Holding

The High Court was not justified in quashing the criminal proceedings; the complaint disclosed a prima facie offence and the pendency of a civil suit cannot be a ground for quashment.

Summary

Kamala Devi Agarwal, a partner in a firm, complained that a deed of dissolution of the partnership had been forged, causing her son mental shock and the closure of his shop. She filed a criminal complaint under IPC sections 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120‑B. The trial magistrate found a prima facie case and issued summons. The accused filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quashment of the criminal proceedings, arguing that a civil suit concerning the same deed was pending. The Calcutta High Court quashed the criminal process. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court had erred: the inherent power under Section 482 must be used sparingly and only when the complaint does not disclose an offence on its face; pending civil litigation is not a ground to quash criminal prosecution, and the magistrate had correctly found a prima facie case. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court order and directed the magistrate to continue the trial.

Issues considered

The scope of the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 CrPC to quash criminal proceedings at the initial stage.
Whether the pendency of a civil suit concerning the same documents bars the continuation of criminal prosecution.
Whether the complaint prima facie disclosed an offence under the IPC sections alleged.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 465, s. 467, s. 468, s. 471

Subjects

Section 482inherent powersquashing criminal proceedingscivil vs criminal jurisdictionforgerypartnership disputeprima facie casecriminal procedure

Judgment

A KAMALADEVI AGARWAL
v.
STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS.

OCTOBER 17, 2001

B [M.B. SHAH AND R.P. SETHI, JJ.)

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

Section 482-Inherent powers of High Court-Quashing the proceeding
at initial stage should be exercised sparingly.;_Could be exercised only where
c the allegations do not prima facie disclose the commission of an offence-
Criminal pros_ecution cannot be thwarted at the initial stage- merely because
civil proceedings are also pending-Nature and scope of civil and criminal
proceeding and standard of proof required is different and distinct-Criminal
cases have to be proceeded with in accordance with the procedure as pre-
D scribed under the code of criminal procedure and the pendency of a civil action
in a different court even though higher in status cannot be made a basis for
quashing of the proceedings.

The appellant was a partner of a registered firm, carrying on the
business of Bhujia and allied products with the trade mark 'HALDIRAM
E BHUJIAWALA'. The partnership business was initially commenced in the
year 1956 with four partners. The firm was reconstituted after admitting a
partner in place of one retiring partner. Appellant was admitted as a
partner of the said firm subsequently in the year 1969. An application for
trade mark of HALDIRAM BHUJIAWALA and IOgo HRB was filed
F before the appropriate authority by all the partners on 29.12.1972 and the
trade mark was registered on 27.01.81.

Appellant filed a complaint alleging that four accused persons had
brought into existence the self-forged deed of dissolution of partnership
for their personal gains and to the detriment of the firm. The appellant
G alleged that her son suffered mental shock upon closure of his shop in
1991, by the order of injunction passed by a Court of law, on the ground of
dissolution of partnership firm of which appellant was a partner, and that
her signature as well as other two partners were not genuine and had been
forged. The Trial Magistrate in his Order dated 5.4.2000 found that appel-
H lanthad made aprimafacie case under Sections 465, 467, 468,471and120-
284
KAMALADEVI AGARWAL v. STATE 285
B IPC against all the accused persons. Therefore, he issued summons for A
their presence on the next date of hearing. The accused respondents in-
stead of appearing before the Magistrate for contesting the case, approached
the High Court by filing a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing
the proceeding initiated and process issued against them. Their petition
was allowed. Hence this appeal.
B
It was contended for the appellant that merely because a civil action
is pending between the parties, it is no ground to quash the proceedi~g;
that as between civil and criminal proceedings, the criminal matters should
be given precedence and that only because genuineness of the document is
required to be determined in both the proceedings, High Court was not c
justified in quashing the criminal proceeding, since the onus of proof
required being different than the proceedings in the civil suit. It was
contended for the respondents that besides law, propriety demanded that
when a higher court was seized of the matter, though in civil proceedings,
Magistrate should have not proceeded the matter by issuance of process.
D
Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1. This Court has consistently held that the revisional or
inherent powers of quashing the proceeding at the initial stage should be
exercised sparingly and only where allegations, even if taken at the face
value and accepted in entirety, do not prim a facie disclose the commission
E
of offence. Disputed controversial facts cannot be made the basis for the
exercise of the jurisdiction. Criminal prosecution cannot be thwarted at
the initial stage because civil proceedings are also pending. [289-B-C]

R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR (1960) SC 866; Hazari Lal Gupta v. F
Rameshwar Prasad & Am:, AIR (1972) SC 484; State of Karnataka v. L.
Muniswamy & Ors., AIR (1977) SC 1489; State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ch.
Bhajan Lal & Ors., AIR (1992) SC 604; Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh
Agarwal & Ors., [1999] 8 SCC 687; Medchi Chemical Pharma (P) Ltd. v.
Biological Ltd. & Ors., [2000] 3 SCC 269; Lalmuni Devi (Smt.) v. State of
Bihar & Ors., [2001) 2 SCC 17 and M. Krishnan v. VUay Singh & Anr., G
Criminal Appeal No. 1028 of 2001 Order dated 11.10.2001, relied on.

Manju Gupta v. Lt. Col. M.S. Paintal, [1982) 2 SCC 412; Mis.
Karamchand Ganga Pershad & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR (1971) SC
1244; Sardool Singh & Anr. v. Smt. Nasib Kaur, [1987) Supp. SCC 146, H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A distinguished.

1.2. Whereas in civil proceedings the matter can be decided on the
basis of probabilities, criminal case has to be decided by adopting the stand-
ard ofproof"beyond reasonable doubt". Where civil and criminal cases are
pending, precedence shall be given to criminal proceeding. [295-B-C]
B
M.S. Sheriff & Anr. v. State Of Madras & Ors., AIR (1954) SC 397,
followed.

2. In the instant case, before issuance of process, the Trial Magistrate
had recorded the statement of witnesses for the complainant, perused the
C record including the opinion of the expert and prima fade found that the
respondents were guilty of the offence for which the process was raised against
them. Criminal cases have to be proceeded in accordance with the proce-
dure as prescribed under the Code of Crimin_al Procedure and the pendency
of civil action in a different court even though higher in status and authority
D cannot be made a basis for quashing the proceedings. Thus the High Court
was not justified in quashing the original proceeding. [206-B; 297-A]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1059
of 2001.

E From the Judgment and Order dated 5.2.2001 of the Calcutta High Court
in Crl.R.A. No. 1421 of 2000.

V.A. Mohta, P.N. Mishra, Ranjit Kumar, U.R. Lalit, Sushil Kumar, D.
Bbarat Kumar, Anand, Abhijit Sengupta, Tara Chandra Sharma, Ajay Sharma,
Mahendra Rana, Amarjit Singh, Ratnesh Kumar and Sumita Mukherjee for the
F appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SETm, J. Leave granted.
-
Aggrieved by the impugned order of the High Court quashing her com-
G plaint and the order of the Magistrate issuing the process against the respond-
ents for the offences under Sections 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian
Penal Code, the appellant has approached this Court'by way of this appeal for
setting aside the order of the High Court with direction to the Magistrate for
proceeding with the complaint in accordance with law. It is submitted that the
H High Court of Calcutta has passed the impugned _order in exercise of its power
KAMALADEVI AGARWAL v. STATE [SETHI, J.] 287
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure completely ignoring the A
mandate of law as settled by various pronouncements of this Court and other
High Courts in the country.

The complainant claims to be a partner of Mis. Chandmal Gangabishan,
a firm registered under the Partnership Act and carrying on business of Bhujia
and other allied products with the trade mark HALDIRAM BHUJIAWALA. B
A\::cording to the averments made in the complaint, the partnership business
was initially commenced in the year 1956 with four partners, namely, Ganga
Bishan Agarwal, Moolchand Agarwal, Rameshwarlal Agarwal and Satidas
Agarwal. Rameshwar Agarwal retired from the firm in the year 1958. The firm
was reconstituted by admitting Shri Shivkishan Aggarwal as partner in place c
of the retiring partner. They started using the brand name HALDIRAM
BHUJIAWALA in the year 1965. The appellant was admitted as a partner of
the said firm on 31st October, 1969. An application for registration of trade-
mark of HALDIRAM BHUJIAWALA and Logo HRB was filed with the
appropriate authority by all the partners on 29th December, 1972. The said
application was advertised inviting objections. Opposition proceedings were
D
commenced at the instance of one Madanlal on 12th January, 1976 which was
rejected on 16.4.1980 and the trademark was registered on 27th January, 1981
in the name of the firm, of which the appellant was a partner. The appellant
alleged that when in the first week of June, 1999 she went to Delhi to attend
her ailing son Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, found him to be :;uffering from serious E
mental depression on account of serious nervous breakdown. After inquiries
and persuasions her son told the appellant in July, 1999 that he had suffered
mental shock upon closure of his opened shop in the year 1991 at Delhi by
reason of the order of injunction passed by the court of law. He disclosed that
the said injunction had been granted against him on the ground that the F
partnership of which the appellant was also a partner stood dissolved on
16.11.197 4. She informed her son of not having signed any deed of dissolution
of the partnership. When Ashok Kumar Aggarwal handed over to the appellant
a xerox copy of the deed of dissolution, she was shocked to know that her
signatures had been forged. Upon scrutiny it appeared that the signatures,
purporting to be of Gangabishan Aggarwal and Moolchand Aggarwal were
G
also not genuine and had been forged besides her signatures. She alleged that
Accused Nos. 1 to 4 have brought into existence the self-forged deed of
dissolution for their personal gains and to the detriment of the partners of the
firm of Mis. Chandmal Gangabishan. She referred to number of circumstances
in her complaint to show that the forgery had been committed by the respond- H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A ent-accused. In para 22 of the complaint, the appellant catalogued a number
of instances allegedly showing the forgery by the respondents.

The Trial Magistrate received the complaint on 21st January, 2000 and
fixed the next date on 7th February, 2000 for examination of the complainant
and her witnesses in terms of Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
B On request of the appellant, the case was adjourned to 10th March, 2000 when
she appeared before Magistrate along with her three witnesses out of whom one
was hand-writing expert. After recording their statements, the case was ad-
journed and ultimately the Trial Magistrate, vide his order dated 5.4.2000,
found that the appellant had made out a prima .facie case under Sections 465,
C 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code against all the accused
persons and, therefore, issued summons for their presence on the next date
fixed for 19th June, 2000. Instead of appearing before the Trial Magistrate and
contesting the case, the respondents chose to approach the High Court by way
of_ a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying
D for quashing of the proceedings initiated and process issued against them.
Their application was ailowed vide the order impugned, hence the present
appeal.

Mr. V.A. Mohta, Sr. Advocate appearing for the appellant submitted that
the impugned judgment is in conflict with the various judgments of this Court.
E It is submitted that merely because a civil action is pending between the parties
can be no ground to quash the proceedings as between the civil and criminal
proceedings, the criminal matters should be given precedence and. that only
because the genuineness of the documents is required to be determined in both
the proceedings, the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings.
p It is submitted that the nature of criminal proceedings and the onus of proof
required in such proceedings being different than the proceedings in the civil
suit, the High Court committed a mistake by quashing the proceedings.

Per contra Shri U.R. Lalit, Sr. Advocate supported the judgment of the
High Court and submitted that besides law, propriety demanded that when a
G hi5her court was seized of the matter, though in civil proceedings, Magistrate
should have not proceeded with the matter by issuance of process against the
respondents. Relying upon some judgments of this Court, the learned counsel
has contended that the pendency of the proceedings before the Tri al Magistrate
would amount to abuse of the process of the court. The impugned order is
H stated to have been passed to secure the ends of justice. Referring to some
KAMALADEVI AGARWAL v. STATE [SETHI, J.] 289
judgments, the attending circumstances and the evidence led in the case, the A
learned counsel ·has tried to impress upon us that the order impugned is just
and reasonable which does not require interference by this Court in exercise
of its power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India:.

This Court has consistently held that the revisional or inherent powers
of quashing the proceedings at the initial stage should be exercised sparingly
iB
and only where the allegations made in the complaint or the FIR, even if taken
it at the face value and accepted in entirety, do not prima .facie disclose the
commission of an offence. Disputed and controversial facts cannot be made the
basis for the exercise of the jurisdiction. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Pw~jab, AIR
( 1960) SC 866 this Court held : C
"It is well established that the inherent jl)risdiction of the High Court
can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent
the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an ac-
cused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the D
High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings
at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to
lay down ~ny inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this
inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of
cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for E
quashing the proceedings. There may be cases were it may be possible
· for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance
of criminal proceedings against an accused person may·amount to the
abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned
proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceed-
F
ings in q"uestion is in respect of an offence alleged to have been
committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there
is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceed-
ing the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceedings on
that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance,
furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the GI
allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if
they are taken at their face 'value and accepted in their entirety, do not
constitute the offencd alleged; in such cases no question of appreci~t
ing evidence arises; it is a matter of merely of looking at the co.mpbint
or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence all~g~<l ~H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High ·
Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust. to allow the process
of the criminal cour.t to be issued against the accused person. A third
category ofthe cases iii which the inherent jurisdiction of High Court
can be successfulJy invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this
category the allegations made against the accused person do.constitute
B
an offence :alleged' but there is either no legal evidence adduced in
support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to
· prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to
bear in mind the distinctiof\ between a case where ·there is no legal
evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly
c inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal
. evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accu-
sation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under s. 561-A the
High Court would not embark upon an inquiry as to_ whether the
evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial
magistrate, and ordinarily it would not ~e open to any part to invoke
D
the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable
. appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused
would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of
the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 561-A in the matter
of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effec;t of the judicial
E decisions on the point (Vide: In re: Shripad G. Chandavarkar, AIR
(1928) Born 184; Jagat Chandra Mozwndar v: Queen Empress, ILR
26 Cal. 786, Dr. Shankar Singh v. State of Punjab, 56 Pun. LR 54 : AIR
( 1954) Punj. 193, Nripe1ulra Bhusan Roy v. Gobinda Bandhu Mqitmular,
AIR (1924). Cal. 1018 and Ramanathan Chettiyar v. Sivarama
F Subramania, ILR 47 Mad. 722 : AIR (1925 Mad. 39)."

This· judgment was reiterated and following in Hazari Lal Gupta v.
Rameshwar Prasad & Anr., AIR (1972) SC 484, State of Karnatalw v. L.
Muniswamy & Ors., AIR (1977) SC 1489, State of Haryaiw & Ors. v. Ch.
Bhciicm·fot & Ors., AIR (1992) SC 604 and various other pronoucements.
G
Criminal prosecution cannot be· thwarted at the initial stage merely
because civil proceedings are also pending. After referring to· judgments in
State ofHaryana v. Bhajan Lal, [1992] Suppl. 1 SCC 335, Rajesh Bajc~j v. State
NCT ofDelhi; .(1999] 3 SCC 259 this Court in Trisuns Chemical bulustry v.
Rqjesh Agarwal·& Ors., [1999] 8 SCC 686 held :
KAMALADEVI AGARWAL v. STATE [SETHI, J.] 29l
"Time and again this Court has been pointing out that quashing of FIR A
or a complaint in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court
should be limited to very extreme exceptions (vide State of Haryana
v. Bhajan Lal, ci 992] Supp. 1 SCC 335 andRajesh Bajaj v. State NCT
of Delhi, [1999] 3 SCC 259.

In the last referred case this court also pointed out that merely because B
an act has a civil profile is not sufficient to denude it of its criminal
outfit. We quote the following observations : (SCC p.263, para 10)

"10. It may be that the facts narrated in the present complaint
~ould as well reveal a commercial transaction or money transac-
tion. But that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of
c
cheating were committed in the course of commercial and also
money transactions."

In Medchl Chemical & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. & Ors.,
[2000] 3 sec 269 this Court agilin reiterated the position and held : ·D

"Exercise of jurisdiction under the inherent power as envisaged in
Section 482 of the Code to have the complaint or the charge-sheet
quashed is rui exception rather than a rule and the case for quashing
at the initial stage must have to be treated as rarest of rare so as not
to scuttle the prosecution. With the lodgement of first information E
report the ball is set to roll and thenceforth the law takes its own course
and the investigation ensues in accordance with the provisions of law.
The jurisdiction as such is rather limited and restricted and its undue
expansion is neither practicable nor warranted. In the event, however,
the court on a perusal of the complaint comes to a conclusion that the
F
allegations levelled in the complaint or charge-sheet on the face of it
does not constitute or disclose any offence as alleged, there ought not
to be any hesitation to rise up to the expectatio~ of the people and deal
with the situation as is required under the law...... ·

Needless to record however and it being!! settled principle of law that G
to exercise powers under Section 482 of the Code, the complaint in its
entirety shall have to be examined on the basis of the allegations made
in the complaint and the High Court at that stage has no authority or
jurisdiction to go into the matter or examine its correctness. Whatever
appears on the face of the complaint shall be taken into consideration
H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A without any critical examination of the same .. But the offence ought to
appear ex facie on the complaint. The observations in Nagawwa v.
Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi, [1976] 3 SCC 736 lend support to
the above statement of law: (SCC p.741, para 5).

"( 1) Where the allegations made in the complaint or the state-
B ments of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at
their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused
or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an
offence which is alleged against the accused;

(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently ab-
c surd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can
ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for pro-
ceeding against the accused;

(3) where the discretion exerci'Sed by the Magistrate in issuing
D process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on ·
no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inad-
missible; and

(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects,
such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally
E competent authority and the like."

The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide suffi-
cient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can
quash p~oceeding." .

F In Lalmuni Devi (Smt.) V. State of Bihar & Ors., [2001] 2 sec 17 this
Court held:

"There could be no dispute to the proposition that if the complaint does
not make out and offence it can be quashed. However, it is also settled
law that facts may give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an
G offence. Merely· because a civil claim is maintainable does not mean
-that the criminai complaint cannot be maintained. In this case, on the
facts, it cannot be stated at this prima.facie stage, that this is a frivolous
complaint. The High Court does not state that on facts no offence is
made out. If that be so, then merely on the ground that it was a civil
H wrong the criminal prosecution could not have been ·quashed."
KAMALADEVI AGARWAL v. STATE (SETHI, J.] 293
Again in M. Krishnan v. V(iay Singh & Am:, (Criminal Appeal No. 1028 A
of 2001 decided on 11.10.2001) this Court held that while exercising powers
under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court should be slow in interfering
with the proceedings at the initial stage and that merely because the nature of
the dispute is primarily of a civil nature, the criminal prosecution cannot be
quashed because in cases of forgery and fraud there is always some element B
of civil nature. In a case where the accused alleged that the transaction between
the parties are of a civil nature and the criminal court cannot proceed with the
complaint because the factum of document being forged was pending in the
civil court, the court observed :

. "Ac;cepting such a general proposition would be against the provisions C
of law inasmuch as in all cases of cheating and fraud, in the whole
transaction, there is generally some element of civil nature. However,
in this case, the allega~ions were regarding the forging of the docu-
ments and acquiring gains on the basis of such forged documents. The
proceedings could not be quashed only because the respondents had D '
filed a civil suit with respect to the aforesaid documents. In a criminal
court the allegations made in the complaint have to be established
independently, notwithstanding the adjudication by a civil court. Had
the complaint failed to prove the allegations made by him in the
complaint, the respondents were entitled to discharge or acquittal but
not otherwise. If mere pendency of a suit is made a ground for E
quashing the criminal proceedings, the unscrupulous litigants, appre-
hending criminal action against them, would be encouraged to frus-
trate the course of justice and law by filing suits with respect to the
documents intended to be used against them after the initiation of
criminal proceedings or in anticipation of such p_roceedings. Such a F
course cannot be the mandate of law. Civil proceedings, as distin-
guished from the criminal action, have to be adjudicated and con-
cluded by adopting separate yardsticks. The onus of proving the
allegations beyond reasonable doubt, in criminal case, is not appliable
in the civil proceedings which can be decided merely on the basis of
G
the probabilities with respect to the acts complained of."

Referring to the judgments of this Court in Smt. Manju Gupta v. Lt. Col.
M.S. Paintal, (1982] 2 SCC 412, Sardool Singh & Am: v. Smt. Nasib Kaur,
[1987] Supp. SCC 146 and Mis. Karamchand Ganga Pershad & Am: v. Union
of India & Ors., AIR (1971) SC 1244, the learned counsel appearing for the H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A respondents submitted that the High Court was justified in qua.shing the com-
plaint which does not require any interference by this Court in this appeal.

In Manju Gupta l' .case (supra) the criminal proceedings were quashed
under the peculiar circumstances of the case. After referring to para 20 of the
comp)airit and holding "such an averment in our view is clearly inadequate and
B insufficient to bring home criminality of the. appellant in the matter of the
alleged <?ffences'', the court found that simply because accused was the
Secretary of the Society, the Magistrate was not justified in presuming her
connection or complicity with the offence merely on that ground. The allega-
tions in the complaint pertinent to forgery of rent receipts was held to be vague
C ·and indefinite. Sardool Singh 's case (supra) was also decided on its facts on
the basis of law earlier settled by this Court. In Karamchand Ganga Persluull'
ease (supra) an observation was made that "it is a well established principle of
law that decisions of the' civil courts are binding on the criminal courts. The
converse is not true''. In that case the appellants had filed a writ petition in the
D High Court for the issuance of appropriate directions requiring the Union of
India to release and deliver to them some consignments of maize transported
from the State of Haryana to Howrah. Alleging that the movement of maize
ha:d been controlled by the provisions of Essential Commodities Act read with
Northern Inter-Zonal Maize (Movement Control) Order, 1967 promulgated by
E the State Government, the restriction on export imposed by the Order were
removed by the State of Haryana in October, 1967 which was duly published
and advertised. The contention of the Union was that the State of Haryana had
not lifted the ban on export and further that it had no power to lift the ban. The
High Court dismissed the writ petition on the sole ground that in view of the
pendency of the criminal proceedings before some court in the State of West
F
Bengal it was in.appropriate for the High Court to pronounce on the question
arising for decision in the writ petition. In tbat context the court held :

