Holding

The conviction under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is upheld because the prosecution proved the benami nature of the assets and the appellant failed to account for them.

Summary

K. Ponnuswamy, a former lecturer who became Minister of Education in Tamil Nadu (May 1993‑May 1996), was charged under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act for possessing assets disproportionate to his known income. The prosecution proved that large sums were transferred to his wife and daughter through his nephew, creating a benami situation. The trial court convicted Ponnuswamy and co‑accused; the High Court upheld his conviction but acquitted the nephew and brother, retaining confiscation of assets in the names of the wife and daughter. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt the benami nature of those assets and that the appellant failed to satisfactorily account for them, affirming the conviction and confiscation order. The appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the assets held in the names of the appellant’s wife and daughter were benami properties of the appellant under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Whether the natural presumption that the nephew acted as a conduit for the appellant’s illicit wealth is sufficient legal evidence to sustain conviction.
Whether the appellant was able to satisfactorily account for the alleged gifts from his nephew.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 109, s. 313
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114, s. 3
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947s. 13(1)(e), s. 13(2)

Subjects

Prevention of Corruption Actbenami propertydisproportionate assetspublic servantministerconvictionconfiscationnatural presumptionevidenceSection 13(1)(e)Section 13(2)Indian Evidence ActSection 114giftslove and affection

Judgment

K. PONNUSWAMY A
V.

STATE OF i:AMILNADU BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE,
DIRECTORATE OF VIGILANCE AND ANTI CORRUPTION
SOUTH RANGE, TRIC}IY

JULY 31, 2001 B

[K.T. THOMAS AND S.N. VARIA VA, JJ.]

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947-Sections 13(1) and 13(2)- C
Prosecution of public servant for having pecuniary resources and property
disproportionate to known sources of income acquired during his tenure as
Minister-Gifts made by his nephew out oflove and affection-Held, on natural
presumption and human conduct, appellant used his nephew for transfer of
monies to appellant's wife and daughter-Evidence Act, 1872-Sections 3
and ll4. D
Appellant, before being elected as a Member of Legislative Assembly,
was employed as a lecturer in a Government College. He was earning a
meagre salary and his financial condition was such that he could not even
repay his small debts. Creditors had to recover the amounts by filing suits
and executing decrees. After being elected, he was a Minister for about 3 years. E
During this tenure (check period), he acquired in his name and in the names
of his wife, daughter, nephew and another close relative, pecuniary resources
and property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Trial Court
convicted the appellant and other accused under Section 13(1)(e) read with
Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and ordered F
confiscation of the pecuniary resources and properties to the extent of about
Rs. 77.50 lakhs. The appellant and other accused filed Criminal Appeals before
High Court against the conviction and the order of confiscation. The High
Court confirmed the conviction of the appellant and acquitted other accused.
The High Court, while upholding the confiscation order in respect of the assets
of the appellant, his wife and daughter, however, held that the assets standing G
in the names of the other two accused should be excluded from confiscation.

In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that he did not have
any pecuniary resources or properties disproportionate to his known sources
of income, which had been established by the High Court; that the prosecution
H
97
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A had failed to prove that the properties standing in the names of his wife and
daughter were held by them on behalf of the appellant; that the prosecution
had failed to prove that these were Benami properties of the appellant; that
the properties standing in the names of his wife and daughter were gifted by
hi~ nephew out of love and affection; that his nephew was acquitted by the
B High Court on the ground that the prosecution has not investigated into his
personal source of income.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD : I. I. The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt
C that prior to the check period, the appellant, his wife and daughter had no
real source of income, except some meagre incomes. The appellant only earned
a small salary as a Lecturer and his wife had small agricultural and other
income. His daughter, being a student, had no real source of income. Prior
to the check period, the financial condition of the family was such that the
appellant could not even repay his small debts. Creditors had to recover their
D amounts by filing suits and executing decrees. (107-C, DJ

1.2. Presuming his nephew had independent income, prior to the check
period he had not been afflicted by any love and affection and had not made
any gifts to any member of the family of the appellant. Prior to the check
E period, the nephew did not even extend help to pay off the small debts of the
appellant even after decrees had been passed against the appellant. Yet
suddenly, during the check period, when the appellant was a Minister, the
nephew donated large sums of money to the appellant's wife and daughter.
The natural presumption, considering the common course of natural events
and human conduct is that the appellant would have used his nephew to
F transfer his monies to his wife and daughter. This is the supposition which
any prudent man under these circumstances would act upon considering the
natural course of events. The Trial Court and the High Court thus rightly
took this as proved by legal evidence. The prosecution, having established by
legal evidence that the monies were transferred by the appellant to his wife
G and daughter through his nephew and that these there monies of the appellant
in the hands of his wife and daughter, it was for the appellant to satisfactorily
account for the gifts. He could have done so by showing that even before and
after the check period, his nephew had made gifts of substantial amounts,
which was not done. Thus the Trial Court and the High Court were right in
not believing the case of gifts supposedly made out of a sudden burst of love
H and affection. 1107-8-Hf
K. PONNUSW AMY v. STATE OF TAMILNADU [S.N. VARIAVA, J.] 99

Krishnanand v. State of MP., (197711 sec 816, referred to. A

. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 759
of 2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.4.2001 of the Madras High
Court in Cr!. A. No. 749 of 2000. B
WITH

Cr!. A. No. 760 of 2001.

P.P. Rao, R. Thyagarajan, Rakesh Dwivedi, U.R. Lalit, K. Ramamurthy, C
V. Balachandran, S. Jayakumar, E.C. Agarwala, Mahesh Agarwala, Rishi
Agarwala, D. Selvaraj, R.K. Sharma, Ms. Purnima Bhat Kak, Mrs. Revathy
Raghavan and Ms. Shweta Garg for the appearing parties.

The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by :
D
S.N. VARIA VA, J. These SLPs are filed against the Judgment dated
12th April, 2001. When these SLPs were called out Mr. Ramamurthy, Senior
Counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu, prayed for an adjournment of four
weeks. He submitted that, as Accused Nos. 2 to 5 have been acquitted by the
impugned Judgment, the State was going to prefer an Appeal against the
same Judgment. Mr. Rao opposed the Application on the ground that the E
Petitioner was in jail. He submitted that if the State wanted an adjournment,
for such a long period, then the Petitioner should be released on bail. We,
therefore, felt that the best course to follow would be to hear these SLPs
today. When the State files its Appeal it can be heard separately.

Accordingly leave is granted F

Heard parties.

By these Appeals the Appellant is challenging his conviction under
Section 13 {l)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
~. G
Brief facts leading to these Appeals are as follows:

The Appellant was elected as a member of Legislative Assembly from
Marungapuri constituency in June 1991. He became the Deputy Speaker of
the Legislative Assembly on 3rd July, 1991. He was Minister of Education H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A to the Government of Tamil Nadu from 17th May, 1993 to 9th May, 1996.
For the sake of convenience this period from 17th May, 1993 to 9th May,
1996 will hereinafter be referred to as the check period.

Before the Appellant came to the political arena he was employed as
B a Lecturer in the Government Arts College. It has been shown that in 1973
the Appellant had taken a crop loan from the Bank of India for a sum of Rs.
13,000. That amount had not been repaid by the Appellant. Ultimately a Suit
came to be filed and the amount had to be collected in execution of decree
in that Suit. In 1985 the Appellant had borrowed a sum of Rs. 5,000 from R.
Palanivelu (P.W.16) who was also working as a Lecturer along with him. For
C this loan the Appellant had executed a promissory note. The financial condition
of the Appellant was such that he was unable to repay the loan. Ultimately
a Suit had to be filed against him and a decree came to be passed. Even after
passing of the Decree the amount was not repaid. The Decree had to be
executed. The decreetal amount had to be recovered from the salary of the
Appellant. This clearly shows that before he became a Minister the Appellant's
D financial condition was very weak.

At this stage, it must be mentioned that Accused No. 2 is the wife of
the Appellant. Accused No. 3 is his daughter. Accused No. 2 was and is
merely a house-wife. She admittedly had only a small agricultural income
E and no other source of income. Admittedly Accused No. 3 was a student
before and during the check period. She had no source of income. Accused
No. 4 is the son of the brother of the Appellant: Accused No. 5 is the brother
of the Appellant. Accused No. 6 is the Chartered Accountant who had
submitted income tax and wealth tax returns of the Accused Nos. 2 to 5.

