K.V. ANIL MITHRA & ANR.versusSREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF SANSKRIT & ANR.

                         [2021] 11 S.C.R. 297


                    K.V. ANIL MITHRA & ANR.
                                    v.
  SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF SANSKRIT &
                    ANR.
                  (Civil Appeal No(s). 9067 of 2014)
                         OCTOBER 27, 2021
          [AJAY RASTOGI AND ABHAY S. OKA, JJ.]
       Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – ss.25F, 25B – Termination –
Retrenchment– Violation of s.25F–Respondent-University
regularized appellants-workmen serving on daily wage basis in non-
teaching staff category – Objections raised w.r.t the manner of
regularization– De-regularised and terminated – Order of de-
regularisation upheld by Division Bench of High Court, question
of non-observance of the provisions of 1947 Act left open – Dispute
raised by appellants – Industrial Tribunal held termination to be in
violation of s.25F, award passed– Set aside by Single Judge – Order
confirmed by Division Bench – On appeal, held: Nature of
employment and the manner in which the workman has been
employed is not significant while invoking the mandatory compliance
of s.25F – In a case where the workman has been in continuous
service for more than 240 days in the preceding 12 months before
the alleged date of terminationas contemplated u/s.25B, the employer
is under an obligation to comply with the twin conditions u/Clauses
(a) and (b) of s.25F– In the present case, the appellants served
from the year 1993-1997, their services were terminated in sequel
to order dtd.24.03.97– Appointments were made on daily wage basis
under the orders of the Vice Chancellor, the competent/appointing
authority– Merely because the appointments were not in accordance
with the procedure prescribed under the Ordinance would not
disentitle the appellants from claiming protection under provisions
of the 1947 Act– Termination of the appellants was in violation of
s.25F – Impugned judgment set aside– Award modified– Sree
Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit Ordinance, 1993.
       Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 –ss.2(g), (j), (k), (s), (oo) – Held:
Every termination for any reason whatsoever provided it does not
fall in any of the exception clause of s.2(oo), is a retrenchment.

                                   297
298           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2021] 11 S.C.R.


A          Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Scheme of the Act – Discussed.
            Industrial Disputes Act, 1947– s.25F – Non-observance of
      mandatory requirement of – Appropriate relief workman is entitled
      for – Discussed.
           Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
B
             HELD: 1.1 The termination which was given effect to by
      the 1st respondent was a retrenchment as defined under Section
      2(oo), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The term ‘retrenchment’
      leaves no manner of doubt that the termination of the workman
      for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted
C     by way of disciplinary action are being termed as retrenchment
      with certain exceptions and it is not dependent upon the nature
      of employment and the procedure pursuant to which the workman
      has entered into service. In continuation thereof, the condition
      precedent for retrenchment has been defined under Section 25F
D     of the Act 1947 which postulates that workman employed in any
      industry who has been in continuous service for not less than
      one year can be retrenched by the employer after clauses (a) and
      (b) of Section 25F have been complied with and both the clauses
      (a) and (b) of Section 25F have been held by this Court to be
      mandatory and its non-observance is held to be void ab initio bad
E     and what is being the continuous service has been defined under
      Section 25B of the Act 1947. The scheme of the Act 1947
      contemplates that the workman employed even as a daily wager
      or in any capacity, if has worked for more than 240 days in the
      preceding 12 months from the alleged date of termination and if
F     the employer wants to terminate the services of such a workman,
      his services could be terminated after due compliance of the twin
      clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F of the Act 1947 and to its
      non-observance held the termination to be void ab initio bad.
      [Para 20, 22 and 23][307-F-G; 308-E-G; 310-C-D]

G           1.2 The salient fact which has to be considered is whether
      the employee who has been retrenched is a workman under
      Section 2(s) and is employed in an industry defined under Section
      2(j) and who has been in continuous service for more than one
      year can be retrenched provided the employer complies with the

H
 K.V. ANIL MITHRA v. SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF                 299
                         SANSKRIT

twin conditions provided under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F     A
of the Act 1947 before the retrenchment is given effect to. The
nature of employment and the manner in which the workman has
been employed is not significant for consideration while invoking
the mandatory compliance of Section 25F of the Act 1947. This
can be noticed from the term ‘retrenchment’ as defined under
                                                                      B
Section 2(oo) which in unequivocal terms clearly postulates that
termination of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever
provided it does not fall in any of the exception clause of Section
2(oo), every termination is a retrenchment and the employer is
under an obligation to comply with the twin conditions of Section
25F of the Act 1947 before the retrenchment is given effect to.       C
In every retrenchment, the employer is not under an obligation
to comply with the twin conditions referred to under clauses (a)
and (b) of Section 25F of the Act but in a case where the workman
has been in continuous service for more than 240 days in the
preceding 12 months before the alleged date of termination as
                                                                      D
contemplated under Section 25B, the employer is under an
obligation to comply with the twin conditions referred to under
clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F of the Act 1947. Such non-
observance has been termed to be void ab initio bad and
consequence in the ordinary course has to follow by reinstatement
with consequential benefits but it is not held to be automatic and    E
what alternative relief the workman is entitled for on account of
non-observance of mandatory requirement of Section 25F of the
Act 1947 is open to be considered by the Tribunal/Courts in the
facts and circumstances of each case. In the instant case, the
appellants had served as a daily wager in non-teaching staff
                                                                      F
category from the year 1993-1997 and their services were
terminated in sequel to the order dated 24th March, 1997 pursuant
to which their services were de-regularized. [Paras 24, 25, 30,
31 and 34][310-F-H; 311-A; 316-C-E; 318-B]
      Punjab Land Development and Reclamation
      Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh Vs. Presiding Officer,             G
      Labour Court, Chandigarh and Others 1990 (3) SCC
      682 : [1990] 3 SCR 111– followed.


                                                                      H
300           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2021] 11 S.C.R.


A           State Bank of India Vs. Shri N. Sundara Money 1976
            (1) SCC 822 : [1976] 3 SCR 160; L. Robert D’Souza
            Vs. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Another
            1982 (1) SCC 645 : [1982] 3 SCR 251; Bharat Sanchar
            Nigam Limited Vs. Bhurumal 2014 (7) SCC 177 : [2013]
            (16) SCR 1023 – relied on.
B
            1.3 What has been observed by the Division Bench in its
      Judgment in the earlier round of litigation may not have any
      relevance so far as the question which has been examined by the
      Tribunal in answering the reference in affirmative terms regarding
      non-observance of Section 25F of the Act 1947 and its
C     consequential effect. Appointments are made in the instant case
      on daily wage basis under the orders of the Vice Chancellor who
      is the competent/appointing authority and merely because their
      appointments are not in accordance with the procedure prescribed
      under the Ordinance would not disentitle them from claiming
D     protection under provisions of the Act 1947. [Paras 35, 37]
      [318-C-D, H; 319-A]
            1.4 In the facts and circumstances of the instant cases and
      looking into the nature of service rendered by the appellants as
      daily wager for a short period, while upholding the termination of
      the appellants being in violation of Section 25F of the Act 1947, a
E
      lumpsum monetary compensation of Rs.2,50,000/- is awardedto
      each of the appellants-workmen in full and final satisfaction of
      the dispute in lieu of right to claim reinstatement with 50% back
      wages as awarded by the Tribunal. The impugned judgment of
      the High Court is set aside and the Award of the Industrial
F     Tribunal is modified to the extent indicated. [Paras 42, 44]
      [319-H; 320-A-B, C]
            R. Vishwanatha Pillai Vs. State of Kerala and Others
            2004 (2) SCC 105 : [2004] (1) SCR 360; Rajasthan
            Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. And Another Vs.
G           Intejam Ali Zafri 2006 (6) SCC 275 : [2006] (3) Suppl.
            SCR 533; Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam Vs. Raj Kumar
            Rajinder Singh (Dead) through legal representatives and
            Others 2019 (14) SCC 449 : [2018] 12 SCR 282;
            Punjab Urban Planning and Development Authority
            and Another Vs. Karamjit Singh 2019 (16) SCC 782 :
H           [2019] (5) SCR 864 – held inapplicable.
  K.V. ANIL MITHRA v. SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF                    301
                          SANSKRIT

        Nagar Mahapalika (Now Municipal Corpn.) Vs. State                 A
        of U.P. and Others 2006 (5) SCC 127 : [2006] (1) Suppl.
        SCR 681; District Development Officer and Another v.
        Satish Kantilal Amralia 2018 (12) SCC 298 : [2017]
        (12) SCR 414 – referred to.
                        Case Law Reference                                B
[1976] 3 SCR 160                 relied on               Para 14
[1982] 3 SCR 251                 relied on               Para 14
[1990] 3 SCR 111                 followed                Para 14
[2006] 1 Suppl. SCR 681          referred to             Para 14          C
[2004] 1 SCR 360                 held inapplicable       Para 17
[2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 533          held inapplicable       Para 17
[2018] 12 SCR 282                held inapplicable       Para 17
2019] 5 SCR 864                  held inapplicable       Para 17          D

[2013] 16 SCR 1023               relied on               Para 32
2017] 12 SCR 414                 referred to             Para 33
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.9067 of
2014.                                                                     E
      From the Judgment and Order dated 04.01.2010 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in W.A. No.2881 of 2009.
        With
        Civil appeal No. 9068 of 2014                                     F
     R. Basant, Sr. Adv., M. T. George, Mrs. Susy Abrahm, Johns
George, K. Rajeev, E. M. S. Anam, Advs. for the appearing parties.
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
        AJAY RASTOGI, J.                                                  G
        1. The instant appeals have been preferred against the judgment
and order dated 4th January, 2010 setting aside the Award passed by the
Industrial Tribunal dated 14th November, 2005 answering the reference
in affirmative terms holding the termination of the appellants-workmen
to be void being in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes
                                                                          H
302             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 11 S.C.R.


A     Act, 1947(hereinafter being referred to as the “Act 1947”) with a direction
      of treating the workmen deemed to be in service till their services are
      validly terminated with 50% back wages.
              2. The brief facts culled out and relevant for the purpose are that
      the 1st respondent-University was established by an Ordinance viz. Sree
B     Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit Ordinance, 1993. The appointments
      of non-teaching staff in different categories, viz., Watchman, Attenders,
      Peons, Sweepers, Assistant Cooks, Assistant Matrons, Drivers, Helpers,
      Waiters, Gardeners, Clerical Assistants were made at different points of
      time on daily wage basis during the period 1993-1995 under the orders
      of the then Vice Chancellor.
C
              3. Their services came to be regularized by the 1st respondent
      giving them the status of regular employees by an order dated 7th May,
      1996. It appears that as some objections were raised questioning the
      manner in which the regularisation had taken place, the 1st respondent
      by a later order dated 24th March, 1997 de-regularised the non-teaching
D     staff/employees and in consequence thereof, their services came to be
      terminated. So far as the order of de-regularisation passed by the 1st
      respondent dated 24th March, 1997 is concerned, it has attained finality
      after the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala has upheld the
      order of de-regularisation dated 24th March, 1997 taking note of the
E     initial engagement as daily wager and the appointment being without
      going through the process of selection as prescribed under the scheme
      of University Ordinance recorded a finding that the order of de-
      regularisation passed by the authorities is valid and justified and left the
      question of non-observance of the provisions of the Act 1947 open to be
      examined in the appropriate proceedings known to law.
F
             4. It may be further noticed that the grievance of the teaching and
      non-teaching staff was jointly examined by the Division Bench of the
      High Court while deciding the writ appeal under its common impugned
      judgment dated 23rd March, 2000. Para 10 of the judgment of the Division
      Bench of the High Court dated 23rd March, 2000 relevant for the purpose
G     is reproduced as under:-
            10. Other point raised related to non-observance of the
            requirements of the ID Act. As rightly observed by learned single
            Judge, same is not to be decided in Article 226 applications since
            appellants, if they are so advised and feel that they have a right
H           under the ID Act, can approach the forum. This position was
  K.V. ANIL MITHRA v. SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF                          303
                SANSKRIT [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

       highlighted by apex Court in Basant Kumar Sarkar and Others              A
       Vs. Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd.(AIR 1954 SC 1200) and Rajasthan
       State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. Krishna(JT 1005(4) SC 343).
      5. The appellants raised an industrial dispute pursuant to which
the appropriate Government made the reference order dated 8th April,
2003 for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal as under:-                     B
        “Whether the de-regularization of regularized employees in the
       Annexure appended and their subsequent termination by the
       management of Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit is legal
       and justifiable? If not what relief they are entitled to?”
        6. It may be noticed that the nature of appointment as a daily          C
wager was not the subject matter of reference and undisputedly, so far
as the order of de-regularisation dated 24th March, 1997 is concerned,
that was not open to be examined by the Tribunal pursuant to a reference
made as it has attained finality by the judgment of the Division Bench of
the High Court after recording a finding that the 1st respondent-University     D
was justified in passing the order of de-regularisation of such employees
who were appointed without going through the process of selection
prescribed under the University Ordinance and were appointed on daily
wage basis and such appointments could not have been regularised by
the 1st respondent-University.
                                                                                E
      7. The limited question in terms of the reference open to be
examined by the Tribunal was as to whether the termination which has
been given effect to by the 1st respondent was legal and justified and if
not, what relief the employee was entitled to.
        8. The Industrial Tribunal, after taking into consideration the         F
material on record, returned a finding that the termination of the appellants
from service is in violation of Section 25F of the Act 1947 and as a
natural consequence held the workman employee to be deemed in service
till their services are validly terminated with 50% back wages. The
relevant para 9 of the Award is as under:-
                                                                                G
      9. If we go through the pleadings in the written statement, it can
      be seen that the service of the workmen which had started in
      various dates in the year 1993, 94,95 and 96 had been regularized
      by the university later through a proceedings dated 12.4.1996.
      From the date of commencement of their service to the date of
      de-regularization of their services, all of them were having              H
304             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 11 S.C.R.


A           continuous service. About one year after from 12.4.96, their
            services were terminated on the basis of decision of the syndicate
            of the university dated 23.3.97. Such a decision was as per the
            judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in the earlier
            writ appeal judgment. Therefore, from these admitted facts, it
            can be seen that all these workmen were having continuous service
B
            and they had more than 240 days of service to their credit service.
            The management does not have any case that the terminations
            effected on these workmen concerned in this dispute were in
            compliance with Section 25-F of the I.D. Act. On that sole ground
            it has to be declared that the terminations effected in the case of
C           workmen were in violation of Sec. 25-F of the I.D. Act. Therefore,
            they would deem to be in service till their services are validly
            terminated strictly in accordance with Industrial Disputes Act. In
            view of various decisions of the Supreme Court and the settled
            position laid thereon, the only relief which can be granted in this
            case is by way of declaration that the termination of all workmen
D
            who had to their credit 240 days of continuous as explained in
            Sec. 25 were illegal. As a natural consequence, all of such
            workmen would deem to be in service till their services are validly
            terminated. Because of that they entitled for full back wages also
            in the ordinary course. However, such entitlement cannot be
E           treated as a matter of rule always. I think it will be appropriate, if
            all the workmen concerned are given 50% of the backwages.
             9. The Award of the Tribunal dated 14th November, 2005 came to
      be challenged at the instance of the 1st respondent before the learned
      Single Judge of the High Court of Kerala. The learned Single Judge
F     without disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal in its Award
      held that each of the workmen has completed more than 240 days of
      service in the preceding 12 months from the alleged date of termination
      and their services were terminated without observance of Section 25F
      of the Act 1947 but further proceeded on the premise that if the order of
G     appointment of the workmen was not valid and has not been made in
      terms of the procedure prescribed under the Ordinance, such irregular
      appointments are not entitled to seek protection of the Act 1947 and
      further observed that retrenchment referred to under Section 25F applies
      to properly employed persons who are in service and set aside the Award
      by a judgment dated 25th June, 2009. The relevant part is as under:-
H
  K.V. ANIL MITHRA v. SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF                         305
                SANSKRIT [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

       “In my view, before proceeding to consider eligibility for relief       A
      under Section 25F, the Tribunal should have considered whether
      appointment of employees terminated was properly made. The
      Syndicate of the University ordered termination only after finding
      that the employees who got appointment was through irregular
      ways. Section 25F does not apply to as case of termination of
                                                                               B
      illegally appointed employees. On the other hand, retrenchment
      referred to in Section 25F applies to properly employed persons
      who were in service. So much so, the order passed by the Industrial
      Tribunal declaring the termination of the employees as illegal is
      only to be set aside and I do so. Consequently, the terminated
      employees are not entitled to compensation ordered by the Tribunal       C
      under Section 25F. During pendency of the W.P., some of the
      terminated employees were granted wages under Section 17B of
      the Industrial Disputes Act, under orders of this Court. Besides
      this, they are not entitled to any other relief. The W.P. is therefore
      allowed setting aside Ext. P14 award of the Industrial Tribunal.”
                                                                               D
       10. That order of the learned Single Judge came to be confirmed
by the Division Bench of the High Court on writ appeal being preferred
at the instance of the present appellants under the impugned judgment
dated 4th January, 2010.
        11. Mr. M.T. George, learned counsel for the appellants submits
                                                                               E
that the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal has been confirmed by
the High Court under the impugned judgment and it can be safely noticed
by this Court that the appellants were appointed on daily wage basis in
non-teaching staff category. Indisputedly, their appointments were made
without going through the process of selection as being contemplated
under the University Ordinance but this is not the case of the respondents     F
that either of the appellants had either misrepresented/misled or committed
fraud or either of them is not eligible in seeking employment in non-
teaching category and itis also not being disputed that each of them had
been in continuous service of more than 240 days in the preceding 12
months from the alleged date of termination.
                                                                               G
      12. Learned counsel submits that admittedly there was a violation
of Section 25F of the Act 1947. In consequence thereof, no error was
committed by the Tribunal in passing an Award treating them to be
deemed in service with 50% back wages unless validly terminated,
obviously after compliance of the mandatory requirement as contemplated
under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F of the Act 1947.                      H
306             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 11 S.C.R.


A            13. Learned counsel further submits that the finding which has
      been recorded by the learned Single Judge and confirmed by the Division
      Bench under the impugned judgment that if the appointments are not
      being made in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, such
      employees are not entitled to seek protection of the Act 1947, is legally
      unsustainable in law as the nature of appointments is not a pre-condition
B
      for compliance of Section 25F andscheme of the Act 1947contemplates
      that if the employee who is a workman under Section 2(s) has been
      retrenched as contemplated under Section 2(oo) and if was in continuous
      service for more than 240 days in the preceding 12 months from the
      alleged date of termination as contemplated under Section 25B of the
C     Act, the employer is under an obligation to comply with the mandatory
      requirement of clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F, its non-observance as
      held by this Court, to be void ab initio bad with the consequential order of
      reinstatement with full back wages and open for the employer to pass a
      fresh order after due compliance in accordance with law.
D           14. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance
      on the judgments of this Court in State Bank of India Vs. Shri N.
      Sundara Money 1; L. Robert D’Souza Vs. Executive Engineer,
      Southern Railway and Another2; Punjab Land Development and
      Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh Vs. Presiding Officer,
      Labour Court, Chandigarh and Others3 and Nagar Mahapalika
E     (Now Municipal Corpn.) Vs. State of U.P. and Others4.
              15. Per contra, Mr. R. Basant, learned senior counsel for the
      respondents, while supporting the finding recorded by the Division Bench
      of the High Court under the impugned judgment, submits that after the
      finding has been recorded by the Division Bench in the earlier round of
F     litigation holding such appointments being conceived in fraud and deceit
      are not entitled to seek protection of Section 25F by those employees
      whose appointments have been declared as void ab initio bad.
            16. Learned counsel further submits that the term ‘retrenchment’
      under Section 2(oo) although have been couched with the words “for
G     any reason whatsoever” but cannot be interpretated to protect those
      who secured entry by backdoor and whose appointments are vitiated by
      1
        1976(1) SCC 822
      2
        1982(1) SCC 645
      3
        1990(3) SCC 682
      4
H       2006(5) SCC 127
    K.V. ANIL MITHRA v. SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF                       307
                  SANSKRIT [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

fraud and deceit as being observed by the Division Bench of the High           A
Court in the earlier round of litigation.
      17. In support of his submission, learned counsel placed reliance
on the judgments of this Court in R. Vishwanatha Pillai Vs. State of
Kerala and Others5; Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation
Ltd. And Another Vs. Intejam Ali Zafri6 followed with recent judgments         B
in Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam Vs. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh (Dead)
through legal representatives and Others 7 and Punjab Urban
Planning and Development Authority and Another Vs. Karamjit
Singh8.
       18. In the alternative, learned counsel further submits that assuming   C
that there was a violation of Section 25F of the Act 1947, still there
cannot be an automatic reinstatement as being considered by this Court
and each of the workmen had worked for a period 1993-1997 and they
were de-regularised by an order dated 24th March 1997, they may be
entitled for reasonable compensation in lieu of reinstatement looking to
the period of service rendered by each of them and further submits that        D
granting 50% backwages is grossly unfair as each of the workmen,
during pendency of the litigation, under Section 17B has received his last
pay drawn and a total sum of Rs. 36.68 lakhs has been paid to the
contesting appellants-workmen and in the given circumstances, the finding
recorded by the Division Bench does not call for any interference.             E
       19. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their
assistance perused the material available on record.
       20. It is an admitted case of the parties that Act 1947 is applicable
on the 1st respondent-University and they are under an obligation to
comply with the provisions of the Act 1947. It is also admitted that the       F
1st respondent is the employer as defined under Section 2(g) and the
dispute which was raised is an industrial dispute as defined under Section
2(k) and the present appellants are the workmen as defined under Section
2(s) and the termination which was given effect to by the 1 st respondent
was a retrenchment as defined under Section 2(oo) and it is not the case
                                                                               G
of the 1st respondent that their termination falls in any of the exceptions
defined under Section 2(oo) of the Act 1947.
5
  2004(2) SCC 105
6
  2006(6) SCC 275
7
  2019(14) SCC 449
8
  2019(16) SCC 782                                                             H
308            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 11 S.C.R.


A           21. Section 2(oo) relevant for the purpose is reproduced as under:-
            (oo) “retrenchment means the termination by the employer of the
            service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than
            as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does
            not include—
B               (a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or
                (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of
                superannuation if the contract of employment between the
                employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in
                that behalf; or
C                  [(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result
                   of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between
                   the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or
                   of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that
                   behalf contained therein; or]
D               (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of
                continued ill-health;]
             22. The term ‘retrenchment’ leaves no manner of doubt that the
      termination of the workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than
      as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action are being termed
E     as retrenchment with certain exceptions and it is not dependent upon the
      nature of employment and the procedure pursuant to which the workman
      has entered into service. In continuation thereof, the condition precedent
      for retrenchment has been defined under Section 25F of the Act 1947
      which postulates that workman employed in any industry who has been
      in continuous service for not less than one year can be retrenched by the
F     employer after clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F have been complied
      with and both the clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F have been held by
      this Court to be mandatory and its non-observance is held to be void ab
      initio bad and what is being the continuous service has been defined
      under Section 25B of the Act 1947. It may be relevant to quote Section
G     25B and clause (a) and (b) of Section 25Fof the Act 1947 which are
      reproduced as under:-
            25B. Definition of continuous service.- For the purposes of this
            Chapter
            (1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a
H           period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including
K.V. ANIL MITHRA v. SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF                      309
              SANSKRIT [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

   service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or             A
   authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or
   a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on
   the part of the workman;
   (2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the
   meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he       B
   shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer—
      (a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of
      twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to
      which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the
      employer for not less than— (i) one hundred and ninety days         C
      in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine;
      and (ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
      (b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period
      of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to
      which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the      D
      employer for not less than— (i) ninety-five days, in the case of
      a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) one
      hundred and twenty days, in any other case. Explanation.—
      For the purposes of clause (2), the number of days on which a
      workman has actually worked under an employer shall include
      the days on which— (i) he has been laid-off under an agreement      E
      or as permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial
      Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under
      this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial
      establishment; (ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned
      in the previous years; (iii) he has been absent due to temporary    F
      disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course
      of his employment; and (iv) in the case of a female, she has
      been on maternity leave; so, however, that the total period of
      such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks.]
   25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.- No              G
   workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous
   service for not less than one year under an employer shall be
   retrenched by that employer until—
      (a) the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing
      indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice
                                                                          H
310            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 11 S.C.R.


A               has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
                notice, wages for the period of the notice:
                (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment,
                compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’ average
                pay [for every completed year of continuous service] or any
B               part thereof in excess of six months; and
                (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate
                Government [or such authority as may be specified by the
                appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette].
             23. The scheme of the Act 1947 contemplates that the workman
C     employed even as a daily wager or in any capacity, if has worked for
      more than 240 days in the preceding 12 months from the alleged date of
      termination and if the employer wants to terminate the services of such
      a workman, his services could be terminated after due compliance of
      the twin clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F of the Act 1947 and to its
D     non-observance held the termination to be void ab initio bad and so far
      as the consequential effect of non-observance of the provisions of Section
      25F of the Act 1947, may lead to grant of relief of reinstatement with full
      back wages and continuity of service in favour of retrenched workman,
      the same would not mean that the relief would be granted automatically
      but the workman is entitled for appropriate relief for non-observance of
E     the mandatory requirement of Section 25F of the Act, 1947 in the facts
      and circumstances of each case.
             24. The salient fact which has to be considered is whether the
      employee who has been retrenched is a workman under Section 2(s)
      and is employed in an industry defined under Section 2(j) and who has
F     been in continuous service for more than one year can be retrenched
      provided the employer complies with the twin conditions provided under
      clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F of the Act 1947 before the
      retrenchment is given effect to. The nature of employment and the
      manner in which the workman has been employed is not significant for
G     consideration while invoking the mandatory compliance of Section 25F
      of the Act 1947.
            25. This can be noticed from the term ‘retrenchment’ as defined
      under Section 2(oo) which in unequivocal terms clearly postulates that
      termination of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever
      provided it does not fall in any of the exception clause of Section 2(oo),
H
  K.V. ANIL MITHRA v. SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF                      311
                SANSKRIT [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

every termination is a retrenchment and the employer is under an            A
obligation to comply with the twin conditions of Section 25F of the Act
1947 before the retrenchment is given effect to obviously in reference
to such termination where the workman has served for more than 240
days in the preceding 12 months from the alleged date of termination
given effect to as defined under Section 25B of the Act.
                                                                            B
       26. This Court in State Bank of India(supra) while examining
the retrenchment of various nature of employments questioning the
interpretation of Section 2(oo) of the Act held as under:-
      8. Without further ado, we reach the conclusion that if the workman
      swims into the harbour of Section 25-F, he cannot be retrenched       C
      without payment, at the time of retrenchment, compensation
      computed as prescribed therein read with Section 25-B(2). But,
      argues the appellant, all these obligations flow only out of
      retrenchment, not termination outside that species -of snapping
      employment. What, then, is retrenchment? The key to this vexed
      question is to be found in Section 2(oo) which reads thus:            D

      2. (oo) “retrenchment” means the termination by the employer of
      the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise
      than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but
      does not include—
                                                                            E
      (a)   voluntary retirement of the workman; or
      (b)   retirement of the workman on reaching the age of
            superannuation if the contract of employment between the
            employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation
            in that behalf; or                                              F
      (c)   termination of the service of a workman on the ground of
            continued ill-health;”
      For any reason whatsoever — very wide and almost admitting
      of no exception. Still, the employer urges that when the order of
      appointment carries an automatic cessation of service, the period     G
      of employment works itself out by efflux of time, not by act of
      employer. Such cases are outside the concept of “retrenchment”
      and cannot entail the burdensome conditions of Section 25-F. Of
      course, that a one year and ten months “nine-days” employment,
      hedged is with an express condition of temporariness and automatic
                                                                            H
312      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 11 S.C.R.


A     cessation, may look like being in a different street (if we may use
      a colloquialism) from telling a man off by retrenching him. To
      retrench is to cut down. You cannot retrench without trenching or
      cutting. But dictionaries are not dictators of statutory construction
      where the benignant mood of a law and, more emphatically, the
      definition clause furnish a different denotation. Section 2(oo) is
B
      the master of the situation and the Court cannot truncate its
      amplitude.
      9. A breakdown of Section 2(oo) unmistakably expands the
      semantics of retrenchment. Termination ... for any reason
      whatsoever are the key words. Whatever the reason, every
C     termination spells retrenchment. So the sole question is, has the
      employee’s service been terminated? Verbal apparel apart, the
      substance is decisive. A termination takes place where a term
      expires either by the active step of the master or the running out
      of the stipulated term. To protect the weak against the strong this
D     policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated.
      Termination embraces not merely the act of termination by the
      employer, but the fact of termination howsoever produced. Maybe,
      the present may be a hard case, but we can visualise abuses by
      employers, by suitable verbal devices, circumventing the armour
      of Section 25-F and Section 2(oo). Without speculating on
E     possibilities, we may agree that “retrenchment” is no longer terra
      incognita but area covered by an expansive definition. It means
      “to end, conclude, cease”. In the present case the employment
      ceased, concluded, ended on the expiration of one year ten months
      nine days — automatically may be, but cessation all the same.
F     That to write into the order of appointment the date of termination
      confers no moksha from Section 25-F(b) is inferable from the
      proviso to Section 25-F(1) [sic 25-F (a)]. True, the section speaks
      of retrenchment by the employer and it is urged that some act of
      volition by the employer to bring about the termination is essential
      to attract Section 25-F and automatic extinguishment of service
G     by effluxion of time cannot be sufficient. An English
      case R. v. Secretary of State3 was relied on, where Lord Denning,
      M.R. observed:
         “I think that the word ‘terminate’ or ‘termination’ is by itself
         ambiguous. It can refer to either of two things — either to
H        termination by notice or to termination by effluxion of time. It
  K.V. ANIL MITHRA v. SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF                         313
                SANSKRIT [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

         is often used in that dual sense in landlord and tenant and in        A
         master and servant cases. But there are several indications in
         this para to show that it refers here only to termination by
         notice.”
      Buckley, L.J. concurred and said:
         “In my judgment the words are not capable of bearing that             B
         meaning. As Counsel for the Secretary of State has pointed
         out, the verb ‘terminate’ can be used either transitively or
         intransitively. A contract may be said to terminate when it comes
         to an end by effluxion of time, or it may be said to be terminated
         when it is determined at notice or otherwise by some act of           C
         one of the parties. Here in my judgment the word ‘terminated’
         is used in this passage in para 190 in the transitive sense, and it
         postulates some act by somebody which is to bring the
         appointment to an end, and is not applicable to a case in which
         the appointment comes to an end merely by effluxion of time.”
                                                                               D
      Words of multiple import have to be winnowed judicially to suit
      the social philosophy of the statute. So screened, we hold that the
      transitive and intransitive senses are covered in the current context.
      Moreover, an employer terminates employment not merely by
      passing an order as the service runs. He can do so by writing a
      composite order, one giving employment and the other ending or           E
      limiting it. A separate, subsequent determination is not the sole
      magnetic pull of the provision. A pre-emptive provision to terminate
      is struck by the same vice as the post-appointment termination.
      Dexterity of diction cannot defeat the articulated conscience of
      the provision.                                                           F
      27. It was later followed in L. Robert D’Souza (supra) and held
as under:-
      25. Assuming we are not right in holding that the appellant had
      acquired the status of a temporary railway servant and that he
      continued to belong to the category of casual labour, would the          G
      termination of service in the circumstances mentioned by the
      Railway Administration constitute retrenchment under the Act?
      26. Section 25-F of the Act provides that no workman employed
      in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less
      than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that              H
314      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 11 S.C.R.


A     employer until the conditions set out in the Act are satisfied. The
      expression “workman” is defined as under:
         “2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject
         or context,—
             (s) “workman” means any person (including an apprentice)
B            employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled
             manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or
             reward, whether the terms of employment be expressed or
             implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this
             Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such
C            person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched
             in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or
             whose dismissal, discharge, or retrenchment has led to that
             dispute, but does not include any such person—
                (i)     who is subject to the Army Act, 1950, or the Air
D                       Force Act, 1950, or the Navy (Discipline) Act,
                        1934; or
                (ii)    who is employed in the police service or as an
                        officer or other employee of a prison; or
                (iii)   who is employed mainly in a managerial or
E                       administrative capacity; or
                (iv)    who, being employed in a supervisory capacity,
                        draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per
                        mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the
                        duties attached to the office or by reason of the
F                       powers vested in him, functions mainly of a
                        managerial nature.”
      27. There is no dispute that the appellant would be a workman
      within the meaning of the expression in Section 2 (s) of the Act.
      Further, it is incontrovertible that he has rendered continuous service
G     for a period over 20 years. Therefore, the first condition of Section
      25-F that appellant is a workman who has rendered service for
      not less than one year under the Railway Administration, an
      employer carrying on an industry, and that his service is terminated
      which for the reasons hereinbefore given would constitute
      retrenchment. It is immaterial that he is a daily-rated worker. He
H
  K.V. ANIL MITHRA v. SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF                         315
                SANSKRIT [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

      is either doing manual or technical work and his salary was less         A
      than Rs 500 and the termination of his service does not fall in any
      of the excepted categories. Therefore, assuming that he was a
      daily-rated worker, once he has rendered continuous uninterrupted
      service for a period of one year or more, within the meaning of
      Section 25-F of the Act and his service is terminated for any
                                                                               B
      reason whatsoever and the case does not fall in any of the excepted
      categories, notwithstanding the fact that Rule 2505 would be
      attracted, it would have to be read subject to the provisions of the
      Act. Accordingly the termination of service in this case would
      constitute retrenchment and for not complying with pro-conditions
      to valid retrenchment, the order of termination would be illegal         C
      and invalid.
      28. Later, in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation
Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh(supra), the Constitution Bench of this
Court examined the scope of the term ‘Retrenchment” under Section
2(oo) of the Actin affirmative in paragraphs 14 and 82. The relevant           D
paras are as under:-
      14. The precise question to be decided, therefore, is whether on
      a proper construction of the definition of “retrenchment” in Section
      2(oo) of the Act, it means termination by the employer of the
      service of a workman as surplus labour for any reason whatsoever,        E
      or it means termination by the employer of the service of a
      workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a
      punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, and those
      expressly excluded by the definition. In other words, the question
      to be decided is whether the word “retrenchment” in the definition
      has to be understood in its narrow, natural and contextual meaning       F
      or in its wider literal meaning.
      82. Applying the above reasonings, principles and precedents, to
      the definition in Section 2(oo) of the Act, we hold that
      “retrenchment” means the termination by the employer of the
      service of a workman for any reason whatsoever except those              G
      expressly excluded in the section.
      29. It leaves no manner of doubt that the nature of every termination
of a kind, by the service of a workman, for any reason whatsoever,
which the Legislature in its wisdom made a clarification in its intention to
be known to the employer that such of the workman whose services, if           H
316                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 11 S.C.R.


A     to be terminated, will amount to retrenchment under Section 2(oo) of the
      Act except those expressly excluded in the section.
            30. It is not open for us to examine the nature of employment
      offered to the workman and the manner he had served the employer is
      beyond the terms of reference made by the appropriate Government
B     dated 8th April, 2003 and the fact is that if the service of the workman
      has been terminated, it will be termed to be a retrenchment under Section
      2(oo) of the Act provided it does not fall under any of those expressly
      excluded under the section. In every retrenchment, the employer is not
      under an obligation to comply with the twin conditions referred to under
      clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F of the Act but in a case where the
C     workman has been in continuous service for more than 240 days in the
      preceding 12 months before the alleged date of termination as
      contemplated under Section 25B, the employer is under an obligation to
      comply with the twin conditions referred to under clauses (a) and (b) of
      Section 25F of the Act 1947.
D            31. The consistent view of this Court is that such non-observance
      has been termed to be void ab initio bad and consequence in the ordinary
      course has to follow by reinstatement with consequential benefits but it
      is not held to be automatic and what alternative relief the workman is
      entitled for on account of non-observance of mandatory requirement of
E     Section 25F of the Act 1947 is open to be considered by the Tribunal/
      Courts in the facts and circumstances of each case.
            32. What appropriate relief the workman may be entitled for
      regarding non-compliance of Section 25F of the Act 1947 has been
      considered by this Court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited Vs.
F     Bhurumal9. The relevant paras are as under:-
                33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that
                the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages,
                when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied
                mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where
G               services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally
                and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimisation, unfair labour
                practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination
                of a daily-wage worker and where the termination is found illegal
                because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section
      9
H         2014(7) SCC 177
K.V. ANIL MITHRA v. SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF                         317
              SANSKRIT [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

   25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in          A
   taking the view that in such cases reinstatement with back wages
   is not automatic and instead the workman should be given
   monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice.
   Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious.
   34. The reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such           B
   cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found
   to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment
   compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under
   Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after
   reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate
                                                                             C
   the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment
   compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily-wage
   basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek
   regularisation [see State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [(2006)
   4 SCC 1]. Thus when he cannot claim regularisation and he has
   no right to continue even as a daily-wage worker, no useful purpose       D
   is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be
   given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if
   he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive
   monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment
   compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief
                                                                             E
   of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any
   purpose.
   35. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be
   cases where termination of a daily-wage worker is found to be
   illegal on the ground that it was resorted to as unfair labour practice
                                                                             F
   or in violation of the principle of last come first go viz. while
   retrenching such a worker daily wage juniors to him were retained.
   There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were
   regularised under some policy but the workman concerned
   terminated. In such circumstances, the terminated worker should
   not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty           G
   reasons for adopting the course of grant of compensation instead
   of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule
   and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing,
   such a relief can be denied.
                                                                             H
318                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2021] 11 S.C.R.


A          33. It has been further followed in District Development Officer
      and Another Vs. Satish Kantilal Amralia10.
            34. In the instant case, the appellants had served as a daily wager
      in non-teaching staff category from the year 1993-1997 and their services
      were terminated in sequel to the order dated 24th March, 1997 pursuant
B     to which their services were de-regularized and that has been upheld by
      the Division Bench of the High Court in writ appeal preferred at the
      instance of the appellants in the earlier round of litigation.
              35. In the afore-stated facts, the High Court of Kerala in the
      earlier round of litigation made certain adverse observations with regard
C     to the nature of appointment as a daily wager but still the alleged
      termination was left open to examine the effect of non-observance of
      the Act, 1947 in the appropriate proceedings. Thus, what has been
      observed by the Division Bench in its Judgment in the earlier round of
      litigation may not have any relevance so far as the question which has
      been examined by the Tribunal in answering the reference in affirmative
D     terms regarding non-observance of Section 25F of the Act 1947 and its
      consequential effect.
             36. At the same time, the finding which has been recorded by the
      learned Single Judge and confirmed by the Division Bench of the High
      Court in the impugned judgment that if the appointment has not been
E     properly made after going through the process of selection as provided
      under the statutory rules/Ordinance, as the case may be, if such irregular
      appointments are being terminated, Section 25F will not apply to a case
      of termination of such appointed employees. The view expressed by the
      High Court in the impugned judgment, in our considered view, is
F     unsustainablein law and is not in conformity with the scheme of the Act
      1947 and deserves to be set aside.
             37. The submission made by learned counsel for the respondents
      that after the finding has been recorded by the Division Bench of the
      High Court in the earlier round of litigation holding the seal of approval
G     on the appointments of the appellants to an act which is conceived in
      fraud and delivered in deceit, are not entitled to claim benefit under
      Section 25F of the Act 1947. In our considered view, the submission is
      without substance for the reason that appointments are made in the
      instant case on daily wage basis under the orders of the Vice Chancellor
      10
H          2018(12) SCC 298
  K.V. ANIL MITHRA v. SREE SANKARACHARYA UNIVERSITY OF                        319
                SANSKRIT [AJAY RASTOGI, J.]

who is the competent/appointing authority and merely because their            A
appointmentsare not in accordance with the procedure prescribed under
the Ordinance would not disentitle them from claiming protection under
provisions of the Act 1947.
       38. The judgment in R. Vishwanatha Pillai(supra) on which
learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance was a case            B
where the incumbent sought an appointment as Scheduled Caste
candidate. On complaint, it revealed that he was not a member of the
Scheduled Caste category and in that reference, a finding was recorded
that the appointment has been obtained by fraud. What will be the
consequence, it does not have any application in the facts of the instant
cases.                                                                        C

       39. So far as the judgment in Rajasthan Tourism Development
Corporation Ltd. and another(supra) is concerned, it was a case where
the workmen had not worked for 240 days in the calendar year which is
the condition precedent for attracting the provisions of Section 25F of
the Act 1947. In those circumstances, a passing reference has been            D
made regarding non-observance of Section 25F of the Act 1947, which,
in our view, may not be of any assistance to the respondents.
       40. The next judgment relied upon in Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam
(supra)is the case of abolition of jagirs by virtue of the Himachal Pradesh
Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act, 1953. While             E
examining the abolition of Jagirs under the Act, reference has been made
of fraud and deceit which has no application in the facts of the instant
case.
       41. So far as the judgment in Punjab Urban Planning and
Development Authority and Another(supra) is concerned, it was a case          F
where three years’ service was required for seeking regularization of
service in terms of circular issued by the authority under its policy dated
23rd January, 2001 and the incumbent had not completed three years of
service for seeking regularization but due to some inadvertence, his name
was included in the list of candidates who were regularized and after a       G
show cause notice, his services were terminated. In that context,
reference has been made which may not have any remote application
on the facts of the case.
       42. In the facts and circumstances of the instant cases and looking
into the nature of service rendered by the appellants as daily wager for
                                                                              H
320             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 11 S.C.R.


A     a short period,while upholding the termination of the appellants being in
      violation of Section 25F of the Act 1947, we consider it just and reasonable
      to award a lumpsum monetary compensation of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees
      two lakh fifty thousand) to each of the appellants-workmen in full and
      final satisfaction of the dispute in lieu of right to claim reinstatement with
      50% back wages as awarded by the Tribunal.
B
            43. The respondents shall pay the compensation as awarded by
      this Court to each of the appellants-workmen within a period of three
      months.
             44. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals succeed and
C     are partly allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court dated
      4thJanuary, 2010 is hereby set aside and the Award of the Industrial
      Tribunal dated 14th November, 2005 is modified to the extent indicated
      above.
             45. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
D
      Divya Pandey                                             Appeals partly allowed.




E




F




G




H