K.P. SINGHversusSTATE OF NCT OF DELHI

                      [2015) 9 S.C.R. 483


                       K.P. SINGH                                  A
                            v.
                 STATE OF NCT OF DELHI
            (Criminal Appeal No. 1264 OF 2015)
                   SEPTEMBER 28, 2015                              B

      [T.S. THAKUR AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]
      Sentence/Sentencing - Quantum of sentence -
Determination of- On facts, the appellant accepted bribe of        C
Rs. 7001- - Court below concurrently convicted the appellant
for the offence punishable uls. 8 of the 1988Act-As regards
sentence, award of rigorous imprisonment for a period of two
years and a fine of Rs. 5, 0001- by the trial court was reduced
to one year besides a fine of Rs. 5, 0001- and default sentence
                                                                   0
of imprisonment for a period of two months by the High Court
- On appeal, held: Per Gowda J: Having regard to the facts
and circumstances of the case, that the main accused-public
servant against whom the charges were leveled under the
1988 Act, was acquitted for want of evidence on record, and        E
the said order has attained finality; and that pursuant to order
by this Court, the appellant surrendered to the Jail and has
served the sentence for more than 7. 5 months and has paid
the fine amount awarded by the courts below, to meet the
ends ofjustice the period of sentence awarded to the appellant     F
reduced to the period already undergone by him- Thus, the
order of High Court is modified accordingly- Per Thakur J:
Determining the adequacy of sentence to be awarded in a
given case is not an easy task, just as evolving a uniform
sentencing policy is a tough call because the quantum of           G
sentence depends upon a variety of factors including
mitigating circumstances peculiar to a given case - Since
the trial and appeal proceedings are pending for nearly 17

                             483                                   H
484         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A years causing immense trauma, mental incarnation and
      anguish to the appellant; that the bribe amount was just about
      Rs. 7001-; and that the appellant has already undergone 7~
      months against the statutory minimum of 6 months
      imprisonment, the reduction of the sentence is correct -
 B    Prevention of Corruption Act. 1988 - s. 8.

       B.G Goswami v. Delhi Administration (1974) 3 SCC 85:
  1974 (1) SCR 222; Dologovinda Mohanty v. State ofOrissa
  (1979) 4 SCC 557;M. W Mohiuddin v. State of Maharashtra
C (1995) 3 SCC 567: 1995 ( 2) SCR 864; Ghulam Din Buch
  etc. etc. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1996) 9 SCC 239:
  1996 ( 3 ) SCR 1121; State of Maharashtra v. Rashid
  Babubhai Mulani (2006) 1 SCC 407: 2006 (1 ) SCR 189
  ;Bechaarbhai S. Prajapati v. State of Gujarat (2008) 11 SCC
D 163: 2008 (3) SCR 634; V.K. Verma v. CBI (2014) 3 SCC
  485:2014 (1) SCR 1063 ;Gulmahmad Abdulla Dall v. State
  ofGujarat2014 (4) Crimes 455 (SC)- referred to.

                         Case Law Reference
.E
         1974 (1) SCR 222              referred to.     Para 4

         (1979) 4 sec 557              referred to.     Para 5

         1995 ( 2) SCR 864             referred to.     Para 6
 F
         1996 ( 3) SCR 1121            referred to.     Para 7

         2006 (1 ) SCR 189             referred to.     Para 8 ·

         2008 (3) SCR 634              referred to.     Para 9
G
         2014 (1) SCR 1063             referred to.   · Para 10

         2014 (4) Crimes 455 (SC)      referred to.     Para 11

H         CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: CriminalAppeal
      No. 1264 of2015.
           K.P. SINGH v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI                  485


     From the Judgment and Order dated 31.10.2014 of the A
 High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal A. No. 758 of
 2008.

      Radha Shyam Jena, J. Samal for the Appellant.
                                                                  B
    K. L. Janjani, Shailender Saini, D.S. Mahra for the
 Respondent.

      The Orders of the Court were delivered by

      V.GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. Leave granted.                        c
        2. The present criminal appeal is directed against the
  impugned judgment and order dated 31.10.2014 passed by
  the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Crl. A. No. 758 of
  2008, wherein it has affirmed the conviction against the D
  appellant for the offence punishable under Section 8 of the
  Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter "the P. C. Act")
  and reduced sentence awarded from 2 years to 1 year
  retaining Rs.5000/- fine imposed with default sentence of 2
  months after re-appreciation of evidence of the prosecution E
  witnesses no.6, 9 and 13 and accepted their evidence as
  cogent to prove the charge levelled against him in exercise
  of its appellate jurisdiction. Various legal contentions have
  been urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant
  before this Court questioning the correctness of the judgment F
  and order reducing the sentence of imprisonment imposed
- upon him from 2 years to 1 year with fine amount of Rs.5,000/
  - and in default sentence as mentioned above. This Court
  vide its order dated 02.02.2015 has issued notice to the
  respondent to re-consider the quantum of sentence subject G
  to the condition that the appellant surrender to the Central
  Jail, Tihar to undergo sentence and file proof thereof within
  a week. Accordingly, he surrendered to the Central Jail, Tihar
  on 04.02.2015 in case FIR No. 29of1997.
                                                                   H
486        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A      3. Mr. Radha Shyam Jena, learned counsel appearing
  on behalf of the appellant contends that both the Special
  Court and the High Court have erred in convicting the
  appellant despite the fact that the main accused Ms. Manju
  Mathur has been acquitted for the offence under Sections
B 7,8, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act, on
  appreciation of evidence on record and that the prosecution
  failed to prove the guilt against her. She was acquitted from
  the charges, which order has attained finality. The learned
  counsel has further contended that the courts below have
C erred in recording a finding of guilt on the charge as against
  the appellant despite the fact that there is no evidence on record
  to prove the same. The learned counsel has further contended
  that the High Court has erred in upholding the judgment and
  order of the Special Judge and did not consider the essential
0
  ingredients of Section 8 of the PC. Act, which are that the
  accused should accept or agree to accept or even attempt to
  obtain gratification from someone, the gratification is for
  himself or for someone else and its motive or reward is to
E induce a public servant by corrupt or illegal means to do or
  forebear to do any official act or to show favour or disfavour to
  someone etc.

       4. It is further contended by Mr. Radha S'hyam Jena,
 Flearned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that the
  prosecution has failed to prove the involvement of someone
  other than the appellant. Further, it is alternatively contended
  by him that the appellant had undergone agony and trauma
  since the litigation has been going on for the last 17 years.
G In this backdrop, the High Court ought to have imposed the
  minimum sentence of 6 months as provided under Section 8
  of the P.C. Act in exercise of its discretionary power. Hence
  the present appeal urging various grounds.

H        5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties
      and have carefully examined the concurrent findings and
           K.P. SINGH v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI                      487
                    [V.GOPALAGOWDA, J.]

. reasons recorded by the appellate court in its judgment after A
  re-appreciation of evidence in exercise of its appellate
  jurisdiction. The High Court after adverting to the evidence of
  the prosecution witnesses has concurred with the findings of
  fact on the charge framed against the appellant under Section
  8 of the P.C. Act. While concurring with the findings of fact on B
  conviction of the charge framed against the appellant, the
  High Court has modified the sentence imposed upon him
  from 2 years to 1 year with no change in the fine amount and
  the default sentence as awarded by the learned Special Judge.
                                                                     c
       6. We have carefully examined the impugned judgment
 and order passed by the High Court with a view to ascertain
 whether the sentence imposed on the appellant by the High
 Court can be modified to the minimum sentence of 6 months
 as provided under the provisions of Section 8 of the P.C.Act.       D
 It is an undisputed fact that the main accused No. 2 has been
 acquitted from the charges framed against her by the Special
 Court. The learned Special Judge, on appreciation of evidence
 on record has held that the prosecution had failed to prove
 the charge against the accused No. 2, who is the public             E
 servant. Further, pursuant to our order dated 02.02.2015
 the appellant surrendered to the Central Jail, Tihar on
 04.02.2015 in FIR case No. 29 of 1997. He has served the
 sentence for more than 7.5 months as per the certificate            F
 dated 6.9.2015 issued by the Deputy Superintendent,
 Central Jail, Tihar and has paid the fine amount awarded by
 the Special Court which fine amount as sentence is affirmed
 by the High Court. Having regard to the facts and
 circumstances of the case, particularly in the light of the fact    G
 thatthe main accused No. 2, against whom the charges we're
 levelled under Sections 7, 8, 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13
 (2) of the P.C. Act, was acquitted for want of evidence on
 record, we are of the view that justice would be met if the
 period of sentence already undergone by the appellant be            H
488         SUPREMECOURTREPORTS                     [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A     treated as the sentence to be imposed for the conviction on.
      the charge framed against him. To that extent the impugned
      order of sentence imposed by the High Court is modified
      and we pass the following order:-

 B        This criminal appeal is partly allowed and we modify the
          order impugned with regard to the period of sentence
          already undergone by the appellant is treated as sentence
          imposed upon him for the charge proved against him. To
          this extent the impugned order of sentence of 1 year
C         imposed by the High Court is modified. In view of the
          above modified order of sentence, we direct the
          Superintendent of Central Jail, lihar to release the
          appellant forthwith from the custody, if he is not required
          in any other criminal case.
D
            T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. I have had the advantage of going
      through the order proposed by my Esteemed Brother Gowda,
      J. and find myself in complete agreement with the view taken
      by His Lordship that the sentence awarded to the appellant
 E    deserves to be reduced to the period already undergone by
      him. Not because the reasoning given in support of that view
      is in any manner deficient, but only to buttress the conclusion
      arrived at by his Lordship, I propose to add a few lines of my
      own.
 F
       2. The facts to the extent relevant have been elucidated
  in the order proposed by Gowda, J. It would, therefore, serve
  no purpose to recapitulate the same over again. What is
  important is that the principal accused has been acquitted of
G the charges framed against her while the courts below have
  c6ncurrently convicted the appellant for the offences punishable
  under Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In
  the present appeal we had issued notice limited to the question
  of quantum of sentence that could be awarded to the
H appellant in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.
          K.P. SINGH v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI                  489
                       [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

The Trial Court had, as noticed by Gowda, J., awarded rigorous A
imprisonment for a period of two years and a fine of Rs. 5,000/
- to the appellant herein which has been in appeal reduced
by the High Court to one year besides a fine of Rs.5,000/-
and a default sentence of imprisonment for a period of two
months.                                                         B

      3. Determining the adequacy of sentence to be awarded
in a given case is not an easy task, just as evolving a uniform ·
sentencing policy is a tough call. That is because the quantum
of sentence that may be awarded depends upon a variety of C
factors including mitigating circumstances peculiar to a given
case. The Courts generally enjoy considerable amount of
discretion in the matter of determining the quantum of
sentence. In doing so, the courts are influenced in varying
degrees by the reformative, deterrent and punitive aspects D
of punishment, delay in the conclusion of the ~rial and legal
proceedings, the age of the accused, his physical/health
condition, the nature of the offence, the weapon used and in
the cases of illegal gratification the amount of bribe, loss of
job and family obligations of accused are also some of the E
considerations that weigh heavily with the Courts while
determining the sentence to be awarded. The Courts have
not attempted to exhaustively enumerate the considerations
that go into determination of the quantum of sentence nor F
have the Courts attempted to lay down the weight that each
one of these considerations carry. That is because any such
exercise is neither easy nor advisable given the myriad
situations in which the question may fall for determination.
Broadly speaking, the courts have recognised the factors G
mentioned earlier as being relevant to the question of
determining the sentence. Decisions of this Court on the
subject are a legion. Reference to some only should, however,
suffice.
                                                                  H
     4. In B.G. Goswami v. Delhi Administration (1974) 3 SCC
490       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015) 9 S.C.R.


A  85, the accused was convicted under Section 5(2) read
   with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
   1947 and under Section 161 of l.P.C and was sentenced to
   undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 1 year and 4
   months. On appeal, this Court while reducing the punishment
 B to the period already undergone, laid down the general
   principles that are to be borne in mind by the Courts while
   determining the quantum of punishment. This Court observed:

        "10. As already observ~d. the appellant's conviction
c       under Section 161, l.P.C. was rightly upheld by the High
        Court and there is no cogent ground made out for our
        interference with that conviction. The sentence of
        imprisonment imposed by the High Court for both these
        offences is 1 year and this sentence is to run concurrently.
D       The only question which arises is that under Section 5(1 )(d)
        read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
        Act the minimum sentence prescribed is rigorous
        imprisonment for one year and there must also be
        imposition of fine. The sentence of imprisonment can
E       be for a lesser period but in that event the Court has to
        assign special reasons which must be recorded in writing.
        In considering the special reasons the judicial discretion
        of the Court is as wide as the demand of the cause of
        substantial justice. Now the question of sentence is always
F
        a difficult question, requiring as it does, proper ·
        adjustment and balancing of various considerations which
        weigh with a judicial mind in determining its appropri'ate
        quantum in a given case. The main purpose ofJhe
G       sentence broadly stated is that the accused must realise
        that he has committed an act which is not only harmful to
        the society of which he forms an integral part but is also
        harmful to his own future, both as an individual and as
        a member of the society. Punishment is designed to
H       protect society by deterring potential offenders as also by
           K.P. SINGH v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI                     491
                        [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

     preventing the guilty party from repeating the offence; it is . A
     also designed to reform the offender and re-claim him
     as a law abiding citizen for the good of the society as
     a whole. Reformatory, deterrent and punitive aspects
     of punishment thus play their due part in judicial thinking
     while determining this question. In modern civilized B
     societies, however, reformatory aspect is being given
     somewhat greater importance. Too lenient as well as
     too harsh sentences both lose their efficaciousness. One
     does not deter and the other may frustrate thereby making
     the offender a hardened criminal. In the present case, C
     after weighing the considerations already noticed by us
     and the fact that to send the appellant back to jail now
     after 7 years of the agony and harassment of these
     proceedings when he is also going to lose his job and to
                                                                     0
     earn a living for himself and for his family members and
     for those dependent on him, we feel that it would meetthe
     ends of justice if we reduce the sentence of
     imprisonment to that already undergone but increase
     the sentence of fine from Rs. 200/- to Rs. 400/-. Period E
     of imprisonment in case of default will remain the same."

     5. In Dologovinda Mohantyv. State of Orissa (1979) 4
 sec 557, this Court upon considering the negligible amount
  of Rs. 138/- alleged to have been received by the accused         F
. as illegal gratification, took a lenient view by reducing the
  sentence of the accused from four months rigorous
  imprisonment to the period already undergone. The following
  passage is apposite:

     " .... It, however, appears that the entire money which was    G
     said to have been embezzled by the appellant was
     recovered by the government by deducting the entire
     amount from the salary of the appellant. It also appears
     from the statement of the accused under Section 342            H
     that in view of his domestic circumstances he was
492       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A       mentally disturbed. Having regard to these special
        circumstances and further having regard to the facts that
        the sum embezzled is only Rs. 138/- we feel that it would
        not be proper to send the appellant back to jail. The
        appellant has already undergone about a week's
B       imprisonment. For these reasons, therefore, we reduce
        the sentence to the period already served and reduce
        the fine from Rs. 1,000/-to Rs. 500/- in default one month's
        rigorous imprisonment. Out of the fine, if deposited
        already, Rs. 500/- may be refunded to the appellant. With
c       this modification the appeal is dismissed."

      6. In light of the long delay in the conclusion of the legal
  proceedings and the consequential agony and incarceration
  undergone by the appellant, this Court in M.W. Mohiuddin v.
D State of Maharashtra (1995) 3 SCC 567 reduced the
  sentence of six months imposed on the accused by the trial
  court to the period already undergone:

        "10. Now coming to the question of sentence, the offence
E       took place in theyear1981.All these years the appellant
        has undergone the agony of criminal proceedings until
        now and he has also lost his job and has a large family to
        support. It is also stated that he has become sick and
        infirm. He has been in jail for some time. For all these
F       special reasons, while confirming the conviction of the
        appellant, we reduce the sentence of imprisonment to
        the period already undergone. However, we confirm
        the sentence of fine with default clause. Accordingly,
        subject to the modification of sentence of imprisonment,
G       the appeal is dismissed."

       7. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in
  Ghulam Din Buch etc. etc. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir
  ( 1996) 9 sec 239 wherein after considering the long delay
H in the legal proceedings, this Court reduced the punishment
          K.P. SINGH v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI                      493
                       (T.S. THAKUR, J.]

of the accused to two months rigorous imprisonment for A
offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 and the Ranbir Penal Code. This Court said:

    "28. According to us, it would be too harsh to award
    even the minimum punishment at this length of time              B
    keeping in view the hardship already undergone and
    the amount which the State had ultimately to lose because
    of the conspiracy - the same being a sum of Rs.
     1,62, 117.89. As about two decades have passed since
    the commission of the offence and as during the                 C
    interregnum the appellants had undoubtedly suffered in
    body and mind, according to us, it is a fit case where the
    proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 5 oftheAct should
    be invoked which states that for special reasons
    recorded in writing, the court may refrain from imposing a      D
    sentence of imprisonment or impose a sentence of
    imprisonment of less than ·one year. Though the proviso
    permits not to impose a sentence of imprisonment at all
    and confine the sentence to fine only, we do not think if
    present is a case where the punishment to be awarded            E
    should be only fine, as any softness in this regard could
    produce an undesirable result, namely, encouragement
    to adoption of corrupt means by public servants which
    has indeed to be checked, and not allow to be                   F
    encouraged. Keeping in view all the attending
    circumstances, we are of the view that a sentence of RI
    for two months would be adequate sentence, apart from
    the fine of Rs. 15,000. On failure to pay the fine, each of
    the appellants would suffer imprisonment for two months."       G

     8. So also, in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Rashid
Babubhai Mulani (2006) 1 SCC 407, the accused had
allegedly obtained illegal gratification to the tune of Rs. 300/
- for which the trial Court had convicted the accused under         H
Section 161 of the l.P.C. and for an offence punishable under
494       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015] 9 S.C.R.


A Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of
  Corruption Act, 194 7 and sentenced him to rigorous
  imprisonment for a period of one year. This Court reduced
  the sentence to four months after considering the b.ribe
  amount and the long delay. The following observations are, in
B this regard, relevant:

        "6. In regard to sentence, we find that the incident
        occurred about 19 years ago. The matter was pending
        for about 3 years before the Special Judge, and about
c       8 years before the High Court and, thereafter, for 8 years
        before this Court. The accused was hardly 32 years old
        when the incident occurred and now more than 50 years
        old. The accused was a Talathi coming from a poor
        background with a family to support. In the
D       circumstances, while restoring the conviction, we reduce
        the sentence from one year to four months both under
        Section 161 IPC and Section 5(2) read with Section
        5(1)(d) of the Act. Both the sentences to run concurrently.
        The accused, who is on bail, shall surrender forthwith to
E       serve out the sentence."

       9. So also, in the case of Bechaarbhai S. Prajapati v. State
  of Gujarat (2008) 11 SCC 163, this Court reduced the sentence
  of one year imprisonment imposed on the accused for the
F offences under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
  and Section 7(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
  The Court, in the following words, held that the delay and
  the sentence undergone by the accused were mitigating
  factors in determining the quantum of sentence:
G
       "8. The alternative submission relates to the harshness
       of sentence. The occurrence took place nearly seven
       years back. It is stated that the appellant has suffered
       custody for more than six months. Taking into account
H      all these aspects, we feel interest of justice would be best
          K.P. SINGH v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI                      495
                       [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

    served if the sentence is reduced to the period undergone,      A
    while maintaining the-conviction. It is to be noted that the
    minimum sentence prescribed under Section 7(2) of the
    Act is six months."

      10. In the recent decision of this Court in V.K. Verma v. B
CBI (2014) 3 sec 485, the accused was charged under
Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section
5( 1)( d) read with 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 for demand and acceptance of a bribe of Rs.265/- and
was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period C
of one and a half years for each of the offences. This Court,
while hearing his appeal limited the quantum of punishment
to the period already undergone. The following words are
seminal to the issue at hand:
                                                                  D
     "10. In imposing a punishment, the concern of the court is
     with the nature of the act viewed as a crime or breach of
     the law. The maximum sentence or fine provided in law
      is an indicator on the gravity of the act. Having regard
     to the nature and mode of commission of an offence by a E
     person and the mitigating factors, if any, the court has to
     take a decision as to whether the charge established
     falls short of the maximum gravity indicated in the statute,
      and if so, to what extent.
                                                                  F
      11. The long delay before the courts in taking a final
     decision with regard to the guilt or otherwise o~ the
     accused is one of the mitigating factors for the superior
     courts to take into consideration while taking a decision
     on the quantum of sentence....                               G

    xxx                             xxx                    xxx
    15. The Appellant is now aged 76. We are informed that
    he is otherwise not keeping in good health, having had          H
    also cardio vascular .problems. The offence is of the
496       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2015) 9 S.C.R.


A       year 1984. It is almostthree decades now. The accused
        has already undergone physical incarceration for three
        months and mental incarceration for about thirty years.
        Whether at this age and stage, it would not be
        economically wasteful, and a liability to the State to keep
B       theAppellant in prison, is the question we have to address.
        Having given thoughtful consideration to all the aspects
        of the matter, we are of the view that the facts mentioned
        above would certainly be special reasons for reducing
        the substantive sentence but enhancing the fine, while
c       maintaining the conviction."

       11. Similarly, in Gulmahmad Abdulla Dall v. State of
  Gujarat 2014 (4) Crimes 455 (SC), the appellant was
  sentenced by the trial court to undergo rigorous imprisonment
D for a period of one year and a fine of Rs. 2500/- for the offence
  punishable under Sections 161 and 165(A) of Indian Penal
  Code and under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
  Act, 1947. While hearing an appeal on the quantum of
  sentence, this Court reduced the sentence of the accused to
E the period already undergone on the ground of protracted
  legal proceedings. The following passage is, in this regard,
  apposite:

        "7. The incident, in question, took place as back as on
F       29/6/1987. Almost 27 years have passed by. All these
        years, the Appellants must have suffered tremendous
        mental trauma and anguish. The Appellants have lost their
        jobs and all retiral benefits. The Appellant - Jujarsinh is,
        as of today, about 76 years old. We are informed by
G       learned Counsel for the Appellant - GulmahmadAbdulla
        Dall that Gulmahmad is suffering from gangrene and
        has undergone surgery. Both the Appellants are in jail.
        We ,are informed by learned Counsel for the Appellants
        that the Appellants have undergcne about more than two
H
        months imprisonment.
            K.P. SINGH v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI                     497
                         [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

     8. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, therefore, A
we are of the opinion that the sentence undergone by
them should be treated as substantive sentence for the
offences for which they are convicted and fine imposed on
them needs to be enhanced".
                                                                 B
     12. Given the fact that the trial and appeal proceedings
have in the case at hand continued for nearly 17 years by now
causing immense trauma, mental incarnation and anguish to
the appellant and also given the fact that the bribe amount
was just about Rs. 700/- and that the appellant has already C
undergone 711:! months against the statutory minimum of 6
months imprisonment, the reduction of the sentence as
proposed by my esteemed Brother appears to be perfectly in
order. I, therefore, concur with the view taken by His Lordship.

NidhiJain                                  Appeal partly allowed.