F The case of the prosecution was that during the check period the Accused
No. I acquired, in his name and in the names of Accused Nos. 2 to 5,
pecuniary resources and property disproportionate to his known sources of
income. The prosecution examined as many as 65 witnesses and got 297
exhibit marks. The Trial Court, on the basis of the evidence lead, acquitted
G Accused No. 6. However, Accused No. I (i.e. the Appellant) was convicted
under Section 13 (1) (e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act. Accused Nos. 2 to 5 were convicted under Section 109 l.P.C.
and also under Section 13(1 )(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act. The Trial Court , after convicting the Accused, directed
consfication of the pecuniary resources and properties to the extant of Rs.
H 77,49,337.77.
K. PONNUSWAMYv. STATEOFTAMILNADU [S.N. VARIAVA, J.] 101
Appellant and Accused Nos. 2 to 5 filed Criminal Appeals before the A
High Court against the conviction as well as against the Order confiscating
- the pecuniary resources and properties. The High Court disposed of these
Appeals by the impugned Judgment dated 12th April, 2001. The High Court
acquitted Accused Nos. 2 to 5 but confirmed the conviction of the Appellant.
The High Court held that as it had acquitted Accused Nos. 4 and 5 the assets B
standing in their names had to be excluded from the Order of confiscation.
The High Court, however, maintained the order of confiscation in respect of
the assets of the Appellant and his wife and daughter. As against this portion
of the Order the wife and daughter of the Appellant have also filed SLP (Cr!.)
Nos. 1867 and 2343 of 200 I. Those were also listed on Board along with
these Appeals. We have delinked those SLPs. c
As stated above, the charge against the Appellant is that whilst he was
holding the office as Minister of Education, Government of Tamil Nadu i.e.
during the check period he abused his position as a public servant and acquired
and possessed pecuniary resources and properties in his name and in the
names of Accused Nos. 2 to 5 disproportionate to his known sources of D
income to the extent of Rs. 77,49,337.77.

Sections 13(1 )( e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read
as follows:

"13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.- (I) A public servant is E
said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct.-

(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx
(c) xxx xxx xxx F
(d) xxx xxx xxx
(e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any
time during the period of his office, been in possession for which
the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary
resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of G
income.

(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than
one year but which may extend t:> seven years and shall also be liable
to fine." H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Thus under Section 13(1)(e) if either the public servant or any person on his
behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office,
been in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his
known sources of income the public servant would have committed misconduct
unless he can satisfactorily account.
-
B As stated above, the Trial Court convicted Accused Nos. I to 5 on the
footing that the prosecution has established that between them assets
disproportionate to the known sources of income (to the extent of Rs.
77,49,337.77) had been proved. That there were large assets has not been
seriously disputed. Of course there is a dispute as to the exact amount.

.C This is set out later. What has however been disputed is that these are
assets in the name of the Appellant i.e. that Accused Nos. 2 to 4 are holding
these assets on behalf of the Appellant.

The High Court asked the parties to give a break up of the assets in the
D names of each of the accused. On such break up it was found that so far as
the Appellant was concerned, in his own name, there were no pecuniary
resources or assets disproportionate to his known sources of income.

However, it was found that assets standing in the name of his wife i.e.
Accused No. 2 were, according to the prosecution in a sum of Rs. 35,23,396
E and according to the defence in a sum of Rs. 29,00,067. The assets standing
in the name of his daughter i.e. Accused No. 3, according to the prosecution
were in the sum of Rs. 11, 14, 772 whereas according to the defence they were
in the sum of Rs. 11,26,283. The assets in the name of Accused No. 4,
according to the prosecution as well as the defence were in region of Rs.
18,55,308/-. The assets in the name of Accused No. 5, according to the
F prosecution were in the region of Rs, 13,16,158, whereas according to the
defence they were in the region of Rs. I 0,01,079. Whether the assets are as
claimed by the defence or the prosecution is not material for purposes of
these Appeals. Even if the figures are, as claimed by the defence, they are
still quite large.
G
The High Court then holds that the prosecution had not proved or
shown whether Accused Nos. 4 and 5 had any independent source of income
of their own. The High Court concludes that the prosecution by failing to
conduct an investigation into the individual income of Accused Nos. 4 and
5 had failed to prove that the assets standing in the names of Accused Nos.
H 4 and 5 did not belong to them. The High Court held that it could not,
K. PONNUSWAMY v. ST ATE OFT AMILNADU (S.N. YARIAVA, J.] ] 03

therefore, be held that Accused Nos. 4 and 5 were holding assets only on A
behalf of Accused No. I. On this basis the High Court acquits Accused Nos.
4 and 5. As we have been told that the State is likely to file an Appeal against
acquittal of Accused Nos. 4 and 5 we make no comments on this aspect.

Accused No. 2 was only a house-wife and Accused No. 3 was only a
student before and during the check period. Accused No. 3 being a student B
had no source of income except some very small agricultural income. It is
proved and admitted that the only source of income of Accused No. 2 is
agricultural income from 5.45 acres of dry lands amounting to Rs, 82,880 .
and interest on saving in bank account amounting to Rs. 16,376. It is proved
that prior to the check period Accused Nos. I, 2 and 3 had no substantial C
income or property. Even according to the defence version, Accused No. 2
got assets amounting to Rs. 29,00,067 and Accused No. 3 got assets amounting
to Rs. 11, 14, 772. According to Accused Nos. 2 and 3 the income is supposed
to have been gifted to both of them by Accused No. 4.

The Trial Court and the High Court have dealt in detail with the evidence D
led by the prosecution to show the existence of the income and the purchase
of properties. We are not setting out the entire evidence as in our view the
following evidence would suffice to show that the prosecution has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that Accused 2 and 3 derived the income and
properties during the check period.
E
The prosecution has led the evidence of PW! 0, the District Registrar,
Trichy who proved that Accused No. 2 purchased a house site in her name
on I 0th August, 1984 for a sum of Rs. 3,23,000/-. She purchased another
property, from Mr. Selvaraj, on 7th November, 1994 for a sum of Rs. 2,50,000.
A third property was purchased by her, from one R. Yijay Lakshmi, on 25th F
February, 1995 for a sum of Rs. 3,25,000/-. In her statement under Section
313 all these purchases are admitted. The only explanation is that these were
purchased from gift cheques received from Accused No. 4.

The prosecution has led the evidence of the Manager, Karur Vyasya
Bank, Main Branch, Trichy. He has produced the ledger of the bank relating G
to the saving bank accounts standing in the name of Accused No. 2. The
computer print out has been marked as Ex. P.E.5 .. It is shown that an amount
of Rs. I 0,00,000, as pe~ pay in slips, Exs. P .40 and 41, had been deposited
in the year I993-94. Further an amount of Rs. 5,00,000 was deposited as per
pay in slip Ex. P.65. On 3.3.1995 another Rs. 5,00,000 was deposited through
pay in slip Ex. P.66. On the same day, yet another amount of Rs. 5,00,000 H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A was deposited as per pay in slip Ex. P.67. One month earlier i.e. on 2.2.1995
an amount of Rs. 5,00,000 was paid into the account through pay in slip Ex.
P. 68. Thus an amount of Rs. 20,00,000 has been deposited into the account
of Accused No. 2 within a period of not even 40 days i.e. 25.1.1995 to
3.3.1995.

B The prosecution has examined P. W.6, Manager of Andhra Bank, Trichy.
His evidence shows that locker Nos. 122 and 32 were kept by Accused Nos.
2 and 4 jointly. These lockers were opened in presence of P. W. 23, the then
Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes by the Deputy Superintendent
of Police, Vigilance on 2.9.1996 at about 2.30 p.m. Totally, there were 37
C items of jewels and Ex. P 114. Search list was prepared and signed by
P. W.23 and PW 6. PW 34 the proprietor of Devi Jewellers, Trichy states that
Accused No. 2 purchased jewels through cash bills Ex. P. 202 to 214. The
various dates of purchases are 16.12.1993, 24.1.1994, 28.1.1994, 18.3.1994,
31.3.1994, 28.7.1994, 28.11.1994, 26.12.1994, 10.2.1995, 28.2.1995,
20.3.1995 and 31.3.1995. Even as per the worksheet submitted by the defence,
D the total value of the jewels purchased by Accused No. 2 from Mis. Devi
Jewellers is Rs. 8,88,086. Further, PW 50, the accountant of Combatore
Jewellers has deposed that Accused No. 2 purchased jewels worth Rs. 84,250
on 15.3.1995. The carbon copy of bill was marked as Ex.P.265. On the same
day, jewels were purchased for Rs. 13,000 as per Ex. P. 266. According to
E the witness on 25.3.1995, jewels for a value of Rs. 1,46,000 were purchased
as per Ex. P267, cash bill. Even as per worksheet filed by the defence from
15.3.1995 to 25.3.1995 jewels were purchased from PW 50 Combatore
Jewellers for Rs. 3,08,250. When the above said evidence of PW 34 and PW
50 was put to A2 during the course of questioning her under Section 313
Cr.P.C. she admitted the above said purchase but failed to explain through
F what income she purchased those jewels. She only stated at the end of her
examination that she purchased movable and immovable out of the gift cheques
received by her through Accused No. 4.

The prosecution has also led the evidence of P.W. I0, District Registrar
Trichy. This witness proved that on 25th November, 1990 Accused No. 3
G purchased property under Sale Deed Ex. P.69. Accused No. 3 also purchased
another property on 24th November, 1994 under Sale Deed Ex. P.71. The
above properties were of the value of Rs. 1,90,000/- and Rs. 1,95,000/-. It
must be noted that Accused No. 2 had also purchased other properties from
the very same party. Thus the daughter of the Appellant (i.e. Accused No. 3)
H was merely a student and had no source of income had purchased properties,
K. PONNUSWAMYv. STATE OFTAMILNADU [S.N. VARIAVA. J.] 105

paid for the stamp duty and other costs. When this fact was· put to her A
Accused No. 3 she admitted that the purchases were made in her name. But
she failed to explain the source of income from which the properties were
purchased.

The prosecution has, through the evidence ofT. Ramachandran (P.W.5),
i.e. the Manager of Karur Vysya Bank, Main Branch, Trichy, also proved B
that Accused No. 3 had Saving Bank A/c in that bank. The computer print
out of the ledger was marked as Ex. P.34. In that an amount of Rs. 5,00,000
was deposited on 24th November, 1994 through pay in slip Exs. P.35 and
P.36. When this fact was put to her in her examination under Section 313 she
admitted the accounts but said that she did not know anything about it. Even C
with regard to the lockers standing in her name she stated that she knew
nothing about it.

The prosecution has thus proved beyond reasonable doubt that substantial
wealth was acquired by Accused Nos. 2 and 3 during the check period. The
only explanation given for the acquisition of this wealth was that it had been D
gifted to them by Accused No. 4. Both the Trial Court and the High Court
have disbelieved the story of gift and concluded that these were in fact the
properties held by these persons on behalf of Accused No. I. On this basis
Accused No. 1 had been convicted.
E
Mr. Rao has seriously assailed the Judgments of the Trial Court and the
High Court. He submitted that it has been established in the High Court that
Accused No. 1 himself did not have any pecuniary resources or properties
disproportionate to his known sources of income. He submitted that the
prosecution has miserably failed to show that the properties standing in the
names of Accused Nos. 2 and 3 were held by them on behalf of Accused No. F
1. He submitted that it was for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt and by means of legal evidence that these were Benami properties of
Accused No. I. Mr. Rao submitted that Accused No. 4 had been acquitted by
the High Court on the ground that the prosecution has not investigated into
his personal source of income. He submitted that, therefore, it could not be G
presumed that Accused No. 4 had no personal source of income. He submitted
that Accused No. 4 was the nephew of the Appellant and, therefore, out of
love and affection he had gifted the properties to Accused Nos. 2 and 3. He
submitted that it was the prosecution to establish by legal and cogent evidence
that the gifts were not genuine and that these were not the properties of
Accused Nos. 2 and 3. He submitted that as the prosecution had miserably H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A failed to discharge the burden and prove that the properties were held benami
by Accused 2 and 3 on behalf of Accused I neither the Trial Court nor the
High Court could have convicted Accused No. I under Section l.3(l)(e) read
with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

In support of his submission Mr. Rao relied upon the authority of this
B Court in the case of Krishnanand v. State of M.P. reported in [ 1977] I sec
816. In this case this Court has held as follows:

"It is well settled that the burden of showing that a particular
transaction is benami and the appellant owner is not the real owner
always rests on the person asserting it to be so and this burden has
c to be strictly discharged by adducing legal evidence of a definite
character which would either directly prove the fact of benami or
establish circumstance unerringly and reasonable raising an inference
of that fact. The essence of benami is the intention of the parties and
not unoften, such intention is shrouded in a thick veil which cannot
be easily pierced through. But such difficulties do not relieve the
D person asserting the transaction to be benami of the serious onus that
rests on him, nor justify the acceptance of mere conjecture or surmises
as a substitute for proof. It is not enough merely to show circumstances
which might create suspicion, because the court cannot decide on the
basis of suspicion. It has to act on legal grounds established by
E evidence."

There can be no dispute with the legal proposition. However, let us see what
is meant by "Proved". Section 3 of the Evidence Act defines "Proved" as
follows:

F "Proved".- A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the
matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its
existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the
...
circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that
it exists."

G Further, Section 114 of the Evidence Act reads as follows:

"/ 14. Court may presume existence of certain facts. - The Court may
presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have
happened regard being had to the common course of natural events
human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to
H the facts of the particular case."
K. PONNUSW AMY v. STATE OF TAMILNADU [S.N. VARIAVA, J.] I 07
Thus the fact is said to be proved when after considering the matters before A
it, the Court believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a
prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act
upon the supposition that it exits. In coming to its belief the Court may
presume existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened having
regard to the natural course of event, human conduct and public and private B
business, in relation to the facts of each case.

Now, let us see the facts of this case. The prosecution has established
beyond a reasonable doubt, that prior to the check period Accused Nos. I, 2
and 3 had no real source of income, except some meager incomes, i.e. Accused
No. I only earned a small salary as a Lecturer and Accused Nos. 2 had small C
agricultural and other income. Accused No. 3 being a student had no real
source of income. Prior to the check period the financial condition of the
family was such that Accused No. I could not even repay his small debts.
The creditors had to recover their amounts by filing suits and executing
decrees. We are presuming that Accused No. 4 had independent income.
However prior to the check period Accused No. 4 had not been afflicted by D
any love and affection and had not made any gifts to any member of the
family of the Accused No. I. Prior to the check period Accused No 4 did not
even extend help to pay off the small debts of Accused No. I even after the
decrees had been passed against Accused No. I. Yet suddenly, during the
check period, i.e. when Accused No. 1 is a Minister, Accused No. 4 donates E
large sums of money to Accused Nos. 2 and 3. The natural presumption,
considering the common course of natural events and human conduct is that
Accused No. I would have used his nephew Accused No. 4 to transfer his
(Accused No l's) monies to Accused Nos. 2 and 3. This is the supposition
which any prudent man under these circumstances would act upon considering
the natural course of events. The Trial Court and the High Court thus rightly F
took this as proved by legal evidence. The prosecution having established by
legal evidence that the monies were transferred by Accused I to Accused
Nos. 2 and 3 through Accused No. 4 and that these were monies of Accused
No. I in the hands of Accused Nos. 2 and 3, it was for the Appellant to
satisfactorily account for the gifts. He could have done so by showing that G
even before the check period Accused No. 4 had made gifts of substantial
amounts. It has not been claimed by Accused 2 and/or 3 and/or 4 that before
the check period also Accused No. 4 had made any such gifts. It is also not
their case that after the check period gifts were made. Thus the Trial Court
and the High Court were right in not believing the case of gifts supposedly
made out of a sudden brust of love and affection. Both the Trial CouJ1 and H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A the High Court were right in convicting Appellant. As we are told that the
State is going to file an appeal against the acquittal of Accused Nos. 2 and
3 we are not making any comments thereon.

In our view, there is no infirmity in the Order of the High Court so far
as the conviction of Apelian! is concerned. We see no reason to interfere.
B
Accordingly these Criminal Appeals stand dismissed. There will be no
Order as to costs.

B.S. Appeals dismissed.

c

•.