KARAN SINGHversusSTATE OF HARYANA

                [2025] 1 S.C.R. 1370 : 2025 INSC 133

                               Karan Singh
                                     v.
                             State of Haryana
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 1076 of 2014)
                               31 January 2025
               [Abhay S. Oka* and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       The Trial Court convicted the appellant for the offences punishable
       u/ss.304-B and 498-A of IPC; By the impugned judgment, the High
       Court has confirmed the conviction and sentence.

                                  Headnotes†
       Penal Code, 1860 – ss.304-B and 498-A – Dowry Prohibition
       Act, 1961 – s.2 – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.113-B – Appellant
       married to victim-deceased on 25.06.1996 – On 02.04.1998,
       the deceased committed suicide – The Trial Court convicted
       the appellant for the offences punishable u/ss.304-B and 498-
       A of IPC – By the impugned judgment, the High Court has
       confirmed the conviction and sentence – Correctness:
       Held: There were three main witnesses: PW-6 (the mother
       of the deceased), PW-7 (brother of the deceased) and PW-8
       (maternal uncle of the deceased) – Both the Courts have believed
       the testimony of PW-6 and PW-7 – PW-6 was confronted by
       showing her prior statements at exhibit PD and DA recorded
       by the police – All the demands of dowry stated by her in her
       examination-in-chief are omissions as far as both the statements
       are concerned – These omissions are significant and relevant
       and, therefore, by virtue of explanation to s.162 of the CrPC, the
       same amounts to contradictions – The version of PW-6 in her
       statements recorded on 02.04.1998 and 06.04.1998 regarding
       providing dowry and regarding demands of dowry are omissions –
       There is something fundamental which goes to the root of the
       matter – While deposing about the demand of dowry, she has
       not deposed to any particular act of cruelty or harassment by the
       appellant – This is an essential ingredient of s.304-B – It is not

* Author
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                            1371

                     Karan Singh v. State of Haryana


     made out from the evidence of PW-6 – In the cross-examination,
     PW-7 stated that police had recorded his statements, which
     were marked as exhibits DG and DH – PW-7 accepted that the
     allegation that the accused used to maltreat his sister on account
     of insufficient dowry given in the marriage and having brought
     broken furniture is not found in both the police statements – He
     also stated that the demand for a refrigerator, a motorcycle, and a
     mixi does not find place in both statements – Therefore, the version
     of PW-7 in his examination-in-chief about the demands of dowry
     is a significant and relevant omission – Hence, this amounts to a
     contradiction – The statement of PW-8 was recorded more than
     two and half months from the date of the incident – Moreover, he
     had no personal knowledge whether the appellant had subjected
     the deceased to cruelty or harassment – Therefore, the prosecution
     did not prove the material ingredients of the offence punishable
     u/s.304-B – Not a single incident of cruelty covered by s.498-A was
     proved by the prosecution – Therefore, both the offences alleged
     against the appellant were not proved by the prosecution beyond
     a reasonable doubt – Hence, the impugned judgments dated
     09.11.2010 and 24.01.2002 are hereby quashed and set aside
     and the appellant is acquitted of the offences alleged against him.
     [Paras 2, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18]

     Penal Code, 1860 – ss.304-B – Essential ingredients:
     Held: The following are the essential ingredients of Section 304-B:
     a) The death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or
     bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise than under normal
     circumstances; b) The death must have been caused within seven
     years of her marriage; c) Soon before her death, she must have
     been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the husband or any
     relative of her husband; and d) Cruelty or harassment must be for,
     or in connection with, any demand for dowry. [Para 6]

                              Case Law Cited
     Charan Singh alias Charanjit Singh v. State of Uttarakhand [2023]
     3 SCR 511 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 454 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
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                             List of Keywords
     Statements recorded by police; Examination-in-chief; Cross-
     examination; Contradictions; Cruelty; Harassment; Dowry Death;
     Contradictory statements; Material ingredients of section 304-B IPC.

                            Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     1076 of 2014
     From the Judgment and Order dated 09.11.2010 of the High Court
     of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRLA No. 329 of 2002

                         Appearances for Parties
     Sanchar Anand, Devendra Singh, Shiv Kumar, Aman Kumar Thakur,
     Abhishek Bhardwaj, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Samar Vijay Singh, Ms. Sabarni Som, Aman Dev Sharma, Fateh
     Singh, Advs. for the Respondent.

                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                 Judgment

     Abhay S Oka, J.

     FACTUAL ASPECTS
1.   The appellant and his parents were tried for the offences punishable
     under Sections 304-B and 498-A read with Section 34 of the Indian
     Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’). While his parents were acquitted, the
     Sessions Court convicted the appellant for the offences punishable
     under Sections 304-B and 498-A of IPC. For the offence punishable
     under Section 304-B of IPC, the appellant was sentenced to undergo
     rigorous imprisonment for seven years. For the offence punishable
     under Section 498-A of IPC, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous
     imprisonment for one year. He was also sentenced to pay a fine of
     Rs.500/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to undergo rigorous
     imprisonment for three months. By the impugned judgment, the High
     Court has confirmed the conviction and sentence.
2.   Appellant married to deceased Asha Rani on 25th June 1996. On 2nd
     April 1998, the deceased committed suicide. After the postmortem,
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                        1373

                         Karan Singh v. State of Haryana


      the doctors opined that the death was due to asphyxia as a result of
      hanging. There were three main witnesses. PW-6 - Inder Kala (the
      mother of the deceased), PW-7 - Parvinder Kumar (brother of the
      deceased) and PW-8 - Ram Singh (maternal uncle of the deceased).
      Both the Courts have believed the testimony of PW-6 and PW-7.

      SUBMISSIONS
3.    The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has taken us
      through the notes of evidence of material prosecution witnesses. He
      submitted that all the allegations made by the witnesses regarding
      the demand of dowry are omissions. Therefore, there is no legal
      evidence to show that the appellant demanded dowry. Moreover, there
      is no evidence that the appellant subjected the deceased to cruelty.
      Learned counsel relied upon a decision of this court in the case of
      Charan Singh alias Charanjit Singh v. State of Uttarakhand1
      and submitted that there is no evidence to show that soon before
      her death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by
      the appellant for or in connection with demand for dowry. He would,
      therefore, submit that in the absence of legal evidence against the
      appellant, the Courts ought to have acquitted him.
4.    Learned counsel for the State submitted that there is more than
      sufficient evidence on record in the form of evidence of PW-6 and
      PW-7 to establish the demand for dowry. In fact, nine to ten days
      before the incident, the deceased had met PW-6 and PW-7 and stated
      about the demand of Rs.60,000/- by the appellant for purchasing a
      jeep. The appellant himself made the said demand to the witnesses.
      Learned counsel submitted that presumption under Section 113-B of
      the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, ‘the Evidence Act’) will apply
      in this case and the Court will have to presume that the appellant
      has caused the dowry death of his wife.

      CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS
5.    Sections 498-A and 304-B read thus:
             “498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
             subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband
             or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such


1    2023 SCC OnLine SC 454
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          woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for
          a term which may extend to three years and shall also
          be liable to fine.
          Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty”
          means—
          (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
          to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
          injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
          physical) of the woman; or
          (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
          with a view to coercing her or any person related to her
          to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
          security or is on account of failure by her or any person
          related to her to meet such demand.”
          “304-B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman
          is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise
          than under normal circumstances within seven years of her
          marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she
          was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband
          or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with,
          any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry
          death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to
          have caused her death.
          Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry”
          shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry
          Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
          (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
          imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
          years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.”
6.   The following are the essential ingredients of Section 304-B:
     a)   The death of a woman must have been caused by any burns
          or bodily injury, or must have occurred otherwise than under
          normal circumstances;
     b)   The death must have been caused within seven years of her
          marriage;
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                       1375

                    Karan Singh v. State of Haryana


     c)    Soon before her death, she must have been subjected to
           cruelty or harassment by the husband or any relative of her
           husband; and
     d)    Cruelty or harassment must be for, or in connection with, any
           demand for dowry.
7.   If the aforesaid four ingredients are established, the death can be
     called a dowry death, and the husband and/or husband’s relative,
     as the case may be, shall be deemed to have caused the dowry
     death. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides that
     dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed to
     be given either directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage to
     the other party to the marriage or by the parents of either party to a
     marriage or by any other person, to the other party to the marriage
     or to any other person. The dowry must be given or agreed to be
     given at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with
     the marriage of the said parties. The term valuable security used in
     Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 has the same meaning
     as in Section 30 of IPC.
8.   In this case, there is no dispute that the death of the appellant’s wife
     occurred within seven years of the marriage. Section 113-B of the
     Evidence Act reads thus:
           “113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the
           question is whether a person has committed the dowry
           death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
           death such woman had been subjected by such person
           to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
           demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such
           person had caused the dowry death.
           Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, “dowry
           death” shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B
           of Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”
     The presumption under Section 113-B will apply when it is established
     that soon before her death, the woman has been subjected by the
     accused to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
     demand for dowry. Therefore, even for attracting Section 113-B,
     the prosecution must establish that the deceased was subjected by
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     the appellant to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any
     demand of dowry soon before her death. Unless these facts are
     proved, the presumptions under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act
     cannot be invoked.
9.   We have carefully perused the evidence of PW-6 and PW-7. PW-6,
     the mother of the deceased, stated that her three statements were
     recorded by the police. The first was exhibit PD, on the basis of which
     the first information report was recognised. The second was exhibit
     DA recorded on 6th April 1998 and the third one was exhibit DB dated
     23rd June 1998. According to PW-6, sufficient dowry was given in the
     marriage to the appellant. Her evidence in the examination-in-chief
     can be summarised as under:
     a)   The deceased was taunted and maltreated as dowry given at
          the time of marriage was not sufficient;
     b)   The deceased was taunted on the ground that at the time of
          marriage, a black and white television set was given and not
          a colour television;
     c)   There was a demand for a motorcycle, a refrigerator and a
          mixi by the accused;
     d)   There was also a demand for a buffalo and a sum of Rs.10,000/-
          was paid to the appellant’s father in his presence for the said
          purpose;
     e)   There was a demand for furniture on the ground that at the
          time of marriage, only old furniture was given;
     f)   She gave a tape recorder and walkman to the appellant;
     g)   Nine to ten days prior to the death of the deceased, the appellant
          and the deceased had come to her village when the deceased
          informed her that she was forced by the accused to bring a sum
          of Rs.60,000/- from her for purchase of a jeep. This demand
          was made in presence of PW-7; and
     h)   Later on, even the appellant demanded a cash amount of
          Rs.60,000/- from her for the purchase of a jeep. The appellant
          disclosed that his parents were putting pressure on him to bring
          the cash amount of Rs.60,000/-.
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                     1377

                    Karan Singh v. State of Haryana


10. PW-6 was confronted by showing her prior statements at exhibit PD
    and DA. All the aforesaid demands stated by her in her examination-
    in-chief are omissions as far as both the statements are concerned.
    Even the payment of Rs.10,000/- is an omission. These omissions
    are significant and relevant and, therefore, by virtue of explanation
    to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short,
    ‘the CrPC’), the same amounts to contradictions.
11. PW-6 claimed that the demand for a colour television, motorcycle,
    refrigerator and mixi had been mentioned in the supplementary
    statement dated 23rd June 1998 (exhibit DB). She stated that even
    demand for new furniture and a buffalo has been mentioned in
    exhibit DB. She further stated that she had stated that she had
    given a tape recorder and a walkman to the appellant in her police
    statements at exhibit DA and DB. However, the same does not find
    place in both statements. She stated that she had told the police
    while recording statements at exhibit PD and DA that she had given
    an amount of Rs. 10,000/- to the appellant’s father in the presence
    of the appellant for the purchase of a buffalo. However, she admitted
    that the allegation does not find a place in statements at exhibit PD
    and DA. She stated that this allegation finds place in her statement
    at exhibit DB. However, the payment of Rs.10,000/- by PW-6 to the
    appellant’s father is irrelevant as the Trial Court acquitted him, and
    his acquittal has become final.
12. PW-6 admitted that though she had stated while recording her
    statement at exhibit PD that when nine or ten days before the
    incident, the deceased and the appellant had come to her house,
    both of them gave information regarding the demand of Rs.60,000/-.
    However, she accepted that this statement does not find place in the
    statement at exhibit PD. She was shown a notebook at exhibit DC,
    allegedly maintained by the deceased. However, PW-6 stated that
    she could not tell whether it was in the handwriting of the deceased.
13. Therefore, the version of PW-6 in her statements recorded on 2nd
    April 1998 and 6th April 1998 regarding providing dowry and regarding
    demands of dowry are omissions. She also stated that she told the
    police that the accused had fled from their house. However, she
    admitted that even this fact is not mentioned in any of the three
    statements. She claimed that she has stated some of the instances
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                        Supreme Court Reports


     of demand of dowry in her statement dated 23rd June 1998. The
     statement was recorded more than two and half months after the
     incident; and therefore, what is stated therein is an afterthought.
14. There is something fundamental which goes to the root of the matter.
    While deposing about the demand of dowry, she has not deposed
    to any particular act of cruelty or harassment by the appellant. This
    is an essential ingredient of Section 304-B. It is not made out from
    the evidence of PW-6.
15. Now, we come to evidence of PW-7. Following are the allegations
    made by him:
     a)   The accused used to taunt her sister by saying that she had
          brought insufficient dowry in the marriage;
     b)   They used to taunt her by stating that she had brought broken
          furniture;
     c)   Three months after the marriage when he had visited the
          matrimonial home of his sister, all the three accused told him
          to bring a motorcycle, a refrigerator and a mixi;
     d)   When the deceased, along with the appellant came to their
          house nine to ten days before the incident, the appellant
          disclosed that his parents were putting pressure upon him that
          he should bring a sum of Rs.60,000/- from PW-6 for purchasing
          a jeep; and
     e)   The accused used to give a beating to the deceased.
16. In the cross-examination, PW-7 stated that police had recorded
    his statements on 3rd April 1998 and 7th April 1998, which were
    marked as exhibits DG and DH, respectively. He accepted that the
    allegation that the accused used to maltreat his sister on account of
    insufficient dowry given in the marriage and having brought broken
    furniture is not found in both the police statements. He also stated
    that the demand for a refrigerator, a motorcycle, and a mixi does not
    find place in both statements. Therefore, the version of PW-7 in his
    examination-in-chief about the demands of dowry is a significant and
    relevant omission. Hence, this amounts to a contradiction. The public
    prosecutor claimed that the demand for a refrigerator, a motorcycle,
    and a mixi was mentioned in his third statement, which was recorded
[2025] 1 S.C.R.                                                      1379

                    Karan Singh v. State of Haryana


     on 23rd June 1998. The third statement, recorded belatedly, obviously
     appears to be an afterthought. As regards his statement that the
     accused used to give a beating to his sister, it seems that he got this
     information when he visited the matrimonial home of his sister three
     months after the marriage. It is a very vague allegation. Moreover,
     the witness has not stated that this was disclosed to him by his
     deceased sister. Assuming that what he has said is correct, this
     incident of beating must have taken place between 25th June 1996
     till end of September 1996. Therefore, this incident did not happen
     soon before the death. It is not his case that when the deceased
     allegedly visited his house nine to ten days before the incident, she
     complained about any cruelty or any harassment. Thus, none of the
     three statements of the witnesses contain any specific instances of
     cruelty or harassment.
17. Now, coming to evidence of PW-8, Ram Singh. PW-6 has not deposed
    that any demand of dowry was made to PW-8 or in his presence.
    She claimed in the cross-examination that PW-8 had told her about
    the maltreatment and the demand of dowry by the accused three
    to four months after the marriage. She stated that before 23rd June
    1998, the police did not record the statement of PW- 8. She stated
    that PW-8 had come to her house after the death of the deceased
    but she did not tell her brother to make a statement before the
    police. The statement of PW-8 was recorded more than two and half
    months from the date of the incident. Moreover, he had no personal
    knowledge whether the appellant had subjected the deceased to
    cruelty or harassment. Therefore, the prosecution did not prove the
    material ingredients of the offence punishable under Section 304-
    B. Not a single incident of cruelty covered by Section 498-A was
    proved by the prosecution. Section 304-B of the IPC was brought
    on the statute book in 1986. This Court has repeatedly laid down
    and explained the ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B.
    But, the Trial Courts are committing the same mistakes repeatedly.
    It is for the State Judicial Academies to step in. Perhaps this is a
    case of moral conviction.
18. Therefore, both the offences alleged against the appellant were not
    proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the
    impugned judgments dated 9th November 2010 and 24th January 2002
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                           Supreme Court Reports


    are hereby quashed and set aside and the appellant is acquitted of
    the offences alleged against him. The appellant was enlarged on bail
    pending this appeal. Hence, his bail bonds are cancelled.
19. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

    Result of the case: Appeal allowed.



    †
        Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan