JASWINDER SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVEversusNAVJOT SINGH SIDHU & ORS.

                        [2022] 4 S.C.R. 725                              725


        JASWINDER SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL                             A
                   REPRESENTATIVE
                                  v.
                 NAVJOT SINGH SIDHU & ORS.
              (Review Petition (Crl.) No. 477 of 2018)                   B
                           MAY 19, 2022
 [A. M. KHANWILKAR AND SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, JJ.]
      Sentence/Sentencing:
       Enhancement of sentence – Incident pertaining to a dispute        C
of right of way – Respondent No. 1-accused inflicted fist blows to a
65 years old man, resulting in his death – High Court convicted the
accused u/s. 304 Part II IPC – However, in appeal, the Supreme
Court held that out of all the fist blows of the respondent, only one
of them landed on the head of the deceased, that there was
                                                                         D
uncertainty regarding the cause of death, that no weapon used nor
there was past enmity, thus, respondent not held guilty of death but
of causing voluntary hurt to the deceased, punishable u/s. 323 IPC
and was sentenced with a fine of Rs. 1000/- only – Review petition
– Held: Accused, 25 year old international cricketer was extremely
physically fit and his hand can also be a weapon itself – He assaulted   E
a man more than twice his age and inflicted even with his bare
hands, a severe blow on victim’s head – Unintended consequence
of harm would still be properly attributable to him as it was
reasonably foreseeable – Even though the harm might not be directly
intended, some aggravated culpability must be attached if the person
                                                                         F
suffers a grievous hurt or dies – While sentencing the principle of
proportionality should be kept in mind – Disproportionately light
punishment humiliates and frustrate a victim of crime, and erodes
the faith of the society in the criminal justice system – Long period
having lapsed by the time the appeal was decided cannot be a ground
to award disproportionate and inadequate punishment – Thus,              G
imposition of sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a period of
one year – Review – Criminal jurisprudence.
     Adequate sentence – Imposition of – Principles of
proportionality – Held: There is necessity of maintaining a
reasonable proportion between the seriousness of the crime and           H
                             725
726           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     punishment – While disproportionately severe sentence ought not
      to be passed, simultaneously it also does not clothe the courts to
      award an inadequate sentence, having due regard to the nature of
      the offence, since an inadequate sentence would fail to produce a
      deterrent effect on the society at large.
B          Partly allowing the Review Petitions, the Court
             HELD: 1.1 There is disinclination to enlarge the notice to
      something more than the aspect of sentencing. The evidence
      has been analysed in detail to come to a conclusion as to what is
      the nature of injury. It has been taken into account that only one
C     blow with bare hands as inflicted by respondent No.1 had landed
      on the head of the deceased. The finding is that apparently in the
      fist fight, other blows may have been attempted but did not fall
      on the material part of the body. Aspects such as lack of post
      enmity, lack of any weapon used except bare hands and the result
      of a spontaneous fight over a right of way were also taken into
D     account. Thus, the argument for expanding the scope of the review
      application is rejected. [Paras 17-18][735-D-F]
            1.2 Some material aspects which were required to be taken
      note of appear to have been somehow missed out at the stage of
      sentencing, such as the physical fitness of respondent No.1 as he
E     was an international cricketer, who was tall and well-built and
      aware of the force of a blow that even his hand would carry. The
      blow was not inflicted on a person identically physically placed
      but a 65 years old person, more than double his age. Respondent
      No.1 cannot say that he did not know the effect of the blow or
F     plead ignorance on this aspect. It is not as if someone has to
      remind him of the extent of the injury which could be caused by a
      blow inflicted by him. In the given circumstances, tempers may
      have been lost but then the consequences of the loss of temper
      must be borne. In fact, this Court to some extent had been
      indulgent in ultimately holding respondent No.1 guilty of an
G     offence of simple hurt under Section 323 IPC. The question is
      whether even on sentence, mere passage of time can result in a
      fine of Rs.1,000/- being an adequate sentence where a person
      has lost his life by reason of the severity of blow inflicted by
      respondent No.1 with his hands. The hand can also be a weapon
H
JASWINDER SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE                     727
                v. NAVJOT SINGH SIDHU

by itself where say a boxer, a wrestler or a cricketer or an            A
extremely physically fit person inflicts the same. This may be
understood where a blow may be given either by a physically fit
person or to a more aged person. Insofar as the injury caused is
concerned, this Court has accepted the plea of a single blow by
hand being given on the head of the deceased. It is this significance
                                                                        B
which is an error apparent on the face of the record needing some
remedial action. [Para 24][737-C-G]
      1.3 While a disproportionately severe sentence ought not
to be passed, simultaneously it also does not clothe the law courts
to award a sentence which would be manifestly inadequate, having
due regard to the nature of the offence, since an inadequate            C
sentence would fail to produce a deterrent effect on the society
at large. Punishments are awarded not because of the fact that it
has to be an eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth, rather having its
due impact on the society; while undue harshness is not required
but inadequate punishment may lead to sufferance of the                 D
community at large. [Para 25][737-G-H; 738-A-B]
       1.4 Any undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence
would do more harm to justice system and undermine the public
confidence in the efficacy of law. The society can not long endure
under serious threats and if the courts do not protect the injured,     E
the injured would then resort to private vengeance and, therefore,
it is the duty of every court to award proper sentence having
regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it
was executed or committed. Thus, the punishment to be awarded
for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should conform to and be
consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which the crime         F
has been perpetrated. [Para 26][738-C-D]
      1.5 The sentencing philosophy for an offence has a social
goal that the sentence has to be based on the principle that the
accused must realise that the crime committed by him has not
only created a dent in his life but also a concavity in the social      G
fabric. While opportunity to reform has to be kept in mind, the
principle of proportionality also has to be equally kept in mind.
[Para 28][738-F]

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728            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A            1.6 When a 25 years old man, who was an international
      cricketer, assaults a man more than twice his age and inflicts,
      even with his bare hands, a severe blow on his victim’s head, the
      unintended consequence of harm would still be properly
      attributable to him as it was reasonably foreseeable. That it would
      cause the death of a person is another matter since the conviction
B
      is only under Section 323 IPC. In that context it has been observed
      that even though any harm might not be directly intended, some
      aggravated culpability must be attached if the person suffers a
      grievous hurt or dies as a result thereof. The Court was not greatly
      influenced by the fact that 26 years had passed since the incident
C     and observed that because a long period had lapsed by the time
      the appeal was decided cannot be a ground to award the
      punishment which was disproportionate and inadequate. [Para
      32][740-G-H; 741-A-B]
            1.7 A disproportionately light punishment humiliates and
D     frustrates a victim of crime when the offender goes unpunished
      or is let off with a relatively minor punishment as the system
      pays no attention to the injured’s feelings. Indifference to the
      rights of the victim of crime is fast eroding the faith of the society
      in general and the victim of crime in particular in the criminal
      justice system. [Para 35][741-E-F]
E
              1.8 This Court is not setting forth much about how the
      investigation proceeded initially, how the court had to intervene
      to see that the relevant people are charged, the manner of leading
      of evidence, the hesitancy of doctors all of which weighed in this
      Court opining that a case beyond reasonable doubt could be only
F     of one under Section 323 of the IPC. It is believed that the
      indulgence was not required to be shown at the stage of sentence
      by only imposing a sentence of fine and letting the respondent go
      without any imposition of sentence. The instant case is not one
      where two views are possible such that review should not be
G     exercised. It is a case where some germane facts for sentencing
      appear to have been lost sight of while imposing only a fine on
      respondent No.1 and, therefore, no question of choosing between
      two possible views arises. Thus, in addition to the fine imposed
      it is considered appropriate to impose a sentence of imprisonment
      for a period of one year rigorous imprisonment to be undergone
H     by respondent No.1. [Para 38-40][742-D-F]
JASWINDER SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE            729
                v. NAVJOT SINGH SIDHU

     Richpal Singh Meena v. Ghasi (2014) 8 SCC 918 :           A
     [2014] 9 SCR 857; Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab [1958]
     SCR 1495; Sunil Dutt Sharma v. State (2014) 4 SCC
     375 : [2013] 9 SCR 1000; Parvinder Kansal v. State of
     NCT 2020 SCC Online SC 685; Mallikarjun Kodagali
     v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 752 : [2018]
                                                               B
     13 SCR 1; Manohar Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2015)
     3 SCC 449; Jai Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh
     (1999) 5 SCC 1 : [1999] 3 SCR 426; Sumer Singh v.
     Surajbhan Singh (2014) 7 SCC 323 : [2014] 5 SCR
     882; Ravji v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 2 SCC 175 :
     [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 195; State of Karnataka v.            C
     Krishnappa (2000) 4 SCC 75 : [2000] 2 SCR 761;
     Shyam Narain v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 7 SCC 77
     : [2013] 8 SCR 951; Rattiram v. State of M.P. (2012) 4
     SCC 516 : [2012] 3 SCR 496; Gopal Singh v. State of
     Uttarakhand (2013) 7 SCC 545 : [2013] 4 SCR 104;
                                                               D
     Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra AIR
     2012 SC 3802 : [2012] 1 SCR 145; Jagjeet Singh &
     Ors. v. Ashish Mishra @ Monu & Anr. 2022 SCC
     OnLine SC 453; State of Rajasthan v. Banwari Lal &
     Anr. Decided on 8.4.2022; Soman v. State of Kerala
     (2013) 11 SCC 382 : [2012] 11 SCR 1155 – referred         E
     to.
     Payne v. Tennessee 501 US 808 (1991); Booth v.
     Maryland 482 U.S. 496 (1987); Snyder v. Massachusetts
     291 US 97 (1934) – referred to.
     Shri P. Babulu Reddy Foundation Lecture, Victims of       F
     Crime – The Unseen Side by Dr. Justice A.S. Anand,
     Judge, Supreme Court of India (as he then was) (1998)
     1 SCC (Jour) 3. Delivered at Hyderabad on 28th
     September 1997 – referred to.
                     Case Law Reference                        G
[2014] 9 SCR 857                referred to        Para 12
[1958] SCR 1495                 referred to         Para 12
[2013] 9 SCR 1000               referred to         Para 21
                                                               H
730            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     [2018] 13 SCR 1                    referred to         Para 22
      (2015) 3 SCC 449                   referred to         Para 23
      [1999] 3 SCR 426                   referred to         Para 25
      [2014] 5 SCR 882                   referred to         Para 26
B
      [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 195            referred to         Para 26
      [2000] 2 SCR 761                   referred to         Para 27
      [2013] 8 SCR 951                   referred to         Para 28
C
      [2012] 3 SCR 496                   referred to         Para 29
      [2013] 4 SCR 104                   referred to         Para 29
      [2012] 1 SCR 145                   referred to         Para 29

D     [2012] 11 SCR 1155                 referred to         Para 31
             CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Review Petition
      (Crl.) No. 477 of 2018 in Crl. A. No. 60 of 2007.
            From the Judgment dated 15.05.2018 passed by this Hon’ble Court
E     in Criminal Appeal No. 60 of 2007.
            With
           Review Petition (Crl.) No. 478 of 2018 in Crl. A. No.58 of 2007
      and Review Petition (Crl.) No. 479 of 2018 in Crl. A. No. 59 of 2007.
F           Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv., Sudhir Walia, Ms. Niharika Ahluwalia,
      Ms. Sneh Kohli, Ms. Shubhangni Jain, Ms. Ambika Atrey, Dr. Abhishek
      Atrey, Ms. Jyoti Mendiratta, Advs. for the Petitioner.
            Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, R. Basant, Sr. Advs., Manu Sharma,
      Ms. Tarannum Cheema, Amit Bhandari, A. Karthik, Gaurav Khanna,
G     Ms. Ridhima Mandhar, Kartik Khanna, Vijay Singh, Ms. Smrithi Suresh,
      Saaketh Kasibhatla, Arsh Khan, Akshay Sahay, Advs. for the
      Respondents.



H
JASWINDER SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE                              731
                v. NAVJOT SINGH SIDHU

       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                A
       SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
       Background:
        1. The original controversy emanates from an FIR dated
27.12.1988 under Section 304/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860                   B
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’) registered by the Sub-Inspector of
P.S. Kotwali of Patiala District, Punjab on the basis of the information
given by one Shri Jaswinder Singh (Informant) about an occurrence
around 12:30 p.m. at the traffic light of Battian Wala Chowk. The
Informant and one Avtar Singh (PW-3 and PW-4 respectively) were
travelling with the deceased, Gurnam Singh in a Maruti Car driven by             C
the deceased. Apparently, a dispute arose on the right of way between
the accused and the deceased and respondent No.1 (the first accused)
came out of his vehicle, pulled out the deceased from his vehicle and
inflicted fist blows. As per the Informant his endeavour to intervene
resulted even in the second accused (respondent No.2) (not mentioned             D
in the FIR) getting out of the vehicle and giving fist blows to the Informant.
It was alleged that the car keys of the deceased’s car were removed by
the accused and they fled from the scene of occurrence. PW-3 and
PW-4 took the deceased in a rickshaw to the hospital where the doctors
announced that Gurnam Singh was dead.
                                                                                 E
       2. A post-mortem was conducted by Dr. Jatinder Kumar Sadana
(PW-2), who recorded that the injuries were ante-mortem in nature and
caused by a blunt weapon though he reserved his opinion on the cause
of death as it could apparently be given only after receiving the report of
the pathologist. The Pathologist’s report dated 09.01.1989 noticed a large
number of abnormalities in the condition of the deceased’s heart and did         F
not notice any pathology insofar as the brain is concerned. Even after
the Pathologist’s report, PW-2 did not give a definite opinion regarding
the cause of death of Gurnam Singh. Thereafter, PW-2 wrote to the
Civil Surgeon, Patiala on 11.01.1989 requesting that the case be referred
to Forensic Expert, Government Medical College, Patiala, as a result of          G
which a Medical Board was constituted consisting of six members. Two
of these members were examined as PW-1 and PW-2 but a very cryptic
opinion was given by PW-1 with disinclination to give any further
clarification when sought for by the prosecution.

                                                                                 H
732             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A            3. A chargesheet dated 06.03.1989 was filed on 14.07.1989 under
      Section 304 of the IPC against respondent No.2, exonerating respondent
      No.1. During the course of trial, the Sessions Court exercised its powers
      under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter
      referred to as the ‘Cr.P.C.’) and after recording the statement of the
      Informant summoned respondent No.1 to stand trial. The Informant also
B
      filed a private complaint against both the accused for commission of
      offences under Sections 302/324/323 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
      Both the cases were consolidated and on 20.08.1994 charges under
      Section 304 Part I were framed against both the accused arising from
      the FIR. While in the complaint, charges were framed under Section
C     302 of the IPC against respondent No.1 and under Section 302/34 of the
      IPC against respondent No.2. Charges under Section 323/34 of the IPC
      were framed against both the accused for causing hurt to the Informant.
            4. The trial court post trial acquitted both the accused vide judgment
      dated 22.09.1999. In terms of the judgment of the trial court, the death
D     was not caused by subdural haemorrhage and the deceased suffered
      sudden cardiac arrest under stress because of which he fell and received
      two abrasions leading to subdural haemorrhage. The death was caused
      due to violence but it was not certain as to when precisely Gurnam
      Singh had died.
E            5. The State and the complainant both moved the High Court vide
      separate appeals. The High Court in terms of the judgment dated
      01.12.2006 opined that the cases of the two accused were to be
      considered separately. The High Court convicted respondent No.1 under
      Section 304 Part II of the IPC based on the testimony of the doctors,
      PW-1 and PW-2. As per their testimony, the cause of death was cardiac
F     failure and all that they had stated was that the cardiac condition of the
      deceased was very weak. On the opening of the skull, subdural
      haemorrhage was present over the left parietal region and brain. It was
      the haemorrhage which caused the death of the deceased and not the
      cardiac arrest. Insofar as respondent No.2 is concerned, he was held
G     guilty under Section 304 Part II read with Section 34 of the IPC as well
      as Section 323 of the IPC.
            6. Three criminal appeals were filed before this Court by the two
      accused and the Informant.
             7. The High Court judgment was analyzed by this Court, wherein
H     it was opined that the testimony of the witnesses was trustworthy. Merely
JASWINDER SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE                              733
     v. NAVJOT SINGH SIDHU [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

because there was a relationship between the Informant, Avatar Singh             A
and the deceased, and more witnesses were not examined, could not
have led to a conclusion that the case had not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
       8. The post-mortem report was examined closely which indicated
only two external injuries – one on the temporal region and another on           B
the left knee of the deceased, and both were abrasions. The doctors had
opined that the second injury could be the result of the fall and, thus, it is
most unlikely that a person would simultaneously aim at the head and
also the knees of the victim while giving fist blows. Respondent No.1
possibly delivered more than one fist blows while only one of them landed
on the head of the deceased and others missed the target. This Court did         C
not agree with the observations of the High Court that the death was
caused by subdural haemorrhage and not cardiac arrest. There was
stated to be uncertainty regarding the cause of death of Gurnam Singh
and no weapon had been used, nor was there any past enmity between
the parties, and what happened was the result of an instant brawl.               D
      9. The case against respondent No.2 was held not to have been
proved and mere presence of respondent No.2 with respondent No.1
was not sufficient to result in a conviction based on common intention.
Even for the offence under Section 323 of the IPC, respondent No.2
was held not guilty.                                                             E
      10. The Court recognized that there were lapses in investigation
but then people are not convicted on the basis of doubts. Respondent
No.1 was held not guilty of causing the death of Gurnam Singh, and the
only conclusion which was found acceptable was of the respondent No.1
causing voluntary hurt to Gurnam Singh which is punishable under Section         F
323 of the IPC. It was noticed that respondent No.1 was an international
cricketer and a celebrity at the time of the incident and at times there
was an endeavour to turn a blind eye to the violations of law committed
by celebrities. On the question of sentence, a fine of Rs.1,000/- alone
was imposed vide order dated 06.12.2006, since the incident was 30
years old at the time, there was no enmity between the parties and no            G
weapon was used.
       On Expanding the Scope of Review Application:
      11. A review application was filed by the complainant in which
notice was issued on 11.09.2018 limited to the question of enlargement
                                                                                 H
734             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     of sentence qua respondent no.1. The matter got delayed as initially the
      counsel could not enter appearance for the accused. There was a change
      of counsel and a change of senior counsel. However, when the arguments
      were addressed, Mr. Luthra, learned senior counsel for the complainant
      sought to persuade us to enlarge the notice qua the aspect of review as
      a whole and not limited to the question of sentence.
B
            12. The aforesaid plea was predicated on account of non-
      consideration of the decision of the co-ordinate Benches of this Court in
      Richpal Singh Meena v. Ghasi1 and Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab2.
              13. In Richpal Singh Meena3 case, a proposition was advanced
C     that cases where a homicide had occurred, but the conviction is only for
      causing grievous hurt, may even fall even within Section 300 (thirdly) of
      the IPC and, therefore, would require reconsideration. Several judgments
      were relied upon on this aspect. After referring to these judgments, the
      jurisprudential aspect was discussed. In this behalf, it was submitted
      that there were cases where in spite of death of a person and a finding
D     in some of them of an act of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, this Court
      has not considered the provisions of Section 299 read with Section 304
      of the IPC. It was for the Court to determine on evidence, whether if it
      is a culpable homicide, it amounts to murder as explained under Section
      300 of the IPC or not as explained under Section 304 of the IPC. If
E     culpable homicide cannot be proved, then it will fall in the category of
      “not-culpable homicide”. In cases relating to hurt (from Section 319 of
      the IPC onwards), they do not postulate death as the end result. Apart
      from this the issue of sentencing was also addressed. It was opined that
      the Court should not ignore or overlook the question whether the homicide
      is culpable or not but merely treat the case as one of voluntarily causing
F     grievous hurt punishable under Section 325 or Section 326 of the IPC.
             14. The earlier judgment in Virsa Singh4 case looked into the
      aspect of intention to inflict the injury that is sufficient to cause death in
      the ordinary course of nature. In such an eventuality, Section 300 thirdly
      of the IPC would be unnecessary because the act would fall under the
G     first part of the Section. However, it was also stated that it has to be
      found that the bodily injury was caused, the nature of injury must be
      1
        (2014) 8 SCC 918.
      2
        1958 SCR 1495.
      3
        (supra)
      4
H       (supra)
JASWINDER SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE                            735
     v. NAVJOT SINGH SIDHU [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

established and whether any vital organs were cut or so forth. Thereafter      A
the focus should shift to the intention to inflict the bodily injury that is
found to be present.
       15. It was also urged by Mr. Luthra, learned senior counsel for
the complainant that the delay of 34 years cannot be a ground to acquit
the accused when the delay was not attributable to the complainants or         B
the victims.
       16. On the other hand, Dr. Singhvi, learned senior counsel for
respondent No.1 sought to emphasise that the incident is 34 years old
pertaining to a dispute of right of way. The case had gone through several
rounds of scrutiny at several stages and now re-assessing the merits of        C
the case in terms of the charge against the respondent would be subversive
of the basic foundations of criminal justice system.
       17. On analysis of the aforesaid aspect, we are disinclined to
enlarge the notice to something more than the aspect of sentencing.
The evidence has been analysed in detail to come to a conclusion as to         D
what is the nature of injury. It has been taken into account that only one
blow with bare hands as inflicted by respondent No.1 had landed on the
head of the deceased. The finding is that apparently in the fist fight,
other blows may have been attempted but did not fall on the material
part of the body. Aspects such as lack of post enmity, lack of any weapon
used except bare hands and the result of a spontaneous fight over a right      E
of way were also taken into account.
      18. We, thus, unequivocally reject the argument for expanding the
scope of the review application.
      On Enhancement of Sentence:                                              F
       19. Next we turn to the aspect of review, which persuaded us to
issue the notice, i.e., qua the sentence imposed – a fine of Rs.1,000/-.
No doubt the conviction is under Section 323 of the IPC relating to
causing hurt, which reads as under:
      “323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.—Whoever,                  G
      except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes
      hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
      a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may
      extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”
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736             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A            20. The punishment under Section 323 of the IPC has been
      prescribed as a sentence of a term which may extend to one year or a
      fine which may extend to Rs.1,000/- or both. In the present case, only
      the fine has been imposed. The question, thus, to be analysed is whether
      in the given factual scenario, grave error can be said to have been
      committed on the issue of sentence by not punishing with imprisonment
B
      of any term whatsoever.
             21. Learned senior counsel for the complainant urged that the
      sentence imposed under Section 323 of the IPC was not in line with the
      principles of sentencing principles and that the observations on sentencing
      in Sunil Dutt Sharma v. State5, albeit in the case of a death sentence,
C     would equally apply for lesser offences. It was held that the aggravating
      and mitigating factors both were required to be considered before deciding
      the question of sentence, more so when the judgment of the High Court
      is sought to be upset, on the provisions under which it is based. The
      sentence imposed, it was urged, should be proportionate to the offence
D     and should take into account the deterrence aspect. There cannot be
      leniency in sentencing when the hurt/injury has resulted in death, nor
      can the delay in trial be taken into account which was not attributable to
      the complainants. Respondent No.1 at the relevant time was a young
      man of 25 years, who was playing international cricket and was athletically
      physically fit. He is expected to know the effect of any blow to be
E     inflicted by him, more so, when on the opposite side the man is aged
      about 65 years (more than his father’s age and elder to him by 40 years).
      Thus, it was urged that simply because it was a spontaneous incident
      where no weapon was used, the same cannot be a ground to inflict
      minimal and innocuous punishment of fine of Rs.1,000/-.
F            22. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for respondent No.1
      urged that a review petition on the quantum of sentence was not
      maintainable. He sought to place reliance on the judgment of this Court
      in Parvinder Kansal v. State of NCT6 and Mallikarjun Kodagali v.
      State of Karnataka & Ors.7 His submission was that the victim’s right
G     to appeal ought to be restricted to only three eventualities, i.e., acquittal
      of the accused, conviction for lesser offence, or for imposing inadequate
      compensation, but there was no provision of appeal for the victim to

      5
        (2014) 4 SCC 375.
      6
        2020 SCCOnline SC 685.
      7
H       (2019) 2 SCC 752.
JASWINDER SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE                              737
     v. NAVJOT SINGH SIDHU [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

question the quantum of sentence as inadequate. Such a right was                 A
available under Section 377 Cr.P.C. for the State.
        23. Learned senior counsel also relied upon the judgment of this
Court in Manohar Singh v. State of Rajasthan8 to contend that even a
fine is fully adequate without any incarceration when there is a prolonged
time since the date of occurrence.                                               B
         Our View:
       24. We have given our thought to the matter. In our view, some
material aspects which were required to be taken note of appear to
have been somehow missed out at the stage of sentencing, such as the
physical fitness of respondent No.1 as he was an international cricketer,        C
who was tall and well built and aware of the force of a blow that even
his hand would carry. The blow was not inflicted on a person identically
physically placed but a 65 year old person, more than double his age.
Respondent No.1 cannot say that he did not know the effect of the blow
or plead ignorance on this aspect. It is not as if someone has to remind         D
him of the extent of the injury which could be caused by a blow inflicted
by him. In the given circumstances, tempers may have been lost but
then the consequences of the loss of temper must be borne. In fact, this
Court to some extent had been indulgent in ultimately holding respondent
No.1 guilty of an offence of simple hurt under Section 323 of the IPC.
The question is whether even on sentence, mere passage of time can               E
result in a fine of Rs.1,000/- being an adequate sentence where a person
has lost his life by reason of the severity of blow inflicted by respondent
No.1 with his hands. The hand can also be a weapon by itself where say
a boxer, a wrestler or a cricketer or an extremely physically fit person
inflicts the same. This may be understood where a blow may be given              F
either by a physically fit person or to a more aged person. Insofar as the
injury caused is concerned, this Court has accepted the plea of a single
blow by hand being given on the head of the deceased. In our view, it is
this significance which is an error apparent on the face of the record
needing some remedial action.
                                                                                 G
      25. We would like to deliberate a little more in detail on the necessity
of maintaining a reasonable proportion between the seriousness of the
crime and the punishment. While a disproportionately severe sentence
ought not to be passed, simultaneously it also does not clothe the law
8
    (2015) 3 SCC 449.                                                            H
738              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A     courts to award a sentence which would be manifestly inadequate, having
      due regard to the nature of the offence, since an inadequate sentence
      would fail to produce a deterrent effect on the society at large.
      Punishments are awarded not because of the fact that it has to be an
      eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth, rather having its due impact on the
      society; while undue harshness is not required but inadequate punishment
B
      may lead to sufferance of the community at large.9
             26. An important aspect to be kept in mind is that any undue
      sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to justice
      system and undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law. The
      society can not long endure under serious threats and if the courts do not
C     protect the injured, the injured would then resort to private vengeance
      and, therefore, it is the duty of every court to award proper sentence
      having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it
      was executed or committed. 10 It has, thus, been observed that the
      punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but it should
D     conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and brutality with which
      the crime has been perpetrated.11
            27. A three Judges Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v.
      Krishnappa12 while discussing the purpose of imposition of adequate
      sentence opined in para 18 that “.....Protection of society and deterring
E     the criminal is the avowed object of law and that is required to be
      achieved by imposing an appropriate sentence.”
              28. The sentencing philosophy for an offence has a social goal
      that the sentence has to be based on the principle that the accused must
      realise that the crime committed by him has not only created a dent in
F     his life but also a concavity in the social fabric.13 While opportunity to
      reform has to be kept in mind, the principle of proportionality also has to
      be equally kept in mind.
            29. Criminal jurisprudence with the passage of time has laid
      emphasis on victimology, which fundamentally is a perception of a trial
G     from the viewpoint of the criminal as well as the victim. Both are viewed
      in the social context and, thus, victim’s rights have to be equally
      9
         Jai Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1999) 5 SCC 1.
      10
          Sumer Singh v. Surajbhan Singh (2014) 7 SCC 323.
      11
          Ravji v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 2 SCC 175.
      12
          (2000) 4 SCC 75.
      13
H         Shyam Narain v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 7 SCC 77.
JASWINDER SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE                           739
     v. NAVJOT SINGH SIDHU [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

