Holding

An Industrial Tribunal cannot invalidate a government reference on the ground of delay; if the reference is made, the Tribunal must decide the dispute, and a termination found to violate Section 25F is bad in law.

Summary

Karan Singh, a former DPL of the Haryana State Marketing Board, was terminated in October 1994 without due process, allegedly violating Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He filed a claim six years later, in 2000, seeking reinstatement and back wages. The State Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court under Section 10(1); the Court held the termination illegal but denied relief on the ground of delay. The workman's writ petition was dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether a government‑made reference to an Industrial Tribunal can be rejected solely for delay. The Court held that the Tribunal cannot invalidate a reference on that ground; any challenge to the reference must be made by way of a writ petition. While confirming the termination as violative of Section 25F, the Court, noting the long lapse and lack of explanation, directed the Board to pay Rs 60,000 as full and final settlement. The appeal was allowed with this limited relief.

Issues considered

Whether a reference made by the appropriate Government to an Industrial Tribunal can be rejected on the ground of delay in filing the claim.
Whether the termination of the workman violated Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
What remedy is available to the employer when a reference is alleged to be stale.

Legislation cited

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 10(1), s. 25F

Subjects

Industrial disputeDelayReference under Section 10Section 25FTerminationLabour CourtWrit petitionFull and final settlement

Judgment

j
KARAN SINGH
V.
MIS EXECUTIVE ENGINEER HARYANA STATE MARKETING
BOARD

SEPTEMBER 28, 2007 B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.]

Labour Laws:
c
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947-ss. 10(1) and 25F-Delayed
raising of dispute by the workman-Challenging his termination as
violative ofs. 25F-Reference ofDispute-Claim rejected on the sole
ground of delay despite holding that termination was violative ofs.
25 F-By Labour as well as High Court-On appeal, held: Reference D
wrongly invalidated on the sole ground ofdelay-:-As the Reference was
made by the Government and the Labour Court held that termination
was violative ofs. 25F-The remedy available to the employer was to
challenge the Reference itselfby way ofWrit Petition-In view oflong
lapse oftime and in absence ofexplanationfor delay, employer directed E
to pay Rs. 60, 000 as full and final settlement.
Delay-Jn seeking reference to Industrial Tribunal-
Determination of-Held: Would depend on the facts ofeach case.

Appellant-workman, made a claim after6 years of termination of F
his service by the respondent-Board, on the ground thatthe termination
was in violation of section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act. State
Government made the reference to LabourCourt'u/s 10(1) of the Act
Labour Court, though held thatthetennination was in violation ofSection
25F, answered the reference in favour of the employer-Board on the G
ground that the claim was highly belated. The Writ Petition thereagainst
was also dismissed confirming the order of Labour Court.
In appeal to this Court the question for consideration was whether
425 H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] I 0 S.C.R.

A the reference of the workman could be rejected on the sole ground of
delay when Government itself made reference for adjudication of the
dispute.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

B HELD: 1. The Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 ofIndustrial
Disputes Act, 1947 gets its jurisdiction to decide an industrial dispute
only upon a reference by the appropriate Government The Industrial
~
Tribunal cannot invalidate the reference on the ground of delay. Ifthe
employer says that the workman has made a stale claim then the
c employer must challenge the reference by way ofWrit petition and say
that since the claim is belated, -there was no industrial dispute.
[Para 9) (429-D-E}

Management ofExpress Newspapers (Private) Ltd v. The Workers
D and Ors., AIR (1963) SC 569 and National Engineering Industries Ltd
v. State ofRajasthan and Ors., (2000) 1SCC371, referred to.
~
2. In the present case, the Industrial Tribunal has held that the
employer has violated Section 25F. Ifso, the order oftermination is bad
in law. It has to be struck down. In the present case, it has been struck
E down. However, the Tribunal had refused to grant any relief on the
ground of delay. The Tribunal has no authority to invalidate the
reference, particularly when it has found that the order oftermination
violates Section 25F of the Act. [Para 9) (429-F]
....
F 3. So far as delay in seeking the reference is concerned, no formula-
of universal application can be laid down. It would depend on facts of
each individual case. [Para 11] (430-D l

4. In the background of the present case normally the award of
-the Labour Court and the High Court would have been set aside. But
G
because oflong passage of time, it would be inappropriate, particularly :>--
when appellant has not even offered any semblance of explanation for
the delay. Accordingly it is directed that the respondent-Board shall pay
a sum of Rs.60,000/- in full and final settlement of appellant's
en!itlements. [Paras 15and16) [432-F-G]
H
(
r--
/
KARAN SINGH v. MIS EXECUTIVE ENGINEER 427
HARYANASTATEMARKETING BOARD [PASAYAT, J.]
Nedungadi Bank Ltd v. KP. Madhavankutty and Ors., (2000] 2 SCC A
455; S.M Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka,
(2003] 4 SCC 27; Management of Sudamdih Colliery of Mis Bharat
Coking Coal Ltd v. Their Workmen represented by Rashtriya Collie1y
Mazdoor Sangh, (2006) 1 Supreme 282 and ChiefEngineer, Ranjit Sagar
Dam and Anr. v. Sham Lal, (2006] 9 SCC 124, relied on. B

Sapan Kumar Panditv. UP. State Electricity Board and Ors.. [2001]
6 sec 222, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4561 of
2007. c
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.4.2005 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in C.W.P. No. 5442/2005.
Jasbir Singh Malik and S.K. Sabharwal for the Appellant.
D
Ajay Siwach and T.V. George for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the Division E
Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the writ petition
filed by the appellant questioning the correctness of the decision rendered
by the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Hissar.
3. The reference made to the Labour Court by the State Government F
of Haryana in terms of Section 10( 1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(in short the 'Act') was answered in favour of the respondent (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Board') holding that the claim was highly belated and
therefore dis-entitled the appellant from any relief.
4. A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice. G
The appellant was appointed as DPL in August 1993 and worked
upto October 1994. According to the appellant his services were
terminated without any charge sheet or holding any enquiry though he had
worked for more than 240 days. In that context it was contended that H
'
---1
'
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A provisions of Section 25-F of the Act were not complied with. He had ...-
/
prayed for re-instatement with full back wages alongwith all consequential
benefits. The claimant who was examined as WW-1 had stated that he
had joined the respondent-Board as DPL on 1.8.1993 and was getting
Rs.1120/- p.m. and had worked till October 1994 continuously when his
B services were terminated. Grievance was made that the workers junior
to him had been regularized and a departure was made in his case.
The respondent-Board took the stand that the services of the claimant --{
were required as DPL as and when required and he had really not
completed 240 days. A stand was taken that the claim was highly belated.
c It is to be noted that in the cross examination appellant had admitted that
he had no proof of having worked from August 1993 to October 1994.
The claim petition was filed in the year 2000. The notice dated 6.6.2000
was the first one and on failure of conciliation, reference was made on
8.2.2001. The appellant should have explained inaction on his part. Labour
D Court took the view that the claim was highly belated. If the appellant
felt that the order of termination was illegal without following due ~
procedure, he should have come up with demand notice within a
reasonable time. It was held that though no limitation is prescribed, but it
would be unequitable to re-open the closed chapter after a bng time. The
E appellant was therefore held not to be entitled to any relief.

Writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed on the ground that
the demand notice had been raised after six years.
~~-
5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that there being
F no period of limitation prescribed and at the most the relief could have
been moulded instead of rejecting the claim.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the order of the
High Court.
G 7. In the appeal the main issue which arises for determination is as
follows:
r-
"Whether the reference of the Petitioner/workman could be
rejected on the sole ground of delay when Government itself made
H reference for adjudication of the issue/ dispute."
/_
KARAN SINGH v. MIS EXECUTIVE ENGINEER 429
HARYANA STATE MARKETING BOARD [PASAYAT, J.]
8. In the case of Management of Express Newspapers (Private) A
Ltd. v. The Workers and Ors., reported in AIR (1963) SC 569 it has
been held that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in dealing with industrial
disputes is limited to the points mentioned in Section 10(4).
9. In the case of National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of
Rajasthan and Ors., [2000] 1 SCC 371 it has been held vide para 24 B
that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there
is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute which could be the
subject-matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal
under Section 10. This is because existence of the industrial dispute is a
jurisdictional fact. Absence of such jurisdictional fact results in the C
invalidation of the reference. For example, even under the Income Tax
Act, 1961 as it stood earlier, the Income Tax Officer must have reason
to believe escapement of income. This "reason to believe" is a
jurisdictional fact, therefore, writ petitions were maintainable in cases where
the High found absence of basic facts for reopening the assessment. The D
industrial Tribunal under Section 10 gets its jurisdiction to decide an
industrial dispute only upon a reference by the appropriate government.
The Industrial Tribunal cannot invalidate the reference on the ground of
delay. If the employer says that the workman has made a stale claim then
the employer must challenge the reference by way of Writ petition and E
say that since the claim is belated, there was no industrial dispute. The
Industrial Tribunal cannot strike down the reference on this ground. In
the present case, the Industrial Tribunal has held that the employer has
violated Section 25F. If so, the order of termination is bad in law. It has
to be struck down. In the present case, it has been struck down. However, F
the Tribhnal had refused to grant any reliefon the ground of delay. The
Tribunal has no authority to invalidate the reference, particularly when it
has found that the order of termination violates Section 25F of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947.
G
10. In Sapan Kumar Pandit v. UP. State Electricity Board and
Ors., [2001] 6 SCC 222, it has been held, vide para 15, as follows:
"There are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even
eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during
H
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A the long interval, it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular
case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when
the dispute remained alive though not galvanized by the workmen
or the Union on account of other justified reasons, it does not cause
the dispute to wane into total eclipse. In this case, when the
B Government have chosen to refer the dispute for adjudication under
Section 4-K of the U.P. Act the High Court should not have
quashed the reference merely on the ground of delay. Of course,
the long delay for making the adjudication could be considered by
the adjudicating authorities while moulding its reliefs. That is a
c different matter altogether. The High Court has obviously gone
wrong in axing down the order of reference made by the
Government for adjudication. Let the adjudicatory process reach
its legal culmination."

D 11. So far as delay in seeking the reference is concerned, no formula
of universal application can be laid down. It would depend on facts of
each individual case.

12. However, certain observations made by this Court need to be
noted. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty and Ors.,
E [2000] 2 SCC 455 it was noted at paragraph 6 as follows:
"6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for ihe appropriate
Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act.
It is not that this power can be exercised at any point oftime and
to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be
F
exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to
us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has
exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years
of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time
reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even
G
said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not
be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act.
As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has
become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the
H
I
1
KARAN SINGH v. MIS EXECUTIVE ENGINEER 431
HARYANA STATE MARKETING BOARD [PASAYAT, J.]
reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the A
circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there
was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question
was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that
two other employees who were dismissed from service were
reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and B
subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by
·>-- the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was exfacie bad
and incompetent."
13. In S.M Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom District Manager, C
Karnataka, [2003] 4 SCC 27 the position was reiterated as follows: (at
para 17)
"17. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that on account
of delay in raising the dispute by the appellants the High Court was
justified in denying relief to the appellants. We cannot agree. It is D
true, as held in Mis. Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Their Workmen
(supra) AIR (1959) SC 1217, that merely because the Industriai
Disputes Act does not provide for a limitation for raising the dispute
it does not mean that the dispute can be raised at any time and
without regard to the delay and reasons therefor. There is no E
limitation prescribed for reference of disputes to an industrial
tribunal, even so it is only reasonable that the disputes should be
.,.;4-
referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after
conciliation proceedings have failed particularly so when disputes
relate to discharge of workmen wholesale. A delay of 4 years in F
raising the dispute after even reemployment of the most of the old
workmen was held to be fatal in Mis. Shalimar Works Limited
v. Their Workmen (supra) AIR (1959) SC 1217, In Nedungadi
Bank Ltd v. KP. Madhavankutty and Ors. (supra) AIR (2000)
SC 839, a delay of 7 years was held to be fatal and disentitled to G
workmen to any relief. In Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Ors.
v. Union of India and Ors. (supra) (1993) AIR SCW 2214, it
was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the employer deprives
himself of remedy available in law by delay itself, lapse of time
results in losing the remedy and the right as well. The delay would H
\
\

-1
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 10 S.C.R.

A certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material evidence relevant to
adjudication being lost and rendered not available. However, we
do not think that the delay in the case at hand has been so culpable
as to disentitle the appellants for any relief. Although the High Court
has opined that there was a delay of 7 to 9 years in raising the
B dispute before the Tribunal but we find the High Court factually
not correct. The employment .of the appellants was terminated
sometime in 1985-86 or 1986-87. Pursuant to the judgment in
Daily Rated Casual Employees Under P&T Department v.
Union of India, (supra) AIR (1987) SC 2342, the department
c was formulating a scheme to accommodate casual labourers and
the appellants were justified in awaiting the outcome thereof. On
16-1-1990 they were refused to be accommodated in the scheme.
On 28-12-1990 they initiated the proceedings under the Industrial
Disputes Act followed by conciliation proceedings and then the
D dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal cum-Labour Court.
We do not think that the appellants deserve to be non suited on
the ground of delay."

14. The above position was highlighted recently in Employers in
E relation to the Management ofSudamdih Colliery ofMis Bharat Coking
Coal Ltd. v. Their Workmen represented by Rashtriya Colliery
Mazdoor Sangh, (2006) 1 Supreme 282 and Chief Engineer, Ranjit
Sagar Dam & Anr. V. Sham Lal, [2006] 9 sec 124.

15. In the aforesaid backgrotmd, we would have normally set aside
F the award of the Labour Court and the High Court. But because of long
passage of time, it would be inappropriate, particularly when appellant has
not even offered any semblance of explanation for the delay.
16. Accordingly we direct that the respondent-Board shall pay a sum
G of Rs.60,000/- within a period of six weeks in full and final settlement of
appellant's entitlements.
17. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent. There will be no
order as to costs.
H K.K.T. Appeal allowed.