JHARKHAND URJA UTPADAN NIGAM LTD. & ANR.versusM/S BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LIMITED

          [2025] 4 S.C.R. 1646 : 2025 INSC 533

     Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr.
                        v.
       M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
      (Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9580 of 2025)
                          15 April 2025
        [J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]


                     Issue for Consideration
The High Court rejected the Interim Application No. 11269 of 2024
filed by the petitioner herein u/s.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and
thereby declined to condone the delay of 301 days in filing the
main appeal u/s.13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

                            Headnotes†
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – ss.13(1-A), 16 – Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 – Order XX Rule 1 – Limitation Act, 1963 –
s.5 – Respondent instituted a civil suit against the Petitioner for
recovery of a sum of money along with interest on the basis of
the award passed by the MSME Council – There was a delay of
301 days in filing the statutory appeal – An application u/s.5 of
the Limitation Act was filed by the Petitioner – The High Court
declined to condone the delay – Before the Supreme Court, the
petitioner contended the pronouncement of the judgment in
the open court in accordance with the amended provisions of
Order XX Rule 1 CPC cannot be the starting point of limitation
unless a free copy of the judgment is provided to the parties
in the manner provided under Order XX Rule 1 CPC:
Held: Order XX Rule 1 CPC cannot be construed as mandatory –
In the present case, after the order in question came to be
pronounced by the Commercial Court, the appellants herein during
the limitation period did not bother to even inquire as to why the
said order was not available – It was only eight-months after the
pronouncement of the said order and almost 150-days after the
expiry of the limitation period, that the realization suddenly dawned
upon the appellants herein to apply for the certified copy – One of
the avowed objects of the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act
read with amended provisions of CPC applicable to the Commercial
Courts is to ensure that there is no unnecessary delay in disposal
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                              1647

              Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
                 M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited

     of the commercial suit – Once specific time lines are fixed and
     there is a strict procedure provided in terms of the Commercial
     Courts Act, parties are by the statute put to notice that they have
     to very carefully contest the suits filed as commercial suits and that
     failing to comply with statutory timelines and a strict procedure,
     certain adverse consequences may flow on account of lack of
     application by a contesting party – Thus, merely because Order
     XX Rule I enjoins a duty upon the commercial courts to provide
     the copies of the judgment that does not mean that the parties can
     shirk away all responsibility of endeavoring to procure the certified
     copies thereof in their own capacity – Any such interpretation
     would result in frustrating the very fundamental cannons of
     law of limitation and the salutary purpose of the Act, 2015 of
     ensuring timely disposals – Therefore, this Court is in complete
     agreement with the line of reasoning assigned by the High Court.
     [Paras 10, 16, 17, 18, 21]

                              Case Law Cited
     Housing Board, Haryana v. Housing Board Colony Welfare
     Association and Others [1995] Supp. 3 SCR 219 : (1995) 5
     SCC 672; Sagufa Ahmed and Others. v. Upper Assam Polywood
     Products Private Limited and Others [2020] 9 SCR 472 : (2021)
     2 SCC 317 – held inapplicable.

                                 List of Acts
     Commercial Courts Act, 2015; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908;
     Limitation Act, 1963.

                              List of Keywords
     Condonation of Delay; Period of Limitation; Order XX Rule 1;
     Commercial Courts; Limitation period; Free copy of judgment;
     Avowed objects of the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act.

                             Case Arising From
     EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave
     Petition (Civil) No. 9580 of 2025
     From the Judgment and Order dated 14.02.2025 of the High Court
     of Jharkhand at Ranchi in COA No. 1 of 2025
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                         Appearances for Parties
     Advs. for the Petitioners:
     Sachin Kumar, A.A.G., Saurabh Kripal, Sr. Adv., Kumar Anurag
     Singh, Ms. Tulika Mukherjee, Zain A. Khan, Ms. Ekta Bharati.

                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                   Order

1.   Exemption Application is allowed.
2.   This petition arises from the judgment and order passed by the High
     court of Jharkhand at Ranchi dated 14.02.2025 in Commercial Appeal
     No. 1 of 2025 by which the High Court rejected the Interim Application
     No. 11269 of 2024 filed by the petitioner herein under Section 5 of
     the Limitation Act, 1963 and thereby declined to condone the delay
     of 301 days in filing the main appeal under Section 13(1-A) of the
     Commercial Courts Act, 2015 for short, the “Act, 2015”.
3.   It appears from the materials on record that the respondent herein M/s.
     Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, a Central Government Company,
     instituted a civil suit against the petitioners herein for recovery of
     Rs. 26,59,34,854/- with interest at the rate of 15.75 per cent per
     annum calculated quarterly till realization from 12.11.2014 on the
     basis of the award passed by the MSME Council Kanpur.
4.   In filing the statutory appeal, there was a delay of 301 days as
     noted above. In such circumstances, the petitioners herein prayed
     for condonation of delay. The High Court declined to condone the
     delay on the ground that no sufficient cause was assigned by the
     petitioners for the purpose of condonation of delay.
5.   Mr. Saurabh Kripal, the learned Senior counsel along with Mr. Zain A.
     Khan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners put forward
     before us two submissions for our consideration:
     (i)    According to him the High Court committed a serious error in
            dismissing the commercial appeal on the ground of limitation
            without considering the true purport of the provisions of Order
            XX Rule 1 CPC inserted specially for the commercial courts.
     (ii)   The High Court failed to take into consideration an important
            question of law that the pronouncement of the judgment in
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                            1649

               Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
                  M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited

            the open court in accordance with the amended provisions of
            Order XX Rule 1 CPC cannot be the starting point of limitation
            unless a free copy of the judgment is provided to the parties
            in the manner provided under Order XX Rule 1 CPC. In other
            words, according to the learned counsel, Order XX Rule 1 CPC
            should be construed as mandatory and not directory in so far
            as providing a copy of the order.
6.   In support of the aforesaid two submissions, Mr. Kripal placed
     reliance on two judgments of this Court (i) Housing Board, Haryana
     v. Housing Board Colony Welfare Association and Others reported
     in (1995) 5 SCC 672 and (ii) Sagufa Ahmed and Others. v. Upper
     Assam Polywood Products Private Limited and Others reported in
     (2021) 2 SCC 317.
7.   Before we proceed to consider the two submissions canvassed
     on behalf of the petitioners as noted above, we must look into few
     provisions of the Act, 2015:
     (i)    The objective of Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and
            Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (the
            Principal Act) was speedy resolution of commercial disputes.
            The “Commercial disputes” have been defined with an inclusive
            definition and it covers almost all disputes arising out of the
            commercial activities. The Act provides for a Schedule which
            amends certain provisions of CPC. These provisions are
            applicable to Commercial Disputes of Specified Value. The Act
            has clarified that the provisions of the CPC as amended by
            the Act would have an overriding effect over any rules of the
            High Court, or the amendments to the CPC made by a State
            Government.
     (ii)   Section 16 of the Act, 2015 reads thus:
                 “16. Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
                 in its application to commercial disputes.—(1) The
                 provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
                 1908) shall, in their application to any suit in respect
                 of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value, stand
                 amended in the manner as specified in the Schedule.
                 (2) The Commercial Division and Commercial Court
                 shall follow the provisions of the Code of Civil
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             Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended by this
             Act, in the trial of a suit in respect of a commercial
             dispute of a Specified Value. (3) Where any provision
             of any Rule of the jurisdictional High Court or any
             amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5
             of 1908), by the State Government is in conflict with
             the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
             (5 of 1908), as amended by this Act, the provisions
             of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by this
             Act shall prevail.”
    (iii) Section 13 of the Act, 2015 provides for appeals. The same
          reads thus:
             “13. Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and
             Commercial Divisions.—(1) Any person aggrieved
             by the judgment or order of a Commercial Court
             below the level of a District Judge may appeal to
             the Commercial Appellate Court within a period of
             sixty days from the date of judgment or order. (1A)
             Any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of
             a Commercial Court at the level of District Judge
             exercising original civil jurisdiction or, as the case
             may be, Commercial Division of a High Court may
             appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of that
             High Court within a period of sixty days from the date
             of the judgment or order:
             Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders
             passed by a Commercial Division or a Commercial
             Court that are specifically enumerated under Order
             XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
             1908) as amended by this Act and section 37 of the
             Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996)
             (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
             law for the time being in force or Letters Patent of
             a High Court, no appeal shall lie from any order or
             decree of a Commercial Division or Commercial Court
             otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of
             this Act.”
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                          1651

              Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
                 M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited

8.   We must now look into Order XX Rule 1 of the CPC:
           “1. Judgment when pronounced.—
           (1) The Court, after the case has been heard, shall
           pronounce judgment in an open Court, either at once, or
           as soon thereafter as may be practicable and when the
           judgment is to be pronounced on some future day, the
           Court shall fix a day for that purpose, of which due notice
           shall be given to the parties or their pleaders:
           Provided that where the judgment is not pronounced at
           once, every endeavour shall be made by the Court to
           pronounce the judgment within thirty days from the date
           on which the hearing of the case was concluded but,
           where it is not practicable so to do on the ground of the
           exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of the case,
           the Court shall fix a future day for the pronouncement of
           the judgment, and such day shall not ordinarily be a day
           beyond sixty days from the date on which the hearing of
           the case was concluded, and due notice of the day so
           fixed shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.
           (1) The Commercial Court, Commercial Division, or
           Commercial Appellate Division, as the case may be,
           shall, within ninety days of the conclusion of arguments,
           pronounce judgment and copies thereof shall be issued
           to all the parties to the dispute through electronic mail or
           otherwise.
           (2) Where a written judgment is to be pronounced, it shall
           be sufficient if the findings of the Court on each issue
           and the final order passed in the case are read out and
           it shall not be necessary for the Court to read out the
           whole judgment.
           (3) The judgment may be pronounced by dictation in
           open Court to a shorthand writer if the Judge is specially
           empowered by the High Court in this behalf: Provided that,
           where the judgment is pronounced by dictation in open
           Court, the transcript of the judgment so pronounced shall,
           after making such correction therein as may be necessary,
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          be signed by the judge, bear the date on which it was
          pronounced, and form a part of the record.”
9.   We need to interpret the expression “pronounced judgment and
     copies thereof shall be issued to all the parties to the dispute
     through electronic material or otherwise”. The argument canvassed
     on behalf of the petitioners is that the aforesaid expression should
     be construed as mandatory and not directory. In other words, the
     argument is that the period of limitation would start only after the
     copy of the judgment is provided to the party concerned through any
     one of the modes as provided in law.
10. We are afraid it is difficult for us to take the view that the provision
    referred to above is mandatory. It comes to this that till the Registry
    does not provide the copy of the judgment, though not demanded,
    the period of limitation would not commence from the date of the
    pronouncement of the judgment.
11. Placing reliance on the decision of Housing Board, Haryana (supra)
    it has been contended by the appellants herein that where the rules
    themselves enjoin a duty of communicating any order or judgment
    that has been passed by a court or forum, then in such cases, the
    period of limitation prescribed has to be computed from the date of
    such communication.
12. In Housing Board, Haryana (supra), the facts germane for our
    consideration are that three appeals were filed before the State
    consumer commission by the appellants therein. The State consumer
    commission dismissed all the three appeals on the ground that
    those were barred by limitation. In appeal before this court, the
    appellant therein contended that the delay in filing those appeals
    was on account of the non-availability of the certified copy of the
    decision rendered by the District Forum which was sought to be
    challenged. The appellant therein contended that as per Rule 4(10)
    of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 all orders of the
    District Forum are required to be signed and communicated to the
    parties free of charge. However, since the order in question after
    being pronounced could not be signed due to non-availability of the
    President of the District Forum the certified copy of the order could
    not be provided in time. In such circumstances, this Court held that
    the period of limitation would begin to run only from the date on
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                         1653

              Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
                 M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited

     which the copies of the order were made available. The relevant
     observations read as under: -
           “13. In the present case as laid before the State
           Commission the appellant contended that the order was
           pronounced by the District Forum in the open court on
           22-10-1992, it was not signed and dated as the President
           had proceeded on leave soon thereafter and therefore,
           neither the reasons on which the said order was based
           were known nor a copy thereof was furnished to the
           appellant-Board so as to know the reasons and contents
           of the order. It was also the case of the appellant that
           on an enquiry by the counsel for the appellant-Board
           he was informed by the stenographer of the President
           that the order would be dictated and typed after the
           return of the President and that the copy would be
           made available to the parties only on 30-10-1992 under
           the signature of the President and the copy was in fact
           made available to the counsel for the appellant only on
           3-11-1992. It may be pointed out that Shri Tirath Singh,
           learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Board before
           the National Commission had filed his own affidavit
           affirming these facts which have not been controverted
           by the respondents. On the contrary the reply filed in
           this Court by Shri K.C. Chug, President, Housing Board
           Colony Welfare Association, Kurukshetra on behalf of
           the respondents has admitted that “in the present case
           free copies were ready with the office on 30-10-1992
           which were collected by the counsel for the answering
           respondent on 30-10-1992 whereas the counsel for the
           petitioner got the same on 3-11-1992”. From these facts
           it is abundantly clear that the copies were duly signed
           and dated by the members of the forum on 30-10-1992.
           That being so the period of limitation in view of the above
           discussion will commence from the date on which the
           copies of the order were ready and made available i.e.
           30-10-1992. In the present case the appeals were filed
           before the State Commission on 30-11-1992 and since
           29-11-1992 was Sunday, the appeals were prima facie
           within time. In these facts and circumstances there was
1654                                                         [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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           no question of making any application for condonation of
           delay in filing the appeals as there was no delay at all.”
13. Although in Housing Board, Haryana (supra) this Court had held that
    where the provisions enjoin a duty of communicating any order or
    judgment that has been pronounced, the limitation for challenging
    the same would begin from the date of such communication, yet the
    aforesaid observations cannot be construed devoid of the context
    in which they were made. A close reading of the decision would
    indicate that in the said case, after the pronouncement of the order,
    the appellants therein had made active efforts for procuring the
    said order, and this is evident from the fact that few days after the
    pronouncement, the counsel of the appellants therein had made
    inquires as regards the unavailability of the order in response to
    which he was informed that the order was yet to be signed.
14. Thus, when this Court in Housing Board, Haryana (supra) held
    that the limitation for challenging the same would begin from the
    date of such communication, the same would be applicable only
    where despite best of efforts at the end of the parties in procuring
    the order the same could not be obtained and thereby resulting in
    unavoidable delay in the filing of appeals. One of the core tenets of
    the law of limitation is to enthuse diligence amongst parties as to
    their rights. The law of limitation cannot be read in such a manner
    whereby parties stop showing any modicum of regard for their own
    rights and on the pre-text of untimely communication continue to
    litigate without being vigilante themselves.
15. Similarly, we find that the reliance by the appellants on the decision of
    Sagufa Ahmed (supra) is also misplaced. In the said case, this Court
    while considering Section 421 sub-section (3) of the Companies Act,
    2013 held that the period of limitation prescribed therein would start
    running only from the date on which a copy of the order is made
    available to the person aggrieved. However, yet again in the said
    case, the appellants therein had made some efforts to procure a
    certified copy of the order to be assailed during the period of limitation.
16. In the present case we find that after the order in question came
    to be pronounced by the Commercial Court, Ranchi, the appellants
    herein during the limitation period did not bother to even inquire as to
    why the said order was not available. It was only eight-months after
    the pronouncement of the said order and almost 150-days after the
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                           1655

              Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
                 M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited

     expiry of the limitation period, that the realization suddenly dawned
     upon the appellants herein to apply for the certified copy.
17. One of the avowed objects of the provisions of the Commercial
    Courts Act read with amended provisions of CPC applicable to the
    Commercial Courts is to ensure that there is no unnecessary delay
    in disposal of the commercial suit. Once specific time lines are fixed
    and there is a strict procedure provided in terms of the Commercial
    Courts Act, parties are by the statute put to notice that they have
    to very carefully contest the suits filed as commercial suits and that
    failing to comply with statutory timelines and a strict procedure, certain
    adverse consequences may flow on account of lack of application
    by a contesting party.
18. Thus, merely because Order XX Rule I enjoins a duty upon the
    commercial courts to provide the copies of the judgment that does not
    mean that the parties can shirk away all responsibility of endeavoring
    to procure the certified copies thereof in their own capacity. Any
    such interpretation would result in frustrating the very fundamental
    cannons of law of limitation and the salutary purpose of the Act,
    2015 of ensuring timely disposals.
19. At this stage, we must look into some of the relevant findings recorded
    by the High Court. The High Court, in para 18 of its judgment, framed
    the following question for its consideration. Para 18 reads thus:
           “18. The question for consideration is:
                “whether the applicants herein can plead that the
                period of limitation for filing the appeal to Commercial
                Appellate Division of this Court did not commence at
                all because the certified copy of the judgment had
                not been issued to the applicants by the Commercial
                Courts?””
20. The High Court, thereafter, proceeded to answer the aforesaid
    question as under:
           “19. In order to answer this question, we cannot lose sight
           of the whole purpose of enactment of the Commercial
           Courts Act, 2015 i.e., to provide for speedy disposal of
           high value commercial dispute.
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        20. No doubt there was a similar provision in Haryana
        Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 framed under the
        Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which was considered
        by the Supreme Court in the case of Housing Board,
        Haryana (1 supra).
        The said provision in the Haryana Consumer Protection
        Rules, 1988 also provided for communication of the order
        of the District forum to the parties free of charge in order
        to avoid the delay as well as to save the parties from the
        burden of expenses that may he incurred for obtaining
        the certified copy.
        The Supreme Court held that the scheme of the Consumer
        Protection Act was to provide for better protection of the
        interest of the consumers as a measure for economical
        and speedy remedy for the settlement of the dispute and
        the matters connected therewith and therefore, the said
        rule should be understood in a manner so that it would
        protect the interest of the parties before the District forum
        by making it obligatory on the District forum to provide a
        copy of the order duly signed and dated by the members
        of the Bench; and the period of limitation prescribed with
        regard to filing of an appeal under Section 15 of the said
        Act therefore, has to be computed as commencing from
        the date of communication of the order in the manner laid
        down in the rules.
        It was in that context that it was Held that mere
        pronouncement of an order in the open Conn would not
        be enough, but under the scheme of the rules copy of
        the said judgment has to be communicated to the parties
        affected by the said order so that the parties adversely
        affected therefrom may have a fair and reasonable
        opportunity of knowing the text, reasons and contents
        thereof so as to formulate grounds of attack before the
        appellate or before the higher forums. In absence of such
        communication of signed and dated order, it was held that
        the parties adversely affected by it will have no means
        of knowing the contents of the order so to challenge the
        same and get it set aside by the appellate authority or by
        the higher forums.
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                           1657

              Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
                 M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited

           21. Normally petitioners before the District forums under
           the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 are individuals and
           not corporate entities like the appellant/instrumentality of
           the State. So, there is justification for taking the view as
           regards petitioners in District forums that the provisions
           in the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 which
           mandated communication of the order of the said forums
           to the parties free of charge was to save the parties from
           the burden of expenses that may be incurred for obtaining
           the certified copy.
           22. We are afraid that the logic behind the provision
           contained in Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988
           framed under the Consumer Protection Act. 1986 cannot
           be applied to the litigants before the Commercial Court.
           For Commercial entities and in particular litigants like
           the applicants herein who are the State Government
           Undertakings, the expenses of obtaining a certified copy
           of a judgment of the Commercial Court would be very
           small compared to the stakes involves in the litigation.
           23. Therefore, they cannot be put on the same footing as
           a petitioner before the District Consumer forum; and the
           logic of counting the period of limitation from the date of
           communication of the order of consumer forum, cannot
           be applied to a Commercial dispute to which Commercial
           entities are parties.
           24. In our opinion. Order XX Rule 1 CPC as amended and
           made applicable to the Commercial Courts is to be treated
           as only directory and not mandatory. So notwithstanding
           the provision contained in the amended Order XX Rule 1
           CPC (mandating issuance of copies to the parties to the
           dispute through electronic mail or otherwise), if such copies
           are not issued within a reasonable time, the parties to the
           dispute have to apply for the same, and after obtaining
           it, prefer an appeal within the time prescribed in Section
           13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
           25. This is because the speedy resolution of high value
           commercial dispute cannot be lost sight of. Such an
           interpretation would be in tune with the scheme and object
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        of the Commercial Couns Act, 2015 and any interpretation
        of the nature advanced by the counsel for the applicants
        would defeat the whole purpose of the object of the
        Commercial Courts Act. 2015 to provide for speedy disposal
        of high value commercial disputes.
        26. Therefore, we reject the contention of the counsel for the
        applicants that the period of limitation for filing the appeal to
        the Commercial Appellate Division of the High Court would
        not commence unless the judgment of the Commercial
        Court in the Commercial suit was communicated by the
        said Commercial Court to the parties.
        27. We shall next consider whether the delay of 301 days
        in filing this Commercial Appeal can be condone in exercise
        of power conferred on this Court under Section 5 of the
        Limitation Act, 1963.
        28. The extent of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation
        Act, 1963 to cases falling under the Commercial Courts
        Act, 2015 fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in
        Government of Maharashtra (2 supra).
        29. The Supreme Court in Para 19 of it’s judgment in
        Government of Maharashtra (2 supra) discussed the
        statement of objects and reasons behind enacting of the
        Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and held that period of
        limitation must always to some extent be arbitrary and
        may result in some hardship, but this is no reason as to
        why they should not be strictly followed.
        In para 32, it held that the condonation of delay under
        Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has to be seen in the
        context of the object of speedy resolution of the dispute.
        In para 58, the Supreme Court held that given the object
        sought to be achieved under the Commercial Courts Act,
        2015 i.e., the speedy resolution of the disputes, expression
        “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
        is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the
        period provided by the appeal provision itself; and that the
        expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea
        for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims.
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                          1659

              Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
                 M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited

           In other words, the Supreme Court indicated that in exercise
           of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 a
           delay beyond the period of 60 days from the date on
           which the appeal could have been filed can be condoned
           (i.e., below 120 days from the date of pronouncement of
           the judgment) by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
           1963, but where there is negligence, inaction or lack of
           bona fides, such power ought not to be exercised.
           It went further in para 59 by observing that merely because
           the Government is involved, a different yardstick for
           condonation of delay cannot be laid down. (This rule would
           thus apply equally to instrumentalities of Government like
           the applicants herein).
           It held in para 62 that merely because sufficient cause
           has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is
           no right in the applicants or the appellants to have the
           delay condoned.
           It concluded in para 63 as under:
           “63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal
           sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration An and
           the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals pled under section
           37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles
           116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(l-A)of
           the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days,
           30 days or 60 days. respectively, is to be condoned by
           way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in
           which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in
           a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period
           can, in the discretion of the court, he condoned, always
           bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that
           the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and
           justice, what may now be lost by the first party’s inaction,
           negligence or laches.”
                                                 (emphasis supplied)

           30. Thus, the Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra
           (2 supra) permitted condonation of delay beyond 60 days
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        in a case falling under the Commercial Courts Act only by
        way of exception and not by way of rule. If the applicants
        for condonation of delay had not acted bona fide and had
        acted in a negligent manner as in the instant case, the
        delay is not liable to be condoned.
        31. In the instant case, the delay in filing the appeal is
        301 days – way beyond 60 days + 60 days = 120 days
        permitted by the judgment of the Supreme Court to be
        condoned in exercise of power under Section 5 of the
        Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, such inordinate delay
        caused by negligence of the applicants is not liable to be
        condoned.
        32. We may also point out that the applicants were
        represented before the Commercial Court, Ranchi by
        counsel and the judgment was obviously pronounced in
        the presence of the counsel.
        Though the order was pronounced on 09.10.2023 it
        appears that the application for issuance of certified
        copy was made on 30.08.2024, it was made ready on
        07.09.2024, and the appeal was filed on 04.10.2024.
        If the Commercial Court had not communicated the copy
        of its judgment to the applicants within the reasonable
        time, it was incumbent on the part of the counsel for the
        applicants or the employees in the Legal Department
        of the applicants to apply for issuance of certified copy
        from the Commercial Court, but they have failed in their
        duty to apply for it when they did not receive it within a
        reasonable time.
        Their negligence resulted in the inordinate delay of 301
        days in filing this appeal.
        33. The applicants cannot blame the respondent for not
        communicating to them about the disposal of the appeal
        and for not making any demand of payment in terms of
        the decree of the Commercial Court.
        34. They also cannot take advantage of the negligence of
        the counsel engaged by them in not informing the applicants
[2025] 4 S.C.R.                                                             1661

                 Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
                    M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited

             about the judgment of the Commercial Court. This is
             because the applicants have a Legal Department and
             employees engaged by the applicants in that department
             have a duty to monitor what is happening in the cases to
             which the applicants are parties, keep track of the progress
             of the said cases and the decisions therein, and ensure
             that applications for issuance of certified copy are made to
             the concerned court so that the appeals, if required, can be
             preferred within the period of limitation prescribed by law.”
21. We are in complete agreement with the line of reasoning assigned
    by the High Court.
22. In the result, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Petition dismissed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan