Holding

Section 23(1‑A) provides a substantive right but its retrospective operation is confined to the cases enumerated in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) of the 1984 Amendment, and it does not apply to all pending reference proceedings.

Summary

The bench examined whether the additional compensation provision (Section 23(1‑A)) inserted by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 applies to acquisition proceedings that were pending before the reference court on 24 September 1984, regardless of when the Collector’s award was made. The majority held that Section 23(1‑A) confers a substantive right but is prospective, and its applicability to pending cases is limited to those covered by clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) of the amending Act. The Court read Section 30(1) as an integral transitional provision that restricts the retrospective operation of Section 23(1‑A). It rejected the broader view in Zora Singh, upheld the limited retrospectivity, and found no violation of Articles 14 or 31A. The appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Does Section 23(1‑A) of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended, apply to all reference proceedings pending on 24 September 1984 irrespective of the Collector’s award date?
Is the applicability of Section 23(1‑A) limited to matters specified in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984?
Are the transitional provisions of Section 30(1) an integral part of the amended substantive provision and do they curtail its retrospective effect?
Does the limited retrospectivity offend the constitutional guarantee of equality under Article 14 or the agrarian‑reform protection of Article 31A?
Can extrinsic materials such as the Statement of Objects and Reasons or parliamentary speeches be used to interpret the statute?

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 23(1‑A), s. 23(2), s. 30(1), s. 30(2)
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984s. 30(1), s. 30(2)

Subjects

land acquisitionadditional compensationretrospective effectstatutory interpretationtransitional provisionsArticle 14Article 31A

Judgment

K.S. PARIPOORNAN A
v.
STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS

SEPTEMBER 12, 1994

[M.N. VENKATACHALIAH C.J., P.B. SAWANT, S.C. AGRAWAL, B
R.M. SAHAI AND S.P. BHARUCHA, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended in 1984)-S.23(1-A)-Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984-S.30(1)-Award of additional amount
payable under s.23( 1-A) in pending proceedings before the reference C
court--Held, (per majority) S.23 ( 1-A) confers substantive right to additional
amount, and is prospective-Reference court may not award additional
amount in pending proceedings except to the extent provided in S.30( 1) of the
amending Act-Transitional provisions in amending Act, held, is integral part
of amended provisions-Zora Singh, held, reversed-Transitional Provisions--: D
Prospectivity.

Interpretation of Statutes:-Retrospectivity-Land Acquisition Act,
1894-S.23(1-A)-Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984-S.30(1)-
Held, (per majority) statute is retrospective if it operates on cases or facts
coming into existence before its commencement, and affects, even if for future E
only, past transactions or other conduct-Held further, statute dealing with
substantive rights is prima facie prospective unless it expressly or by necessary
implication has retrospective effect-S.23(1-A), held, is prospective, and does
not apply to pending proceedings except to extent provided by the statute.

Interpretation of Statutes-Extrinsic aids-Statement of Objects and F
Reasons and speeches in Parliament-Held, (per majority) cannot be used as
aids to constrnction of statute.

Constitution of India-Article 14-Land Acquisition Act, 1894-S.23(1-
A)-Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984-S.30(1)-Limited retrospec- G
tivity--Provisions having effect from date of-original Bill being introduced in
Lok Sabha-Held, not arbitrary-Constitutionality upheld-Interpretation of
Statutes.

Constitution of India-Article 31A(1) Proviso-Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (as amended in 1984)-S.23 (1-A)-Land Acquisition (Amendment) H
405
406 / SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Act, 1984-S.30(1)-Held, (per majority) object of Article 31 A is to facilitate
agrarian reforms-l'rincipal law not relating to agrarian reform, Article 31A
has no bearing on· the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984.

In Union of India v.Zora Singh, [1992) 1 SCC 673 decided by a three
B Judge Bench, it was held that the payment of additional amount @12% per
annum on the market value under s.23(1·A) of the Land Acquisition Act
1894 ('Act'); inserted by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984
('amending Act') is to be ordered in every case where reference was pending
before the reference court on the date of commencement of the amending
C Act even· though the award of the Collector was made prior to April 30,
1982. The correctness of this view was doubted by a two Judge bench and
the matter was referred to a larger bench, for considering the correctness
of the decision in Zora Singh Case.The question referred for examination
by the larger bench was whether the additional amount payable @12% per
D annum on the market value under s.23(1·A) is restricted to matters
referred to in s.30(1)(a) and (b) of the amending Act or is to be awarded
in every case where the reference .was pending before the reference court •
on September 24, 1984 (the date of commencement of the amending Act)
irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the Collector.

E While urging that Zora Singh lays down the correct law, it was inter
alia contended for the claimants that S.23(1~A) does not involve giving
retrospective effect only because a part of the requisites for its action is
drawn from events antecedent to its passing; that the language used in
S.23(1·A) being clear, its scope cannot be limited by the Transitional
F Provisions in s.30(1) of the amending Act; that where a reference has been
made under the Act, the acquisition proceedings do not terminate with
the making of the award by the Collector; and the object of the amending
Act shows that it was Parliament's intention to remove the hardship
caused by pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods rendering
~e scale of compensation to be unrealistic.
G
For the Union of India and the States it was contended that since
the insertion of S.23(1·A) imposes an ad«!itional amount by way of com·
pensation, it can only apply to proceedings for acquisition initiated sub·
sequent to the coming into force of the amending Act, except to the limited
H extent of retrospectivity given by S.30(1) of the amending Act.
KS. PARIPOORNAN v. STAIB OFKERAIA 407

Disposing of the reference, this Court A
HELD : (Per Majority Venkatachaliah CJ., Agrawal & Bharucha JJ.)

1. In respect of the acquisition proceedings initiated prior to the
commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 the pay-
ment of the additional amount payable under S.23(1-A) of the Act will be B
restricted to matters referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1)
of S.30 of the Amending Act. Insofar as Zora Singh holds that the said
amount is payable in all cases where the reference was pending before the
reference court on September 24, 1984, irrespective of the date on which
the award was made by the Collector, it does not lay down the correct law. C
(443-D, E]
Union of India & Anr. v. Zora Sing, (1992) 1 SCC 673, reversed.

Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989] 3 SCR 316, followed.

K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, D
(1985) 2 SCR 914, affirmed

Bhag Singh v. Union Tenitory of Chandigarh, (1985) Suppl. 2 SCR
949, reversed.

Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Soma Gopal Gowda, AIR (1986) E
Kar 179; Jaiwant Laxman P. Sardesai v. Govt. of Goa, Daman and Diu, AIR
(1967) Bom 214; The Special Deputy Collector v. B. Venkata Seshamma, AIR
(1987) AP 136 and Maya Devi v. Union Tenitory of Chandigarh, 1988 Punj.
W.189, overruled.

Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama, (1989) Supp. 2 SCR 336, F
affirmed.

R. v. St. Mary Whitechapel, (1848) 12 QB. 120 116 E.R. 525; Master
Ladies Tailor Organisation v. Minister of Labour & National Service, (1950)
2 All E.R. 525; In re A Solicitor's Clerk, (1957) 1 W.L.R.1219; Alexander v.
Mercouris, (1979) 3 All E.R. 305; Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1964] 1 G
SCR 631; Kapur Chand Jain v. B.S. Grewal, (1965] 2 SCR 36; T.KL. Iyer v.
State of Madras, (1968] 3 SCR 542; Lakshminarayan Guin & Ors. v. Niran-
jan Modale, (1985) 2 SCR 20~Darshan Singh v. Ram Pal Singh, (1992]
Suppl. 1 SCC 191; Warbwton v. Loveland, (1832) VI Bligh N.S.I, 5 E.R. 499
and Khorshed Shapoor Chenai v. Assistant Collector of Estate Duty, (1980) H
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A 2 SCR 315, referred to.

2. S.23(1-A) deals with substantive rights and it confers a substantive
right to claim an additional amount. The applicability of the said provision
to proceedings for acquisition which were pending on the date of coming
into force of the said provisions has, therefore, to be examined keeping in
B view the aforesaid nature of the provisions. [432-B, C]

3. A statute dealing with substantive rights differs from a statute
which relates to procedure or evidence or is declaratory in nature inas-
much as while a statute dealing with substantive rights is prima facie
C prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have
retrospective effect, a statute concerned mainly with matters of procedure
or evidence or which is declaratory in nature has to be construed as
retrospective unless there is a clear indication that such was not .the
intention of the legislature. A statute is regarded as retrospective if it
operates on cases or fact coming into existence before its commencement
D in the sense that it affects, even if for the future only, the character or
consequences of transactions previously entered into or of other past
conduct. By virtue of the presumption against retrospectivity of laws
dealing with substantive rights transactions are neither invalidated by
reason of their failure to comply with formal requirements subsequently
E imposed, nor open to attack under powers of avoidance subsequently
conferred. They are also not rendered valid by subsequent relaxations of
the law, whether relating to form or substance. Similarly, provisions in
which a contrary intention does not appear neither impose new liabilities
in respect of events taking place before their commencement, nor relive
persons from liabilities then existing, and the view that existing obligations
F was not intended to be affected has been taken in varying degrees even of
provisions expressly prohibiting proceedings. These principles are equally
applicable to amendatory statutes. [432·D to HJ

Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 44, paras 921, 922, 925 and
G 926, referred to.
Crawford' Statutory Constntction, pp. 622-23, relied on.

4. The question whether a particular statute operate prospectively
only or has retrospective operation also will have to be determined on the
H basis of the effect it has on existing rights and obligations, whether it
KS. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OFKEPALA 409

creates new obligations or imposes new duties or levies new liabilities in A
relation to past transactions. For that purpose it is necessary to ascertain
the intention of the legislature as indicated in the statute itself. (433-F]

The Queen v. St. Mary, Whitechapel, [1848) 12 Q.B. 120, 116 E.R. 525,
distinguished.
B
Alexander v. Mercouris, [1979) All E.R. 305, referred to.

5. In relation to pending proceedings, the approach of the Courts
in India is similar to the courts in England which is that they are unaf-
fected by the changes in the law so far as they relate to the determination C
' of substantive rights and in the absence of a clear indication of a contrary
intention in the amendment, the substantive rights of the parties to an
action fall to be determined by the law as it existed when the action was
commenced and this is so the whether the law is changed before the
hearing of the case at the first instance or while an appeal is pending.
[433-H, 434-AJ D
Halsbury's Law of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44 para 922 referred to.

United Provinces v.Atiqa Begum, [1940) FCR 110; Garikapatti Ve"aya
v. N. Subbiah Chaudhury, [1975) SCR 488, relied on.
E
6. In order that the provisions of a statute dealing with substantive
right may apply to pending proceedings the court has insisted that the law
must speak in language which expressly or by clear intendment, takes in
even pending matters. [434-G]

Smt. Dayawati and Anr.. v. Inderjit and Ors., [1966) 3 SCR 275 and F
Lakshminarayan Guin & Ors. v. Niranjan Modak, [1985] 2 SCR 202, relied .
on.

Union of India & Anr. v. Zora Singh, [1992) 1 SCC 673, reversed.

7. For the purpose of ascertaining whether and, if so, to what extent G
the provisions of sub-section (1-A) introduced in S.23 by the amending Act
are applicable to proceedings that were pending on the date of commence-
ment of the amending Act it is necessary to read S.23 (1-A) along with the
transitional provisions continued in sub-section (1) of S.30 of the amend-
~~~~ H
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS· [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Francis Bennion, Statutory interpretation, 2nd Edn., p.213; Thornton
on Legislative Drafting, 3rd Edn., 1987, p. 319 quoted in Britnell v. Secretary
of State, (1991] 2 All E.R. 726, relied on.

8. In Zora Singh the Court has laid stress on the word "also" in
S.30(1) and has held that apart from the retrospectivity flowing from the
B provisions contained in s.23 (1· A) further retrospectivity is given to these
provisions in cases where no proceedings were pending on the date of
commencement of the amending Act. This would mean that Parliament has
made two provisions for giving retrospectivity to section 23(1-A), one in
section 23(1-A) itself and the other in Section 30(1) of the Amending Act.
.C The is no sound basis for this construction. This approach has been
disapproved by the Constitution Bench in Raghubir Singh on the ground
that the terms in which s.30 is couched indicate a limited extension of the
benefit. [436-GH, 437-A, B]

Union of India and Anr. v. Zora Singh, (1992] 1 SCC 673, reversed.
D
Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, [1989] 3 SCR 316, relied on.

Union of India v. Filip -Tiago De Gama, [1989] Supp. 2 SCR 336,
affirmed.

E Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Soma Gopal Gowada, AIR (1986)
Karnataka 179; Jaiwant Laxman P.Sardesai v. Govt. of Goa, Daman And
Diu, AIR (1967) Born 214; The Special Deputy Collector v. B. Venkata
Seshamm, AIR (1987) AP 136, overruled.

9. Merely because the provision regarding scope of the retrospec·
F tivity in regard to pending matters is contained in a separate provision
and is not found in the amended provision would not justify treating the
said provisions independent of each other. The provisions contained in
s.30 of the amending Act are to be treated as an integral part of the
amended provisions of the principal Act to which they relate. (437-F]
G
Warburton v. Loveland, [1832] VI Bligh N.S.1, 5 E.R. 499 and Special
Reference No. 1 of (1974 -1975] 1SCR504, distinguished. ·

10. The provisions of S.23(1-A) have been given limited retrospec·
tivity by s.30(1). In relation to proceedings which were initiated prior to
H the date of commencement of the amending Act S.23(1-A) would be ap-
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERAIA 411

plicable only to those cases which fall within the ambit of clauses (a) and A
(b) of sub-section (1) of s.30 of the amending Act. Even where the statute
is clearly intended to be retrospective to some extent, it is not to be
construed as having a greater retrospective effect than its language
renders necessary. [439-E, F]

There is no scope' for extending the ambit of retrospective operation B
of sub-section (1-A) of s.23 beyond the limits specified in s.30(1) of the
amending Act so as to apply it all proceedings initiated prior to this date
of coming into force of the amending Act which were pending before the
civil court on reference under s.18 of the principle Act irrespective of the
date on which the award was made by the Collector. [439-G] C

Union of India and Anr. v. Zora Singh, [1992) SCC 673, reversed.

Union of India v. Filip tiago De Gama, [1989) Supp. SCR 336,
affirmed.
D
Municipal Council of Sydney v. Margaret Alexandra Troy, AIR (1928)
PC 128, distinguished.

Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, para 924, referred to.
E
10. Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to a bill cannot be
used except for the limited purpose of understanding the background and
the state of affairs leading to the legislation but it cannot be used as an
aid to the constructfon of the statute. [441-C]

Asvini Kumar v.Arbinda Bose, [1953) SCR 1; State of West Bengal v. F
Subhash Gopal Bose, [1954) SCR 587 and State of West Bengal v. Union of
India, [1964) 1 SCR 371, relitd on.

12. Speeches made by the members in the House at the time of
consideration of the Bill are not admissible as extrinsic aids to the inter- G
pretation of the statutory provisions though the speech of the mover of the
Bill may be refetred to for the purpose of finding out the object intended
to be achieved by the Bill. [441-D]

. State of Travancore-Cochin v. The Bombay Co. Ltd., [1952) SCR 1112
andAswini Kumar v.Arbinda Bose, (1953) SCR 1, relied on. H
412 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A 13. The Bills of 1982 and 1984 show that they did not contain the
provisions found in s.23 (1-A) of the principal Act and s.30(1) of the
amending Act. These provisions were inserted when the 1984 Bill was
under consideration before Parliament. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons does not, therefore, throw any light on the circumstances in which
these provisions were introduced. [441-E]
B
14. Merely because Parliament has decided to give a limited
retrospectivity so as to cover awards that were made by the Collector
during the period from April 30, 1982 when the original Bill was introduced
in Lok Sabha till the date of the commencement of the amending Act would
C not result in the said provisions being infected with the vice of arbitrari-
ness. The choice of April, 30, 1982, the date on which the original Bill was
introduced in parliament, cannot be said to be arbitrary and confining the
ambit of retrospectivity so as to exclude awards made by the Collector
prior to April 30, 1982, would not render the provisions of s.30(1) of the
D amending Act unconstitutional. [442-B, C]

15. Article 31A (1) proviso has no bearing on the interpretation of
sub-section (1-A) of s.23 and s.30(1) of the amending Act. The object
underlying Article 31 A is to facilitate agrarian reforms and it extends
protection to laws bringing about such reforms. The principal Act is not
E a law relating to agrarian reform as contemplated in Article 31 A of the
Constitution. It is pre-constitutional legislation which was saved by Article
341 (5) (a) from any attack on the ground of violation of the right
conferred by Article 31(2) of the Constitution. [443-C, B]

Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959] Supp. 1SCR887, relied on.
F
Per Sawant J., (dissenting);

1. Section 23(1-A) like the one for solatium in sub-section (2) of
section 23, is a substantive one. Unless, therefore, there is a statutory
G ·mandate, neither of these provisions can be given retrospective. [448-D]

2. S. 30(1) deals exclusively with the powers of the Collector and it
has no bearing on the powers of the Reference Court under s.23. Also,
s.30(1)(a) is not retrospective in operation. It speaks of power of the
. Collector in the proceedings pending before him on April 30, 1982 in which
H 'he ltas yet to make an award. It .is only clause (b) of the said section which
/
KS. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OF KERALA 413

gives a limited retrospectivity to the power of the Collector when it enables A
him to reopen the award made by him before the commencement of. the
amending Act which is September 24, 1984 in proceedings started after
April 30, 1982. [451-C to E]

3. S.23 does not make any distinction in the acquisition proceedings
pending before the reference court on September 24, 1984 between those B
which bad commenced prior to April 30, 1982 and those which had com·
menced thereafter. If the proceedings are pending before the reference
court on the date of the commencement of the Act which is September 24,
1984 the plain language of s.23 enjoins upon the reference court to give the
benefit of s.23(1-A) in all such proceedings without making any distinction. C
When the reference court does so, it gives prospective effect to S.23(1· A).
It does not give retrospective effect to the said section merely because the
proceedings in question had started to prior to April 30, 1982. [464-D to F]

Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 4, para 221; Queen v.
Inhabitants of St. Mary, Whitechapel, [1848) 12 QB 120; Rao Shiv Bahadur D
Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR (1953) SC 394; T.K Lakshmana Iyer
v. State of Madras, [1968) 3 SCR 842; Trimbak Damodhar Rajpurkar v.
Assaram Hiraman Pati~ AIR (1966) SC 1758 and Bishun Narain Misra v.
State of U.P., AIR (1965) SC 1567, relied on.
E
4. This interpretation is also in conformity with the object of the
legislation. The Act was amended to deal with the long delays which
occurred very often, and which affected the land owners materially as the
market value of the land is to be deterpiined unde(' s.23 of the principal
Act with reference to the date of the notification issued under S.4(1).
[454-D, 455-B] F
All India Report on Agricultural Census, 1985-86 (1992); Law Commis-
sion Report, (1958) and (1970) Report, relied on.

It was, therefore, clearly the intention of the legislature in enacting
the amending Act and in particular s.23(1-A) to give additional amount to G
the deprived land owners in all the proceedings which were pending before
the Collector on April 30, 1982 and before the reference court on Septem·
ber 24, 1984 i.e. the date of commencement of the Act. But for the
provisions of s.30(1), the Collector would not have been able to give the
benefit of S.23(1-A) in the proceedings referred to therein. This would have H
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A defeated the object of the Act in those cases which had not travelled or
could not travel to the reference court and had or would become final with
the Collector's award. If the Collector could give the said benefit in
proceedings pending before him on April 30, 1982 although started prior
to that date, where he had not made his award, it will be against the scheme
B of the Act to contend that the reference court could not give the same
benefit in the proceedings pending before it because the acquisition
proceedings had started prior to April 30, 1982. [457-C, D, H, 458-A]

5. S.30(1) of the amending Act is confined to spelling out the powers
of the Collector. It has no reference to and bearing on the power of the
C reference or the appellate court. Also Ss. 30(1) and 30(2) deal with dif-
ferent benefits and speak of powers of different tribunals. It is not permis·
sible to read the provisions of S.30(2) of the amending Act into S.30(1)
thereof and thereby in s.23(1·A). The provisions of S.30(2) are exclusively
concerned with Ss.23(2) and 28 and have no relation to the provisions of
D S.23(1-A). [458-B to D]

Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama, [1989] Supp. 2 SCR 336,
partly affirmed and partly reversed. ·

The reference under S.23 has no power to reopen the award made by
E it before September 24, 1984 to give the benefit of S.23(1-A), since the
provisions of S.23(1·A) have no retrospective effect. The retrospective
effect is given only to the powers of the Collector to reopen the awards
made by him before September 24, 1984. [459-H, 460-A]

Union ofIndia &Anr. v. Zora Singh, [1992) 1 SCC 673, partly reserved.
F
K.S. Paripooman v. State of Kerala, [1992] 1 SCC 684, reversed.

Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, [1989] 3 SCR 316, endorsed.

K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer,
G [1985) 2 SCR 914, affirmed.
Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, [1985] Suppl. 2 SCR 949,
reversed.

Union of India v. Filip Tiago De Gama, [1989] Supp. 2 SCR 336,
H partly approved, partly reversed.
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERALA 415

State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh, [1986] 1 SCC 365, referred to. A
6. It is not possible to accept the view that the word 'award' occurring
in s.23(1-A) is used there not as a noun but as a verb. Although the word
'award' is .not defined in the Act, the legislature has used the said word in
various provisions of the Act with a specific intention and meaning and
hence there cannot be any mistake that the said expression has been used B
_
....
even in s.23(1-A) as a noun. Inconvenient words, expressions and language,
when their intendment and meaning are plain, cannot be got over by either
mutilating them or by attributing to them unnatural and unwarranted role.
Such an exercise is against the canons of the interpretation of statutes.
[460-G, H, 461-A] C
7. But for the provisions of S.30(1), the Collector would not have
been able to give the benefit of S.23(1-A) in the proceedings.referred to
therein. This would have defeated the object of the Act in those cases which
had not travelled or could not travel to the reference court and had or
would become final with the Collector's award. The legislature, therefore, D
wanted to give the power to the Collector in addition to the reference court
to take care of such cases. It was aware that many cannot and did not go
to the reference court to get their due compensation. Any other interpreta-
tion will be a distortion of the plain language, meaning and intendment of
the relevant provisions. It will also amount to reading limitation on the
powers of the Collector and the courts where the legislature intended to E
expand them. (463-D to F]

8. Neither the reference court nor the appellate court, whether High
Court or the Supreme Court can grant the benefit of S.23(1-A) in any
proceeding in which the reference court has made its award prior to
September 24, 1984. The grant of such benefit by the courts is not war-
F
ranted by the transitional provisions of S.30(1). [464-H, 465-AJ

Per Saha~ J. (Dissenting)

1. S.23(1-A) is not a procedural or declaratory law, but is substantive G
in nature and prospective in operation. The section is not robbed of its
prospectivity because for the exercise of right the calculation of compen-
sation has to be made on facts which ·come into existence prior to the date
of the amending Act. [471-F, 474-D]

Kapur Chand v. B.S.Grewal, Financial Commissioner, AIR (1965) SC H
416 SUPREME COURTREPORTS !1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A 1491 and Master Ladie.1· Tailm:1· Organisation v. Minister of Labour and Na-
tional Se1vice, [1950) I All ER 525, relied on.

Union of India & A11r. v. Zora Singh, [1992) I SCC 673 and
K.S.Paripoornan v. State of Kera/a, [1992) 1 SCC 684, discussed.

B The right to receive additional compensatio~ at the rate of 12 %
under S.23(1-A) operates in future, i.e., it confers benefit of additional
compensation from the date it came into force and not from a date prior to
coming into force of the provisions. If the legislature does not use any
expression to indicate that the law made by it shall apply to any cause of
action or incident taking place only after coming into force of the Act, then
c the law has to be applied in praesenti, i.e., to matters pending before it even
if it those matters had arisen before the coming into force of the Act.
[473-H, 474-A, 471-G)
Halsbwy's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 4, para 221; Queen v.
Inhabitants of St. Mary, Whitechapel, [1848) 12 QB 120; Rao Shiv Bahadur
D Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR (1953) SC 394; T.K. Lakshmana Iyer
v. State of Madras, [1968) 3 SCR 842; Trimbak Damodhar Rajpurkar v.
Assaram Hiraman Patil, AIR (1966) SC 1758 and Bishun Narain Misra v.
State of U.P., AIR (1965) SC 1567, relied on.

Principles of interpretation are only the guideline, they are not con·
E elusive. The sure and safe way is to interpret the provision on the necessity
and requirement as appears from the objective of the Act and the words
used by the legislature. [ 473-C]

Alexander v. Mercowis, [1979) 3 All E.R. 305, distinguished.
F
S.23(1-A) come into force on September 24, 1984, and requires the
court to pay additional compensation in every case. The ambit of the section
cannot be narrowed by confining its operation to those cases where notifica·
ti on is issued after coming into force of the amending Act. [ 476-E]

G Union of India v. Ragltubir Singh, [1989] 3 SCR 316; Union of India v.
Filip Tiago De Gama, [1989) Supp. 2 SCR336 andKS.Paripooman v. State
of Kerala, [1992) 1 SCC 684, distinguished.

Union of India & Anr. v. Zora Singh, [1992) 1 SCC 673, referred to.

H 2. By calculating compensation for the period between the notifica·
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA 417

tion under S.4(1) and publication under S.6, the right to receive additional A
compensation is not taken into the past. The right operates from the date
the amending Act came into force. [475-G]

Union of India v. Zora Singh, [1992] 1 SCC 673, affirmed.

Literally or even constructionally the law requires the Court deter- B
mining compensation under S.18 of the Act, to pay additional compensa-
tion in every case coming before it after the amendment comes into force.
[477-D]
3. Necessity to construe a provision by taking recourse to adding or
substracting words may arise if the provision is otherwise ambiguous or C
it may lead to disastrous consequences. In this case, the expression in
S.23(1-A) is "the Court shall in every case" award the amount. The word
"shall" has been used to impart it mandatory character. This obligation
the court has to discharge in every case. In absence of any expression
limiting the exercise of power in only those cases where notification is D
issued after September 24, 1984 or making it retrospective so as to apply
to every case in which proceedings for acquisition had started before the
Act came into force, the provision has to be applied to every case which
was pending for award of compensation on and after the date when the
section becomes operative. [477-F of HJ
E
Union of India and Anr. v. Zora· Singh, [1992] 1 SCC 673 and K.S.
Panpooman v. State of Kera/a, [1992] 1 SCC 684, discussed.

Municipal Council of Sydney v. Margaret Alexander Troy, AIR (1928)
PC 128, relied on.
F
When the court proceeds to determine compensation after Septem-

- ber 24, 1984, it cannot ignore S.23(1-A). That would be against the plain
and simple language of the section. [478-C]

4. A transitional provision cannot curtail operation of the substan-
tive provision. The field of operation of S.30 being narrow, namely, to G
extend the benefit of S.23(1-A) to all those land owners whose land has
been notified to be acquired before 1982 and in which no award has been
made by the Collector, it cannot be taken help of for determining the scope
of the main provision and hold that what is not covered by it stands
excluded from S.23 (1-A). [481-B] H
418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A 5. The legislative background and purpose of the enactment of the
amending Act was to remove the hardship of the effected parties because
of the delay in payment of compensation. It is the duty of the court to
construe the provisions in such a manner ·that the mischief which the
legislature intended to remove may be suppressed and the avowed objec-
tive of the legisla_tion be served. [470-E, F]
B
All India Report on Agricultural Census 1985-86, (1992) Law Commis-
sion Report, 1958 and 1970 Report, relied on.

6. The legislature has used different language in S.30(1) and S.30(2).
The construction placed by the Court on S.30(2) cannot furnish basis for
c construing S.30(1) in the same manner. [483-F]

Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, [1985] Suppl. 2 SCR
949; Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, [1989] 3 SCR 316 and K Kamala-
jammannivaru v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, [1985] ~ SCR 914,
D referred to.

7. S.30(1) does not spell out power of the Collector. Its clauses (a)
and (b) are descriptive of those proceedings to which the benefit of
S.23(1-A) has been extended. They deal with retrospectivity given to S.23(1-
A). But the Collector should be deemed to have this power, otherwise it
E would cause injustice where the land owner does not seek a reference for
any reason. This power, however, flows from S.15 of the Act itself. It is also
just and reasonable that the additional compensation is payable even by
the Collector when he is making a award under S.11. [ 483-H, 484-A, B]

8. No additional compensation is payable in appeals pending on or
F before September 24, 1984 either in the High Court or the Supreme Court.
[488~B]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (C)
Nos. 5514-17 of 1990 etc. etc.

G From the Judgment and Order dated 4 & 5.10.89 of the Kerala High
Court in L.A.A. No. 119 of 1986.

(With SLP (C) Nos. 5685-88 of 1990, 9215-22 of 1920.

/A.1.taf Ahmad, Additional Solicitor General, P.S. Poti, AS. Nambiar
H Soli J Sorabjee, Santosh Hedge, Vikram Mahajan, Vellapally Joseph, V.A.
K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 419

Bobde, O.P. Rana, V.C. Mahajan, AB. Rohtagi, O.P. Sharma, G. Vish- A
wanatha Iyer, K.L. Rathi, Rajender Sachar, Ujagar Singh, S.P. Goyal, Ms
ASubhashini, S.N. Terdol, C.V. Subba Rao, Vishnu B. Saharya, Mrs.
Ratna Nair, M.T. George, Dr. Meera Aggarwal, R.C. Misra, Ranbir Yadav
G.K. Bansal, Tripurari Ray, Gopal Jain, Mukul Mudgal, P.N. Gupta, S.M.
Sareen, P.N. Puri, M.K.pua, S. Balakrishnan, K.L. Narsimhan, S. Prasad, B
R.C. Verma, AK. Srivastava, Ambrish Kumar, Manoj Swarup, Pradeep
Gupta, K.K. Mohan, Shivi Sharma, Goodwill Indeevar, K.C. Jain, Atul
Sharma, E.C. Agarwala, Ms. Rekha Palli, Balmokand Goyal, T.V.S.N.

... Chari, N.D. Garg, R.C. Pathak, Satish Vig, Arvind Minocha, Sanjeev
Malhotra, Mrs. S. Bagga, R.B. Misra, R.S. Suri, R.N. Kovind, Ms. Madhu
Moolchandani and Ms. Naresh Bakshi for the appearing parties. C
The following Judgments of the Court were delivered by

S.C. AGRAWAL, J. By order dated December 17, 1991, these matters
have been referred to a larger bench to consider the correctness of the
decision in Union of India & Anr. v. Zora Singh & Ors., [1992] 1 SCC 673 D
(decided by a bench of three Judges). In Zora Singh's case (supra), this
Court has held that the payment of additional amount payable @ 12% per

. annum on the market value under sub-section (1-A) inserted in Section 23
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the principal
Act') by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the amending Act') is to be ordered in every case where the E
reference was pending before the reference cotirt on the date of commen-
cement of the amending Act even though ihe award of the Collector was
made prior to April 13, 1992.

In all these matters preliminary notification under Section 3(1) of
Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 was published on f'4arch 21, 1979 and F
the notification under Section 6 of the said Act was published on May 15,
1979. The Land Acquisition Officer made the award on December 30,
1980. The reference under Section 18 was decided by Ilnd Additional
Subordinate Judge, Trivandrum on December 28, 1985, after the commen-
cement of the amending Act. The amending Act also repealed the Kerala G
Land Acquisition Act, 1961 and extended the principal Act as amended to
Kerala with effect from September 24, 1984. The civil court enhanced the
compensation and awarded interest @12% per annum from March 11,
1981 till the deposit of the excess amount of compensation awarded by it.
The High Court rejected the claim for additional amount at the rate of
12% per annum payable under Section 23(1-A) on the view ~hat the said H
420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A provision was not attracted in view of Section 30(1) of the amending Act.
The said view is assailed by the petitioners on the basis of the decision in
Zora Singh (supra). Therefore, this reference.

The question which is required to be examined by this Bench is : ·
whether the additional amount payable @ 12% per annum oti the market
B value under Section 23 (1-A) is restricted to matters referred to in clauses
(a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of section 30 of the amending Act or is to
be awarded in every case where the reference was pending before the

C
reference court on September 24, 1984 (the date of the commencement of
the amending Act) irrespective of the date on which the award was made
by the Collector.
....
Section 23 of the principal Act prescribes, in sub-section (1), the
matters which are required to be considered in determining compensation
by the Court on a reference under Section 18. Sub-section (2) of Section
D 23 makes provision for award of a sum, commonly known as 'solatium' in
consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. Prior to the
amending Act, 15% of the market value of the land was required to be
paid as solatium. In Section 28 of the principal Act provision has been
made for payment of interest on the amount which has been awarded as
compensation in excess of the sum awarded by the Collector. Prior to the
E amending Act the said interest was payable at the rate of 6% per annum.
Similarly in Section 34 of the principal Act provision is made for payment
of interest on the amount of compensation when the said amount is not
paid or deposited before taking possession of the land. Prior to the
amending Act the said interest was payable at the rate of 6% per annum.
Having regard to the recommendations of the Law Commission and the
F Land Acquisition Review Committee, a Bill (Bill No.67 of 1982) for
amending the various provisions of the principal Act was introduced in the
Lok Sabha on April 30, 1982. while the said bill was pending consideration
before Parliament various other proposals for amendment, in the principal
Act were received and after considering these proposals in consultation · ...
G with the State Governments and other agencies the said Bill was withdrawn
and another Bill (Bill No. 63 of 1984) was introduced and the same was
enacted as the amending Act which came into force on September 24, 1984.
The amending Act introduced amendments in various provisions of the
principal Act. The amendments relevant for the purpose of the present
controversy are those introduced in Section 23 of the Act. Sub-section
H (1-A) inserted after sub-section (1) in Section 23 reads as under :
K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERA!..A[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 421

"(1-A) In addition to the market-value of the land, as above A
provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated
at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market-value
for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication
of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of
such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of B
taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier.

Explanation. - In computing the period referred to in this sub-sec-
tion, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the
acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or
injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded." C
In sub-section (2) of Section 23 solatium was enhanced from 15% to
30%. The rate of interest prescribed in Sections 28 and 34 was enhanced
from 6% to 9%.

Section 30 of the amending Act contains the following transitional D
provisions:

"30. Transitiohal provisions. -

(1) The provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the
principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, E
shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in
relation to, -

(a) every proceeding for the ~cquisition of any land under the
principal Act pending on the 30th day of the April, 1982 (the
date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) F
Bill, 1982, in the House of the People), in which no award
has been made by the Collector before that date :

(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under
the principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not G
an award has been made by the Collector before the date of
commencement of this Act.

(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28
of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and
Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed H
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the
Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or
Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the
provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982
(the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment)
Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) and before the commence-
B ment of this Act.

(3) The provision of Section 34 of the principal Act, as amended
by Section 20 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have
applied also to, in relation to. -
c (a) every case in which possession of any land acquired under
the principal Act had been taken before the 30th day of
April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Bill, 1982 in the House of the People), and the
amount of compensation for such acquisition had not been
D paid or deposited under Section 31 of the principal Act until
such date, with effect on and from the. date; and

(b) every case in which such possession has been taken on or
after that date but before the commencement of this Act
without the amount of compensation having been paid or
E deposited under the said Section 31, with effect on and from
the date of taking such possession."

Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amend-
ing Act are interrelated and have to be read together. Similarly section
F 23(2) of the principal Act, as amended, as Section 30(2) of the amending
Act have to be read together. Though sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section
30 of the amending Act are differently worded, the construction that is
placed on one set of provisions has a bearing on the construction of the
other set. Since the provisions of Section 23(2) of the principal Act and
Section 30(2) of the amending Act came up for consideration before this
G Court earlier than the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act
and Section 30(1) of the amending Act, we will briefly refer to the decisions
wherein Section 23(2) of the principal Act as amended and Section 30(2)
of the amending Act have been construed before we come to the decisions
on Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending.
H Act.
K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.) 423

In K Kamla Jammanniav(l!U (Dead) by Lrs. v. The Special Land A
Acquisition Officer,[1985) 2 SCR 914, a two-Judge Bench of this Court
rejected the contention that the amendment in the provisions of Section
23(2) regarding enhanced solatium at the rate of 30% was applicable to all
proceedings · in regard to compensation which had not become final
whether they be pending before the Collector, court, High Court or B
Supreme Court and held that the amended provisions of Section 23(2)
would apply to awards made after the commencement of the amending Act
and in view of sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the Amending Act the said
amended provisions would also apply to awards made by the Collector or
Court before April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984 and to orders made
by High Court or by Supreme Court in appeals against such awards. C
Chinnappa Reddy, J., speaking for the Court, has observed:

"Parliament did not intend and could not have intended that
whatever be the date of the award, however ancient it may be;
solatium would stand enhanced to 'thirty per centum' if an appeal D
happened by chance or accident to be pending on April 30, 1982.
Surely it was not the intention of parliament to reward those who
kept alive the litigation even after several years. If it was the
intention of Parliament to make the amended section 23(2) ap-
plicable to all proceedings relating to compensation wherever they
be pending, the words "after the 30th day of April 1982 (the date E
of introduction of the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, 1982 in
the House of the people) and before the commencement of this
Act" is section 30(2) and would become meaningless. It is clear that
Parliament wanted the amended section 23(2) to have very limited°
retrospectivity. It made the provision applicable to awards made F
after April 30, 1982 and before September 24, 1984 also and further
to appeals to the High Court as the Supreme Court arising from
such awards." (p.917)

(Emphasis supplied) G

A three Judge Bench of this Court in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory
of Chandigarh, [1985) Suppl. 2 SCR 949, disapproved the view taken in
Kamala Jammanniavarn (supra) and held that under sub-section (2) of
Section 30 of the amending Act the provisions of the amended Section
23(2) and Section 28 are made applicable to all proceedings relating to H
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A compensation pending on April 30, 1982 or filed subsequent to that date,
whether before the Collector or before the Court or the High Court or the
Supreme Court, even it they have finally terminated before the enactment
of the amending Act. The Court first considered what would be the
position if Section 30(2) were not enacted and the amendments in sub-sec-
tion (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 were effective only from the date on
B which they were made, namely, September 24, 1984, when the amending
Act received the assent of the President and was brought into force. After
observing that "if at the date of the amending Act, any proceedings for
determination of compensation were pending before the Collector under
Section 11 of the Act or before the Court on a reference under Section 18
C of the Act, the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would
admittedly be applicable to such proceedings", the Court posed the ques-
tion I : "But if an award were made by the court on a reference under
Section 18 prior to the commencement of the amending Act and an appeal
against such award was pending before the High Court under Section 54
D at the date of the commencement of the amending Act, which provisions
would the High Court have to apply in deciding the appeal and determining
the amount of compensation: the amended provisions in Section 23 sub-
section (2) and Section 28 or the unamended provisions". The said ques-
tion was thus answered:

E "The answer can only be that the High Court would have to apply
the provisions in the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and
Section 28. The appeal against the award would be a continuation
of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference
under Section 18 and when the High Court hears the appeal, it
F would be in effect and substance be hearing the reference and
while determining the amount of compensation, it would have to
give effect to Sections 23 and 28 as it finds them at the date of
decision of the appeal. When Section 23 sub-section (1) provides
that in determining the amount of compensation the court shall
take into consideration matters specified in the various s:ub-clauses
G of that sub-section and sub-section (2) of Section 23 directs that
in addition to the market value of the land the court shall in every
case award a sum of 15 per centum of such market value in
consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition, the
mandate of these two sub-sections must apply equally whether the
H court is hearing a reference or the High Court is hearing an appeal
K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OFKERALA[S.C. AGRAWAL, J.] 425

against an award made by the Court. The amended provisions in A
Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would therefore have to
be applied by the High Court in determining the amount of
compensation. The same position would obtain where an appeal
against an award has been decided by the High Court prior, to the
commencement of the amending Act and an appeal against the B
order of the High Court is pending before the Supreme Court at
the date of commencement of the amending Act or is filed after
such date." (pp.858-59)

Thereafter the Court examined sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the
amending Act and observed that by virtue of the said provision the C
amended provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 were
made applicable also where the proceedings were pending on April 30,
1982, the date when the original Bill (which ultimately became the amend-
ing Act) was introduced in Parliament, but were commenced after that date
even though they might have finally come to an end before the enactment D
of the amending Act. The expression "such award" in section 30(2) was
construed to mean only the award made by the Collector or by the Court
and it was held that it does not import the time element which finds place
only at the end of the sentence and not immediately followed by the words
"any award made by the Collector or Court". It was, therefore, held that
under Section 30(2) the provisions of amended Section 23(2) and Section E
28 are applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation pending on
April 30, 1982 or filed subsequent to that date, whether before the
Collector or before the Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court,
even though they have finally terminated before the enactment of the
Amendment Act. F

The said decision in Bhag Singh (supra) has been reversed by the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, [1989)
3 SCR 316, wherein the earlier decision in K Kamala Jammanniavaru
(supra) has been affirmed. Accepting the contention of the learned Attar- G
ney General that if Parliament had intended that the benefit of enhanced
compensation should be extended to all pending proceedings it would have
said so in clear language and that on the contrary the terms in which
Section 30 is couched indicate a limited extension of the benefit, Pathak,
CJ. speaking for this Court, has stated: H
426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A "The Amendment Act has not been made generally retrospective
with effect from any particular date, and such retrospectivity as
appears is restricted to certain areas covered by the parent Act
and must be discovered from the specific terms of the provisions
concerned. Since it is necessary to spell out the degree of
retrospectivity from the language of the relevant provision itself,
B close attention must be paid to the provisions of S.30(2) for
determining the scope of retrospective relief intended by Parlia-
ment in the matter of enhanced solatium." (pp.339-40)

Referring to the principle that an appeal is a continuation. of the
C proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under Section
18, the learned Chief Justice observed that "the application of a general
principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself."
(p.340) While construing the provisiOns of Section 30(2) of the amending
Act, it was held that the words "any such award", in the context in which
D they appear in Section 30(2), are intended to refer to awards niade by the
Collector or by the Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984,
and they could not have the expanded meaning given to them in Bhag Singh
(supra).

The provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section
E 30(1) of the amending Act have been construed by the various High Courts
in the light of the decision in Bhag Singh (supra). A Full Bench of the
Karnataka High Court in Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Soma Gopal
Gowda, AIR 1986 Karnataka 179, construed Section 23(1-A) of the prin-
cipal Act to mean that in all pending cases whether on reference or on
F appeal, the Court is required to apply the provisions of sub-section (1-A)
of Section 23 in determining the compensation payable to claimants. It was
held that Section 23(1-A) is not restricted by Section 30(1) of the amending
Act which gives a limited retrospectivity to category of cases specified
therein. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Jaiwant Laxaman P.
Sardesai & etc. etc. v. Government of Goa, Daman and Diu & Anr., AIR
G (1967) Born. 214, also construed Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act
independently of Section 30(1) of the amending Act and held that where
on the date of the commencement of the amending Act any proceedings
for determination of compensation were pending before the Collector
under section 11 or before the Court under referen,ce under Section 18 of
H the Act or before the High Court under appeal under Section 54 of the
K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OF KERAIA[S.C. AGRAWAL,J.] 427

Act, then the amended Section 23(1-A) would be applicable to such A
proceedings in absence of Section 30(1). Similarly a Full Bench of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court in The Special Deputy Collector v. B. Venkata
Seshamma, AIR (1987) Andhra Pradesh 136, took the view that the
amended provisions of Section 23(1-A) were applicable to all pending
cases, whether pending before the Collector or on reference or appeal on B
the date of commenceiiient of the amending Act i.e. September 24, 1984,
and the operation of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 was not cut down by
the transitory provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the
amending Act. A Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
took the same view in Maya Devi v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, [1988]
Punj. l.J 189. The Kerala High Court in the judgment under appeal has, C
however, taken a different view and has held that the retrospectivity of
Section 23(1-A) stands regulated by section 30(1) of the amending Act in
the same mode as Section 30(2) regulate!! the retrospectivity of Section
23(2) and that in cases where the acquisition proceedings commenced
before April 30, 1982 amount would be payable under Section 23(1-A) only D
if no award was made before April 30, 1982.

The question of applicability of Section 23(1-A) to pending proceed-
ings was considered by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India
v. Filip Tiago De Gama, [1989] Supp. 2 SCR 336. In that case, the Land
Acquisition Officer declared the award on March 5, 1969, and on reference E
the Civil Court made the award on May 28, 1985, i.e., after the commen-
cement of the amending Act. It was held that the entitlement of additional
amount provided under Section 23(1-A) depends upon pendency of ac-
quisition proceedings as on April 30, 1982 or commencement of acquisition
proceedings after that date and if the Collector has made the award before p
that date then, additional amount cannot be awarded;. After referring to
the provisions of Section 23(1-A), Jagannatha Shetty, J., speaking for the
Court, has observed :

"The objective words used in this sub-section are similar to those
that are used in Section 23(2). It enjoins a duty on the Court to G
award the additional amount at twelve per cent on the market value
of the land for the period prescribed thereunder. But this again is
a part of the scheme for determining compensation under Section
23(1) of the Act. It also operates on the market value of the land
acquired. It is plainly and distinctly prospective in its operation H
428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A since market value has to be determined as on the date of publi-
cation of notification under section 4(1). But the legislature has
given new starting point for operation of Section 23(1-A) for
certain cases. That will be found from section 30 sub-section 1(a)
and (b) of the Transitional Provisions." (p. 345)
B Referring to Section 30 of the amending Act the learned Judge has
pointed out that the Collector had made the award on March 5, 1969 and
on April 30; 1982, no proceeding was pending before the Collector and,
therefore, Section 30 sub-section (1) (a) was not attracted to the case and
since the proceedings for acquisition commenced before April 30, 1982,
C Section 30 sub-section (l)(b) was also not applicable to the case. The
learned Judge has taken note of the decisions of Karnataka High Court in
Soma Gopal Gowda (supra) and Bombay High Court case in laiwant
Laxaman P. Sardesai (supra) and has observed:

"Both the High Courts have focussed attention on the terms and
D phraseology used in Section 30 sub-section (1) namely, "........... shall
apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation
has also been proceedings for acquisition...... ". The conclusion has
also been rested on the mandatory words of Section 23(1-A). It
was said that it enjoins a duty on the court to award the amount
in every case and that mandate of the legislature could not be
- E ignored. The decision of this Court in Bhag Singh appears to be
the single motive force guiding the approach and reaching the
conclusion. But it may be noted that the aforesaid phraseology
used in Section 30 sub-section (1) is quite similar to that used in
Section 30 sub-section (2). The scope of those words has already
F been examined and no more need to be stated in that regard since
Bhag Singh has been overruled in Raghubir Singh. The view taken
by the High Courts of Karnataka and Bombay, therefore, could no
ionger be considered as. good law and the said decisions are
accordingly overruled." (p. 347)
G
It may be mentioned that the decision of the Karnataka High Court
in Soma Gupal Gowda (supra) which was reversed by Jagannath Shetty, J.
in Filip Tiago(supra) was also rendered by Shetty, J. in the High Court.

The said view in Filip Tiago (supra) has been reversed by a three-
H Judge Bench of this Court in Zora Singh (supra). The Court has held that
K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERAIA[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 429

Section 23(1-A) confers a substantive right to claim the additional amount A
calculated as set out ill the said sub-section in the circumstances set out
therein and that under the well-settled rules the said provisions can have
only prospective operation unless the language in which the provisions are
couched, read in the context, shows that the;: intention of the legislature was
to give retrospective effect to them. Laying emphasis on the language of
section23(1-A) the Court has observed that a duty has been cast on the B
Reference Court to award an additional amount calculated as prescribed
. therein and that an unduly restricted meaning given to the provisions of
Section 23(1-A) in Filip Tiago (supra) was not warranted. It was held that
on the plain language of Section 23(1-A) itself the additional amount is
directed to be awarded by the Court, namely, the Reference Court, in all C
cases which are pending before that Court on September 24, 1984 even if
the award of the Collector was made before April 30, 1982. It was so
confined to the Reference Court on the ground that the provisions "award",
as distinguished from the expression "decree", has been used in Section
23(1-A) and for that reason it was held that Section 23(1-A) would not
come into play where award had been made by the Collector as well as by D
the Reference Court earlier, but on the date of coming into effect of the
said sub-section, an appeal from the said award might have been pending
in a court. The benefit conferred by Section 30(1)(a) has been limited to
only those cases where the Collector as well as the Court have made their
respective awards between April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. Kania, E
J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was), speaking for the Court, has
observed:

"We find that on the plain language of Section 23(1-A) itself, which
we have set out earlier, the ducy was cast on the court to award
an additional amount calculated as prescribed therein which would F
mean that it is directed to be awarded by the court, namely, the
Reference Court, in all cases which are pending before the Court
on September 24, 1984. Sub-section (1) (a) of Section 30 undoub-
tedly lays down that the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the Act
are also made applicable to all proceedings for the acquisition of G
any land under the said Act pending on April 30, 1982, where no
award had been made by the Collector before that. At first glance
this would appear to suggest that the additional amount referred
to in Section 23(1-A) could not be awarded where the Collector
had made his award before April 30, 1982. But this provision
cannot be allowed to cut down the benefits available to the H
430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A claimants on a plain reading of Section 23(1-A). This is clear from
the use of the word "also" in the opening part of Section 30(1). In
our opinion, the view taken by the bench comprising two learned
Judges of this Court in that case cannot be accepted as correct as
it is too narrow and unduly cuts down the operation of the benefit
conferred under the plain language of Section 23(1-A) of the said
B Act." (p. 682)

The decision in Raghubir Singh, (supra) was distinguished on the
ground that it was mainly concerned with the provisions of Section 30(2) I
of the amending Act with which the Court was not directly concerned.
c
The correctness of the said view in Zora Singh, (supra) has been
doubted by a two-Judge Bench in the order of Reference.

The learned counsel appearing for the claimants have urged that
D Zora Singh (supra) lays down the correct law and that in view of the
language used in Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act in every case which
was pending before the Reference Court on September 24, 1984 the date
of commencement of the amending Act, the Court has to award the
additional amount as prescribed in sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 and that
this obligation is irrespective of the date on which the award was made by
E the Collector. It has been submitted that this construction does not involve
giving retrospective effect to the provisions of sub-section (1-A) introduced
in Section 23 of the amending Act for the reas'on that a provision cannot
be held to be retrospective only because a part of the requisites for its
action ·is drawn from events antecedent to its passing. In support of the
p said submission reliance has been placed on a number of English decisions,
namely, R v. St. Mary Whitechapel, (1848] 12 Q.B. 120, 116 E.R. 811;
Master Ladies Tailors Organisation & Anr. v. Minister of Labour & National
Service, [1950] 2 All E.R. 525; In re A Solicitor's Clerks, (1957] 1 W.L.R.
1219 and Alexander v. Mercouris, [1979] 3 All E.R. 305; as well as the
G decisions of this Court in Sajjan Singh v. The State of Punjab, [1964) 1 SCR
631, Kapur Chand Jain v. B.S. Grewal & Ors., [1965] 2 SCR 36, T.KL. Iyer
v. State of Madras, [1968] 3 SCR 542, Lakshminarayan Guin & Ors. v.
Niranjan MQdak, [1985] SCR 202 and Darshan Singh v. Ram Pal Singh &
Anr., [1992) Suppl. 1 SCC 191. Placing reliance upon the observations of
the House of Lords in Warburton v. Loveland, [1832) VI Bligh N.S.1, 5 E.R.
H 499, that "no rule of construction can require that where the words of one
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERALA[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 431

part of a statute convey a clear meaning it shall be necessary to introduce A
another part of a statute for the purpose of controlling or diminishing the
efficacy of the first part", it has been urged that the language used in
sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act is clear and the scope
of that language cannot be limited by reference to Section 30(1) of the
amending Act. It has also been submitted that acquisition proceedings do
B
not terminate with the making of the award by the Collector, and in case
Reference has been made the proceedings remain pending till the Court
decides the Reference and that Collector's award is no more than an offer
of compensation made by the government to the claimant whose property
is acquired and that if the offer is acquiesced by total acceptance the right
to compensation does not survive but if the offer is not accepted or is C
accepted under protest and reference is sought by the claimant under
Section 18, the right to receive compensation must be regarded as having
survived and kept alive which the claimant prosecutes in Civil Court. In
support of the said submission reference has been made to the decision in
Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Etc. v. Assistant Collector of Estate Duty, [1980] D
2 SCR 315. The learned counsel have also placed before us the statements
of objects and reasons for the Bills which led to the enactment of the
amending Act and the debates in the Lok Sabha to show that the intention
of Parliament in enacting Section 23(1-A) was to remove the hardship
caused to the affected parties on account of pendency of acquisition
proceedings for long periods which renders unrealistic the scale of com- E
pensation offered to them.

The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for union of
India and the other counsel appearing for the State have, on the other
hand, urged that since the amendment introduced in Section 23 by inser-
tion of Sub-section (1-A) imposes an obligation to pay an additional F
amount by way of compensation, it can only apply to proceedings for
acquisition which are initiated subsequent to the coming into force of the
amending Act and it can only operate prospectively. According to the
learned counsel retrospectivity to a limited extent has been given to the
said provisions under sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act G
and except in cases falling within the ambit of sub-section (1) of Section
30, the benefit of additional amount by way of compensation under sub-
section (1-A) of Section 23 cannot be granted in acquisition proceedings
which had commenced prior to the coming into force of the amending Act.

In view of the submissions that have been advanced the first question H
432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A which needs to be examined ic; whether sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 has
been correctly construed in Zora Singh (supra) to apply on its own force
to matters in which acquisition proceedings were initiated prior to the
commencement of the amending Act and were pending on the date of said
commencement.

B Zora Singh (supra) proceeds on the basis, and rightly so, that Section
23(1-A) deals with substantive rights and it confers a substantive right to
claim additional amount calculated as set out in the said sub-section in the
circumstances set out therein. The applicability of the said provisions to
proceedings for acquisition which were pending on the date of coming into
force of the said provisions has, therefore, to be examined keeping in view
c the aforesaid nature of the provisions.

A statute dealing with substantive rights differs from a statute which
relates to procedure or evidence or is declaratory in nature inasmuch as
while a statute dealing with substantive rights is prim a f acie prospective
D unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective
effect, a statute concerned mainly with matters of procedure or evidence
or which is declaratory in nature has to be construed as retrospective unless
there is a clear indication that such was not the intention of the legislature.
A statute is regarded retrospective if it operates on cases or facts coming
E into existence before its commencement in the sense that it affects, even if
for the future only, the character or consequences of transactions pre-
viously entered into or of other past conduct. By virtue of the presunwtion
against retrospective applicability of laws dealing with substantive rights
transactions are neither invalidated by reason of their failure to comply
with formal requirements subsequently imposed, nor open to attack under
F powers of avoidance subsequently conferred. They are also not rendered
valid by subsequent relaxations of the law, whether relating to form or to
substance. Similarly, provisions in which a contrary intention does not
appear neither impose new liabilities in respect of events taking place
before their commencement, nor relieve persons from liabilities then exist-
ing, and the view that existing obligations were not intended to be affected
G has been taken in varying degrees even of provisions expressly prohibiting
proceedings. (See: Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 44, paras
921, 922, 925 and 926)

These principles are equally applicable to amendatory statutes.
H According to crawford :
KS. PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 433 ,

"Amendatory statutes are subject to the general principles relative A
to retrospective operation. Like original statutes, they will not be
given retrospective constructions, unless the language clearly
makes such construction necessary. In other words, the amend-
ment will usually take effect only from the date of its enactment
and will have no application to prior transaction, in the absence
B
of an expressed intent or an intent clearly implied to the contrary.
Indeed there is a presumption that an amendment shall operate
prospectively."

(S~e : Crawford's Statutory Construction, pp. 622-23)
c
The dictum of Lord Denman, CJ in The Queen v. St. Mary,
Whitechapel, (supra) that a statute which is in its direct operation prospec-

' tive cannot properly be called a retrospective statute because a part of the
requisites for its action is drawn from time antecedent to its passing, which
has received the approval of this Court, does not mean that a statute which D
is otherwise retrospective in the sense that it takes away or impairs any
vested right acquired under existing laws or creates a new obligation or
imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions
or considerations already past, will not be treated as retrospective. In
Alexander v. Mercouris, (supra), Goff, Ll, after referring to the said obser-
vation of Lord Denman, CJ has observed that a statute would not be E
operating prospectively if it creates new rights and duties arising out of
past transactions. The question whether a particular statute operates
prospectively only or has retrospectiv~ operation ;tlso will have to be
determined on the basis of the effect it has on existing rights and obliga-
tions, whether it creates new obligations or imposes new duties or levies p
new liabilities in relation to past transaction. For that purpose it is neces-
sary to ascertain the intention of the legislature as indicated in the statute
itself.

In the instant case we are concerned with the application of the
provisions of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 as introduced by the amend- G
ing Act to acquisition proceedings which were pending on the date of
commencement of the amending Act. In relation to pending proceedings,
the approach of the courts in England is that the same are unaffected by
the changes in the law so far as they relate to the determination of the
substantive rights and in the absence of a clear indication of a contrary H
434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A intention in an amending enactment, the substantive rights of the parties
to an action fall to be determined by the law as it existed when the action
was commenced and this is so whether the law is changed before the
hearing of the case at the first instance or while an appeal is pending. (See
: Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, para 922). Similar is the
approach of the courts in India. In United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum, [1940]
B FCR 110, Sulaiman, J. has observed. :

"Undoubtedly, an Act may in its operation be retrospective, and
yet the extent of its retrospective character need not extend so far
as to affect pending suits, Court have undoubtedly leaned very
c strongly against applying a new Act to a .pending action, when the
language of the statute does not compel them to do so". (p.163)

To the same effect are the observations of Varadachariar, J., who has
stated:

D "There can be little doubt that there is a well-recognised presump-
tion against construing an enactment as governing the rights of the
parties to a pending action. .. .... There ~re two recognised prin-
ciples, that vested rights should not be presumed to be affected
and that the rights of the parties to an action should ordinarily be
determined in accordance with the law as it stood at the date of
E the commencement of the action. The language used in an enact-
ment may be sufficient to rebut the first presumption, but not the
second. Where it is intended to make a new law applicable even
to pending actions, it is common to find the legislature using
language expressly referring to pending actions." (p. 185-186)
F
In the words of S.R. Das, CJ, "The golden rule of construction is that, .
. in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it is to have
retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of
altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act
G was passed." (See : Garikapatti Ve"aya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, [1957]
SCR 488, at pp. 515-16). In order that the provisions of a statute dealing
with substantive right may apply to pending proceedings the court has
insisted that the law must speak in language which expressly or by clear
intendment, takes in even pending matters.' (See : Smt Dayawati & Anr. v.
Inderjit & Ors., (1966] 3 SCR 275, and Lakshminarayan Guine's case
H (supra)].
K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERALA[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 435

The provisions of section2J(l-A) have to be construed in the light of A
the aforementioned principles. If thus construed, it would be evident that
under section 23(1-A) an obligation to pay an additional amount by way of
compensation has been imposed. Such an obligation did not exist prior the
enactment ·of the said provision by the amending Act. If the said provision
is applied to the acquisition proceedings which commenced prior to its B
enactment and an additional obligation in the matter of payment of com-
pensati01;1 is imposed for such acquisition the effect would be that the said
provision would be operating retrospectively in respect of transactions
already past. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view expressed
in Zora Singh (supra) that Section 23(1-A) would only operate prospec-
tively and will not have retrospective operation if it is construed as applying C
to proceedings which were pending before the Reference Court on the date
of the commencement of the amending Act and in which the Reference
Court makes the award after the commencement of the amending Act.

The next question which needs to be considered is whether any D
indication has been given by Parliament that Section 23(1-A) will have
retrospective operation so as to be applicable to acquisition proceedings
which were commenced prior to the date of the enactment or the said
provision. The learned counsel for the claimants have urged that such an
indication has been given by the words "in every case" used in Section
23(1-A). We are, however, of the view that Parliament has given a clear E
indication of its intention in this regard in Section 30(1) of the amending
Act. Since express provision is contained in Section 30(1) of the amending
Act indicating the intention of Parliament as to the extent to which the
provision of Section 23(1-A) would apply to pending proceedings there is
no scope for speculating about the said intention of Parliament by reading p
Section 23(1-A) in isolation without reference to Section 30(1) of the
amending Act.

Section 30 of the amending Act bears the heading "Transitional
provisions". Explaining the role of transitional provisions in a statute,
Bennion has stated : G

"Where an Act contains substantive, amending or repealing enact-
ments, it commonly also includes transitional provisions which
regulate the coming into operation of those enactments and modify
their effect during the period of transaction. Where an Act fails H
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A to include such provisions expressly, the court is required to draw
inferences as to the intended transitional arrangements as, in the
light of the interpretative criteria, it considers Parliament to have
intended."

[Francis Bennion : Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn. p. 213]
B
The learned author has further pointed out :

"Transitional provisions in an Act or other. instrument are
provisions which spell out precisely when and how the operative
parts of the instrument are to take effect. It is important for the
c interpreter to realise, and bear constantly in mind, that what
appears to be the plain meaning of a substantive enactment is often
modified by transitional provisions located elsewhere in the Act."
(p.213)

D Similarly Thornton in his treatise on Legislative Drafting has stated:

"The function of a transitional provision is to make special
provision for the application of legislation to the circumstances
which exist at the time when that legislation comes into force."

E [See : Thornton on Legislative Drafting, 3rd Edn., 1987, p.319
quoted in Britnell v. Secretary of State, [1991] 2 All E.R. 726; at p.
730, Lord Keith]

For the purpose of ascertaining whether and, if so, to what extent the
provisions of sub-section (1-A) introduced in Section 23 by the amending
F Act are applicable to proceedings that were pending on the date of the
.commencement of the amending Act it is necessary to read Section 23(1-A)
along with the transitional provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Sec-
tion 30 of the amending Act.

In Zora Singh (supra) the Court has laid stress on the word "also" in
G Section 30(1) and has held that apart from the retrospectivity flowing from
the provisions contained in Section 23(1-A) further retrospectivity is given
to these provisions in cases covered by clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1)
in cases where no proceedings were pending on the date of commencement
of the amending Act. This would mean that Parliament has made two
H provisions for giving retrospectivity to Section 23(1-A), one in Section
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 437

23(1-A) itself and the other in Section 30(1) of the amending Act. We do A
not find a sound basis for this construction. The words "in every case" are
also found in Section 23(2) and so is the word "also" contained in Section
30(2) of the amending Act. While construing Section 23(1-A) the approach
in Zora Singh (supra) is not different from that in Bhag Singh (supra) on
the construction of Section 23(2). This approach was disapproved by the B
Constitution Bench in Raghubir Singh (supra) on the ground that the terms
in which section 30 is couched indicate a limited extension of the benefit.
The Full Bench decisions of the High Courts of Karnataka, Bombay and
Andhra Pradesh were given after Bhag Singh (supra) but before Raghubir
Singh (supra) and while construing Section 23(1-A) they adopt the same
approach as in Bhag Singh (supra). Keeping in view the decision in C
Raghubir Singh (supra) the two-Judge Bench in Filip Tiago (supra) rightly
disapproved the view taken in these Full Bench decisions. The learned
Judges on the three-Judge Bench in Zora Singh (supra), while reversing
the said view in Filip Tiago (supra), have failed to take note of the basic
premise underlying the decision in Raghubir Singh (supra). D

A perusal of the various amendments that have been introduced in
the principal Act by the amending Act shows that the approach in relation
to acquisition proceedings which had commenced prior to the date of
commencement of the amending Act is not identical. In relation to some
of the amendments provision for their applicability is contained in the E
amended provision itself (Section 6(1) Proviso (i); Section 11-A Proviso)
while in respect of the other amendments separate provision is made in
Section 30 of the amending Act. Merely because the provision regarding
scope of the retrospectivity in regard to pending matters is contained in a
separate provision and is not found in the amended provision would not F
justify treating the said provisions independent of each other. The
provisions contained in Section 30 of the amending Act are to be treated
as an integral part of the amended provisions in the principal Act to which
they relate. In our opinion, therefore, the observations in Warburton v.
Loveland (supra), that no rule of construction can require that when the
words of one part of a statute convey a clear meaning, it shall be necessary G
to introduce another part of a statute for the purpose of controlling or
diminishing the efficacy of the first part, which have been approved by this
Court in Special Reference No. 1 of 1974, [1975] 1 SCR 504, at p. 519 and
on which reliance has been placed by Shri Sorabjee, can have no applica-
tion because Section 23(1-A) and Section 30(1) are so inter-connected that H
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A for construing sub-section (1-A) of Section 23, it is not possible to ignore
the provisions of Section 30(1) of the amending Act.

If sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 is construed in the light of the
provisions contained in sub-section(l) of Section 30 of the amending Act
B there is no escape from the conclusion that Section 23(1-A), by itself, has
no application to proceedings which had commenced prior to the enact-
ment of the amending Act and the applicability of the said provision to
pending proceedings is governed exclusively by sub-section (1) of Section
30 of the amending Act. A perusal of sub-section (1) of section 30 of the
amending Act shows that it divides the proceedings for acquisition of land
C which had commenced prior to the date of the commencement of the
amending Act into two categories, proceedings which had commenced
prior to April 30, 1982 and proceedings· which had commenced after 30,
1982. While clause (a) of Section 30(1) deals with proceedings which had
commenced prior to April 30, 1982, clause (b) deals with proceedings
D which commenced after April 30, 1982. By virtue of clause (a) of section
23(1-A) has been made applicable to proceedings which had commenced
prior to April 30, 1982 if no award had been made by the Collector in those
proceedings before April 30, 1982. It covers (a) proceedings which were
pending before the Collector on April 30, 1982 where in award was made
after April 30, 1982 but before the date of the commencement of the
E · amending Act, and (b) such proceedings wherein award was made by the
Collector after the date of the commencement of the amending Act.
Similarly Section 30(1)(b) covers (a) proceedings which had commenced
after April 30, 1982 wherein award was made prior to the commencement
of the amending Act, and (b) such proceedings wherein award was made
F after the commencement of the amending Act. It would thus appear that
both the clauses [(a) and (b)] of sub-section (1) of Section 30 cover
proceedings for acquisition which were pending on the date of the com-
mencemeI).t of the amending Act and to which the provisions of Section
23(1-A) have been made applicable by virtue of Section 30(1). If Section
G 23(1-A), independently of Section 30(1), is applicable to all proceedings
which were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending
Act clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) would have been confined to
proceedings which had commenced prior to the commencement of the
amending Act and had concluded before such commencement because by
virtue of Section 15 the provisions of Section 23(1-A) would have been
H applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of
K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[S.C.AGRAWAL,J.] 439

commencement of the amending Act. There was no need to so phrase A
Section 30(1) as to apply the provisions of Section 23(1-A) to proceedings
which, pending before the Collector on the date of the commencement of
the amending act. This only indicates that but for the provisions contained
in section 30(1). Section 23(1-A) ,would not have been applicable to
proceedings pending pefore the Collector on the date of commencement B
of the amending Act.

Merely because sub-section (1) of Section 30 only refers to award
made by the Collector while sub"section (2) of Section 30 also refers to an
award made by the court as well as the order passed by the High Court or
the Supreme Court in appeal against such award does not mean that C
Section 23(1-A) was intended to have application to all proceedings which
were pending before the civil court on the date of the commencement of
the amending Act. The difference in the phraseology in sub-sections (1)
and (2) of Section 30 only indicates the limited nature of the retrospectivity
that has been given to provisions contained in Section 23(1-A) under D
Section 30(1) as compared to that given to the provisions of Sections 23(2)
and 28 under Section 30(2). The limited scope of the retrospectivity that
has been conferred in respect of Section 23(1-A) under sub-section (1) of
Section 30 does not lend support to the contention that the scope of such
retrospectivity should be enlarged by reading such further retrospectivity
into the provisions of Section 23(1-A). For the reasons aforementioned we E
are of the view that in relation to proceedings which were initiated prior
to the date of the commencement of the amending Act Section 23(1-A)
would be applicable only to those cases which fall within the ambit of
clauses (a) and (b) of sub-s~ction (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act.
In this context it is also necessary to bear in mind the rule of statutory F
construction that even where a statute is clearly intended to be to some
extent retrospective, it is not to be construed as having a greater retrospec-
tive effect than its language renders necessary. [See : Halsbury's Law of
England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, para 924). There is, therefore, no scope for
extending the ambit of retrospective operation of sub-section (1-A) of G
Section 23 beyond the limits specified in Section 30( 1) of the amending Act
so as to apply it to all proceedings initiated prior to the date of coming
into force of the amending Act which were pending before the civil court
on reference under Section 18 of the principal Act irrespective of the date
on which the award was made by the Collector. For the reasons aforemen-
tioned we are unable to subscribe to the view taken in Zora Singh (supra) H
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A that sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 would apply to all proceedings pending
in the Reference Court on the date of commencement of the amending Act
irrespective of the date on which award was made by the Collector. In our
opinion, the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section
30(1) of the amending Act have been correctly construed in Filip Tiago
B (supra)to mean that the obligation to pay additional amount in respect of
proceedings initiated before the date of commencement of the amending
Act is confined to the matters covered by clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section
(1) of Section 30 of the amending Act and we endorse the said view.

Reference may be made, at this stage, to the decision of the Judicial
C Committee of the Privy Council in Municipal Council of Sydney v. Margaret
Alexandra Troy, AIR (1928) P.C. 128, on which reliance was placed by Shri
Sorabjee. In that case, a piece of land was acquired by the Municipal
Council on June 6, 1924, and on the date of such acquisition interest on
compensation was payable at the rate of 4%. After the said acquisition, a
D statute was enacted which came into operation on September 17, 1924,
whereby the rate of interest was prescribed at 6%. The said statute con-
tained a non-obstante clause in Section 17 which gave overriding effect to
its provisions. Having regard to the said non-obstante clause the Supreme
Court of New South Wales held that prior acquisitions were covered and
that for the period upto September 17, 1924, interest on the unpaid amount
E of compensation was payable at the rate 4% and for the period subsequent
thereto, it was payable at 6%. Upholding the said view the Privy Council
observed that this conclusion is neither affected by the well-known rule of
construction against retrospective interpretation, nor by anything to be
imported from the expressions used in the earlier statutes in the series
F which has to be read in conjunction. The said decision which turns on the
non-obstante clause in the subsequent . statute has, in our opinion, no
application to the present case in view of the express provisions contained
in Section 30(1) of the amending Act which specifically restrict the ap-
plicability of sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 to proceedings covered by
clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act.
G
In support of the construction placed on Section 23(1-A) of the
principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act in Zora Singh (supra),
the learned counsel for the claimants have referred to the Statement of
objects & Reasons appended to the Bill in 1982 as well as the Bill of 1984
H arid have submitted that the said Statements of Objects and Reasons show
K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[S.C.AGRA.WAL,J.] 441

that the object underlying the enactment of Section 23(1-A) was to remove A
the hardship to the affected parties on account of pendency of acquisition
proceedings for a long time which renders unrealistic the amounts of
compensation offered to them. Our attention has also been invited to the
speeches made by members at the time when the Bill was considered and
was adopted by Parliament. It has been urged that a construction which B
advances the said object must be adopted. We are unable to accept this
contention. As regards the Statement of Objects and reasons appended to
the Bill the law is well settled that the same cannot be used except for the
limited purpose of understanding the background and the state of affairs
leading to the legislation but it cannot be used as an aid to the construction
of the statute. [See : Asvini Kumar & Anr. v. Arbinda Bose & Anr., [1953] C
SCR 1, at p. 28; State of West Bengal v. Subhash Gopal Boshe, 1954 SCR
587, at p. 628, per Das J,; State of West Bengal v. Union of India, [1964] 1
SCR 371 at p. 383]. Similarly, with regard to speeches made by the
members in the House at the time of consideration of the Bill it has been
held that they are not admissible as extrinsic aids to the interpretation of D
the statutory provisions though the speech of the mover of the Bill may be
referred to for the purpose of finding out the object intended to be
achieved by the Bill. [See : State of Travancore-Cochin & Anr. v. The
Bombay Co. Ltd., [1952] SCR 1112 and Aswini Kumar v. Arabinda Bose,
(supra)]. On a perusal of the Bills of 1982 and 1984 we find that they did
. not contain the provisions found in Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act E
and Section 30(1) of the amending Act. These provisions were inserted
when the 1984 Bill was under consideration before Parliament. The State-
ment of Objects and Reasons does not, therefore, throw any light on the
circumstances in which these provisions were introduced.
F
Shri V.A. Bobde, appearing for some of the claimants, has contended
that a construction whereby Section 23(1-A) is held inapplicable to awards
made by Collector prior to April 30, 1982, would render the provisions of
Section 30(1) of the amending Act unconstitutional as being violative of
the right to equality. To illustrate the discriminatory effect it has been G
pointed out that out of two cases arising from same notification one may
· be decided by the Collector on April 28, 1982, and the othef on May 1,
1982 and that if the construction placed in Zora Singh is not adopted while
the former will not attract the provisions of Section 23(1-A) the latter
would. The submission is that a construction which leads to such a result
must be avoided. We find no merit in this contention. It was open to H
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Parliament to apply the provisions of Section 23(1-A) only to awards
whether of the Colle~tor or the Court made after the commencement of
-the ainending Act. It is not suggested that such a course would ~ave been
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Merely because Parliament has
decided to give a limited retrospectivity so as. to cover awards that were
made by the Collector during the period from April 30, 1982, when the
B original Bill was introduced in Lok Sabha till the date of. the commence-
ment of the amending Act would not result in the said provisions being
infected with the vice of arbitrariness. The choice of April 30, 1982, the
date on which the original Bill was introduced in Parliament, cannot be
said to be arbitrary and confining ·the ambit of retrospectivity so as to
c exclude awards made by Collector prior to April 30, 1982 would not render
the provision of Section 30(1) of the amending Act unconstitutional. The
question of expanding the field of retrospectivity so as to cover all the
awards made by the Collector prior to the commencement of the amending
Act irrespective of the date when they were made, therefore, does not
D arise.

Relying upon the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A of the
Constitution which prescribes that "where any law makes any provision for
the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised
therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be
E lawful· for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the
ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or
any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless
the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure,
provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than
p the market value thereof' Shri K.C. Jain has submitted that compensation
for the land acquired under the Act must be paid on the basis of the market
value of the property which should be assessed on the date of acquisition,
namely,.the date on which possession is taken. The submission of Shri Jain
is that Section 23(1-A) by providing for payment of additional amount at
the rate of 12% per annum on the market value for the period commencing
G after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) to the date of
taking possession seeks to give effect to said requirement of Article 31A
of the Constitution and that if it is held that sub-section (1-A) of Section
23 is not applicable to the cases where the award by the Collector.is made
prior to April 30, 1982, the result would be that the amount of compensa-
H tion would not be equal to the market value on the date of acquisition in
K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[SAWANT,J.] 443

respect of acquisition of lands where the award was made prior to April A
. 30, 1982 and the provisions of the Act regarding acquisition would be
rendered violative of the provisions of Article 31A. We find no merit in
this contention. As pointed in Atma Ram v. State of Punjab&: Ors., [1959)
Supp. 1 SCR 887, at p. 904 the object underlying Article 31A is to facilitate
agrarian reforms and iJ extends protection to laws bringing about such B
reforms. The principal Act is not a law relating to agrarian .reform as
contemplated in Article 31A of the Constitution. It is pre-constitutional
legislation which was saved by sub-clause (a) of clause (5) of Article 341
from any attack on the ground of violation of the right conf~rred by clause
(2) of Ai-tide 31 of the Constitution. The second proviso to clause (1) of
Article 31A has, therefore, no bearing on the interpretation of sub-section C
(1-A) of Section 23 and Section 30(1) of the amending Act.

Conclusion,

For the reasons aforementioned .it must be concluded that in respect
of acquisition proceedings initiated prior to date of commencement of the D
Amending Act the payment of the additional amount payable under Sec-
tion 23(1-A) of the Act will be restricted to matters referred to in clauses
(a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Amending Act. Zora
Singh (supra) insofar as it holds that the said amount is payable in all cases
where the reference was pending before the reference court on September E
24, 1984, irrespective of the ~te on which the award was made by the
Collector, does not lay down the correct law.

The question referred is answered accordingly. The matters be
placed before the appropriate bench for consideration in the light of this
order. F
SAWANT, J. I have perused the draft of the judgment prepared by
my bo$er Justice Agrawal. Since, I respectfully beg to differ with the
interpretation on the relevant provisions of the Act and the conclusions
drawn therein, I am impelled to deliver this dissenting judgment.
G
2. The question of law involved .in these matters though a short one,
has been the subject of conflicting decisions of this Court and hence is
referred to the Constitution Bench for resolving the conflict. '.I'he question
is whether the benefit of sub-section (1-A) of Sectit>n 23 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (the 'principle Act') is to be granted only in the H
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A proceedings for the acquisition of land referred to in clauses (a) and (b)
of section 30. (1) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, (the
'amending Act') or it is to be granted in all proceedings pending before
the Courts on the 24th September, 1984.

3. To appreciate the controversy,· it is necessary to refer to the
B relevant provisions of the principal Act.

·Section 3 (d) defines "Court" to mean a principal Civil Court of
original Jurisdiction, unless the appropriate Government has appointed a
special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform the
C functions of the Court under the Act. In the context of the other provisions
and the scheme of the Act, it means the Court to which the reference is
made by the Collector under Section 18 of the principal Act. .

Section 11 empowers the Collector, among other things, to enquire
into the value of the land on the date of the publication of the notification
D for acquisition of the land under Section 4 (1) and to make an award of
the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land.

Section 15 requires the Collector while determining the amount of
compensation, to be .guided by the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 of Act.
E Section 16 empowers the Collector to take possession of the land
when he has made the award under Section 11 of the Act. On talcing such
possession, the land vests absolutely in the Government, free from all
encumbrances. In case of urgency, Section 17 empowers the appropriate
Government to direct the Collector to take possession of the land after 15
F days from the publication of the notice under Section 9(1) although no
award has been made under Section 11.

Section 18 provides for reference to the Court by an interested
person, among other things, on the ground that the amount of compensa-
tion awarded by the Collector is inadequate. When a reference is made to
G the Court for determining the amount of compensation, Section 23 requires
the Court to take into consideration six factors which are mentioned
therein for determining the market value of the land. Sub-sections (1-A)
and (2) of the said section require the Court to award in every case,
amounts referred to therein in addition to the market value of the land.
H Sub-section (1-A) provides for an additional amount calculated at the rate
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERALA[SAWANT,J.J 445

of 12 per centum per annum on the market value of the land, for the period A
commencing on and from the date of the publication of notice under
' Section 4 (1) to the date of the award of the Co~lector or to the date of
' taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. Likewise, sub-section
(2) requires the Court to award in every case a sum of 30 per centum on
the market value determined under Section 23(1) in consideration of the
B
compulsory nature of the acquisition. This amount is commonly known as
solatium and is in addition to the additional amount under-section (1-A);

Section 24 enumerates eight matters which are to be ignored while
determining the compensation of the land.
c
Sections 25 lays down that the amount of compensation awarded by
the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by the Collector under
Section 11. Section 28 enables the Court to direct the Collector to award
interest on the excess amount at the rate of 9 per centum per annum from
the date on which the possession of the land is taken to the date of payment D
of such excess into Court if, in the opinion of the Court, the sum which the
Collector ought to have awarded as compensation,was in excess of the sum
which the Collector did award. The proviso to the said section further
enables the Court to award interest at the rate of 15 per centum per annum,
if the excess amount or any part thereof that is payable is not paid inot the
Court within one year from the date on which possession is taken. The E
interest is to be paid from the date of expiry of the said period of one year.

Section 28-A enables the persons interested in, all the other lands
covered by the same notification under section 4 (1) and aggrieved by the
award made by the Collector, to make a written application to the Collec- F
tor within three months from the date of the award of the Court requiring
that the amount of compensation payable to them be re-determined on the
basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court to the ap-
plicants who had sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act to the
Court, if the amount of compensation awarded to such applicants by the G
Court is in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector, although the
persons concerned may not have similarly applied for a reference under
Section 18 to the Court. On such application being made, the Collector is
required to hold inquiry to make an award re-determining the award of
compensation payable to such applicants. Any person who does not accept
the award of the Collector re-determining the amount of Compensation, is H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A given a right to' require the Collector to refer the matter for the determina-
tion of the Court, and such application is to be deemed to be an application
for reference under Section 18 of the Act.
)
)
4. Before we proceed further, it is necessary to bear in mind that the
determination of the amount of compensation under Section 11 as well as
B by the Court on a reference under Section 18, are both regarded by the .
Act as an "Award" as distinguished from "Order" or "Decree" of the
appellate courts such as High Court and the Supreme Court in appeal
against such award. This is clear from the language of sections 11 to 12,
13A, 15A, 16-18, 23, 25 to 28-A and 54, among others. While under Section
C 26, the award made by the reference Court is deemed to be a decree and
the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment withiri the
meaning of Section 2, clause (2) and Section 2 clause (9), respectively of
.the Civil Procedure Code, under Section 54, the order passed by the High
Court is per se decree and it is appealable as such to the Supreme Court
under the Civil Procedure Code. But for Section 54 of the Act, the award
D of the reference court would not have been appealable. What is further,
Section 30 (2) of the Amending Act clearly and specifically brings out the
distinction between "award" made by the Collector and by the reference
Court on the one hand and the "order" passed by the High Court or the
Supreme Court in appeal on the other. It is an error to dismiss this vital
E distinction made in the principal and amending Acts between "award" and
"order" by characterising the use of the word "award" as a verb and not
noun. The distinction between the two has a significant relevance for the
correct interpretation of the provisions in question. According to us, the
fogislature has not used the two words causally or unintentionally.

F It is further necessary to bear in mind that the amending Act has
added, among others, the provisions of Section 23(1A) and 28-A and has
amended the provisions of Section 23(2). It ha_s also made independent
transitional provision in its Section 30. The relevant provisions of Section
30 read as follows :
G
30. Transitional provision.- (1) The provisions of sub-section (1-A)
of Section 23 of the principal Act,"as inserted by clause (a) of
Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, anc,i shall be deemed to have
applied, also to, and in relation to,

H (a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land uncler the
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERALA(SAWANT,J.] 447

principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of A
introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982 in
the House of the People), in which no award has been made by
the Collector before that date :

(b) Every proceedings for the acquisition of any land under the

..
principal Act commenced after that date, whether 01 not an award B
has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement
of this Act.

(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 23 and section 28
of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and C
Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply and shall be deemed
to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the
Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or
Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the
provisions of the principal Act after the 30th· day of April, 1982
(the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) D
Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) and before the commence-
ment of this Act.

The date of the introduction of the Bill of the amending Act is
30.4.1982 and the date of its commencement is 24.9.1984.
E
5. Against the background of the aforesaid relevant provisions of the
principal and the amending Act, we have to interpret the provisions of
Section.23(1-A) of the principal Act. Section 23(1) speaks of the factor
which the reference Court has to take into consideration while determining
the amount of compensation to be awarded for the acquired land. The F
compensation so determined is to be the market value of the land in
question on the date of the publication of the n~tification under Section
4(1). of the principal Act. The legislature had originally provided for a
further sum in every case to be paid in addition to the market value of the
land in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition. That sum G
was 15 per centum on the market value. This additional sum known as
'solotium' was provided for in sub-section (2) of Section 23. By the amend-
ing Act, it has been increased to 30 per centum of the market value. The
solotium was thus a part of the compensation from the very inception of
the principal Act and all that was done by the amending Act, was to
increase its amount. H
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

·A It was, however, found that there was a considerable time lag1be-
tween the date of the publication of the notification under section 4(1) and
the date of the awar.d of the Collector. The market value of the land
acquired was however frozen to the date of the notification under Section
4(1). In order to relieve the hardship of the persons interested in the land
(hereinafter compendiously termed as 'land-owners' for the sake of con-
B venience), the legislature for the first time introduced sub-section (1-A) in

....
Section 23. of the principal Act by the amending Act. This sub-section
enjoins the grant, in every case, of a further amount in addition to the
market value. The amount is to be calculated at the rate of 12 per centum
per annum on the market value for a specific period, namely the period
c commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification
under Section 4(1) and ending with the date of the award of the Collector
or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. The
Explanation to the said sub-section .(1-A), states that in computing the
period for which the said amount is to be granted, any period or periods
D during which the proceedings for the acquisition of the land, were held up
on account of any stay or injunction by the order of any court, shall be
excluded. This provision like the one for solatium in sub-section (i) of
Section 23, is a substantive one. Unless therefore, there is a statutory
mandate, neither this provision nor the provisions }or--tlfe-increased
solatium can be given retrospective effect. It is here that the role of Section
E 30 of the amending Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Section 30') which
makes provisions for the transitional period, viz. the period between the
introduction of the Bill of the amending Act and the commencement of
the said Act, comes into play. It is the interpretation of the said Section 30
and its bearing on the provisions of Section 23 which has become a matter
F of controversy and a subject of conflicting,decisions of this Court as stated
at the outset.

The relevant provisions of Section 30 have already been reproduced.
An analysis of the Section shows that it deals separately with the two
different benefits w_hich the amending Act has conferred on the land-
G owners. Sub-section (1) thereof deals exclusively with the provisions of
sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 of the provisions Act while sub-section (2)
thereof deals exclusively with the provisions of the sub-section (2) of
Section 23, and section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by the amend-
ing Act. In the present proceedings, we are concerned with the applicability
H of the newly inserted sub-section (1-A) of Se.ction 23 of the principal Act
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERAlA(SAWANT,J.] 449

and not with the amended Sections 23(2) and 28 of the principal Act. A
However, since some decisions of this Court have tried to project and rely
upon sub-section (2) of Section 30 for the interpretation of sub-section (1)
thereof and also for the interpretation of Section 23 of the principal Act,
., it will be necessary to refer to the provisions of section 30(2) also in the
course of the discussion that follows.
B
Sub-section (1) of Section 30 in its turn deals separately with two
classes of cases. By clause (a) thereof it makes the provisions of Section
23(1-A) of the principal Act applicable also to and in relation to every
acquisitions proceeding pending on the 30th April, 1982 i.e., the date of
the introduction of the Bill of the amending Act, in which no award has C
been made by the Collector before that date. By its clause (b), it makes
the provisions of the said Section 23(1-A) applicable also to and in relation
to every acquisition proceeding commenced after 30th April, 1982 whether
the Collector has or has not made an award before the date of the
commencement of the Act, i.e., 24th September, 1984. It is further clear D
that sub-section (1) of Section 30, deals exclusively with the power and the
jurisdiction of the Collector in the proceedings before him. It does not deal
with or refer to the power either of the reference Court under Section 23
of the principal Act or of the appellate Court such as the High Court and
the Supreme Court. With respect, it is the failure to appreciate the sine
qua non of the provisions of Section 30(1) which is responsible for E
misinterpretation of, and wrong conclusions with regard to the applicability
of Section 23(1-A). These transitional provisions with regard to the
proceedings pending before the. Collectqr were necessary, for without them
it would not have been permissible for the Collector to give benefit of
Section 23(1-A) to the concerned land-owners. The legislature not only F
wanted the reference Court under Section 23, but also the Collector under
Section 11 of the principal Act, to give the benefit of Section 23(1-A)- in
the proceedings pending before them. This is as it should be, for Section
15 of the principal Act requires the Collector to take into consideration
the provisions contained in Sections 23 and 24 while determining the G
amount of compensation to be awarded. To get his due compensation,
every landowner need not be obliged to ask for a reference under Section
18 nor is every land-owner in a financial position to do so. It is common
knowledge that many a land acquisition proceedings come to an end at the
stage of the Collector, and only some cases travel to the reference Court
and thereafter to the appellate Courts. Secondly, Section 30(1) while giving H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the power to the· Collector to grant the benefit of section 23(1-A), also
places a restriction on the said power. The Collector is empowered to grant .
the said benefit only in those proceedings which are pending before him
on 30th April, 1982 and in which no award has been made by him before
that date. That is understandable since the proceedings would be pending
before him on 30th April, 1982 even after he has made his award, either
B for making a reference or for payment and distribution of the compensa-
tion. In such cases, he is not empowered to give the said benefit by
reopening the award. If the reference in such proceedings is ultimately
made under section 18 of the principal Act, the reference Court under
Section 23 will have authority to give the benefit. If it is not made, the
c proceedings will stand closed without the said benefit. On the other hand,
if the proceedings are pending before him on the 30th April, 1982 in which
no award is made, he is empowered to give the said benefit in such
proceedings since, as pointed out earlier, under section 15 of the principal
Act he is to be guided by the provisions of Section 23 and 24 of that Act
D while determining the compensation. This is the substance of clause (a) of
Section 30(1).
)

Clause (b) of Section 30(1) takes care of another situation where the·
Collector is given power to give the benefit of section 23(1-A). That
situation is where the proceedings for acquisition have been started after
E 30th April, 1982 whether an award has been m~de or not by the Collector
before 24th September, 1984, which is the date of the commencement of
the amending Act. In other words, the Collector has been given power to
give benefit of Section 23(1~A) in ·an acquisition proceedings started after
30th April, 1982. This provision was also necessary, since but for the said
provision, the Collector would have been powerless to give the said benefit
F in the acquisition proceedings started after 30th April, 1982 in which he
has made his award before 24th September, 1984. The clause (b) empowers
the Collector to reopen such award whether the proceedings are pending
before him or not. Secondly, the said clause empowered the Collector to
give the said benefit also in all acquisition proceedings started after that
G date in which he has not made award till 24 th.e September. 1984.

6. Thus, the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 30 are in
conformity with the object of the amending Act, namely, to give benefit to
the land-owner.s who were denied the benefit of compensation for a long
time and were put to an avoidable loss. There is no reason why if the
H reference Court under Section 23 of the principal Act can give the benefit
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERAIA[SAWANT,J.] 451

of Section 23(1-A) in the proceedings pending before it on the date of the A
commencement of the amending Act, the Collector should not have power
to give the said benefit in the proceedings before him. The only restriction
that the legislature has placed on the said power of the Collector is that it

- has prevented him from reopening the awards which he had already made
before 30th April, 1982 in proceedings pending before him on that day. B
This was, as stated above, for the reason that those of the awards made by
him in such proceedings which were the subject matter of reference under
Section 18 could be taken care of by the reference Court under Section 23.
On the other hand, those of such awards which were not questioned and,
therefore, had become final, should not be reopened.
c
What is, therefore, necessary to note is that Section 30(1) deals
exclusively with the powers of the Collector and it has no bearing on the
powers of the Reference Court under Section 23. What is more, clause
(a) of the said Section 30(1) is not retrospective in operation. It speaks of
power of the Collector in the proceedings pending before him on 30th D
April, 1982 in which he has yet to make the award. It is only clause (b) of
the said Section which gives a limited retrospectivity to the power of the
Collector when it enables him to reopen the award made by him before
the commencement of the amending Act, viz., 24th September, 1984 in
proceedings started after 30th April, 1982.
E
The reference Court in its turn in the matters pending before it on
the date of the commencement of the amending Act. viz., 24 September,
1984 is enjoined upon to give the benefit of section 23 (1-A) in awards
made by it on and after the date of the commencement of the Act. For
granting the said benefit, Section 23 of the principal Act nowhere makes F
any distinction between the acquisition proceedings commenced prior to
and after 30th April, 1982 or inhibits the power of the Reference Court,
unlike the provisions of Section 30 (1) which deal with the powers of the
Collector. When the reference Court does so, it gives prospective effect
to the provisions of Section 23(1-A). It does not give retrospective effect
to the said provisions. To import the concept of retrospectivity in Section G
23 merely because the reference Court gives the benefit of Section 23(1-A)
in the proceedings pending before it on the date of the commencement of
the amending Act, is neither interpretatively correct nor in· conformity with
the provisions of Section 23. It is wrong to say that merely because the
·acquisition proceedings were commenced prior to 30.4.1982, i.e., the date H
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A of the introduction of the Bill of the amending Act, the grant of the said
benefit has a retrospective effect, although the benefit is given by the
reference Court in the proceedings pending before it. In the first instance,
the additional amount under Section 23(1-A) is to be calculated till the
date of the award or the date of taking possession of the land whichever
is earlier. Secondly, when the legislature does not use any expression to
B indicate that the law made by it shall apply only to causes of action or
incidents taking place after the coming into force of the amending Act, the
law has to be applied to all matters pending before the Court even if those
matters had arisen before coming into force of the Act.

C "A statute is not retrospective merely because it affect existing rights;
nor it is retfbspective merely because a part of the requisites for its action
is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing". (Halsbury's Laws of
England Vol. IV para 221). In The Queen v. The Inhabitants of St. Mary,
Whitechapel, [1848) 12 Q.B. 120 at page 127), the law intended to secure ,.
that a widow residing in a parish with her husband shall not be removed
D for twelve months after his death. The benefit of the·1aw was extended even
when the husband had died before coming into force of the Act and it was
observed.

"It was said that the operation of the statute was confined to
E persons who had become widows after the Act was passed, and
that the presumption against a retrospective statute being intended
supported this construction; but we have shown before that t~e
statute is in its direct operation prospective, as it relates to future
removals only, and that it is not properly called a retrospective
F statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from
time antecedent to its passing. In this case the words 'shall be
removed' were thus found appropriate to cover all cases of future
removals irrespective of whether the husband had dies prior to the
Act but they were not found wide enough to nullify completed
removals prior to the Act, even if the widow was removed within
G twelve months of her husband's death."

This principle was approved by our Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh
& Anr. v. The State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR (1953) SC 394 at 398 and in
T.K Lakshmana Iyer and Ors. v. State of Madras and Ors., [1968) 3 SCR
H 842. In Trimbak Damodhar Rajpurkar v. Assaram Hiraman Patil & Ors.,
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFY.ERAIA(SAWANT,J.] 453

AIR 1966 SC 1758, it was observed by the Constitution Bench. A
"where a statute operates in future it cannot be said to be
retrospective merely because within the sweep of its operation all
existing rights are included."

In Bishun Narain Misra v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR B
(1965) SC 1567 a rule made by the State Governnient providing that the
age of retirement would be 55 years came up for consideration before the
Constitution Bench. It was argued that since the rule could not apply
retrospectively, a Government servant who was recruited and appointed
earlier to the date when the rule was made by the Government, could not C
be retired in exercise of power under this rule retrospectively. The submis-
sion was repelled and it was held that the rule could not be struck down
on the ground that it was retrospective in operation as all that it provided
was that from the date it came into force the age of retirement became 55
years.
D
The fact that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 30 are
confined to the powers of the Collector and have no relation to or bearing
on the power of the reference Court under Section 23 of the principal Act
or of the appellate Courts, becomes dbundantly clear when we contrast the
said provisions with the provisions of sub-section (2) of the said Section E
30. That sub-Section extends the benefit of the amended Section 23 (2) and
Section 28 of the principal Act also to and in relation to not only the award
made by the Collector but also to that made by the reference Court and ·
further to the orders passed by the High Court and the Supreme Court in
appeals against any such award made by the Collector or the reference
Court after 30.4.1982 and before 24.9.1984. In other words, sub-section (2) F
of Section 30 empowers all the tribunals, viz., the Collector, the reference
Court and the appellate Courts to grant the benefits of the amended
Section 23(2) and Section 28 in contradiction to its sub-section(!) which
only speaks of the Collector and the award made by him.

7. In the face of these clear indications given by Section 30(1) and G
(2), it is incorrect to read in Section 23, the limitations of section 30(1) and
circumscribe the powers of the reference Court under Section 23. The
reference Court acting under Section 23 is not inhibited in any manner as
the Collector under Section 30(1), from giving benefit of Section 23 (1-A)
in the proceedings pending before it on 24.9.1984, whether the said H
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A proceedings were started prior to or after 30.4.1982. In fact the plain
language of Section 23 enjoins upon the reference court to grant the said
benefit in all-proceedings pending before it on the date of the commence-
ment of the amending Act. For the same ·reason, neither the reference
Court nor the appellate Court like the High Court and the Supreme Court
can give the benefit of Section 23(1-A) in proceedings which were closed
B before the reference Court before 24.9.1984. This is so, because unlike
sub-section (2) Section 30 which extends the benefit of the amended
section 23 (2) and Section 28 of the principle Act .to the awards made by
the reference Court after 30.4.1982 and before 24.9.1984 or to any order
passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal against such
c award, sub-section (1) of Section 30 does not extend the benefit of Section
23(1-A) to such award of the reference Court and to the orders of High
Courts and the Supreme Court in appeal against such award.

8. The above interpretation is also in conformity with t~e object of
D the legislation. It must be remembered in this connection that according to
the Agricultural Census of 1985-86, [All-India Report on Agricultural
Census, 1985-86 (1992)] the small holders of agricultural land, i.e., those
who hold land between 1 to 2 hectares, constitute 18.4 per cent of the
agriculturists whereas marginal holders, i.e., those who possess less than
one hectare constitute 57.8 per cent of the agriculturists. Thus, together,
E the small and the marginal holder constitute 76.2 per cent of the agricul-
turists. The average small holding is 1.43 hectare whereas the average
marginal holding is 0.39 hectares. Out of the total holdings, only 27.1 per
cent are wholly irrigated whereas 17.8 per cent are partly irrigated and
remaining 55.1 per cent are wholly unirrigated. The vast majority of the
F land holders in this country, thus, are sub,&istence farmers. It is also a
notorious fact that agriculture in this countfy has never been a profitable
occupation. The vagaries of nature, the spiralling prices of inputs and the
basic necessities of life, uneconomic prices fixed for the agricultural
products, the exploitation of farmers by the middlemen and market forces,
G the growing burden of dependents on the limited holdings are rendering
even the so-called large holdings, the area of which ranges be~een 10
hectares to 50 hectares on average unremuner.ative. When the acquisition
takes away either wholly or partly the lands from the farmers, they are
deprived of their only means of livelihood or the already slender means are
still further slimmed, depending upon the area of the land acquired and
H the person from whom it is acquired.
K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERAIA(SAWANT,J.] 455

9. The right to receive compensation under the priilcipal Act accrues A
to the owner when the possession is taken by the Collector. Section 16 vests
the land in the State absolutely free from all encumbrances when the
Collector takes possession of the land after making the award in non-urgent
circumstances, the urgent cases being covered by Section 17 of the prin-
cipal Act. But as stated above between the date of notification under B
Section 4 and the date of award and of taking possession of the land, vecy
often than not a long delay occurred which affected the land-owners
materially as the market value of the land is to be determined under
Section 23 of the principal Act with reference to the date of the notification
issued under Section 4(1). The delays became more pronounced and their
consequences to the land-owners more and more adverse with the passage C
of time on account of the spiralling of the prices. To remedy the situation,
the Law Commission as early as in 1958 observed as follows :

"...... .It is noteworthy, however, that the State Governments them-
selves admit that the delay is largely due to the tardy manner in D
which the machinery of the government moves in the matter. They
also admit that, if the land acquisition officers are made to work
methodically and expeditiously, the pace can be quickened. Any
proposal for the reform of the ·1aw should, therefore, aim at
overcoming these evils. Most of the delay occurs in the initial stages
of the proceedings between the date of the notification under E
Section 4 and the declaration under section 6. Further delay arise
in the making of the award by the Collector, with the result that
as under the existing law, the Government cannot obtain posses-
sion until the award is made and the taking of possession is
indefinitely delayed." F

The report submitted in 1970 which suggested a time-frame for
completion of the acquisition proceedings, particularly to relieve the poor
land holders whose only means livelihood was taken away, recommended
as follows: ·
G
"The Land Acquisition Act is over 75 years old. When enacted it
was not faced with the requirements of the Constitution of India.
It is remarkable that broadly speaking it fulfilled the needs of the
community for such a length of time. Even today the Act is not so
much vulnerable on its provisions as on the way_ the executive H
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A authority tried to implement them. From one end of the country
to the other the same story has been repeated again and again
(with provincial variations) that it has been used as an engine of
oppression by the administrative authorities and the weaker poorer
sections of the community have suffered the most. The complaint
(not without substance) is that only an illusory compensation was
B awarded in an appreciable number of cases and that too was not
paid for years. Emergent acquisition was the order of the day
without the existence of any emergency. The law was ignored and
the exception was made the Jaw perhaps on the ground that
observance of law would have meant delay. The executive mind
c considered the delay in acquiring possession as a matter of great
importance but the delay in payment of compensation to poor
land-owners as of no consequence. This callous indifference was
manifested again and again. Many of the sufferers lost their
hereditary occupation also which alone provided them with some
sort of economic security. As a result quite an appreciable number
D
of citizens were completely uprooted and turned into refugees in
their own land of birth."

To implement these recommendations and suggestions, the amend-
ing Act was enacted. One of the suggestions made in the debate in the
E Parliament was that the determination of the value of the land be made
with reference to the notification issued under Section 6 of the Principal
Act. The Honourable Minister who piloted the Bill expressed his inability
to do so due to various difficulties. Instead, he opted for measures includ-
ing that provided under Section 23 (1-A) to mitigate the miseries of the
land-owners. In this connection, he stated thus :
F
"It is, therefore, necessary to ensure particularly that the interest
of the weak and the poor are not overlooked in our concern for
modernisation and industrialisation. Even when acquisition of their
land, becomes an inescapable necessity for the larger interest of
G the community, they ought to be provided with the necessary
wherewithals of rehabilitation. In making provision in the amend-
' .
ing Bill, we have been animated by our concern of ensuring that
the person who loses his property right in land, particularly one
how belongs to the weaker sections of the community, is adequately
H compensated for his loss ........ As it is well known, a number of land
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[SAWANT,J.] 457

acquisition proceedings have been pending for the award of Col- A
lector for years an end. In some cases, the preliminary notification
under Section 4 (1) was issued many year ago. Payment of com-
pensation to the interested parties on the basis of the market value
of the land prevailing on the one of the preliminary notification
will be purely unfair. To remedy this unfairness, the Bill provides B
for payment, in every proceeding for acquisition of land where the
award of the Collector had not been given on the 30th day of April,
1982, an additional payment of 10 per cent annum from the date
of the preliminary notification on the date of the payment or
deposit of compensation."
c
10. It is, therefore, clear that the intention of the legislature in
enacting the amending Act and in particular Section 23 (1-A) with which
we are concerned, was to give additional amount to the deprived land
owners in all the proceedings which were pending before the Collector on
the 30th April, 1982 and before the reference Court on the 24th September, D
1984 i.e. the date of the commencement of the .Act. However, the legisla-
ture conferred the power on the Collector to give the said benefit only in
those proceedings which were pending before him on 30.4.1982, where no
award was made by him. This is because, as explained earlier, where he
had made his awards in such proceedings, either they had travelled to the
reference Court and were pending before it or had been accepted and E
become final. The awards which were before the reference Court were left
to be dealt with by it under Section 23 while those which had become final.
were not to be reopened. However, in proceedings which were started after
30.4.1982, whether the award was or was not made by the Collector before
the date of commencement of the Act, the legislature gave the Collector F
the power to grant the said benefit even by reopening the award, because
the Collector was seized of the proceedings between 30.4.1982 and
24.9.1984 when the benefits were on the anvil. If he could give the benefit
to the awards made by him in such proceedings after 24.9.1984, there is no
reason why the awards made by him during the said interregnum should
not receive the same treatment. The reference Court proprio vigore was G
empowered to give the said benefit in all proceedings which were pending
before it on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. If the
Collector could give the said benefit in proceedings pending before him on
30.4.1982, although started prior to that date, where he had not made his
award, it will be against the scheme of the Act to contend that the reference I I
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Court could not give the same benefit in the proceedings pending before
it because the acquisition proceedings had started prior to 30.4.1982.

11. According to me the error in the contrary view springs, firstly,
from the fact that the said view fails to notice that section 30(1) of the
amending Act is confined to spelling out the powers of the Collector. It
B has no reference to and bearing on the powers of the reference or the
appellate Court. The dovetailing of the provisions of Section 30(1) into the
provisions of Section 23 is, therefore, mainly responsible for the error.
Secondly, sections 30(1) and 30(2) deal with different benefits and speak
of powers of different tribunals. While Section 30(1) speaks of powers only
c of the Collector, Section 30(2) speaks of powers of the Collector, the
·reference Court and also of the appellate Court. An attempt to project the
provisions of Section 30(2) into the provisions of Section 30(1) and conse-
quently in Section 23(1-A) is no less responsible for the erroneous inter-
pretation of the powers of the reference Court under Section 23 to grant
D the benefit of Section 23(1-A).

12. The. relevant decisions of this Court may now be referred to.
There are three decisions directly on Section 23(1-A) viz., Union of India
and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, (1990] 1 SCC
277, Union of India and Anr. v. Zora Singh .and Ors., (1992] 1 SCC 673, and
E the referring judgment in KS. Paripooman & Ors. v. State of Kera/a & Ors.,
(1992] 1 SCC 684. The other decisions, viz., Union of India and another v.
Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. etc., (1989] 2 SCC.754 which is a Constitution
Bench decision and K Kamalajammiavaru (Dead) by Lrs. v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, (1985] 1 SCC 582, Bhag Singh and Ors. v. Union
p Territory of Chandigarh, (1985] 3 SCC 737 and State of Punjab v. Mohinder .
Singh and Anr., (1986] 1 SCC 365 are all on the interpretation of amended
Sections 23 (2) and 28 of the principal Act and, therefore on the inter-
pretation of Section 30 (2) of the Amending Act.

In Vasco De Gama (supra), the facts were that the acquisition
G proceedings were commenced with the notification publish~d under Sec-
tion 4 (1) of the principal Act on 26.10.1967. The Collector made his award
·on 5.3.1969 and the reference Court made its award on 28.,5.1985. The
Court was here called upon to interpret the provisions of sections 23 (2)
and 28 of the principal Act and, therefore, of Section 30(2) of the Amend-
H ing Act as well as the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) of the princiP,al Act
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[SAWANT,J.] 459

and of Section 30 (1) of the Am.ending Act. I am in respectful agreement A
with the observations made in the said judgment that Section 30 (1) of the
Amending Act refers to the Collector's award and Section 30 (2) refers to
the award of the reference Court as well. To this extent, the view which I
have taken above on the point finds support in these observations. The
conclusion, drawn in, this case however as far as Section 23 (1-A) is B
concerned, was, with respect, incorrect inasmuch as it denied the power to
the reference Court to give the benefit of Section 23 (1-A) in the proceed-
ings in that case, though they were pending before the Court on the
commencement of the amending Act. i.e. on 24.9.1984..1This decision, with
respect, has committed the error of projecting the provisions of section
30(2) in Section 30(1) and in Sections 23 and 23(1-A) of the principal Act. C

In Zora Singh (supra), notification under Section 4(1) of the principal
Act was issued on 10.5.1979. The Collector made his award on 31.3.1981
and the Court made its award in 1985, i.e., after the commencement of the
principal Act. Although I agree with the proposition laid down there that D
the plain language of Section 23(1-A) shows that a duty is cast on tht<
reference Court to award the additional amount in all cases pending before
that court on 24.9.1984 even if the award of the Collector was made before
April 30, 1982, with respect, I am unable to agree with the following
observation underlined by me in paragraph 14 of the judgment:
E
"..... .. On a correct interpretation of the provisions of section
23(1-A) read with Section 30(1)(a) of the Amendment Act of 1984,
an additional amount calculated in the manner indicated in Section
23 (1-A) is also payable in those cases where the Collector had
not made his award on or before April 30, 1982, even in cases where p
the court might have made its award before September 24, 1984."

The above observation, according to me, ignores that in cases where
(a) acquisition proceedings were pending on 30.4.1982 and the award i.s
made by the Collector after that date (b) where acquisition proceedings G
had started after 30.4.1982 and the Collector made award after that date
but before the 'commencement of the amending Act i.e., 24.9.1984, the
Collector is given power to reopen the award and give the benefit of
.Section 23(1-A). The reference Court under Section 23 has no power to
reopen the award made by it before 24.9.1984 to give the benefit of Section
23 (1- A), since the provisions of Section 23 (1-A) have no. retrospective H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A effect. The retrospective effect is given only to the powers of the Collector
to reopen the awards made by him before 24.9.1984. For the similar reason,
the observations made by the Court to the same effect in paragraph 15,
with respect, cannot be accepted.

As regards the referring judgment in KS. Paripoornan (supra), the
B facts in that case show that notification under section 4 (1) was issued on
21.3.1978. The Collector made his award on 30.12.1980 and the reference
Court gave its award on 28.2.1985. I agree with the observation made there
that the said case is not covered by Section 30(1). However, I am unable
to agree that in that case the benefit of Section 23(1-A) is not available to
C be granted by the reference Court under Section 23. With respect, the
decision confuses the powers of the Collector under Section 30 (1) with
the powers of the Court under Section 23. The provisions of Section 30(1)
govern only the powers of the Collector under Section 11 and not the
powers of the Court under Section 23. Further, there is no retrospectivity
D given by Section 30(1) to the powers of the Collector except where it
enables the Collector to reopen the award made by him before 24.9.1984
in proceedings for acquisition started after 30.4.1982. In all other respects,
the powers of the Collector are prospective in nature inasmuch as both
clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) grant power to the Collector to give
the benefit of section 23 (1-A) in proceedings pending before him on
E 30.4.1982 and thereafter. I am also unable to agree that the use of the word
"Court" in Section 23 (1-A) is of no significance and that the said expression
would include the appellate Courts, i.e., the High Court and the Supreme
Court. It is also difficult to agree with the statement made in paragraph 11
of the judgment that even the High Court and Supreme Court can award
F the benefit of Section 23 (1-A) if they decide the matter on or after
24.9.1984 irrespective of the date on which the award was made by the
reference Court. The said interpretation gives retrospective effect to Sec-
tion 23(1-A) inasmuch as it applies the provisions of the said Section also
to awards made by the reference Court prior to 24.9.1984.

G 13. I am further unable to accept the view that the word "award"
occurring in Section 23(1-A) is used there not as a noun but as a verb.
Although the word "award" is not defined in the Act, as pointed out at the
outset, the legislature has used the said word in various provisions of the
Act with a specific intention and meaning and hence there cannot be any
H mistake that the said word has been used even in Section 23(1-A) as a
K.S.PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERALA[SAWANT,J.) 461

noun. The inconvenient words, expressions and language, when their in- A
tendment and meaning are plain, cannot be got over by either mutilating
or by attributing to them unnatural and unwarranted role. Such an exercise
is against all canons of the interpretation of statutes.

14. Coming now to the decisions of this Court on Section 23(2), I
find that on the language of Section 30(2) of the amending Act, this Court
B
in Kamalajammanniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [1985) 1 SCC
582, has with respect taken the correct vi~w of the law. In that case, the
notification under Section 4(1) was issued on 28.11.1957 and the Collector
and the Court made their awards either in 1970 or prior to it. The Court
held that the provisions of section 23 (2) read in the light of Section 30(2) c
of the amending Act did not apply to the said case. This judgment is also
relevant for yet another reason in that it states that it is only the awards
made by the Collector under Section 11 and the reference Court under
Section 18 which are "awards" proper under the Act. This observation
supports the view I have taken.
D
15. I am, however, unable to agree with the decision in Bhag Singh,
(supra) which was also a decision under Section 23(2) and Section 28 of
the principal Act read with Section 30(2). In that case, notification under
Section 4(1) of the principal Act was issued on 19.10.1974. The Collector
made his award on 9.10.1975 and the Court made its award on 31.7.1979. E
This decision ignores the limited prospectivity given by section 30(2) of the
Amending Act and makes the amended provisions of Sections 23(2) and
28 of the principal Act applicable also to cases where the award were made
by the Collector or the Court prior to'30.4.1982. This decision has relied
upon the earlier decision of the Court in State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh p
and Another, (supra). Unfortunately the latter decision has not given any
reasons for coming to the conclusion in question except that S.L.P. against
the same decision was already dismissed. For the reasons given above, I
am unable to agree with the conclusions in this decision.

16. The last decision on the amended Sections 23(2) and 28 read with G
Section 30(2) is of the Constitution Bench in the case of Raghubir Singh
(supra). This decision has overruled the decisions in Bhag Singh and
Mohinder Singh (supra). With respect, I am in complete agreement with
the decision which has taken the correct view of law as taken in the case
of K. Kamalajammanniavaru v. The Appellate Court, viz, that under Section H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A 30(2),. the High Court and the Supreme Court have power to give the
benefit of the amended Sections 23(2) and 28 retrospectively only in those r
proceedings where the awards are made by the Collector, or the reference
Court between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984. It is further only to such awards of
the Collector and the reference Courts that the said provisions apply
retrospectively.
B
17. The transitional provision is by its very nature an enabling one
and has to be interpreted as such. In the present case, it is made to take
care of the period between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984, i.e., between the date
of the ·introduction of the Bill of the amending Act and the date of the
C commencement of the Act. Since some awards might have made by the
Collector and the reference Court during the said interregnum, the legis-
lature did not want to deprive the concerned awardees either of the newly
conferred benefit of Section 23(1-A) or of the 'increased benefit under
Sections 23(2) and 28. The second object was to enable the Collector and
the Court to give the said benefits in the proceedings pending before them
D where they had not made awards. The only limitation that was placed on
the power of the Collector· in this behalf was that he should not reopen the
awards already made by him in proceedings which were pending before
him on 30.4.1982 to give the benefit of Section 23 (1-A) to such awardees.
This was as stated earlier, for two reasons. If the said awards are pending
before th~ reference court on the date of the commencement of the
E amending Act viz., 24.9.1984, the reference Court would be al;>le to give
the said benefit to the awardees. On the other hand, if the awardees in
question had accepted the awards, the same having become final, should
not be teopened. As regards the increased benefit under Sections 23(2)
and 28, the intention of the legislature was to extend it not only to the
p proceedings pending before the reference Court on 24.9.1984 but also to
those where awards were made by the Collector and the reference Courts
between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984. Hence these awards could not only be
reopened but if they were the subject-matter of the.before High Court or
the Supreme Court, the appellate orders could also be reopened to extend
the said benefits.
G
The difference made in the transitional provisions of Section 30
between payment of the additional amount under Section "23(1-A) and of
the increased solatium and interest under Sections 23(2) and 28 has to be
noted. While the former is provided for under Sub-Section (1) of Section
· _H 30, the latter are taken care of by sub-Section (2) thereof. Sub-section (1)
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERAIA[SAWANT,J.] 463

gives power to the Collector while sub-section (2) gives power to all the A
tribunals - the Collector, the.reference Court and the appellate courts. The
Collector's powers under sub-section (1) are confined (a) to the acquisition

' . proceedings pending before him on 30. 4.1982 where he has not made
award before that date and (b) to the acquisition proceedings commenced
after 30.4.1982 whether he has or has not made award prior to the com-
B
mencement of the amending Act i.e., 24.9.1984. As against this, the power
conferred by sub- section (2) on all the tribunals is confined only to the
awards made by the Collector and the reference Court between 30.4.1982
and 24.9.1984. This distinction is necessitated by the difference in the
nature of the benefit. While the additional amount under Section 23(1-A)
which is for the first time made payable by the amending Act is to ·C
compensate for the delay in the making of the award or taking possession
of the land, the solatium under Section 23(2) and interest on the excess
amount under Section 28 which were always payable were increased to take
care of the inflation and the fall in the purchasing power of the rupee in
the meanwhile.
D
But for the provisions of sub-section (1) of the said Section 30, the
Collector would not have been able to give the benefit of Section 23(1-A)
in the proceedings referred to therein. This would have defeated the object
of the Act in those cases which had not travelled or could not travel to the
reference Court and had or would become final with the Collector's award. E
The legislature, therefore, wanted to give the power to the Collector in
· addition to the reference Court to take care of such cases. It was aware
that many cannot and did not go to the reference Court to get their due
compensation.

18. According to me, any other interpretation will be a distortion of F
the plain language, meaning and intendment of the relevant provisions. It
will also amount to reading limitation on the powers of the Collector and
the Courts where the legislature intended to expand them.

19. I, therefore, hold that : .
G
-(i) Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Amending Act relates
only to the powers of the Collector. It has no relation to or
bearing on the powers of the reference Court. It is erroneous
to read its provisions and the limitations placed by and the
distinction made by it between acquisition proceedings com- . H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A menced prior to and after 30th April 1982, into the provisions
of Section 23 including of sub-section (1-A) thereof.

(ii) Under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of the said Section 30,
·.the Collector has power to grant benefit of Section 23(1-A) ·-·~·
of the principal Act in every proceeding for the acquisition
B which is pending before him on 30th April, 1982_ but in which
he has made no award before that date.
..,..
(iii) Under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of the said Section 30,
the Collector has power to give the benefit under Section
23(1-A) in every proceeding for the acquisition commenced
c aft.er 30th April, 1982 whether or not he has made his award
in such proceeding before 24th September, 1984. Where he
has made his award in such proceeding before that date, he
,
is empowered to reopen the same and grant the said benefit.

D (iv) Section 23 does not make any distinction in the acquisition
proceedings pending before the reference Court on the 24th
September, 1984 between those which had commenced prior
to 30th April, 1982 and those which had commenced there-
after. If the proceedings are pending before the reference
Court on the date of the commencement of the Act, viz., 24th
E September, 1984, the reference Court is enjoined upon to give
the benefit of Selection 23(1-A) in all such proceedings
without making any distinction. When the reference Court
does so, it gives prospective effect to Section 23(1-A). It does
· not give retrospective effect to the said Section merely be-
F cause the proceedings in question had started prior to 30th
Apri~ 1982.
'."
(v) It is not permissible to read the provisions of sub-section (2)
of Section 30 of the amending Act into the provisions of
sub-section (1) thereof and thereby in Sections 23 and 23(1-
G A). The provisions of Section 30(2) are exclusively concerned
with Sections 23(2) and 28 and have no relation to the
provisions of Section 23(1-A).

(vi) Neither the reference Court under Section 23 nor the appel-
H late court, whether High Court or the Supreme Court can
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[SAHAI,J.] 465

grant the benefit of Section 23 (1-A) in any proceeding in A
which the reference Court has made its award prior to 24th
September, 1984. The grant of such benefit by the Courts is
not warranted by the transitional provisions of Section 30(1).
·c The provisions of Section 30(2) as stated above are not
applicable to the benefit under Section 23 (1-A). For the B
Courts to grant the said benefit in such proceedings is to give
retrospective effect to the provisions of Section 23 (1-A)
which is impermissible in law.

20. For the reasons stated above, I agree with the conclusion drawn
in Union of Indian & Another v. Zora Singh & Others, [1992] 1 SCC 673, C
that in all proceedings pending before the reference court on 24.9.1984, the
reference Court has to give benefit of the provisions of Section 23(1-A) to
the claimants.

R.M. SARAI, J. How to construe section 23(1-A) of the Land D
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (for short 'the Amendment Act') a
substantive provision added in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short
'the Act') after 90 years, for striking proper balance, 'between the need of
acquisition of land for private purpose and the rights of the individual
whose land is acquired' is the simple issue but of far reaching consequence
both for the State or the acquiring body and the owners who, by process E
of law are deprived of their land. Should the interpretative process, which
in public welfare measures has to be purpose oriented, further the legisla-
tive objective by taking recourse even to the debates in the House, if
necessary, to find out the mischief the Legislature intended to remedy or
it should resort to strained or unduly restrictive construction by adding or F
substracting words to the otherwise plain and simple language on assump-
tions of limited retrospectivity drawn from the transitional provision. Even
a decade has not elapsed since the amendment was made yet there are no
less than six decisions one of them being constitution bench on scope and
applicability of the amending provision when it could not be disputed that G
the law was amended and the Legislature made the changes to mitigate the
rigour of the owners on account of delay by providing for time frame in
Section 11-A, additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) enhanced
solatium under Section 23(2), and equality of compensation for persons
affected by same notification under Section 28-A. But the divergence has
arisen not on the purpose of objective, or the benefit the provision intends H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A to confer but on construction arising out of difference in approach of
interpreting such a provision. Brother Agrawal has opted for construction
which restricts the operation of Section 23(1-A) to the proceedings for
acquisition initiated after coming into force of the Amendment Act. This
with profound respect to him is not made out either from the language of
the provision or from the legislative objective as discerned from the
...
Debates in the LokSabha. Therefore, despite deliberations and discussions
it has not been possible to share the views expressed by him, that if the
provision for additional compensation is extended to the land owner whose
reference were or are pending under Section 18 it would amount to
operating the provisions retrospectively in respect of past transactions. Nor
c it has been possible to reconcile to the view that Section 30(1), the
transitional provision, can be reflected into Section 23(1-A) to curtail its
ambit and scope and construe it as applicable to notification issued under
Section 4(1)'after September, 1984.

D Before entering into the legalistic exercise of analysing Section 23(1-
A) and the time or period from which it commences to operate it, it is
appropriate to preface it by making an attempt to bring out the purpose
.and objective of the amendment. The Land Acquisition Act enacted in
1894 primarily, for acquiring land was more socially inclined towards
displacement of the individual by providing for payment of compensation,
E from the date the declaration was issued under Section 6 of the Act. But
as time passed and acquisition expanded the date of determining compen-
sation was pushed back in 1923 to the date notification under section 4 was
issued. Effect of it on the right of land owners was economically harsh as
at times there was long delay between issuing of notifications under See-
p tions 4 and 6 of the Act and compensation due to distance of time between
the two notifications, in many cases, became nugatory. Yet it took 34 years,
even, from the date the country became independent for the elected
representative, most of whom come from rural background, to intervene in
favour of that class of persons who not only form bulk of the society and
G for whom land is not only property but their bread and butter, their life
and soul, to relieve them to the effect of compulsory taking over of their
land by restructuring and making the provisions more economically viable.
Even though our country is vast, bristling with varied cultures yet the
economy, basically, being agricultural right from Kashmir to Kanyakumari,
irrespective of the fertility of land, the love and lure for it is the same. An
H agriculturist of Tamil Nadu is as much concerned as a cultivator in Uttar
KS. PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[SAHAI,J.) 467

Pradesh and Bihar. But the development of different State, the potential A
value of land etc. is vastly different. An acre of land in one State due to
irrigation facility and development activity may cost more than in any other
State. Therefore,. the high ratio of compensation for land in that State
should not be a scare for construing, the beneficient, provision narrowly.
If the Legislature in kee~ing with feeling of its elected representative brings B
out a legislation then the Courts endeavour should be to advance it and
the draftsman devil, if any, should not be permitted to act as obstruction
in achieving the basic purpose.

Although the amendments touched various aspects but these peti-
tions are primarily concerned with construction of Section 23(1-A) of the C
Act. To put it precisely whether the provision for additional compensation
introduced since 1984 is attracted even in those cases where the awards
had been made by the Collector prior to 1982 and their final adjudication
was pending in courts either under Section 18 of the Act or in appeal etc.
But before adverting to and examining its reach it appears apposite to D
mention in brief the provisions relating to determin,ation of compensation
under the Act prior to 1984, the defects, if any, with which ft suffered, and
if the Legislature intended to cure and remedy the mischief.

Relevant sections of the Act which deal directly or indirectly with the
right to receive compensation, jurisdiction and power to C;ietermine it and E
method and manner of its calculation and payment of interest on it are
Sections 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 18, 23, 24, 28 and 34. They can be conveniently
divided in two parts, one, the right and duty of the Collector to make award
and take possession and second the jurisdiction and power of the court to
determine compensation. In the first part there are three stages, one, from F
sections 6 to 9 that is the · period during which the .Collector acquires
jurisdiction to measure and plan the land, which has been declared to be
intended to be used for public purpose, and issue,, 'lotice to persons
interested to file objection to the value of the land. The second stage deals
with procedure which the Collector is required to follow under section 10
which ultimately ends in making of the award under Section 11 of the Act. G
Section 12 make5 the award as conclusive and· binding between the parties
subject to provisions of the Act. The third stage is to take possession under
Section 16 is after making of the award. The second part deals with
determination of compensation by the court on reference made to it under
Section 18 in the manner provided by the Act by taking into consideration H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A certain factors in Section 23 and ignoring those in Section 24. Section 28
empowers the Court to award interest on difference in the amount awarded
by the Collector and determined by the Court whereas Section 34 entitles
Collector to award interest if the amount determined is not paid before
taking possession. Nature of the proceedings for determination of the
compensation both by the Court and the Collector are statutorily regarded
B as award. That is apparent, amongst others, from sub-section (1) of Section
26 of the Act.

Right to receive compensation accrues to the owners, under the Act, "'·
when possession is taken by the Collector. Section 16 vests the land in the
C State absolutely free from all encumberances when the Collector takes
possession after making the award. But between Sections 4 and 6 notifica-
tion and thereafter between Section 6 and 11 there occurred at times much
delay. The Act did not provide for any time frame. And this affected the
land owners vitally as the market value of the land under Section 2J is to
D be determined on the date the notification under sub-section (1) of Section
4 was issued whereas the award has to be made after declaration under
Section 6 and issuing of notice under Section 9. The effect of such delay
become more marked as years rolled in after 1950. As far back as 1958 the
Law Commission observed :

E
"The Finance Ministry has given four instances in which the car-
rying ·out of projects has been delayed because they could not
obtain possession of the land in time and it has been stated that
acquisition proceedings commenced as early as 1948 are still
F pending. It is noteworthy, however, that the State Governments
themselves admit that the delay is largely due to the tardy manner
in which the machinery of the Government moves in the matter.
They also admit that, if the land acquisition officers are made to
· work methodically and expeditiously, the pace can be quickened.
Any proposal for the reform of the law should, therefore, aim at
G overcoming these evils. Most of the delay occurs in the initial stages
of the proceedings between the date of the notification under
Section 4 and the declaration under section 6. Further delays arise
in the making of the award by the Collector, with the result that
as under the existing law, the Government cannot obtain posses-
H sion until the award is made indefinitely delayed."
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERALA[SAHAf,J.] 469

The situation deteriorated further and report submitted in 1970 suggested A
time frame as delay in acquisition proceedings caused untold sufferings to
the land owners and affected the poor adversely.

· "The Land Acquisition Act is over 75 years old. When enacted
it was not faced with the requirements of the Constitution of India. B
It is remarkable that broadly speaking it fulfilled the needs of the
~ommunity for such a length of time. Even today the Act is not so
much vulnerable on its provisions as on the way the executive
authority tried to implement them. From one end of the country
to the other the same story has been repeated again and again
(with provincial variations) that it has been used as an engine of C
oppression by the administrative authorities and the weaker poorer
sections of the community have suffered the most. The complaint
(not without substance) is that only an illusory compensation was
awarded in an appreciable number of cases and that too was not
paid for years. Emergent acquisition was the order of the day D
without the existence of any emergency. The law was ignored and
the exception was made the law perhaps on the ground that
observance of law would have meant delay. The executive mind
considered the delay in acquiring possession as a matter of great
importance but the delay in payment of compensation to poor
landowners as of no consequence. This callous indifference was E
manifested again and again. Many of the sufferers lost their
hereditary occupation also which alone provided them with some
sort of economic security. As a result quite an appreciable number
of citizens were completely uprooted and turned into refugees in
their own land of birth." F

(emphasis supplied)

There can thus be no dispute that there existed a lacuna in the Act which
did not provide for compensating for the rise in price of land due to delay G
rendering the compensation illusory, in many cases. To overcome this and
similar defects the Parliament introduced the Bill in 1982. It was withdrawn
as it suffered from certain defects. It was reintroduced in 1984. One of the
suggestions in the House was that determination of value of the land may
again be restored to the date the declaration was published under Section
6 of the Act. But the Hon'ble Minister who piloted the Bill expressed his H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A inability due to various difficulties and opted for measures including Sec-
tion 23(1-A) to mitigage misery of the land owners. It was stated thus,

"It is, ·therefore, necessary to ensure particularly that the interest
of the weak and the poor are not overlooked in our concern for
modernisation and industrialisation. Even when acquisition of
B their land, often the only source of their livelihood, becomes an
inescapable necessity for the larger interest of the community, they
ought to be provided with the necessary wherewithals of rehabilita-
tion. In making provision in the amending Bill, we have been
animated by our concerned of ensuring that the person who loses his
c property right in land, particularly one who belongs to the weaker
sections of the community, is adequately compensated for his
loss ....... As it is well known, a member of land acquisition proceed-
ings have been pending for the_ award of the Collector for years
an end. In some cases, the preliminary notification under Section
4(1) was issued many years ago. Payment of compensation to the
D interested parties on the basis of the market value of the land
prevailing on the one of the preliminary notification will be purely
unfair.''

(Emphasis supplied)
E
Such being the legislative background and purpose of its enactment being
to remove the hardship of the affected parties as is clear from the objects
and reasons that 'The pendency of acquisition proceedings for long periods
often, caused hardship and to the affected parties and renders umealistic
p the scale of compensation offered to them', it becomes the duty of the
Court while construing the provisions to construe it in such a manner that
the mischief which the Legislature intended to remove may be suppressed
and the avowed objective of the legislation be served. The rule in this
regard as laid down in numerous decisions rendered by this Court and
English Courts is th<i.'t the Court when faced with interpretation of such
G provisions must ascertain what was the law before making of the Act, what
we.re the mischief or defects in such law and how the Parliament intended
to resolve or cure it. The prevailing law and its defects have already been
noticed. It has been attempted to be remedied by taking recourse to
provide not only for future but present and past as welt Future has been
H taken care of by providing for automatic lapse of acquisition proceedings
K.S.PARIPOORNAN v.STATEOFKERALA[SAHAI,J.] 471

under Section 11-A if the award is not made by the Collector within two A
years of the publication of notification under Section 6 of the Act. Present
is protected by Section 23(1-A) and past by Section 30. It is the under-
standing of scope of these two sections and their inter-relation which shall
be decisive of fate of these petitions. For this purpose Section 23(1-A) of
the Act is extracted below :
B
"S.23(1-A). - In addition to the market value of the land, as above
provided, the Court shall in every case award an amount calculated
at the rate of twelve per centum on such market value for the
period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the
notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such C
land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking
possessiop of the land, whichever is earlier.

Explanation. - In computing the period referred "to in this
sub-section, any period or periods during 'which the proceedings D
for the acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay
or injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded."

It is added to Section 23 which provides for considerations which may be
taken into account for determination of compensation. But it is different
in nature. Unlike sub- section (1) it operates on its own as it crates the E
right of additional compensation, provides for the rate at which it is to be
paid and lays down the period for which it is to be calculated. Therefore,
from the date it came on the statute book, i.e., September 24, 1984 an
owner became entitled to the additional amount and the court became
~tatutorily obliged to award it. The use of the expression 'in every case' F
widens the ambit of the Section. True it. is not a procedural law or a
declaratory law, therefore it is substantive in nature and is prospective in
operation. Yet the question is, as arises in every such provisions, the time
or the date from which it commences to operate. The difficulty is greater
when there are no express indications and the provision is general in nature
and wider in reach. If the legislature does not use any expression to indicate G
that the law made by it shall apply to any cause of action or incident taking
place only after coming into force of the Act then the law has to be applied
in presenti, that is to the matters pending before it even if those matters
and arisen before coming into force of th~ Act, as "A (a) statute is not
retrospective merely because it affects existing rights; nor it is retrospective H
) i
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A merely because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time
antecedent to its passing". (Halsbury Laws of England Vol. IV para 221).
In The Queen v. The inhabitants of St. Ma1y Whitechapel, [1848] 12 Q.B.
120 at page 127, it was observed that the rule against retrospective opera- '
tion was not applicable to a statute merely because a part of the requisites
for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. This principle
B was approved by our Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. State of
Vindhya Pradesh, AIR (1953) SC 394 at 398 and in T.K Lakshmana Iyer
and Others v. State of Madras and others, AIR (1968) SC 1489. In T1imbak
Damodhar Raipurkar v. Assaram Hiraman Patil & Ors., AIR (1966) SC
1758, it was observed by the Constitution Bench.
c 11
........ where a statute operates in future it cannot be said to be

retrospective merely because within the sweep of its operation all
existing rights are included.......... ".

In Bishun Narain Misra v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR (1965)
D SC 1567 a rule made by the State Government providing that the age of
retirement would be 55 years came up for consideration before the Con-
stitution Bench. It was argued that since the rule could not apply retrospec-
tively, a Government servant who was recruited and appointed earlier to
the date when the rule was made by the Government could not be retired
E in exercise of power under this rule otherwise it would amount to applica-
tion of the rule retrospectively. The submission was repelled and it was
held that the rule could not be struck down on the ground that it was
retrospective in operation as all that it provided was that from the date it
came into force the age of retirement became 55 years.

F In St. Whitechapel (supra) the law intended to secure that a widow
residing in a parish with her husband shall not be removed for twelve
months after his death. The benefit of the law extended even when the
husband had died before coming into force of the Act and it was observed:

"It was said that the operation of the statute was confined to
G persons who had become widows after the Act was passed, and
that the presumption against a retrospective statute being intended ·
supported this construction; but we have shown before that the
statute is in its direct operation prospective, as it relates to future
removals only, and that it is not properly called a retrospective
H statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from
K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OFKERAIA [SARAI, J.) 473

time antecedent to its passing. In this case the words 'shall be A
removed' were thus found appropriate to cover all cases of future
removals irrespective of whether the husband had died prior to
the Act but they were not found wide enough to nullify completed
removals prior to the Act, even if the widow was removed within
twelve months of her husband's death."
B
This observation was made was the literal and abstract construction would
hav~ resulted in hardship. Any legislation specially a legislation enacted to
mitigate special mischief is norm~lly construed to serve the public good.
Principles of interpretation are only the guideline they are not conclusive.
The sure and safe way is to interpret the provision on the necessity and C
requirement as appears from the objective of the Act and the words used
by the Legislature. Reliance was placed on observations made by Lord
Goffe in Alexander v. Mercouris [1979] 3 All England Law Reports 305
distinguishing Whitechepals case that a statute, 'would not be operating
prospectively if it creates new rights and duties arising out of past transac- D
tion.' This decision turned more on the language of the Section than the
principle that the prospectivity of a provision is not effected even if it draws
partly from past transactions. Section 1(1) of the Defective Premises Act,
1972 provided that a person taking on work for or in connection with the
provision of a dwelling' owes a duty to see that the work is done properly,
'so that as regards that work the dwelling will be fit for habitation when E
completed.' The question that arose was 'whether this duty applied where
the work was taken on before the commencement of the 1972 Act but
completed after. It was held that the substance of the matter was the initial
act of 'taking on' the work, therefore, the duty could not be said to arise
unless the 'taking on' occurred after the commencement of the Act'. The F
decision thus turned on the explicit language used in the Section. No
exception can be taken to the observation that a statute creating new right
on past transactions cannot be held to be prospective. How does this
principle help the State? Section 23(1-A) does not create any right on past
transactions. Misconception appears to be prevailing due to fixation of the G
period for which additional compensation shall be paid. The two termini,
that is, issuance of notification under Section 4(1) and publication of
declaration under Section 6 are erroneously understood as creating right
or furnishing starting point from which the Section shall apply. The right
which is substantive in nature is to get additional compensation at the rate
of twelve per cent. The right is not created on past transactions. It operates H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3-S.C.R.

A in future, that is, confer benefit of additional compensation from the date
it came into force and not from a date prior to coming into force of the
provisions.

A substantive law is held to be prospective as a matter of legal policy
B since it is founded on public policy tqat no right be so created as to work
to the disadv~tage for whom it is crated as if it be so, 'it would be betrayal
of what the law stands for' (Bennion on Statutory Interpretation). Section
23(1-A) does not suffer from such betrayal. It is just the otherwise. It
instead of operating to disadvantage promotes the law and fairness by
extending the benefit provided by the Section to all such proceedings which
C are pending before the court under Section 18. It ensures uniformity and
equality.

The Section ·is not robbed off its prospectivity because for the e.icer-
D cise of right the calculation of compensation has to be made on' facts which
come into existence prior· to the date of the Amending Act. To take a
practical illustration a law may be made that any person who suffers an
injury or damage would be liable to be compensated. If there is no, date of
its commencement then the law under General Clauses Act would start
applying from the date of its enactment. And any person suffering any
E injury or damage after the date of enactment can file the suit. the law
being substantive a person suffering any injury prior to the date of enact-
ment would not be entitled to file the suit. To this extent the law is
prospective. But if the Legislature while enacting such law provides the
scale of damages and links it with year or place or time prior to the date.
F of coming into force of the Act it cannot be said that since part of it extends
to any point of time anterior to the law the provision has become retrospec·
tive. In Kapur Chand v. B.S. Grewa~ Financial Commissioner, Punjab,
Chandigarh & Ors., AIR (1965) SC 1491: Section 14-A added from 1955 to
the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 permitted a land owner ·to
bring a suit for eviction notwithstanding anything to the contrary if the
G tenant failed to pay rent regularly as provided in Section 9(ii) of the Punjab
Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953. The suit was filed by the land owner
for eviction for arrears due for the years 1952, 1953, 1954 and January,
1955. It was decreed and the argument that since the provisions came into
force in 1955 the arrears of certain period could not furnish the cause of
, H action else it would become retrospective was repelled and it was observed,
K.S.PARIPOORNAN v.STATEOFKERAIA[SAHAI,J.) 475

".............. In our opinion, the conduct of the tenant prior to the A
coming into force of the new section can be taken into aceount.
No doubt a statute must be applied prospectively. But a Statute is
not applied retrospectively because a part of the requisites for its
action is drawn from a mom~nt of time prior to its passing. The
clause in question makes a particular conduct the ground for an B
application for eviction. The necessary condition for the applica-
tion of S.9(1) (ii) may commence even before the Act came into
force and past conduct, which is as relevant for the clause as
conduct after the coming. into force of the Act, cannot be over
looked;"
c
The substantive right to evict was enforced prospectively but the necessary
facts for its enforcement were taken even from before coming into force
of the Act. The law was not held to be retrospective on that account. In
Master Ladies Tailors Organisation & Anr. v. Minister of Labour & National
Service, (1950) (1) All England Law Reports p. 525, a question arose if an D
order passed by the Minister fixing remuneration for work and holding was
ultra vires the Act as it applied retrospectivity. It was held the effect of the
provisions relating to accrued remuneration being merely to determine and
limit the quantum to be made the order could not be construed as having
retrospective operation. It was observed by the Court that if a prospective
benefit is in certain cases to be measured by or depends on antecedent E
facts does not make the provision retrospective. This decision makes it
clear that a substantive provision is not rendered retrospective if the right
created by the provision provides the scales or fixes the benefit from period
prior to coming into force of the provision. Therefore, merely beeause the
substantive right of additional compensation at the rate of ·12% on the p
compensation determined it to be paid for the period ~mmencing from
'the date the notification under Section 4(1) was issued to. the date the
publication was made under Section 6 which period may be prior to coming
into force of the amending Act would not render the provision retrospec-
tive. By calculating compensation for the period between the two notifica-
tions the right to receive additional compensation is not taken into the past. G
The right operates from the date the amending Act came into force. As
explained earlier, Section 23(1A) creates not only the right to receive·
additional compensation but also lays down the period for which the
amount shall be paid. By the latter part of the Section which only provides
for measure for compensation, the Section is not rendered retrospective. H
476 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A It is not the method of drafting a provision that makes it prospective or
retrospective but its effect on the rights of the parties effected by it. If the
legislature would have stopped by providing for additional compensation
at the rate of 12% to be calculated in the manner prescribed probably no
argument could have been raised about it being applied retrospectively.
B Therefore, it does not make any difference if the Legislature instead of
providing separately that the additional compensation shall be payable for
the period covered by the tWo notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6
chose to provide it in the same section. The substantive provision which
otherwise is applicable to all proceedings which are pending before the
reference court, would not become retrospective as for calculation of the
C compensation the notification issued prior to coming into force of the Act,
is to be taken into consideration.

Even though no part of the Section, is of any help for deciding if the
Section applies to only future or past acquisitions, yet this Court in Union
D of India & Anr. v. Zora Singh & Ors., [1992] 1 SCC 673 tried to find out
the point of time from which the Section would operate and observed as
follows,

"The expression "award" used in Section 23(1-A) suggests that
the intention of the legislature was to make the provisions of the
E said sub-section applicable to cases where the Collector had yet
to make his award or the trial Court hearing the reference under
Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act had still to make its award
after the coming into force of the said-section on September 24, 1984."

(Emphasis supplied)
F
Whereas in KS. Paripooman & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors., (1992] 1 SCC
684 the order by which reference was made to the larger Bench it was
observed,

"The legislature having designed the horizontal growth in such
G manner, the collective scheme which has been made operational
prospectively on September 24, 1984 and onwards becomes plain
because that is the date on which the amendnient comes into effect.
When we import this understanding to the scheme of things it
becom~s evident that a Court when applying sub-section ( 1-A) of
H Section 23 would do so only if it has in hand an acquisition based
K.S. P ARIPOORNAN v. STATE OF KERALA [SARAI, J.] 477

upon a notification under Section 4 of the Act issued on September A
24, 1984 or thereafter and not to any such notification issued earlier
to that date. Same would be the role of the Collector at his end
when employing Section 15 and making an award under Section
11 of the Act."

(Emphasis supplied) B

The expression 'commencing on' used before the words 'on and from the
date of publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1)' or
the words 'to be date of award' etc., do not indicate directly or indirectly
that the Section shall be applied from this or that date to the proceedings C
of one or the other nature. A provision laying down the date or the period
on which the valuation of land shall be determined cannot be taken as the
date from which the amendment in the Act providing for additional com-
pensation could be said to apply. Literally or even constructionally the law
requires the Court determining compensation under Section 18 of the Act, D
to pay additional compensation in every case coming before it after the
amendment came into force. Any other interpretation would result in
rendering Section 23(1-A) dormant and non-operative in class of those
cases where compensation is being determined by the Court on objection
raised by interested persons against making of award by the Collector prior
to 1982 not on the language of the Section but on assumption that the E
Section was designed to apply to notification issued under Section 4(1) of
the Act after the Amendment Act came in to force.

Necessity to construe a provision. by taking recourse to adding or
substracting words may arise if the provision is otherwise ambiguous or it
may lead to disastrous consequence. If the construction in Zora Singh F
(supra) was adopted by straining the language then the interpretation
suggested in Paripooman's case (supra) is unduly restrictive. What has not
been taken notice of in either decisions is the expression 'the court shall
in every case' award the amount. Use of the word 'shall' has been used to
impart it mandatory character. This obligation the court has to discharge G
in every case. In absence of any expression limiting the exercise of power
in only those cases where notification is issued after September, 1984 or
making it retrospective so as to apply to every case in which proceedings
for acquisition had started before coming into force of the Act, the
provision has to be applied to every case which was pending for award of
compensation on and after the date when the Section became operative. H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Any other construction may result in consequences which were not in-
tended by the Legislature and may leave the mischief as it was. Such
impractical or inconvenient result should be avoided. In Municipal Council
of Sydney v. Margaret Alexandra Troy, AIR (1928) PC 128 in more or less
similar circumstances when rate of interest payable on compensation was
increased from four to six per cent, it was held that the increase in the rate ....
· B of interest was payable in respect of land acquired before the date the Act
came into force and such construction did not result in making the
provision retrospective as, 'the provision being substantive one which was
not made to depend on any reference to corresponding provision iii the
earlier Statute.' Similarly, the substantive part of Section 23(1-A) also does
C not depend on any reference to the corresponding provision in the prin-
cipal Act. It has been explained earlier that it stands on its own. Even
otherwise when the Court proceeds to determine compensation after Sep-
tember 1984 it cannot ignore sub-section (1-A) added to Section 23. That
would be against plain and simple language of the Section.

D The additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) was thus pay-
able on every matter which was pending ln. Court on 24th September, 1984.
But that would not have been complete and full realisation. of the legisla-
ture intention as the malady which the Legislature intended to cure was
concerned not only with present and future but past as well. Section
23(1-A) being prospective in nature it could not have applied to acquisition
E proceedings which were pending before September, 1984 in which award
has been made or not. To cover up this Section 30 was enacted which read
as under:

"30. Transitional provisions - (1) The provisions of sub-section
(1-A) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as inserted by clause (a)
F of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have
applied, also to, and in relation to, -

(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the
principal Act pending on the 30th day or April, 1982 (the
date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment)
G
Bill, 1982 in the House of ~he People), in which no award has
been made by the Collector before that date;

(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under
the principal Act commenced after that date whether or not
H an award has been made by the Collector before the com-
K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OF KERAIA [SAHAI, J.) 479

mencement of this Act. A

(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28
of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and
Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed
to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the
Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or B
Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the
provisions of the principal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982
(the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (amendment)
Bill, 1982, in the House of the People) ~d before the commence-
ment of this Act." c
The Section is headed as transitional provision. The word transitional
according to dictionary means, 'passage or change from one act or set of
circumstances to another'. The objective of such a provision is to bridge
the gap between commencement of the Act and its operation prior to it:
It is a drafting measure to, 'regulate the coming into operation of these D
enactments and modify their effect during the period of transition'. As
stated earlier, Section 23(1-A) empowers the Court to grant additional
compensation in every case which was before it on ·the day the Act came
into operation. But that could not have served the legislative purpose,
therefore, Section 30 was added to serve as transitional provision to extend E
the benefit of Section 23(1-A) by bridging the gap and providing for
payment of additional compensation to even those who were not covered
otherwise in Section 23(1-A). The Section has two sub- clauses. Clause (a)
takes back applicability of section 23(1- A) to all those proceedings in
which notifications had been issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Ac-
quisition Act and proceedings were pending on 30th day of April, 1982 as F
no award had been made by the Collector before that date. Clause (b)
extends the benefit of Section 23(A) to the proceedings which had com~
menced after 30th April, 1982. This date .was chosen as the Bill for
amending the Act was initiated in 1982. It provides that where notification
had been issued after 1982 the land owner is entitled to additional com- G
pensation whether the award had been made before September, 1984 or
not.

In acquisitions in which notification has been issued prior to 1982 the
Legislature placed them in two categories, one, where award had been
made and others where it was still pending at a stage prior to making of H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the award. Where awards had been made prior to 1982 and the persons
interested had not accepted it and sought reference it was pending before
the court on the date the Section came into force. No provision was
necessary for such matters as they came within the purview of Section
23(1-A). But in those cases where the matter was still pending a provision
had to be made to obviate any injustice to them and, therefore, clause (1)
B of Section 30 provided for payment of additional compensation to them as ----
well. Therefore, if Section 23(1-A) and Section 30 are read together they
cover among themselves entire proceedings for the acquisition of land in
which notification had been issued under Section 4(1) of the Act before
1982 but the proceedings had not become final either because no award
C had been made by the Collector or because award had been made but it
was pending before the court under Section 18 or the proceedings had
been initiated between April, 1982 and September, 1984, irrespective of
whether the award had been made or not. What was canvassed from the
other side is that Section 23(1-A) having been made retrospective by
Section 30 and its operation being limited to those cases where the award
D had not been made by the Collector, a land owner was not entitled to claim
a~ditional compensation where the award had been made before that date.
That is not a correct way of construing the two Sections. In absence of
Section 30 it would have been difficult for a land owner whose land had
been acquired under a notification issued under Section 4(1) before com-
ing into force of the Act and in which no award had been made to claim
E additional compensation. That would have been contrary to the legislative
objective. Therefore, the Legislature in order to cover up all those cases
in which award had not been made added a transitional provision. It can
better be explained by taking a practical illustration. Suppose two notifica-
tions were issued on January, 1979 for acquiring the land mentioned in the
notification. In one the award is made before April, 1982 and in the other
F it remained pending. If the construction as suggested on behalf of the
Union of India and other State Governments is accepted then the addi-
tional compensation would be payable only in a case in which the proceed-
ings were pending and not in those in which the proceedings had become
final before the Collector. Such construction would be highly unjust and
G inequitable. The benefit of additional compensation could not be denied
on of chance of the award having been made. There must be some rationale
for giving benefit to that class of land owners in whose cases due to delay
for one or the other reasons the proceedings could not be finalised and
others where award had been made. A construction which leads to
anomalous and illogical results should be avoided. True once the award is
H
('
K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STATE OFKERAIA(SAHAl,J.] 481

made right to compensation accrues but Section 23(1-A) does not on its A
own make a distinction for purposes of payment of additional compensa-
tion between pendency of proceedings and making of award. A transitional
- provision cannot curtail operation of the substantive provision. The field
of operation of Section 30 being narrow, namely to extend the benefit of
Section 23(1-A) to all those land owners whose land has been notified to
be acquired before 1982 and in which no award has been made by Callee- B
tor, it cannot be taken help of for determining the scope of the main
provision and hold that what is not covered by it stands excluded from
Section 23(1-A). A transitional provision cannot become main provision
nor it can curtail the ambit and width of the principle Section. The
prospectivity of Section 23(1-A) is not eroded by applying it to the C
proceedings pending before it. Nor could the concept of limited retrospec-
tivity be imported by resorting to sub-section (1) of Section 30. In fact the
field of operation of Section 23(1-A) and Sections 30(1)(a) and (b) are
entirely different. Neither can be projected in another. The submission that
Section 23(1-A) applied only to situation visualised by Section 30 is not
made either by the language employed by the two Sections or any principle D
of interpretation or construction. Section 23(1-A) does not suffer from
casus ommisa which requires to be supplied by taking recourse to external
help. The Legislature was never in doubt about the matters pending before
court in reference u/s 18. Therefore, by the transitional provision it at-
tempted to cover other cases. That is why it uses the expression, 'also'. The
significance of this word should not be lost sight of. It is clear indication E
of extended the benefit provided by Section 23(1-A) not only to those cases
in which the award had been made and the matters were pending in court,
but 'also' to all those cases in which acquisition proceedings due to delay
were still pending. In fact in absence of transitional provision there might
have been difficulty in awarding additional compensation in cases covered F
by sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 30 as Section 23(1-A)
could not have applied to proceedings which were pending prior to coming
into force of the Act. In any case, the ambit of Section 23(1-A) coll·~ not
be narrowed by operating Section 30 as it would be contrary to cannon8 of
interpretation.
G
Reliance was placed on construction of sub-section (2) of Section 30
by the Constitution Bench in Union of India & Anr v. Raghubir Singh
(Dead) by LRs. etc., [1989) 3 SCR 316 and it was urged that since the two
sub-sections of Section 30 were enacted on the same date with same
purpose and objective, the interpretation put by the Constitution Bench on
H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A the limited retrospectivity of sub-section (2) should be extended to sub-
section (1) of Section 30 as well. The submission suffers from inherent
fallcy of ignoring the difference in phraseology of the two sub-sections and
the objective sought to be achieved by them. Their field of operation is
different and they serve different purpose. The amendment in sub-section
(2) of Section 23 brings about a change in existing ratio of solatium from
B 15% to 30%. And sub-section (2) of Section 30 makes it operative from
30th April 1982, in relation to any award made by the Collector or Court
or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal
against any such award. Both the decisions, i.e., Bhag Singh v. Union
Territory of Chandigarh, [1985) Supp. 2 SCR 949 which was held to be
C incorrectly decided and Raghubir Singh agreed to the extent that the
retrospectivity visualised by the sub-section applied to the award made by
the Collector or Court. But difference arose as to whether 30% enhanced
solatium was payable in appeals pending in the High Court and this Court
irrespective of the date of award. The interpretation turned on expression
'such award' used in the sub-section. In Bhag Singh (supra) it ~as extended
D even to the appeals pending in the High Court or Supreme Court against
award of the Collector or the Court whereas in Raghubir Singh (supra) it
was confined to those appeals in High Court or this Court which arose out
of, 'such award'. The question of liniited retrospectivity arose on .specific
language of the sub-section. In absence of sub-section (2) of Section 30 the
enhanced solatium would have been payable on not only an award after
E 30th April 1982 but in all appeals pending in the High Court or this Court
irrespective of the date of award. The Legislature, therefore, carved out an
exception and confined payment of enhanced solatium in pending appeals
only if they had arisen out of award made after 30th April 1982. A
comparison of the two sub-sections of Section 30 indicates thi\t the expres-
F sion of sub- section (1) beginning from the "provisions of sub-section" and
upto "in relation to" are identical to first part of sub-section (2). But there
the similarity ends. Sub-section (l)(a) applies to every proceeding which
was pending on 30th day of April, 1982 in which no award has been made
by the Collector before that date. Whereas sub-section (2) extends the
benefit of retrospectivity to any award made by the Collector or Court or
G to any order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal
against any, 'such award' under the provisions of the principal Act after
30th day of April,1982. The construction in Raghubir Singh case (supra)
turned on the use of the words 'such award'. It was held that the use of
the expression 'any such award' restricted the operation of the Section to
only those awards which had been made after 30th day of April, 1982.
H
K.S. PARIPOORNAN v. STAIBOFKERAIA[SAHAI,J.] 483

T~erefore, it was held that a land-owner could claim additional solatium A
in those appeals only which were directed against such award as had been
made after 30th April, 1982. The interpretation placed on sub-section (2),
therefore, could not help in arriving at the legislative intention of sub-
section (1) of Section 30. Why this d,ifference in phraseology of the two
sub-sections ? What could be the rationale for confining additional
solatium in appeals arising out of the awards made after 1982? A Legisla- B
ture is presumed to know the needs of its people. Similarly it should be
presumed to be aware of the state of affairs prevalent at the time of
enacting a law. Solatium is no do:ubt compensation but it is in nature of
payment for displacement. The effect of acquisition due to rise in price
and inflation. was not so acute in Sixties or Seventies as in Eighties and C
Nineties. It was for this economic reason that the Legislature enhanced the
solatium from 15% to 30%. But this enhanced amount was not to be paid
to those land owners whose land had been acquired much before 1982 but
its final adjudication was pending in appeal in the High Court or this Court.
The Legislature must be presumed to be aware that such disputes in which
land had been acquired much earlier were still pending and could not be D·
disposed of due to heavy work load in higher ·courts. Therefore, the
Legislature in its wisdom considered it proper to confine the benefit of
enhanced solatium to those land owners whose appeals arose out of the
award made after 1982. ·

Same rationale which in fact furnished basis in K Kamala Jamman- E
niavarn (Dead) by Lrs. v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, [1985] 2
SCR 914, and was approved in Raghubir Singh (supra) cannot be applied
to reference pending before the Court under Section 18 of the Act. The
Legislature for good reason, therefore, used different language in two
sub-sections. And the construction of one cannot furnish basis for constru- F
ing the other in same manner.

Although brother Sawant, J. has agreed . ~th me on construction of
Section 23(1-A) of the Amendment Act but he has written a separate order
to highlight the difference between exercise of power by the Court under
\ Section 16 on one hand and High Court and Supreme Court on the other. G
He has also attempted to cull out power in favour of Collector to award
additional compensation from Section 30(1). So far the first is concerned
I fully agree with his reasons and conclusions. But I have reservations on
the second. Section 30(1) does not spell out power of the Collector. Its
clauses (a) and (b) are descriptive of those proceedings ~o which the H
,-

484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A benefit of Section 23(1-A) has been extended. They deal with retrospec-
tivity given to Section 23(1-A). But I agree with him that the Collector
should be deemed to have this power otherwise it would cause injustice in
those large number of cases where a land owner does not seek any
reference either because he is satisfied with the determination of compen- ......
sation or his financial resources prevent him from pursuing the hazard of
B taking recourse to Court of law. However, this power, in my opinion, flows
froni Section 15 itself. In any case it in just and reasonable to hold that the
additional compensation is payable even by the Collector when he is
making an award under Section 11.

c What remains to be considered is if the benefit under Section 23(1-
A) could be extended even in those cases where appeals were pending in
the High Court or Supreme Court against the award made by the court
under section 18 of the Act. The word, 'court' used in Section 23(1-A)
appears to refer to the court under Section 18, only, as the court under this
D provision has been empowered to award additional compensation on such
market value as is determined by taking into consideration Section 23 of
the Act. The word 'court' in Section 23(1-A) does not appear to have been •
used in the wider sense as including the Court of appeal or the court under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India. In Zora Singh (supra) it was
observed rightly by this Court that the Legislature's intention was to award
E
additional compensation only at the stage of award made by the Collector
or the Court under Section 18. The construction of the word 'court' in the
wider sense would not be in consonance with the purpose and objective of
the legislation the background of which has been traced in detail. It is thus
clear that the benefit of Section 23(1-A) is available only in those cases
F where the matter was pending for determination of compensation at the
stage of reference under Section 18 in respect of acquisitions which had
started even before 1982.

Having explained the scope of Section 23(1-A) and Section 30, their
G inter-relation and the field of their operation, it may now be seen as to how
I
these provisions have been dealt with by this Court in various decisions
which came before it. When Sectiun 23(1-A) was added Section 23(2)
providing for solatium was amended and from 15% it was raised to 30%.
Its operation during transitional period was regulated by Section 30(2) of
H the Act. This provisions came up for consideration earlier in point of time
KS.PARIPOORNAN v. STATEOFKERAIA[SAIW,J.] 485

and by 1989 there were at least four decisions one of them being Constitu- A
tion Bench Union of India and Another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs.
etc., [1989] 2 SCC 754. Since this decision has been considerably influenced
the decisions on Section 23(1-A) which have been rendered since 1990 it
may be adverted to first. The following question was referred for considera-
tion by the Constitution Bench, B
"Whether under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended
by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984 the claimants are
entitled to solatium at 30 per cent of the market value irrespective
of the dates on which the acquisition proceedings are initiated or
the dates on which the award had been passed?" C

But the Bench did not enter into the larger issue and confined itself to the
limited question of whether the amended provision for enhanced solatium
was available only in appeals arisir.tg out of awards made by the Collector
or the Court between 30th April, 1982 and 24th September 1984 or even
prior to it. And on construction of the expression, 'or to any order passed D
by the High Court or subordinate court on appeal against any such award
under the provisions of the principle Act' after 30th April 1982 and before
24th September 1984 held that in the context they were used they intended
to awards made by the Collector or the Court between the two dates.
According to the Bench, E
"In other words Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends the
benefit of the enhanced solatium to cases where the award by the
Collector or by the Court is made between 30 April, 1982 and 24
September, 1984 or to appeals against such a~ards decided by the
High Court and the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the F
High Court or Supreme Court are rendered before 24 September,
1984 or after that Date. All that is material is that the award by
the Collector or by the Court should have been made between 30
April, 1982 and 24 September, 1984."

This decision was not concerned with the jurisdiction and power of the G
Court to grant enhanced solatium in reference pending before it under
Section 18 as the notification for acquiring the land was issued on 13th
November 1959 and the reference court had decided the proceedings on
10th June 1968. What was pending on the date the amendment came into
force was the appeal in the High Court. Therefore, the main provision of H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Section 23(2) was not attracted. The land owners could get the benefit only
if their case was governed by the transitional provision. Further, the con-
struction turned on use of the expression, 'against such award under the
provisions of the Principal Act after 30th April, 1992'. No such language
has beeu used in clause (a) of Section30(1). The ratio of the decision, thus,
has to be appreciated in this context.
B
In the present set of petitions this Court is concerned whether the
power of the Court to grant additional compensation, which as explained
earlier, in absence of any express indication to the contrary extends in all
those cases where reference was pending at the stage of making the award
C by the Court under Section 18 could be curtailed or negatived by taking
recourse to the transitional provision. The question cropped up first in
Union of India & Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama
(1990) 1 SCC 277 when this Court while recognising that Section 23(1-A)
enjoined a duty on the Court to award the additional amount on 12% on
D the market value of the land observed as under :

"But this again is a part of the scheme for determining compensa-
tion under Section 23(1) of the Act. It also operates on the market
value of the land acquired. It is plainly and distinctly prospective
in its operation since market value has to be determined as on the
E date of publication of notification under Section 4(1). But the
legislature has given new starting point for operation· of Section
23(1-A) for certain cases. That will be found from Section 30
sub-sections (l)(a) and (b) of the Transitional Provisions."

F Consequently the Court held that a land owner was entitled to additional
amount provided under Section 23(1-A) only if the acquisition proceedings
were pending on April 30, 1982 or they had been commenced after that
day and were either pending or concluded before September 1984. In
taking this view the Bench held an owner to be entitled to additional
compensation if the acquisition of his land was covered in either clauses
G of Section 30 or if the notification under. sub-section (1) of Section 4 had
been issued after coming into force of the amended provision. No excep-
tion can be taken so far as the construction of Section 30 is concerned. But
the observation that the Legislature has given new starting point of opera-
tion of Section 23(1-A) was based on Raghubir Singh's decision (supra).
H The starting point in that decision was given for purposes of appeals
KS.PARIPOORNAN v.STATEOFKERAIA(SAIW,J.] 487

pending in High Court or the Supreme Cotirt. The Bench did not examine A
if the benefit of enhanced solatium under Section 23(2) could not be
extended to the acquisitions which were pen~g before the court under
Section 18. Yet prospectivity of the Section 23(1-A) was linked with
issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act after coming into
force of the Act. The Section does not give any such indication. Determina- B
tion of market value on the date the no~ification is issued under Section
4(1) fixes the point of time on which date the court shail determine
compensation and not the date from which the Act shall commence to
operate. Use of expression, 'in addition to the market value of the land'
cannot be stretched to mean that the additioMJ compensation shall be
payable only in those cases in which notification under Section 4(1) has C
been issued after coming into force of the Act. This decision was not
accepted as laying down correct law in Zora Singh (supra) as expression
'award' used in Section 23(1-A) according to the Bench suggested that the
intention of the legislature was to make the provisions of the said section
applicable to cases where the Collector or the court hearing the reference D
had yet to make its award. It has been explained earlier that such construc-
tion would be straining language of the Section. In KS. Paripooman
(supra) doubt has been expressed on correctness of Zora Singh (supra).
Basis for it appears to be same as was expressed in Filip Tiago's case
(supra). Neither of the decisions have noticed that in absence of any
indication to the contrary the Section became operative on the date it came E
into force that is 24th September, 1984. If it came into force on that date
and the Section requires the court to pay additional compensation in every
case then the ambit of the section cannot be narrowed by confining its
operation to those cases where notification is issued after coming into force
of the Act. The scope of Section 23(1-A) has already been explained. It p
has also been explained, at length, as to what was the objective and purpose
of it. In light of that it would not be reasonable to restrict the operation of
this Section to those proceedings which will be taken for determination of
compensation after the Act came into force in September 1984. The
expression 'in addition to' is only descriptive rather explanatory by direct-
ing that in all those cases where the Court was awarding compensation G
after coming into force of the Act it shall award an additional amount as
provided in sub-section (1) of the Act.

For all these reasons the questions raiseq in these petitions are
answered as below : H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A (1) Section 23(1-A) providing for additional compensation is at-
tracted in every case where reference was pending under Section
18 before the Court (Section 23(1-A).

(2) No additional compensation is payable in appeals pending on
or after 24th September 1984 either in High Court or this Court.
B
(3) Additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) is also payable
in all those case where the proceedings were pending and the
award had not been made by the Collector on or before 30th April
1982 [Section 30(1)(a)].
c (4) Similarly every land owner is entitled to additional compensa-
tion where the land acquiring proceedings started after 24th April
1982 whether the award by the Collector was made before 24th
September 1984 or not [Section 30 (l)(b)].

(5) Additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) is liable to be
D
paid by the Collector as well. (Section 15 of the Act).

ORDER OF THE COURT (PER MAJORITY)

In respect of acquisition proceedings initiated prior to the date of
E commencement of the Amending Act 68 of 1984, the payment of the
additional amount under Section 23(1-A) of the Act will be restricted to
matters referred to in clauses (a) and (b) of sub- section (1) of Section 30
of the said Amending Act. Union of India & Anr. v. Zora Singh & Ors.,
(1992) 1 Sec 673 insofar as it holds that the said amount is payable in all
cases· where the reference was pending before the reference court on
F September 24, 1984, irrespective of the date of which the award was made
by the Collector, does not lay down the correct law.

The question referred is answered accordingly. The matters be now
placed before the appropriate Benches for consideration and disposal of
G the appeals in the light of this order and on the other contentions, if any,
raised in the appeals.

U.R. Appeals disposed of.