Holding

The suit is not time‑barred under Article 109 and the alienation is void as it was not for a pious purpose and lacked consent of all coparceners.

Summary

The plaintiff, a coparcener in a Hindu Undivided Family, challenged a settlement/gift deed executed by his father, the Karta, which transferred a portion of the joint family property to a non‑coparcener. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the deed was null and void and partition of his share. The defendants contended that the suit was barred by limitation, relying on Article 58 of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court held that Article 109, which provides a twelve‑year limitation for suits challenging alienation of ancestral property by a father, applies instead of Article 58, and the suit was filed within time. The Court also affirmed that a Karta may alienate joint family property only with consent of all coparceners or for a pious purpose; the deed was a gift made out of love and affection, not a pious purpose, and lacked consent, rendering it void. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the suit challenging the alienation of joint family property is barred by limitation under Article 58 or Article 109 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Whether the settlement/gift deed executed by the Karta in favour of a non‑coparcener is valid, i.e., whether it was made for a pious purpose and with requisite consent.

Legislation cited

Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 109, s. Article 58

Subjects

Limitation ActArticle 109Article 58Hindu joint familyKartaalienation of propertygift deedpious purposeMitakshara lawpartition suit

Judgment

40 [2022]
SUPREME COURT 3 S.C.R. 40
REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A K.C. LAXMANA
v.
K.C. CHANDRAPPA GOWDA & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 2582 of 2010)
B
APRIL 19, 2022
[S. ABDUL NAZEER AND KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]
Limitation Act, 1963: Articles 58 and 109 – Plaintiff challenged
C alienation of portion of joint family property made by his father-
the first defendant, under Ex.P-1, in favour of the second defendant
– Defendants relying on Article 58 took plea that suit was time barred
– Held: Parties to the suit are Hindus and are governed by
Mitkashara Law – Article 58 provides for the period of limitation to
file a suit to obtain any other declaration – It is a residuary article
D governing all those suits for declaration which are not specifically
governed by any other articles in the Limitation Act – Article 109 is
the special article to apply where the alienation of the father is
challenged by the son and the property is ancestral and the parties
are governed by Mitakshara law – Generally, where a statute
E contains both general provision as well as specific provision, the
latter must prevail – Therefore, Article 58 has no application to the
instant case – The word ‘alienation’ in Article 109 includes ‘gift’ –
In order to attract Article 109, the conditions to be fulfilled are: (1)
the parties must be Hindus governed by Mitakshara; (2) the suit is
for setting aside the alienation by the father at the instance of the
F son; (3) the property relates to ancestral property; and (4) the
alienee has taken over possession of the property alienated by the
father – This article provides that the period of limitation is twelve
years from the date the alienee takes possession of the property –
In the instant case, Ex.P-1 was executed by the father of the plaintiff
G in favour of the second defendant on 02.03.1980 and the second
defendant took possession of the property on 22.03.1980 when Ex.P-
1 was registered – Counting the period of twelve years from
22.03.1980, the limitation for filing of the suit would have expired
on 21.03.1992 – Suit was filed on 11.10.1991 – Therefore, suit was
not barred by time.
H
40
K.C. LAXMANA v. K.C. CHANDRAPPA GOWDA & ANR. 41

Hindu law: Alienation of portion of joint family property by A
father who was karta of joint family in favour of a person who was
neither coparcener nor member of family

– Suit for declaration that the gift/settlement deed executed
by father-first defendant in favour of second defendant was null
B
and void – Plaintiff was not a signatory to the said document and
has categorically averred in the plaint that he did not consent to
the gifting of the schedule property in favour of the second defendant
by the said deed

– Held: It is trite law that Karta/Manager of a joint family C
property may alienate joint family property only in three situations,
namely, (i) legal necessity (ii) for the benefit of the estate and (iii)
with the consent of all the coparceners of the family – Where an
alienation is not made with the consent of all the coparceners, it is
voidable at the instance of the coparceners whose consent has not D
been obtained – Therefore, the alienation of the joint family property
in favour of the second defendant was voidable at the instance of
the plaintiff whose consent was not obtained as a coparcener before
the said alienation – It is admitted by the second defendant that the
settlement deed was, in fact, a gift deed which was executed by the
first defendant in favour of the second defendant ‘out of love and E
affection’ and by virtue of which the second defendant was given a
portion of the joint family property

– A Hindu father or any other managing member of a HUF
has power to make a gift of ancestral property only for a ‘pious F
purpose’ and what is understood by the term ‘pious purpose’ is a
gift for charitable and/or religious purpose – Therefore, a deed of
gift in regard to the ancestral property executed ‘out of love and
affection’ does not come within the scope of the term ‘pious purpose’
– It is irrelevant if such gift or settlement was made by a donor, i.e.
G
the first defendant, in favour of a donee who was raised by the
donor without any relationship, i.e. the second defendant – The
settlement deed/gift deed executed by the first defendant in favour
of the second defendant was rightly declared as null and void by
the courts below.
H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Article 58 of the Second Schedule to the
Limitation Act provides for the period of limitation to file a suit
to obtain any other declaration. The period of limitation under
this article is three years from the date when the right to sue first
B accrues. It is a residuary article governing all those suits for
declaration which are not specifically governed by any other
articles in the Limitation Act. Article 109 is the special Article to
apply where the alienation of the father is challenged by the son
and the property is ancestral and the parties are governed by
Mitakshara law. Generally, where a statute contains both general
C provision as well as specific provision, the later must prevail.
Therefore, Article 58 has no application to the instant case.
[Para 8][46-E-F]
1.2 The word ‘alienation’ in article 109 includes ‘gift’. In
order to attract Article 109, the following conditions have to be
D fulfilled, namely, (1) the parties must be Hindus governed by
Mitakshara; (2) the suit is for setting aside the alienation by the
father at the instance of the son; (3) the property relates to
ancestral property; and (4) the alienee has taken over possession
of the property alienated by the father. This article provides that
E the period of limitation is twelve years from the date the alienee
takes possession of the property. [Para 9][46-H; 47-A]
1.3 In the instant case, Ex.P-1 was executed by the father
of the plaintiff in favour of the second defendant on 02.03.1980
and the second defendant has taken possession of the property
F on 22.03.1980 when Ex.P-1 was registered. Counting the period
of twelve years from 22.03.1980, the limitation for filing of the
suit in the present case would have expired on 21.03.1992. The
suit was filed on 11.10.1991. Therefore, the suit was not barred
by time. [Para 10][47-B-C]

G 2.1 The second defendant has adopted the written statement
filed by the first defendant before the trial court wherein it was
admitted that the schedule property was a joint family property
belonging to the HUF consisting of the plaintiff, his father and his
brother, all three of whom were coparceners in the HUF. The

H
K.C. LAXMANA v. K.C. CHANDRAPPA GOWDA & ANR. 43

second defendant is not a coparcener or a member of this family. A
It was also admitted that the schedule property was gifted to him
by the settlement/gift deed (Ex.P-1) by the first defendant who
was the Karta of the HUF. The plaintiff was not a signatory to the
said document. In fact, the plaintiff has categorically averred in
the plaint that he did not consent to the gifting of the schedule
B
property in favour of the second defendant vide the said deed.
[Para 11][47-D-F]
2.2 It is trite law that Karta/Manager of a joint family
property may alienate joint family property only in three situations,
namely, (i) legal necessity (ii) for the benefit of the estate and (iii)
with the consent of all the coparceners of the family. In the instant C
case, the alienation of the joint family property under Ex.P-1 was
not with the consent of all the coparceners. It is settled law that
where an alienation is not made with the consent of all the
coparceners, it is voidable at the instance of the coparceners
whose consent has not been obtained Therefore, the alienation D
of the joint family property in favour of the second defendant was
voidable at the instance of the plaintiff whose consent had not
been obtained as a coparcener before the said alienation.
[Para 12][47-F-H; 48-A]
2.3 In the instant case, it is admitted by the second defendant E
that the settlement deed (Ex.P-1) is, in fact, a gift deed which
was executed by the first defendant in favour of the second
defendant ‘out of love and affection’ and by virtue of which the
second defendant was given a portion of the joint family property.
It is well-settled that a Hindu father or any other managing
member of a HUF has power to make a gift of ancestral property F
only for a ‘pious purpose’ and what is understood by the term
‘pious purpose’ is a gift for charitable and/or religious purpose.
Therefore, a deed of gift in regard to the ancestral property
executed ‘out of love and affection’ does not come within the
scope of the term ‘pious purpose’. It is irrelevant if such gift or G
settlement was made by a donor, i.e. the first defendant, in favour
of a donee who was raised by the donor without any relationship,
i.e. the second defendant. The gift deed in the instant case is not
for any charitable or religious purpose. The settlement deed/gift

