Holding

The seat of arbitration, once expressly designated, is the juridical home that confers exclusive supervisory jurisdiction on the courts of that seat, rendering the Delhi courts without jurisdiction in this case.

Summary

The Jammu & Kashmir Economic Reconstruction Agency (JKERA) engaged Rash Builders for four road projects in J&K, but contractual disputes led the contractor to invoke arbitration. The parties, with the arbitrator’s consent, fixed Srinagar as the seat of arbitration and New Delhi as the venue, later appointing a new sole arbitrator after the first’s death. An award was rendered in New Delhi, and JKERA sought to set aside the award under Section 34 of the Jammu & Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997. The High Court of J&K held that because the proceedings and award were conducted in New Delhi, only Delhi courts had jurisdiction, a view JKERA appealed. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the seat, once designated, determines the exclusive supervisory jurisdiction, and venue does not alter that jurisdiction. Consequently, the High Court’s order was quashed and the appeal was allowed, restoring JKERA’s petition before the Srinagar court.

Issues considered

Whether the conduct of arbitration proceedings and the rendering of the award in New Delhi confers jurisdiction on the courts of New Delhi despite the parties having expressly designated Srinagar as the seat of arbitration.
The legal distinction between the seat and venue of arbitration and its impact on the supervisory jurisdiction of courts under the Arbitration and Conciliation Acts.

Legislation cited

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 20, s. 2(1)(e)
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Jammu & Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997s. 11, s. 14, s. 15, s. 33, s. 34
Societies Registration Act, 1941

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue pertains whether, despite an express designation of Srinagar as seat of arbitration, the conduct of proceedings and rendering of the award at New Delhi would confer jurisdiction upon courts at New Delhi; and the distinction between the seat and consequent determination of supervisory jurisdiction of the courts. Headnotes† Jammu & Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 – s.34 – Juridical seat of arbitration – Appellant engaged respondent- contractor for execution of road projects –

Subjects

Designation of Srinagar as seat of arbitrationConduct of proceedingsRendering of the award at New DelhiJurisdiction upon courts at New DelhiDistinction between the seat and venue of arbitrationDetermination of supervisory jurisdiction of the courtsJuridical seat of arbitrationInfrastructure road projectsContractual claimsAppointment of sole arbitratorTerritorial jurisdictionNaviera Amazonica principleShashoua principle

Judgment

[2026] 5 S.C.R. 210 : 2026 INSC 368

J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency
v.
Rash Builders India Private Limited
(Civil Appeal No. 4461 of 2026)
15 April 2026
[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue pertains whether, despite an express designation of Srinagar
as seat of arbitration, the conduct of proceedings and rendering of
the award at New Delhi would confer jurisdiction upon courts at New
Delhi; and the distinction between the seat and venue of arbitration,
and consequent determination of supervisory jurisdiction of the courts.

Headnotes†
Jammu & Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 – s.34 –
Juridical seat of arbitration – Appellant engaged respondent-
contractor for execution of road projects – Disputes between
the parties regarding the contractual claims – Respondent
invoked arbitration, and filed separate applications u/s.11 for
the appointment of a sole arbitrator for each project – High
Court appointed the former District and Sessions Judge as
sole arbitrator – This Court, having regard to the value of the
contracts, modified the High Court order and appointed former
Judge of this Court as the sole arbitrator in substitution of the
previously appointed arbitrator – Arbitral Tribunal, with the
consent of the parties, fixed Srinagar as the seat of arbitration
and New Delhi as the venue – Upon the demise of the sole
arbitrator, the High Court appointed another former Judge of
this Court, as the sole arbitrator to continue proceedings –
Arbitral award delivered in New Delhi – Applications u/s.33
filed by appellant subsequently decided – Appellant then filed
petition u/s.34 before the High Court seeking to set aside
the arbitral award insofar as it related to Shahdra Project –
Respondent raised preliminary objection regarding territorial
jurisdiction – High Court returned the petition, holding that
since the arbitration proceedings were conducted and the
award was rendered at New Delhi, the courts at New Delhi
alone had jurisdiction – Correctness:
* Author
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 211

J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency v.
Rash Builders India Private Limited

Held: Not only have the parties expressly agreed upon Srinagar as
seat of arbitration, but even the surrounding circumstances reinforce
this – Contracts executed in the State of Jammu & Kashmir and
the works were to be carried out within the said State – Arbitration
proceedings were initiated in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and
the High Court had appointed the arbitrator – These factors as well
as the ‘closest and most intimate connection test’ unmistakably
anchors the arbitration at Srinagar – Submission that arbitral award
records New Delhi as place of arbitration and is thus, determinative
of the seat cannot be accepted – Seat of arbitration is governed
by the agreement of the parties and not by any stray recital in the
award – Once the seat of arbitration is fixed, it remains immutable
unless altered by an express agreement – In the absence of any
agreement, the designation of Srinagar as seat of the arbitration
continues to hold the field – High Court ought to have appreciated
that Srinagar was consciously designated as the seat of arbitration –
Once such a designation was made, the legal consequence that
inexorably follows is that courts at Srinagar alone would have
supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceeding – Mere fact that
arbitral tribunal for reasons of convenience, conducted proceeding
at New Delhi or rendered the award at that place does not and
cannot, alter the juridical seat of arbitration – Approach adopted by
the High Court, if upheld, would have the effect of rendering the
concept of juridical seat otiose, and would introduce uncertainty in
arbitration proceeding by allowing the place of hearing or the place
where the award is signed to determine the jurisdiction – Such a
consequence would be contrary to principles of party autonomy
and legal certainty – Impugned order cannot be sustained – Court
at Srinagar being the court of seat of arbitration, alone possesses
the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the challenge to the arbitral
award – Impugned order quashed and set aside – Proceeding
u/s.34 restored. [Paras 19-24]

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.20 – Principles
governing the distinction between the seat and venue of the
arbitration, and the jurisdictional consequences:
Held: Seat of arbitration constitutes the juridical home or legal place
of arbitration – It determines the curial law governing the arbitral
process and identifies the Court having supervisory control over
the arbitration – Once the seat is designated by agreement of the
parties, the courts of that place alone have exclusive jurisdiction
to entertain all proceedings arising out of the arbitration, including
212 [2026] 5 S.C.R.

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challenges to the award – Venue is merely a geographical location
chosen for convenience for holding hearings, examination of
witnesses, or meetings of the arbitral tribunal – It does not confer
jurisdiction and does not, by itself, alter or determine the seat –
Arbitral tribunal is free to conduct proceedings at locations different
from the seat without affecting the juridical seat – Mere fact that
arbitral proceedings are conducted or the award is rendered at
a particular place does not confer jurisdiction on courts of that
place if it is different from the designated seat – Seat remains
fixed unless expressly altered by agreement of the parties –
Where the seat is not expressly designated, courts determine
it by applying the closest and most intimate connection test,
identifying the place most closely connected with the arbitration
(based on the Naviera Amazonica principle); and in appropriate
cases, construing the venue as the seat where the agreement and
surrounding circumstances indicate such intention (as reflected in
the Shashoua principle) – Intention of the parties, as discerned
from the arbitration agreement and surrounding circumstances, is
the paramount factor in determining the seat – Once such intention
is expressed-either expressly or by necessary implication-it must
be given full effect by Courts. [Para 18]

Case Law Cited
Inox Renewables Ltd. v. Jayesh Electricals Ltd. [2021] 4 SCR
376 : (2023) 3 SCC 733; BBR (India) Private Limited v. S.P.
Singla Constructions Private Limited [2022] 19 SCR 977 : (2023)
1 SCC 693; BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Ltd. [2019] 17 SCR
742 : (2020) 4 SCC 234; Mankastu Impex (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Airvisual
Ltd. [2020] 4 SCR 565 : (2020) 5 SCC 399; Bharat Aluminium
Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. [2012] 12 SCR
327 : (2012) 9 SCC 552; Enercon (India) Ltd. & Ors. v. Enercon
GMBH & Anr. [2014] 2 SCR 855 : (2014) 5 SCC 1; Indus Mobile
Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.
[2017] 4 SCR 744 : (2017) 7 SCC 678; Hindustan Construction
Co. Ltd. v. NHPC Ltd. & Anr. (2020) 4 SCC 310; Arif Azam Co.
Ltd. v. Micromax Informatics FZE [2024] 11 SCR 1142 : (2025) 9
SCC 750 - referred to.
Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (COMM) – referred to.
Naviera Amazonica Peruana S.A. v. Compania Internacional de
Seguros del Peru (1988) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 116 (CA) – referred to.
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 213

J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency v.
Rash Builders India Private Limited

List of Acts
Jammu & Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997; Societies
Registration Act, 1941; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords
Designation of Srinagar as seat of arbitration; Conduct of proceedings;
Rendering of the award at New Delhi; Jurisdiction upon courts at
New Delhi; Distinction between the seat and venue of arbitration;
Determination of supervisory jurisdiction of the courts; Juridical seat
of arbitration; Execution of infrastructure road projects; Contractual
claims; Appointment of sole arbitrator for each project; Appointment of
the former District and Sessions Judge as sole arbitrator; Appointment
of the former Judge of this Court as the sole arbitrator; Substitution
of the previously appointed arbitrator; Territorial jurisdiction; Naviera
Amazonica principle; Shashoua principle.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4461 of 2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.07.2024 of the High
Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar in ARBP No.
28 of 2024.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Parth Awasthi, Pashupathi Nath Razdan.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Ms. Renu Gupta, Ms. Mandakini Ghosh, Ms. Pratiksha Jalan.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Alok Aradhe, J.

1. Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted.
3. The present appeal presents an occasion to revisit the settled
distinction between the seat and venue of arbitration, and consequent
214 [2026] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

determination of supervisory jurisdiction of the courts. The appeal
arises from an order directing return of a petition under Section 34
of Jammu & Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 (Act).

FACTS: -
4. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are undisputed and may
be briefly stated. The appellant, Jammu and Kashmir Economic
Reconstruction Agency (JKERA) is a society registered under the
Societies Registration Act, 1941 functioning as a special purpose
vehicle for execution of externally aided infrastructure projects. The
respondent is a contractor engaged by the appellant for execution
of four infrastructure road projects namely, (i) Kralgund-Ashpora-
Qaziabad Road Project (Kralgund Project) (ii) Handwara-Zachaldara-
Waddur Road Project (Handwara Project) (iii) Hubdipora-Kadar-
Qaimoh Road Project (Hubdipora Project) and (iv) Shahdra-Kamalkote
Road Project (Shahdra Project) in the State of Jammu & Kashmir.
The agreements between the parties were executed on 31.03.2008.
5. Disputes having arisen between the parties regarding the contractual
claims, the respondent invoked the arbitration, by issuing a notice
on 18.04.2014, in terms of Arbitration clause contained in the
agreements. The respondent thereafter filed four separate applications
on 12.06.2014 under Section 11 of the Act before the High Court
of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar (High Court) for
appointment of sole arbitrator for each project. By an order dated
30.07.2015, the High Court, appointed Mr. Javed Ahmad Kawoosa,
former District and Sessions Judge as sole arbitrator.
6. The appellant challenged the said order by filing Civil Appeal
Nos.14167-14170 of 2015. By an order dated 07.12.2015, this
Court, having regard to the value of the contracts, modified the
High Court order and appointed Mr. Justice S.S. Nijjar, former Judge
of this Court as the sole arbitrator in substitution of the previously
appointed arbitrator.
7. By an order dated 26.03.2016, the Arbitral Tribunal, with the consent
of the parties fixed Srinagar as seat of arbitration and New Delhi
as the venue. Upon the demise of sole arbitrator, on 26.03.2021,
the High Court in exercise of powers under Sections 14 and 15 of
the Act vide order dated 17.09.2021 appointed Mr. Justice Amitava
Roy, a former Judge of this Court, as the sole arbitrator to continue
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 215

J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency v.
Rash Builders India Private Limited

proceedings from the stage left by the previous arbitrator. The arbitral
award was delivered on 15.01.2024 at New Delhi. The applications
under Section 33 of the Act filed by the appellant, were subsequently
decided by an order dated 12.03.2024.
8. The appellant filed a petition under Section 34 of the Act before the
High Court seeking to set aside the arbitral award dated 15.01.2024
and order dated 12.03.2024 in so far it related to Shahdra Project.
The respondent raised a preliminary objection regarding the territorial
jurisdiction.
9. By an order dated 08.07.2024, the High Court returned the petition,
holding that since the arbitration proceedings were conducted and
the award was rendered at New Delhi, the courts at New Delhi alone
had jurisdiction.

SUBMISSIONS: -
10. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that by an order dated
26.03.2016, with the consent of the parties, the arbitrator had fixed
the seat of arbitration at Srinagar and the same could be altered only
by mutual agreement. It is submitted that where the seat and venue
differ, the seat determines the supervisory jurisdiction, hence the courts
at Srinagar alone possess jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act.
11. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted
that appellant had also approached High Court of Delhi by filing
petitions under Section 34 of the Act and thereafter has filed the
Special Leave Petition. It is contended that arbitral award recorded
New Delhi as the place of arbitration for all intents and purposes,
and parties may alter seat by mutual consent. Therefore, the appeal
is liable to be dismissed. In support of the aforesaid submissions,
reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court1.

CASE LAW AND THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES: -
12. The distinction between the seat and venue of arbitration though,
firmly embedded in arbitral jurisprudence, continues to give rise
to jurisdictional errors. The present appeal exemplifies one such

1 Inox Renewables Ltd. v. Jayesh Electricals Ltd.; (2023) 3 SCC 733, BBR (India) Private Limited v.
S.P. Singla Constructions Private Limited; (2023) 1 SCC 693, BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Ltd.;
(2020) 4 SCC 234 and Mankastu Impex (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Airvisual Ltd.; (2020) 5 SCC 399
216 [2026] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

instance, necessitating judicial correction. The core issue is whether,
despite an express designation of Srinagar as seat of arbitration, the
conduct of proceedings and rendering of the award at New Delhi would
confer jurisdiction upon courts at New Delhi. In order to answer this
question, it becomes necessary to revisit the well-settled principles
governing the concept of juridical seat of arbitration.
13. A Constitution Bench of this Court 2, recognised that arbitration
is anchored to the seat or place chosen by the parties, and that
the law of that seat governs the arbitration. It was observed that
Section 20 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 embodies
party autonomy in the choice of seat, while also permitting, under
sub-section (3), the holding of hearings at a place convenient to the
parties. The distinction is both deliberate and doctrinal: while the
seat determines jurisdiction and applicable law, the venue is merely
a matter of convenience for conducting proceedings.
14. A two-Judge Bench of this Court3 while placing reliance on the “closest
and most intimate connection” test involved in English jurisprudence4,
held that seat of arbitration is juridical home of arbitration and where
the agreement of the parties is clear, such designation must be given
full effect. Even in cases of ambiguity, the seat is to be determined
by identifying the place with the closest and most intimate connection
to the arbitration.
15. Another two-Judge Bench of this Court5 authoritatively expounded
the concept of the “juridical seat” and held that the designation of a
seat of arbitration is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. It was
observed that the expression “subject-matter of arbitration” in Section
2(1)(e) of the Act is not to be confused with the subject-matter of the
suit, but rather refers to the process of dispute resolution, thereby
identifying the court which exercises supervisory jurisdiction over
the arbitral proceedings. It was further held that once a seat is
designated, it operates as the centre of gravity of the arbitration and
vests exclusive jurisdiction in the courts of that place for all matters

2 Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2012) 9 SCC 552.
3 Enercon (India) Ltd. & Ors. v. Enercon GMBH & Anr.; (2014) 5 SCC 1.
4 Naviera Amazonica Peruana S.A. v. Compania Internacional de Seguros del Peru (1988) 1 Lloyd’s
Rep 116 (CA).
5 Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.; (2017) 7 SCC 678
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 217

J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency v.
Rash Builders India Private Limited

arising out of the arbitration, including challenges to the arbitral
award. The designation of a seat, therefore, is not a matter of mere
form, but carries with it significant legal consequences.
16. The aforesaid principle has been affirmed by a three-Judge Bench of
this Court6 and it has been held that the moment the seat is designated,
it operates as an exclusive jurisdiction clause, irrespective of whether
any part of the cause of action has arisen there. Arbitration law, in
this respect, departs from the Code of Civil Procedure, permitting
parties to choose a neutral seat which may have no connection with
the underlying dispute, yet vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Courts
of that place.
17. A three-Judge Bench of this Court7 held that once the seat of arbitration
is designated, such clause becomes the exclusive jurisdiction clause
as a result of which only the courts where the seat is located would
have jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. Recently, another
three-Judge Bench of this Court8 reaffirmed the principle that seat
remains the judicial anchor, determining both the applicable law and
the supervisory jurisdiction.
18. Thus, the principles governing the distinction between the seat and
venue of the arbitration, and the jurisdictional consequences that
follow, may be summarised as under: -
(i) The seat of arbitration constitutes the juridical home or legal
place of arbitration. It determines the curial law governing the
arbitral process and identifies the Court having supervisory
control over the arbitration.
(ii) Once the seat is designated by agreement of the parties, the
courts of that place alone have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain
all proceedings arising out of the arbitration, including challenges
to the award. The designation of the seat operates akin to an
exclusive jurisdiction clause, excluding all other courts – even
those where the cause of action may have arisen.

6 BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd.; (supra)
7 Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHPC Ltd. & Anr.; (2020) 4 SCC 310; See also: Mankastu
Impex Pvt. Ltd. v. Airvisual Ltd. (supra) and BBR (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. S.P. Singla Constructions Pvt.
Ltd. (supra).
8 Arif Azam Co. Ltd. v. Micromax Informatics FZE; (2025) 9 SCC 750.
218 [2026] 5 S.C.R.

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(iii) The venue is merely a geographical location chosen for
convenience for holding hearings, examination of witnesses, or
meetings of the arbitral tribunal. It does not confer jurisdiction
and does not, by itself, alter or determine the seat. The arbitral
tribunal is free to conduct proceedings at locations different
from the seat without affecting the juridical seat.
(iv) The mere fact that arbitral proceedings are conducted or
the award is rendered at a particular place does not confer
jurisdiction on courts of that place if it is different from the
designated seat. The seat remains fixed unless expressly
altered by agreement of the parties.
(v) Where the seat is not expressly designated, courts determine
it by applying:
(a) the closest and most intimate connection test, identifying
the place most closely connected with the arbitration (based
on the Naviera Amazonica principle); and
(b) in appropriate cases, construing the venue as the seat
where the agreement and surrounding circumstances
indicate such intention (as reflected in the Shashoua
principle9).
(vi) The intention of the parties, as discerned from the arbitration
agreement and surrounding circumstances, is the paramount
factor in determining the seat. Once such intention is expressed-
either expressly or by necessary implication-it must be given
full effect by Courts.

APPLICATION TO FACTS: -
19. In the backdrop of aforesaid well-settled legal principles, we may
advert to the facts of the case in hand. In the instant case, the
sole arbitrator by an order dated 26.03.2016 had fixed the seat of
arbitration as Srinagar and venue of arbitration as New Delhi. The
relevant extract of the order dated 26.03.2016 reads as under: -
“…In the order dated 16.01.2016 the direction that the
seat of arbitration shall be Srinagar and that the venue

9 Shashoua v. Sharma 2009 EWHC 957 (COMM).
[2026] 5 S.C.R. 219

J&K Economic Reconstruction Agency v.
Rash Builders India Private Limited

shall be New Delhi has been inadvertently omitted. Please
note that on agreement of the parties seat of Arbitration
shall be at Srinagar and Venue shall be at New Delhi.”
20. In the present case, not only have the parties expressly agreed
upon Srinagar as seat of arbitration, but even the surrounding
circumstances reinforce this conclusion. The contracts are executed
in the State of Jammu & Kashmir and the works were to be carried
out within the said State. The arbitration proceedings were initiated in
the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the High Court had appointed
the arbitrator. These factors as well as the ‘closest and most intimate
connection test’ unmistakably anchors the arbitration at Srinagar.
21. The contention of the respondent that arbitral award records New
Delhi as place of arbitration and is therefore determinative of the
seat cannot be accepted. The seat of arbitration is governed by the
agreement of the parties and not by any stray recital in the award.
Once the seat of arbitration is fixed, it remains immutable unless
altered by an express agreement. In the absence of any agreement,
the designation of Srinagar as seat of the arbitration continues to
hold the field.
22. The High Court ought to have appreciated that Srinagar was
consciously designated as the seat of arbitration. Once such a
designation was made, the legal consequence that inexorably follows
is that courts at Srinagar alone would have supervisory jurisdiction
over the arbitral proceeding. The mere fact that arbitral tribunal for
reasons of convenience, conducted proceeding at New Delhi or
rendered the award at that place does not and cannot, alter the
juridical seat of arbitration
23. The approach adopted by the High Court, if upheld, would have the
effect of rendering the concept of juridical seat otiose, and would
introduce uncertainty in arbitration proceeding by allowing the place
of hearing or the place where the award is signed to determine the
jurisdiction. Such a consequence would be contrary to principles of
party autonomy and legal certainty that underly the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996.

CONCLUSION: -
24. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order returning the
application filed by the appellant under Section 34 of the Act cannot
220 [2026] 5 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

be sustained. The court at Srinagar being the court of seat of
arbitration, alone possesses the jurisdiction to entertain and decide
the challenge to the arbitral award. It was stated at the Bar that after
the impugned order, the appellant had filed four separate petitions
under Section 34 of the Act before High Court of Delhi. Needless
to state that the appellant shall be at liberty to withdraw the petition
under Section 34 of the Act relating to Shahdra Project and the fate
of remaining three petitions shall abide by this decision.
25. In the result, impugned order dated 08.07.2024 passed by the High
Court is quashed and set aside. The proceeding under Section 34
of the Act shall stand restored. The High Court shall consider and
decide the same on its own merits, with due expedition. The appeal
is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain