J. D. JAINversusTHE MANAGEMENT OF STATE BANK OF INDIA & ANR.

                       I




                                                                                 227

                                      J. D. JAIN

                                            v.

               THE MANAGEMENT OF STATE BANK OF
                                  INDIA & ANR.

                                  December 17, 1981

                    [V.D. TULZAPURKAR, BAHARUL ISLAM AND
                             A. VARADARAJAN, JJ.)

          Constitution of India 1950, Art. 226-Award of Industrial Tribunal-Jurisdic-
    tion of High Court-interference-When arises.

          Industrial Disputes Act 1947, S. lJA-Comp/aint-Depositor against bank
    employee-Debit authority alteration of-Withdrawal of excess money-Confession
    by employee to officer of alteration and withdrawal-Holding of domestic enquiry-     D
    Non examination of depositor-Chari:e of.fraud and misappropriation proved-
    Employee discharged from service-Dispute raised-Issue referred to Tribunal-
    Tribunal holding depositor (complainant) not examined-Evidence against employee
    'hearsay'-Direcring reinstatement-High Court in writ petilion setting aside
    award of tribunal-High Court whether correct in interfering with award-Award
    whether vitiated by misconception of law.
                                                                                         E
         Labour Law-Domestic enquiry-Guilt whether to be established beyond
    reasonable doubt-Proof of misconduct alone-Whether sufficient,

         Words & Phrases 'hearsay'-Meaning of

          The Appellant was working as a Cashier in a Bank. A depositor who had
    a Savings Bank Account with the Bank came 10 the Bank to receive his Pass            ID'
    Book. On receipt of his Pass Book from the Counter Clerk he complained to
    the ledger keeper that on a certain date he had withdrawn only Rs. 500 but a
    debit entry of Rs, l ,500 had been shown in the Pass Book. The Ledger kc~f)er
    took the depositor to the Supervisor and the Agent and his complaint was
    recorded. When the documents pertaining to the withdrawal were examined it
    was found that the depositor had given a letler of authority to the appellant
    authorising withdrawal from his account. The letter of authority showed that it      G
    was for withdrawal of Rs. l 500 though there appeared to be some interpolation
    suggesting that the figure of Rs. 500 had been altered to the figure of Rs. l 500.




,
          A memorandum of charge was served on the appellant by the Management
    respondent No. I and a disciplinary enquiry was held. The Enquiry Officer
    submitted his report and his findings were that the appellant had fraudulently
    altered the amount in the letter of authority given by the depcsitor, withdrew
    Rs. 1500 from the depositor's account and paid Rs. 500 only to the depositor and
    228                    SUPilEMil COURT REPORTS                  [1982) 2 S.C.R.

A   misappropriated Rs.1500. In pursuance of the enquiry the appellant was dischar-
    ged from service.

          The appellant having raised an industrial dispute the matter was referred to
    the Industrial Tribunal. Before the Tribunal the appellant denied the charges
    and pleaded that as the depositor was not examined in the discplinary enquiry
    there was no legal evidence before the Enquiry Officer for finding that he was
B   guilty. Before the Tribunal the Management examined no witnesses but
     produced documents and relied on them. The Tribunal held that on the evidence
    before it the appellant could not be held guilty as in the absence of the evidence
    of the depositor, the evidence recorded was 'hearsay' and directed re-instatement
    of the appellant with full back wages.


c        The respondent moved the High Court under Article 226 and 227 which
    held that the charge against the appellant had been established and quashed the
    award of the Tribunal.


          In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant : (1)
    that the Tribunal exercised its powers under Section 1!A of the Industrial Dis-
    putes Act and the High Court exercising powers under Article 226/227 had no
D   jurisdiction to interfere with the award ; (2) the Tribunal rightly refused to rely
    on the evidence which was hearsay; the depositor not having been examined,
    and (3) the High Court committed an error in not considering the receipt execut-
    ed by the depositor showing payment of Rs. 1000 to the depositor.          ,


          Dismissing the appeal,

E         HELD : The award of the Tribunal is vitiated by misconception of the law
    involved. It erred in holding that as Kansai (depositor) was not examined, fraud
    and misappropriation on the part of appellant cannot be held to be proved and in
    failing to appreciate the confession made by the appellant to the higher officer
    that he had altered the amount in figures and words in his own band. [236 G]


          I. In an application for a writ of certiorari under Article 226 for quashing
F   the award of an Industrial Tribunal the jurisdiction of the High Court is limited.
    It can quash the award when the Tribunal has committed an error of Jaw
    apparent on the face of the record or when the finding of facts of the Tribunal
    is perverse. (233 BJ

          In the instant case, three kinds of proceedings against the delinquent
G   were possible : (i) departmental proceedings and action, (ii) Criminal prosecu-
    tion for the alleged misappropriation of the amount, and (iii) civil proceedings
    for recovery of the amount alleged to be misappropriated. The respondent adop-
    ted the first course and instituted the domestic enquiry. In such an enquiry
    guilt need not be established beyond reasonable doubt; proof of misconduct may
    be sufficient. (234 G-235 A]
H
          Stale of llaryana & Anr. v. Ra/Ian Singh A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1512, referred        ~
    to
                     J.D. JAIN v. STATE BANK (Baharul Islam, J.)                  229

           2. The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it means what-      A
     ever a person declares on information given by someone else. [235 E]

            In the instant case, the Tribunal after having made a detailed reference to
     the evidence of the witnesses found that a complaint was made by Kansai and that
      the appellant confessed that he had altered the debit authority, but held that as
     Kansai was not examined, this was not direct evidence but was of the nature of
      'hearsay' evidence, with regard to the fact whether the appellant manipulated the   8
     documents, withdrew the excess amount and misappropriated it, there is no direct
    evidence of any of the witnesses except the appellant's confession. The evidence on
     which reliance has been taken by the respondent is the confession and circumstan-
     tial evidence. The evidence of Kansai would have been primary and material. if
     the fact in issue were whether Kansai authorised the appellant to make the altera~
    tions in the authority letter. But Kansal's complaint was to the contrary. No rule
     of law enjoins that a complaint has to be in writing as insisted by the Tribunal:    C
     For the purpose of a departmental enquiry, complaint substantiated by circum-
    stantial evidence is enough. What the respondent sought to establish in the
     domestic enquiry was that Kansai had made a verbal complaint with regard to the
    withdrawal of excess money by the appellant. On the factum of complaint of
    Kansai the evidence of these four witnessess is direct as the complaint is said to
    have been made by Kansai in their presence and hearing. It is not therefore
    'hearsay'. The respondent has succeeded in proving that a complaint was made          D
    by Kansai on the evidence of these four witnesses. [236 A-El

         Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 W.L.R. 965, referred to.

         3. The receipt executed by Kansai showing payment by the appellant of
    Rs. 1000 to the former is destructive of the appellant's defence and on the
    contrary proves the respondent's case. [236 H-237 A]                                  E

         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :                Civil Appeal       No.    495
    of 1979.

          Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
    the 18th October, 1978 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Peti-
                                                                                          F
    tion No. 1292 of 1975.

           R.K. Garg, U.R. La/it and Randhir Jain for the Appellant.

         M.C. Bhandare, S.A. Shroff, S.S. Shrofj and Miss C.K.
    Sachurita for Respondent No. 1.                                                       G
           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by




,
          BAHARUL ISLAM J. This appeal by special leave is by the
    appellant, J.D. Jain. who was a workman and whose services have                       H
    been terminated by the management of the St11te; Bank of {ndi11
    (hereinafter called the respondenq.
    230                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [1982) 2 s.c.R.

A         2.   The material facts are these.

          The appellant was working as a cashier in the Meerut City
     Branch of the State Bank of India. On June 21, I 971, one Dish an
    Prakash Kansai ('Kansai' for short) who had a Savings Bank account
    with the said branch of the State Bank came to the Bank to receive
B   his Pass Book. On receipt of the Pass Book from the counter
    clerk, Kansai complained to Wadhera who was the Ledger-
    keeper, that on February 8, 1971, he had withdrawn only
    Rs. 500 but a debit entry of Rs. 1,500 had been shown
    in the Pass Book. Wadhera thereupon took Kansai to the
    the Supervisor, R.P. Gupta, before whom Kansai repeated his
c   complaint. Necessary documents pertaining to the said withdrawal
    were then examined and it was found that Kansai had given a 'li:tter
    of authority' (which expression means, we are told, the withdrawal
    application form) to the appellant on February 8, 1971 authorising
    him to withdraw the amount from his account. The letter of
    authority showed that it was for withdrawal of Rs. 1,500 though
D   there appeared to be some interpolation suggesting that the figure
    of Rs. 500 had been altered to the figure of Rs. 1,500. The matter
    was then brought to the notice of M. Ramzan, the Agent of the
    State Bank, before whom also Kansai is said to have repeated his
    complaint.
E
           3. Eventually on September 18, 1972, a memorandum of
    charges was served on the appellant by the respondent stating, illler
    alia that in the letter of authority, the appellant altered in his own
    handwriting with different ink the amount of Rs. 500 to Rs. 1,500
    and thus received Rs. 1,000 in excess, passing only Rs. 500 to the
F    pass-book holder, and that he subsequently, on June 24, 1971,
    deposited Rs 250 in the account of Kansai to liquidate a part of the
    amount mirnppropriated by him. The appellant replied to the
    charges. He denied the allegations. Thereupon. the respondent
    appointed one Rajendra Prasad as an Enquiry Officer and a formal
    disciplinary enquiry was held against the appellant. The Enquiry
    Officer submitted his report to the respondent on February 13, 1973.
G
    The findings of the Enquiry Officer were that the appellant ha.d
    fraudulently altered the amount in the letter of authority given to
    bim by Kansai, withdrew Rs. l ,500 from Kansal's account and paid
    Rs. 500 only to Kansai and misappropriated Rs. 1000. The discipli-
H   nary authority on receipt of the report of the Enquiry Officer passed
    the followin~ order (material portion only) :-
                   J.D. JAIN v. STATE BANK (Balwrul Islam, J.)             231

                  "2. Although, the charges against you are of a serious         A
             nature which would, in normal course, warrant your dis-
            missal from the service of the Bank, yet keeping in view
            your past record, I am inclined to take a lenient view in
            the matter. Upon consideration of the <natter, I have ten-
            tantively come to the 1'edsion that your misconduct be
           condoned and you be merely discharged of in terms of                  B
           paragraphs 521 (5) (e) of the Sastry Award read with para-
           graph 18.28 of the Desai Award and paragraph I. I of the
           Agreement dated the 3 lst March 1967 entered into between
           the Bank and the State Bank of India Staff Federation.
           Before, however, I take a final decision in the matter I
           would like to give you a hearing as to why the proposed               c
-          punishment should not be imposed upon you. To enable
           you to do so, I enclose copies of tl:e proceedings of the
           enquiry and findings of the Enquiry Officer.

                3. You may ask for a hearing or if you so prefer
           show cause in writing within one week of receipt by you
                                                                                 D
           thereof. If you fail therein, I will conclude that you have
           no cause to show in this behalf."

       '   The appellant then submitted a representation to Shri V.B.
    Chadha, the Regional Manager of the State Bank of India on
                                                                                 E
    June 15, 1973. Shri Chadha after perusing the representation of
    the appellant and hearing him in person, recommended that the
    proposed punishment should not be imposed upon the appellant,
    on the grounds that Kansai had not been examined as a witness and


-   that there had been no written complaint against the appellant.
    The respondent, however, did not accept the recommendation, and,
    by its memorandum of December 7, 1973, discharged the appellant
    from service with effect from the close of the business on Decem-
                                                                                 F

    ber 22, 1973.

