'r was not authorized to drive any vehicle. A sum of rupees
one lakh was awarded along with 12% interest from the date of the claim till
realization. The manner in which the amount was to be deposited was also
indicated in the award. An appeal was preferred by the claimant Balwant
Singh which as noted above was dismissed by the High Court.
F
5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the awarded amount is meagre and considering the background from
which deceased came and his academic career the award should have been
more. Learned counsel for the owner of the vehicle on the other hand supported
G the order. Similar was the stand of the insurance company.
6. In Mallett v. McMonagle, (1970) AC 166, Lord Diplock analysed in
detail the uncertainties which arise at various stages in making a rational
estimate and practical ways of dealing with them. In Davies v. Taylor (1974)
AC 207, it was held that the Court, in looking at future uncertain events, does
H not decide whether on balance one thing is more likely to happen than
KAUSHALYADEVI v. KARAN ARORA[PASA YAT,J.) 573
~
>-· another, but merely puts a value on the chances. A possibility may be ignored A
if it is slight and remote. Any method of calculation is subordinate to the
necessity for compensating the real loss. But a practical approach to the
calculation of the damages has been stated by Lord Wright in Davies v.
Powell Dujfryn Associated Colleries Ltd, ( 1942) I All ER 657, in the following
words:
B
'The starting point is the amount of wages which the deceased
was earning, the ascertainment of which to some extent may depend
•
~ -1 on the regularity of his employment. Then there is an estimate of how
much was required to be spent for his own personal and living
expenses. The balance will give a datum or basic figure which will
generally be turned into a lump sum by taking a certain number of
c
years' purchase."

7. In State of Haryana and Anr. v. Jasbir Kaur and Ors., [2003] 7 SCC
484 it was held as under:

"7. It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted under the D
~ Act as provided in Section 168 is required to make an award determining
the amount of compensation which is to be in the real sense "damages"
which in tum appears to it to be "just and reasonable". It has to be
borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly
be weighed in golden scales. But at.the same time it has to be borne E
in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a windfall for the
victim. Statutory provisions clearly indicate that the compensation
must be "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit; but
the same should not be a pittance. The courts and tribunals have a
duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of

-.., compensation, which should be just. What would be 'just" F
compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule
applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb.
Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical
calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and
circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every G
method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be
considered in the background of 'just" compensation which is the
~
)..
pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression "which appears
to it to be just" a wide discretion is vested in the Tribunal, the
determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach
and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness. The H
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 6 S.C.R.
.... ...
A expression 'just" denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness,
and non-arbitrary. If it is not so it cannot be just. (See Helen C.
Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC. [1999] 1SCC90)

8. There are some aspects of human life which are capable of monetary
measurement, but the totality of human life is like the beauty of sunrise or
B the splendor of the stars, beyond the reach of monetary tape-measure. The
detennination of damages for Joss of human life is an extremely difficult task
and it becomes all the more baffling when the deceased is a child and/or a
non-earning person. The future of a child is uncertain. Where the deceased ,..
was a child, he was earning nothing but had a prospect to earn. The question
of assessment of compensation, therefore, becomes stiffer. The figure of
c compensation in such cases involves a good deal of guesswork. In cases,
where parents are claimants, relevant factor would be age of parents.

9. In case of the death of an infant, there may have been no actual
pecuniary benefit derived by its parents during the child's life-time. But this
D will not necessarily bar the parent's claim and prospective Joss will find a valid
claim provided that the parents establish that they had a reasonable expectation
-,.
of pecuniary benefit if the child had lived. This principle was laid down by
the House of Lords in the famous case of Taff Vale Rly. v. Jenkins, (1913) AC
1, and Lord Atkinson said thus:

E " ..... alJ that is necessary is that a reasonable expectation of
pecuniary benefit should be entertained by the person who sues. It
is quite true that the existence of this expectation is an inference of
fact - there must be a basis of fact from which the inference can
reasonably be drawn; but I wish to express my emphatic dissent from
the proposition that it is necessary that two of the facts without
F which the inference cannot be drawn are, first that the deceased
earned money in the past, and, second, that he or she contributed to "
the support of the plaintiff. These are, no doubt, pregnant pieces of
evidence, but they are only pieces of evidence; and the necessary
inference can I think, be drawn from circumstances other than and
G different from them." (See Lata Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar
and Ors., [2001] 8 SCC 197)

10. This Court in Lata Wadhwa's case (supra) while computing ~
~
compensation made distinction between deceased children falling within the
age group of 5 to 10 years and age group of 10 to 15 years.
H
KAUSHALYADEV!v. KARANARORA[PASAYAT,J.] 575
11. In cases of young children of tender age, in view of uncertainties A
abound, neither their income at the time of death nor the prospects of the
future increase in their income nor chances of advancement of their career are
capable of proper determination on estimated basis. The reason is that at such
an early age, the uncertainties in regard to their academic pursuits, achievements
in career and thereafter advancement in life are so many that nothing can be B
assumed with reasonable certainty. Therefore, neither the income of the
deceased child is capa!Jle of assessment on estimated basis nor the financial
loss suffered by the parents is capable of mathematical computation.

12. These aspects were highlighted in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.
Satender and Ors., AIR (2007) SC 324. C
13. Applying the principles indicated in last named case (supra) to the
facts of the present case, and the fact that the husband of the appellant has
already died, we find no scope for interference with the quantum awarded.

14. The appeal deserves dismissal which we direct. D
RP. Appeal dismissed