Supreme Court of India
KASIREDDY UPENDER REDDYversusSTATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2025 INSC 768
- Decided
- 22 May 2025
- Bench
- B PARDIWALA
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the grounds of arrest provided to the accused satisfied the constitutional and statutory requirements of Article 22(1) and Section 47 of the BNSS, and therefore the arrest was not illegal.
Summary
The appellant challenged the arrest of his son, Kessireddy Raja Shekhar Reddy, alleging that the police failed to provide appropriate and meaningful grounds of arrest, thereby violating Article 22 of the Constitution. The son was arrested on 21 April 2025 by the CID in connection with offences under Sections 420, 409, and 120‑B of the IPC (now covered by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita) and was produced before a Special Judge within 24 hours. The High Court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus, holding that the grounds of arrest complied with the requirements of Article 22 and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the information supplied at the time of arrest was sufficiently detailed to satisfy the constitutional mandate, referring to the recent Vihaan Kumar judgment and earlier precedents. The Court concluded that the grounds of arrest, though concise, conveyed the essential facts and thus met the standards set in Vihaan Kumar. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the arrest upheld.
Issues considered
- The arrest of the appellant's son was per se illegal for want of supply of appropriate and meaningful grounds of arrest.
- Whether the information supplied at the time of arrest complied with the requirements of Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 47 of the BNSS.
- Whether the burden of proving compliance with Article 22(1) lies on the police.
- Whether the inclusion of additional offences in the remand report satisfies the "forthwith" requirement of Section 47 BNSS.
Legislation cited
- Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023s. 35, s. 47, s. 48
- Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023s. 316(5), s. 318, s. 61(2)
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 41(1), s. 50
- Constitution of Indias. Art.21, s. Art.22
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(b), s. 13(2), s. 7, s. 7A, s. 8
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Whether the arrest of the appellant’s son was per se illegal for want of supply of appropriate and meaningful grounds of arrest, as alleged. Headnotes† Constitution of India – Art.22 – When not violated – Appellant filed writ petition before corpus on the ground that his son was illegally arrested by CID as appropriate grounds for arrest were not furnished at the time of arrest and thus, the arrest was violative of Art.22 – Writ petition dismissed – Sustainability: Held: If a person is arrested on a warrant, the grounds
Subjects
Article 22 of the Constitution of IndiaGrounds of arrestArrested on a warrantArrested without a warrantAppropriate and meaningful grounds of arrestAt the time of arrestWrit of habeas corpusVihaan Kumar caseInformation of the grounds of arrestSufficient knowledge of the basic factsArrest by CID
Judgment
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 105 : 2025 INSC 768
Kasireddy Upender Reddy
v.
State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2808 of 2025)
23 May 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the arrest of the appellant’s son was per se illegal for want
of supply of appropriate and meaningful grounds of arrest, as alleged.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Art.22 – When not violated – Appellant
filed writ petition before High Court seeking a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that his son was illegally arrested by
CID as appropriate grounds for arrest were not furnished at
the time of arrest and thus, the arrest was violative of Art.22 –
Writ petition dismissed – Sustainability:
Held: If a person is arrested on a warrant, the grounds for reasons
for the arrest is the warrant itself; if the warrant is read over to him,
that is sufficient compliance with the requirement that he should be
informed of the grounds for his arrest – If he is arrested without a
warrant, he must be told why he has been arrested – If he is arrested
for committing an offence, he must be told that he has committed
a certain offence for which he would be placed on trial – In order
to inform him that he has committed a certain offence, he must
be told of the acts done by him which amounts to the offence –
He must be informed of the precise acts done by him for which
he would be tried; informing him merely of the law applicable to
such acts would not be enough – The information of the grounds
of arrest must be provided to the arrested person in a manner that
sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds is
imparted and communicated to the arrested person effectively in
the language which he understands – The mode and method of
communication must be such that the object of the constitutional
safeguard is achieved – Appellant’s son was arrested for specific
offences as mentioned in the grounds of arrest – The grounds of
arrest show that the requirement in terms of para 21(b) as laid
* Author
106 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
down in Vihaan Kumar’s case is fulfilled – No merit in this appeal –
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – ss.47, 48, 35 – Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.41(1). [Paras 25, 36]
Constitution of India – Art. 22 – Judgment of Supreme Court in
Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana and another – Constitutional
protections against arbitrary arrest and detention – Rights of
individuals upon arrest – Principles of law explained in Vihaan
Kumar, enumerated. [Paras 15, 18]
Case Law Cited
Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana and another, 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 269; State of Bombay v. Atma Ram [1951] 1 SCR 167 : (1951)
SCC 43 : AIR 1951 SC 157 (C) – relied on.
Magan Lal Jivabhai, in re, AIR 1951 Bom 33(D); Vimal Kishore
Mehrotra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 All 56 – referred to.
Hooper v. Lane (1857) 6 HLC 443 : 10 ER 1368 (G); Christie v.
Leachinsky (1947) AC 573; McNabb v. United States of America
(1943) 318 US 332 (H); United States v. Cruikshank (1876) 92
US 542 – referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023;
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords
Article 22 of the Constitution of India; Grounds of arrest; Arrested on
a warrant; Arrested without a warrant; Appropriate and meaningful
grounds of arrest; At the time of arrest; Writ of habeas corpus;
Vihaan Kumar case; Information of the grounds of arrest; Sufficient
knowledge of the basic facts; Arrest by CID.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2808 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.05.2025 of the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh at Amravati in WP No. 10858 of 2025
With
SLP (CRL.) No. 5691 of 2025
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 107
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Mahesh Jethmalani, Navin Pahwa, Ponnavolu Sudhakar Reddy,
Sr. Advs., Ramesh Allanki, Ms. Aruna Gupta, Shriharsha Peechara,
Syed Ahmad Naqvi, Alabhya Dhamija, Shreevardhan Dhoot,
M. Bala Krishna, T. Vijaybhaskar Reddy, Yash Gupta, Krishna Kumar
Singh, Ms. Serena Jethmalani, Ajay Awasthi, Ms. Mugdha Pande,
Vaibhav Thaledi, Yashaswi SK Chocksey, Krishna Kumar Singh.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Sidharth Luthra, Siddharth Aggarwal, Sr. Advs., Guntur Pramod
Kumar, Ms. Prerna Singh, Samarth Krishan Luthra, Ms. Rajni Gupta.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
J.B. Pardiwala, J.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2808 OF 2025
(@ SLP (CRIMINAL) No. 7746 OF 2025)
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati dated 8.05.2025 in W.P.
No. 10858 of 2025 by which the writ petition filed by the appellant
herein seeking a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his son
viz. Kessireddy Raja Shekhar Reddy came to be illegally arrested
by the CID and is in unlawful detention, came to be dismissed.
3. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarised as under:
a. The son of the appellant herein, namely, Kessireddy Raja
Shekhar Reddy came to be arrested on 21.04.2025 in connection
with Crime No. 21 of 2024 dated 23.09.2025 registered with
CID Police Station, Mangalagiri for the offence punishable under
Sections 420, 409 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal
Code respectively (for short, the “IPC”) (Now Sections 318,
316(5) read with Section 61(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita,
2023 respectively (for short, the “BNS”)).
108 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
b. It appears from the materials on record that on 19.04.2025 the
son of the appellant herein was arrayed as accused no. 1 by
way of an entry in the case diary.
c. The son of the appellant was arrested at around 6 P.M. from
the Hyderabad Airport. At the time of arrest, the grounds of
arrest were supplied to him and later were also served on his
father i.e. the appellant herein.
d. Pursuant to the arrest, the son of the appellant was brought to
Vijayawada and was produced before the jurisdictional magistrate
i.e. the Special Judge for SPE and ACB cases, Vijayawada at
5.15 P.M. on 22.04.2025 i.e. within 24 hours of the arrest.
d. It appears that police remand was prayed for and the same
came to be granted vide order dated 22.04.2025 passed by
the Special Judge for SPE and ACB cases.
e. The operative part of the remand order reads thus:
“12. Remand report further reveals that, police have
to examine several witnesses and has to apprehend
several Government and non Government officials
and investigation is only at preliminary stage and
police requires time to conduct thorough investigation
in this case. Therefore, request for remand of Al is
accepted, hence, Al is remanded to judicial custody
under Section 187 of BNSS till 6.5.025, for the
offences under Sections 420, 409, 120 B IPC and
Sections 7, 7A and 8, 13(1)(b) , 13 (2) of P.C.Act, Al is
hereby ordered to be kept in District Jail, Vijayawada
under proper escort.
Sd/-P.Bhaskara Rao
SPL. JUDGE FOR SPE AND ACB
CASES-CUM-III ADJ. VIJAYAWADA”
f. The appellant preferred a writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution before the High Court and prayed for a writ of
habeas corpus on the ground that the arrest of his son was per
se illegal and therefore, his continued detention in jail could be
said to be unlawful and thereby, violative of Article 21 of the
Constitution.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 109
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
g. The writ of habeas corpus was prayed for essentially on the
ground that although the grounds of arrest were served upon
the appellant’s son at the time of his arrest, yet such grounds
were not meaningful and were just an eyewash. The grounds
of arrest lacked in material particulars.
h. It was argued before the High Court that if appropriate grounds
for arrest are not furnished at the time of arrest then the arrest
would be violative of Article 22 of the Constitution read with
Sections 47 and 48 respectively of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 respectively (for short, the “BNSS”).
i. The High Court adjudicated the writ petition filed by the appellant
herein and ultimately vide the impugned judgment and order
dismissed the same holding as under:
“11. In the present case, both the provisions of law
as well as the grounds for arrest, can be made out,
on a conjoint reading of the notice under Section 47,
the grounds of arrest, 48 of BNSS and the remand
report which were all served on the detenue prior to
the hearing of his remand application. The learned
Special Judge, had specifically recorded that even the
remand report had been served on the detenue prior to
the commencement of the hearing before the Special
Judge. The copy of the remand report, filed by the
respondents, show that the detenue had signed a copy
of the remand report as service of the said grounds
of arrest on him. In view of the earlier judgment of
this Court, it must be held that the requirements of
Article 22 of the Constitution of India as well as the
provisions of BNSS have been complied.
xxx xxx xxx
13. In Vihaan Kumar vs. State of Haryana and
Another’s case, neither the detenue nor his relatives or
family members had been served with any document.
In such circumstances, as can be seen from the
same passage, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had
held that in the absence of service of the remand
report, mere inclusion of grounds of arrest in the
110 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
remand report would not be sufficient compliance of
Article 22 of the Constitution of India or Section 47
of BNSS. In the present case, the Special Judge had
recorded that the remand report had been served
on the detenue and the copy of the remand report,
containing the signature of the detenue, produced
by the respondents would also fortify this position.
Sri P. Sudhakar Reddy contends that papers were
served on the detenu after the hearing in the remand
application and as such, there is no compliance of
Article 22 of the Constitution of India. This contention
does not appear to be correct inasmuch as the Special
Judge had recorded, in the remand order, that the
remand report had been served on the detenue. In
these circumstances, this Court does not find any
reason to interfere with the order of remand.
14. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is dismissed.
However, this would not preclude the detenue from
availing of his remedies under law for being set at
liberty. There shall be no order as to costs.”
4. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here before
this Court with the present appeal.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
5. Mr. Mahesh Jethmalani, the learned Senior Counsel, made oral
submissions and has also filed his written submissions. The written
submissions read thus:
“A) That since 25.03.2025, the Respondent State has
issued notices under Section 179 of the BNSS to appear
before them. The accused has challenged these notices
and the said challenge is a subject matter of Petition tagged
along with the instant case. On 21.04.2025 at 5 PM, the
Petitioner sent a WhatsApp message to the Investigating
Officer that he would appear before him on 22.04.2025 at 10
AM. Pursuant to the said Section 179 notices, the accused
travelled from Goa to Hyderabad, Telangana en route to
Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh and reached Hyderabad
Airport at 6 PM. On his disembarking the accused was
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 111
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
arrested and taken to Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh. The
Petitioner’s son was never cited as an Accused in the
FIR, was in the eyes of the Respondent State a witness
as disclosed by the Section 179 Notices sent to him and
was always of the impression that he was wanted as a
witness to which he even acceded on 21.04.2025. The
Petitioner’s son was not an accused person at the time of
his arrest on 21.04.2025 and there was no evidence of his
complicity in any crime. The Respondent’s case (see para
6 of the Impugned Judgment of the High Court) is that
the Petitioner’s son was made an accused on 19.04.2025
by way of an entry in the Case Diary. The Case Diary is
not a public document like an FIR and so there was no
public document disclosing that the Petitioner’s son was
an accused person in the case. Admittedly, in the same
Paragraph 6 of the Impugned Order, the intimation of such
inclusion as filed with a Special Judge for SPE and ACB
Cases, Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh on 22.04.2025, i.e.,
after his arrest on the previous day. The Petitioner’s son’s
arrest was without any basis and illegal.
B) Further, events post the arrest of the Petitioner’s son
clearly discloses the groundless basis of his arrest as
also the mala fide intent behind it. In the course of his
investigation post his arrest, the Petitioner’s son was
informed that he should make a Statement implicating the
then Chief Minister of the State of Andhra Pradesh – Shri
Y. S. Jagan Mohan Reddy, for alleged illegalities in the
liquor excise policy that was being investigated. Shockingly,
present during his investigation were 2 ‘mediators’. The
case of the Respondent has disclosed in the Remand
Application of the next day (Second paragraph @ Page
88 of the SLP) was that the accused refused to sign on
an alleged confession. It is clear from the said averments
in the Remand Application that the ‘mediators’ were
introduced to pressurize the Petitioner’s son into making
a ‘confession’ implicating the Former Chief Minister of
the State of Andhra Pradesh – Shri Y. S. Jagan Mohan
Reddy. The entire conspectus of facts that transpired during
interrogation discloses glaring illegalities, including the
112 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
presence of the ‘mediators’. The fact that the Petitioner’s
son refused to sign the alleged ‘confession’ is clear proof
that he was being forced to make a confession, which
he refused. In sum, the events that transpired from the
evening of 21.04.2025 till 22.04.2025, establishes that the
Petitioner was not an accused until the time he refused to
comply with the pressure of the ‘mediators’ and the police.
It is reiterated that the arrest of the Petitioner’s son as an
Accused was baseless and mala fide.
“During the course of interrogation, the above noted
accused admitted the facts and his guilt about the
commission of offences. The entire confession got
drafted in the presence of mediators Chavalam
Gopala Krishna S/o Narasimha Rao, 40 Years, VRO
2, Nunna and Mohd Sirajuddin, S/o Kutubiddin, 40
Yrs, VRO-1, Kundavari Kandrika under a cover of
mahazar and seized a mobile phone 14 Funtouch
OS vivo Y18t having IMEI number 869933078319375
(Slot 1), 869933078319367 (Slot 2) and SIM card
of number +917559260506 and for investigation
purpose duly signed by the mediators. However, the
accused refused to sign on the above confessional
statement. The mediators endorsed the same.”
C) That the grounds of arrest served on the Petitioner on
21.04.2025 were in total non compliance of Article 22 of
the Constitution of India and Section 47 of the BNSS for
the following reasons:
i. It has been laid down in a number of decisions of this
Hon’ble Court that the grounds of arrest are not an empty
formality. This principle has been enunciated with greater
rigour in recent judgments (see: Prabir Purkayastha v.
State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254 and Vihaan
Kumar v. State of Haryana & Anr., 2025 SCC OnLine SC
269 : SLP(Crl) 13320 of 2024) that the whole rational
behind communicating the grounds of arrest is to enable
the Petitioner’s son’s counsel to meet the Police case in
remand proceedings and for bail. In the grounds of arrest
served on the Petitioner on 21.04.2025, the substantive
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 113
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
offences were Sections 409 and 420 IPC. While the Section
numbers were mentioned, the ingredients of the offence
find no mention in the furnished grounds. Thus, in so far
as Section 409 IPC is concerned, there is not a whisper
about the ingredient of entrustment, the property entrusted
and the manner of misappropriation or conversion to the
accused’s use. Similarly, as far as Section 420 IPC is
concerned, the ingredients of deception, fraudulent or
dishonest inducement and the property delivered pursuant
to such inducement are all significantly absent. The grounds
of arrest therefore did not even remotely disclose how the
offences alleged were made out. It is submitted that this
was the case because there was no ground to arrest the
Petitioner’s son and his arrest was illegal and mala fide.
ii. Article 22 of the Constitution requires that the grounds
of arrest shall be informed to the person arrested “as soon
as may be”. In Paragraph 5 of the Impugned Judgment of
the High Court, it is recorded that, “The learned Advocate
General would submit that the grounds of arrest as well
as the provisions of the law were made known to the
detenue, in writing, by virtue of service of the notice of
arrest under Section 47, the grounds of arrest under Section
48 and the remand report.” It is submitted that a remand
report cannot in law be grounds of arrest contemplated
under Article 22 or Section 47 of the BNSS, save perhaps
when the Accused is produced in Court for remand and
furnished with a Remand Application immediately on his
production. Else a remand report can never comply with
the requirement of the obligation to furnish grounds as
soon as may be in Article 22 or ‘forthwith’ communication of
such grounds prescribed by Section 47 BNSS. In admitting
that the remand report was part of the grounds of arrest
and that it was served on the accused on 22.04.2025, the
Respondent State has violated the mandate of “as soon as
may be” in Article 22 and ‘forthwith’ in Section 47 BNSS.
It is important to emphasize that Article 22 mandates that
“no person who is arrested shall be detained in custody
without being informed as soon as may be of the grounds
of such arrest…”. The Constitutional mandate was thus
114 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
violated because the Petitioner’s son was detained in
custody post arrest without being informed “as soon
as may be” of the complete grounds for arrest. Further,
what he was provided with at the time of his arrest was
grounds of arrest which did not spell out the particulars
of the offences alleged.
iii. In addition, Section 47 of the BNSS mandates that what
should be ‘forthwith’ communicated to an arrested person
is the full particulars of the offence. Fully cognizant of the
fact that the grounds of arrest served on the Petitioner’s son
on 21.04.2025 did not disclose the offence under Section
409 and 420 IPC, the remand report of 22.04.2025 added
the substantive offences of Sections 7, 7A, 8 and 13(1)(b)
read with 13(2) Prevention Corruption Act, 1988. Thus the
‘full particulars of the offence’ for which the Petitioner’s son
was arrested was not furnished to him ‘forthwith’.
iv. That the invocation of offences under the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 in the remand report as grounds
for arrest of the Petitioner’s son is vitiated by patent
illegality. The Petitioner could not have been arrested
for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, in
view of the provisions of Section 17A of the said Act It is
the Respondent State’s case that they could only invoke
the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act on
22.04.2025 as they had not received the requisite sanction
under Section 17A at the time of the Petitioner’s son’s
arrest. The sanction order under Section 17A (Pages 66 –
67 of the SLP) is dated 21.04.2025. Moreover, the sanction
sought and granted on 21.04.2025 was only in respect of
a public servant by the name Shri Dodda Venkat Satya
Prasad. There was no sanction granted for investigation
for the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act
for the Petitioner’s son. Granting of Sanction is not akin
to taking of cognizance by a Court where cognizance is
taken of offences and not of offenders. Section 17A of
the Prevention of Corruption Act prohibits any enquiry,
inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have
been committed by a public servant under this act where
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 115
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation
made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge
of his official functions or duty. Thus under Section 17A,
the sanctioning authority has to examine the case of
every public servant separately to determine whether the
provisions of that Section apply to him so that sanction
may be granted or refused. The Ministry of Personnel,
Public Grievances and pensions (Department of Personnel
and training) has on 17.09.2021 issued SOPs for the
processing of cases under Section 17A of the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988 (Annexure P – 10 @ Page 5 in
Vol 2). Clause 4.6 of the SOP mandates as under:
“4.6. Separate proposals shall be made in respect
of each public servant, where a composite offence
is alleged against more than one public servant.”
Thus, where a composite offence is alleged against more
than one public servants, a separate proposal shall be
made in respect of each public servant. There is neither
a sanction proposal nor grant of such sanction in respect
of the Petitioner’s son. The invocation of offences under
the PC Act against him and the contention that the remand
report which contains these offences constituted the
grounds of arrest within the meaning of Article 22 of the
Constitution and Section 47 of the BNSS is manifestly
untenable. In invoking offences against the Prevention
of Corruption Act as part of the grounds of arrest, the
Respondent State has committed a manifest illegality, as
in the absence of the requisite sanction, under Section 17A
of the Prevention of Corruption Act, read with Clause 4.6
of the SOP of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances
and pensions (Department of Personnel and training)
dated 03.09.2021, the grounds of arrest were untenable
and consequently the arrest and detention in custody of
the Petitioner’s son was patently illegal.”
6. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel prayed
that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed and the
arrest of the accused may be declared as illegal thereby, rendering
his continued detention unlawful.
116 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
7. Mr. Siddharth Luthra, the learned Senior Counsel made oral
submissions on behalf of the State while opposing this appeal and has
also filed his written submissions. The written submissions read thus:
“1. Crime No. 21 of 2024 dated 23.09.2025 was registered
in CID P.S., Mangalagiri under Sections 420,409 r/w 120-
B I.P.C. (FIR@Pg39-49 of SLP). On 19.04.2025,the son
of the present Petitioner being Kessireddy Raja Shekhar
Reddy(hereinafter referred to as A1) was arrayed as
Accused A1 by way of an entry in the Case Diary Refer-Para 6
of the impugned order & Para 9 of the Counter Affidavit
filed by the State before the High Court (Ann P13 @
Pg 23, relevant at Pg 26 of IA No.128534/2025 for Addl.
Documents).
2. On 21.04.2025 at 6 PM, Accused No 1 was arrested
from the Hyderabad Airport. At the time of arrest, Grounds
of Arrest were supplied to him and served on his father as
well (Grounds of Arrest @ Pg13-14 of IA No.128534/2025
for Addl. Documents). A perusal of the said Grounds of
Arrest would show complete compliance with the directions
in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana; 2025 SCCOnLine
SC 269 @ Para21, wherein this Hon’ble Court directed
that information of grounds of arrest must be provided “in
such a manner that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts
constituting the grounds is imparted and communicated
to the arrested person…”
3. Pursuant to arrest, A1 was brought to Vijayawada and
produced before the jurisdictional magistrate i.e. the Ld.
Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases Vijayawada at 5.15
PM on 22.04.2025 i.e. within 24 hours of arrest, thereby
complying with all requirements as well as Article 22(2) of
the Constitution. In the Remand Order dated …, the Ld.
Magistrate inter alia noted in para 2, that A1 stated that
he had not been ill-treated in custody and that he had
received the Remand Report with enclosures (Pg 106 of
SLP). After considering all aspects, including the nature
of the allegations, the Ld. Magistrate ordered for A1 to be
remanded (Remand Order @ Pg106-113 of SLP), and
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 117
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
the same was upheld by way of the impugned order. It
is humbly submitted that the arrest and remand of A1 do
not suffer from any infirmity.
4. In pursuance of Article 22(2), the procedural aspects
are set out in the BNSS/Cr.P.C. Section 57 & 58 of the
BNSS (formerly Section 56 and 57, Cr.P.C.) deals with
the procedure to be followed upon arrest. Section 187
BNSS (Section167, Cr.P.C.) provides the procedure when
investigation can’t be completed in 24hours. S. 57 These
provisions i.e. S. 57/58/187 BNSS have to be read together
&the requirement of law is to produce the arrestee before
the jurisdictional magistrate within 24 hours. If the period
of 24 hours is expiring and the detenu cannot be produced
before the jurisdictional Magistrate, then he/she must be
produced before the nearest Magistrate. Indisputably the
detenu was produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate
within 24 hours.
5. This exposition of law has been time and again
reinforced by this Hon’ble Court; notably in State of U.P. v.
Abdul Samad; AIR 1962 SC 1506 @ Para 14, Chaganti
Satyarayana v. State of A.P. (1986) 3 SCC 141 @ Para12
and more recently reiterated in Gautam Navlakha v. NIA;
(2022) 13 SCC 542 @ Para 102.
6. The Calcutta High Court in In Re: Nagendranath
Chakravarti; 1923 ILR Vol. LI 402, interpreting S. 61 &
167 CrPC 1898 (equivalent to S. 58 BNSS) observed that,
“…the intention of the Legislature, having regard
to sections 61 and 167 and to the requirements of
justice generally, is that an accused person should
be brought before a Magistrate competent to try, or
commit with as little delay as possible….”
7. In this regard, any reliance on Priya Indoria v. State
of Karnataka; (2024) 8 SCC254 by the Petitioner is
entirely misplaced. That case dealt with issues relating to
anticipatory bail, and observations in this regard was in the
passing and are obiter. That judgment doesn’t consider
the law laid down by earlier judgments of this Hon’ble
Court including in Re: Nagendranath Chakravarti supra
118 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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and Gautam Navlakha supra (2JJ), and is therefore per
incuriam in this regard.
Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act
8. On 21.04.2025, in Vijayawada, the IO had made a
request for the addition of sections 7, 7A, 8, 13(1)(b) and
13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and made a
request for approval under sec 17A of the Act with respect
to co-accused D.Venkata Satya Prasad. Approval under
Section 17-A was granted on 21.04.2025 in Vijayawada.
Upon reaching Vijayawada, on 22.04.2025, A1 was served
with the Arrest Memo containing the above mentioned
sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the same
was received by A1 and is in case diary.
9. A1 was only an “IT Advisor” to the Government of Andhra
Pradesh who was running his business in Hyderabad at
the relevant time. The scope of the Petitioner’s duties as
an “IT Advisor” had no relation at all to the excise/liquor
policy, as has been repeatedly averred by the Petitioner
himself (Pg G & Pg 123of SLP). Earlier, in his Reply to
a Notice u/sec 179 BNSS, A1 himself clearly stated that
“..based on publicly available information, I understand that
the case pertains to an excise-related matter in Andhra
Pradesh. However, I am unable to ascertain any direct or
indirect link in the case from my end…”
10. It is submitted that the approval under Section 17A is
person-specific (as admitted by the Petitioner himself,
Ground F @ Pg123 of the SLP), required when the
alleged offence is “relatable to any recommendation made
or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of
his official functions or duties.” In the present case, the
allegations against A1 with respect to the perpetration of
the liquor scam are in no way relatable to his function as
an IT Advisor, therefore there is no requirement for approval
under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act.”
ANALYSIS
8. Since the entire case revolves around the question whether the arrest
of the appellant’s son could be said to be per se illegal for want of
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 119
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
supply of appropriate and meaningful grounds of arrest, we should
look into few provisions of the Constitution as well as the BNSS.
9. Article 21 of the Constitution reads thus:
“21. Protection of life and personal liberty-
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by law.”
10. Article 22 of the Constitution reads thus:
“22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain
cases. -(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained
in custody without being informed, as soon as may be,
of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the
right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner
of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody
shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a
period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the
time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to
the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be
detained in custody beyond the said period without the
authority of a magistrate.
(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply— (a) to any
person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or (b)
to any person who is arrested or detained under any law
providing for preventive detention.
**(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall
authorise the detention of a person for a longer period
than three months unless— (a) an Advisory Board
consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are
qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court
has reported before the expiration of the said period of
three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause
for such detention:
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise
the detention of any person beyond the maximum period
prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-
clause (b) of clause (7); or (b) such person is detained
120 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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in accordance with the provisions of any law made by
Parliament under subclauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order
made under any law providing for preventive detention,
the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be,
communicate to such person the grounds on which the
order has been made and shall afford him the earliest
opportunity of making a representation against the order.
(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making
any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose
facts which such authority considers to be against the
public interest to disclose.
(7) Parliament may by law prescribe—
*(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or
classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for
a period longer than three months under any law providing
for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of
an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of
sub-clause (a) of clause (4);
**(b) the maximum period for which any person may in
any class or classes of cases be detained under any law
providing for preventive detention; and
(c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in
an inquiry under ***[sub-clause (a) of clause (4)].”
11. Sub-section (1) of Section 41 of Code of Criminal Procedure (for
short the “Cr.P.C.”) lists cases where the police may arrest a person
without a warrant. The corresponding provision in the BNSS is Section
35. Section 41 of the Cr.P.C. reads thus:
“41. When police may arrest without warrant.—(1) Any
police officer may without an order from a Magistrate
and without a warrant, arrest any person—
(a) who commits, in the presence of a police officer, a
cognizable offence;
(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made,
or credible information has been received, or a reasonable
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 121
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable
offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which
may be less than seven years or which may extend to
seven years whether with or without fine, if the following
conditions are satisfied, namely:—
(i) the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of
such complaint, information, or suspicion that such person
has committed the said offence;
(ii) the police office is satisfied that such arrest is necessary—
(a) to prevent such person from committing any further
offence; or
(b) for proper investigation of the offence; or
(c) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of
the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence
in any manner; or
(d) to prevent such person from making any inducement,
threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts
of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such
facts to the Court or to the police officer; or
(e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the
Court whenever required cannot be ensured,
and the police officer shall record while making such arrest,
his reasons in writing.
Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where the
arrest of a person is not required under the provisions
of this subsection, record the reasons in writing for not
making the arrest.
(ba) against whom credible information has been
received that he has committed a cognizable offence
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to more than seven years whether with or without
fine or with death sentence and the police officer has
reason to believe on the basis of that information that
such person has committed the said offence;
122 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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(c) who has been proclaimed as an offender either under
this Code or by order of the State Government; or
(d) in whose possession anything is found which may
reasonably be suspected to be stolen property and who
may reasonably be suspected of having committed an
offence with reference to such thing; or
(e) who obstructs a police officer while in the execution
of his duty, or who has escaped, or attempts to escape,
from lawful custody; or
(f) who is reasonably suspected of being a deserter from
any of the Armed Forces of the Union; or
(g) who has been concerned in, or against whom a
reasonable complaint has been made, or credible
information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion
exists, of his having been concerned in, any act committed
at any place out of India which, if committed in India, would
have been punishable as an offence, and for which he is,
under any law relating to extradition, or otherwise, liable
to be apprehended or detained in custody in India; or
(h) who, being a released convict, commits a breach of
any rule made under sub-section (5) of Section 356; or
(i) for whose arrest any requisition, whether written or oral,
has been received from another police officer, provided
that the requisition specifies the person to be arrested
and the offence or other cause for which the arrest is to
be made and it appears therefrom that the person might
lawfully be arrested without a warrant by the officer who
issued the requisition.
(2) Subject to the provisions of Section 42, no person
concerned in a non-cognizable offence or against whom
a complaint has been made or credible information has
been received or reasonable suspicion exists of his having
so concerned, shall be arrested except under a warrant
or order of a Magistrate.”
(emphasis added)
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 123
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
12. Section 47 of the BNSS reads thus:
“47. Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest
and of right to bail. –
(1) Every police officer or other person arresting any
person without warrant shall forthwith communicate to
him full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested
or other grounds for such arrest.
(2) Where a police officer arrests without warrant any
person other than a person accused of a non-bailable
offence, he shall inform the person arrested that he is
entitled to be released on bail and that he may arrange
for sureties on his behalf.”
13. Section 48 of the BNSS reads thus:
“48. Obligation of person making arrest to inform about
the arrest, etc., to relative or friend. –
(1) Every police officer or other person making any arrest
under this Sanhita shall forthwith give the information
regarding such arrest and place where the arrested person
is being held to any of his relatives, friends or such other
persons as may be disclosed or mentioned by the arrested
person for the purpose of giving such information and also
to the designated police officer in the district.
(2) The police officer shall inform the arrested person of
his rights under sub-section (1) as soon as he is brought
to the police station.
(3) An entry of the fact as to who has been informed of the
arrest of such person shall be made in a book to be kept
in the police station in such form as the State Government
may, by rules, provide.
(4) It shall be the duty of the Magistrate before whom such
arrested person is produced, to satisfy himself that the
requirements of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) have
been complied with in respect of such arrested person.”
14. We shall now look into the grounds of arrest which were provided to
the appellant’s son in writing at the time of his arrest and also to the
appellant as the father of the person arrested. The same reads thus:
124 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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“GROUNDS OF ARREST IN RESPECT OF SRI
KESSIREDDY RAJA SHEKHAR REDDY (A1) IN CR.
NO. 21/2024 U/S 420, 409, 120(B) IPC OF CID P.S.
MANGALAGIRI
This is a case of Conspiracy, Cheating, Criminal breach
of trust, Corruption and Money Laundering which caused
huge wrongful loss to the state exchequer/Distilleries and
wrongful gain to influential individuals/ Few Distilleries/
Few Suppliers to a tune of more than Rs. 3200 Crores,
that occurred between October 2019 and March 2024
in AP State Beverages Corporation Limited, Vijayawada
and reported to CID PS on 23-09-2024 at 22-00 hrs. The
complainant Sri Mukesh Kumar Meena, I.A.S., Principal
Secretary Government of Andhra Pradesh vide Memo No.
Rev-01/CPE/20/2024-VIG-IV, Dated: 20.09.2024, lodged a
complaint based on the enquiry report with title “Report
on Liquor Procurement and Market Manipulation (2019-
2024)” submitted by a five member committee of APSBCL.
The committee found the following manipulations,
1. Suppression of the established popular brands and
unfair discrimination in allocation of OFS over a period
of time leading to almost disappearance of some popular
brands from the market.
2. Favorable/Preferential allocation of orders to certain
new brands in violation of the existing norms giving them
undue market share and competitive advantage over the
existing brands in the market.
3. T
he procurement system was shifted to manual process
giving scope for manipulation of OFS against the previous
system of automated OFS issuance compromising the
integrity of the process in order to implement the two
manipulations mentioned above.
On which a case in Cr.No.21/2021 U/s 409,420, 120(B)
IPC of CID PS, AP, Mangalagiri was registered by the
SHO (Y.Srinivasa Rao, DSP, AP, Mangalagiri)/CID PS, AP,
Mangalagiri on 23.09.2024 at 22.00 hrs and submitted the
copies of FIRs to all the concerned.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 125
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
Grounds of Arrest:
Investigation done so far reveals prima facie case of
Conspiracy, Cheating, Criminal breach of trust and
Corruption
1. You are the key person in organizing the kickback
driven liquor trade in AP during 2019-2024. You along with
Vasudeva Reddy, Satya Prasad, Midhun Reddy, Vijaya
Sai Reddy, Sajjala Sridhar Reddy and others hatched
conspiracy, suppressed popular brands, promoted blue-
eyed brands and caused wrongful gain about Rs. 3200
Crores towards kickbacks to the liquor syndicate through
public servants by corrupt practices.
2. In pursuance of the conspiracy, you have controlled
issuance of OFSs to suppliers based on kickbacks
received. You used to get sales data, calculate the kickback
amounts, and used to collect kickbacks through Booneti
Chanakya and others regularly.
3. You have threatened SPY Agro Industries Pvt. Ltd., and
took over the control of SPY accounts and managed their
accounts without their consent. You are further responsible
for transfer of money from the bank accounts of SPY Agro
Industries Pvt. Ltd., to lot of shell companies.
4. You are responsible for floating of Adan Distillery Pvt
Ltd and manufacture of brands like Supreme Blend etc.,
in some bottling units as a part of the conspiracy.
5. After collecting kickbacks, you used to send the same
to P.V.Mithun Reddy and others.
6. Further, you have organized entire business of Leela
brand in AP by appointing your henchman Varun as head
of operations as a part of the conspiracy.
7. You invested the crime proceeds in various real estate,
Infra, Entertainment, chemical and mobility companies.
8. As a part of the conspiracy, you caused lot of wrongful
loss to the APSBCL and to the State Exchequer.
9. You have been absconding and not appearing before the
Investigation officer in response to notices U/s 179 BNSS.
126 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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On the above grounds and as the investigation is not yet
completed, your arrest is necessary for further investigation
of the case. You are hereby arrested.
Sd/-
21/4/25
I/c Investigating Officer,
Dy. Supdt. Of Police
SIT, Vijaywada.”
15. The pathbreaking judgment of this Court in the case of Vihaan
Kumar v. State of Haryana and another reported in 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 269 serves as a pivotal reference point in Indian
jurisprudence regarding the rights of individuals upon arrest. The
judgment in Vihan Kumar (supra) has profound implications for the
enforcement of Article 22 of the Constitution across the country. It
underscores the judiciary’s commitment to upholding constitutional
protections against arbitrary arrest and detention. This decision
sets a clear precedent that the investigating agency/ police officer/
authorities effecting arrest of any person in connection with any
cognizable offence without a warrant must provide specific, actionable
reasons for an individual’s arrest, beyond citing broad provisions
of law. A clear dictum has been laid in Vihaan Kumar (supra) that
the law enforcement agencies must exercise greater diligence in
communicating the precise grounds of arrest in order to avoid unlawful
detention claims. The decision further reinforces the right to legal
recourse through habeas corpus petitions, empowering individuals
to challenge the legality of their detention effectively.
16. In Vihaan Kumar (supra), this Court eruditely speaking through
Justice Abhay S. Oka made some very important observations which
we must reproduce as under:
“Therefore, as far as Article 22(1) is concerned, compliance
can be made by communicating sufficient knowledge of
the basic facts constituting the grounds of arrest to the
person arrested. The grounds should be effectively and fully
communicated to the arrestee in the manner in which he
will fully understand the same. Therefore, it follows that the
grounds of arrest must be informed in a language which the
arrestee understands. That is how, in the case of Pankaj
Bansal v. Union of India reported in (2024) 7 SCC 576,
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 127
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
this Court held that the mode of conveying the grounds
of arrest must necessarily be meaningful so as to serve
the intended purpose. However, under Article 22(1), there
is no requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest
in writing. Article 22(1) also incorporates the right of every
person arrested to consult an advocate of his choice and
the right to be defended by an advocate. If the grounds of
arrest are not communicated to the arrestee, as soon as
may be, he will not be able to effectively exercise the right
to consult an advocate. This requirement incorporated in
Article 22(1) also ensures that the grounds for arresting
the person without a warrant exist. Once a person is
arrested, his right to liberty under Article 21 is curtailed.
When such an important fundamental right is curtailed, it
is necessary that the person concerned must understand
on what grounds he has been arrested. That is why the
mode of conveying information of the grounds must be
meaningful so as to serve the objects stated above.
14. Thus, the requirement of informing the person arrested
of the grounds of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory
constitutional requirement. Article 22 is included in Part
III of the Constitution under the heading of Fundamental
Rights. Thus, it is the fundamental right of every person
arrested and detained in custody to be informed of the
grounds of arrest as soon as possible. If the grounds
of arrest are not informed as soon as may be after the
arrest, it would amount to a violation of the fundamental
right of the arrestee guaranteed under Article 22(1). It will
also amount to depriving the arrestee of his liberty. The
reason is that, as provided in Article 21, no person can
be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with the
procedure established by law. The procedure established
by law also includes what is provided in Article 22(1).
Therefore, when a person is arrested without a warrant,
and the grounds of arrest are not informed to him, as soon
as may be, after the arrest, it will amount to a violation of
his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 as well.
In a given case, if the mandate of Article 22 is not followed
while arresting a person or after arresting a person, it will
128 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
also violate fundamental right to liberty guaranteed under
Article 21, and the arrest will be rendered illegal. On the
failure to comply with the requirement of informing grounds
of arrest as soon as may be after the arrest, the arrest is
vitiated. Once the arrest is held to be vitiated, the person
arrested cannot remain in custody even for a second.
15. We have already referred to what is held in paragraphs
42 and 43 of the decision in the case of Pankaj Bansal
(supra). This Court has suggested that the proper and
ideal course of communicating the grounds of arrest is
to provide grounds of arrest in writing. Obviously, before
a police officer communicates the grounds of arrest, the
grounds of arrest have to be formulated. Therefore, there
is no harm if the grounds of arrest are communicated in
writing. Although there is no requirement to communicate
the grounds of arrest in writing, what is stated in paragraphs
42 and 43 of the decision in the case of Pankaj Bansal1
are suggestions that merit consideration. We are aware
that in every case, it may not be practicable to implement
what is suggested. If the course, as suggested, is followed,
the controversy about the non-compliance will not arise
at all. The police have to balance the rights of a person
arrested with the interests of the society. Therefore,
the police should always scrupulously comply with the
requirements of Article 22.
16. An attempt was made by learned Senior counsel
appearing for 1st respondent to argue that after his arrest,
the appellant was repeatedly remanded to custody, and
now a chargesheet has been filed. His submission is that
now, the custody of the appellant is pursuant to the order
taking cognizance passed on the charge sheet. Accepting
such arguments, with great respect to the learned senior
counsel, will amount to completely nullifying Articles 21
and 22(1) of the Constitution. Once it is held that arrest is
unconstitutional due to violation of Article 22(1), the arrest
itself is vitiated. Therefore, continued custody of such a
person based on orders of remand is also vitiated. Filing
a charge sheet and order of cognizance will not validate
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 129
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
an arrest which is per se unconstitutional, being violative
of Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. We
cannot tinker with the most important safeguards provided
under Article 22.
17. Another argument canvassed on behalf of the
respondents is that even if the appellant is released on
the grounds of violating Article 22, the first respondent
can arrest him again. At this stage, it is not necessary to
decide the issue.
18. In the present case, 1st respondent relied upon an entry
in the case diary allegedly made at 6.10 p.m. on 10th June
2024, which records that the appellant was arrested after
informing him of the grounds of arrest. For the reasons
which will follow hereafter, we are rejecting the argument
made by the 1st respondent. If the police want to prove
communication of the grounds of arrest only based on a
diary entry, it is necessary to incorporate those grounds
of arrest in the diary entry or any other document. The
grounds of arrest must exist before the same are informed.
Therefore, in a given case, even assuming that the case
of the police regarding requirements of Article 22(1) of
the Constitution is to be accepted based on an entry in
the case diary, there must be a contemporaneous record,
which records what the grounds of arrest were. When an
arrestee pleads before a Court that grounds of arrest were
not communicated, the burden to prove the compliance
of Article 22(1) is on the police.
19. An argument was sought to be canvassed that in view
of sub-Section (1) of Section 50 of CrPC, there is an option
to communicate to the person arrested full particulars of
the offence for which he is arrested or the other grounds
for the arrest. Section 50 cannot have the effect of diluting
the requirement of Article 22(1). If held so, Section 50 will
attract the vice of unconstitutionality. Section 50 lays down
the requirement of communicating the full particulars of the
offence for which a person is arrested to him. The ‘other
grounds for such arrest’ referred to in Section 50(1) have
nothing to do with the grounds of arrest referred to in
130 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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Article 22(1). The requirement of Section 50 is in addition
to what is provided in Article 22(1). Section 47 of the BNSS
is the corresponding provision. Therefore, what we have
held about Section 50 will apply to Section 47 of the BNSS.
20. When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial
Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to
ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) has been
made. The reason is that due to non-compliance, the
arrest is rendered illegal; therefore, the arrestee cannot
be remanded after the arrest is rendered illegal. It is the
obligation of all the Courts to uphold the fundamental rights.
CONCLUSIONS
21. Therefore, we conclude:
a) The requirement of informing a person arrested of
grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article
22(1);
b) The information of the grounds of arrest must be
provided to the arrested person in such a manner that
sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the
grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested
person effectively in the language which he understands.
The mode and method of communication must be such
that the object of the constitutional safeguard is achieved;
c) When arrested accused alleges non-compliance with
the requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will always
be on the Investigating Officer/Agency to prove compliance
with the requirements of Article 22(1);
d) Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation
of the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed by
the said Article. Moreover, it will amount to a violation of
the right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of
the Constitution. Therefore, non-compliance with the
requirements of Article 22(1) vitiates the arrest of the
accused. Hence, further orders passed by a criminal court
of remand are also vitiated. Needless to add that it will not
vitiate the investigation, charge sheet and trial. But, at the
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 131
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
same time, filing of chargesheet will not validate a breach
of constitutional mandate under Article 22(1);
e) When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial
Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to
ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other
mandatory safeguards has been made; and
f) When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is
the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of
the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even
if statutory restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The
statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the court
to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of
the Constitution is established.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Justice N. Kotiswar Singh while fully concurring with the views
expressed by Justice Abhay S. Oka added a few lines of his own
as under:
“2. The issue on the requirement of communication of
grounds of arrest to the person arrested, as mandated
under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, which
has also been incorporated in the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002 under Section 19 thereof has been
succinctly reiterated in this judgment. The constitutional
mandate of informing the grounds of arrest to the person
arrested in writing has been explained in the case
of Pankaj Bansal (supra) so as to be meaningful to serve
the intended purpose which has been reiterated in Prabir
Purkayastha (supra). The said constitutional mandate
has been incorporated in the statute under Section 50 of
the CrPC (Section 47 of BNSS). It may also be noted that
the aforesaid provision of requirement for communicating
the grounds of arrest, to be purposeful, is also required to
be communicated to the friends, relatives or such other
persons of the accused as may be disclosed or nominated
by the arrested person for the purpose of giving such
information as provided under Section 50A of the CrPC.
As may be noted, this is in the addition of the requirement
as provided under Section 50(1) of the CrPC.
132 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
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3. The purpose of inserting Section 50A of the CrPC,
making it obligatory on the person making arrest to
inform about the arrest to the friends, relatives or persons
nominated by the arrested person, is to ensure that they
would able to take immediate and prompt actions to secure
the release of the arrested person as permissible under
the law. The arrested person, because of his detention,
may not have immediate and easy access to the legal
process for securing his release, which would otherwise
be available to the friends, relatives and such nominated
persons by way of engaging lawyers, briefing them to
secure release of the detained person on bail at the
earliest. Therefore, the purpose of communicating the
grounds of arrest to the detenue, and in addition to his
relatives as mentioned above is not merely a formality but
to enable the detained person to know the reasons for
his arrest but also to provide the necessary opportunity
to him through his relatives, friends or nominated persons
to secure his release at the earliest possible opportunity
for actualising the fundamental right to liberty and life as
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Hence,
the requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in
writing is not only to the arrested person, but also to the
friends, relatives or such other person as may be disclosed
or nominated by the arrested person, so as to make the
mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution meaningful
and effective failing which, such arrest may be rendered
illegal.”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Thus, the following principles of law could be said to have been laid
down, rather very well explained, in Vihaan Kumar (supra):
a) The requirement of informing the person arrested of the grounds
of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory constitutional
condition.
b) Once a person is arrested, his right to liberty under Article 21 is
curtailed. When such an important fundamental right is curtailed,
it is necessary that the person concerned must understand on
what grounds he has been arrested.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 133
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
c) The mode of conveying the information of the grounds of arrest
must be meaningful so as to serve the true object underlying
Article 22(1).
d) If the grounds of arrest are not informed as soon as may be
after the arrest, it would amount to a violation of the fundamental
right of the arrestee guaranteed under Article 22(1).
e) On the failure to comply with the requirement of informing the
grounds of arrest as soon as may be after the arrest, the arrest
would stand vitiated. Once the arrest is held to be vitiated, the
person arrested cannot remain in custody even for a second.
f) If the police want to prove communication of the grounds of
arrest only based on a diary entry, it is necessary to incorporate
those grounds of arrest in the diary entry or any other document.
The grounds of arrest must exist before the same are informed.
g) When an arrestee pleads before a court that the grounds of arrest
were not communicated, the burden to prove the compliance
of Article 22(1) is on the police authorities.
h) The grounds of arrest should not only be provided to the arrestee
but also to his family members and relatives so that necessary
arrangements are made to secure the release of the person
arrested at the earliest possible opportunity so as to make the
mandate of Article 22(1) meaningful and effective, failing which,
such arrest may be rendered illegal.
19. We must clarify one important aspect of Vihaan Kumar (supra). In
Vihaan Kumar (supra) the case was that there was an absolute
failure on the part of the police to provide the grounds of arrest. In
Vihaan Kumar (supra) reliance was placed upon the entry in the case
diary which recorded that the appellant therein was arrested after
informing him of the grounds of arrest. In the case at hand, it is not
in dispute that the grounds of arrest were supplied to the arrestee,
however, the case put up is that those grounds are not meaningful
and are bereft of necessary essential information.
20. In this appeal our endeavor would be to consider whether the
grounds of arrest supplied to the appellant’s son at the time of his
arrest could be said to be meaningful and sufficient enough to give
a broad idea to the person arrested of the accusations levelled and
as to why he was being taken into custody.
134 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
21. Having looked into the grounds of arrest which were supplied to the
son of the appellant at the time of his arrest, it is difficult for us to
take the view that the grounds do not make any sense or are not
meaningful or are just an eyewash.
22. In the case of State of Bombay v. Atma Ram reported in 1951 SCC
43 : AIR 1951 SC 157 (C), it was held by this Court that, the test is
whether the communication of the grounds of arrest is sufficient to
enable the detained person to make a representation at the earliest
opportunity.
23. Similarly in the case of Magan Lal Jivabhai, in re, AIR 1951 Bom
33(D), it was held that, the only possible and reasonable construction
that can be put upon the language of Article 22(6) is that the detaining
authority, while furnishing grounds of detention, is required to state
the facts on account of which he is satisfied that the detention is
necessary in the interest of the security of the State, maintenance,
of public order, etc.
24. The only privilege a detaining authority can claim against the
disclosure of facts is on the grounds of public interest. If no facts at
all leading to the detention of a detenu are to be mentioned in the
grounds which are to be furnished to him, then obviously the intention
underlying the enactment of Article 22(6) would be frustrated.
25. In both the cases referred to above, the persons had been detained
under the provisions of Preventive Detention Act. The information to
be supplied to such a person is governed by Clause (5) of Article 22.
In the present case, the son of the appellant has been arrested for
specific offences as mentioned in the grounds of arrest. His case is
governed by Clause (1) and not by Clause (5) of Article 22. However,
under both the clauses, certain information has to be supplied to the
person arrested and detained.
26. Under Clause (1), the ground for arrest has to be communicated
to the person arrested. Under Clause (5) the grounds on which the
order of detention has been made has to be communicated to the
person detained.
27. The object underlying the provision that the grounds of arrest should
be communicated to the person arrested has been very succinctly
explained in Vihaan Kumar (supra). On learning about the grounds
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 135
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
for arrest, the person concerned will be in a position to make an
application before the appropriate Court for bail, or move the High
Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Further, the information will enable
the arrested person to prepare his defence in time for the purposes of
his trial. For these reasons, it has been provided by the Constitution
that, the ground for the arrest must be communicated to the person
arrested as soon as possible.
28. For the purposes of Clause (1) of Article 22, it is not necessary
for the authorities to furnish full details of the offence. However,
the information should be sufficient to enable the arrested person
to understand why he has been arrested. The grounds to be
communicated to the arrested person should be somewhat similar
to the charge framed by the Court for the trial of a case.
29. The rule in Article 22(1) that a person upon being arrested must be
informed of the grounds of arrest is similar to, though not exactly
identical with, the rules prevailing in England and in United States
of America. The rule prevailing in England is that
“in normal circumstances an arrest without warrant either by
a policeman or by a private person can be justified only if it is
an arrest on a charge made known to the person arrested”;
(per Viscount Simon L.C. in — ‘Christie v. Leachinsky (1947
AC 573 at p. 586(F).”
30. It is a rule of common law and is described in different languages by
different authorities, but the meaning is the same; the arrested person
must be told for what he is arrested or be informed of the cause of
his arrest. In the United States the accused has the constitutional
right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation”; see
6th Amendment to the American Constitution. In Hooper v. Lane,
(1857) 6 HLC 443 : 10 ER 1368 (G), one of the reasons for the rule
was said to be that the person arrested should know whether he is
or is not bound to submit to the arrest. In Christie v. Leachinsky
reported in (1947) AC 573 Lord Simonds observed at page 591 as
thus:
“Putting first things first, I would say that it is the right
of every citizen to be free from arrest unless there is in
some other citizen, whether a constable or not, the right
to arrest him. And I would say next that it is the corollary
of the right of every citizen to be thus free from arrest that
136 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
he should be entitled to resist arrest unless that arrest
is lawful. How can these rights be reconciled with the
proposition that he may be arrested without knowing why
he is arrested? ……. Blind, unquestioning obedience is
the law of tyrants and of slaves: it does not yet flourish
on English soil”.
31. Professor Glanvile L. Williams in his article “Requisites of a Valid
Arrest” in (1954) Criminal Law Review, at page 16, criticised the
reason given by Lord Simonds as “somewhat legalistic” because very
few people know the law of arrest in such a way that they can decide
on the spot whether the arrest to which they are being subjected to
is legal. In his opinion, the true reason is a different one, e.g., the
reason given by Viscount 11th Simon L.C. in the same case at page
588 in the following words:
“If the charge on suspicion of which the man if arrested is
then and there made known to him, he has the opportunity
of giving an explanation of any misunderstanding or of
calling attention to other persons for whom he may have
been mistaken with the result that further inquiries may
save him from the consequences of false accusation.”
32. Another reason given by Lord Simonds at page 592 is that the
arrested person may without a moment’s delay take such steps as
will enable him to regain freedom. One more reason is that it acts
as a safeguard against despotism and over-zeal. As remarked by
Professor Glanville L. Williams (supra), at page 17:
“the rule has the effect of preventing the police from arresting
on vague general suspicion, not knowing the precise crime
suspected but hoping to obtain evidence of the commission
of some crime for which they have power to arrest”.
33. In McNabb v. United States of America reported in (1943) 318 US
332 (H), Frankfurter, J. observed at page 343:
“Experience has therefore counselled that safeguards
must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous
as well as the despotic ……………. Legislation such
as this, requiring that the police must with reasonable
promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested
persons, constitutes an important safeguard”.
[2025] 7 S.C.R. 137
Kasireddy Upender Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors.
34. In United States v. Cruikshank reported in (1876) 92 US 542, it
was observed by Waite C.J. that the accused is given the right to
have a specification of the charge against him in order that he may
decide whether he should present his defence by motion to quash,
demurrer or plea.
35. The debates of the Constituent Assembly which framed the
Constitution are relevant for the purpose of ascertaining the reason
behind the insertion of a certain Article in the Constitution. In the
Draft of the Constitution, the Article corresponding to the Article under
consideration was Article 15A. The reason given for the inclusion of
the said Article was that it contained safeguards against illegal or
arbitrary arrests (9 Constituent Assembly Debates, p. 1497).(See:
Vimal Kishore Mehrotra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 All 56)
36. If a person is arrested on a warrant, the grounds for reasons for
the arrest is the warrant itself; if the warrant is read over to him,
that is sufficient compliance with the requirement that he should be
informed of the grounds for his arrest. If he is arrested without a
warrant, he must be told why he has been arrested. If he is arrested
for committing an offence, he must be told that he has committed
a certain offence for which he would be placed on trial. In order to
inform him that he has committed a certain offence, he must be told
of the acts done by him which amounts to the offence. He must be
informed of the precise acts done by him for which he would be
tried; informing him merely of the law applicable to such acts would
not be enough. (See: Vimal Kishore Mehrotra (supra))
37. In the overall view of the matter more particularly having gone
through the grounds of arrest we have reached the conclusion that
the requirement in terms of para 21(b) as laid down in Vihaan Kumar
(supra) could be said to have been fulfilled.
38. In view of the aforesaid, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The
same is accordingly dismissed.
39. It is needless to clarify that it shall be open for the person arrested
viz. Kessireddy Raja Shekhar Reddy and in judicial custody as on
date to apply for regular bail before the competent court. If any
regular bail application is pending as on date, the same shall be
taken up for hearing at the earliest and be decided in accordance
138 [2025] 7 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
with law keeping in mind the well-settled principles governing the
grant of regular bail.
40. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.
SLP (CRL.) No. 5691 OF 2025
1. In view of the judgment and order pronounced in Criminal Appeal @
SLP (CRL.) No. 7746 of 2025, it is needless for us to now go into
legal issues raised in the present petition. We believe that it would
be just an academic exercise for us. However, the question of law
is kept open. The petition is disposed of accordingly.
Result of the case: Matters disposed of.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey
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