J. VEDHASINGHversusR.M. GOVINDAN & ORS.

888                      [2022]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    6 S.C.R. 888              [2022] 6 S.C.R.


A                              J. VEDHASINGH
                                       v.
                          R.M. GOVINDAN & ORS.
         (Criminal Appeal [Arising Out of SLP(Crl.) No. 2864 of 2019])
B                              AUGUST 11, 2022
          [S. ABDUL NAZEER AND J. K. MAHESHWARI, JJ.]
             Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 and s.300 (1) –
      High Court allowed criminal petition filed by respondents no.1 to 4
      u/s.482 CrPC and quashed proceedings u/ss.120B, 406, 420 and
C
      34 IPC taking into consideration that proceedings u/s.138 of the
      NI Act pertaining to the same cause of action and on the same facts
      and grounds were pending, prior to registration of the present
      proceedings – It held that, looking to the allegations made in the
      FIR, only offence u/s.138 of NI Act can be made out and continuance
D     of the proceedings for offences u/ss.406, 420, 120B and 34 IPC
      would amount to abuse of process of the Court – Legal issue before
      two Judge Bench of Supreme Court as to whether on similar set of
      allegations of fact the accused can be tried for an offence under
      NI Act which is special enactment and also for offences under IPC
      unaffected by the prior conviction or acquittal and, whether the
E
      bar of s.300(1) CrPC would attract for such trial – Judgments relied
      upon by the parties were rendered by judges’ bench of equal strength
      (strength of two Judges) and in conflict with each other on the legal
      issue involved – Therefore, questions of law formulated for answer
      by a larger bench for decision – Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
F     – s.138 – IPC – ss.120B, 406, 420 and 34.
            Judicial discipline – Issue decided in a judgment – Conflicting
      view in a subsequent judgment by a judges’ bench of equal strength
      – Held: Judicial decorum demands that if judgments passed by two
      judges’ bench of equal strength are conflicting, the issue of law
G     involved must be referred to a larger bench as the same is desirable
      to avoid confusion and maintain consistency of law.
            Referring the matter to larger Bench, the Court
            HELD:1.1. In the judgment of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai
      Patel it was held that the requirement to prove an offence under
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                                      888
         J. VEDHASINGH v. R.M. GOVINDAN & ORS.                            889


the NI Act and an offence under the IPC is different, and it was          A
observed that there may be some overlapping of facts but the
ingredients of the offences are entirely different, therefore, the
subsequent cases are not barred by any statutory provisions.
While in the case of G. Sagar Suri and Kolla Veera Raghav Rao,
the Court concluded that as per Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. no one
                                                                          B
can be tried and convicted for the same offence or even for a
different offence on the same facts, therefore, the prosecution
under Section 420 of the IPC is barred by Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C
and accordingly liable to be quashed. [Para 12][898-G-H; 899-A]
      1.2. In the case of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel the
judgments of G. Sagar Suri and Kolla Veera Raghav Rao have                C
been referred but distinguished on the ground that it was not
raised and decided that ingredients of both offences were not
same, and the bar of Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. would not attract.
[Para 12][899-B]
       1.3. The judgments cited by both the parties are rendered          D
by benches having the strength of two Judges. The bench of this
Court in the case of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel followed in
M/s. V.S. Reddy and Sons has taken a different view from the
previous judgments of G. Sagar Suri and Kolla Veera Raghav Rao
rendered by the bench of the same strength. The view taken in             E
both the cases are conflicting to each other. It is a trite law, if any
issue is decided in a previous judgment by a bench of the same
strength, conflicting view in the subsequent judgment should not
be rendered on the pretext that the issue has not been raised or
considered in the previous judgment. Judicial decorum demands
that if judgments passed by two judges’ bench of equal strength           F
are conflicting, the issue of law involved must be referred to a
larger bench as the same is desirable to avoid confusion and
maintain consistency of law. The aforesaid judgments cited by
the respective parties are conflicting, however, to avoid any
further confusion and to maintain consistency, it is deemed               G
appropriate to refer this issue for decision by the larger bench to
answer the following questions: (1) Whether the ratio of the
judgment, in the case of G. Sagar Suri and Kolla Veera Raghav
Rao lay down the correct law? or The view taken in the case of

                                                                          H
890            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2022] 6 S.C.R.


A     Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel as followed in M/s V.S. Reddy
      and Sons which is subsequent and conflicting, lay down the correct
      proposition of law? (2) Whether on similar set of allegations of
      fact the accused can be tried for an offence under NI Act which is
      special enactment and also for offences under IPC unaffected by
      the prior conviction or acquittal and, the bar of Section 300(1)
B
      Cr.P.C. would attract for such trial? [Para 12][899-C-H; 900-A]
            District Manager, APSRTC, Vijaywada v. K. Sivaji,
            (2001) 2 SCC 135 : [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 193; and
            Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P., 2002 AIR SCW 1573
            – relied on.
C
            Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat
            and Anr, (2012) 7 SCC 621 : [2012] 3 SCR 1155;
            M/s V.S. Reddy and Sons v. Muthyala Ramalinga Reddy
            and Anr. (Crl Appeal No. 1285 of 2015) decided on
            28.09.2015; Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla
D           Venkateswara Rao and Anr., (2011) 2 SCC 703 : [2011]
            2 SCR 364; and G. Sagar Suri and Anr. v. State of UP
            and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 636 : [2000] 1 SCR 417 –
            referred to.
                            Case Law Reference
E
      [2012] 3 SCR 1155                 referred to      Para 6
      [2011 ] 2 SCR 364                 referred to      Para 7
      [2000] 1 SCR 417                  referred to      Para 7
      [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 193           relied on        Para 12
F
      2002 AIR SCW 1573                 relied on        Para 12
            CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: SLP (Crl.) No.
      2864 of 2019.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2018 of the High Court
G     of Judicature at Madras in CRL. O.P. No. 6750 of 2017.
            S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Adv., Y. Arunagiri, P. Soma Sundaram, G. R.
      Vikash, A. S. Vairawan, R. Sudhakaran, Subrahmanya Banu, Ms. Shalini
      Mishra, Ms. Puspita B., Advs. for the Appellant.

H
          J. VEDHASINGH v. R.M. GOVINDAN & ORS.                              891


      T. Harish Kumar, Navneet Dugar, Raghunatha Sethupathy B.,              A
Prasanth Padmanaban, Subham Kothari, Advs. for the Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.
      1. Leave granted.                                                      B
      2. The instant appeal has been filed assailing the final order dated
06.12.2018 passed by the High Court of Madras in CRL.O.P. No. 6750
of 2017, whereby the High Court allowed the criminal petition filed by
the respondents no.1 to 4 under Section 482 of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C”) and quashed proceedings under           C
Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for
short “IPC”) being C.C. No. 33 of 2017 pending before Judicial
Magistrate Court No. III, Coimbatore.
        3. The brief facts necessary for the instant appeal are that the
appellant herein was working as a Civil Engineer in Saudi Arabia. On his     D
return back to India in the year 2011, he purchased a site from respondent
no.2 who is the father of respondent no.1 in Coimbatore. Apart from
this, the respondents owned 7 other house sites in total in V.C.K. Layout,
Trichy Road, Coimbatore City, which all were mortgaged to Tamil Nadu
Industrial Investment Corporation, way back from 12.10.2006. Appellant
contended that the respondents approached and asked him to invest            E
money for the development of the land of the said 7 sites and assured
that profit shall be divided amongst the appellant and respondents.
Pursuant to it a profit-sharing agreement was executed between the
parties. The appellant made the investment of a sum of Rs.62,32,754/-,
but neither profit was shared nor any piece of land was given to the         F
appellant. Consequently, the appellant asked to repay the amount. Under
guise of assurance of re-payment by respondent no.1, the appellant did
not lodge any criminal prosecution as per his request. The respondent
no.1 handed over a cheque dated 09.09.2015 for an amount of
Rs.87,00,000 in lieu of repayment of principal sum and interest.
                                                                             G
      4. On presenting the said cheque to the bank it was dishonored on
account of insufficient funds on 09.09.2015. Being aggrieved, a demand
notice was issued on 30.10.2015 and complaint under Section 138 of
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short “NI Act”) being S.T.C.
No.792 of 2015 renumbered as C.C. No.199 of 2016 on the file of Fast
                                                                             H
892             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2022] 6 S.C.R.


A     Track Magistrate No.1 of Coimbatore (for short “138 Proceedings”)
      was lodged by the appellant on 07.12.2015. Prior to initiating 138
      proceedings, the appellant lodged a complaint under section 156(3) Cr.P.C
      being CMP No. 5083 of 2015 before Judicial Magistrate No. III
      Coimbatore on 30.10.2015. The Magistrate directed respondent no. 5 to
      register the FIR but by filing a report dated 29.01.2016, it was said that
B
      no offence is made out against the respondents. The appellant challenged
      the same by filing CRL.O.P. No. 6766 of 2016 before the High court of
      Madras and also prayed for direction against respondent no.5 to conduct
      fresh investigation. The High Court disposed of the same with an
      observation that the appellant may raise objection on closure report by
C     way of protest petition. In pursuance thereof, the appellant filed a protest
      petition being Crl.M.P. No. 3891 of 2016, which was allowed by the
      Magistrate vide order dated 24.09.2016 directing the respondent no. 5 to
      register the case against the respondent no. 1 to 4 and to complete the
      investigation. Thereafter only, the respondent no.5 registered the case
      against respondent no.1 to 4 at Crime No.49 of 2016 for the offences
D
      under Sections 120B, 406, 420 and 34 of IPC on 01.10.2016, and after
      investigation, challan was filed before the competent Magistrate on which
      cognizance was taken by him.
             5. The respondents, being aggrieved by the same, filed CRL.O.P.
      No. 6750 of 2017 before the High Court of Madras for quashment of
E     the aforesaid proceedings. The High Court by the impugned order allowed
      the said petition and quashed the proceedings taking into consideration
      that proceedings under Section 138 of the N.I. Act pertaining to the
      same cause of action and on the same facts and grounds are pending,
      prior to the registration of the present proceedings. It was observed that,
F     looking to the allegations made in the FIR, only offence under section
      138 of NI Act can be made out and continuance of the present proceedings
      for offences under sections 406, 420, 120B and 34 of IPC would amount
      to abuse of process of the Court. The said order passed by the High
      Court is assailed by the appellant in the instant appeal.
G            6. Learned senior counsel Mr. S. Nagamuthu contends that in the
      facts of the present case the plea of double jeopardy or bar of Section
      300(1) of Cr.P.C. would attract only when the earlier offence and the
      later offence is same or have same ingredients. The identity of the
      allegations on fact is not relevant, in fact, the identity of the ingredients
      of the offence is relevant. The plea taken by respondent no.1 to 4 that a
H
          J. VEDHASINGH v. R.M. GOVINDAN & ORS.                              893
                  [J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

person who is previously acquitted cannot be tried for the same offence      A
subsequently, shall apply only when it is shown that acquittal for the
previous charge would lead to acquittal in the subsequent charge. In an
offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, requirement to prove mens
rea is not necessary although for an offence under Section 420, fraudulent
and dishonest intention i.e. mens rea is relevant to prove. In support of
                                                                             B
the said contention, reliance has been placed on the judgment of
Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and Anr, (2012)
7 SCC 621. The said judgment has also been relied in the case of M/s
V.S. Reddy and Sons v. Muthyala Ramalinga Reddy and Anr. (Crl
Appeal No. 1285 of 2015) decided on 28.09.2015. Therefore, urged the
quashment of the proceedings for an offence under Sections 420, 406,         C
120(B) and 34 IPC as directed by the High Court is wholly unjustified.
       7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contends
that as per the judgment of Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla
Venkateswara Rao and Anr, (2011) 2 SCC 703, this Court has held
that if the offences are different and the facts are the same, the           D
prosecution under Section 420 of the IPC is barred by virtue of Section
300(1) of the Cr.P.C. Further reliance has been placed on a judgment of
this Court in the case of G. Sagar Suri and Anr. v. State of UP and
Others, (2000) 2 SCC 636, wherein also the offences under Section
138 of NI Act as well as the offence under Sections 406 and 420 of IPC
were allegedly committed by the accused of that case. After lodging the      E
complaint under Section 138 of NI Act, a petition under Section 482
before the High Court was filed for quashment of the complaint which
was dismissed. On filing the special leave petition before this Court, it
was allowed and the Court directed that the prosecution under Sections
420 and 406 is not tenable and quashed.                                      F
      8. After having heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant as well as the respondents who have advanced their contentions
relying upon the judgments of this Court. The reliance placed by the
appellant is on a judgment of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel
(supra) wherein this Court has considered various judgments. The             G
relevant portion of the judgment of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel
(supra) is reproduced as thus:
      “35. The learned counsel for the appellant has further placed
      reliance on the judgment in G. Sagar Suri v. State of
      U.P. [(2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513] wherein during            H
894      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2022] 6 S.C.R.


A     the pendency of the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI
      Act, prosecution under Sections 406/420 IPC had been
      launched. This Court quashed the criminal proceedings under
      Sections 406/420 IPC, observing that it would amount to the
      abuse of process of law. In fact, the issue as to whether the
      ingredients of both the offences were same, had neither been
B
      raised nor decided. Therefore, the ratio of that judgment does
      not have application on the facts of this case.
      36. Same remained the position so far as the judgment in Kolla
      Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao [(2011) 2
      SCC 703 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 882 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 547]
C     is concerned. It has been held therein that once the conviction
      under Section 138 of the NI Act has been recorded, the
      question of trying the same person under Section 420 IPC or
      any other provisions of IPC or any other statute is not
      permissible being hit by Article 20(2) of the Constitution and
D     Section 300(1) CrPC.
      37. Admittedly, the appellant had been tried earlier for the
      offences punishable under the provisions of Section 138 of
      the NI Act and the case is sub judice before the High Court.
      In the instant case, he is involved under Sections 406/420
E     read with Section 114 IPC. In the prosecution under Section
      138 of the NI Act, the mens rea i.e. fraudulent or dishonest
      intention at the time of issuance of cheque is not required to
      be proved. However, in the case under IPC involved herein,
      the issue of mens rea may be relevant. The offence punishable
      under Section 420 IPC is a serious one as the sentence of 7
F     years can be imposed.
      38. In the case under the NI Act, there is a legal presumption
      that the cheque had been issued for discharging the
      antecedent liability and that presumption can be rebutted only
      by the person who draws the cheque. Such a requirement is
G     not there in the offences under IPC. In the case under the NI
      Act, if a fine is imposed, it is to be adjusted to meet the legally
      enforceable liability. There cannot be such a requirement in
      the offences under IPC. The case under the NI Act can only
      be initiated by filing a complaint. However, in a case under
H     IPC such a condition is not necessary.
          J. VEDHASINGH v. R.M. GOVINDAN & ORS.                              895
                  [J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

      39. There may be some overlapping of facts in both the cases           A
      but the ingredients of the offences are entirely different. Thus,
      the subsequent case is not barred by any of the aforesaid
      statutory provisions.
      40. The appeal is devoid of any merit and is accordingly
      dismissed.”                                                            B
       On perusal of the same, it is clear that the judgment of G. Sagar
Suri (supra) has been considered but because the issue regarding the
ingredient of both offences were same was not raised or decided, it has
been said that the ratio of that judgment does not have application in the
facts of the case. Similarly, the judgment of Kolla Veera Raghav Rao         C
(supra) has also been considered but distinguished on fact while observing
that when a conviction under Section 138 of the NI Act has been recorded,
the prosecution to try the same person under Section 420 of the IPC is
not permissible as per Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. The judgment of
Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel (supra) has been relied in the case
of M/s. V.S. Reddy and Sons (supra).                                         D

       9. Learned counsel for the respondents have relied upon the
judgment of G. Sagar Suri (supra) and contended that the said issue
has been settled more than two decades prior. The relevant paragraphs
of the said judgment are reproduced as thus:
                                                                             E
      “13. In the circumstances of the case in hand the conclusion
      is inescapable that invoking the jurisdiction of a criminal
      court for allegedly having committed offences under Sections
      406/420 IPC by the appellants is certainly an abuse of the
      process of law. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the
      complainant it is now admitted that none of the two appellants         F
      is a Director of Ganga Automobiles Ltd. Only in respect of
      the first appellant it is stated that he is the authorised signatory
      of that Company and that in fact he had signed the cheques
      which were returned dishonoured. Apart from making the
      omnibus statement that the first appellant with dishonest              G
      intentions and misrepresentations got a loan of Rs 50,00,000
      from the complainant Company for Ganga Automobiles Ltd.
      there is nothing said as to what were those misrepresentations
      and how the complainant Company was duped. The only part
      attributed to the second appellant is that the first appellant
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896     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2022] 6 S.C.R.


A     along with Ashwani Suri, Managing Director and Mukender
      Singh, Director approached the complainant in June 1996
      and had represented that they and Shalini Suri, Shama Suri
      (Appellant 2), Charanjit Singh and M.L. Kampani were the
      Directors of Ganga Automobiles Ltd. There is nothing stated
      in the counter-affidavit about the role, if any, played by the
B
      second appellant. A complaint under Section 138 of the
      Negotiable Instruments Act has already been filed by the
      complainant. There is no allegation of any corrupt practice
      by any of the accused as if they duped the Finance Company
      in parting with the amount of Rs 50,00,000. As normally
C     understood, the business of a finance company is to invite
      deposits, pay interest on that and also to give loans and earn
      interest. A finance company also advances short-term loans.
      In that case it is essentially a commercial transaction. After
      the first two cheques were dishonoured two cheques were
      again issued, which again were dishonoured resulting in filing
D
      of complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
      Act. None of the respondents has been able to explain as to
      why offences under Sections 406/420 IPC were not added in
      the complaint filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable
      Instruments Act and why resort was had to filing of a separate
E     first information report. A certain motive has been attributed
      to the investigating officer but we think we need not go into
      that. There is also no answer as to why the investigation
      against the three other Directors was still stated to be pending
      when the same role is assigned to all the accused. In the FIR
      it is Sukhvinder Singh, who first approached the complainant,
F
      but later it is Mukender Singh. There is no answer as to why
      there are two different names. As to who are the Directors of
      Ganga Automobiles Ltd. could have been easily found by the
      complainant after going through the records of the Registrar
      of Companies and also about its status. As noted above, in
G     the subsequent statement by the complainant he does not
      assign any role to the first appellant. The allegation that in
      the first instance three persons contacted the complainant
      Company, who told the complainant of other Directors with
      whom the complainant conversed on telephone appears to
      be rather improbable.
H
         J. VEDHASINGH v. R.M. GOVINDAN & ORS.                          897
                 [J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

      14. We agree with the submission of the appellants that the       A
      whole attempt of the complainant is evidently to rope in all
      the members of the family particularly those who are the
      parents of the Managing Director of Ganga Automobiles Ltd.
      in the instant criminal case without regard to their role or
      participation in the alleged offences with the sole purpose of
                                                                        B
      getting the loan due to the Finance Company by browbeating
      and tyrannising the appellants with criminal prosecution. A
      criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable
      Instruments Act is already pending against the appellants and
      other accused. They would suffer the consequences if offence
      under Section 138 is proved against them. In any case there       C
      is no occasion for the complainant to prosecute the appellants
      under Sections 406/420 IPC and in his doing so it is clearly
      an abuse of the process of law and prosecution against the
      appellants for those offences is liable to be quashed, which
      we do.
                                                                        D
      15. The appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court
      dated 6-5-1999 is set aside and prosecution of the appellants
      under Sections 406/420 IPC in Criminal Case No. 674 of 1997
      (now Criminal Case No. 6054 of 1998) and pending in the
      Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad is quashed.”
                                                                        E
      10. Similarly in the case of Kolla Veera Raghav Rao (supra)
this Court reaffirmed the view taken in the said case. The relevant
paragraphs are reproduced as thus:
      “4. It may be noticed that there is a difference between the
      language used in Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India       F
      and Section 300(1) CrPC. Article 20(2) states:
      “20. (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the
      same offence more than once.”
      On the other hand, Section 300(1) CrPC states:
                                                                        G
      “300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for
      same offence.—(1) A person who has once been tried by a
      court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted
      or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or
      acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for
      the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence     H
898            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2022] 6 S.C.R.


A           for which a different charge from the one made against him
            might have been made under sub-section (1) of Section 221,
            or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section
            (2) thereof.”
            5. Thus, it can be seen that Section 300(1) CrPC is wider
B           than Article 20(2) of the Constitution. While Article 20(2) of
            the Constitution only states that “no person shall be prosecuted
            and punished for the same offence more than once”, Section
            300(1) CrPC states that no one can be tried and convicted
            for the same offence or even for a different offence but on
            the same facts.
C
            6. In the present case, although the offences are different but
            the facts are the same. Hence, Section 300(1) CrPC applies.
            Consequently, the prosecution under Section 420 IPC was
            barred by Section 300(1) CrPC.”

D            11. In that case, on similar set of allegations, cognizance under
      Section 138 of NI Act on filing a private complaint was taken and accused
      were tried, while in other complaint it is alleged that the offence under
      Sections 406 and 420 is also made out, however, as directed by Court
      separate prosecution was lodged. On filing the quash petition, this Court
      held that on the same set of allegations two different offences i.e., under
E     NI Act and IPC cannot be proceeded with and the proceedings under
      Sections 420 and 406 of IPC is liable to be quashed.
             12. On perusal of the judgment of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai
      Patel (supra) relied in the case of M/S. V.S. Reddy and Sons (supra)
      by the appellant and the judgments relied upon by the respondents in the
F     case of G. Sagar Suri (supra) and Kolla Veera Raghav Rao (supra)
       as afore quoted, the facts and the allegations were similar and that too
      the prosecution for the offences under Section 138 of the NI Act and,
      under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC were also similar. In the judgment
      of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel (supra) it was held that the
G     requirement to prove an offence under the NI Act and an offence under
      the IPC is different, and it was observed that there may be some
      overlapping of facts but the ingredients of the offences are entirely
      different, therefore, the subsequent cases are not barred by any statutory
      provisions. While in the case of G. Sagar Suri (supra) and Kolla Veera
      Raghav Rao (supra), the Court concluded that as per Section 300(1)
H
          J. VEDHASINGH v. R.M. GOVINDAN & ORS.                                899
                  [J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.]

Cr.P.C. no one can be tried and convicted for the same offence or even         A
for a different offence on the same facts, therefore, the prosecution
under Section 420 of the IPC is barred by Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C and
accordingly liable to be quashed. It is to observe that in the case of
Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel (supra) the judgments of G. Sagar
Suri (supra) and Kolla Veera Raghav Rao (supra) have been referred
                                                                               B
but distinguished on the ground that it was not raised and decided that
ingredients of both offences were not same, and the bar of Section 300(1)
of Cr.P.C. would not attract. It is relevant to note here that the judgments
cited by both the parties are rendered by benches having the strength of
two Judges. In our considered view, the bench of this Court in the case
of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel (supra) followed in M/s. V.S.                C
Reddy and Sons (supra) has taken a different view from the previous
judgments of G. Sagar Suri (supra) and Kolla Veera Raghav Rao
(supra) rendered by the bench of the same strength. The view taken in
both the cases are conflicting to each other. Needles to observe that it is
a trite law, if any issue is decided in a previous judgment by a bench of
                                                                               D
the same strength, conflicting view in the subsequent judgment should
not be rendered on the pretext that the issue has not been raised or
considered in the previous judgment. In this regard the judgment in District
Manager, APSRTC, Vijaywada v. K. Sivaji, (2001) 2 SCC 135,
Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P., 2002 AIR SCW 1573 can be
profitably referred whereby it is observed that judicial decorum demands       E
that if judgments passed by two-judges’ bench of equal strength are
conflicting, the issue of law involved must be referred to a larger bench
as the same is desirable to avoid confusion and maintain consistency of
law. In our view, the aforesaid judgments cited by the respective parties
are conflicting, however, to avoid any further confusion and to maintain
                                                                               F
consistency, we deem it appropriate to refer this issue for decision by
the larger bench to answer the following questions:
       (1) Whether the ratio of the judgment, in the case of G. Sagar
Suri (supra) and Kolla Veera Raghav Rao (supra) lay down the correct
law?
                                                                               G
                                    or
      The view taken in the case of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel
(supra) as followed in M/s V.S. Reddy and Sons (supra) which is
subsequent and conflicting, lay down the correct proposition of law?
                                                                               H
900             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2022] 6 S.C.R.


A            (2) Whether on similar set of allegations of fact the accused can
      be tried for an offence under NI Act which is special enactment and
      also for offences under IPC unaffected by the prior conviction or acquittal
      and, the bar of Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. would attract for such trial?
             13. In view of the above discussion, in our view, the judgments
B     relied by learned counsel for both the parties are in conflict with each
      other on the legal issue. Therefore, the above questions of law have
      been formulated for answer by a larger bench for decision. In such
      circumstances, we request the Registry to place the file before Hon’ble
      the Chief Justice of India for orders.
C


      Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                                 Referred to larger Bench.



D




E




F




G




H