Holding

The Court ordered that the ratio decidendi of M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh be examined by a larger bench, and pending that, the Union must ensure Aadhaar is not mandatory and its data is used only for specified welfare schemes.

Summary

The petitioners challenged the Aadhaar Card Scheme on the ground that the compulsory collection of biometric and demographic data violated the fundamental right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Union of India and the UIDAI argued that the scheme is essential for the delivery of welfare benefits and that no injunction had been granted against the collection of data. The Court noted that earlier decisions of this Court, notably M.P. Sharma (1954) and Kharak Singh (1963), denied a constitutional right to privacy, whereas later judgments such as Rajagopal (1994) and PUCL (1997) recognized it, creating a doctrinal conflict. The Court held that the ratio decidendi of M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh must be scrutinised and that the matter involves substantial questions of constitutional interpretation requiring a larger bench. Consequently, an interim order was issued directing the Union to publicise that Aadhaar is not mandatory, that it will not be a condition for benefits, and that data will be used only for specified schemes, pending referral to a larger bench. The order also directed the Registry to place the matters before the Chief Justice for further orders.

Issues considered

The collection of biometric data under the Aadhaar scheme violates the right to privacy under Article 21.
Whether a fundamental right to privacy exists under the Constitution of India and, if so, its source and scope.
Whether the ratio decidendi of M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh should be overruled in light of later judgments.
Whether the Aadhaar card can be made mandatory for availing government welfare schemes.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 145(3), s. Article 19(1)(a), s. Article 19(2), s. Article 21, s. Article 32

Subjects

right to privacyAadhaarbiometric dataArticle 21constitutional lawinterim orderlarger benchfundamental rights

Judgment

[2015] 9 S.C.R. 99

JUSTICE K.S. PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) &ANOTHER A
v.
UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS
(Writ Petition (Civil) No.494 of2012)
B
AUGUST11,2015
[J. CHELAMESWAR, S. A. BOBDE AND
C. NAGAPPAN, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950-Art.21- Right to privacy- c
Aadhaar Card Scheme - Collection of biometric data - Writ
petition on the ground that the very collection of biometric
data for the "Aadhar Card Scheme" is violative of the "right to
privacy" u/Art.21 - Plea that in view of judgments of larger
benches of Supreme Court in M.P. Sharma and Kharak D
Singh, the legal position regarding the existence of the
fundamental right to privacy is doubtful - Held: The cases
on hand raise far reaching questions of importance involving
interpretation of the Constitution - At the same time, the
institutional integrity and judicial discipline require that E
pronouncement made by larger benches of Supreme·Court
cannot be ignored by smaller benches without appropriately
explaining the reasons for not following the pronouncements
made by such larger benches- To give a quietus to the kind
of controversy raised, the ratio decidendi of M.P. Sharma F
and Kharak Singh need to be scrutinized and jurisprudential
correctness of the subsequent decisions of this Court where
the right to privacy is either asserted or referred be examined
and authoritatively decided by a Bench of appropriate
G
strength - Interim order passed in view of the balance of
interest that till the matter is finally decided by the larger
-i.
Bench, Union of India or the UIDA is directed to proceed in
the following manner- (i) the UO/ to give wide publicity in the
electronic and print media including radio and television
H
99
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 9 S.C.R.

A networks, that it is not mandatory for a citizen to obtain an
Aadhar card; (ii) The production of Aadhar card will not be a
condition for obtaining any benefits otherwise due to a citizen;
(iii) The Unique Identification No. or the Aadhar card will not
be used by the respondents for any purpose other than the
B PDS Scheme (iv) The information obtained while issuing an
Aadhar card shall not be used for any other purpose, except
as may be directed by a Court for the purpose of criminal
investigation.

c M.P Sharma & Ors. v. Satish Chandra & Ors. AIR 1954
SC 300: 1954 SCR1077; Kharak Singh v. State ofU.P
& Ors. AIR 1963 SC 1295: 1964 SCR 332; Gobind v.
State of M.P & Anr. (1975) 2 sec 148: 1975 (3)
SCR 946; R. Rajagopal & Another v. State of Tamil
D Nadu & Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 632 :1994 (4) Suppl. SCR
353; People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) v. Union
of India & Anr. (1997) 1 SCC 301: 1996 (10) Suppl.
SCR 321; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr.
(1978) 1SCC248: 1978 (2) SCR 621; A.K. Gopalan v.
E State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27: 1950 SCR 88;
Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1
SCC 248: 1970 (3) SCR 530 - referred to.

Case Law Reference
F
1954 SCR 1077 referred to. Para 3
1964 SCR 332 referred to. Para 3
1975 (3) SCR 946 referred to. Para4
1994 (4) Suppl. SCR 353 referred to. Para4
G 1996 (10) Suppl. SCR 321 referred to. Para 4
1978 (2) SCR 621 referred to. Para 8
1950 SCR 88 referred to. Para 8
1970 (3) SCR 530 referred to. Para 8
H
JUSTICE K.S. PUTTASWAMY(RETD.) &ANOTHER v. 101
UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. A
494 of2012
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
WITH
Transferred Case (Civil) Nos. 151 & 152 of 2013
B
. Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 829, 833 & 932 of2013
and 37 & 220 of 2015
Transfer Petition (Civil) Nos. 312 & 313 of2014
and 921 of 2015
Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 144 of 2014 in c
WP(C) 494 of 2012
Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 470 of 2015 in
WP(C) 494 of 2012

Mukul Rohatgi, AG, Pinky Anand, ASG, A. Mariarputham, D
Adv. Gen., Shyam Divan, Gopal Subramanium, Soli Sorabjee,
Anil B. Diwan, A. K. Sanghi, MeenakshiArora, K. K. Venugopal,
Jayant Bhushan, J. S. Attri, Ashok Desai, Sajjan Poovayya,
Ajit Kumar Sinha, Suryanarayana Singh, Sr. AAG, Sanchar E
Anand, Shiv Mangal Sharma, AAGs, Aaayush Agarwal, Ms.
Prasanna S., Niharika, Pratap Venugopal, Gaurav Nair (for K.
J. John & Co.), Aishwarya Bhati, TalhaAbdul Rahman, Prateek
Chaddha, Ankur Kashyap, Kushag1a Pandey, Anusha
Ramesh, Rudra Pratap, Saransh Kumar, Anirban Sen, Neha F
Meena, Madhurima Ghosh, T. Gopal, Ankit Goel, Sanjay Kumar
Yadav, Anish Kumar Gupta, Geetha Kovilan, P. R. Kovilan, S.
S. Rawat, D. S. Mahra, Rahul Narayan, Mohit Singh, Vijay
Kumar, Amit Meharia, Dhritiman Das (for Meharia &
Company), Dr. AbhishekAtrey, Sella Kumar, Sumit Rajora, R. G
Balasubramanian, Ajay Sharma, Devanshi Singh, Binu Tamta,
Zoheb Hossain, Kritika Sachdeva, Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Vakul
Sharma, Meenkashi Grover, Karan Seth, Gopal
Sankaranaryanan, Prerna Priyadarshini, Ankur Talwar, Nidhi,
Savita Singh, S. Uadaya Kumar Sagar, Krishna Kumar Singh, H
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 9 S.C.R.

A Kuldeep S. Parihar, H. S. Parihar, J. M. Kalia, Ninad Laud,
Karan Mathur, Jayant Mohan, K. V. Jagdeshvaran, G. Indira,
Corporate Law Group, Varinder Kumar Sharma, Pragati
Neekhra, Nachiketa Joshi, Nishant Katneshwarkar, E. C.
Agrawala, Abhinav Mukerji, Bihu Sharma, Guntur Prabhakar,
B Prerna Singh, Jatinder K. Bhatia, B. Balaji, R. Rakesh Sharma,
Mishra Saurabh, Sapam Biswajit Meitei, Z. H. Issac Haiding;
S. Vijayanand Sharma, Ashok Kumar Singh, K. N.
Madhusoodhanan, T. G. N. Nair,Aruna Mathur, Yusuf Khan, K.
Vijay Kumar, Arputham Aruna & Co., K. Enatoli Serna, Edward
C Belho, Amit Kumar Singh, S. K. Mendiratta, Monisha Nanda,
Mohit D. Ram, Praveen Sehrawat, Priyadarshi Banerjee,
Sarans Jain, Gopal. Singh, Rituraj Biswas, Rashmi Srivastava,
Anil Shrivastav, Vimla Sinha, Jogy Scaria, Reegan S. Bel,
Apoorv Singhal, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Tapesh Kumar Singh,
0
Mohd. Waquas, C. D. Singh, Sylona Mohapatara, V. G.
Pragasam, Prabu Ramasubramanian, Praveen Sehrawat,
Nikhil Nayyar, Anitha Shenoy, Soumitra G. Chaudhuri, Anip
Sachthey, Abhinandini Sharma, Nishit Agrawal, Anjali
E Chauhan, Shrey Kapoor, Saurabh Rajpal, Milind Kumar, Ruchi
Kohli, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Garvesh"Kabra, Hemantika Wahi, .
Jesal Wahi, Vinakshi Kadan, Saikrishna Rajagopal, Arjun
Ranganathan, Julien George, C. K. Sucharita, Kamal Mohan
Gupta, Dinkar Ka Ira, Amit Sharma, T. G. Narayan Nair for the
F appearing parties. •
The following orders of the Court were delivered
ORDER
1. In this batch of matters, a scheme propounded by the
G Government of India popularly known as "Aadhaar Card
Scheme" is under attack on various counts. For the purpose
of this order, it is not necessary for us to go into the details of
the nature of the scheme and the various counts on which the
scheme is attacked. Suffice it to say that under the said
H scheme the Government of India is collecting and compiling
JUSTICE K.S. PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) &ANOTHER v. 103
UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

both the demographic a_nd biometric data of the residents of A
this country to be used for various purposes, the details of which
are not relevant at present.

2. One of the grounds of attack on the scheme is that the
very collection of such biometric data is violative of the "right 8
to privacy". Some of the petitioners assert that the right to
privacy is implied under Article 21 of the Constitution of India
while other petitioners assert that such a right emanates not
only from Article 21 but also from various other articles
embodying the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-Ill of c
the Constitution of India.

3. When the matter was taken up for hearing, Shri Mukul
Rohatgi, learned Attorney General made a submission that in
view of the judgments of this Court in M.P. Sharma & Others D
v. Satish Chandra & Others, AIR 1954 SC 300 and Kharak
Singh v. StateofU.P. & Others, AIR 1963SC1295, (decided
by Eight and Six Judges respectively} the legal position
regarding the existence of the fundamental right to privacy is
doubtful. Further, the learned Attorney General also submitted E
that in a catena of decisions of this Court rendered
subsequently, this Court referred to "right to privacy", contrary
to the judgments in the abovementioned cases which resulted
in a jurisprudentially impermissible divergence of judicial
opinions. F
"A power of search and seizure is in any system of
jurisprudence an overriding power of the State for the
protection of social security and that power is necessarily
regulated by law. When the Constitution makers have G
thought fit not to subject such regulation to constitutional
limitations by recognition of a fundamental right to
privacy, analogoustotheAmerican FourthAmendment,
we have no justification to import it, into a totally
different fundamental right, by some process of H
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 9 S.C.R.

A strained construction. [See: M.P. Singh & Others v.
Satish Chandra & Others, AIR 1954 SC 300, page 306
para 18]
" ... Nor do we considerthatArt. 21 has any relevance in
the context as was sought to be suggested by learned
8
counsel for the petitioner. As already pointed out, the
right of privacy is not a guaranteed right under our
Constitution and therefore the attempt to ascertain the
movement of an individual which is merely a manner in
c which privacy is invaded is not an infringement of a
fundamental right guaranteed by Part Ill." [See: Kharak
Singh v. State of U.P. & Others, AIR 1963 SC 1295, page
1303 para 20]
[Emphasis supplied]
D
4. Learned Attorney General submitted that such
impermissible divergence of opinion commenced with the
judg'!lent of this Court in Gobind v. State of M.P. & Another,
.( 1975) 2 sec 148, which formed the basis for the subsequent
E decision of this Court wherein the "right to privacy" is asserted
or at least referred to. The most important of such cases are
R. Rajagopal & Another v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others,
.(1994) 6 SCC 632 (popularly known as Auto Shanker's case)
. and People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) ·v. Union of
F India &Another, (1997) 1 SCC 301.

5. All the judgments referred to above were rendered by
smaller Benches of two or three Judges.

6. Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing
G
for one of the respondents submitted that the decision of this
Court in Gobind (supra) is not consistent with the decisions
of this Court in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh. He
submitted that such divergence is also noticed by the
H academicians, Shri F.S. Nariman, Senior Advocate of this Court
JUSTICE K.S. PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) &ANOTHER v. 105
UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

and ShriA.M. Bhattacharjee1, Fonner Chief Justice, High Court A
at Calcutta and High Court at Bombay.

7. Therefore, it is submitted by the learned Attorney
General and Shri Venugopal that to settle the legal position,
this batch of matters is required to be heard by a larger Bench B
of this Court as these matters throw up for debate important
questions- (i) whether there is any "right to privacy" guaranteed
under our Constitution. (ii) If such a right exists, what is the
source and what are the contours of such a right as there is no
express provision in the Constitution adumbrating the right to c
privacy. It is therefore submitted that these batch of matters
are required to be heard and decided by a larger bench of at
least five Judges in view of the mandate contained under Article
145(3)2 of the Constitution of India.
8. On behalf of the petitioners Shri Gopal Subramanium D
and Shri Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel very vehemently
opposed the suggestion that this batch of matters is ·required
to be heard by a larger bench. According to them:
(i) The conclusions recorded by this Court in R. Rajagopal E
and PUCL are legally tenable for the reason that the
observations made in M.P. Sharma regarding the absence
of right to privacy under our Constitution are not part of ratio

1
A.M. Bhattacharjee, Equality, Liberty & Property under the Constitution of India, F
(Eastern Law House, New Delhi, 1997)
2 Article 145(3). The minimum number of Judges who are to sit for the purpose of

deciding any case involving a substantidl question of law as to the interpretation of this
Constitution or for the purpose of hearing any reference under Article 143 shall be
five:
Provided that, where the Court hearing an appeal under any of the provisions of this G
chapter other than Article 132 consists of less than five Judges and in the course of
the hearing of the appeal the Court is satisfied that the appeal involves a substantial
question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution the determination of which
is necessary for the disposal of the appeal, such Court shall refer the question for
opinion to a Court constituted as required by this clause for the purpose of deciding
any case involving such a question and shall on receipt of the opinion dispose of the H
appeal in conformity with such opinion
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 9 S.C.R.

A decidendi of that case and, therefore, do not bind the
subsequent smaller Benches.
(ii) Coming·to the case of Kharak Singh, majority in Kharak
Singh did hold that the right of a person not to be disturbed at
his residence by the State and its officers is recognized to be
B a part of a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 which
is nothing but an aspect of privacy. The observation in para
20 of the majority judgment at best can be construed only to
mean that there is no fundamental right of privacy against the
State's authority to keep surveillance on the activities of a
person. Even such a conclusion cannot be good law any more
c in view of the express declaration made by a seven-Judge
bench decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India & Another, (1978) 1 SCC 248 3 •
(iii) They further argued that both M.P. Sharma (supra) and
Kharak Singh (supra) came to be decided on an
D interpretation of the Constitution based on the principles
expounded in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, Al R 1950
SC 27. Such principles propounded by A.K. Gopalan
themselves came to be declared wrong by a larger Bench of
this Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India,
3
Pam 5... It was in Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295 that the
E question as to the proper scope and meaning of the expression 'personal liberty' came
up pointedly for consideration for the first time before this Court. The majority of the
Judges took the view "that 'personal liberty' is used in the article as a compendious
term to include within itself all the varieties of rights which go to make up the 'personal
liberties' of man other than those- dealt with in the several clauses of Article 19(1 ). In
other words, while Article 19(1) deals with particular species or attributes, of that
F freedom, 'personal liberty' in Article 21 takes in and comprises the residue". The
minority judges, however, disagreed with this view taken by the majority and explained
their position in the following words: "No doubt the expression 'personal lib erty' is a
comprehensive one and the right to move freely is an attribute of personal liberty. It is
said that the freedom to move freely is carved out of personal liberty and, therefore,
the expression 'personal liberty' in Article 21 excludes that attribute. In our view, this is
G not a correct approach. Both are independent fundamental rights, though there is
overlapping. There is no question of one being carved out of another. The fundamental
right of life and personal liberty has many attributes and some of them are found in
Article 19. If a person's fundamental right under Article 21 is infringed, the State can
rely upon a law to sustain the action, but that cannot be a complete answer unless the
said law satisfies the test laid down in Article 19(2) so far as the attributes covered by
H Article 19(1) are concerned". There can be no doubt that in view of the decision of this
Court in R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 2 SCC 298 the minority view must be
regarded as correct and the majority view must be held to have been overruled.
JUSTICE K.S. PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) &ANOTHER v. 107
UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

(1970) 1SCC248. Therefore, there is no need for the instant A
batch of matters to be heard by a larger Bench.
9. It is true that Gobind (supra) did not make a clear
declaration that there is a right to privacy flowing from any of
the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-Ill of the
B
Constitution of India, but observed that ''Therefore, even
assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to move
freely throughout the territory of India and the freedom of speech
create an independent right of privacy as an emanation from
them which one can characterize as a fundamental right, we. c
do not think that the right is absolute". This Court proceeded
to decide the case on such basis.
10. However, the subsequent decisions in R. Rajagopal
(supra) and PUCL (supra), the Benches were more categoric
in asserting the existence of "right to privacy". While R. D
Rajagopal's case4 held that the "right to privacy" is implicit
under Article 21 of the Constitution, PUCL's case held that
the "right to privacy" insofar as it pertains to speech is part of
fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of the
E
Constitution 5
4
Para 9. "Right to privacy is not enumerated as a fundamental right in our Constitution
but has been inferred from Article 21."
5
· Para 18. "The right to privacy - by itself - has not been identified under the
Constitution. As a concept it may be too broad and moralistic to define it judicially.
Whether right to privacy can be claimed or has been infringed in a given case would F
depend on the facts of the said case. But the right to hold a telephone conversation in
the privacy of one's home or office without interference can certainly be claimed as
"right to privacy". Conversations un the telephone are often of an intimate and
confidential character. Telephone conversation is a part of modern man's life. It is
considered so important that more and more people are carrying mobile telephone
instruments in their pockets. Telephone conversation is an important facet of a man's G
private life. Right to privacy would certainly include telephone conversation in the
privacy of one's home or office. Telephone-tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of
the Cons.titution of India unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law.
19. Right to freedom of speech .and expression is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of
the Constitution. This freedom means the right to express one·s convictions and opinions
freely by word of mouth, writing, printing, picture, or in any other manner. When a H
person is talking on telephone, he is exercising his right to freedom of speecl1 and
expression. Telephone-tapping unless it comes within the grounds of restrictions
under Article 19(2) would infract Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution."
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 9 S.C.R.

A 11. Elaborate submissions are made at the bar by the
learned counsel for the petitioners to demonstrate that world
over in all the countries where Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence is
followed, 'privacy' is recognised as an important aspect of the
liberty of human beings. It is further submitted that it is too late
B in the day for the Union of India to argue that the Constitution
of India does not recognise privacy as an aspect of the liberty
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. At least to the \
extent that the right of a person to be secure in his house and
not to be disturbed unreasonably by the State or its officers is
C expressly recognized and protected in Kharak Singh (supra)
though the majority did not describe that aspect of the liberty
as a ~ight of privacy, it is nothing but the right of privacy.

12. We are of the opinion that the cases on hand raise far
D reaching questions of importance involving interpretation of
the Constitution. What is at stake is the amplitude of the
fundamental rights including that precious and inalienable right
under Article 21. If the observations made in M.P. Sharma
(supra) and Kharak Singh (supra) are to be read literally and
E accepted as the law of this country, the fundamental rights
guaranteed under the Constitution of India and more particularly
right to liberty under Article 21 would be denuded of vigour
and vitality. At the same time, we are also of the opinion that
F the institutional integrity and judicial discipline require that
pronouncement made by larger Benches of this Court cannot
be ignored by the smaller Benches without appropriately
explaining the reasons for not following the pronouncements
made by such larger Benches. With due respect to all the
G learned Judges who rendered the subsequent judgments - .
where right to privacy is asserted or referred to their Lordships
concern for the liberty of human beings, we are of the humble
opinion that there appears to be certain amount of apparent
unresolved contradiction in the law declared by this Court.
H 13. Therefore, in our opinion to give a quietus to the kind
JUSTICE K.S. PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) &ANOTHER v. 109
UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS ·

of controversy raised in this batch of cases once for all, it is A
better that the ratio decidendi of M.P. Sharma (supra) and
Kharak Singh (supra) is scrutinized and the jurisprudential
correctness of the subsequent decisions of this Court where
the right to privacy is either asserted or referred be examined
and authoritatively decided by a Bench of appropriate strength. B

14. We, therefore, direct the Registry to place these
matters before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for
appropriate orders.
OR o·E R
c
Having regard to importance of the matter, it is desirable
that the matter be heard at the earliest.

D
INTERIM ORDER

After the matter was referred for decision by a larger
Bench, the learned counsel forthe petitioners prayed for further
interim orders. The last interim order in force is the order of E
this Court dated 23.9.2013 which reads as follows:-

"
All the matters require to be heard finally. List all
F
matters for final hearing after the Constitution Bench is
over. ·

In the meanwhile, no person should suffer for not
getting the Aadhaar card inspite of the fact that some
authority had issued a circular making it mandatory and G
when any person applies to get the Aadhaar card
voluntarily, it may be checked whether that person is
entitled for it under the law and it should not be given to
any illegal immigrant."
H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 9 S.C.R.

A It was submitted by Shri Shyam Divan, learned counsel
for the petitioners that the petitioners having pointed out a
serious breach of privacy in their submissions, preceding the
reference, this Court may grant an injunction restraining the
authorities from proceeding further in the matter of obtaining
B biometrics etc. for an Aadhaar card. Shri Shyam Divan
submitted that the biometric information of an individual can
be circulated to other authorities or corporate bodies which,
in turn can be used by them for commercial exploitation and,
therefore, must be stopped.
c
The learned Attorney General pointed out, on the other .
hand, that this Court has at no point of time, even while making
the interim order dated 23.9.2013 granted an injunction
restraining the Unique Identification Authority of India from
D going ahead and obtaining biometric or other information from
a citizen for the purpose of a Unique Identification Number,
better known as "Aadhaar card". It was further submitted that
the respondents have gone ahead with the project and have
issued Aadhaar cards to about 90% of the population. Also
E that a large amount of money has been spent by the Union
Government on this project for issuing Aadhaar cards and that
in the circumstances, none of the well-known consideration
for grant of injunction are in favour of the petitioners.

F The learned Attorney General stated that the respondents
do not share any personal information of an Aadhaar card
holder through biometrics or otherwise with any other person
or authority. This statement allays the apprehension for now,
that there is a widespread breach of privacy of those to whom
G an Aadhaar card has been issued. It was further contended
on behalf of the petitioners that there still is breach of privacy.
This is a matter which need not be gone into further at this
stage.

H
JUSTICE K.S. PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) &ANOTHER v. 111
UNION OF INDIA& OTHERS

The learned Attorney General has further submitted that A
the Aadhaar card is of great benefit since it ensures an effect(ve
implementation of several social benefit schemes of the
Government like MGNREGA, the distribution of food, ration
and kerosene through PDS system and grant of subsidies in
the distribution of LPG. It was, therefore, submitted that B
restraining the respondents from issuing further Aadhaar cards
or fully utilising the existing Aadhaar cards for the social
schemes of the Government should be allowed.

The learned Attorney General further stated that the C
respondent Union of India would ensure thatAadhaar cards
would only be issued on a consensual basis after informing
the public at large about the fact thatthe preparation of Aadhaar
card involving the parting of biometric information of the
individual, which shall however not be used for any purpose D
other than a social benefit schemes.

Having considered the matter, we are of the view that the
balance of interest would be best served, till the matter is finally
decided by a larger Bench if the Union of India or the UIDA E
proceed in the following manner:-

1. The Union of India shall give wide publicity in the
electronic and print media including radio and
television networks that it is not mandatory for a citizen F
to obtain an Aadhaar card;

2. T,he production of an Aadhaar card will not be
condition for obtaining any benefits otherwise due to
a citizen; G
3. The Unique Identification Number or the Aadhaar card
will not be used by the respondents for any purpose
other than the PDS Scheme and in particular for the
purpose of distribution of foodgrains, etc. and
H
112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 9 S.C.R.

A cooking fuel, such as kerosene. The Aadhaar card
may also be used for the purpose of the LPG
Distribution Scheme;

4. The information about an individual obtained by the
B Unique Identification Authority of India while issuing
an Aadhaar card shall not be used for any other
purpose, save as above, except as may be directed
by a Court for the purpose of criminal investigation.

c Ordered accordingly.

Devika Gujral Matters referrred to Larger Bench.