protected14. It would be useful to rely on the observations of this Court     A
in Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand15 that just punishment is the
collective cry of the society and while collective cry has to be kept
uppermost in mind, simultaneously the principle of proportionality between
the crime and punishment cannot be totally brushed aside. Thus, the
principle of just punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a
                                                                              B
criminal offence. No doubt there cannot be a straitjacket formula nor a
solvable theory in mathematical exactitude. An offender cannot be allowed
to be treated with leniency solely on the ground of discretion vested in a
court. Similarly, in Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra16,
the twin objective of the sentencing policy to be kept in mind was
emphasised as deterrence and correction and, thus, principle of               C
proportionality in sentencing a convict were held to be well entrenched
in the criminal jurisprudence.
       30. We may also take note of the recent judgment of this Court
decided by a three Judges bench on 18.04.2022 in Jagjeet Singh &
Ors. v. Ashish Mishra @ Monu & Anr.17 albeit, on the issue of bail. It        D
emphasised the victim’s right to be heard. What is relevant for us to note
is that the victim being the de facto sufferer of a crime had no
participation in the adjudicatory process. The current ethos of criminal
justice dispensation to prevent and punish crime had surreptitiously turned
its back on the victim. No doubt in the present case at every stage the
victim has been heard and the present application is also by the victim.      E
The near and dear ones whether as guardians or legal heirs are required
to be treated as victims. It was, thus, observed in para 23 as under:
       “23. It cannot be gainsaid that the right of a victim under
       the amended Cr.P.C. are substantive, enforceable, and are
       another facet of human rights. The victim’s right, therefore,          F
       cannot be termed or construed restrictively like a brutum
       fulmen. We reiterate that these rights are totally independent,
       incomparable, and are not accessory or auxiliary to those of
       the State under the Cr.P.C. The presence of ‘State’ in the
       proceedings, therefore, does not tantamount to according a             G
       hearing to a ‘victim’ of the crime.”

14
   Rattiram v. State of M.P. (2012) 4 SCC 516.
15
   (2013) 7 SCC 545.
16
   AIR 2012 SC 3802.
17
   2022 SCC OnLine SC 453.                                                    H
740                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A            31. In the similar vein in Criminal Appeal No.579/2022 titled State
      of Rajasthan v. Banwari Lal & Anr.18, this Court has again frowned
      upon the tendency of courts to reduce the sentence to the period already
      undergone. An earlier judgment of this Court in Soman v. State of
      Kerala19 was referred to, more specifically para 27, which reads as
      under:
B
                “27.1. Courts ought to base sentencing decisions on various
                different rationales — most prominent amongst which would
                be proportionality and deterrence.
                27.2. The question of consequences of criminal action can
C               be relevant from both a proportionality and deterrence
                standpoint.
                27.3. Insofar as proportionality is concerned, the sentence
                must be commensurate with the seriousness or gravity of the
                offence.
D               27.4. One of the factors relevant for judging seriousness of
                the offence is the consequences resulting from it.
                27.5. Unintended consequences/harm may still be properly
                attributed to the offender if they were reasonably foreseeable.
                In case of illicit and underground manufacture of liquor, the
E               chances of toxicity are so high that not only its manufacturer
                but the distributor and the retail vendor would know its likely
                risks to the consumer. Hence, even though any harm to the
                consumer might not be directly intended, some aggravated
                culpability must attach if the consumer suffers some grievous
F               hurt or dies as result of consuming the spurious liquor.”
            32. We find the observations in para 27.5 as quoted above of
      some significance in the context of the facts of the present case. Thus,
      when a 25 year old man, who was an international cricketer, assaults a
      man more than twice his age and inflicts, even with his bare hands, a
      severe blow on his (victim’s) head, the unintended consequence of harm
G
      would still be properly attributable to him as it was reasonably foreseeable.
      That it would cause the death of a person is another matter since the
      conviction is only under Section 323 of the IPC. In that context it has

      18
           Decided on 8.4.2022.
      19
H          (2013) 11 SCC 382.
JASWINDER SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE                                   741
     v. NAVJOT SINGH SIDHU [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

been observed that even though any harm might not be directly intended,               A
some aggravated culpability must be attached if the person suffers a
grievous hurt or dies as a result thereof. Another similarity in terms of
the facts of the case at hand and that of Soman20 is that the Court was
not greatly influenced by the fact that 26 years had passed since the
incident and observed that because a long period had lapsed by the time
                                                                                      B
the appeal was decided cannot be a ground to award the punishment
which was disproportionate and inadequate.
      33. Among the factors to be taken note of are the “defenceless
and unprotected state of victim” appropriate in the facts of the present
case.
                                                                                      C
       34. The US Supreme Court has also moved in the same direction
in Payne v. Tennessee21 while examining the aspect of the “victim impact
statement” in a case of capital offence at the time of sentencing. The
court considered the aspect from the dissenting judgment in the case of
Booth v. Maryland22 which emphasized on “reminding the sentencer
that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too               D
the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society
and in particular to his family.” The words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo
in Snyder v. Massachusetts23 bring out that “justice, though due to the
accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be
strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance                E
true.”
       35. Thus, a disproportionately light punishment humiliates and
frustrates a victim of crime when the offender goes unpunished or is let
off with a relatively minor punishment as the system pays no attention to
the injured’s feelings. Indifference to the rights of the victim of crime is          F
fast eroding the faith of the society in general and the victim of crime in
particular in the criminal justice system.24
       36. We noticed the aforesaid judgments to repel the contention of
learned senior counsel for the respondent that the victim should have no
say in the matter of enhancement of sentence.                                         G
20
   (supra).
21
   501 US 808 (1991).
22
   482 U.S. 496 (1987).
23
   291 US 97 (1934).
24
   Shri P. Babulu Reddy Foundation Lecture, Victims of Crime – The Unseen Side by
Dr. Justice A.S. Anand, Judge, Supreme Court of India (as he then was) (1998) 1 SCC
(Jour) 3. Delivered at Hyderabad on 28 th September 1997.                             H
742              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 4 S.C.R.


A            37. In a nutshell, the aspects of sentencing and victimology are
      reflected in the following ancient wisdom:




B


             It means: The person dispensing justice as per Dharmashastra
      should prescribe a penance appropriate to the age, the time and strength
      of the sinner, the penance being such that he may not lose his life and yet
C
      he may be purified. A penance causing distress should not be prescribed.
            38. We are not setting forth much about how the investigation
      proceeded initially, how the court had to intervene to see that the relevant
      people are charged, the manner of leading of evidence, the hesitancy of
      doctors all of which weighed in this Court opining that a case beyond
D     reasonable doubt could be only of one under Section 323 of the IPC.
      We do believe that the indulgence was not required to be shown at the
      stage of sentence by only imposing a sentence of fine and letting the
      respondent go without any imposition of sentence.
            39. The present case is not one where two views are possible
E     such that review should not be exercised. It is a case where some
      germane facts for sentencing appear to have been lost sight of while
      imposing only a fine on respondent No.1 and, therefore, no question of
      choosing between two possible views arises.
             Conclusion:
F
             40. The result of the aforesaid is that the review applications/
      petitions are allowed to the aforesaid extent and in addition to the fine
      imposed we consider it appropriate to impose a sentence of imprisonment
      for a period of one year rigorous imprisonment to be undergone by
      respondent No.1. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
G
      Nidhi Jain                                      Review Petitions partly allowed.
      (Assisted by : Shashwat Jain, LCRA)




H