"In our opinion the High Court seriously erred in coming to this
conclusion. If the appellants are able to establish their case that the ban
G on export of maize from the State of Haryana had been validly lifted
all the proceedings taken against those who exported the maize auto-
matically fall to .the ground. Their maintainability depends. on the
assumption tha,t the exports were made without the authority of law.
ll is a well established principl~ of law that the decisions of the civil
H courts are binding on the criminal courts. The converse is not true. The
KAMALADEVI AGARWAL v. STATE [SETHI, J.] 295
High Court after entertaining the writ petitions and hearing arguments A
on the merits of the case should not have dismissed the petitions merely
because certain consequential proceedings had been taken on the basis
that the exports in question were illegal."

We have already noticed that the nature and scope of civil and criminal
B
proceedings and the standard of proof require in both matters is different and
distinct. Whereas in civil proceedings the matter can be decided on the basis
of probabilities, the criminal case has to be decided by adopting the standard
of "beyond reasonable doubt". A Constitution Bench of this Court, dealing
with the similar circumstances, in M_.S. Sheriff & Am: v. State of Madras &
Ors., AIR (1954) SC 397 held that where civil and criminal cases are pending,
c
precedence shall be given to criminal proceedings. Detailing the reasons for the
conclusions, the court held :

"As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the
opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There D
is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. .
No hard and fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the
possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is
a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when
it expressly refrains from making the decision of one courtbinding on E
the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such
as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the
likelihood of embarrassment.

Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on
for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait
F
till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public
interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the
guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public
mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent
with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable G
to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust.

This however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations
obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more
expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ZOOl] S,UPP. 4 S.C.R.

A pro9eeding may be so near its end as to make it expedient to stay it in
. order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under s.476. But in
th~s case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the
criminal proceedings have finished."

In the present case we have notice~ that before issuanc~ of the process,
B
the Trial Magistr~te had recorded the statement of the witnesses for the C?m-
plainant, perused the record including' the opinion of the ,expert and his depo- '
siti~ri and p~ima facie found that the respondents were guilty for the offe~ce~
,• ' I' . '

for which the process was issued against.them. The High Court rightly did not
refer to any of those circumstances but quashed the proceedings only on the ,
c ground:

"Consideration is and should be 'whether any criminal proceeding 1
instituted before a court subordinate to this court should be allowed to
continue when the very foundation of the criminal case, namely,
D forgery of document is under scrutiny by this court in a ,civil proceed-
ing instituted by same person i.e., the complainant. in the criminal case.
In my considered view it would not be proper io allow the criminal
proceeding t~ continue when the validity of the document (deed of
dissolution is being ~ested in a· civil proceeding before; this court.
E Judicial propri~tY. demands that the course adopted by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case .of Manju Gupta (supra) and Sardool Singh
(supra) should be followed. If such course of action is adopted by this
colirt, that would be in consonance with the expression used in Section
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - "or otherwise to secure the
en~s of justice". In b.oth the case referred to above civil suits were
F pending, where the validity and genuineness .of a document was
· 'challenged. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that when the
question regarding validity of a document is subjudice in the civil
c?urt~. criminal p~osecution, on the allegation of the do.cument being
forged, cannot be institu~ed."
G ' ' ·.1 • •
In view of the preponderance of auihorities. to the contrary, we are
satisfied that the High Court ~as not justified in quashing the proceedings
ini~iated by .the appellant against the i:espondent. We are also not impressed by
the ~gum~ri.t thi:~t ¥.the civil suit was pending in tlie·H;igh Court, the Magistrate
H. was n~t j~~tifietl to proceed ~ith the criminal case either in. Jaw or on the basis
I
KAMALADEVI AG~RWAL v. STATE [SETHI, J.] 297
of propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded.with in accordance with the A
procedure as prescribed under the Code of.Criminal Procedure and the pendency
of a civil action in a different court even though higher in status and authority,
cannot be made a basis for quashing of the p~oceedings.

In the result the appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order
passed by the High Court and restoring ·the· order of 'the Magistrate with B
direction to proceed with the trial of the case in accordance with the provision
of law and decide the same on merits.

S.K.S. Appeal allowyd ...
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