H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A deed (Ex.P-1) executed by the first defendant in favour of the
second defendant was rightly declared as null and void by the
first Appellate Court and the High Court. [Paras 13, 16][48-B-D;
50-B]
Thimmaiah and Ors. v. Ningamma and Anr. (2000) 7
B SCC409 : [2000] 2 Suppl. SCR 653; Guramma Bhratar
Chanbasappa Deshmukh and Ors. v. Mallappa
Chanbasappa and Anr. AIR 1964 SC 510 : [1964] 4
SCR 497; Ammathayi @ Perumalakkal and Anr. v.
Kumaresan @ Balakrishnan and Ors. AIR 1967 SC
569 : [1967] 1 SCR 353 – relied on.
C
Case Law Reference
[2000] 2 Suppl. SCR 653 relied on Para 12
[1964] 4 SCR 497 relied on Para 14

D [1967] 1 SCR 353 relied on Para 15
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.2582
of 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.10.2008 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bangalore in R.S.A. No.372 of 2003.
E Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, Suraj Kaushik, Agam Sharma, Dharam
Singh for M/s Nuli & Nuli, Advs. for the Appellant.
Arvind Varma, Sr. Adv., Sharan Thakur, Mahesh Thakur, Sandiv
Kalia, Ms. Reena Rao, Dr. Sushil Balwada, Advs. for the Respondents.
F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.
1.This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment
and decree in Regular Second Appeal No.372 of 2003 dated 03.10.2008,
whereby the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore has dismissed the
G appeal.
2. K.C. Chandrappa Gowda filed a suit against his father-K.S.
Chinne Gowda and one K.C. Laxmana for partition and separate
possession of his one-third share in the suit-schedule property and for a
declaration that the gift/settlement deed dated 22.03.1980 (Ex. P-1)
H
K.C. LAXMANA v. K.C. CHANDRAPPA GOWDA & ANR. 45
[S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

executed by the first defendant-K.S. Chinne Gowda in favour of the A
second defendant-K.C. Laxmana as null and void. According to the
plaintiff, the schedule property belongs to the joint family consisting of
himself, the first defendant and one K.C. Subraya Gowda. It was further
contended that the first defendant had no right to transfer the schedule
property in favour of the second defendant as he is not a coparcener or
B
a member of their family. Consequently, it was contended that the
alienation made without the plaintiff’s consent is null and void and thus
not binding on him.
3. The first defendant opposed the suit by filing his written
statement. It was admitted that the suit schedule property is a joint family
property. It was contended that the second defendant was brought up C
by the first defendant and out of love and affection he settled the suit
property under Ex.P-1 in favour of the second defendant. It was further
contended that the joint family property was already partitioned between
himself, the plaintiff and the other son-Subbraya Gowda on 23.03.1990.
The plaintiff, having taken his share without any demur is not entitled to D
maintain the suit. It was also contended that the suit was barred by
limitation. The second defendant had adopted the written statement filed
by the first defendant.
4. The parties led evidence in support of their respective
contentions and have produced the documents thereof. The Trial Court, E
on appreciation of the materials on record, dismissed the suit. Feeling
aggrieved, the plaintiff filed a first appeal. The Appellate Court, after
reconsideration of the entire materials on record and re-assessment of
evidence, set aside the judgment of the Trial Court. It was held that the
Settlement Deed at Exhibit P-1 is a void document. The plaintiff was
granted one-third share in the suit property. This judgment of the Appellate F
Court was challenged by K.C. Laxmana, the second defendant in the
High Court. The High Court, after hearing the learned counsel for the
parties and on consideration of the materials on record, dismissed the
appeal by the impugned order.
5. Mr. Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, learned counsel appearing for the G
appellant/second defendant, first contended that the High Court was not
justified in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation. According
to him, Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the facts of
the present case. Secondly, it was argued that the transfer of property
by way of settlement was for pious purpose which is permissible in law. H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A Therefore, he submitted that the High Court was not justified in upholding
the judgment of the Appellate Court.
6. On the other hand, Mr. Arvind Varma, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondent/plaintiff, while supporting the judgment of
the High Court, has submitted that the alienation by way of gift of joint
B family property made by the first defendant in favour of the second
defendant was void. The period of limitation for challenging such an
alienation is twelve years from the date the alienee takes possession of
the property under Article 109 of the Second Schedule to the Limitation
Act. Therefore, he submitted that the suit was not barred by time.
C 7. Having regard to the contentions urged, the first question for
consideration is whether the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by
limitation.
There is no dispute that the parties to the suit are Hindus and are
governed by Mitkashara Law. The plaintiff has challenged the alienation
D made by his father-the first defendant, under Ex.P-1 which is a joint
family property, in favour of the second defendant.
8. Article 58 of the Second Schedule to the Limitation Act provides
for the period of limitation to file a suit to obtain any other declaration.
The period of limitation under this article is three years from the date
E when the right to sue first accrues. It is a residuary article governing all
those suits for declaration which are not specifically governed by any
other articles in the Limitation Act. Article 109 is the special Article to
apply where the alienation of the father is challenged by the son and the
property is ancestral and the parties are governed by Mitakshara law.
Generally, where a statute contains both general provision as well as
F specific provision, the later must prevail. Therefore, Article 58 has no
application to the instant case. Article 109 is as under:

G

9. The word ‘alienation’ in this article includes ‘gift’. In order to
attract Article 109, the following conditions have to be fulfilled, namely,
(1) the parties must be Hindus governed by Mitakshara; (2) the suit is
for setting aside the alienation by the father at the instance of the son;
H
K.C. LAXMANA v. K.C. CHANDRAPPA GOWDA & ANR. 47
[S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

(3) the property relates to ancestral property; and (4) the alienee has A
taken over possession of the property alienated by the father. This article
provides that the period of limitation is twelve years from the date the
alienee takes possession of the property.
10. In the instant case, Ex.P-1 was executed by the father of the
plaintiff in favour of the second defendant on 02.03.1980 and the second B
defendant has taken possession of the property on 22.03.1980 when
Ex.P-1 was registered. Counting the period of twelve years from
22.03.1980, the limitation for filing of the suit in the present case would
have expired on 21.03.1992. The suit was filed on 11.10.1991. Therefore,
the suit was not barred by time.
C
11. The second question for consideration is whether the transfer
of property made by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant
under Ex.P-1 was for a pious purpose.
As noticed above, the second defendant has adopted the written
statement filed by the first defendant before the trial court wherein it D
was admitted that the schedule property was a joint family property
belonging to the HUF consisting of the plaintiff, his father the second
defendant and his brother one K.C. Subbaraya Gowda, all three of whom
were coparceners in the HUF. The second defendant is not a coparcener
or a member of this family. It was also admitted that the schedule property
was gifted to him by the settlement/gift deed dated 22.03.1980 (Ex.P-1) E
by the first defendant who was the Karta of the HUF. The plaintiff was
not a signatory to the said document. In fact, the plaintiff has categorically
averred in the plaint that he did not consent to the gifting of the schedule
property in favour of the second defendant vide the said deed.
12. It is trite law that Karta/Manager of a joint family property F
may alienate joint family property only in three situations, namely, (i)
legal necessity (ii) for the benefit of the estate and (iii) with the consent
of all the coparceners of the family. In the instant case, the alienation of
the joint family property under Ex.P-1 was not with the consent of all
the coparceners. It is settled law that where an alienation is not made G
with the consent of all the coparceners, it is voidable at the instance of
the coparceners whose consent has not been obtained (See : Thimmaiah
and Ors. Vs. Ningamma and Anr.1). Therefore, the alienation of the
joint family property in favour of the second defendant was voidable at
1
(2000) 7 SCC 409 H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A the instance of the plaintiff whose consent had not been obtained as a
coparcener before the said alienation.
13. In the instant case, it is admitted by the second defendant that
the settlement deed dated 22.03.1980 (Ex.P-1) is, in fact, a gift deed
which was executed by the first defendant in favour of the second
B defendant ‘out of love and affection’ and by virtue of which the second
defendant was given a portion of the joint family property. It is well-
settled that a Hindu father or any other managing member of a HUF has
power to make a gift of ancestral property only for a ‘pious purpose’
and what is understood by the term ‘pious purpose’ is a gift for charitable
and/or religious purpose. Therefore, a deed of gift in regard to the ancestral
C property executed ‘out of love and affection’ does not come within the
scope of the term ‘pious purpose’. It is irrelevant if such gift or settlement
was made by a donor, i.e. the first defendant, in favour of a donee who
was raised by the donor without any relationship, i.e. the second defendant.
The gift deed in the instant case is not for any charitable or religious
D purpose.
14. This principle of law has been laid down by this Court in
Guramma Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh and Ors. vs. Mallappa
Chanbasappa and Anr.2, wherein it was held as follows:
“It may, therefore, be conceded that the expression “pious
E purposes” is wide enough, under certain circumstances, to take in
charitable purposes though the scope of the latter purposes has
nowhere been precisely drawn. But what we are concerned with
in this case is the power of a manager to make a gift to an outsider
of a joint family property. The scope of the limitations on that
F power has been fairly well settled by the decisions interpreting
the relevant texts of Hindu law. The decisions of Hindu law
sanctioned gifts to strangers by a manager of a joint Hindu family
of a small extent of property for pious purposes. But no authority
went so far, and none has been placed before us, to sustain such
a gift to a stranger however much the donor was beholden to him
G on the ground that it was made out of charity. It must be
remembered that the manager has no absolute power of disposal
over joint Hindu family property. The Hindu law permits him to do
so only within strict limits. We cannot extend the scope of the

2
H AIR 1964 SC 510
K.C. LAXMANA v. K.C. CHANDRAPPA GOWDA & ANR. 49
[S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.]

power on the basis of the wide interpretation give to the words A
“pious purposes” in Hindu law in a different context. In the
circumstances, we hold that a gift to a stranger of a joint family
property by the manager of the family is void.”
15. In Ammathayi @ Perumalakkal and Anr. Vs. Kumaresan
@ Balakrishnan and Ors.3, this Court has reiterated the above position B
as under:
“10. As to the contention that Rangaswami Chettiar was merely
carrying his father’s wishes when he made this gift in favour of
his wife and that act of his was a matter of pious obligation laid on
him by his father, we are of opinion that no gift of ancestral C
immovable property can be made on such a ground. Even the
father-in-law, if he had desired to make a gift at the time of the
marriage of his daughter-in-law, would not be competent to do so
insofar as immovable ancestral property is concerned. No case in
support of the proposition that a father-in-law can make a gift of
ancestral immovable property in favour of his daughter-in-law at D
the time of her marriage has been cited. There is in our opinion no
authority to support such a proposition in Hindu law. As already
observed, a Hindu father or any other managing member has
power to make a gift within reasonable limits of ancestral immovable
property for pious purposes, and we cannot see how a gift by the E
father-in-law to the daughter-in-law at the time of marriage can
by any stretch of reasoning be called a pious purpose, whatever
may be the position of a gift by the father or his representation to
a daughter at the time of her marriage. One can understand such
a gift being made to a daughter when she is leaving the family of
her father. As it is the duty of the father or his representative to F
marry the daughter, such a gift may be and has been held by this
Court to be for a pious purpose. But we see no pious purpose for
such a gift by a father-in-law in favour of his daughter-in-law at
the time of marriage. As a matter of fact the daughter-in-law
becomes a member of the family of her father-in-law after G
marriage and she would be entitled after marriage in her own
right to the ancestral immovable property in certain circumstances,
and clearly therefore her case stands on a very different footing
from the case of a daughter who is being married and to whom a
3
AIR 1967 SC 569 H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 3 S.C.R.

A reasonable gift of ancestral immovable property can be made as
held by this Court.”
16. In view of the above, we are of the view that the settlement
deed/gift deed dated 22.03.1980 (Ex.P-1) executed by the first defendant
in favour of the second defendant was rightly declared as null and void
B by the first Appellate Court and the High Court.
17. Resultantly, the appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.

Devika Gujral Appeal dismissed.
C

D

E

F

G

H