KARNATAKA POWER TRANSMISSION CORPORATION LIMITEDversusREKHA & ORS

                     [2026] 8 S.C.R. 489 : 2026 INSC 847

      Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited
                             v.
                        Rekha & Ors.
                          (Civil Appeal No. 10659 of 2026)
                                    12 August 2026
                           [Sanjay Karol* and
                    Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.]


                                Issue for Consideration
           Maintainability of writ petition in cases of electrocution; the
           yardstick to be used in determining compensation in such cases.

                                       Headnotes†
           Electrocution – Writ petition u/Art.226 – Maintainability – High
           Court directed the appellant-Corporation to pay compensation
           holding the writ petitions to be maintainable and the disputed
           facts to not be of much relevance because, according to it,
           it is the standard of absolute liability that is applicable and
           not strict liability – Interference with:
           Held: If questions of fact are disputed, then Art.226 would not
           be an appropriate remedy in cases of electrocution – In cases
           such as these i.e. electrocution of an individual, the standard of
           liability upon bodies such as the appellant is strict, for not in all
           cases can it be said that the electricity boards are liable – The
           transmission of electricity is undoubtedly inherently dangerous –
           Those who carry out the inherently dangerous activity should bear
           the burden, and the State is no exception to that rule – Such
           enterprises operate on a loss distribution mechanism i.e. they are
           in the best position to spread the loss incurred through insurance
           or higher prices, as the case may be – They are expected to
           factor in these possibilities – It is for these reasons that they are
           liable to compensate the injured/deceased irrespective of any
           fault on their part, provided that none of the exceptions to the
           rule of strict liability apply to the case at hand – Granted that they
           would have taken all reasonable care to protect individuals from
           electrocution – Further, the multiplier method cannot be applied
           to determine compensation in cases of electrocution – Since the

* Author
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                           Supreme Court Reports


       calculation paradigm as provided for in connection with the Motor
       Vehicles Act, 1988 is dependent on the multiplier, the scenario
       thereunder could not have been applied mutatis mutandis to
       electrocution cases, as done by the High Court in the impugned
       judgment – Electricity Act 2003 does not provide for the method
       to calculate compensation – What it does provide is the liability
       of the licensee to pay compensation in certain scenarios u/s.57
       thereof but does not say anything regarding the method applicable
       to calculating the same – The overarching principle of just and
       reasonable, fair compensation would govern the calculation here
       as well, based on the income of the person and other related
       claims – In the present case, there are disputed questions of facts
       involved, thus, the Writ Petition seeking compensation filed by the
       respondent was not maintainable – Interim compensation of Rs.5
       Lakhs awarded – Impugned judgment of the Division Bench as
       also the Single Judge quashed and set aside. [Paras 8, 14-16]
       Electrocution – Compensation – Yardstick to be used in
       determination of, discussed. [Para 15]
       Electrocution – Standard of liability of electricity boards –
       Strict or Absolute Liability – Stated. [Para 14]

                               Case Law Cited
       Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P [2021] 3 SCR 406 :
       (2021) 6 SCC 771; T.N. Cements Corpn. Ltd. v. Unicon Engineers
       (2025) 4 SCC 1; Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v.
       Sukamani Das [1999] Supp. 2 SCR 458 : (1999) 7 SCC 298;
       M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Shriram-Oleum Gas [1987] 1 SCR
       819 : (1987) 1 SCC 395; Rajkot Municipal Corpn. v. Manjulben
       Jayantilal Nakum [1997] 1 SCR 304 : (1997) 9 SCC 552; Union
       of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar [2008] 7 SCR 673 : (2008)
       9 SCC 527; M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari [2002] 1 SCR
       164 : (2002) 2 SCC 162; Kaushnuma Begum & Ors. v. New India
       Assurance Co. Ltd. [2001] 1 SCR 8 : (2001) 2 SCC 9; Raman v.
       Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. [2014] 13 SCR 842 : (2014)
       15 SCC 1; Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha [2013] 12 SCR 30 :
       (2014) 1 SCC 384 – referred to.
       Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330; Quebec Railway,
       Light, Heat & Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry 1920 SCC OnLine
       PC 10 – referred to.
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                               491

         Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v.
                            Rekha & Ors.

                                  List of Acts
      Electricity Act 2003; Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

                              List of Keywords
      Electrocution; Standard of liability of electricity boards; Strict
      liability; Rule in Rylands applies to electricity also; Absolute
      liability; Maintainability of writ petition in cases of electrocution;
      Compensation in cases of electrocution; Yardstick to be used in
      determining compensation; Disputed questions of facts involved;
      Questions of facts disputed; Writ Petition not maintainable;
      Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation; Imputation of liability
      to pay compensation; Yardstick of compensation; Multiplier method
      cannot determine compensation in cases of electrocution; Interim
      compensation; Just, reasonable and fair compensation.

                             Case Arising From
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10659
      of 2026

      From the Judgment and Order dated 23.01.2025 of the High
      Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in WA No. 861 of 2022

      With
      Civil Appeal No. 10660 of 2026

                          Appearances for Parties
      Advs. for the Appellant(s):
      Tushar Mehta, S.G. S. Sriranga, Sr. Adv., Ms. Srishti Govil,
      Ms. Sumana Naganand, Ms. Ashwini Ravindra, Ms. Tanish
      Manuja, Tushar Kanti Mohindoor, Pranav Jain, Ms. Hepsiba
      Bobin, Ms. Anaida Khan, Ms. Astha.

      Advs. for the Respondent(s):
      Sarim Naved, Ms. Maulshree Pathak, Zeeshan Ahmad,
      Ms. Aditi Prakash, Amicus Curiae, Anantha Narayana M.G., Ankur
      S. Kulkarni, Ms. Uditha Chakravarthy, Ms. Abhay Singh Yadav,
      Ms. Patil Rekha Chandra Gouda, Shubhranshu Padhi,
      Pranav Giri, Jay Nirupam, D. Girish Kumar, Ekansh Sisodia,
      Ritik Sharma.
492                                                            [2026] 8 S.C.R.

                              Supreme Court Reports


                     Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                   Judgment

       Sanjay Karol, J.

1.     Leave granted.
2.     Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation 1 challenges the
       imputation of liability upon itself, and the consequent order to
       pay compensation made by a Learned Single Judge of the High
       Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru2 and its subsequent confirmation
       by a Division Bench of the High Court in Writ Appeals preferred
       thereagainst3.
3.     It has to be noted, right at the outset, that the impugned judgement
       of the Division Bench of the High Court disposed of three appeals
       out of which the KPTC has chosen to file the present appeal
       against only two of the three. In the present case, respondent
       No. 1, namely Rekha, is the widow of one N. Subramanya who
       died due to an incident of electrocution on 22 February 2018. A first
       information report was registered the same day, setting into motion
       the law, the outcome thereof is not part of the record. Apparently,
       the respondent no.1 filed a writ petition, the subject matter of these
       appeals. The Appellant herein opposed the petitions on the ground
       of inter alia maintainability; lack of fault on the part of the Appellant;
       and the presence of disputed questions of fact. Rejecting these
       objections, both the learned single Judge and Division Bench held
       the writ petitions to be maintainable since what was sought by the
       writ petitioners is a remedy for tortious act of the State and such
       a prayer not requiring exhausting of private law remedy before the
       Civil Court. On merits the court held the appellant liable, to grant
       compensation for which the framework of the Motor Vehicles Act,
       19884 was adopted. Both the Courts awarded Rs. 25,52,500/- with
       interest payable at the rate of 6% after three months of the date
       of judgment.


1    KPTC
2    In WP No. 1383 of 2020
3    WA No. 861 of 2022
4    MVA
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                             493

           Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v.
                              Rekha & Ors.

4.     In Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) 24854 of 2025, the facts in brief were that
       the Respondent therein, namely Muizz Ahmad Shariff, had jumped
       onto the roof of a neighboring building to retrieve a cricket ball,
       when in the process of doing so, he came in contact with a 66KV
       Line and was severely injured. The learned Single Judge awarded
       Rs. 44,32,050/- which was upheld by the Division Bench.
5.     The questions to be decided by us are the maintainability of the
       writ petition and the yardstick that is to be used in determining
       compensation in cases of electrocution.
       We have heard the learned Solicitor General, learned senior counsel/
       counsel for the parties.
6.     The question of maintainability of the writ petition is no longer res-
       integra. Numerous judgments of this Court have delineated on this
       question. We may refer to one such judgment where the principles
       regarding maintainability have been culled out. In Radha Krishan
       Industries v. State of H.P.5, it has been observed:
               “27. The principles of law which emerge are that:
               27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to
               issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement
               of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well.
               27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a
               writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power
               of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy
               is available to the aggrieved person.
               27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise
               where : (a) the writ petition has been filed for the
               enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III
               of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the
               principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings
               are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a
               legislation is challenged.
               27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest
               the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the



5    (2021) 6 SCC 771
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                            Supreme Court Reports


               Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a
               writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious
               alternate remedy is provided by law.
               27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself
               prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right
               or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory
               remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under
               Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion
               of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience
               and discretion.
               27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of
               fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in
               a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively
               of the view that the nature of the controversy requires
               the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would
               not readily be interfered with.”
       These principles have been referred to with approval by a bench of
       three judges in T.N. Cements Corpn. Ltd. v. Unicon Engineers6
       where it further stood clarified that:
               “55. It has been well-settled through a legion of judicial
               pronouncements of this Court that the writ courts, despite
               the availability of alternative remedies, may exercise writ
               jurisdiction at least in three contingencies — (i) where
               there is a violation of principles of natural justice or
               fundamental rights; (ii) where an order in a proceeding
               is wholly without jurisdiction; or (iii) where the vires of
               an Act is challenged… ”
7.     Specifically in the context of cases of electrocution, whether or not
       a petition under Article 226 is maintainable, is also in the realm
       of the well-settled law. In Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd.
       (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das7, G.T. Nanavati J. made observations
       directly relevant for us:



6    (2025) 4 SCC 1
7    (1999) 7 SCC 298
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                           495

         Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v.
                            Rekha & Ors.

            “6. In our opinion, the High Court committed an error in
            entertaining the writ petitions even though they were not
            fit cases for exercising power under Article 226 of the
            Constitution. The High Court went wrong in proceeding
            on the basis that as the deaths had taken place because
            of electrocution as a result of the deceased coming
            into contact with snapped live wires of the electric
            transmission lines of the appellants, that “admittedly/
            prima facie amounted to negligence on the part of the
            appellants”. The High Court failed to appreciate that all
            these cases were actions in tort and negligence was
            required to be established firstly by the claimants. The
            mere fact that the wire of the electric transmission line
            belonging to Appellant 1 had snapped and the deceased
            had come in contact with it and had died was not by itself
            sufficient for awarding compensation. It also required to
            be examined whether the wire had snapped as a result
            of any negligence of the appellants and under which
            circumstances the deceased had come in contact with
            the wire. In view of the specific defences raised by the
            appellants in each of these cases they deserved an
            opportunity to prove that proper care and precautions
            were taken in maintaining the transmission lines and
            yet the wires had snapped because of circumstances
            beyond their control or unauthorised intervention of third
            parties or that the deceased had not died in the manner
            stated by the petitioners. These questions could not have
            been decided properly on the basis of affidavits only. It is
            the settled legal position that where disputed questions
            of facts are involved a petition under Article 226 of the
            Constitution is not a proper remedy. The High Court has
            not and could not have held that the disputes in these
            cases were raised for the sake of raising them and that
            there was no substance therein. The High Court should
            have directed the writ petitioners to approach the civil
            court as it was done in OJC No. 5229 of 1995.”
8.    What is been held here is that if questions of fact are disputed,
      then Article 226 would not be an appropriate remedy in cases of
      electrocution.
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                            Supreme Court Reports


9.     The record reveals the following facts to be disputed in respect
       of :
       (A)   Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 24849 of 2025:
             (i)     Whether using an aluminium ladder while working in
                     a coffee plantation, in such a manner that it came in
                     contact with an 11 KV Line, constitutes negligence on
                     the part of the respondent?
             (ii)    Whether the owner of the coffee plantation was himself
                     negligent for having provided the respondent with the
                     aluminium ladder, in the first instance?
             (iii)   Whether the backup relays, which according to the report
                     of the Assistant Executive Engineer, were in satisfactory
                     condition, were actually so or not?
             (iv)    Whether the appellant escapes liability because it was
                     responsible for maintenance of electric lines only above
                     a certain voltage and as such, if at all, liability would be
                     on the Respondent No. 2 in the present case?

       (B)   Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 24854 of 2025 :
             (i)     Whether the statutorily mandated distance between the
                     electric line and the building, at 4 metres, was complied
                     with or not;
             (ii)    In terms of the undertaking dated 19th April 2000, would
                     make the building owner solely liable for payment of
                     compensation;
             (iii)   Whether negligence can be imputed to the appellant
                     since it provided connection to the building in question,
                     if it indeed was the case that the statutorily mandated
                     minimum distance was complied with or not;
10.    The High Court had, in effect, held the disputed facts to not be of
       much relevance because, according to it, it is the standard of absolute
       liability that is applicable and not strict liability. Since absolute liability
       obviously has no exceptions, the presence of disputed facts, if at all,
       would not absolve the appellant herein. In deciding the correctness
       of this finding, we must then go to the meaning of absolute liability
       and strict liability.
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                               497

            Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v.
                               Rekha & Ors.

11.     Absolute liability, as the name itself suggests, is a kind of liability
        that leaves no scope for exception from such liability. To put it
        simply, the person who has been deemed to be absolutely liable
        shall be so liable irrespective of the facts and circumstances in
        which such imputation has been made upon them. It is applied
        only to enterprises and comes into play when the activity in which
        the enterprise is engaged, is inherently dangerous or hazardous
        and someone has been harmed as a result of the accident that
        has taken place in performing such activity. The classic case in this
        regard is the Constitution Bench decision in Oleum Gas Leak Case
        (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Shriram - Oleum Gas)8 where an
        industrial unit of Shriram Foods and Fertilisers, located in Delhi,
        suffered a leak of Oleum Gas leading to danger to the lives of the
        people in the area. Bhagwati C.J. held thus:
                “31. …We no longer need the crutches of a foreign
                legal order. We are certainly prepared to receive light
                from whatever source it comes but we have to build
                our own jurisprudence and we cannot countenance an
                argument that merely because the law in England does
                not recognise the rule of strict and absolute liability in
                cases of hazardous or inherently dangerous activities or
                the rule laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL
                330 : 19 LT 220 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] as developed
                in England recognises certain limitations and exceptions,
                we in India must hold back our hands and not venture
                to evolve a new principle of liability since English courts
                have not done so. We have to develop our own law and
                if we find that it is necessary to construct a new principle
                of liability to deal with an unusual situation which has
                arisen and which is likely to arise in future on account
                of hazardous or inherently dangerous industries which
                are concommitant to an industrial economy, there is no
                reason why we should hesitate to evolve such principle
                of liability merely because it has not been so done in
                England. We are of the view that an enterprise which
                is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous
                industry which poses a potential threat to the health


8     (1987) 1 SCC 395
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                              Supreme Court Reports


                and safety of the persons working in the factory and
                residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and
                non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that
                no harm results to anyone on account of hazardous
                or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which
                it has undertaken. The enterprise must be held to be
                under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or
                inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged
                must be conducted with the highest standards of safety
                and if any harm results on account of such activity, the
                enterprise must be absolutely liable to compensate for
                such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise
                to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the
                harm occurred without any negligence on its part… We
                would therefore hold that where in enterprise is engaged
                in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity and
                harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the
                operation of such hazardous or inherently dangerous
                activity resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas the
                enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate
                all those who are affected by the accident and such
                liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which
                operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability
                under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL
                330 : 19 LT 220 : (1861-73) All ER Rep 1]”
                                                     (emphasis supplied)

12.     Now let us look to the concept of strict liability. The general rule
        is that when a person collects or brings upon his land anything
        that is likely to cause mischief and if such thing escapes, then
        this person is liable for all natural consequences that follow. (See
        Rylands v. Fletcher9 ; Rajkot Municipal Corpn. v. Manjulben
        Jayantilal Nakum10,). Relevant observations of the Privy Council
        in this regard made in Quebec Railway, Light, Heat & Power Co.
        Ltd. v. Vandry11, are reproduced as under:


9     (1868) LR 3 HL 330
10    (1997) 9 SCC 552
11    1920 SCC OnLine PC 10
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                         499

         Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v.
                            Rekha & Ors.

            “25. Two decisions which were pressed on their Lordships
            attention require particular examination namely Canadian
            Pacific Ry. Co. v. Roy [[1902] A.C. 220.] and Dumphy v.
            Montreal Light Heat and Power Co. [[1907] A.C. 454.] .
            The former is a case of damage by the escape of sparks
            from a locomotive engine and the decision in terms is in
            line with the well-known authorities of Vaughan v. Taff
            Vale Ry. Co. [[1860] 5 H. & N. 679.] and Hammersmith
            and City Ry. Co. v. Brand [L.R. 4 H.L. 171.] it is case
            of “plain words authorizing the doing of the very thing
            complained of”. Dumphy v. Montreal Light Heat and
            Power Co. [[1907] A.C. 454.] is a case of high-tension
            electricity released by the act of a third party’s workman
            whom the jury acquitted of negligence. No specific article
            of the Code is mentioned and the presence of high
            tension current in the cable was only the causa sine
            qua nonand the human action which released it was
            the causa causans of the accident. There was statutory
            authority to circulate high-tension electricity overhead
            but on the simple issue, whether the damage caused
            by the escape of that electricity was caused by the
            company’s negligence it was held that no negligence
            had been proved and indeed but for the act of a stranger
            who himself was not careless, the company’s electricity
            would have done no harm to anybody.
            26. Whether in the present cases the evidence
            established affirmatively a case of negligence against
            the defendants is a question on which the Supreme
            Court arrived at no definite conclusion. Had it been
            necessary the respondents would have been entitled
            to claim before their Lordships’ Board that this issue
            should be decided now, since the terms imposed on
            the appellants under the special leave to appeal bound
            them to rely on points of law only, but did not preclude
            the respondents from meeting those points upon the
            facts in any way which the evidence warranted. In the
            view, however, above taken of the case no decision on
            this question is needed.”
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                             Supreme Court Reports


       A subsequent decision in 2008 titled Union of India v. Prabhakaran
       Vijaya Kumar12, discussed this rule in the following terms:
               “22. Strict liability focuses on the nature of the defendant’s
               activity rather than, as in negligence, the way in which it is
               carried on (vide Torts by Michael Jones, 4th Edn., p. 247).
               There are many activities which are so hazardous that
               they may constitute a danger to the person or property
               of another. The principle of strict liability states that the
               undertakers of these activities have to compensate for
               the damage caused by them irrespective of any fault on
               their part. As Fleming says “permission to conduct such
               activity is in effect made conditional on its absorbing the
               cost of the accidents it causes, as an appropriate item of
               its overheads” (see Fleming on Torts, 6th Edn., p. 302).
               …
               24. The basis of the doctrine of strict liability is twofold: (i)
               The people who engage in particularly hazardous activities
               should bear the burden of the risk of damage that their
               activities generate, and (ii) it operates as a loss distribution
               mechanism, the person who does such hazardous activity
               (usually a corporation) being in the best position to spread
               the loss via insurance and higher prices for its products
               (vide Torts by Michael Jones, 4th Edn., p. 267).
               …
               27. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL 330 :
               (1861-73) All ER Rep 1] was subsequently interpreted to
               cover a variety of things likely to do mischief on escape,
               irrespective of whether they were dangerous per se e.g.
               water, electricity, explosions, oil, noxious fumes, colliery
               spoil, poisonous vegetation, a flagpole, etc. (see Winfield
               and Jolowicz on Tort, 13th Edn., p. 425) vide National
               Telephone Co. v. Baker [(1893) 2 Ch 186], Eastern and
               South African Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. Cape Town Tramways
               Co. Ltd. [(1902) AC 381 : (1900-03) All ER Rep Ext
               1316 (PC)], Hillier v. Air Ministry [(1962) CLY 2084], etc.


12   (2008) 9 SCC 527
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                            501

         Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v.
                            Rekha & Ors.

            In America, the rule was adapted and expressed in the
            following words “one who carried on an ultra-hazardous
            activity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels
            the actor should recognise as likely to be harmed by the
            unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting
            thereto from that which makes the activity ultra-hazardous,
            although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm”
            (vide Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 3, p. 41).
            …
            35. However, we are now witnessing a swing once again
            in favour of the principle of strict liability. The Bhopal
            Gas Tragedy, the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the crude
            oil spill in 1988 on to the Alaska coastline from the oil
            tanker Exxon Valdez, and other similar incidents have
            shocked the conscience of people all over the world and
            have aroused thinkers to the dangers in industrial and
            other activities in modern society.
            …
            39. The decision in M.C. Mehta case [(1987) 1 SCC
            395 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 37 : AIR 1987 SC 1086] related
            to a concern working for private profit. However, in our
            opinion the same principle will also apply to statutory
            authorities (like the Railways), public corporations or
            local bodies which may be social utility undertakings
            not working for private profit.
            40. It is true that attempts to apply the principle of
            Rylands v. Fletcher against public bodies have not on
            the whole succeeded vide Administrative Law by P.P.
            Craig, 2nd Edn., p. 446, mainly because of the idea
            that a body which acts not for its own profit but for the
            benefit of the community should not be liable. However,
            in our opinion, this idea is based on a misconception.
            Strict liability has no element of moral censure. It is
            because such public bodies benefit the community that
            it is unfair to leave the result of a non-negligent accident
            to lie fortuitously on a particular individual rather than to
            spread it among the community generally.”
502                                                             [2026] 8 S.C.R.

                            Supreme Court Reports


       It has to be noted that the judgment in M.P. Electricity Board v.
       Shail Kumari13; which arose from a suit for damages filed in a case
       of electrocution, this court held the exception to the principle of strict
       liability not to be applicable. Since the present case is also dealing
       with a matter concerning electrocution, the discussion made therein
       is relevant for our purposes and accordingly reproduced below:
               “7. It is an admitted fact that the responsibility to supply
               electric energy in the particular locality was statutorily
               conferred on the Board. If the energy so transmitted
               causes injury or death of a human being, who gets
               unknowingly trapped into it the primary liability to
               compensate the sufferer is that of the supplier of the
               electric energy. So long as the voltage of electricity
               transmitted through the wires is potentially of dangerous
               dimension the managers of its supply have the added
               duty to take all safety measures to prevent escape of such
               energy or to see that the wire snapped would not remain
               live on the road as users of such road would be under
               peril. It is no defence on the part of the management
               of the Board that somebody committed mischief by
               siphoning such energy to his private property and that the
               electrocution was from such diverted line. It is the lookout
               of the managers of the supply system to prevent such
               pilferage by installing necessary devices. At any rate,
               if any live wire got snapped and fell on the public road
               the electric current thereon should automatically have
               been disrupted. Authorities manning such dangerous
               commodities have extra duty to chalk out measures to
               prevent such mishaps.
               8. Even assuming that all such measures have been
               adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving
               hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable
               under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered
               by any other person, irrespective of any negligence
               or carelessness on the part of the managers of such
               undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable


13   (2002) 2 SCC 162
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                                    503

            Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v.
                               Rekha & Ors.

                risk inherent in the very nature of such activity. The
                liability cast on such person is known, in law, as “strict
                liability”. It differs from the liability which arises on account
                of the negligence or fault in this way i.e. the concept
                of negligence comprehends that the foreseeable harm
                could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions. If the
                defendant did all that which could be done for avoiding the
                harm he cannot be held liable when the action is based
                on any negligence attributed. But such consideration is not
                relevant in cases of strict liability where the defendant is
                held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided
                the particular harm by taking precautions.”
13.     Exceptions to this rule have been recognised in numerous judgments.
        Among others, reference can be made to Kaushnuma Begum &
        Ors. vs New India Assurance Co. Ltd.14 where the principles of the
        exception were reiterated. The relevant portion of Para 14 thereof
        is extracted hereunder:
                “14. … They are:
                (1) Consent of the plaintiff i.e. volenti non fit injuria.
                (2) Common benefit i.e. where the source of the danger
                is maintained for the common benefit of the plaintiff and
                the defendant, the defendant is not liable for its escape.
                (3) Act of stranger i.e. if the escape was caused by the
                unforeseeable act of a stranger, the rule does not apply.
                (4) Exercise of statutory authority i.e. the rule will stand
                excluded either when the act was done under a statutory
                duty or when a statute provides otherwise.
                (5) Act of God or vis major i.e. circumstances which no
                human foresight can provide against and of which human
                prudence is not bound to recognise the possibility.
                (6) Default of the plaintiff i.e. if the damage is caused
                solely by the act or default of the plaintiff himself, the
                rule will not apply.



14    (2001) 2 SCC 9
504                                                             [2026] 8 S.C.R.

                            Supreme Court Reports


                (7) Remoteness of consequences i.e. the rule cannot
                be applied ad infinitum, because even according to
                the formulation of the rule made by Blackburn, J., the
                defendant is answerable only for all the damage “which
                is the natural consequence of its escape”.”
14.     Now the question is whether in cases such as these i.e. electrocution
        of an individual, the standard of liability upon bodies such as the
        appellant is strict or absolute. We are of the considered view that to
        impose strict liability would be more appropriate, for not in all cases
        can it be said that the electricity boards are liable. The transmission
        of electricity is undoubtedly inherently dangerous. Those who carry
        out the inherently dangerous activity should bear the burden, and the
        State is no exception to that rule. Such enterprises operate on a loss
        distribution mechanism i.e. they are in the best position to spread
        the loss incurred through insurance or higher prices, as the case
        may be. It can also be said that they are expected to factor in these
        possibilities. It is for these reasons that they are liable to compensate
        the injured/deceased irrespective of any fault on their part, provided
        that none of the exceptions to the rule of strict liability apply to the
        case at hand. Granted that they would have taken all reasonable care
        to protect individuals from electrocution. We are supported in this view
        by the observations made in Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar, where it
        has been categorically held that the rule in Rylands (supra) applies
        to a number of different categories of cases inter alia, electricity also.
15.     On the question of yardstick of compensation, we find this Court to
        have observed in a two-Judge Bench decision in Raman v. Uttar
        Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd.15, that the multiplier method cannot
        be applied to determine compensation in cases of electrocution.
        Since the calculation paradigm as provided for in connection with
        the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is dependent on the multiplier, the
        scenario thereunder could not have been applied mutatis mutandis
        to electrocution cases, as done by the High Court in the impugned
        judgment. It is a matter of law that the Electricity Act 2003 does
        not provide for the method to calculate compensation. What it does
        provide is the liability of the licensee to pay compensation in certain
        scenarios under Section 57 thereof but does not say anything


15    (2014) 15 SCC 1
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                           505

              Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v.
                                 Rekha & Ors.

        regarding the method applicable to calculating the same. This holding
        in Raman (supra) relies on Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha16. Be
        that as it may, the overarching principle of just and reasonable, fair
        compensation would govern the calculation here as well, based on
        the income of the person and other related claims.
16.     Having held as above that there are disputed questions of
        facts involved, we are of the view that the Writ Petition seeking
        compensation filed by the respondent was not maintainable. While
        issuing notice, we had stayed the operation of the impugned
        judgment and by a subsequent order dated 18.12.2025, had ordered
        the payment of interim compensation to the tune of Rs. 5 Lakhs.
        The impugned judgment of the Learned Division Bench as also
        the Single Judge are quashed and set aside. However, the end
        result here would be of no consequence to the remedy available
        to the respondent to take recourse to such alternate remedies as
        are available against the appellant before the concerned forum. As
        and when filed, the same shall be decided in accordance with law,
        on an expeditious basis, uninfluenced by any observations made
        herein. It is further clarified that the amount of compensation paid in
        these proceedings shall not be recovered from the respondents and
        neither will it influence the total compensation as may be awarded in
        the appropriate proceedings, should it arrive at such a conclusion.

        Civil Appeal @ Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24854 of 2025
17.     In view of the conclusion arrived at in the Civil Appeal @ arising out
        of SLP(C) No(s).24849 of 2025, the Respondents herein are also
        at liberty to take appropriate action in the above terms.
18.     Both the Appeals are allowed. Pending application(s), if any, shall
        stand disposed of. Parties will bear their own costs.

        Result of the case: Appeals allowed.




        †
            Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey



16   (2014) 1 SCC 384