          4. The appellant then having raised an industrial dispute,
    the Central Government, by its order dated January 17, 1975,                 G
    referred the following issue to the Central Government Industrial
    Tribunal at Delhi for adjudication :

                "Is the management of State Bank of India justified in
           discharging from service Shri J.D. Jain, Cashier of Meerut            H
           Branch, with effect from 22nd. December, \973? lf not to
           what relief is he entitled ?'"
    232                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [1982] 2 s.c.R.

A         5. Before the Tribunal, the appellant denied the charges, He
    inter alia, pleaded that as Kansai was not examined in the enquiry,
    there was no legal evidence before the Enquiry Officer for a finding
     that he was guilty.

          The Tribunal framed the following two issues :-
B
          "I. Whether a proper and valid domestic enquiry was
              held by the Bank and its effect ?

          2.   Is the management of State Bank of India justified in
                discharging from service Shri J.D. Jain, Cashier of
                                                                             '
                                                                             '

c               Meerut Branch with effect from 22nd December, 1973 ?
                If not to what relief is he entitled ?"

          Before the Tribunal, the Management examined no witnesses
    but produced certain documents and relied on them. The appellant
                                                                                 -
    also did not adduce any evidenc.
0
           On a perusal of the evidence recorded by the Enquiry Officer,
    the Tribunal held that on the evidence before it, the appellarlt could
    not be held guilty as, according to it, in the absence of the evidence
    of Kansai, the evidence recorded was hearsay, with the result that
    it directed reinstatement of the appellant with full back wag~s from
E   22nd December, 1973. The respondent moved the High Court
    under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing
    the award of the Tribunal. The High Court held that the charges
    against the appellant had been established and quashed the award
    ot the Tribunal. It is against this judgment of the High Court

F
    that the present appeal by special leave is directed.

          6. Mr. R.K. Garg, learned counsel appearing for the appel-
    lant makes three submissions before us :-
                                                                                 -
          (I) That the Tribunal exercised its powers under Sec-
              tion 11 A of the Industrial Disputes Act and the High
G             Court, exercising powers under Article 226/227 of the
              Constitution, had no jurisdiction to interfere with the
              award of the Tribunal ;

          (2) The Tribunal in the perspective of the broad contours
H             of the case rightly refused to rely on the evidence
              which was hearsay, Kansai not having been exa-
              111ined;
                j D. JAIN v. STATE BANK ( Baharul Islam, J.)        233

         (3) Assuming the evidence could be relied on, th High              A
             Court committed error in not considering the receipt
             executed by Kansai showing payment of Rs. 1000 to
             Kansai and its judgment is vitiated.

          7. In an application for a Writ of Certiorari under Article
    226 of the Constitution for quashing an award of an Industrial Tri-     B
    bunal, the jurisdiction of the High Court is limilld. It can quash
    the award, inter alia, when the Tribunal has committed an error of
    law apparent on the face of the record or when the finding of facts
    of the Tribunal is perverse. In the case before us, according to the
    Tribunal, as Kansai was not examined, the evidence before it was
    hearsay and as such on the basis there0f the appellant could not be     C
    legally found guilty.

-         8. Before the Enquiry Officer, the respondent examined the
    following witnessess :
                                                                            D
            Gupta (Witness I), Wadhera, the Ledger Keeper (Witness
         2), Mahesh Chander who was incharge of Savings Bank
         Account on 8.2.1971 (Witness 3), M. Ramzan, Agent of
         the Bank (Witness 4), Sarkar (Witness 5), and Bhardwaj
         (Witness 6).

           Bhardwaj was a leader of the employees' union of the respon-
                                                                            E
    dent. He did not support the case of the respondent. The other
    witnesses supported the case of the respondent. Witnesses Nos. 1, 2,
     4 and 5 depose that a verbal complaint was made by Kansai in
    their pr;:sence to the effect that he had authorised the appellant
    to withdraw Rs. 500 which sum was paid to him, but the entries
                                                                            F
    showed that Kansai had withdrawn Rs. 1,500. Witnesses Vadhera,
    Ramzan and Sarkar als.1 deposed that the appellant had confessed
    before them that he had made the alterations in the figure and in
    words of the sum. The Tribunal after having made detailed referen-
     ces to the evidence of the above witnesses in fact found, "All that
     this evidence thus, proves is that a complaint was made by Shri
                                                                            G
    Kansai and that the workmen confessed that he had altered the debit
     authority." (emphasis added). Curiously, however, it held, "This
     evidence, by no means prove that the workman altered the debit
     authority to defraud or that he actually defrauded or that he mis·
     appropriated the amount of Rs. 1,000 after paying Rs. 500 only         H
     to Mr. Kansai from the amount of Rs. 1,500 withdrawn from the
     bank by him as it was not direct evidence but was in the nat1.1re of
     234                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [1982] 2 S.C.R.

A    hearsay evidence since it was learnt through the medium of a third
     person and that person was not available." It further held, "There
     can be no hesitation, therefore, that the enquiry officer rdied on
     hearsay evidence in arriving at his findings and it vitiated the
     enquiry." It went on, "All this could be enough for raising a suspi-
     cion only. In order to be called 'proved' it needed evidence which
     was not there." It further observed, "But the question was whether
     it was done without the consent or knowledge of Mr. Kansai. There
     was no evidence on the record to prove it. The only person who
     could speak about it was Mr. Kansai. He did not appear before the
     inquiry officer, therefore, there was no direct evidence that the
     change that was admittedly made by the workman in the debit autho-
c    rity was without Mr. Kansal's consent or knowledge or that it was
     designed to defraud." (emphasis added)

           The positive findings of the Tribunal are :
                                                                               -
            (i) Kansai made the complaint as alleged by the manage-
I)              ment,

            (ii) The appellant confessed that he had made the altera-
                 tions charged with, as alleged by the management,

           (iii) By implication it has also found that Rs. 1,000 in
E                excess of the original amount of Rs. 500 was received
                 by the appellant as a result of the alternations. But it
                 has held that as Kansai was not examined, fraud and
                 misappropriation on the part of the appellant cannot
                  be held to be proved, as the evidence was 'hearsay'.

            9. The learned Tribunal, it appears, was obvious of th1~ fact
     that it was examining the evidence in a domestic enquiry, and not
                                                                               -
     the evidence in a criminal prosecution entailing conviction and
     sentence.

           In a case like the one before us, three kinds of proceedings
G    against the delinquent are possible :

             (i) departmental proceedings and action,

            (ii) oriminal prosecution for forgery and misappropriation,
H
                                                                               -·
            (iii) civil!proceedings for;,recovery of the amount alleged to
                  be misappropriated.
                          J,D. JAIN v. STATE BANK (Baharul Islam, J.)             235

                 The respondent herein adopted course (i) and instituted the                A
            domestic enquiry in which the principle Uapplied by the Tribunal is
            not applicable ; in such an enquiry guilt need not be established
            beyond reasonable doubt, proof of misconduct may be sufficient.

                  The learned Tribunal has committed another error in holding
            that the finding of the domestic enquiry was based on "hearsay"                 B
            evidence. The law is well-settled that the strict rules of evidence are
            not applicable in a domestic enquiry.

      ~          This Court in the case of State of Haryana & Anr. v. Rattan
           Singh(1 ) held :
                                                                                            c
                      "It is well-settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict

 -·                  and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian
                     Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are
                     logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible.
                     There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has
                     reasonable nexus and credibility."                                 D
                10. The next question is, is the evidence in the domestic
          enquiry really hearsay, as held by the Tribunal ?

                The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Some times it
          means whatever a person is heard to say; some times it means what-            E
          ever a person declares on information given by someone else. (See
          Stephen on Law of Evidence).

                 The Privy Council it the case of Subramaniam v/s. Public Prose-
           cutor(•), observed : "Evidence of a statement made to a witness who
---        is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is
           hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to esta-
                                                                                        F

           blish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hear-
          say and is admissible when it is prop('Sed to establish by the evidence,
           not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made. The
          fact that it was made quite apart from its truth, is frequently relevant
          in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness         G
          or some other persons in whose presence these statements are
          made."


              (1)  AIR 1977 S.C. 1512.                                                  H
              (2) [1956] 1 W.L.R. 96~.
    236                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            (198~1.J 2 S.C.R.

A          I l. In the instant case,. the alleged misconduct of the appel-
    lant was that he forged documents, withdrew Rs. 1,500-Rs. I ,000 in
    excess of the amount he was authorised to do and misappropriated
    the excess amount of Rs. 1,000. With regard to the fact whether the
    appellant manipulated the documents, withdrew excess amount and
    misappropriated it, there is, of course, no direct evidence of any eye
B   witness except the appellant's 'confession' referred to above. The
    evidence on which reliance has been taken by the respond1~nt is the
    confession and circumstantial evidence, namely, the authority letter
     containing the admitted interpolations by the appellant in his own
    handwriting in different ink, and the addition of the digit "I" before
                                                                                   ''
    500. The evidence of Kansai would have been primary and material,
c   if the fact in issue were whether Kansai authorised the appellant io
    make the alterations in the authority letter. But Kansai' s complaint was
    to the contrary. For the purpose of a departmental enquiry complaint
    certainly not frivolous, but substantiated by circumstantial evidence,
    is enough. What the respondent sought to establish in the domestic
                                                                                        -
    enquiry was that Kansai had made a verbal complaint with regard to
D   the withdrawal of excess money by the appellant in presence of the
    four witnesses, namely, Wadhera, Gupta, Ramzan and Sarkar, afore-
    said, against his advice. On the complaint of Kansai, the evidence
    of these four witnesses is direct as the complaint is said to have been
    made by Kansai in their presence and bearing; it is therefore, not
    hearsay. As the respondent has succeeded in proving that a com-
E   plaint was made by Kansai on the evidence of the above-named four
    witnesses, the respondent has succeeded. No rule of law enjoins that
    complaint has to be in writing as insisted by the Tribunal.

           12. The learned Tribunal has committed yet another grevious
    error, in failing to appreciate the confessions made by the appellant
F   "in the presence of witnesses and to the higher officer who appeared
    as witness" (as found by itself) namely, Wadhera, Ramzan, Gupta
    and Sarkar, aforesaid. The confessions of the appellant before the
    said witnesses were to the effect that he had altered the amount in
    figure and words in his own hand.

G        The award of the Tribunal, therefore, has been vitiated by
    misconception of the law involved in the case.

          13. The last submission of Mr. Garg that the judgment of the
H   High Court had been vitiated as it had not taken into consideration           . -·
    the receipt executed by Kansai showing payment by the appellant of
    Rs. 1000 to the former is destructive of the appellant's defence. In
            1.0. JAIN v. STATE BANK (JJaharul Islam, J.)          237

our opinion, this payment on the contrary, proves the respondent's       A
case and destroys the appellant's defence which was that he had with-
drawn Rs. 1,500 as advised by Kansai and paid the full amount to
Kansai.

       14. In our opinion the High Court was fully in its jurisdiction
in quashing the award of the Tribunal. This appeal has no merit
and is dismissed. We, however, leave the parties to bear their own
costs.



N.V.K.                                               Appeal dismissed.