Holding

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s conviction and life imprisonment of A‑15 under IPC 217, 218 and SC/ST Act 3(2)(i), 4, and affirmed A‑14’s conviction under IPC 217 and SC/ST Act 4, rejecting the modifications that acquitted them of other charges.

Summary

The case concerns the honour killing of a Dalit boy, Murugesan, and his Vanniyar bride, Kannagi, in 2003. Police officers Sub‑Inspector K.P. Tamilmaran (A‑14) and Inspector M. Sellamuthu (A‑15) failed to register an FIR despite being informed of the murders and later fabricated evidence to implicate Dalit relatives while shielding the Vanniyar perpetrators. The trial court convicted both officers under IPC sections 217, 218 and the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act sections 3(2)(i) and 4, sentencing them to life imprisonment; the High Court modified A‑14's conviction, acquitting him of some charges. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the statutory duty to register an FIR under s.154 CrPC, the evidentiary value of hostile witnesses, and the powers of the court under s.311 CrPC and s.165 Evidence Act. It held that both officers deliberately violated their duties, fabricated evidence, and therefore the High Court was correct in upholding A‑15's conviction and in affirming A‑14's conviction under s.217 IPC and s.4 SC/ST Act. The appeals were dismissed and compensation was awarded to the victims' family.

Issues considered

Whether police officers can be convicted under IPC sections 217 and 218 and SC/ST Act sections 3(2)(i) and 4 for failing to register an FIR and fabricating evidence.
Whether the High Court was justified in upholding the conviction and life sentence of A‑15 while modifying the conviction of A‑14.
Interpretation of Section 154 CrPC on the obligation to register an FIR in the absence of a formal informant.
The admissibility and evidentiary weight of hostile witnesses and the scope of Section 311 CrPC and Section 165 Evidence Act.
Whether victim compensation under the SC/ST Act is appropriate in the circumstances.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 154, s. 156, s. 157(1), s. 311
Evidence Act, 1872s. 154, s. 155, s. 165
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 217, s. 218
Police Act, 1861s. 23, s. 24
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989s. 3(2)(i), s. 4

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the High Court was justified in upholding the conviction and sentence of A-15 under Sections 217, 218, Penal Code, 1860 and ss.3(2)(i), 4, SC/ST Act, 1989 and modifying the conviction and sentence of A-14, while upholding the conviction and sentence Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302 r/w 149, 217, 218 – Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – ss.3(2)(i), 4 – Murder of a young couple in the name of honour killing where the girl belonged to the Vanniyar community and

Subjects

Sections 217, 218 of the Penal Code, 1860Sections 3(2)(i), 4 of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989Honour killingDouble murderVanniyar CommunityDalit CommunityPoisonedCaste-based abusesDelay in trialConviction and sentence modifiedHostile witnessCross-examinationCross-examine own witnessDeclaration of hostilityProsecution witnessCourt witnessTestimony of prosecution witnessImpeach credibility of own witnessfalsus in uno, falsus in omnibusRelated witnessesInterested witnessesEyewitnessDuty on court to summon and examine or recall or re-examine any person as witnessNot listed as witness in charge-sheetAdditional prosecution witnessexamination-in-chiefCourt witness cannot be contradicted to his/her previous statements made before the policeWrong and misleading investigationExtra-judicial confessionImplicate the innocentNot only covered evidence but fabricatedCommission of cognizable offenceRegistration of FIR obligatoryNeglected duties and disobeyed lawKnowingly and deliberately falsely implicated DalitsVictim compensation

Judgment

[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1865 : 2025 INSC 576

K.P. Tamilmaran
v.
The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police
(Criminal Appeal No. 2253 of 2025)
28 April 2025
[Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in upholding the conviction
and sentence of A-15 under Sections 217, 218, Penal Code, 1860
and ss.3(2)(i), 4, SC/ST Act, 1989 and modifying the conviction
and sentence of A-14, while upholding the conviction and sentence
of the other co-accused.

Headnotes†
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302 r/w 149, 217, 218 – Scheduled
Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 –
ss.3(2)(i), 4 – Murder of a young couple in the name of honour
killing where the girl belonged to the Vanniyar community and
the boy was a Dalit – Eventually, 11 accused were convicted
and sentenced by the High Court wherein A-14 and A-15 were
the police officers who were convicted by the Trial Court
u/ss.217, 218, IPC and ss.3(2)(i), 4, SC/ST Act, 1989 and
were sentenced to life imprisonment – However, High Court
modified the conviction and sentence of A-14 by acquitting
him for offences u/s.3(2)(i), SC/ST Act, 1989 and s.218, Penal
Code, 1860 but, maintained his conviction u/s.4, SC/ST Act
and s.217, IPC; the conviction and sentence of A-15 was
upheld – Present appeal by eleven accused:
Held: A-14 (Sub-inspector) and A-15 (Inspector-IO) both committed
the offences u/s.217, IPC and s.4, SC/ST Act as they did not register
the FIR at the first instance with the intention to save the culprits – In
addition, A-15 was the main architect behind the FIR which falsely
implicated the four members of Schedule Caste community –
Further, A-15 was in-charge of the investigation which led to the
filing of the charge-sheet against the innocent persons belonging
to Dalit community – A-15 did this entire exercise to absolve the
culprits belonging to the Vanniyar community of their complicity

* Author
1866 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

in the crime, and he knowingly and deliberately falsely implicated
some of the Dalits in an offence punishable with death – A-15 also
manufactured the extra-judicial confessions and evidence – High
Court rightly upheld the conviction of A-15 u/ss.217, 218, IPC and
ss.4, 3(2)(i), SC/ST Act and the sentence of life imprisonment –
Impugned judgment not interfered with. [Paras 74, 75]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.154 – Penal Code, 1860 –
ss.302 r/w 149, 217, 218 – Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – ss.3(2)(i), 4 – Murder
of a young couple in the name of honour killing – A-14 and
A-15 were the police officers who were convicted by the Trial
Court u/ss.217, 218, IPC and ss.3(2)(i), 4, SC/ST Act, 1989 and
were sentenced to life imprisonment – High Court upheld the
conviction of A-14 but modified his sentence by acquitting
him of charges u/s.3(2)(i), SC/ST Act, 1989 and s.218, Penal
Code, 1860 however, the conviction and sentence of A15 was
not modified – One of their defence was that nobody came
forward to lodge a complaint for registration of FIR:
Held: Such defence is unacceptable in light of the law as well as
the facts of the case and was rightly disbelieved by High Court –
s.154, CrPC should not be misunderstood to mean that the police
is empowered to register FIR only in cases where some informant
comes forward and provides information regarding the commission
of a cognizable offence to the police – Once the police gets
information regarding the commission of a cognizable offence,
whether it is through any informant/complainant or otherwise,
police is empowered to register the case and proceed with the
investigation – In the present case, A-14 (Sub-inspector) and A-15
(Inspector-IO) had the information regarding the incident on the
day of the incident itself – However, they still did not register the
FIR. [Para 69]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.156, 157(1) – Police
Act, 1861 – ss.23, 24 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302 r/w 149,
217, 218 – Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – ss.3(2)(i), 4:
Held: The purpose of an investigation is to reach to the truth –
Duty of an Investigating Officer is to lawfully collect evidence – In
the present case, the Investigating Officer (A-15) not only covered
evidence but fabricated his own – Instead of collecting evidence,
he created evidence and tried to implicate the innocent and set the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1867

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

guilty loose – In order to fulfil his wicked design, he deliberately
and willfully violated the mandate of ss.154 and 157(1), CrPC as
well as ss.23 and 24, Police Act, 1861. [Para 67]

Criminal Jurisprudence – Hostile witness – Meaning – Evidence
Act, 1872 – ss.154, 3, 155:
Held: The phrase ‘hostile witness’ is used for a witness who gives
a statement contrary to the story of the side for which he/she is a
witness – Only because a witness has supported some, though
not all, aspects of a case, it would not automatically mean that this
witness has to be declared ‘hostile’ – A party can cross-examine
its own witness u/s.154 even without getting a declaration of
‘hostility’ – The only restriction to cross-examination u/s.154 is
that the party, who seeks to cross-examine its own witness, must
obtain the leave of the Court – If part of the evidence of a hostile
witness corroborates with other reliable evidence, then that part of
the evidence is admissible – Once a prosecution witness has been
declared hostile and then cross-examined by the prosecution, then
it is for the Court to evaluate the veracity of the testimony – There
can be several reasons for a witness to turn hostile and the court
must also look into these factors while evaluating the evidence given
by a hostile witness – The purpose of a Trial Court is to go to the
truth of the matter – Whatever evidence is there before the Court
must be examined, tested, corroborated (whenever necessary),
before a verdict can be finally given. [Paras 31, 36]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.311 – Evidence Act,
1872 – s.165 – Power to summon material witness, or examine
person present – Judge’s power to put questions or order
production – Powers of Court u/s.311 and s.165, Evidence Act:
Held: Power u/s.311, CrPC can be invoked at any stage of the trial,
even after the closing of the evidence – Powers of the Court u/s.165,
Evidence Act are complementary to s.311, CrPC – Powers u/s.311,
CrPC can either be exercised on an application moved by either
side to the case or suo moto by the Court – In case a person is not
listed as a witness in the charge-sheet but later, the prosecution
desires to bring that person as an additional prosecution witness,
then the prosecution can move an application to bring this person
as a prosecution witness – It is then for the Court to decide whether
such a person is required as a witness or not – If the Court finds
that such a person should have been examined as a prosecution
witness then the Court may allow the application and such a
1868 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

person can be examined as a prosecution witness – Thereafter,
the normal course of examination-in-chief, cross-examination, etc.
would follow – On the other hand, when the Court calls a person
as a Court witness, he can be cross-examined by either side but
only with the leave of the Court – Further, the cross-examination is
to be restricted only to what was stated by this witness in his/her
reply to the questions of the Court, and a Court witness cannot be
contradicted to his/her previous statements made before the police
i.e. statements u/s.161 of CrPC – However, the special powers of
the Court u/s.165, Evidence Act are not impaired or controlled by
the provisions of s.162, CrPC – Courts are not barred from putting
questions which may contradict the witness with the previous
statements made before the police. [Paras 48, 51]
Words and Phrases – ‘may’, ‘shall’ – Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 – s.311 – Discussed.
Evidence – Hostile witness – Position in India vis-à-vis under
English law – Discussed. [Para 30]

Case Law Cited
Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi) (1975) 3 SCC 562; Sat Paul v. Delhi
Administration [1976] 2 SCR 11 : (1976) 1 SCC 727; Neeraj
Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2022] 5 SCR 104 : (2023) 4 SCC
731; Paulmeli v. State of T.N. [2014] 6 SCR 420 : (2014) 13 SCC
90; Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P. [2012] 6 SCR 688 : (2012) 5
SCC 777; Bhajju v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2012] 5 SCR 37 :
(2012) 4 SCC 327; Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P. [2021] 14 SCR
767 : (2021) 13 SCC 716; State of A.P. v. S. Rayappa [2006] 2
SCR 200 : (2006) 4 SCC 512; Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State
of Maharashtra [1967] 3 SCR 415 : 1967 SCC OnLine SC 19;
Rama Paswan v. State of Jharkhand [2007] 5 SCR 83 : (2007)
11 SCC 191; Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & Anr. v. State of Gujarat
& Ors. [2006] 2 SCR 1081 : (2006) 3 SCC 374; Mahabir Mandal
& Ors. v. State of Bihar [1972] 3 SCR 639 : (1972) 1 SCC 748;
Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat & Anr. [2019]
6 SCR 701 : (2019) 16 SCC 547; Raghunandan v. State of U.P.
[1974] 3 SCR 92 : (1974) 4 SCC 186; Ram Chander v. State of
Haryana [1981] 3 SCR 12 : (1981) 3 SCC 191; Lalita Kumari v.
Govt. of U.P. [2013] 14 SCR 713: (2014) 2 SCC 1 – referred to.
Khijiruddin Sonar v. Emperor, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 259;
Praphullakumar Sarkar v. Emperor, 1931 SCC OnLine Cal 7 –
referred to.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1869

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973; Police Act, 1861.

List of Keywords
Sections 217, 218 of the Penal Code, 1860; Sections 3(2)(i), 4 of
Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989; Honour killing; Double murder; Vanniyar Community;
Dalit Community; Poisoned; Caste-based abuses; Delay in
trial; Conviction and sentence modified; Hostile witness; Cross-
examination; Cross-examine own witness; Declaration of hostility;
Prosecution witness; Court witness; Testimony of prosecution
witness; Impeach credibility of own witness; falsus in uno, falsus
in omnibus; Related witnesses; Interested witnesses; Eyewitness;
Duty on court to summon and examine or recall or re-examine any
person as witness; Not listed as witness in charge-sheet; Additional
prosecution witness; examination-in-chief; Court witness cannot be
contradicted to his/her previous statements made before the police;
Wrong and misleading investigation; Extra-judicial confession;
Implicate the innocent; Not only covered evidence but fabricated;
Commission of cognizable offence; Registration of FIR obligatory;
Neglected duties and disobeyed law; Knowingly and deliberately
falsely implicated Dalits; Victim compensation.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
2253 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.06.2022 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in CRLA No. 626 of 2021
With
Criminal Appeal No(s). 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259-2260
and 2261 of 2025

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Ratnakar Dash, M. Sathyanarayanan, Gopal Sankaranarayanan,
Siddharth Aggarwal, S. Nagamuthu, Mrs. Anjana Prakash, Sr. Advs.,
K. Balu, Avinish K Saurab, S. Thananjayan, Poornachandiran R,
1870 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Ajith Williyam S, Ms. Puspita Basak, Ankur S. Kulkarni, Karuppaiah
Meyyappan, Ms. Kanika Kalaiyarasan, Tushar Srivastava,
Shourya Dashupta, Nirnimesh Dube, S. Prabu Ramasubramanian,
Raghunatha Sethupathy B, Ms. Arshiya Ghose, S. Sabari Bala
Pandian, Pariksheet Bishnoi, Yusuf, Muthalagu, Naveen, G
Anandan, G Jai Singh, Muthu Ganesa Pandian, M. A. Gouthaman,
Dr. Ram Sankar, Mrs. Harini Ramsankar, Mrs. Usha Prabakaran,
Maheswaran Prabakaran, M/s. Ram Sankar & Co, C. Paramsivam,
Nishant Sharma, Rakesh K. Sharma, Ms. Promila, Deepak Reddy,
Pradum Kumar, Neeraj Dubey.
Advs. for the Respondent:
Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Arkaj Kumar,
B K Satija, Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Anukalp Jain, Madhav Sinhal,
Rohit Khare, Ms. Sunanda Shukla, Ishaan Sharma, Arvind Kumar
Sharma, Rahul Shyam Bhandari, Ms. G Priyadharshni, Satyam
Pathak, Prabhakar Pahepuri, Harsh Vardhan, K Kesavan.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.

1. Leave granted.
2. The challenge before this Court in all these Appeals is to the decision
of the Madras High Court dated 08.06.2022. Before proceeding to
the impugned judgment, it is necessary to trace the trajectory of this
case from the Trial Court onwards, since it has passed through a
maze of facts.
3. A total of fifteen accused had faced trial, and the Trial Court ultimately
convicted thirteen of them. Amongst them, A-1 to A-3, A-5 to A-8, A-10
to A-13 were convicted primarily under Sections 302 read with 149
of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’). They were all sentenced
to life imprisonment, except A-2 (Maruthupandiyan), who was given
death sentence by the Trial Court. A-14 and A-15 were the police
officers, who were convicted by the Trial Court under Sections 217,
218 of IPC and Sections 3(2)(i), 4 of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, ‘SC/ST Act’), and
both of them were sentenced to life imprisonment. A-4 (Ayyasamy)
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1871

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

and A-9 (Gunasekaran) were acquitted by the Trial Court, and no
appeal against their acquittal was filed before the High Court.
4. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has modified the conviction
and sentence of A-14 (Sub-inspector K.P. Tamilmaran), acquitting him
for offences under Section 3(2)(i) of the SC/ST Act and Section 218
of IPC, but maintaining his conviction for offences under Section 4
of the SC/ST Act and Section 217 of IPC, and thus reducing the
sentence imposed from life imprisonment to two years rigorous
imprisonment. The conviction and sentence of another police officer
(A-15, Inspector M. Sellamuthu) has been upheld. In the case of A-2,
the conviction by the Trial Court has been maintained but the sentence
was changed from death penalty to life imprisonment. The High Court
has also acquitted two other accused, i.e. A-3 (Rangasamy) and A-13
(Chinnadurai). The remaining appeals of all other co-accused were
dismissed, and their conviction and sentence was upheld.
5. No appeal has been filed against the acquittal of the above-mentioned
accused by the High Court. Before us, now the remaining eleven
accused i.e. A-1, A-2, A-5 to A-8, A-10 to A-12, A-14, A-15, have
challenged their conviction and sentence.
6. At this stage, it is necessary to bring a few crucial aspects of this
case, in order to have a better perspective.
7. This is a case of a dastardly murder of a young couple, Murugesan
and Kannagi, who were only in their early twenties, when they were
killed. Both of them were administered poison in full view of a large
number of villagers. The masterminds and the main perpetrators of
this macabre act were none other than the father and the brother of
the girl Kannagi. The reason behind the murder of this young couple
was that Kannagi, belonging to the ‘Vanniyar’ community, had dared
to marry Murugesan, who was a ‘Dalit’ from the same village. So,
at the root of this crime is the deeply entrenched hierarchical caste
system in India, and ironically, this most dishonorable act goes by
the name of honour-killing!
8. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
i. Kannagi and Murugesan, both residents of village ‘Pudukoorapettai’
in District Cuddalore, Tamil Nadu, were in love. Murugesan had
just completed his B.E. (Chemical Engineering) from a college
in Chidambaram, Tamil Nadu, and was employed in Bangalore,
1872 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

whereas Kannagi was completing her B.Com. studies from the
same college. Knowing well that the Vanniyar community, to
which Kannagi’s family belonged, would never allow their union,
the two got secretly married before the Registrar of Marriage
at Cuddalore on 05.05.2003, and got their marriage registered.
The marriage certificate was marked as Exhibit P-1 before the
Trial Court.
ii. After performing their marriage, the two returned to their village
and were leading a normal life with their respective families,
but then in the first week of July, 2003, both left their village
quietly without attracting any attention.
iii. On 03.07.2003, A-2 (Maruthupandiyan), brother of Kannagi,
reached the house of PW-1 Samikannu (father of Murugesan),
with a big sickle in his hand, and ordered PW-1 to bring his
son back to the village. The reason why he was looking for
Murugesan, A-2 said, was that Murugesan had borrowed money
from him which he was now refusing to return. Samikannu (PW-1)
leaves his house the same day to look for Murugesan. He goes
to his sister-in-law’s house in the village Rasapalayam where
he met Murugesan and asked Murugesan to send Kannagi to
her parents. Thereafter, PW-1 returned to his house that day.
After a gap of four days, on 07.07.2003, A-2 again comes to
the house of PW-1 and threatens him for the second time to
bring Murugesan back to the village. On 07.07.2003, PW-1
again goes in search of Murugesan but he returns only on
08.07.2003, and by that time, his son and Kannagi had already
been murdered. It is further on record that, on 07.07.2003, A-2
also threatened A-4 (Ayyasamy), who was made an accused
by the prosecution, though he was the uncle of Murugesan. A-2
repeats the same false story of Murugesan borrowing money
from him, which he had refused to return and therefore he was
on a lookout for him.
iv. The prosecution story then proceeds to state that on 07.07.2003,
A-4 leaves his village Pudukoorapettai for the house of PW-
15 (Tamilarasi), sister of Murugesan, in Vannangudikadu
village, where Murugesan was hiding. A-4 brings Murugesan
back to Pudukoorapettai village and presents him before A-1
(Duraisamy) and A-2 (Maruthupandiyan), father and brother of
Kannagi, respectively.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1873

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

v. By the time Murugesan was brought to the village, it was evening
(on 07.07.2003). Thereafter, as per the prosecution story, A-1
to A-13 undressed Murugesan, tied him to a post and then he
was mercilessly beaten by the mob including A-1 to A-13. This
was done in full view of many villagers who were present there,
yet there was no attempt to stop this savage brutality. A-1 to
A-13 continued to torture Murugesan compelling him to reveal
the whereabouts of Kannagi. After much physical torture and
beating, when Murugesan was unable to bear it any longer, he
finally revealed that Kannagi was in PW-23 Saroja’s house (who
was the mother-in-law of A-4). Immediately a Tata Sumo car was
arranged by A-1, which was driven by PW-22 (Jayatharasan), in
which A-4 to A-11 climbed and proceeded to Moongilthuraipattu
village where PW-23’s house was located, with the intention of
getting Kannagi back to Pudukoorapettai village.
vi. Kannagi was finally brought to her village, and by this time it was
about 5:30 AM in the morning (of 08.07.2003). Both Kannagi
and Murugesan were then taken to a cashew grove near the
village. Once there, A-1 gets Nuvacron1 (insecticide/poison) in
a steel tumbler and gives it to his son A-2, and orders him to
administer that to his daughter Kannagi.
vii. A-2 then forced Nuvacron down Kannagi’s throat which caused
her death in minutes. The prosecution story here though also
suggests that A-2 tried to administer the remaining Nuvacron
to Murugesan but when Murugesan resisted, this task was
assigned to A-4. All the same, we must note that this version of
prosecution, that A-4 administered or tried to administer poison
to Murugesan, was not accepted in view of the evidence of
PW-49 (Chinnapillai, step-mother of Murugesan) who had said
that she saw A-2 administering poison to her son Murugesan.
Like Kannagi, Murugesan too died minutes after being forced to
drink the poison. PW-49 is an eye-witness who has stuck to her
deposition that it was A-2 who had administered poison to her
son Murugesan, and not A-4. A-4 has ultimately been acquitted
by the Trial Court and as stated above, no appeal against his
acquittal was filed before the High Court. We will deal with this

1 Insecticide with common name “Monocrotophos”. Considered highly toxic by all routes of exposure. The
ingestion of even 120 mg of Monocrotophos can be fatal.
1874 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

aspect in greater detail at a later point in this judgment. We
must also point out here that PW-49 was not mentioned in the
charge-sheet as one of the prosecution witnesses. It was only
in the middle of the trial that an application was moved under
Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short
‘CrPC’) by the prosecution to bring PW-49 as a witness.
viii. Returning to the facts of the case. The two bodies were then
burnt in different places-Kannagi in the village cremation ground
and Murugesan at a place nearby.
ix. Meanwhile, as per the prosecution case, A-14 and 15 (police
officers) not only knew about these events but they had also
visited the crime scene, according to some of the witnesses
on 08.07.2003 itself, and yet they did not lodge an FIR, which
was their statutory duty under Section 154 and Section 157
CrPC. Not only this, but when PW-49 goes to the police station
to lodge an FIR on 08.07.2003, she was rebuffed and abused
at the police station, and practically thrown out of the station.
x. It was only after a gap of nine days, when some leaders
belonging to the Dalit community raised this issue through Press
and Media and a support was gathered from the public, that
a case was finally registered on 17.07.2003 as Crime No.356
of 2003 under Sections 147, 302, 201 of IPC at police station
Virudhachalam. The FIR, however, was registered on the basis
of the extra-judicial confession of A-1 before PW-32 (Ashokan),
who was the Village Administrative Officer. In this FIR, eight
accused were named, four belonging to the Dalit community and
the other four belonging to the Vanniyar community. The Dalits
included PW-1 (Samikannu), who was none other than the father
of the deceased Murugesan; A-4 (Ayyasamy), who was the uncle
of Murugesan and who allegedly brought Murugesan back to
Pudukoorapettai village from his sister’s house; Ilayaperumal,
another uncle of Murugesan, and Kannadasan, who ultimately
became a prosecution witness as PW-33. The four Vanniyars
who were made accused were A-1, A-2 (who were the father
and brother of Kannagi, respectively), A-3 and Anbalagan, who
later became a prosecution witness as PW-29.
xi. Based on this FIR, an investigation was done by the local
police and a charge-sheet was filed on 16.09.2003 against all
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1875

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

the eight above-mentioned accused under Sections 147, 302,
201 of IPC.
xii. Meanwhile, the questionable manner in which the entire
investigation was carried out by the local police, compelled the
family of the deceased Murugesan to seek interference from the
Madras High Court where a petition was filed with a prayer that
the investigation in this case must be handed over to the Central
Bureau of Investigation (for short ‘CBI’). The High Court, by its
order dated 22.04.2004, allowed this application and directed
that the investigation be handed over to CBI.
xiii. On 21.05.2004, the CBI again registered its FIR under Sections
147, 302, 201 of IPC and started the investigation. A charge-
sheet was filed on 14.10.2005 against fifteen accused, which
included two Dalits i.e. A-4 (Ayyasamy) and A-9 (Gunasekaran),
two police officers i.e. A-14 (K.P Tamilmaran) and A-15 (M.
Sellamuthu). The remaining accused belong to the Vanniyar
community. As we have already stated in the beginning, A-4
and A-9 were acquitted by the Trial Court, while accused A-3
and A-13 were later acquitted by the High Court in Appeal.
xiv. There has been an inordinate delay caused in this case. The
incident is of 7th and 8th July, 2003, and the Trial was concluded
only on 24.09.2021. The delay on account of the belated filing
of the FIR, etc. we have already discussed above, but the case
was only committed to Sessions on 15.03.2010 i.e. after more
than seven years. The proceedings again remained stalled till
charges were ultimately framed on 14.07.2017. An additional
charge under Section 3 of the SC/ST Act was framed by the
Trial Court against A-14 and A-15 in 2020.
As noticed by the High Court, the reason for this long and
inordinate delay was because of the multiple petitions filed by
the accused for one reason or the other primarily as a challenge
to the proceedings itself.
9. As mentioned in the beginning, the High Court in appeal, by the
impugned judgment, modified the sentence of A-2 from death penalty
to life imprisonment, while upholding his conviction. A-3 and A-13
were acquitted by the High Court. A-14 was acquitted for offences
under Section 3 of SC/ST Act and Section 218 of IPC.
1876 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

10. The eleven accused who stood convicted and sentenced by the High
Court are now before us. Their defence is based primarily on the
alleged weaknesses of the prosecution theory, the inconsistencies
and frequent contradictions in the statements of key prosecution
witnesses, including its star witness PW-49 (Chinnapillai), etc. The
learned senior counsels for the appellants, Mrs. Anjana Prakash, Mr.
Ratnakar Dash, Mr. M. Sathyanarayanan, Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal
and Mr. S. Nagamuthu have tried to convince this Court that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are unreliable and there
has been a total failure on the part of the prosecution to prove its
case beyond reasonable doubt.
11. The contention on behalf of A-14 and A-15 (the two police officers-
K.P Tamilmaran and M. Sellamuthu, respectively), raised by
learned senior counsel Mr. Siddharth Aggarwal and Mr. Gopal
Sankaranarayanan, respectively, is that none of the witnesses have
specifically identified them as the officers at the police station who
refused to lodge the FIR when apprised of the incident. It is the
contention of A-15, additionally, that merely because he had filed
the charge-sheet against persons belonging to both the Dalit and
Vanniyar community, the investigation conducted by him cannot be
said to be motivated by a desire to falsely implicate members of
the Dalit community.
12. We have heard learned senior counsels for the accused as well as
the learned counsel, Mr. Rahul Shyam Bhandari, for the family of
Murugesan and Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, the learned Additional Solicitor
General representing CBI.
13. In order to appreciate the sequence of events and the role of
the accused, it is important to look at the testimonies of PW-1
(Samikannu-father of Murugesan), PW-2 (Velmurugan-younger
brother of Murugesan), PW-3 (Palanivel-second younger brother
of Murugesan), PW-15 (Tamilarasi-sister of Murugesan), and PW-
49 (Chinnapillai-step-mother of Murugesan), who are the main
prosecution witnesses.
14. But before we do that, it may be necessary to say a few words about
some essential aspects of this case, in order to set the context for
the examination of testimonies of these key prosecution witnesses.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1877

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

Delay in Trial and evidentiary value of so-called “hostile witness”
15. The long and inordinate delay which has been caused in this case,
right from the lodging of the FIR, speaks volumes about the gross
inefficiency at the hands of the prosecution on the one hand and
dilatory tactics employed by the defence on the other hand, which
together led to a slow trial.
16. The second and more crucial aspect is that many of the prosecution
witnesses in this case have turned, what has come to be known
as ‘hostile’; a fact which has been strongly pressed by the defence
in their favour. The defence would also argue that the Trial Court
and High Court have mainly relied on the testimonies of the family
members of Murugesan, who are interested witnesses.
17. In our opinion, there is no force in these arguments and as will be
seen, there was enough material placed by the prosecution before
the Trial Court, which was sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused,
beyond a reasonable doubt.
18. When a witness, produced on behalf of prosecution, deposes against
the prosecution version and goes against his/her own previously
recorded statements, the prosecution can request the Court to
declare such a witness as hostile and seek permission from the
Court to cross-examine its own witness. This is the procedure
followed in a Trial, as we all know. In the present case, there are
as many as fifty-one prosecution witnesses and it is also a fact that
many of them have turned hostile by turning against their earlier
statements made before the police under section 161 CrPC, and
even before the Magistrate under section 164 CrPC, in some cases.
This phenomenon is not new, in fact it is sadly a common occurrence
in our criminal Courts today, much to the despair and frustration of
the prosecution. This case, therefore, is no exception. Despite this,
however, there are witnesses in the present case, especially PW-1,
PW-2, PW-3, PW-15 and PW-49, whose evidence, in the form of
their testimonies before the Court, is more than sufficient to convict
the present appellants. A word here about the evidentiary value of
a so-called hostile witness.
19. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter ‘Evidence Act’) allows a
party, with the leave of the Court, to cross-examine its own witness.
Section 154 of the Evidence Act originally read as follows:
1878 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

“154.Question by party to his own witness The Court
may, in its discretion, permit the person who calls a witness
to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-
examination by the adverse party.”
20. The Calcutta High Court, in Khijiruddin Sonar v. Emperor 1925 SCC
OnLine Cal 259, while interpreting Section 154 of the Evidence Act,
held that “When a witness who has been called by the prosecution is
permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution under
the provisions of Section 154 of the Evidence Act, the result of that
course being permitted is to discredit that witness altogether and
not merely to get rid of a part of his testimony”.
21. But this judgment in Khijiruddin was overruled by a five-Judge bench
of the Calcutta High Court in Praphullakumar Sarkar v. Emperor
1931 SCC OnLine Cal 7. The High Court was answering a reference
from a Division Bench regarding the specific question of whether
the testimony of a witness, who was cross-examined by the party
which produced him/her, should be discarded totally, partially, or
not discarded at all. Chief Justice Rankin, speaking for three other
Judges and himself, answered the reference in the following terms:
“24. In my opinion, the fact that a witness is dealt with
under Section 154 of the Evidence Act, even when under
that Section he is “cross-examined” to credit, in no way
warrants a direction to the jury that they are bound in law
to place no reliance on his evidence, or that the party who
called and cross-examined him can take no advantage
from any part of his evidence. There is, moreover, no
rule of law that if a jury thinks that a witness has been
discredited on one point they may not give credit to him
on another. The rule of law is that it is for the jury to say.
Of the seven questions stated by the Division Bench I
propose that we should answer four, viz.—
(3) whether the evidence of a witness treated as “hostile”
must be rejected in whole or in part;
(4) whether it must be rejected so far as it is in favour of
the party calling the witness;
(5) whether it must be rejected so far as it is in favour of
the opposite party.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1879

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

These three questions I would answer in the negative.
(6) Whether the whole of the evidence so far as it affects
both parties favourably or unfavourably, must go to the
jury for what it is worth.
25. To this question, I would be content to answer “yes,” …”
22. Justice Buckland, in the above case, in his concurring opinion holds
that there is no law which states that the evidence of a witness, who
has been cross-examined by its party, should be entirely rejected.
In his opinion, it is for the jury (or the Judge) to form an opinion
regarding the value of the testimony of such a witness.
23. All the same, later this Court in Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi) (1975)
3 SCC 562 held to the contrary and approved the decision of the
Calcutta High Court in Khijiruddin. This is what was said in Jagir
Singh by Justice Bhagwati:
“7. Now, it is apparent from the judgment of the High Court
that the conviction of the appellant rested entirely on the
evidence of Pritam Singh (P.W. 10) and Sajjan Singh
(P.W. 13). Swaran Singh (P.W. 11) was also examined on
behalf of the prosecution but his evidence is of no help
to the prosecution because he went back on the story of
the prosecution and was permitted to be cross-examined
on behalf of the prosecution. It is now well settled that
when a witness, who has been called by the prosecution,
is permitted to be cross-examined on behalf of the
prosecution, the result of that course being adopted is to
discredit that witness altogether and not merely to get rid
of a part of his testimony. See Khijiruddin v. Emperor….”
24. However, it is to be noted that Jagir Singh does not refer to the five-
Judge Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Praphullakumar
Sarkar.
25. But then in a subsequent decision (of which Justice Bhagwati was
also a part) i.e., Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1976) 1 SCC
727, it was held differently. Justice Sarkaria, speaking for the Bench,
clarified the earlier judgment in Jagir Singh, and held that what has
been held in Jagir Singh would only be applicable where a witness
through cross-examination by the party which calls it, is totally
1880 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

discredited. It is only in such a situation that the Court, as matter of
prudence, discards his/her evidence in its entirety.
26. As a general rule, the testimony of a witness who has been cross-
examined by the party which produced him/her will not stand totally
discredited, and it is for the Court to consider what value should be
attached to this testimony. After referring to a series of judgments
on this point, the Court in Sat Paul held as follows:
“52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clear that
even in a criminal prosecution when a witness is cross-
examined and contradicted with the leave of the court, by
the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of
law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is
for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether
as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction,
the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be
believed in regard to a part of his testimony. If the Judge
finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has
not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and
considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with
due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other
evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he
finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case,
the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned,
and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally
discredited, the Judge should, as matter of prudence,
discard his evidence in toto.
53. It was in the context of such a case, where, as a
result of the cross-examination by the Public, Prosecutor,
the prosecution witness concerned stood discredited
altogether, that this Court in Jagir Singh v. State (Delhi
Admn.) with the aforesaid rule of caution — which is not
to be treated as a rule of law — in mind, said that the
evidence of such a witness is to be rejected en bloc.”
(Emphasis Provided)

27. An examination of the cases referred above shows that there can
be no doubt about the fact that the evidence of a witness, who has
been cross-examined by the side which produced him/her, cannot
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1881

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

be totally discarded [Also see:Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2023) 4 SCC 731].
28. It may also be worthwhile to mention here that by the Criminal Law
Amendment Act of 2005, sub-section 2 was added to section 154
of the Evidence Act. The amended section 154 of the Evidence Act
now reads as under:
154. Question by party to his own witness.— (1) The
Court may, in its discretion, permit the person who calls
a witness to put any questions to him which might be put
in cross-examination by the adverse party.
(2) Nothing in this section shall disentitle the person so
permitted under sub-section (1), to rely on any part of the
evidence of such witness.
(Emphasis Provided)

29. By way of the above amendment, the position which had been
reiterated by this Court has now come in the statute itself.
30. The word ‘hostile’ or ‘hostile witness’ has not been used anywhere
in the Evidence Act. The logic behind this exclusion seems to be
that the declaration of witness as ‘hostile witness’ carries a specific
significance under the English law, from where this term has been
derived, where liberty is only granted to a side to cross-examine
its own witness when such declaration of ‘hostility’ is made. The
position in India is different and here it is left to the discretion of the
Court to allow a party to cross-examine its own witness, regardless
of a declaration of ‘hostility’. This has been explained by this Court
in Sat Paul:
“38. To steer clear of the controversy over the meaning of the
terms “hostile” witness, “adverse” witness, “unfavourable”
witness which had given rise to considerable difficulty and
conflict of opinion in England, the authors of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 seem to have advisedly avoided the
use of any of those terms so that, in India, the grant of
permission to cross-examine his own witness by a party
is not conditional on the witness being declared “adverse”
or “hostile”. Whether it be the grant of permission under
Section 142 to put leading questions, or the leave under
1882 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Section 154 to ask questions which might be put in cross-
examination by the adverse party, the Indian Evidence
Act leaves the matter entirely to the discretion of the
court (see the observations of Sir Lawrence Jenkins in
Baikuntha Nath v. Prasannamoyi [AIR 1922 PC 409: 72IC
286]). The discretion conferred by Section 154 on the
court is unqualified and untrammelled and is apart from
any question of “hostility”. It is to be liberally exercised
whenever the court from the witnesses demeanour, temper,
attitude, bearing, or the tenor and tendency of his answers,
or from a perusal of his previous inconsistent statement,
or otherwise, thinks that the grant of such permission is
expedient to extract the truth and to do justice. The grant
of such permission does not amount to an adjudication by
the court as to the veracity of the witness. Therefore, in
the order granting such permission, it is preferable to avoid
the use of such expressions, such as “declared hostile”,
“declared unfavourable”, the significance of which is still
not free from the historical cobwebs which, in their wake
bring a misleading legacy of confusion, and conflict that
had so long vexed the English Courts.”
(Emphasis Provided)

31. The phrase ‘hostile witness’ is commonly used in criminal jurisprudence
and court proceedings. We too cannot escape the blame of using the
term ‘hostile witness’ in our judgment. We do it for pragmatic reasons.
Some words like ‘hostile witness’ in this case are now a part of our
legal vocabulary. There is no point in inventing or substituting new
words or phrases, at least in the present case, and we leave that for
the future. But what is necessary, however, is to explain the meaning
of the term as it is now to be understood. The phrase ‘hostile witness’
has come to be used for a witness who gives a statement contrary
to the story of the side for which he/she is a witness. All the same,
because a witness has supported some, though not all, aspects of
a case, it would not automatically mean that this witness has to be
declared ‘hostile’. A party can cross-examine its own witness under
Section 154 Evidence Act, even without getting a declaration of
‘hostility’. The only restriction to cross-examination under Section
154 Evidence Act is that the party, who seeks to cross-examine its
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1883

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

own witness, must obtain the leave of the Court. Whether there is
a declaration of ‘hostility’ or not, one thing is clear that evidence of
witness, who has been cross-examined under Section 154 Evidence
Act by the party who called such witness, cannot be washed off
entirely and it is for the Court to see what can be retrieved from
such evidence.
32. This can be understood from another aspect. We shall now refer
to the definition of the term ‘evidence’ given under Section 3 of the
Evidence Act. It reads as follows:
“Evidence” - “Evidence” means and includes –
(1) all statements which the Court permits or requires
to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to
matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are
called oral evidence;
(2) all documents including electronic records produced
for the inspection of the Court; such document are
called documentary evidence.”
(Emphasis Provided)

33. The statements made by a witness in Court, including in cross-
examination, either conducted by the opposite party or by the party
who produced the witness, would come under the definition of
‘evidence’ under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, since this evidence
has come before the Court with its permission. Moreover, there is
no specific bar under the Evidence Act which mandates that such
evidence has to be discarded. Thus, it would form part of the entire
evidence which the Court can examine while arriving at its decision,
and it is for the Court to determine what value has to be given to
that piece of evidence or how such evidence has to be used in a
given case.
34. Viewed from a different perspective, the rejection of the entire
testimony of a prosecution witness, who has been cross-examined
by the prosecution, would not only harm the case of the prosecution
but perhaps also of the defence in a given case. This is because as
the law stands today, the benefit of the testimony of such witness
can be taken by both the prosecution and the defence, allowing them
to use it to build their case [See: Paulmeli v. State of T.N. (2014)
1884 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

13 SCC 90, Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P. (2012) 5 SCC 777].
In any case, ultimately, it will be the cause of justice that will suffer
if the testimony of such witness is totally discarded. It is, therefore,
rightly left to the discretion of the Court to test the evidentiary value
of such a testimony.
35. Here, we may also take note of Section 155 of the Evidence Act2
which allows a party, with permission of the Court, to impeach the
credibility of its own witness as per the procedure laid down therein.
36. It is though trite and much overstated but the maxim “falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus”3, is not applicable to our criminal justice system. It
is for the Court to distinguish the wheat from the chaff while dealing
with the depositions of a hostile witness. Courts can rely upon that
part of the deposition of a hostile witness which is corroborated by
other evidence on record. This Court in Bhajju v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 327 discussed the worth of the evidence of
a hostile witness in the following words:
“36. It is settled law that the evidence of hostile witnesses
can also be relied upon by the prosecution to the extent to
which it supports the prosecution version of the incident.
The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as
washed off the records, it remains admissible in trial and
there is no legal bar to base the conviction of the accused
upon such testimony, if corroborated by other reliable
evidence…”
If part of the evidence of a hostile witness corroborates with other
reliable evidence, then that part of the evidence is admissible. Once
a prosecution witness has been declared hostile and then cross-
examined by the prosecution, then it is for the Court to evaluate
the veracity of the testimony. There can be several reasons for

2 155. Impeaching credit of witness: The credit of a witness may be impeached in the following ways by
the adverse party, or, with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him:
(1) By the evidence of persons who testify that they, from their knowledge of the witness, believe him to
be unworthy of credit;
(2) By proof that the witness has been bribed, or has accepted the offer of a bribe, or has received any
other corrupt inducement to give his evidence;
(3) By proof of former statements inconsistent with any part of his evidence which is liable to be
contradicted…
3 false in one thing, false in everything.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1885

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

a witness to turn hostile and the court must also look into these
factors while evaluating the evidence given by a hostile witness. It
is an uncomfortable reality in our criminal Courts for a prosecution
witness to turn hostile. But then the purpose of a Trial Court is to
go to the truth of the matter. Whatever evidence is there before the
Court must be examined, tested, corroborated (whenever necessary),
before a verdict can be finally given.
37. One of the many reasons for witnesses turning hostile is the long
delay usually caused in a trial. This is again unfortunate but true in
our country. The present case is no exception. Here, the incident
occurred in the year 2003, the case was committed to Sessions
in the year 2010 and charges were framed as late as in the year
2017, and the judgment was finally pronounced by the Trial Court
on 24.09.2021. It took eighteen years!
38. The role played here by the accused in delaying the trial cannot
be discounted, as already stated. The records also reveal that the
depositions of most of the prosecution witnesses were recorded
only towards the end of the year 2017. Moreover, CBI in this case
had filed its charge-sheet, inter alia, against two persons belonging
to Dalit community. Although, these two (A-4 and A-9) were finally
acquitted by Trial Court as there was absolutely nothing against
them, but in the process, prosecution had to declare many of its
witnesses belonging to the Dalit community as hostile simply because
these witnesses did not depose against A-4 and A-9. It is also clear
now, in any case, that these two were wrongly made accused by
the prosecution. All the same, the benefit of such witnesses turning
hostile cannot be given to other accused who were found involved
in the offence, on the overwhelming weight of other evidence.

Related witnesses are not necessarily interested witnesses
39. Another plea taken by the defence is that many witnesses who have
deposed against them, such as PW-49, PW-1, PW-15, are interested
witnesses. PW-49 for example being the step-mother of Murugesan,
the boy who was killed. Now, so far as witnesses being interested
witnesses is concerned, it is a settled position of law that the Court
cannot ignore the testimonies of witnesses only because they are
close relatives of the victim. A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in
Jaikam Khan v. State of U.P. (2021) 13 SCC 716 notes:
1886 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

“28…No doubt that, merely because the witnesses are
interested and related witnesses, it cannot be a ground to
disbelieve their testimony. However, the testimony of such
witnesses has to be scrutinised with due care and caution.
Upon scrutiny of the evidence of such witnesses, if the
court is satisfied that the evidence is creditworthy, then
there is no bar on the court in relying on such evidence.”
In cases where the crime is committed at the residence or a place
near the residence of the deceased, it is the close relatives who
are likely to be a witness to the crime. They are natural witnesses.
This Court in State of A.P. v. S. Rayappa, (2006) 4 SCC 512, while
noting the difference between interested witness and related witness,
observed as follows:
“6…By now it is a well-established principle of law that
testimony of a witness otherwise inspiring confidence
cannot be discarded on the ground that he being a relation
of the deceased is an interested witness. A close relative
who is a very natural witness cannot be termed as an
interested witness. The term interested postulates that
the person concerned must have some direct interest in
seeing the accused person being convicted somehow or the
other either because of animosity or some other reasons.
7. On the contrary it has now almost become a fashion
that the public is reluctant to appear and depose before
the court especially in criminal case because of varied
reasons. Criminal cases are kept dragging for years to
come and the witnesses are harassed a lot. They are
being threatened, intimidated and at the top of all they are
subjected to lengthy cross-examination. In such a situation,
the only natural witness available to the prosecution
would be the relative witness. The relative witness is not
necessarily an interested witness. On the other hand, being
a close relation to the deceased they will try to prosecute
the real culprit by stating the truth. There is no reason as
to why a close relative will implicate and depose falsely
against somebody and screen the real culprit to escape
unpunished. The only requirement is that the testimony of
the relative witnesses should be examined cautiously…”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1887

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

40. Keeping these principles in mind, we shall now discuss the testimonies
of prosecution witnesses:
i. PW-1 (Samikannu) is the father of Murugesan who was made an
accused in the first FIR filed by the local police when A-15 was
the I.O. PW-1 is one of the main witnesses of the prosecution.
PW-1 states that, five days prior to the death of Murugesan
i.e. on 03.07.2003, at around 5 PM, A-2 (Maruthupandiyan),
armed with a big sickle, comes to his house and orders him to
find Murugesan and bring him to his house as Murugesan had
borrowed money from him which he now refuses to return. A-2
threatened PW-1 with dire consequences, if he did not bring
Murugesan. On 03.07.2003 itself, PW-1 leaves his village for
his sister-in-law Dhanavalli’s house in Rasapalayam, where he
found Murugesan with Kannagi. Murugesan informed PW-1 that
Kannagi is A-1’s daughter. Upon hearing this, PW-1 pleaded
with him to ask Kannagi to return to her family as she belongs
to a higher caste. On the same day, i.e. 03.07.2003, PW-1
returns to his village. Thereafter, four days later, on 07.07.2003,
A-2 again threatens PW-1 to bring back Murugesan and PW-1
yet again leaves his village in search of Murugesan. This time,
since PW-1 could not find Murugesan, he delays his return to
his village, and when he reaches his village the next day (on
08.07.2003), Murugesan and Kannagi had already been killed.
ii. PW-2 (Velmurugan), is the younger brother of Murugesan. He
was seventeen years old at the time of the incident. In Court,
PW-2 had deposed that at 11 AM on 07.07.2003, A-2 and
his aides intercepted PW-2 near the village water tank while
he was returning to his village from Virudhachalam. They
questioned him on the whereabouts of Murugesan, repeating
the story of the money which was lent to Murugesan. PW-2
was then forcibly taken by them and confined in a store-room
near the water tank and was only released in the evening, after
Murugesan was brought back to the village. When PW-2 went
home, his mother PW-49 (Chinnapillai) informed him that A-4
had brought Murugesan back to the village. PW-2 then went
to the sugarcane field of A-1, where he was joined by PW-3
(Palanivel). At the sugarcane field, PW-2 saw that A-2 and A-7
were threatening Murugesan to disclose the location of Kannagi.
He then saw A-4 (Ayyasamy) asking A-1 (C. Duraisamy) as to
1888 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

why A-1 was inquiring Murugesan regarding Kannagi, when the
only reason given to A-4 for their search of Murugesan was
the money which was to be recovered from him. To this, A-1
then answered that he had to weave a story of ‘loan’, in order
to bring Murugesan. Later, PW-2 and PW-3 returned home. At
around 7 PM on 07.07.2003, the villagers were heard saying that
Murugesan was being beaten near Mariamman temple. PW-2
proceeded to the place near Mariamman temple. There, he saw
A-1, A-2, A-4, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-9, A-10, A-11, and hundred other
villagers gathered. PW-2 witnessed Murugesan being tortured.
He was hung upside down with his leg tied by a rope to a
borewell situated near the water tank. PW-2 then states how
Murugesan finally disclosed the location of Kannagi who was in
the house of PW-23 (Saroja) at Moongilthuraipattu. Having got
this information, A-1 asked PW-22 (Jayatharasan) to bring the
vehicle, which was a Tata Sumo Jeep, in which A-5, A-6, A-7,
A-8, A-9, and A-10 jumped in and also compelled A-4 to sit with
them, and then they all left for Moongilthuraipattu. Murugesan
was watched by A-1, A-2 and others. A-1 and A-2 then forced
PW-2 to go back and PW-2 further states that he, along with
his brother PW-3, slept in A-4’s motor shed that night, fearing
they will be harmed in case Kannagi was not found.
iii. PW-3 (Palanivel) is the second younger brother of Murugesan.
In his deposition, PW-3 speaks about A-2 threatening his father
(PW-1) on 03.07.2003 to compel PW-1 to bring Murugesan back
to Pudukoorapettai village. PW-3 has also testified to the fact that
A-2 later threatened A-4, asking him to bring Murugesan back
to the village, and that A-4 was the one who, in fact, brought
Murugesan to the village. PW-3 has also spoken about the
wrongful detention of PW-2 (Velmurugan) and his subsequent
release once Murugesan returned. PW-3 further deposed that
A-2 and his men had beaten Murugesan near the water tank
and village temple, which was witnessed by nearly fifty villagers.
PW-3 also confirmed the presence of A-1, A-2, A-5, A-6, A-7,
A-9, A-12, and A-13 at the site where Murugesan was beaten
and tortured. He recollects seeing that A-4 (Ayyasamy) (A-4,
as we know, belongs to the Dalit community and was the uncle
of Murugesan, who was made an accused by the prosecution,
but later acquitted by the Trial Court) was also tied along with
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1889

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

Murugesan. PW-3 then goes on to speak about the Tata Sumo
being driven by PW-22 coming to the scene and A-4, A-5, A-6,
A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10 boarding the vehicle, which then headed
towards Moongilthuraipattu. Like PW-2, PW-3 also speaks
about returning home later, but he says that they (PW-2 and
PW-3) slept in their backyard at night. He also says that when
he returned to the house at around 7 AM on 08.07.2003, his
mother PW-49 (Chinnapillai), A-4, PW-16 (Amaravathi) informed
him that Murugesan had been poisoned and killed.
iv. PW-15 (Tamilarasi), who is the sister of Murugesan, deposed
that at around 11 AM on 07.07.2003, Murugesan was in her
house in Vannangudikadu village. Later when she found him
missing, she along with PW-16 (Amaravathi-who also lived in
Vannangudikadu village), proceed for Pudukoorapettai, the
village of Murugesan. Once they reached the village she saw
A-2, A-5 and A-12 beating Murugesan, and hurling casteist
abuses at him. PW-15 further says that there was a huge crowd
of villagers also present at the spot. Later when Murugesan
finally disclosed the location of Kannagi as he could not stand
the torture, a Tata Sumo vehicle was brought to the spot, in
which some of the accused went to bring Kannagi. PW-15 along
with PW-2, PW-3, PW-16, and PW-49 then returned home.
The next day i.e. 08.07.2003, PW-15 was told by PW-16 and
PW-49 that Murugesan had been killed.
v. PW-16 (Amaravathi), the aunt of Murugesan, has not fully
confirmed the prosecution story. She only states that she saw
Murugesan in PW-15’s house, where he told PW-16 that he had
not borrowed any money from A-2. She denies any knowledge
of the events that took place thereafter, and states that she was
informed of the death of Murugesan by other persons. This
witness was also declared, what we call ‘hostile’.
vi. PW-49 (Chinnapillai), the step-mother of Murugesan, is the star
witness of the prosecution. She states that A-2 threatened her
husband, PW-1, to bring back Murugesan, on 03.07.2003, and
then how her husband PW-1 left the village to find Murugesan but
returns without Murugesan. She further deposes that how again,
on 07.07.2003, A-2 threatened PW-1 to bring back Murugesan
and PW-1 again left the village in search of Murugesan and
1890 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

returned on 08.07.2003, after the death of Murugesan and
Kannagi. PW-49 further testified that it was A-4 who finally
brought Murugesan to the village. She specifically identified
A-2, A-3, A-8, A-10, A-13 as the accused who had beaten and
tortured her son near the temple. PW-49 also states that A-2,
A-6, A-7, A-8, A-10, A-12 assaulted A-4 and compelled him to
get into the Tata Sumo vehicle which was requisitioned to bring
Kannagi. Thereafter, they forced PW-49 to leave the place.
41. So far, the following facts emerge from the testimonies reproduced
above:
i. On 03.07.2003, A-2 (Maruthupandiyan) threatened PW-1
(Samikannu) to bring back Murugesan. PW-1 goes to his sister-
in-law’s house where he met Murugesan and asked Murugesan
to send Kannagi to her parental home. On the same day, PW-1
returns to his village.
ii. On 07.07.2003, A-2 again threatened PW-1 to bring Murugesan
back to the village, and PW-1 once again leaves his village in
search of Murugesan. But this time, he could not find Murugesan
and fearing that A-2 would harm him if he returns without
Murugesan, PW-1 did not return to his village that day.
iii. On 07.07.2003, A-2 also threatened A-4 (Ayyasamy) to bring
Murugesan back to the village and it was A-4 who finally brought
Murugesan back to the village
iv. Murugesan was battered and tortured by A-1, A-2 and their men
in order to elicit the location of Kannagi, which he ultimately
revealed after he was unable to bear the torture. Many villagers
were present when all this was happening.
v. A Tata sumo vehicle, driven by PW-22 (Jayatharasan), went to
find Kannagi and bring her back to the village.
42. It is from this point onwards that the case depends mainly on
the testimony of PW-49 (Chinnapillai), who is the step-mother of
Murugesan, and an eyewitness. She is the most important witness,
as she has seen the macabre act of the actual poisoning of the two
innocent lives. Although, PW-16 (Amaravathi), the aunt of Murugesan,
was also produced by the prosecution as an eye-witness, but she
has turned hostile and denies even being present on the spot.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1891

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

43. PW-49, all the same, states that after PW-2, PW-3, PW-15, PW-16
and she were compelled to leave the place where Murugesan was
tortured, they returned home. At dawn on 08.07.2003, PW-16 and
PW-49 went near the temple, but did not find Murugesan there. PW-
49 heard some villagers saying that Murugesan would be poisoned.
PW-49 and PW-16 ran through the temple when they heard a noise.
They followed the sound which led them to a place where PW-49
saw Murugesan tied to a tree in a cashew grove. She says that A-4
was also tied to a tree. PW-49 further states that barring A-14 and
A-15, all the accused were present there. She specifically states that
A-2 poured poison down her son’s throat. She tried to stop A-2 but
was held back by the accused. After A-2 had administered poison to
Murugesan, PW-49 fainted and it was PW-16 who sprinkled water
on her face to bring her back to consciousness. PW-49 then states
that she immediately went to the Virudhachalam police station, but
no one listened to her. On the contrary, she was given casteist slurs
and driven away. After she returned home, PW-1 also came back.
Then, A-3 and others told them that Murugesan’s body had been
set ablaze. Upon hearing this, PW-49, PW-1, PW-15 went to the
place where Murugesan’s body was being burnt. All that they could
recover was a ring that Murugesan used to wear.
44. From a perusal of the evidence, it is also clear that the accused
before us had brought Kannagi to Pudukoorapettai village, where she
was also killed by administration of poison along with Murugesan.
45. In the present case, PW-49, who is an eyewitness, was not cited
as a witness in the charge-sheet submitted by the CBI. What she
had said before the police during investigation under Section 161
CrPC is what she later deposed more or less as a witness in the
Court. There may be some discrepancies in PW-49’s deposition but
on overall consideration of the evidence, these will be of no help
to the defence.
46. The prosecution, however, was not confident that this witness would
withstand the cross-examination, considering she was uneducated
and extremely inarticulate. It was only later during the trial that an
application was moved on behalf of the prosecution under Section
311 CrPC to summon PW-49 as an additional witness, which was
allowed, and PW-49 was made a prosecution witness. This order of
the Sessions Court was challenged before the High Court by none
1892 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

other than PW-14, who prayed that PW-49 ought to be examined as a
‘Court witness’ rather than a prosecution witness. PW-1 approached
the High Court with this prayer because the apprehensions weighing
in his mind were that if his wife (PW-49, Chinnapillai) is examined as
a prosecution witness, she may be declared hostile, and the benefit
thereof would ultimately be availed by the accused. However, the
High Court dismissed PW-1’s petition and affirmed the decision of
the Trial Court summoning Chinnapillai as a prosecution witness. The
High Court held that these apprehensions have to be disregarded
for the reason that the Trial Court is empowered under Section 165
of the Evidence Act to take care of any apprehensions as raised by
PW-1 regarding PW-49 turning hostile.

Prosecution Witness and Court Witness, and Section 311 CrPC
and Section 165 of the Evidence Act
47. Before moving further, we consider it necessary to deal with the law
relating to section 311 CrPC under which PW-49 was summoned
as a witness.
Section 311 CrPC reads as follows:
“311. Power to summon material witness, or examine
person present.—Any Court may, at any stage of any
inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon
any person as a witness, or examine any person in
attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall
and re-examine any person already examined; and the
Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine
any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential
to the just decision of the case.”
This Section 311 of CrPC provides wide powers to a Criminal Court,
to do the following:
i. Summon any person as a witness, or
ii. Examine any person present in court, though not
summoned as witness, or
iii. Recall and re-examine any person already examined

4 PW-49 is the wife of PW-1 and step-mother of the deceased Murugesan
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1893

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

The above powers can be exercised ‘at any stage of any inquiry, trial
or other proceeding’ under the CrPC. The provision can be divided
into two parts. The word ‘may’ is used in the first part of the section
which grants the Court the discretion to summon a witness. In contrast,
the second part of the Section uses the word ‘shall’ which casts a
duty on the Court to summon and examine or recall or re-examine
any such person as a witness when it appears to the Court that it is
essential to do so for a just decision in the case. In other words, the
second part is mandatory, and Courts are obligated to exercise their
powers under Section 311 CrPC when the evidence of any person
is essential for a just decision of the case. (See: Jamatraj Kewalji
Govani v. State of Maharashtra 1967 SCC OnLine SC 19)
48. As is clear from the language of the provision itself, there is a wide
discretion with the Courts under Section 311 CrPC. These powers
can be exercised suo moto or on an application moved by either
side. After all, the object is that the Court must not be deprived of
the benefit of any valuable evidence. It is absolutely necessary that
the Court must be apprised of the best evidence available. Thus,
Courts have been given wide powers to decide on their own if a
witness is required to be called or recalled for examination or re-
examination. This power under Section 311 CrPC can be invoked
at any stage of the trial, even after the closing of the evidence.
Section 311 CrPC can also be read along with Section 165 of the
Evidence Act, as the powers of the Court under Section 165 of
the Evidence Act are complementary to Section 311 of CrPC. As
discussed above, powers under Section 311 CrPC can either be
exercised on an application moved by either side to the case or suo
moto by the Court. In case a person is not listed as a witness in the
charge-sheet but later, the prosecution desires to bring that person
as an additional prosecution witness, then the prosecution can move
an application to bring this person as a prosecution witness. It is
then for the Court to decide whether such a person is required as
a witness or not. If the Court finds that such a person should have
been examined as a prosecution witness and he/she was omitted
from the list of witnesses due to some oversight, mistake or for any
other reason, the Court may allow the application and such a person
can be examined as a prosecution witness. Thereafter, the normal
course of examination-in-chief, cross-examination, etc. would follow
as per the procedure. On the other hand, when the Court calls a
1894 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

person as a Court witness, there are some restrictions regarding
the cross-examination of such witness.
49. In a case where neither party is interested in examining a person as
a witness yet the Court feels that the evidence of such a person is
necessary for a just decision, the Court though cannot compel either
the prosecution or the defence to call a witness, but it can invoke
its power under Section 311 CrPC, read with Section 165 of the
Evidence Act and call such a person as a Court witness. Whether a
person is required to be examined as a witness for a just decision is
again a question which has to be decided by the Court on the basis
of the facts of that particular case. (See: Rama Paswan v. State of
Jharkhand (2007) 11 SCC 191)
50. As far as cross-examination of a Court witness is concerned, no
party can claim cross-examination of a Court witness as a matter
of right. A Court witness can only be examined with the leave of the
Court [See: Zahira Habibullah Sheikh & Anr. v. State of Gujarat
& Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 374 and Jamatraj (Supra)]. Where a Court
witness says something prejudicial to any party, then such a party
must be allowed to cross-examine that witness.
51. Also, as discussed earlier, Court witnesses can be cross-examined
by either side but only with the leave of the Court. Further, the cross-
examination is to be restricted only to what was stated by this witness
in his/her reply to the questions of the Court, and a Court witness
cannot be contradicted to his/her previous statements made before
the police i.e. statements under section 161 of CrPC. The proviso
to section 162(1)5 of CrPC makes it very clear that only prosecution
witnesses can be contradicted against their previous Section 161
CrPC statements. Under the proviso to Section 162(1) of CrPC,

5 162. Statements to police not to be signed: Use of statements in evidence.
(1) No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this
Chapter, shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or
any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement of record, be
used for any purpose, save as hereinafter provided, at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under
investigation at the time when such statement was made:
Provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement
has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by
the accused, and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution, to contradict such witness in the
manner provided by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872); and when any part of such
statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness, but for
the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1895

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

Section 161 CrPC statements of any prosecution witness can be
used by the defence to contradict such a witness during the cross-
examination. The prosecution may also contradict its own witness
during cross-examination regarding the previous statements made
before the police, but again it can only be done with the leave of
the Court. [See: Mahabir Mandal & Ors. v. State of Bihar (1972)
1 SCC 748, Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of Gujarat
& Anr. (2019) 16 SCC 547]
All the same, none of these restrictions apply to the Court, which
has wide power under Section 165 of the Evidence Act to ask any
questions. The Courts are not barred from putting questions which
may contradict the witness with the previous statements made before
the police. The special powers of the Court under Section 165 of
the Evidence Act are not impaired or controlled by the provisions
of Section 162 of the CrPC. (See: Raghunandan v. State of U.P.
(1974) 4 SCC 186)
52. The powers of a Court under Section 165 of the Evidence Act and
the importance of Section 165 in the meaningful conduct of a trial is
brilliantly explained by Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy with distinctive
clarity of his letters in Ram Chander v. State of Haryana (1981)
3 SCC 191:
“What is the true role of a Judge trying a criminal case?
Is he to assume the role of a referee in a football match
or an umpire in a cricket match, occasionally answering,
as Pollock and Maitland [ Pollock and Maitland : The
History of English Law] point out, the question “How is
that”, or, is he to, in the words of Lord Denning “drop the
mantle of a Judge and assume the robe of an advocate?”
[Jones v. National Coal Board, (1957) 2 All ER 155 : (1957)
2 WLR 760] Is he to be a spectator or a participant at
the trial? Is passivity or activity to mark his attitude? If
he desires to question any of the witnesses, how far can
he go? Can he put on the gloves and ‘have a go’ at the
witness who he suspects is lying or is he to be soft and
suave? These are some of the questions which we are
compelled to ask ourselves in this appeal on account of
the manner in which the Judge who tried the case put
questions to some of the witnesses.
1896 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

2. The adversary system of trial being what it is, there is
an unfortunate tendency for a Judge presiding over a trial
to assume the role of a referee or an umpire and to allow
the trial to develop into a contest between the prosecution
and the defence with the inevitable distortions flowing
from combative and competitive elements entering the
trial procedure. If a criminal court is to be an effective
instrument in dispensing justice, the presiding Judge must
cease to be a spectator and a mere recording machine.
He must become a participant in the trial by evincing
intelligent active interest by putting questions to witnesses
in order to ascertain the truth. As one of us had occasion
to say in the past:
“Every criminal trial is a voyage of discovery
in which truth is the quest. It is the duty of a
presiding Judge to explore every avenue open
to him in order to discover the truth and to
advance the cause of justice. For that purpose
he is expressly invested by Section 165 of the
Evidence Act with the right to put questions to
witnesses. Indeed the right given to a Judge
is so wide that he may, ask any question he
pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness,
or of the parties about any fact, relevant or
irrelevant. Section 172(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure enables the court to send for the
police-diaries in a case and use them to aid it
in the trial. The record of the proceedings of the
Committing Magistrate may also be perused by
the Sessions Judge to further aid him in the trial.”
3. With such wide powers, the court must actively
participate in the trial to elicit the truth and to protect the
weak and the innocent. It must, of course, not assume the
role of a prosecutor in putting questions. The functions of
the Counsel, particularly those of the Public Prosecutor,
are not to be usurped by the judge, by descending into the
arena, as it were. Any questions put by the Judge must
be so as not to frighten, coerce, confuse or intimidate the
witnesses...”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1897

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

53. Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy then goes on to say that a judge can
“ask any question, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the
parties, about any fact, relevant or irrelevant”. But then while doing this
the Judge must take both the prosecution and the defence with him.
54. In the present case, in our opinion, the High Court was right in
dismissing the apprehensions of PW-1 that the prosecution would
get PW-49 declared hostile to the benefit of the accused. These
apprehensions were not well-founded. PW-49 is an eyewitness, she
ought to have been made a prosecution witness in the first instance.
Theoretically speaking, the Trial Court could have called her as a Court
witness, in light of the facts of the present case, as her evidence was
absolutely essential for the just decision of the case. All the same,
before the Trial Court could have done it, the prosecution itself moved
an application to summon her as a prosecution witness and therefore,
in our opinion, the Trial Court rightly made her a prosecution witness
by allowing such an application. In the present case, PW-49 did not
support the case of prosecution on some aspects, such as the role
of A-4 and A-9 (Dalits who were made accused), yet her evidence
in respect of other accused was correctly relied upon by the Trial
Court in convicting the other accused.

The findings of the Court on the role of A-14 & A-15 - the Police
Officers
55. Now coming to the role of A-14 (K.P. Tamilmaran) and A-15 (M.
Sellamuthu), who were the Sub-Inspector and Inspector, respectively,
of the Virudhachalam police station at the relevant point of time.
56. A-14 and A-15 were convicted by the Trial Court under Sections
217 & 218 of IPC and Sections 3(2)(i) & 4 of SC/ST Act. However,
the High Court acquitted A-14 for offences under Sections 218 and
Section 3(2)(i) of SC/ST Act. Whereas conviction and sentence under
other provisions were upheld by the High Court.
57. Before we proceed to examine their role, it is necessary to state that
the police station, where these two officers were posted and which
has the jurisdiction of the village, is not very far from the village in
any case as noticed by the High Court, it was about 3 kilometres
from the village. It is very difficult to believe that a dastardly double
murder takes place in the village, and those in-charge of the police
station remain unaware of the crime. To the contrary, it has come
1898 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

in the evidence that the police refused to lodge the FIR against the
accused villagers belonging to the Vanniyar community, when the
incident was reported by a Dalit (PW-49). Further, as stated above,
even though the incident takes place on 07/08.07.2003, the police
only registered the FIR on 17.07.2003 i.e. after a delay of nine days,
after political pressure and the news having caught the attention of
Press and the Media.
58. PW-2, PW-3, PW-15, PW-49 have all spoken about going to the
Virudhachalam police station but being driven out after being given
casteist slurs by the policemen who were there.
59. The fact that A-14 and A-15 had knowledge of the incident, and that
A-15 purposely conducted a wrong and misleading investigation, has
been disclosed in the statements of PW-38 to PW-44 and PW-47
to PW-49, to the CBI, though they did not support the prosecution
on this aspect in the Court. What they said before the Court is as
follows:
i. PW-38 (Sundarapandiyan) served as Head Constable in
Virudhachalam police station between 2002 and 2004. He
deposed that he had heard of A-14 having visited the scene of
crime upon receiving information regarding the incident. PW-38
further states that FIR No. 356 of 2003 was registered by A-14,
and A-15 conducted the investigation.
ii. PW-39 (Ramamoorthy) also served as Head Constable in
Virudhachalam police station at the time of the incident. He
deposed that he was the one who submitted the evidence in
the case, and that A-14 and A-15 were in-charge of the police
station at the relevant time.
iii. PW-40 (Antonysamy) served as Sub-Inspector in the Special
Branch when the incident dated 07/08.07.2003 had taken place.
He was informed about the incident by one PW-47 (Rajendran),
Head Constable in the Special Branch. PW-40 ordered PW-47
to visit the scene of crime. PW-47 told PW-40 that he had visited
the scene of crime, that it was not known whether such an
occurrence had taken place, and that he would inquire further.
PW-40 asked as to why the FIR has not been lodged yet, to
which PW-47 responded that nobody has come forward to file
a complaint yet.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1899

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

iv. PW-41 (Anwar Baig) served as Head Constable in Virudhachalam
police station at the time of the incident. He denies any
knowledge of the complaint being received on 08.07.2003 or FIR
being registered on 17.07.2003, but admits that he prepared the
Observation Mahazar, to which A-15 has attested his signatures.
v. PW-44 (Dhanapaul) was Sub-Inspector of Avinankudi police
station at the time of the incident. He deposed that the DSP,
Virudhachalam asked him to go to Virudhachalam police station
on 17.07.2003. When PW-44 reached there at around 4 PM,
A-14 and A-15 were on duty. A-15 asked PW-44 to assist A-14
with writing work. The FIR No. 356 of 2003 was written by PW-
44, on which A-14 put his signatures.
vi. PW-47 (Rajendran) worked as Head Constable in the Special
Branch when the incident occurred. While on duty, he overheard
people saying that two persons had died by taking poison in
Pudukoorapettai village. PW-47 gave this information to his
superior PW-40, who asked PW-47 to look into the matter.
When PW-47 went to Pudukoorapettai village and inquired, he
claims that nobody gave him correct information. When PW-47
asked at the police station, he was told that no complaint had
been filed.
vii. PW-48 (Harishankar), who was a Head Constable in the
Virudhachalam police station when the double murders took
place, has said in his deposition that he came to know 3-4
days after 08.07.2003 that upon receiving information about the
incident, A-14 had gone to the spot but since nobody lodged a
complaint, he returned and kept quiet.
60. It is true that PW-49 has not specifically said that A-14 and A-15
were the same police officers who refused to register the FIR based
on her complaint, hurled casteist abuses at her, and sent her away
on 08.07.2003. Also, though the police witnesses did not completely
support the prosecution’s case, but from their evidence, it is clear
that A-14 and A-15 both had knowledge of the incident. Considering
the proximity of the police station from the village, it is also highly
unlikely that the police officers in-charge of the police station would
not have known about the incident. Besides, the investigation done by
the local police itself was motivated and downright dishonest, where
the intention was to show that the crime was jointly committed by the
1900 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

Vanniyar and Dalit community, which is far from the truth. It puts the
perpetrators and the victim together as accused. The investigation
of CBI discloses quite another story which, by and large, has placed
the pieces together, except for a few discrepancies here and there.
The local police had also made PW-1, who was none other than
the father of the deceased Murugesan, as one of the co-accused.
This was a ruse.
61. In this regard, evidence given by PW-32 (Ashokan), who was the
suspended Village Administrative Officer at the relevant point in time,
assumes great significance. According to the investigation done
by A-15, PW-32 was the person before whom A-1 had given an
extra-judicial confession. According to the version of the local police,
it was PW-32 who took A-1 to the police station and on the basis of
the extra-judicial confession given before PW-32 by A-1, the FIR was
registered by the local police on 17.07.2003. However, the deposition
of this witness in Court will be of some interest.
62. In his examination-in-chief, which was conducted on 18.09.2017,
PW-32 states that during the relevant time he was a Village
Administrative Officer, but under suspension. In the evening of
16.07.2003, he was asked by the Tahsildar to meet the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, who further asked PW-32 to meet the
inspector of Virudhachalam police station i.e. A-15. The next day i.e.
17.07.2003, PW-32 went to the police station where he met A-15.
PW-32 states that A-15 gave him two sheets of paper with something
written on them already and asked PW-32 to write down the same
contents on another sheet of paper. Initially, PW-32 refused to oblige
by saying that he is under suspension but thereafter, the Revenue
Officer directed PW-32 to comply. Finally, PW-32 agreed to do what
was told to him. A-15 gave the sheets of paper with something written
on them to PW-32 and whatever was written on those papers was
copied by PW-32 on another piece of paper, which PW-32 was later
asked to sign. This was the so called ‘extra-judicial confession’ of
A-1, on the basis of which the FIR was registered. A-1 signed the
same papers immediately thereafter.
63. Thus, it is clear from examination-in-chief of PW-32 that neither did
A-1 make any extra-judicial confession before PW-32, nor was A-1
taken to the police station by PW-32 to make him surrender. Contrary
to this, the version put forth by A-15 in the initial investigation was
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1901

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

that, at some point in time the conscience of A-1 started nagging
him, after he had killed his own daughter and thus he made an extra
judicial confession before a government servant, who was an officer
connected with the functioning of his village. The reality, however, is
quite different. It was all planned and executed to perfection, since
the registration of FIR became a necessity due to political and media
pressure.
64. Immediately after his examination-in-chief, PW-32 was cross-
examined on behalf of A-14 and A-15, but PW-32 stood by whatever
he had deposed in his examination-in-chief.
Four years after the cross-examination was over, PW-32 was recalled
for cross-examination on 03.03.2021 on an application moved by
A-14 & A-15. This time, PW-32 differs from his earlier examination-
in-chief and cross-examination recorded on 18.09.2017, as he now
states that he recorded the confession as made before him and
gave it to the Police.
65. Similarly, examination-in-chief of PW-34, who was the Village
Administrative Officer of Virudhachalam, was conducted on
18.09.2017 where he deposed that at 4:30 pm on 17.07.2003, he
was summoned by A-15 to the police station. There, A-15 made PW-
34 affix his signatures on several documents relating to the double
murders. These included Mahazar, confessions etc. which were
shown to be signed at late night of 17.07.2003 and early morning
of 18.07.2003 at different places.
66. A-15 was behind this devious and dishonest investigation from the
very beginning, and he had falsely implicated the family members of
Murugesan, who belonged to a Schedule Caste community of Tamil
Nadu. There is conclusive evidence in this regard.
67. The purpose of an investigation, like the purpose of a trial, is to
reach to the truth. The duty of an Investigating Officer is to lawfully
collect evidence. In the present case, the Investigating Officer
(A-15) not only covered evidence but fabricated his own. Instead
of collecting evidence, he created evidence and tried to implicate
the innocent and set the guilty loose. In order to fulfil his wicked
design, he has deliberately and willfully violated the mandate of
Sections 154 and 157(1) of CrPC as well as Section 23 and 24 of
the Police Act, 1861.
1902 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

68. Section 154(1) of CrPC provides that when an officer-in-charge of a
police station receives any information regarding the commission of a
cognizable offence, such information shall be reduced in writing and
be read over to the informant. The relevant part of section 154(1)
reads as follows:
“154. Information in cognizable cases.—(1) Every
information relating to the commission of a cognizable
offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police
station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his
direction, and be read over to the informant; and every
such information, whether given in writing or reduced to
writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it,
and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be
kept by such officer in such form as the State Government
may prescribe in this behalf…”
69. Reading of the above provision should not be misunderstood to mean
that the police is empowered to register FIR only in cases where
some informant comes forward and provides information regarding
the commission of a cognizable offence to the police.
Once the police gets information regarding the commission of a
cognizable offence, whether it is through any informant/complainant
or otherwise, police is empowered to register the case and proceed
with the investigation. This becomes clear from the bare reading
of Sections 156 and 157 of CrPC. Section 156(1) reads as under:
“156. Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable
case.—(1) Any officer in charge of a police station
may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any
cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the
local area within the limits of such station would have power
to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.”
Relevant portion of Section 157(1) reads as follows:
“157. Procedure for investigation.—(1) If, from
information received or otherwise, an officer in charge of
a police station has reason to suspect the commission of
an offence which he is empowered under section 156 to
investigate, he shall forthwith send a report of the same
to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1903

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

offence upon a police report and shall proceed in person,
or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being
below such rank as the State Government may, by general
or special order, prescribe in this behalf, to proceed, to
the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances of the
case, and, if necessary, to take measures for the discovery
and arrest of the offender...”
(Emphasis Supplied)

The above provisions make it very clear that where an officer-in-
charge of a police station, from information received or otherwise,
has reason to suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed,
he shall forthwith send a report to a Magistrate and shall start the
investigation.
A Constitution Bench of this Court in Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P.
(2014) 2 SCC 1 made it absolutely clear that an FIR can be registered
even if there is no formal informant. In fact, it is obligatory for police to
register the FIR when they receive any information which is sufficient
to suspect that some cognizable offence has been committed. This
is exactly what was said by this Court:
“97. The Code contemplates two kinds of FIRs: the duly
signed FIR under Section 154(1) is by the informant to the
officer concerned at the police station. The second kind
of FIR could be which is registered by the police itself
on any information received or other than by way of an
informant [Section 157(1)] and even this information has
to be duly recorded and the copy should be sent to the
Magistrate forthwith. The registration of FIR either on the
basis of the information furnished by the informant under
Section 154(1) of the Code or otherwise under Section
157(1) of the Code is obligatory…”
It is not the case that Lalita Kumari (Supra) had made the registration
of FIR obligatory for the first time; it was always there in the statute.
Thus, even in the absence of a formal informant, the police is duty-
bound to register the case whenever they receive any information
regarding the commission of a cognizable offence.
In the present case, as discussed earlier, there is no doubt that A-14
and A-15 had the information regarding the death of Murugesan
1904 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

and Kannagi on the day of the incident itself i.e. on 08.07.2003.
However, they did not register the FIR, thereby acting in violation
of the provisions of law. Their defence that nobody came forward
to lodge a complaint for registration of FIR cannot be accepted
for two reasons. Firstly, when members from Murugesan’s family
went to the police station to register an FIR, they were rebuffed
and were given caste-based abuses. Thus, their plea that nobody
came forward to lodge a complaint is unsustainable in light of
the facts of the case. Secondly, even if we assume for the sake
of argument that nobody went to the police station to report the
double murders, it was the duty of A-14 and A-15 to register the
FIR as it cannot be doubted that they had information regarding
the crime. Hence, their defence is unacceptable in light of the law
as well as the facts of the case, and has rightly been disbelieved
by the High Court.
70. When public, political, and media pressure builds up, A-15 (nine
days after the double murders had taken place), manufactures an
extra-judicial confession of A-1 and registers the FIR against four
Dalits (family members of Murugesan) and four Vanniyars. A-15
then went further and manufactured the confessions of the other
accused. These facts are particularly glaring in light of the fact that
A-15 knew about the incident right from the date of its occurrence i.e.
08.07.2003, but still took no action and made no effort whatsoever
to uncover the truth.
71. We have examined the provisions of law and the facts of the case,
particularly the role of A-15 in detail. Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan,
the learned Senior Counsel for A-15 would argue that at worst, the
case of A-15 can be treated on the same footing as that of A-14, who
has been acquitted of charges under Section 3(2)(i) of the SC/ST
Act and Section 218 of IPC though convicted under other charges.
All the same, we see no reason how that can be done.
72. Sections 217 and 218 of IPC read as under:
“217. Public servant disobeying direction of law with
intent to save person from punishment or property
from forfeiture.—Whoever, being a public servant,
knowingly disobeys any direction of the law as to the way
in which he is to conduct himself as such public servant,
intending thereby to save, or knowing it to be likely that
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1905

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

he will thereby save, any person from legal punishment,
or subject him to a less punishment than that to which
he is liable, or with intent to save, or knowing that he is
likely thereby to save, any property from forfeiture or any
charge to which it is liable by law, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
“218. Public servant framing incorrect record or writing
with intent to save person from punishment or property
from forfeiture.—Whoever, being a public servant, and
being as such public servant, charged with the preparation
of any record or other writing, frames that record or writing
in a manner which he knows to be incorrect, with intent
to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby
cause, loss or injury to the public or to any person, or with
intent thereby to save, or knowing it to be likely that he
will thereby save, any person from legal punishment, or
with intent to save, or knowing that he is likely thereby to
save, any property from forfeiture or other charge to which
it is liable by law, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to three
years, or with fine, or with both.
(Emphasis provided)

73. Here, we would also like to reproduce the provisions of SC/ST Act
under which both the policemen (A-14 and A-15) were convicted
by the Trial Court. The relevant portions of sections 3(2)(i) and 4 of
SC/ST Act are as follows:
“3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.—
…..
(2) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste
or a Scheduled Tribe,—
(i) gives or fabricates false evidence intending thereby
to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby
cause, any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled
Tribe to be convicted of an offence which is capital by
the law for the time being in force shall be punished with
1906 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

imprisonment for life and with fine; and if an innocent
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe be
convicted and executed in consequence of such false or
fabricated evidence, the person who gives or fabricates
such false evidence, shall be punished with death;”
“4. Punishment for neglect of duties.—(1) Whoever,
being a public servant but not being a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, wilfully neglects
his duties required to be performed by him under this Act
and the rules made thereunder, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six
months but which may extend to one year.
(2) The duties of public servant referred to in sub-section
(1) shall include—
(a) to read out to an informant the information given orally,
and reduced to writing by the officer in charge of the police
station, before taking the signature of the informant;
(b) to register a complaint or a First Information Report
under this Act and other relevant provisions and to register
it under appropriate sections of this Act;
(c) to furnish a copy of the information so recorded forthwith
to the informant;
(d) to record the statement of the victims or witnesses;
(e) to conduct the investigation and file charge sheet in
the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court within
a period of sixty days, and to explain the delay if any, in
writing;
(f) to correctly prepare, frame and translate any document
or electronic record;
(g) to perform any other duty specified in this Act or the
rules made thereunder:..”
(Emphasis provided)

74. Analyzing the above-quoted provisions of law in light of the facts of
the case, the following position would emerge:
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1907

K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police

(a) A-14 (K.P Tamilmaran) and A-15 (M. Sellamuthu) both had
committed the offences under Section 217 IPC and Section 4
of the SC/ST Act as they neglected their duties and disobeyed
the law by not registering the FIR at the first instance with the
intention to save the culprits.
(b) Now, coming to the role of A-15. Like A-14, A-15 too is guilty
of offences under section 217 of the IPC and under section 4
of the SC/ST Act but, in addition to these wrongdoings, it is
also borne out from the record that it was A-15 who was the
main architect behind the FIR dated 17.07.2003, which falsely
implicated the four members of Schedule Caste community.
Further, it was A-15 who was in-charge of the investigation
which led to the filing of the chargesheet against the innocent
persons belonging to Dalit community. There is no doubt that
A-15 did this entire exercise to absolve culprits belonging to
the Vanniyar community of their complicity in the crime, and he
knowingly and deliberately falsely implicated some of the Dalits
in an offence punishable with death. Evidence, as discussed
earlier, makes it clear that A-15 manufactured the extra-judicial
confessions and evidence and thereafter, filed the chargesheet
against Dalits on the basis of that evidence. Hence, the High
Court rightly upheld the conviction of A-15 under Sections 217,
218 of IPC and Sections 4, 3(2)(i) of the SC/ST Act and the
sentence of life imprisonment. There is no doubt in our mind
that A-15 is guilty of the offences as held both by the Trial Court
as well as the High Court in appeal.
75. We have also looked into the aspect of victim compensation in this
case. A crime is an act against the State. But a wicked and odious
crime, as the one we have just dealt with, is the ugly reality of our
deeply entrenched caste structure. Honour-killing, as these are
called, must get a strong measure of punishment. We are also of
the opinion that victim compensation here is warranted. We thus
award compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) to PW-1
(Samikannu-father of Murugesan) and PW-49 (Chinnapillai – step-
mother of Murugesan) jointly, or to the nearest of their kins. This
compensation is liable to be paid by the State of Tamil Nadu to the
above-mentioned persons. We further clarify that this compensation
would be in addition to the amount awarded or directed to be paid
as compensation by the Sessions Court and High Court.
1908 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

76. We see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment of the
Madras High Court, and these appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.
77. All those appellants, who are on bail, are directed to surrender within
two weeks from today to undergo their remaining sentence.
78. Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) vacated. Interlocutory application(s),
if any, stand(s) disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey